In the article the author describes theoretical reasons that stood behind Kołakowski's transition from being an orthodox Marxist to become an actual leader of the polish revisionist movement. His intention is to concentrate on those aspects of Kołakowski's thought that have not changed, apart from any biographical and psychological reasons. (1) First of those features is Kołakowski's inability of completability, the anti-code disposition. (2) The second trait is the moral attitude, an intention to influence on people's morality by convincing them (...) that social and internal (necessarily bound with social) changes are desirable; that an existential calm demolishes morality. (3) Third feature concerns the fact that Kołakowski did not attempt to create his own philosophy, he was rather a historian of ideas, a skeptic, and a critic. (shrink)

Who and how revised Marxism in Poland? The simple answer is that it was done by young intellectuals seeing themselves as obligated to social and political activity, eager to participate in the process of the constitution of a new postwar Communist society. Marxism was for them a philosophical world-view and a political program rising hopes for a better socio-economic reality. Revisionists were committed Communists and their attitude toward Marxism was almost religious. Marxism, Promethean and scientific at the same time, was (...) supposed to replace religion, for which the radically secular revisionists saw no place in the new society. (See: Mikołajczyk 2013, p. 44-48) After the shock of 1956 they stuck by the slogan: ’socialism–yes, distortions–no,’ they thought that “Marxist socialism was possible without Leninist political forms, that Communism might be attacked within «the framework of Marxism»,” and they “believed for some time ... that Stalinism was curable in the sense that Communism could be restored or «democratized» without questioning its foundations” (Kolakowski 1978, p. 461). They saw themselves in an elitist way, i.e., as true and devoted Marxists fighting with dogmas, orthodoxy, myths, and unfounded faith both within Marxism-Leninism and outside it. They were willing to accept the position of sectarians, heretics, or apostates. Their political and ideological involvement forced them to attack pre-war but still active Polish philosophers of the Lvov-Warsaw School and other nonMarxist thinkers (Roman Ingarden, Władysław Tatarkiewicz, Stanisław Ossowski), who were classified as “bourgeois thinkers” unable to understand and assimilate Marxism. (shrink)

The ‘Warsaw School of History of Ideas’ is the name given to a ‘revisionist think tank’ which was led by the historian Bronisław Baczko from 1956 to 1968 in Communist Poland. This group reunited scholars like Leszek Kołakowski or Krzysztof Pomian around questions related to political believes, theological conceptions or utopian thought. Expelled from the University, B. Baczko left Poland and seek shelter in Geneva where he became a Professor of history of Ideas and historiography. In his new home, he (...) developed an original vision on Enlightenment and the French Revolution. (shrink)

The article analyzes the main aspects of the interpretation of philosophical thinking by the Polish philosopher Leszek Kolakowskі (1927–2009). He is more known as a brilliant disputant on the history of Marxism and the prospects for the further development of Marxist theory, but his thoughts on the nature and functions of philosophical thinking in the broadest sense are of no less importance, since they address the painful issue of the autonomy of thinking. The purpose of the article is to reconstruct (...) the principles that, according to the philosopher, would allow thinking to maintain its autonomy under the pressure of ideas and ideologies. Utopia and nihilism in the interpretation of L. Kolakowskі appear as temptations of the modern world. It is in the quest for defending from these “monsters” (L. Kolakowskі) that the philosopher comes to the conclusion that the basis of utopia and nihilism are certain ideas about the truth. Through the prism of this theoretical discovery, he reveals the importance of consensus, tolerance, compromise, and non-consistency (inconsistency) as epistemological tools of support or undermining of ideologies. The basic epistemological model the philosopher used has been reproduced by means of theoretical reconstruction. This is the attitude of the subject to the truth, which is realized in two ways: to either master the truth on the basis of certain beliefs or neglect the truth on the basis of other beliefs. With the help of this model, the philosopher comes to understanding that dogmatism and unification are not only utopian diseases but also nihilists. The reason for this is loyalty to one’s own truth, that is, thinking without gaps based on unchanging principles and aimed at reproducing certain institutional and social constants. Instead, inconsistency as a principle forms a completely different setting, the advantage of which is that it extends to itself and frees a thinker from the need to be or not to be consistent, but does not relieve the search of truth and meaning, without which human existence is impossible, according to L. Kolakowskі. The reconstruction was carried out on the basis of analysis of articles and essays of various years, combined with the development of concepts of utopia and nihilism as alternative projects of human existence, rooted in the epistemological directions of the subject. (shrink)

My paper refers to Leszek Kołakowski’s Main Currents of Marxism: Its Origin, Growth, and Dissolution (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1987). Kołakowski’s intention was to write a textbook on the history of Marxism based on his lectures but his book is much more than that. It is a philosophical treatise in which Marx’s doctrine of mankind and the program of its liberation are critically analysed and reinterpreted. The core of Marx’s philosophy is the idea of man and the belief that the real (...) existence of humans is not identical with their essence. Kołakowski shows that this belief is rooted in mythological thinking, the Platonic tradition, and in the Christian thought. A moral that follows from Kołakowski’s critical analysis of Marx’s doctrine is that man has never lived in a paradise and yet he perceives himself as banished thereof; that he will never enter a paradise and yet he cannot live without the faith that this is somehow possible. Therefore, what he should do is to have a minimum of common sense and skepticism related to it, for they would protect him against the traps laid by false prophets repeatedly asserting that they know the means to construct the paradise today or at least tomorrow. (shrink)

Zygmunt Bauman was one of the leading revisionists in Poland before March 1968. Together with six other academics he was expelled from the University of Warsaw on the basis of the decision of the Minister of Higher Education taken on the 25st March 1968. It should be stressed, however, that at the beginning of his academic career Bauman had been a staunch believer of the Polish United Workers’ Party and an adherent of the Marxist-Leninist ideology. In his first revisionist paper, (...) published soon after the Polish October, he criticized the previous policy of the Party and expressed his hope that significant changes will take place in Poland. As a result of Party withdrawal from the reforms, his attitude towards both the communist rule and Marxism-Leninism had been changing. This paper analyses the evolution of his thought towards revisions. It presents the characteristic features of Bauman’s revisionism as well: an emphasis on human praxis, alternative thinking, and heterogeneity of culture. (shrink)

Adam Schaff was one of the most important Marxist philosophers in Poland. His work well documents the time, when Marxism was an 'official philosophy', burdened with political responsibilities and problems of strategy. The text is a critical analysis of Schaff's political writings. It highlights the most specific traits of his often paradoxical position, that was termed in literature as 'orthodox-revisionism'. Schaff tried to meet double and often conflicting requirements: tried to develop Marxist theory by posing problems unforeseen by the classics, (...) and to stay faithful to what he understood as strategic interests of socialist countries at the same time. It will be argued, that even in its theoretical shortcomings, his writings are still among the most important resources for reflection on complex and tragic history of the Left in 20th Century. (shrink)

Antonio Labriola in the crisis of Marxism. The article deals with the relationship between Marxism and science in Antonio Labriola’s philosophy in the years1898-­1899. In the first part, the Author looks at the content of the Postscript to Discorrendo di socialismo e di filosofia and critically analyzes Labriola’s objections to some of the central theses defended by Benedetto Croce on the theory of value and the economics of Karl Marx. In the second part, two important writings by Labriola linked to (...) the incipient debate on revisionism are examined: Polemiche sul socialismo and Sulla crisi del marxismo. In conclusion, the Author identifies in a specific conception of theory defended by Labriola the common trait between these two apparently distinct areas of inquiry. (shrink)

In Marxist circles it is common to refer to Karl Marx’s The Civil War in France for a theoretical analysis of the historical significance of the Paris Commune, and to Prosper-Olivier Lissagaray’s History of the Commune of 1871 for a description of the facts surrounding the insurrection of the Paris workers and its repression by the National Assembly led by Adolphe Thiers. What is less well-known is that Marx himself oversaw the German translation of Lissagaray’s book and made numerous additions (...) to it. In this article we describe Marx’s addenda to Lissagaray’s work, showing how they contribute to concretising his analysis of the Paris Commune and how they relate to the split in the International Working Men’s Association between Marxists and anarchists that took place after the Commune’s defeat. We also show how Marx’s additions to the German version of Lissagaray’s book were linked to his involvement with the recently created Socialist Workers’ Party of Germany and to his criticism of the programme it had adopted at the congress celebrated in the city of Gotha. (shrink)

G. A. Cohen defends and Jon Elster criticizes Marxist use of functional explanation. But Elster's mechanical conception of explanation is, contrary to Elster's claims, a better basis for vindication of functional explanation than Cohen's nomological conception, which cannot provide an adequate account of functional explanation. Elster also objects that functional explanation commits us to metaphysically bizarre collective subjects, but his argument requires an implausible reading of methodological individualism which involves an unattractive eliminativism about social phenomena.

This article explains and defends a novel idea about how people can be misled by a discussion topic, even if the discussion itself does not explicitly involve the making of false claims. The crucial aspect of this idea is that people are liable to infer, from the fact that a particular topic is being discussed, that this topic is important. As a result, they may then be led to accept certain beliefs about the state of the world they consider necessary (...) for the topic’s importance. What the article calls “importance misrepresentation” occurs when these beliefs about the state of the world are false or otherwise mistaken. The article explores different ways in which importance misrepresentation can occur, and it uses this idea to help clarify and strengthen some well‐known criticisms of the topic choices of academic philosophers. (shrink)

This is a semifinal draft of a forthcoming paper. Kant’s account of the pain of remorse involves a hybrid justification based on self-retribution, but constrained by forward-looking principles which say that we must channel remorse into improvement, and moderate its pain to avoid damaging our rational agency. Kant’s corpus also offers material for a revisionist but textually-grounded alternative account based on wrongdoers’ sympathy for the pain they cause. This account is based on the value of care, and has forward-looking constraints (...) much like Kant’s own account. Drawing on both Kant’s texts and recent work in empirical psychology, I argue that experiences of remorse which conform to the sympathetic account may fulfill Kant’s forward-looking goals better than those conforming to his own account. (shrink)

This article delves into the concept of bringing justice to the world and creating a society of equals. It questions why achieving such a society seems difficult and explores the political means to attain it. The essay also examines the relationship between emancipation and politics. It references Terry Eagleton's book, "Why Marx Was Right," which addresses similar questions. The central argument of the essay is that contrary to anti-utopianism, only utopia can fulfill the aspiration for a better future. The essay (...) aims to revive the idea of utopia, rescuing it from its perceived tragic fate. It draws inspiration from thinkers such as Kolakowski, White, Bloch, and Jameson, who, although influenced by Marxism, provide a sense of hope and the belief that one-day humanity will no longer desire further change. (shrink)

Duncan Pritchard (2008, 2009, 2010, forthcoming) has argued for an elegant solution to what have been called the value problems for knowledge at the forefront of recent literature on epistemic value. As Pritchard sees it, these problems dissolve once it is recognized that that it is understanding-why, not knowledge, that bears the distinctive epistemic value often (mistakenly) attributed to knowledge. A key element of Pritchard’s revisionist argument is the claim that understanding-why always involves what he calls strong cognitive achievement—viz., cognitive (...) achievement that consists always in either (i) the overcoming of a significant obstacle or (ii) the exercise of a significant level of cognitive ability. After outlining Pritchard’s argument, we show (contra Pritchard) that understanding-why does not essentially involve strong cognitive achievement. Interestingly, in the cases in which understanding-why is distinctively valuable, it is (we argue) only because there is sufficiently rich objectual understanding in the background. If that’s right, then a plausible revisionist solution to the value problems must be sensitive to different kinds of understanding and what makes them valuable, respectively. (shrink)

The text addresses the question of whether and to what extent a theorization of experience provides a basis for socio-critical theories. Following the ideology-critical diagnosis of an immediate involvement of lived experience in ideological constitutive structures, the argument is made that a critical and ›left‹ phenomenology in particular can address the manner in which experience as a ›mediated immediacy‹ manifests as a medial condition for ideological processes.

In what follows, I will provide some elements for constructing Mariátegui’s plural spatiotemporal conception of history. I will do so by focusing on the two books he published in his lifetime: The contemporary scene and Seven Interpretive Essays on Peruvian Reality. In a footnote in the Seven Essays, the reader encounters a concept that opens up the problem of plural temporality in Latin American Marxism: relativismo histórico (historical relativism). This will be the keystone concept upon which certain fragments of Mariátegui’s (...) writings will be put together to construct the concept of plural temporality. This involves taking a detour through what Mariátegui understood by relativismo (relativism). In that detour, we find that Mariátegui’s use of relativismo consists in translating and assimilating the insights of one of the pillars of contemporary physics: Einstein’s theory of relativity. For Mariátegui, the relativistic theory of spacetime undermined the old “absolutes” of the positivist unilinear philosophy of history. I then argue that Mariátegui, through his friend and comrade Hugo Pesce, assimilates and translates the “revolutionary” theory of spacetime as a weapon against the unilinear philosophy of history and as a resource to construct a concept of plural spatiotemporal concept of history. Re-situating Mariátegui’s work along this axis puts some pressure on certain Bergsonian and Sorelian readings that overemphasize the importance of Myth and Humanity as a “metaphysical animal” and thereby tend to underemphasize or outright suppress his creative assimilation and translation of the sciences of his time. (shrink)

This paper offers an exploration of the socialist principle “From each according to their abilities, to each according to their needs.” The Abilities/Needs Principle is arguably the ethical heart of socialism but, surprisingly, has received almost no attention by political philosophers. I propose an interpretation of the principle and argue that it involves appealing ideas of solidarity, fair reciprocity, recognition of individual differences, and meaningful work. The paper proceeds as follows. First, I analyze Marx’s formulation of the Abilities/Needs Principle. Second, (...) I identify the principle’s initial plausibility, but show that it faces serious problems that cannot be addressed without developing a fresh interpretation of it. Third, I provide an interpretation of the principle that highlights demands concerning opportunities for self-realization in work, positive duties of solidarity, sensitivity to individual differences, and mechanisms of fair reciprocity. Fourth, I discuss a possible institutional implementation of the Abilities/Needs Principle. Finally, I identify some normative puzzles about the transition from capitalism to socialism, and suggest how the Abilities/Needs Principle might gain motivational traction by mobilizing the powerful idea of human dignity. (shrink)

One of the most influential recent developments in supposedly radical philosophy is ‘posthumanism’. This can be seen as the successor to ‘deconstructive postmodernism’. In each case, the claim of its proponents has been that cultures are oppressive by virtue of their elitism, and this elitism, fostered by the humanities, is being challenged. In each case, however, these philosophical ideas have served ruling elites by crippling opposition to their efforts to impose markets, concentrate wealth and power and treat everyone and everything (...) as mere instruments in a way that is not only undermining democracy and threatening economic, social and political stability through growing inequality, but is crippling efforts to deal with the global ecological crisis. Philosophers, Nietzsche claimed, are physicians of culture. Why should people claiming to be philosophers, or at least aligned with philosophers, subvert their own calling? In this paper I will suggest that with the expansion of education and the rise of neoliberalism, those involved in education and research, particularly in the humanities and social sciences, have been proletarianized, and most have accepted this proletarianization. They have been reduced to a fraction of the proletariat - wage-slaves without economic security and therefore dependent on the will of others on whom they are dependent. They are not ordinary wage-slaves, however, but wage-house-slaves, having salaries rather than wages. If, as Marx argued, social being determines consciousness, posthumanism can be understood as the expression of ressentiment of these house-slaves at their condition while simultaneously serving to affirm their superiority to field-slaves while serving their masters. Their work is supported because it provides ideological cover for their masters, the new transnational managerial class or corporatocracy as they expand their power through information technology, while absolving this corporatocracy from responsibility for the consequences of their growing power. In making this claim I will argue that the real target of deconstructionists and posthumanists, although this is now seldom appreciated, has been the humanism of the New Left, a revival of the Radical Enlightenment inspired by Renaissance civic humanism and the German Renaissance. (shrink)

Roemer's attempt to undermine the normative reasons that Marxists have thought exploitation important (domination, alienation, and inequality) is vitiated by several crucial errors. First, Roemer ignores the dimension of freedom which is Marx's main concern and replaces it with an interest in justice, which Marx rejected. This leads him to misconstrue the nature of exploitation as Marx understands it. Second, his procedure for disconnecting these evils from exploitation, or denying their importance, involves the methodological assumption that exploitation must strictly imply (...) these evils. He thus fails to see that exploitation may 'cause' domination, alienation, and inequality; this assumption and the focus on justice also lead him to overlook the sort of alienation that is most important to Marx and the way exploitation, as Marx understands it, does imply coercion. Roemer's alternative conception of exploitation thus fails to capture basic Marxist normative and explanatory concerns. But Roemer's insistence on the importance of justice and the need for an articulated alternative to capitalism are a necessary supplement to a Marxist account. (shrink)

Our planet contains 194 independent states and much more nations. They share membership of the United Nations and in consequence they subscribed the Universal Declaration of Rights. These are rooted in the modern universal conception of states and human rights formulated by philosophers of the Enlighten Age like Locke, Kant., Montesquieu, Voltaire and Rousseau. Concepts like democracy are mirrored to the organization of the political life as it was developed in North America and Europe at the end of the 18th (...) and the 19th century. Universality was deeply rooted in the Western intellectual, moral and religious tradition of that part of the world. Even globalization of the economic and social life is governed by the same Western standards and worldwide consumed basic goods like prime matter,. food and energy is expressed in terms of Western currency like dollar, pound sterling or euro. Despite this economic globalization there were two contradictory political evolution to discern: At the one hand more than 70 new states where created and on the other hand 28 European states started to integrate to a political European Union. The latter trend was based on a deep economic integration and since the creation of the euro also a financial integration. Basic idea was the creation of a free economic market as bases for a political unified Europe. Euro criticism is not only identified with conservatism, nationalism, narrow mind and even racism, euro criticism is deprived from any intellectual significance. However other trends put some shadow on the European project. First the Soviet experience around Marxism, Leninism and Stalinism unified more different nations than the European Union but ended in a complete political and economic chaos. Secondly the financial euro crisis involves only the tacit undermining of the national political independence of the member states, but does not make room for a deep analysis what the fundamentals are of this crisis such as lack of confidence of the citizen in the created unified political and financial market and its main instruments like banks that we consider as the fundamental boundary conditions of the worldwide globalization of goods, power and all aspects of human life. Furthermore we claim that this market in al its aspects is the worst answer to the inconvenient yet unavoidable truth that Western way of life of consumption includes a ecological footprint that exceeds since many years the sustainability of our planet. -/- . (shrink)

"Populism" has long been a dirty word. To some, it suggests the tyranny of the mob, to others, a xenophobic nativism. It is sometimes considered conducive to (if not simply identical to) fascism. In this timely book, Walter Horn acquits populism by "distilling" it, in order to finally give the people the power to govern themselves, free from constraints imposed either by conservatives (or libertarians) on the right or liberals (or Marxists) on the left. Beginning with explanations of what it (...) means to vote and what makes one society better off than another, Horn progresses to issues involving what makes for fair aggregation and appropriate, deliberative representation. From suggesting solutions to contemporary problems like gerrymandering, immigration control, and campaign finance, to offering answers to age-old questions like why dissenters should want to obey the majority and who should have the right to vote in various elections, Horn, using his new theory of "CHOICE Voluntarism," provides solutions to some of the most perplexing problems in the history of democratic theory. -/- The Introduction and first chapter can now be read free at Amazon. (shrink)

This article analyses in detail Wittgenstein’s ‘Cambridge period’ from his return to Cambridge in 1929 until his decease in 1951. Within the ‘Cambridge period’, scholars usually distinguish the ‘middle’ (1929–1936) and the ‘late’ (1936–1951) periods. The trigger point of Wittgenstein’s return to Cambridge and philosophy was his visit to Brouwer’s lecture on ‘Mathematics, Science, and Language’ in Vienna in March 1928. Dutch mathematician Brouwer influenced not only Wittgenstein’s ability to do philosophy again but also the development of some of his (...) ideas. Namely, for Brouwer, language was a natural development of the social history of human beings. With the help of his friends, F. P. Ramsey, J. M. Keynes, G. E. Moore, and B. Russell, in 1929 Wittgenstein returned to Cambridge. The author argues that this was the crucial turning point in his philosophy that led to the revision of some of his ideas. Wittgenstein returned from self-isolation in remote villages of Lower Austria to the intellectual academic environment, where he could discuss his ideas with intellectual interlocutors and receive their valuable remarks and comments. This article is organised in chronological order: it describes the very ‘early’ middle period of 1929–1935 involving the development of Wittgenstein’s ‘phenomenology’ and the origin of the ‘language-games’ concept in the Blue and Brown Books; 1935–1936 period of ‘romantic’ enthusiasm for Soviet Russia and a trip there; Wittgenstein’s life and work during the WWII-time; resign from teaching in Cambridge in 1947 to finally finish his Philosophical Investigations. The author suggests that the ‘romantic areal’ about the USSR was formed by Wittgenstein’s predilection for Russian poetry and literature of the nineteenth century, i.e., Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, and Pushkin. Analysing the development of Wittgenstein’s ideas on language in his Cambridge period, the author mentions the influence of N. Bakhtin and P. Sraffa. Also, the author touches upon the topic of the possibility of Marxism’s influence on Wittgenstein’s life and thought. (shrink)

This paper is about the modern-day problem of human alienation and fulfillment in work from the perspective of the Catholic social thought. It analyses the symptoms and causes of work alienation, the meaning of work and its significance in the individual’s quest for fulfillment, and how the Catholic social teachings can shed light on the problems involved in transforming the world of work. Alienation in work affects one’s subjective and psychological fulfillment, but it is not ultimately dependent on material culture (...) or economic models. The problem of alienation in work cannot be dealt with by simply modifying the production process or the wage system, although these are factors that alienate people even more. Social problems cannot be solved without light of faith and the recognition of the moral order that is rooted in God. In the final analysis, alienation is not simply the loss of meaning in human activities. It is the loss of life’s meaning and man’s estrangement from his own authentic nature, including his reason for being and final end, that results from the rejection of God and His teachings. What Catholicism provides is a combination of economic, psychological, moral, social, and spiritual motives for work that will make it personally fulfilling. (shrink)

I analyze Deleuze’s concept of temporality in terms of its ontology and axiological (political and aesthetic) aspects. For Deleuze, the concept of temporality is non-monolithic, in the senses that it is modified throughout his works — the monographs, lectures, and those works that were co-authored with Félix Guattari — and that it is developed through reference to a dizzying array of concepts, thinkers, artistic works, and social phenomena. -/- I observe that Deleuze’s concept of temporality involves a complex ontology of (...) difference, which I elaborate through reference to Deleuze’s analyses of Ancient Greek and Stoic conceptualizations of time. From Plato through to Chrysippus, temporality gradually comes to be identified as a form that comprehends the variation of particulars. Deleuze modifies the ancients’ concept of time to suggest that time obtains as a form of ceaseless ontological variation. Through reference to Deleuze’s reading of Gilbert Simondon, I further suggest that Deleuze tends to conceive of temporality as an ontogenetic force which participates in the complex process of individuation. -/- A standout feature of this dissertation involves an analysis of how Deleuze’s concept of temporality is modified in his works on cinema. In Cinema 1: The Movement-Image and Cinema 2: The Time-Image, temporality comes to be characterized as something other than the measure of the movement of existents. In his detailed analyses of Bergson — in Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, and Bergsonism — Deleuze suggests that time involves an actualization of aspects of a virtual past as contemporaneous with the lived present. While not an outright denial of the relation of temporal succession, Deleuze’s claim implies a diminishment of this relation’s significance in an adequate elaboration of the nature of temporality. -/- Further, I observe —through reference to Deleuze’s readings of Marx, Kierkegaard, and Spinoza — that (the explicitly temporal) change of societal forms of economic organization is non-reducible to that suggested by linear evolution. The claim is that putatively discrete modes of economic organization do not enjoy temporal displacement with respect to one another. This suggests that linear evolutionary models of societal development are inadequate. This further implies that temporality is non-reducible to the relation of temporal succession. In concrete terms, societal change is characterized as immanent temporal variation. -/- Taken together, these analyses yield the conclusion that Deleuze tends to conceive of the nature of temporality as involving the ongoing realization of multiple — non-identical, sometimes contrary — aspects of a stochastic process of creation that is expressed in ontogenetic circumstances, social evolution, literary works, and filmic works. (shrink)

STANISŁAW BRZOZOWSKI – TO THINK RADICALLY Stanisław Brzozowski is one of the most radical philosophers. Radicalism of his thought involves not only the idea of fundamental social change, but also the reinterpretation of some philosophical concepts. Two main concepts are nature and history. They are reinterpreted in order to show their human origins. According to Brzozowski nature and history are human constructions, namely they are set by human praxis. Brzozowski’s understanding changed over the time. In my article I focus on (...) two phases of Brzozowski’s thought. The first is Kantian and Fichtean. At that point Brzozowski interprets human praxis as moral act. The second one is Marxian. At that point human praxis is understood as labour. (shrink)

Several theorists have observed that attitude reports have what we call “revisionist” uses. For example, even if Pete has never met Ann and has no idea that she exists, Jane can still say to Jim ‘Pete believes Ann can learn to play tennis in ten lessons’ if Pete believes all 6-year-olds can learn to play tennis in ten lessons and it is part of Jane and Jim’s background knowledge that Ann is a 6-year-old. Jane’s assertion seems acceptable because the claim (...) she reports Pete as believing is entailed by Pete’s beliefs if they are revised in light of Jane and Jim’s background knowledge. We provide a semantic theory of revisionist reports based on this idea. We observe that the admissible “revisions” are limited in a striking way. Jane cannot say ‘Pete thinks Ann is a 6-year-old and can play tennis in ten lessons’ in the same context that she can say ‘Pete believes Ann can learn to play tennis ten lessons’, even though this too follows from Jane and Jim’s background knowledge together with what Pete believes. Our theory predicts the infelicity of these latter reports. It also has the resources to predict the truth of “exported” attitude reports and casts the relationship between these reports and “singular thought” in a new light. We conclude by discussing how revisionist reports make trouble for a simplistic view of the connection between the relations expressed by attitude verbs in natural language and the relations of most interest to philosophers of mind and cognitive science. (shrink)

The choice of tracking Hegel’s reception in the Arab world in order to explore the connections between modernity and colonialism is an excellent one, since it was Hegel himself who inaugurated the explicit philosophical discourse of modernity (Habermas 1990: 4-5). Ventura’s book is divided into three parts of roughly equal length of around fifty pages each. The first part provides an overview of Hegel’s philosophy of history, and of the place of Arab peoples and Islam in his philosophy of history. (...) This section allows Ventura to put forward some of her own interpretations in relation to questions that are the objects of controversy in the secondary literature on Hegel. In general, Ventura’s account of Hegel’s views on Arabs and Islam draws attention to the internal differentiation which characterized ‘Orientalism’ as a discourse. The second part of the book deals with the indirect reception of Hegel in nineteenth century Ottoman Syria (which encompassed modern day Lebanon, Syria, Palestine and Jordan). Ventura’s salutary emphasis on internal differentiation is one of the strengths of this part of the book. She emphasizes the differences between the American Protestant missionaries who founded the Syrian Protestant College in 1866 and the French Jesuits who founded the Université Saint-Joseph in 1880. Ventura argues that the American Protestant missionaries were influenced by Hegel (58), whereas the French Jesuits were not (59). The third part of the book attempts to provide an account of the direct reception of Hegel in the Arab world which, according to Ventura, only begins in the 1960s and 1970s. Ventura’s account of the contemporary reception of Hegel is based on the research that she conducted in Syria and Lebanon in 2009-2010, which involved conducting interviews with prominent Syrian and Lebanese philosophers and examining libraries. While the title of the book might suggest that it aims to provide an account of the reception of Hegel in the Arab world as a whole, the focus is really on the reception of Hegel in modern day Syria and Lebanon, with Egypt being given rather cursory treatment. (shrink)

In the literature on supervaluationism, a central source of concern has been the acceptability, or otherwise, of its alleged logical revisionism. I attack the presupposition of this debate: arguing that when properly construed, there is no sense in which supervaluational consequence is revisionary. I provide new considerations supporting the claim that the supervaluational consequence should be characterized in a ‘global’ way. But pace Williamson (1994) and Keefe (2000), I argue that supervaluationism does not give rise to counterexamples to familiar inference-patterns (...) such as reductio and conditional proof. (shrink)

Contemporary just war theory is divided into two broad camps: revisionists and traditionalists. Traditionalists seek to provide moral foundations for something close to current international law, and in particular the laws of armed conflict. Although they propose improvements, they do so cautiously. Revisionists argue that international law is at best a pragmatic fiction—it lacks deeper moral foundations. In this article, I present the contemporary history of analytical just war theory, from the origins of contemporary traditionalist just war theory in Michael (...) Walzer's work to the revisionist critique of Walzer and the subsequent revival of traditionalism. I discuss central questions of methodology, as well as consider the morality of resorting to war and the morality of conduct in war. I show that although the revisionists exposed philosophical shortcomings in Walzer's arguments, their radical conclusions should prompt us not to reject the broad contemporary consensus, but instead to seek better arguments to underpin it. (shrink)

G. E. Moore famously argued against skepticism and idealism by appealing to their inconsistency with alleged certainties, like the existence of his own hands. Recently, some philosophers have offered analogous arguments against revisionary views about ethics such as metaethical error theory. These arguments appeal to the inconsistency of error theory with seemingly obvious moral claims like “it is wrong to torture an innocent child just for fun.” It might seem that such ‘Moorean’ arguments in ethics will stand or fall with (...) Moore’s own arguments in metaphysics and epistemology, in virtue of their shared structure. I argue that this is not so. I suggest that the epistemic force of the canonical Moorean arguments can best be understood to rest on asymmetries in indirect evidence. I then argue that this explanation suggests that Moorean arguments are less promising in ethics than they are against Moore’s own targets. I conclude by examining the competing attempt to vindicate Moorean arguments by appealing to Rawls’s method of reflective equilibrium. (shrink)

In Replacing Truth, Scharp takes the concept of truth to be fundamentally incoherent. As such, Scharp reckons it to be unsuited for systematic philosophical theorising and in need of replacement – at least for regions of thought and talk which permit liar sentences and their ilk to be formulated. This replacement methodology is radical because it not only recommends that the concept of truth be replaced, but that the word ‘true’ be replaced too. Only Tarski has attempted anything like it (...) before. I dub such a view Conceptual Marxism. In assessing this view, my goals are fourfold: to summarise the many components of Scharp’s theory of truth; to highlight what I take to be some of the excess baggage carried by the view; to assess whether, and to what extent, the extreme methodology on offer is at all called for; finally, to briefly propose a less radical replacement strategy for resolving the liar paradox. (shrink)

In ‘Equity and Marxist Buddhism,’ Tzu-wei Hung engages with the Marxist Buddhism developed by Taiwanese philosopher Lin Qiu-wu in the 1920s, brings this underexplored theory to the table and discusses a few merits and insights of the theory. Building on Hung’s analysis, this paper paper elaborates on the lessons and insights that Taiwanese Marxist Buddhism provides for modern times. The first three lessons are distinctive points that Taiwanese Marxist Buddhism brings to the discussion on combining Marxism and Buddhism: the connections (...) between the ethical and political, the responsibility for pursuing social justice and the nonviolence means towards social justice. The last lesson comes at the meta-philosophical level, focusing on how Hung’s engagement with Taiwanese Marxist Buddhism sheds light on the issue of diversifying the discipline philosophy. Overall, I argue that Taiwanese Marxist Buddhism not only makes contributions to theoretical frameworks while providing a practical means for pursuing equity and social justice, but it also manifests the epistemic and moral values for engaging with under-represented philosophical traditions. (shrink)

Some philosophers deny the existence of composite material objects. Other philosophers hold that whenever there are some things, they compose something. The purpose of this paper is to scrutinize an objection to these revisionary views: the objection that nihilism and universalism are both unacceptably uncharitable because each of them implies that a great deal of what we ordinarily believe is false. Our main business is to show how nihilism and universalism can be defended against the objection. A secondary point is (...) that universalism is harder to defend than nihilism. (shrink)

This paper introduces the reconciliation as well as an analysis of the divide between contemporary and classical aesthetics in architecture. The analysis outlines the segmentation as one of the standards rather than of aesthetic appeal, concluding with a proposal for the reconciliation by means of integrating modern and contemporary art into today’s architecture. This reconciliation would not only serve as an artistic take on architecture but also raise awareness of the subjectivity of beauty in architecture. In the conclusion of this (...) paper, there are highlighted illustrations demonstrating the picturesque outcome of using this proposed method of integration. (shrink)

What does a Marxist theory of human psychology look like? Kyrill Potapov sheds light on this topic by showing how the works of Soviet thinkers like Lev Vygotsky and Evald Ilyenkov relate to more modern research on collective intentionality and niche construction.

This paper argues that there is reason to distinguish between moral responsibility and blameworthiness and, in particular, that we can acknowledge that a person is responsible for the negative outcomes of their behavior without this necessarily informing our judgments about the person’s blameworthiness. This general theme is elaborated in the context of a discussion of some of Björn Petersson’s work on collective moral responsibility.

Modern analytical just war theory starts with Michael Walzer's defense of key tenets of the laws of war in his Just and Unjust Wars. Walzer advocates noncombatant immunity, proportionality, and combatant equality: combatants in war must target only combatants; unintentional harms that they inflict on noncombatants must be proportionate to the military objective secured; and combatants who abide by these principles fight permissibly, regardless of their aims. In recent years, the revisionist school of just war theory, led by Jeff McMahan, (...) has radically undermined Walzer's defense of these principles. This essay situates Walzer's and the revisionists’ arguments, before illustrating the disturbing vision of the morality of war that results from revisionist premises. It concludes by showing how broadly Walzerian conclusions can be defended using more reliable foundations. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is fairly modest. I obviously do not claim that there has never been or could never be an instance of irrational or fallacious appeals to quotations from canonical sources in the marxist tradition. Instead, I claim that the practice of using quotations from canonical sources is not, as such, irrational. If we understand the epistemological infrastructure of the practice -- the rational underpinnings of it -- we can grasp how these citations appeal to the presumptive (...) authoritativeness of formulations that condense or concisely convey the core of insights that emerged from learning processes that the intellectual tradition of marxism has already traversed. The rational underpinnings of the practice include, first, the neo-Hegelian idea that we can justify a view we now hold by rationally reconstructing the insight-motivated learning process from which it emerged, and second, the convention that these rational reconstructions do not have to be elaborated in each insistence, but can be invoked in a short-form way, such as by citing the name of a decision or a concise statement of it (like a short quotation), as is common in the epistemologically similar practice of precedential reasoning in common law juridical justification. No claim is true just because of who made it; but a claim might be presumptively authoritative in cases where it was made at the end of a learning process, which has not been overtaken by a change in the circumstances or further learning. (shrink)

Since the publication of the Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, Wittgenstein’s interpreters have endeavored to reconcile his general constructivist/anti-realist attitude towards mathematics with his confessed anti-revisionary philosophy. In this article, the author revisits the issue and presents a solution. The basic idea consists in exploring the fact that the so-called “non-constructive results” could be interpreted so that they do not appear non-constructive at all. The author substantiates this solution by showing how the translation of mathematical results, given by the (...) possibility of translation between logics, can be seen as a tool for partially implementing the solution Wittgenstein had in mind. (shrink)

We shall see that as the Master of suspicion, Marx rejects capitalism, which he considers to be a system of bourgeois oppression, absurd and decadent. The latter eludes the importance of the social question in the historical future of a society. Trampling on the lyrical illusions of practical rationality, he insists on the rigidity of economic and social determinisms, to which he confers an overdeterminent role in sub-estimating the impact of cognitive and/or psychological mechanisms on the exercise of state power. (...) We will explain how dialectical materialism in Marx joins in many respects the methodological revolution initiated by Nietzsche, particularly as regards its requirement to contextualize a real understood as a fabric of forces, in order to understand the origin of the dominant values and that of the capitalist system. Moreover, it will be important to develop the idea that within a civil society, itself prey to a crisis of the sittlichkeit (the ethical life), history tends to separate the interests in favor of imperceptible cowards perverse become legion, while insidiously affecting a social body incapable of escaping from material contingencies. We will then have the right to question the way in which revolutions occur? (shrink)

It is shown that Russell's Paradox can be solved without advocating the Theory of Types, and also that the Liar's Paradox can be solved in much the same way. Neither solution requires that any of our commonsense-based beliefs be revised, let alone jettisoned. It is also shown that the Theory of Types is false.

Th is work is a companion piece to "The American Worker," Karl Kautsky's reply to Werner Sombart’s Why Is There No Socialism in the United States? (1906), first published in English in the November 2003 edition of the journal Historial Materialism. In August 1909 Kautsky wrote an article on Samuel Gompers, the president of the American Federation of Labor, on the occasion of the latter's first European tour. Th e article was not only a criticism of Gompers’s anti-socialist "pure-and-simple" unionism (...) but also part of an ongoing battle between the revolutionary wing of German Social Democracy and the German trade-union officials. In this critical English edition we provide the historical background to the document as well as an overview of the issues raised by Gompers' visit to Germany, such as the bureaucratisation and increasing conservatism of the union leadership in both Germany and the United States, the role of the General Commission of Free Trade Unions in the abandonment of Marxism by the German Social-Democratic Party and the socialists’ attitude toward institutions promoting class collaboration like the National Civic Federation. (shrink)

The present book is an in-depth study of Lukács’ musical aesthetics and, more specifically, of his essay on music from The Specificity of the Aesthetic (Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen, 1963). Lukács’ problematic in this essay revolves around a central issue in the history of Aesthetics: the problem of mimesis in music. Since the time of Plato and Aristotle music has been regarded as a mimesis (an imitation) of reality. However, this theory of music as mimesis presents major difficulties which have (...) long been the subject of philosophical thinking: how is it possible that an art so far removed from reality, an art that employs sounds (not images or concepts) be considered as an imitation of reality? This is the main question that concerns Lukács in this essay. The present book seeks, through the detailed examination of Lukács’ central argument, to demonstrate and clarify Lukács’ solution to this problem of musical mimesis and to highlight its significance for the contemporary debate on Aesthetics. (shrink)

The paper discusses Beauvoir's interpretation of the Marxist and Freudian contributions to our understanding of the feminine condition. Several epistemological assumptions derived from Sartre's philosophy are pointed out. Beauvoir's reading of Marx, Engels, and Freud is discussed, claiming that her reading is biased by humanistic and historicist assumptions. This is an unpublished English version of Sergio Cremaschi, “Marxismo e psicanalisi in Il secondo sesso di Simone de Beauvoir”, Vita e Pensiero, 67 (1975), 3-4, pp. 510-525; reprint in E. De Marchi (...) (ed.), In nome della donna, Editrice Vita e Pensiero, Milano, 1976, pp. 510-525. (shrink)

Feminist theorists try to approach their philosophical perspectives from various systems. They approach it from the perspectives of liberalism, Marxism, radicalism, existentialism, postmodernism, etc. Whatever may be the system they use, their aim seems to be to divulge the oppressions undergone by the women. They use a method or adopt philosophical thinking so that they can spell out their cries in a philosophical manner. Using the philosophical systems does not mean that the philosopher who forwarded the system was aiming at (...) the liberation of women. I would like to present in this essay the utilitarian and Marxian perspectives on Feminism. For the utilitarian perspective, I base myself on Harriet Taylor Mill and the Marxian perspective is from the writings of Karl Marx. I also attempt to connect the philosophy of Harriet Taylor with the Iranian movie, The Day I Became a Woman, and the philosophy of Karl Marx with the illustrious play of Bertolt Brecht, The Caucasian Chalk Circle. (shrink)

eSports practice designates a unique set of activities tethered to competitive, virtual environments, or worlds. This correlation between eSports practitioner and virtual world, we argue, is inadequately accounted for solely in terms of something physical or intellectual. Instead, we favor a perspective on eSports practice to be analyzed as a perceptual and embodied phenomenon. In this article, we present the phenomenological approach and focus on the embodied sensations of eSports practitioners as they cope with and perceive within their virtual worlds. (...) By approaching eSports phenomenologically, we uncover ways in which its unique forms of virtual involvement overlap with as well as differentiate themselves from traditional structures of embodiment. (shrink)

During the last two years, senior high school teachers struggled with course contents in a neoliberal education. While the Mass Training of Teachers (MTOT) focuses on pedagogical knowledge, their concern is to deepen their content knowledge. As a result, they face difficulty in teaching the subjects, one of which is Marxism under Disciplines and Ideas in the Social Sciences (DISS). Enriching this paper, the query turns to the key participants of the sector and seek their insights. Then, critical analysis applies (...) what the literature says about the way Marxism is taught. (shrink)