Názory na historickou identitu Laoziho a na vznik a výklad Dao De Jingu se v průběhu dvacátého století silně rozrůznily. V tomto článku nejprve stručně představuji tradiční a modifikovaně-tradiční náhled na Laoziho a Dao De Jing. Poté se obšírněji věnuji genesi taoismu podle Russella Kirklanda. Tento americký badatel ve své knize Taoism: The Enduring Tradition (2004) syntetickým způsobem předkládá výsledky mnoha specializovaných studií, vedených historicko-kritickou metodou známou např. z biblické hermeneutiky. Kirkland hájí mj. následující čtyři teze: (1) Laozi je (...) fiktivní osoba, (2) Dao De Jing je výsledkem komplexního redakčního procesu, (3) Dao De Jing je hromada přísloví, nikoli dílo jednotné vize, (4) taoismus jakožto identifikovatelné hnutí vznikl až v 5. stol. n.l. Přes výhrady, které vůči Kirklandovým tezím vyjádřuji v tomto svém článku, je třeba jeho knihu považovat za zásadně přínosnou výzvu pro všechny taoistické badatele. (shrink)

V tomto článku se zamýšlím nad možností „správné“ (objektivní, adekvátní) interpretace Dao De Jingu (DDJ). Zamyšlení nad „komunikační situací“ vede k rozlišení několika základních prvků (autor, text, interpret, adresát). K jednotlivým prvkům stručně shrnuji současný stav interpretačního úsilí odborníků na DDJ (opíraje se především o článek A. Chana). Kontroverzní povaha výsledků současného bádání nás nemá vést ke skepticismu „integrativní hermeneutiky“, která na adekvátní interpretaci rezignuje. Je možné se i nadále držet principů „rekonstruktivní hermeneutiky“, která spatřuje adekvátní interpretaci jakožto svůj cíl.

This study attempts to reconstruct Nietzsche’s reading of Aristotle in the 1860s and 1870s—the years before he left his career as a philologist. Against the popular view that Nietzsche read only one book by Aristotle, namely the Rhetoric, the present study hopes to show that he had direct knowledge of several of Aristotle’s main works, while much of his interest in Aristotle centred on the latter’s account of art. The particular aim of this study is to explore how Nietzsche’s reading (...) of Aristotle contributed to the formation of The Birth of Tragedy. It will show that, although Nietzsche mentions Aristotle in his first book only en passant, his theory of tragedy should be understood against the background of Aristotelian poetics, especially as interpreted by such contemporaries as Jacob Bernays, Joseph Hubert Reinkens, and Gustav Teichmüller. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In a Buddhist treatise from around the fourth century CE there is a very remarkable story which serves as a thought experiment calling us to question the nature of self and the identity of persons. Lost in Sanskrit, the passage is fortunately preserved in a Chinese translation, the Dà zhìdù lùn. We here present the first reliable translation directly from the Classical Chinese, and discuss the philosophical significance of the story in its historical and literary context. We emphasise the (...) philosophical importance of embedding the story in two framing narratives, and demonstrate that the story taps a range of intuitions, and indeed fears, about the survival of the self which have also played a large role in the history of the topic in the West, and which continue to be of great contemporary concern. (shrink)

Is shame an accomplice of external oppressive values or an introspective emotion that reveals one’s true moral character? We track these conflicting intuitions about shame and argue that they point to several understudied social features of shame. We then lay out a more nuanced and inclusive view of shame that accounts for meaningful life-long interactions between self and community. This view emphasizes both personal agency in navigating shame-related experiences and the social challenges to such agency, namely the social structures and (...) values that breed shame for some people while exempting others. We argue that individuals demonstrate their agency in managing the emotion of shame not just through their private attitudes, by accepting, negotiating, or rejecting specific values, but also through social action, by identifying with some communities and distancing themselves from others. In pointing out that shame is a double-edged sword—harmful in ways not discussed before, yet also morally potent by propelling individual agency—we hope to add much-needed complexity to the discussion of shame. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Some epistemologists hold that all rational norms are fundamentally concerned with the agent’s states or attitudes at an individual time [Hedden 2015, 2016; Moss 2015]; others argue that all rational norms are fundamentally concerned with processes [Podgorski 2017]. This distinction is not drawn in discussions of emotional rationality. As a result, a widely held assumption in the literature on emotional rationality has gone unexamined. I employ Abelard Podgorski’s argument from rational delay to argue that many emotional norms are fundamentally (...) concerned with emotional processes. I also claim that the main response available to the synchronist about belief is not available to the synchronist about emotions and, therefore, fundamental process norms are more plausible than epistemologists tend to believe. (shrink)

Shame is frequently viewed as a destructive emotion; but it can also be understood in terms of change and growth. This essay highlights the problematic values that cause pervasive and frequent shame and the importance of resisting and changing these values. Using Confucian insights, I situate shame in an interactive process between the individual's values and that of their society, thus, being vulnerable to shame represents both one's connection to a community and an openness to others’ negative feedback. This process (...) provides an important arena where personal values interact with communal ones. The Confucian tradition, I argue, affords individuals a degree of autonomy in internalization through urging them to cultivate and maintain a keen sense of shame. My discussion also offers resources for understanding the various aspects of this interactive process—how individuals with similar experiences of shame may, through channeling their experiences, influence social values and propel moral progress. (shrink)

This chapter advocates for a naturalistic ethical framework that bases normative components in basic human functions, such as emotions, as an effective approach to address intergenerational ethics questions. Using Mencius’s ethical framework as an example, which establishes emotional pivot points to incorporate others’ concerns and worries into moral deliberation, the chapter argues that this approach provides significant theoretical advantages over frameworks that rely on a familial-role-based relational understanding of Confucian ethics and moral cultivation through rituals. The chapter also highlights the (...) flexibility and adaptability of Mencian ethics, which was redeveloped over a thousand years later during the Neo-Confucian flowering and serves as evidence of its philosophical framework’s ability to connect people emotionally and ethically across time. (shrink)

The issue of the use of the Nachlass material has been much debated in Nietzsche scholarship in recent decades. Some insist on the absolute interpretative priority of his published writings over those unpublished and suggest that an extensive engagement with the Nachlass is harmful because it is something Nietzsche rejected. To verify this claim, they appeal to the story of Nietzsche asking his landlord in Sils-Maria to burn some of his notes. Since the notes that were ultimately retrieved are purportedly (...) incorporated into the compilation The Will to Power, the story also leads some to conclude that Nietzsche rejected his project on the will to power. However, the reliability of this story has been questioned. In this manuscript I first present the decisive piece of evidence that will settle the controversy over the story’s authenticity. After showing that it is true that in 1888 Nietzsche wanted some of his notes burned, I address the question of what we can conclude from this story. I argue that it neither suggests the abandonment of the will to power project, nor warrants a devaluation of the Nachlass. Finally, I will discuss the methodological problem of the use of Nietzsche’s Nachlass in general. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Nietzsche-Studien Jahrgang: 44 Heft: 1 Seiten: 516-531.

Name der Zeitschrift: Nietzsche-Studien Jahrgang: 44 Heft: 1 Seiten: 498-499.

Name der Zeitschrift: Nietzsche-Studien Jahrgang: 44 Heft: 1 Seiten: 490-493.

Name der Zeitschrift: Nietzsche-Studien Jahrgang: 44 Heft: 1 Seiten: 494-497.

Name der Zeitschrift: Nietzsche-Studien Jahrgang: 46 Heft: 1 Seiten: 242-242.

Name der Zeitschrift: Nietzsche-Studien Jahrgang: 47 Heft: 1 Seiten: 364-366.

Name der Zeitschrift: Nietzsche-Studien Jahrgang: 46 Heft: 1 Seiten: 235-235.

Abstract: Background: Coronary artery disease remains the leading cause of morbidity and mortality Worldwide. Previous reviews pointed that nursing interventions are beneficial for coronary artery patients. However, most interventions focused on education and counselling, but not consistent with the outcome set; still did not consider patient’s coronary artery disease risky characteristics. Related studies in China also difficult to find. Therefore this study was conducted to investigate kinds of nursing interventions delivered to coronary artery patients and match them with patient’s risk (...) factors of coronary artery disease. Results of this study were expected to add new knowledge that will alert nurses to consider coronary artery risk factors which in turn might enable the development of appropriate approaches to improve patient’s wellbeing hence reduce frequent coronary artery morbidity and mortality. Methods: A descriptive, cross-sectional, retrospective design using clinical case notes was employed. Study was undertaken in coronary care wards at the teaching hospital in China from November 2017 to September 2018. Structured-literature supported self-designed questionnaire was utilized for data collection. Chi square (χ2) test and multivariate logistic regression for adjusted odds ratio with 95% confidence interval were used to compare the relationship among independent (patient’s risk coronary artery disease factors) and dependent (nursing interventions) categorical variables. Ethical permission was granted accordingly. Results: A total of 300 coronary artery patients’ case notes were audited with mean age 63±11.2 years. Of these 175 (58.3%) were males. 126(42%) were smoking and 224(74.7%) were hypertensive. More evidence based nursing interventions than education and counselling were found to be delivered to these patients. “Administer coronary artery disease medication and their instructions” was mostly delivered to many patients 291(97%) while “counsel to cope with stress” was the least one 60 (20.0%). Three of eight nursing interventions delivered significantly matched with three or all of these patient’s coronary artery risk variables (age, smoking, hypertension and diabetes) (p < 0.05 and/or < 0.01) with Adjusted odds ratio (95% CI) within their significant ranges. Conclusion: This study delivers valuable insight that, nurses in the studied teaching hospital delivered beneficial evidence based nursing interventions to patients with coronary artery disease which significantly matched with their risk factors of coronary artery illness. However, care for stress was low hence needs improvement. Furthermore, research is needed to get consistency of nursing interventions with patient’s end point clinical outcomes for further appraisal of nursing efforts in caring CAD patients . (shrink)

In 2010, Christian Wollek published his doctoral thesis Die lateinischen Texte des Schülers Nietzsche. Übersetzung und Kommentar —a German translation of Nietzsche’s Latin writings with an introduction and commentary. This book represents the breadth of Nietzsche’s Latin writings and his vast learning while he was a student at the Naumburg Domgymnasium and Schulpforta. As Wollek tells us in the introduction, LT aims both to highlight the relevance of Nietzsche’s early writings, which he argues have been too often ignored, even in (...) recent scholarship, and to... (shrink)

The paper argues against a widely held synchronic view of emotional rationality. I begin by considering recent philosophical literature on various backward‐looking emotions, such as regret, grief, resentment, and anger. I articulate the general problem these accounts grapple with: a certain diminution in backward‐looking emotions seems fitting while the reasons for these emotions seem to persist. The problem, I argue, rests on the assumption that if the facts that give reason for an emotion remain unchanged, the emotion remains fitting. However, (...) I argue there are rationally self‐consuming attitudes: affective attitudes that become less fitting the longer they endure while the facts that give reason for them persist. A widely held synchronic view of fitting affective attitudes denies that fittingness at a time depends on the agent's attitudes at different times and therefore denies that the fittingness of an affective attitude can depend on its duration. Once we reject the synchronic view, we may see that affective attitudes are often fitting due to the fitting processes of which they are part. These fitting processes explain the fitting diminution of backward‐looking emotions as well as other diachronic aspects of the fittingness of emotions. -/- . (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Nietzsche-Studien Jahrgang: 43 Heft: 1 Seiten: 241-249.

First and primarily, I criticize Jay Wallace's account of the affirmation dynamic, which entails a willingness to bring about past occurrences that were necessary for one's present attachments. Specifically, I criticize his analysis of regret and affirmation as intention-like attitudes about the past. Second, I trace Wallace's notion of regret to a common but misguided model of retrospection as a choice between courses of history. Finally, I offer reason to think that the rationality of retrospection crucially differs from the rationality (...) of choice. (shrink)

Our beliefs, intentions, desires, regrets, and fears are evaluable for fit—they can succeed or fail to be fitting responses to the objects they are about. Can our headaches and heartrates be evaluable for fit? The common view says ‘no’. This chapter argues: sometimes, yes. First, it claims that when a racing heart accompanies fear it seems to have the typical characteristics of fit-evaluable items. Then, it suggests that suspicion of this initial impression is explained by the assumption that whether an (...) item is ever fit-evaluable is determined by the type of item it is. Fear is the type of thing that can be fit-evaluable, a racing heart is not. The chapter then proposes an alternative whereby the same type of item can be fit-evaluable on one occasion but not on another. What explains the difference, it is argued, is that only in the former occasion the item is explained by the agent’s narrative as an element of a fit-evaluable response. (shrink)

In the remainder of this article, we will disarm an important motivation for epistemic contextualism and interest-relative invariantism. We will accomplish this by presenting a stringent test of whether there is a stakes effect on ordinary knowledge ascription. Having shown that, even on a stringent way of testing, stakes fail to impact ordinary knowledge ascription, we will conclude that we should take another look at classical invariantism. Here is how we will proceed. Section 1 lays out some limitations of previous (...) research on stakes. Section 2 presents our study and concludes that there is little evidence for a substantial stakes effect. Section 3 responds to objections. The conclusion clears the way for classical invariantism. (shrink)

I propose that shock can be morally significant independently of its consequences but only as part of an ongoing commitment to certain norms, in particular norms that constitute recognizing another as a person. When we witness others in agony, or being severely wronged, or when we ourselves severely wrong or mistreat others, our shock can reflect our recognition of them as persons, a recognition constituted by our commitment to certain moral norms. However, if we do not in fact respond to (...) the suffering or wrong in accordance with these norms—if, for example, we do not act to relieve their suffering or to properly address the wrong done, and do not avoid or prevent its recurrence—then our commitment to the relevant norms is undermined. When we consistently violate the norms whose violation initially shocked us, our lingering shock upon repeated violations gradually loses its significance and becomes a mere impulse—a fossil of a past commitment, so to speak—before it disappears completely. The failure to be shocked in such instances marks the failure of our moral commitments, which is the failure to recognize others as persons. (shrink)

A joke is amusing if and only if it’s fitting to be amused by it; an act is regrettable if and only if it’s fitting to regret it. Many philosophers accept these biconditionals and hold that analogous ones obtain between a wide range of additional evaluative properties and the fittingness of corresponding responses. Call these the _fit–value biconditionals_. The biconditionals give us a systematic way of recognizing the role of fit in our ethical practices; they also serve as the bedrock (...) of various metaethical projects, such as fitting-attitude analysis of value and the ‘fittingness first’ approach. Yet despite the importance of the biconditionals, there is very little discussion of their proper interpretation. This paper argues that any plausible interpretation of the fit_–_value biconditionals must disarm several kinds of apparent counterexample. For instance, that an achievement is pride-worthy doesn’t imply it is fitting for me to take pride in it because the achievement might not be mine or that of anyone close to me; that a joke is amusing doesn’t imply it is fitting for me to be amused by it for six straight months; and that a person is loveable doesn’t imply it is fitting for me to love him romantically because that person might be my sibling. We consider possible responses to such counterexamples and develop what we consider the most promising interpretation of the biconditionals. The upshot is that certain widespread assumptions about fit and its relation to value and reasons should be reconsidered. (shrink)

Surprises are important in our everyday lives as well as in our scientific and philosophical theorizing—in psychology, information theory, cognitive-neuroscience, philosophy of science, and confirmation theory. Nevertheless, there is no satisfactory theory of what makes something surprising. It has long been acknowledged that not everything unexpected is surprising. The reader had no reason to expect that there will be exactly 190 words in this abstract and yet there is nothing surprising about this fact. We offer a novel theory that explains (...) when and why an unexpected fact is surprising. We distinguish between descriptive and normative notions of what is surprising; clarify the sense in which surprising facts are unexpected; and, finally, develop and defend the significance account of surprise, according to which a fact is surprising to an agent if and to the extent that it is both unexpected and significant to the agent. Since a surprising fact can be significant to an agent in various ways—personal, moral, epistemic, and aesthetic—surprise is not merely or primarily epistemic. Fitting surprise reflects more than a person’s view of what is; it reflects a person’s view of what is significant. (shrink)

Does the Ship of Theseus present a genuine puzzle about persistence due to conflicting intuitions based on “continuity of form” and “continuity of matter” pulling in opposite directions? Philosophers are divided. Some claim that it presents a genuine puzzle but disagree over whether there is a solution. Others claim that there is no puzzle at all since the case has an obvious solution. To assess these proposals, we conducted a cross-cultural study involving nearly 3,000 people across twenty-two countries, speaking eighteen (...) different languages. Our results speak against the proposal that there is no puzzle at all and against the proposal that there is a puzzle but one that has no solution. Our results suggest that there are two criteria—“continuity of form” and “continuity of matter”— that constitute our concept of persistence and these two criteria receive different weightings in settling matters concerning persistence. (shrink)

[Purposes] This paper aims to summarize the research outcome on publishing ethics of scientific journals abroad, which is expected to serve as a reference for the research on related topics in China. [Methods] Literature review method and content coding method were adopted to systematically sum up related research abroad. Then, the status quo and development trend were analyzed. [Findings] There are five main research topics: anomy of publishing ethics, elements of publishing ethics norms, status quo of publishing ethics implementation, knowledge (...) of authors and editors on publishing ethics and their attitudes, and management of publishing ethics. [Conclusions] Foreign research on publishing ethics of scientific journals has achieved fruitful results with obvious characteristics, but there is a lack of research scope definition and systematic analysis of ethical norms. Chinese scientific journals should take international research outcome as a reference and strengthen the research on ethical norms to enhance the development of publishing ethics. (shrink)

This collection brings together fourteen contributions by authors from around the globe. Each of the contributions engages with questions about how local and global bioethical issues are made to be comparable, in the hope of redressing basic needs and demands for justice. These works demonstrate the significant conceptual contributions that can be made through feminists' attention to debates in a range of interrelated fields, especially as they formulate appropriate responses to developments in medical technology, global economics, population shifts, and poverty.

This paper analyzes and evaluates Benatar's influential thesis on pessimism, which claims that life has no meaning and is one of the premises for anti-natalism. Benatar's main point is that the human condition is, in fact, a tragic predicament. Benatar argues that although limited meaning is attainable, life has no meaning from a cosmic perspective, and our lives do not possess the cosmic significance we seek. He argues that since humans have no purpose for being created and there is no (...) cosmic purpose in the lives of individual humans, human life has no meaning sub specie aeternitatis. Nihilism about cosmic meaning is the bad news. Furthermore, human life is bad because the quality of life is poor, and death is also bad because it annihilates the individual. He argues that most people's subjective assessments of their quality of life are unreliable due to psychological phenomena such as optimism bias, adaptation, and comparison with others. According to him, human life is actually full of bad things, and regardless of which theory of well-being one chooses, even the best quality of life is very poor due to empirical asymmetry. I object to Benetar's argument that life has no meaning from a cosmic perspective. Because, even when interpreted charitably, his argument is invalid, inconsistent, unclear, has odd implications, and is counterintuitive. I argue that evaluating life from a cosmic perspective is irrational. I also contend that there is no evidence that humans desire cosmic meaning, and that the meaning of life does not depend on meaning sub specie aeternitatis. Furthermore, I argue that the three psychological phenomena Benatar mentions do not threaten the reliability of quality of life assessments, and there is no empirical evidence to support his claims. Instead, I provide evidence that subjective assessments of quality of life can be trusted. Additionally, I argue that the claim that life is full of bad things is exaggerated and based on inappropriate evaluation standards. And I argue that empirical asymmetries cannot support the conclusion that human life is actually bad. My conclusion is that Benatar's attempt to explain cosmic insignificance and his claim that life is actually bad both fail. In other words, humans are not in a tragic predicament as Benatar suggests. (shrink)

We lose something central to our humanity when we divide our world into neat little packages of sacred and secular.

In this paper we elaborate on the neo-Confucian interpretation of the Yi-Jing system. Based on a further exploration of the Diagram of the Supreme Polarity of Zhou Dunyi, we develop a cosmological-anthropological model in constructive engagement with Western thoughts and views on systems and on the universe. The vital energy and the pattern play central roles in this model and also in the interpretation of the images and forces of the trigrams. This leads to a comparative model, based on (...) a quadrant system with four perspectives: naturality, rationality, humanity and morality. This model fits in the quadrant system of Wilber, and also corresponds to the cosmic ring of duograms. The natural YI Ba-Gua, a cycle of trigrams where Heaven and Earth are seen as elements of the production cycle, supplies an alternative interpretation of the King Wen Ba-Gua. When extending the quadrant system to octants we observe a cycle of trigrams, the cosmic YI Ba-Gua, as a spiralling sequence, following the order of the Five elements. Heaven and Earth are seen, as in the elaborated Diagram of the Supreme Polarity, as instigator and receiver respectively of the production cycle. It forms the framework for an alternative interpretation of the Fu Xi Ba-Gua. In addition to the images, we can display the forces of the trigrams in the octant system of the cosmic YI Ba-Gua as concentric circles. In the YI Ba-Gua we combine both the cosmic and the natural YI Ba-Gua, and compare this with the Ba-Gua of King Wen and of Fu Xi. Finally we present some hypotheses for further analysis of the matrix of hexagrams based on the cosmic YI Ba-Gua. The comparison of the different philosophical views in one framework may lead to further engagement of these ways of seeing. We already conclude that there is so much structure in the Yi-Jing that it is possible to use the wisdom of the Yi-Jing without applying a divination system. (shrink)

A ideia de que a ciência — ou ao menos as atividades científicas que são consideradas as mais essenciais para a ciência — deve ser livre de valores é bastante difundida. Neste capítulo, vou discutir essa tese, normalmente entendida como um ideal de ciência. Na primeira seção, introduzo alguns conceitos e distinções que são importantes para entender essa tese, como a diferença entre valores cognitivos e não-cognitivos. Na segunda seção, discuto o papel dos valores na seleção de problemas e na (...) metodologia científica. Na terceira seção, apresento dois argumentos canônicos contra o ideal da ciência como livre de valores: o argumento da lacuna explicativa, de Helen Longino (1990), e o argumento do risco indutivo, de Heather Douglas (2009). Na quarta seção, discuto algumas respostas a esses argumentos. Por fim, na última seção, a partir da abordagem ecológica, exploro e sustendo a ideia de que a reconcepção da ciência como uma atividade social situada e adaptativa supera a dicotomia entre fato e valor que subjaz a discussão. Essa nova concepção de ciência nos permite acomodar melhor os resultados dos argumentos apresentados na terceira seção. (shrink)

"Berkeley na história do ceticismo" é uma tradução para o português do artigo “Berkeley in the History of Scepticism”, publicado originalmente em inglês em: R. H. Popkin, E. de Olaso, e G. Tonelli (Orgs.) Scepticism in the Enlightenment, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997, pp. 173-186.

W tekście omawiam tę część internetowej dyskusji, przeprowadzonej w listopadzie 2012 r. na stronie Polskiego Towarzystwa Bioetycznego, która dotyczyła niepewności na temat moralnego statusu embrionów ludzkich. W trakcie dyskusji PTB na temat Stanowiska Komitetu Bioetyki przy Prezydium PAN w sprawie preimplantacyjnej diagnostyki genetycznej (PDG) pojawił się następujący argument: skoro spór o moralny status embrionu jest nierozstrzygalny, to powinniśmy opowiedzieć się przeciwko moralnej dopuszczalności wykonywania PDG na embrionach, a także przeciwko prawnej dopuszczalności tego rodzaju diagnostyki. W tekście omawiam tezy Stanowiska i (...) zdań odrębnych, które wywołały tę część dyskusji, a potem koncentruję się na następujących problemach: (I) dopuszczalność stosowania narzędzi teorii decyzji w debatach etycznych; (II) procedura podejmowania decyzji przez ciała doradcze w sytuacji niepewności moralnej; (III) znaczenie osiągnięć nauk biologicznych przy ustaleniu statusu moralnego embrionu; (IV) możliwość kompromisu w sytuacji pluralizmu wartości; (V) znaczenie statusu moralnego embrionów dla oceny moralnej i prawnej dopuszczalności PDG. (shrink)

Tato recenzní studie sleduje analogii, na níž založil svoji metodu bádání i psaní Douglas R. Hofstadter v knize Gödel, Escher, Bach. Proti Hofstadterovu pojetí analogie, kromě jiného ilustrované zavádějícími příklady skladeb J. S. Bacha, je analogie v této studii precizována. Zároveň jsou ve studii napraveny nedostatky hudebních příkladů, jež by patrně neodhalili čtenáři bez přímé vazby na hudební teorii. Tyto aspekty sleduje tato studie až k závěru, že recenzovaná vlivná kniha, neprávem aspirující na metodologii veškerenstva, patří mezi poulárně naučnou literaturu.

De todos os aspectos do comportamento não-verbal, a face é sem dúvida uma das mais ricas e importantes fontes de informação sobre o estado inter- no do outro. Mas expressões faciais são raramente percebidas de forma isolada. Ao contrário, são tipicamente inseridas em contextos sociais ricos e dinâmicos, que incluem gestos e posturas corporais, conhecimento situacional, etc. Com base nessas observações, podemos nos perguntar se o contexto no qual uma expressão é percebida pode influenciar a percepção de emoções nesta expressão. (...) No caso de uma resposta afirmativa, de que modo se daria essa influência contextual, e quais seriam os seus limites? O propósito desse artigo é explorar algumas possibilidades sobre o papel do contexto na percepção de emoções, desde a teoria das emoções básicas, que defende que categorias discretas de emoções podem ser lidas diretamente da face de forma invariável, a abordagens mais contemporâneas, que atribuem um papel constitutivo para o contexto na percepção de emoções. Embora o debate esteja longe de ser resolvido, as conclusões deste artigo apontam para um novo modo de se pensar sobre fenômenos emocionais, onde a díade de interação torna-se a unidade básica de análise, e onde emoções são concebidas como propriedades emergentes de relações em contextos particulares de interação social. (shrink)

O presente artigo examina a natureza da investigação antropológica que Kant executou nos seus cursos sobre geografia física. Se, por um lado, a sua relação com a física empírica é assegurada, por outro, a incorporação de ambos os objetos do sentido interno, alma e ser humano, na abordagem cosmológica da investigação empírica da natureza humana gera questionamentos sobre a articulação disciplinar e metodológica pressupostas no Conhecimento do Mundo. Será mostrado que a investigação antropológica de Kant desde o início procurou assegurar (...) uma combinação sistemática entre diferentes procedimentos científicos que visam o conhecimento da natureza humana e que este é justamente o caso do emprego geográfico do conceito ontológico de alma no esclarecimento da diversidade de temperamentos e de gostos da espécie humana. (shrink)

A quarter-life crisis (QLC) is a phenomenon that has gained widespread attention in the media and popular literature as a result of the difficulties associated with early adulthood. This study, "Tumatanda na Ako: The Quarter-life Crisis Phenomenon Among Emerging Adults," explored the emerging adults’ experiences of quarter-life crisis and the meaning they make out of their experiences of this phenomenon. The study utilized the interpretative phenomenological analysis of the qualitative data gathered from twenty (20) respondents from a higher educational institution (...) in Bocaue, Bulacan. The findings have been the bases for the development of the developmental program entitled, “KnowNow, Know-How: Unveiling the Quarter-life Crisis Phenomenon and Finding Ways to Conquer!” and for the development of a proposed psychological assessment tool namely “Help! I Am Lost,” A Quarter-life Crisis Scale. (shrink)

Gdzieś w ciemnej uliczce... Bandyta: Ej ty, dawaj portfel! Pascal: A niby dlaczego miałbym to zrobić? Bandyta: Bo w przeciwnym razie cię zastrzelę. Pascal: Ale przecież nie masz broni. Bandyta: A niech to! Wiedziałem, że zapomniałem o czymś. Pascal: No to zapomnij też o moim portfelu. Miłego wieczoru. Bandyta: Stój! Pascal: Co znowu? Bandyta: Jest interes do zrobienia... Co ty na to, żebyś jednak oddał mi portfel? W zamian obiecuję przyjść do ciebie jutro i dać ci dwukrotność kwoty, którą w (...) nim masz. Nieźle, co? 200 procent zwrotu z inwestycji w 24 godziny. (shrink)

Este texto pretende discutir, do ponto de vista kantiano, o que pode ser ensinado e o que pode ser aprendido em Filosofia. Seu objetivo é construir os argumentos hipotéticos de Kant em face do método estruturalista de leitura de textos filosóficos. Para circunscrever este tema, aparentemente muito amplo, tomaremos como fio condutor um célebre texto de aula de I. Kant, publicado por G. B. Jäsche sob o título Manual dos Cursos de Lógica Geral. Kant ministrou este curso por mais de (...) quarenta anos, até o término de suas atividades docentes em 1797, e nele apresenta considerações bastante fecundas e atuais sobre o ensino da História da Filosofia e sobre a formação do filósofo. A partir da distinção entre conhecimento histórico e conhecimento racional, e da distinção entre o conceito de filosofia na escola e o conceito de filosofia no mundo (AK 9:24), procuraremos apresentar as contribuições kantianas que podem ainda ser consideradas pertinentes para se discutir o modo de ensinar Filosofia e a formação do filósofo. (shrink)

Assume que o estudo da produção científica pode oferecer entendimento sobre os temas abordados, tendências da comunidade, autores mais citados, indicação de maturação da área e consolidação ou silenciamento da área. Tem como objetivo mapear como a Filosofia está contida na Ciência da Informação brasileira. Coleta os dados dos artigos científicos publicados entre 1972 e 2018 na Coleção de Publicações Brasileiras em Ciência da Informação - BRAPCI. Analisa uma amostra de 300 artigos e deriva algumas questões descritivas. Conclui que a (...) Ciência da Informação brasileira mantém um discurso filosófico ocidental canônico com uso equilibrado de autores e principais correntes filosóficas. Não aponta ao uso de pensadores e temas periféricos. Propõe a continuidade desse tipo de pesquisa para incentivar debates sobre uma relação interdisciplinar saudável entre Ciência da Informação e Filosofia. (shrink)