In this essay I argue that Machiavelli does not hold that all deception is permissible in war. While Machiavelli claims that "deceit... in the conduct of war is laudable and honorable," he insists that such deceit, or ruses of war, is not to be confounded with perfidy. Any Lee's U.S. Civil War film, "Ride With the Devil," illustrates this difference. The film also illustrates the difference between lying as part of romance, which is permitted, and lying at the moment of (...) truth in a relationship, when admitting one's feelings, which is not. (shrink)

Political protesters often don’t play by the rules. Think of the Occupy Movement, which brought lower Manhattan to a standstill in 2011 under the slogan, “We are the 99%”. Closer to home, think of the refugee activists who assisted a breakout from South Australia’s Woomera detention centre in 2002. Both are examples of contentious politics, or forms of political engagement outside the institutional channels of political decision-making. The democratic credentials of contentious politics are highly ambivalent. On the one hand, contentious (...) politics appears to have insufficient respect for democratic decision. Protesters are often forceful, uncivil and rowdy, aiming to disproportionately influence policy. But shouldn’t proposals be put forward with civility through the proper channels? And shouldn’t their proponents accept with good grace if they are democratically rebuffed? A closer look at the history of political thought can provide us with the framework to assess the case for and against the democratic reasonableness of contentious politics. (shrink)

I rapporti annuali su Gli italiani e lo stato, coordinati da Ilvo Diamanti, continuano a rilevare che i cittadini sono impegnati negli associazionismi ma disincantati dalla politica. Con le tipiche differenze nelle diverse aree del paese e a seconda del livello istituzionale, accanto alla sfiducia verso le istituzioni pubbliche c’è una propensione alla partecipazione. Come mostrano la diffusione delle primarie e le esperienze di democrazia partecipativa che si moltiplicano a livello locale, si riscontra, infatti, una disponibilità a sperimentare forme di (...) coinvolgimento differenti rispetto alla militanza politica che possono costituire un utile complemento della democrazia rappresentativa e degli strumenti di democrazia diretta. La partecipazione non solo richiede la possibilità legale di votare ma anche un contesto sociale che induca effettivamente il popolo a votare e ad esprimere i propri punti di vista elevando il livello di informazione e il confronto su argomenti alternativi, cercando di evitare nelle controversie pubbliche le valutazioni puramente opportunistiche o emotive. L’interesse qui si rivolge verso il “sondaggio deliberativo” di James S. Fishkin, una procedura molto diversa dal sondaggio d’opinione poiché rovescia la logica demoscopica. Le persone sondate dagli istituti di ricerca a volte non hanno indicazioni adeguate sul tema; altrettanto spesso non ci hanno riflettuto e non hanno confrontato le proprie preferenze, scelte o credenze con gli argomenti in contrasto in una libera e approfondita discussione. Renato Mannheimer, presidente dell’Istituto per gli studi sulla pubblica opinione (Ispo) è d’accordo con l’affermazione secondo cui le persone rispondono anche su ciò che non conoscono e, a suo parere, il problema si fa ancora più evidente a ridosso delle elezioni. Oggi, a suo avviso, la maggior parte della gente vota non per vera convinzione, ma sulla base di impressioni acquisite dalla TV durante le ultime settimane prima del voto. I sondaggi deliberativi, invece, sono diretti a migliorare la qualità del confronto pubblico, attraverso una procedura articolata che favorisce l’informazione,la riflessione e il dibattito, a partire, ovvio, dall’idea di creare un rapporto diverso tra i sondaggi e l’opinione pubblica intenso come misurazione di come muta l’opinione dopo che le persone hanno avuto l’opportunità di diventare più competenti e di confrontare in un dialogo aperto le loro idee. Nonostante alcune riserve di ordine metodologico e taluni rischi di strumentalizzazione politica, l’esame dei sondaggi deliberativi risveglia una viva ammirazione per uno studioso riuscito a riversare la passione civile e l'impegno politico in una pratica democratica concreta alla quale ha dedicato, quasi interamente, molti anni del suo lavoro. Rimane, certo, uno strumento insufficiente a rianimare e risollevare il momento deliberativo nelle democrazie contemporanee, ma nessuno può negare che indichi a tutti la direzione giusta. (shrink)

La prima cosa che dobbiamo tenere a mente è che quando diciamo che la Cina dice questo o la Cina lo fa, non stiamo parlando del popolo cinese, ma dei Sociopatici che controllano il Partito Comunista Cinese CCP, cioè i Sette Killer Seriali Senile (SSSSK) del Comitato permanente del PCC o dei 25 membri del Politburo ecc. I piani del CCP per la terza guerra mondiale e il dominio totale sono strutturati abbastanza chiaramente nelle pubblicazioni e nei discorsi govt cinesi (...) e questo è il "sogno di Cina" di Xi Jinping. È un sogno solo per la piccola minoranza (forse da poche decine a poche centinaia) che governa la Cina e un incubo per tutti gli altri (tra cui 1,4 miliardi di cinesi). I 10 miliardi di dollari all'anno che si stima spendano in propaganda in tutto il mondo permette loro o i loro burattini di possedere o controllare giornali, riviste, canali televisivi e radiofonici e di inserire notizie false nella maggior parte dei principali media ovunque decine o centinaia di migliaia di volte ogni giorno. They hanno un esercito (forse milioni di persone) che oltre alla censura totale e immediata di tutti i media all'interno della Cina, troll tutti i media del mondo, mettendo più propaganda e annegando legittimo commento (l'esercito 50 centesimi). Oltre a spogliarerd il terzo mondo di risorse, una spinta importante della multi-trilionaria Belt and Road Initiative sta costruendo basi militari in tutto il mondo. Stanno costringendo il mondo libero in una massiccia corsa agli armamenti ad alta tecnologia che fa sembrare la guerra fredda con l'Unione Sovietica un picnic. Anche se la SSSSK, e il resto dell'esercito mondiale, stanno spendendo enormi somme su hardware avanzato, è altamente probabile che WW3 (o gli impegni più piccoli che portano ad esso) sarà software dominato. Non è fuori questione che la SSSSK, con probabilmente più hacker (programmatori) che lavorano per loro allora tutto il resto del mondo combinato, vincerà WW3 con minimo conflitto fisico, solo paralizzando i loro nemici tramite la rete. Niente satelliti, niente telefoni, niente comunicazioni, niente transazioni finanziarie, niente rete elettrica, niente internet, niente armi avanzate, niente veicoli, treni, navi o aerei. Ci sono solo due percorsi principali per rimuovere il PCC, liberare 1,4 miliardi di prigionieri cinesi e porre fine alla marcia folle per la terza guerra mondiale. Quello pacifico è quello di lanciare una guerra commerciale a tutto campo per devastare l'economia cinese fino a quando i militari si stancano e si avvia il PCC. Un'alternativa alla chiusura dell'economia cinese è una guerra limitata, come uno sciopero mirato di conlsi 50 droni termobarici sul 20congresso del PCC, quando tutti i membri migliori sono in un unico posto, ma che non avrà luogo fino al 2022 in modo da poter colpire la riunione plenaria annuale. I cinesi sarebbero stati informati, come è avvenuto l'attacco, che devono deporre le armi e prepararsi a tenere un'elezione democratica o essere inglobito nell'età della pietra. L'altra alternativa è un attacco nucleare a tutto campo. Il confronto militare è inevitabile, visto l'attuale corso del PCC. Accadrà probabilmente sulle isole del Mar Cinese Meridionale o Taiwan entro pochi decenni, ma man mano che stabiliscono basi militari in tutto il mondo potrebbe accadere ovunque (vedi il libro Tigre accovacciata ecc.). I futuri conflitti avranno aspetti hardkill e softkill con gli obiettivi dichiarati del PCC per enfatizzare la guerra informatica hackerando e paralizzando i sistemi di controllo di tutte le comunicazioni militari e industriali, attrezzature, centrali elettriche, satelliti, internet, banche e qualsiasi dispositivo o veicolo collegato alla rete. La SSSSK sta lentamente schierando una serie mondiale di sub o droni di superficie e subacquei con equipaggio e autonomi in grado di lanciare armi convenzionali o nucleari che possono rimanere domeggiati in attesa di un segnale dalla Cina o addirittura alla ricerca della firma di navi o aerei statunitensi. Mentre distruggevano i nostri satelliti, eliminando così la comunicazione tra gli Stati Uniti e le nostre forze in tutto il mondo, useranno i loro, insieme ai droni per colpire e distruggere le nostre forze navali attualmente superiori. Naturalmente, tutto questo è sempre più fatto automaticamente dall'IA. Di gran lunga il più grande alleato del PCC è il partito democratico degli Stati Uniti. La scelta è quella di fermare il PCC ora o guardare come estendere la prigione cinese su tutto il mondo. Naturalmente, la sorveglianza universale e la digitalizzazione delle nostre vite è inevitabile ovunque. Chi non la pensa così è profondamente fuori contatto. Naturalmente, è l'optinebbie che si aspettano che i sociopatici cinesi a governare il mondo, mentre i pessimisti (che si vedono come realisti) si aspettano AI (Intelligenza Artificiale, o come lo chiamo it Imbecility artificiale o Unalien follia) a prendere il sopravvento, forse non appena 2030. Coloro che sono interessati a ulteriori dettagli sul percorso folle della società moderna possono consultare le mie altre opere come Suicide by Democracy-an Obituary for America and the World 4th Edition 2020 e Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century: Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization 5th ed (2020) . (shrink)

L. Gazziero, « Machiavelli », in M. Lewis and D. Rose (ed.), The Bloomsbury Italian Philosophy Reader, London, Bloomsbury, 2022, p. 51-58 Confusion verging on chaos aptly describes Italian politics between any two points in time. That being said, the amount of outright violence, political backstabbing and social upheaval Machiavelli had to put up with - as a successful bureaucrat and diplomat first (1498-1512), and later as a disgraced citizen (1512-27) is, with few if any exceptions, virtually unmatched in the (...) history of Italian philosophy. At any rate, it is conspicuous enough to put him in a league of his own (among political thinkers). All the more so since, in Machiavelli's own words, his claim to originality rested on a return to the things themselves and the 'real truth' they convey through experience, as opposed to the traditional proclivity towards speculation regarding 'imaginary things', most notably by portraying fanciful characters and devising political regimes that can only exist on paper. Indeed, philosophers had long been lecturing- either in flawless syllogistic fashion or in vivid rhetorical style - both rulers and subjects on how they should behave and interact. However, they had taken little notice of how they actually go about their business. Alternatively, what does unbiased, direct observation of the present and extensive, informed reading of the past teach us about the ways of the world? (shrink)

This article examines Machiavelli’s image of humanity. It argues against the prevailing views that characterize it either as pessimistic or optimistic and defends the thesis that the Florentine has a realist image of humanity. Machiavelli is a psychological egoist who conceives of man as a being whose actions are motivated by his drives, appetites, and passions, which lead him often to immoral behavior. Man’s main drives are “ambition” (ambizione) and “avarice” (avarizia). This article also investigates Machiavelli’s concept of nature and (...) shows that, for him, the constancy of human nature is the central premise that makes the scientific analysis of politics possible. Despite the fact that human drives and capabilities are the same at all times, good laws, military training, and religion allow man to be changed and educated toward “virtue” (virtù). To make such changes in man, however, presupposes a good legal and political order. Machiavelli justifies the state because of its capacity to reshape human nature and to improve man. The state is not only a coercive power but a moral institution. This leads to the conclusion that Machiavelli does not separate politics from morality as most scholars claim. (shrink)

Machiavelli is commonly known by a political theory associated to his name: "machiavellism". The initial effort of the article is to take apart Machiavellian thought from such a conception. After this it tries a detailed analysis of all occurrences of the term "education", which amounts to eleven times in his work. The hypothesis by which our reflexion is guided is that education is conceived by Machiavelli as a force addressed to control the desire's as well as the nature's inherent movement (...) disorder, preventing the deleterious effects of the first on the political life. Due to education the human being is able to know the "nature of things", i.e., to know what things "always were", and, through such knowledge, to anticipate to the "course of the things ordered by the heaven". Finally, we will try to demonstrate that for Machiavelli education provides the adaptation of the individuals behaviour in such a way that it is possible to redirect the course of things for a coherent order in regard to the collective good.Maquiavel é popularmente conhecido por uma teoria política associada ao seu nome: "maquiavelismo". O artigo realiza um esforço inicial para afastar o pensamento maquiaveliano de semelhante concepção. Em seguida, faz uma análise detalhada de todas as ocorrências do termo "educação", num total de onze, na sua obra. A hipótese que orienta nossa reflexão é de que a educação é pensada por Maquiavel como uma força destinada a controlar a desordem inerente ao movimento tanto do desejo quanto da natureza impedindo os efeitos deletérios daquele sobre a vida política. Graças à educação, o homem é capaz de conhecer a "natureza das coisas", isto é, saber o que as coisas são "desde sempre" e, desta maneira, antecipar-se ao "curso das coisas ordenado pelos céus". Por fim, procuramos mostrar que, para Maquiavel, a educação possibilita moldar o comportamento dos indivíduos de tal modo que é possível redirecionar o curso das coisas para uma ordem coerente com o bem coletivo. (shrink)

Niccolò Machiavelli's support for what he calls governo largo, or popular government, is usually contrasted with the diffidence towards it of Francesco Guicciardini, the Florentine aristocrat. The article argues that both these authors grounded their vision on Polybius' theory of “mixed government,” though adapting it in different directions. In examining this difference, the article reaches the conclusion that it concerns far less the degree of popular participation in political decision-making and government than the value that Machiavelli and Guicciardini respectively ascribe (...) to it in comparison with that of safety-liberty. In this respect, their theories may be viewed as anticipating the tensions between democracy and the rule of law, the co-presence of which provides the essential foundation of the structure of present-day constitutional democracies. (shrink)

Niccolò Machiavelli is one of the most famous political philosophers in the world. His philosophy continues to influence the ideas of today’s political leaders. This is the reason why the researcher is determined to study Niccolò Machiavelli’s political ideas. Niccolò Machiavelli is famous for his work, The Prince, which is a political handbook for achieving goals by any means necessary. His work consists of ways in acquiring power, maintaining power, and using political power. Machiavelli’s political ideas can be deduced into (...) a positivistic approach. He suggested ways that are morally evil but are effective in governing a state. Therefore, any means that will be beneficial for the ruler and for the state’s glory are necessary to be acted upon. Furthermore, the researcher only intends to expose the political ideas of Niccolò Machiavelli. Hopefully after reading this paper, the reader will have a full grasp of understanding Niccolò Machiavelli’s political philosophy. (shrink)

Civil disobedience, despite its illegal nature, can sometimes be justified vis-à-vis the duty to obey the law, and, arguably, is thereby not liable to legal punishment. However, adhering to the demands of justice and refraining from punishing justified civil disobedience may lead to a highly problematic theoretical consequence: the debilitation of civil disobedience. This is because, according to the novel analysis I propose, civil disobedience primarily functions as a costly social signal. It is effective by being reliable, reliable by being (...) costly, and costly primarily by being punished. My analysis will highlight a distinctive feature of civil disobedience: civil disobedients leverage the punitive injustice they suffer to amplify their communicative force. This will lead to two paradoxical implications. First, the instability of the moral status of both civil disobedience and its punishment to the extent where the state may be left with no permissible course of action with regard to punishing civil disobedience. Second, by refraining from punishing justified civil disobedience, the state may render uncivil disobedience—illegal political activities that fall short of the standards of civil disobedience—potentially permissible. (shrink)

This essay aims at clarifying the concept of «multitude» through a comparison between Negri’s work and some of the critiques addressed to his thought. In the first part of the paper, I will consider the relationship between multitude and the individual, in order to confute those who think that the category of «multitude» is a liberal one. Then, I will analyze the connection between the multitude and class-working class, so as to highlight that in Negri’s theory there is not an (...) opposition between those categories. Finally, the last paragraph will examine the forms of the «multitudinarian class struggle» and the hiatus existing between will and potentiality of the multitude related to the issue, still not resolved, of its organization. That is, the long-standing issue of the relationship between theory and «practice» of the multitude. (shrink)

This paper investigates civility from an Aristotelian perspective and has two objectives. The first is to offer a novel account of this virtue based on Aristotle’s remarks about civic friendship. The proposed account distinguishes two main components of civility—civic benevolence and civil deliberation—and shows how Aristotle’s insights can speak to the needs of our communities today. The notion of civil deliberation is then unpacked into three main dimensions: motivational, inquiry-related, and ethical. The second objective is to illustrate how the post-truth (...) condition—in particular, the spread of misinformation typical of the digital environments we inhabit—obstructs our capacity to cultivate the virtue of civility by impairing every component of civil deliberation. The paper hopes to direct virtue theorists’ attention to the need to foster civic virtues as a means of counteracting the negative aspects of the post-truth age. (shrink)

The vast majority of work on the ethics of war focuses on traditional wars between states. In this chapter, I aim to show that this is an oversight worth rectifying. My strategy will be largely comparative, assessing whether certain claims often defended in discussions of interstate wars stand up in the context of civil conflicts, and whether there are principled moral differences between the two types of case. Firstly, I argue that thinking about intrastate wars can help us make progress (...) on important theoretical debates in recent just war theory. Secondly, I consider whether certain kinds of civil wars are subject to a more demanding standard of just cause, compared to interstate wars of national-defence. Finally, I assess the extent to which having popular support is an independent requirement of permissible war, and whether this renders insurgencies harder to justify than wars fought by functioning states. (shrink)

Painless civilization is a term I coined in my Japanese book of the same title, which was published in 2003. Contemporary civilization aims to provide pleasure and comfort and eliminate pain and suffering as much as possible. This is especially evident in advanced countries. Contemporary civilization is moving toward a painless civilization. However, in a painless civilization, we are deprived of the joy of life, which is considered a fundamental source of meaning in life, and we are led toward the (...) situation of drowning in a sea of pleasure. This is a kind of dystopia, and we cannot find an easy way to escape from it. It is important to pay special attention to this aspect of contemporary civilization when we think about the future of our planet. (shrink)

The standard of proof applied in civil trials is the preponderance of evidence, often said to be met when a proposition is shown to be more than 50% likely to be true. A number of theorists have argued that this 50%+ standard is too weak – there are circumstances in which a court should find that the defendant is not liable, even though the evidence presented makes it more than 50% likely that the plaintiff’s claim is true. In this paper, (...) I will recapitulate the familiar arguments for this thesis, before defending a more radical one: The 50%+ standard is also too strong – there are circumstances in which a court should find that a defendant is liable, even though the evidence presented makes it less than 50% likely that the plaintiff’s claim is true. I will argue that the latter thesis follows naturally from the former once we accept that the parties in a civil trial are to be treated equally. I will conclude by sketching an alternative interpretation of the civil standard of proof. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that the practice of civil disagreement has robust epistemic benefits and that these benefits enable meaningful forms of reconciliation—across worldview lines and amid the challenging information environment of our age. I then engage two broad groups of objections: either that civil disagreement opposes, rather than promotes, clarity, or else that it does little to help it. If successful, my account gives us reason to include civil disagreement among what Mill calls “the real morality of public (...) discussion,” a fact that should stir us to take more seriously the decline of civility in contemporary life. (shrink)

This paper argues that political civility is actually an illusionistic ideal and that, as such, realism counsels that we acknowledge both its promise and peril. Political civility is, I will argue, a tension-filled ideal. We have good normative reasons to strive for and encourage more civil political interactions, as they model our acknowledgement of others as equal citizens and facilitate high-quality democratic problem-solving. But we must simultaneously be attuned to civility’s limitations, its possible pernicious side-effects, and its potential for strategic (...) manipulation and oppressive abuse, particularly in contemporary, pluralistic and heterogeneous societies. (shrink)

In response to the spread of COVID-19, governments across the world have, with very few exceptions, enacted sweeping restrictive lockdown policies that impede citizens’ freedom to move, work, and assemble. This paper critically responds to the central arguments for restrictive lockdown legislation. We build our critique on the following assumption: public policy that enjoys virtually unanimous support worldwide should be justified by uncontroversial moral principles. We argue that that the virtually unanimous support in favor of restrictive lockdowns is not adequately (...) justified by the arguments given in favor of them. Importantly, this is not to say that states ought not impose restrictive lockdown measures, but rather that the extent of the acceptance of these measures is not proportionate to the strength of the arguments for lockdowns. -/- We begin by exploring the case for restrictive lockdowns. We first argue that several of the principles that are used to justify the lockdowns yield unexpectedly revisionary implications for other political problems that many would be unwilling to accept. We then outline what we consider the strongest argument for a lockdown—namely, that its net welfare benefits are great enough to defeat the moral presumption against restricting citizens’ civil liberties to move, work, and assemble. However, we give a number of reasons for doubting that the lockdown’s net welfare benefits are, in fact, sufficiently high to defeat the presumption against it. (shrink)

We should conceive of illegal covert animal rescue as acts of “subrevolution” rather than as civil disobedience. Subrevolutions are revolutions that aim to overthrow some part of the government rather than the entire government. This framework better captures the relevant values than the opposing suggestion that we treat illegal covert animal rescue as civil disobedience. If animals have rights like the right not to be unjustly imprisoned and mistreated, then it does not make sense that an instance of animal rescue (...) will be justifiable only if it meets criteria for justified civil disobedience, e.g., the requirement that the civil disobedient not rescue more animals than would be necessary to communicate their message. Thus, the framework of subrevolution is a more apt way to analyze animal rescue. (shrink)

Is hactivism the new civil disobedience? I argue that most recent hacktivism isn't, and shouldn't be shoehorned into the category of civil disobedience. I sketch instead a broad matrix of electronic resistance, attentive to the many shapes and goals of hacktivism and I locate five clusters on it, briefly sketching possible dimensions of normative assessment for each: vigilantism, whistleblowing, guerrilla communication, electronic humanitarianism, and electronic civil disobedience.

Sumer was an ancient civilization in southern Mesopotamia (modern Iraq) during the Chalcolithic and Early Bronze Ages. Although the historical records in the region do not go back much further than ca. 2900 BCE, modern historians believe that Sumer was first settled between ca. 4500 and 4000 BCE by people who may or may not have spoken the Sumerian language. These people, now called the "Ubaidians," were the first to drain the marshes for agriculture; develop trade; and establish industries including (...) weaving, leatherwork, metalwork, masonry, and pottery. (shrink)

Calls for civility have been on the rise recently, as have presumptions that civility is both an academic virtue and a prerequisite for rational engagement and discussion among those who disagree. One imperative of epistemic decolonization is to unmask the ways that familiar conceptual resources are produced within and function to uphold a settler colonial epistemological framework. I argue that rhetorical deployments of ‘civility’ uphold settler colonialism by obscuring the systematic production of state violence against marginalized populations and Indigenous peoples, (...) relying on the colonial conceptual framework of ‘civilized’ vs ‘savage’, and excusing death-promoting rhetoric under the guise of liberal disagreement. (shrink)

Tony Milligan argues that some forms of covert non-human animal rescue, wherein activists anonymously and illegally free non-human animals from confinement, should be understood as acts of civil disobedience. However, most traditional understandings of civil disobedience require that the civil disobedient act publicly rather than covertly. Thus Milligan’s proposal is that we revise our understanding of civil disobedience to allow for covert in addition to public disobedience. I argue we should not. Milligan cannot justify using paradigm cases to expand the (...) scope of civil disobedience without justifying similar reasons to limit the scope, and he does nto give convincing reasons for discarding the communication requirement, according to which an action cannot count as civil disobedience unless it is communicative. The immediate conclusion is that animal rescue is not civil disobedience, while the broader conclusion is one about civil disobedience more broadly: an act must be public to count as civil disobedience. (shrink)

In a morally diverse society, moral agents inevitably run up against intractable disagreements. Civility functions as a valuable constraint on the sort of behaviors which moral agents might deploy in defense of their deeply held moral convictions and generally requires tolerance of other views and political liberalism, as does pluralism. However, most visions of civility are exceptionless: they require civil behavior regardless of how strong the disagreement is between two members of the same society. This seems an excellent idea when (...) those required to do the tolerating might otherwise smash us. However, the demands of civility are universal and fall upon everyone, including ourselves. They may seem to require us to tolerate the intolerable, leading us not into pluralism but rather into functional relativism, and also require the powerless to moderate their demands for redress. They also place moral agents in a very difficult position with respect to realizing our deeply held moral values. Isaiah Berlin’s pluralism, by contrast, allows us to violate tolerance when we come up against values which, put into practice, are incompatible with a form of life we can tolerate. Despite the many fronts on which civility and pluralism align, they are also pitted against each other. Only a qualified (not exceptionless) civility based in respect for persons can cohere with pluralism and thus resolve the double bind in which the moral agent seemed to be placed by exceptionless civility. I develop a rule for Accepted Exceptions that helps to explain how moral agents can be civil, value pluralism, demand redress, and maintain their own deeply held moral commitments. (shrink)

This is the English translation of Chapter One of Mutsu Bunmei Ron, which was published in Japanese in 2003. Since this book’s publication I have received many requests for an English translation from people around the world. I decided to begin by publishing this first chapter under the title Painless Civilization 1 and make it available to readers who have a keen interest in this topic. * The original text of this chapter was written in 1998, more than twenty years (...) ago, but I believe what I argued there is becoming increasingly important today. Painless civilization is a pathology of contemporary society. We will be pulled much deeper into a painless stream in the future. What is needed is the wisdom to see through the fundamental structure of our painless civilization and its relationship with the meaning of life. ** Modern society seems on the verge of being swallowed up by the pathology of “painless civilization.” I have written this book for people who, in the midst of anxiety studded with pleasure, joyless repetition, and a maze from which they cannot escape no matter how far they walk, nevertheless retain in some corner of their hearts a desire to live life fully and without regrets. * When we feel a vague anxiety, like being bound in gossamer cords, in the midst of modern society, we are perhaps intuitively sensing the existence of “painless civilization.” This book is an attempt to give words to this feeling that the reader has, I am sure, already experienced at least once in their life. (shrink)

This paper defends the institution of civil marriage against the objection that it is inconsistent with political liberalism, and so should be either totally abolished or else transformed virtually beyond recognition.

To say Early Confucians advocated the possession of a sense of shame as a means to moral virtue underestimates the tact and forethought they used successfully to mold natural dispositions to experience shame into a system of self, familial, and social governance. Shame represents an adaptive system of emotion, cognition, perception, and behavior in social primates for measurement of social rank. Early Confucians understood the utility of the shame system for promotion of cooperation, and they build and deploy cultural modules (...) – e.g., rituals, titles, punishments – with this in mind. These policies result in subtle alterations to components of the evolved shame system that are detectable in data form contemporary cross-cultural psychology that show that populations in the Confucian diaspora have a unique shame profile compared to Western and non-Western populations. The status of Confucian diaspora populations as outliers in the context of shame is partially explained by appeal to the cultural transmission and historical endurance of relevant Early Confucian cultural modules. (shrink)

Interviewet er lavet i juli 2021. Dets formål er at belyse emner, der er centrale i Celikates’ tænkning, f.eks. den voksende højrefløjspopulisme, migration, voldelige versus ikke-voldelige protester, civil ulydighed og den kritiske filosofis rolle i dag. -/- When Celikates and I sat down digitally in July 2021, the interview’s primary purpose was to examine topics central to Celikates’ thinking, such as the rise of right-wing populism, migration, violent versus non-violent protest, civil disobedience, and the role of critical philosophy today.

When he gave his first political work the title The Elements of Law Natural and Politic, Hobbes signalled an agenda to revise and incorporate continental Roman and Natural Law traditions for use in Great Britain, and from first to last he remained faithful to this agenda, which it took his entire corpus to complete. The success of his project is registered in the impact Hobbes had upon the continental legal system in turn, specific aspects of his theory, as for instance (...) the right to punish, entering the European civil code through Pufendorf, and remaining to this day. This is a topic of considerable importance at a time at which the UK is considering scrapping the European Union, with all the attendant the legal ramifications. But strangely, despite some acknowledgement of Hobbes’s contribution to European civil law, and specifically the German civil code, the larger legal context for his thought has not thus far been systematically addressed. -/- Key words: Hobbes, civil law, common law, jurisprudence, ‘artificial reason’, natural law, sovereignty,. (shrink)

In 2007 the Chinese government embraced ‘ecological civilization’ as a central policy objective of the government. In 2012, the goal of achieving ecological civilization was incorporated into its constitution as a framework for China’s environmental policies, laws and education, and was included as a goal in its five-year plans. In 2017, the 19th Congress of the Communist Party called for acceleration in achieving this goal. Expenditure on technology to ameliorate environmental damage, reduce pollution and reduce greenhouse gas emissions has been (...) massively increased. It is also presented and promoted as a vision for our global future, in Cornelius Castoriadis’ terminology, a new social imaginary. (shrink)

Strauss’s analysis of Machiavelli is both about his argument and action. He looks Machiavelli’s argument through the lens of classicalpolitical philosophy especially Plato’s political philosophy. He believed Machiavelli had not achieved important theoretical innovation. He looks Machiavelli’s action through the lens of modernity. He believed Machiavelli’s political thought did not perform a good function as it did in the last several centuries any more. Moreover, Strauss supplement Machiavelli’s political thought with a discussion of the problem of technique. Strauss’s caution of (...) the technical innovation makes sense, but his distinction between theoretical science and technique is not convincing. (shrink)

Whereas civil discourse is usually thought to be about defusing conflict, this essay argues it may be fruitfully thought of as fighting honorably for what we believe. Thus agonistic honor, which conceives of rightness in terms of fair and respectful contest for status, will be an especially important virtue in contexts—from classrooms to courtrooms to pluralistic democracies in general—where conflict is inevitable and desirable. To motivate this claim, I take a Hobbesian approach. I begin with a rational reconstruction of honor (...) patterned after Hobbes’ rational reconstruction of justice, and imagine honor-equivalents of “rational” individuals in a “state of nature.” I then describe a multi-stage process that culminates in honorable contests among a natural aristocracy. The lessons from this exercise apply to the question of civil discourse: while the "standard model" of civil discourse aims at resolving disagreement by downplaying rivalry and ego, the more realistic agonistic model harnesses these factors to make our civil debates more culturally sustainable. (shrink)

Developing MacIntyre’s metaphilosophy, Whitehead’s contention that philosophy ‘is the most effective of all the intellectual pursuits’ is elucidated and defended. It is argued that the narratives through which philosophical ideas are evaluated can refigure the stories constituting societies. In this way philosophical ideas become practically effective and come to be embodied in institutions. This is illustrated by the challenge by process philosophy to scientific materialism in the face of an impending global ecological crisis. It is argued that to be successful, (...) process philosophy must be articulated into a grand narrative to challenge the dominant grand narrative of modernity. (shrink)

I argue that, in one sense, collective wisdom can save civilization. But in a more important sense, collective wisdom should be understood as a form of civilization, as the result and expression of a moral civilizing-process that comes about through the creation and transmission of collective interpretations of human experience and human nature. Collective wisdom traditions function in this manner by providing an interpretation of what it means to be human and what thoughts, skills, and actions are required to live (...) a successful human life at the most general level of analysis. Collective wisdom can have a civilizing effect on individuals, and indirectly on societies, by providing a type of orienting framework for understanding the proper relationship between the self, others, and the world. Such traditions in effect provide a “blueprint” for the successful human life as such, by providing guidance on thought and action, on what is appropriate to think, feel, desire, and do in theoretical and practical contexts. A wise individual will be a 'civilized' individual in this moral sense, an individual who is properly habituated and educated so as to now reflectively endorse and desire thinking and acting in virtuous ways. However, this understanding of collective wisdom and civilization is in many ways today controversial and met with justified critiques and skeptical criticisms. To defend this way of approaching and answering our question against these critiques, I turn to ancient wisdom traditions from ancient India, China, and Greece as paradigms for understanding exactly how collective wisdom can achieve the end of civilizing humanity. Based on this analysis, I sketch the outlines of a revitalized ancient wisdom tradition able to civilize individuals today, but such a tradition must be updated to reflect the advancement of modern natural science and to meet the demands of living in our diverse, pluralistic, and globalized world. (shrink)

This interview focuses on Arran Gare’s thinking about ecological civilization and its relationship to a new theoretical ecology, strong democracy and political philosophy based on “ecopoiesis” or “home-making.” Gare believes that it is possible to create a global ecological civilization that empowers people to augment their ecological communities. Complex transformations of the social and economic organization of societies and a radical upheaval of our conceptions of what it means to be human are required to bring about this change to a (...) new ecological (eco-human) culture. (shrink)

In 1984 scientists in the former Soviet Union called for an ecological civilization. This idea was taken up in 1987 in China by Ye Qianji. Subsequently the notion of ecological civilization was promoted by the deputy director of China’s State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA), Pan Yue, incorporated into the Central Commission Report to the Communist Party’s 17th Convention in November, 2007, and embraced as one of the key elements in its political guidelines. Characterized as the successor to agricultural and industrial (...) civilization, it is now being promoted as a goal for the whole of humanity in order to avert a global ecological disaster. The success or failure of this project to create an ecological civilization could determine whether humanity survives. But what does it mean to create an ecological civilization? What does ‘civilization’ mean, and then what would it mean to create an ‘ecological’ civilization? This essay seeks to answer this question. (shrink)

This is the editorial introduction to the edition of Cosmos & History on Civilization in Crisis.

Is it possible to compare civilizations one with another? Is it possible, in other words, to construct some neutral and objective framework in terms of which we could establish in what respects one civilization might deserve to be ranked more highly than its competitors? Morality will surely provide one axis of such a framework (and we note in passing that believers in Islam might quite reasonably claim that their fellow-believers are characteristically more moral than are many in the West). Criteria (...) such as material well-being will need to play a role, too, as also will happiness or pleasure (and again we note that it is not clear a priori that there is more happiness in the West than there is in other civilizations). But even happiness (pace some proponents of the utilitarian philosophy) comes in different types, and to count in the civilization stakes the happiness involved would presumably need to be of the right kind. We explore what this might mean in terms of the idea of a self-chosen life plan. (shrink)

For those familiar with Machiavelli’s texts, Foucault’s interpretation of Macchiavelli in his 1978 lecture series Sécurité, Territoire, Population1 is surprising. Although Machiavelli figures prominently in five of the thirteen lectures,2 Foucault treats Machiavelli as if he were the author of only one book—The Prince—and his reading treats this complex text as if it covered only one topic: how to guarantee the security of the Prince. Clearly Foucault did not intend his interpretation of Machiavelli as a close exegesis. Other discussions of (...) Foucault’s treatment of Machiavelli have acknowledged the role Machiavelli plays in these lectures and even note the inadequacy of the interpretation given by Foucault, but most commentators do not pursue Foucault’s reading further.3 This investigation is not concerned with whether Foucault got Machiavelli right. Rather, Foucault’s reading of Machiavelli is noteworthy because it is partial and incomplete in a way reminiscent of Foucault’s reading of Hobbes in, Il faut défendre la société. This fragmentary character of Foucault’s inscription of Machiavelli as a forerunner of the history of biopolitique allows an innovative reading of the Florentine that connects Machiavelli’s thinking, however indirectly, on a trajectory that encounters, for instance, Foucault’s analysis of populations, the police state, and even his reading of liberalism during the 1978-­‐ 1979 lectures. My argument here is that the specific way Foucault’s inscribes Machiavelli in the history of gouvernementalité, while seeming to reject him, in fact acts to resuscitate, and thereby relay, a reading of Machiavelli as a thinker who articulates encounters among political practices engaged within a horizon of radical immanence. (shrink)

Die ethische und politische Philosophie al-Fārābīs beruht auf einer philosophischen Anthropologie, die die Menschen als von Natur aus als ungleich betrachtet und der Natur eine fundamentale Bedeutung zuschreibt. Die Natur stattet nur wenige Menschen mit besonderen Fähigkeiten aus, sodass die Verwirklichung der höheren theoretischen, geistigen, moralischen Tugend und der praktischen Kunst nur jene betrifft, die von der Natur dafür ausersehen wurden. Die Anthropologie ist darüber hinaus auch ein wichtiges Instrument politischen Handelns. Der Herrscher muss sich kontinuierlich dem Studium der menschlichen (...) Natur widmen und die jeweiligen Eigenschaften benennen, die bestimmten Menschengruppen zugeschrieben werden. Dadurch kann er die geeigneten Mittel identifizieren, mit denen jede Gruppe zur Glückseligkeit geführt werden kann, und wählt die für jeden Fall geeigneten Argumente. Niccolò Machiavelli stützt sein gesamtes politisches Denken auf die Anthropologie. Ein zweiter Pfeiler der politischen Philosophie Machiavellis ist, wie bei al-Fārābī auch, die Religion. Beide machen sich Gedanken über die politische Dimension der Religion, ohne dass Machiavelli aber bis zur Entgeistigung der Religion gehen würde, wie es al-Fārābī gewagt hatte. Neben der Anthropologie, die ein integrales Element des politischen Denkens al-Fārābīs und Machiavellis darstellt, teilen sie sich die Auffassung von der Religion als Instrument politischen Handelns. Beide versuchten den Menschen zu zeigen, dass auf dem Gebiet des öffentlichen Lebens die Regierungskunst der Religion überlegen ist, ohne sich im Besonderen mit ihrem Wert an sich und ihrer Bedeutung für das private Leben zu befassen. Der substantielle Unterschied zwischen beiden liegt in der Breite der politischen Mittel. Hier ist die Innovation Machiavellis offensichtlich, weil sich seine Anthropologie von der al-Fārābīs unterscheidet. (shrink)

This paper discusses some philosophical problems lurking behind the issues of human biotechnology, particularly prenatal screening. Firstly, prenatal screening technology disempowers existing disabled people. The second problem is that it systematically deprives us of the “fundamental sense of security.” This is a sense of security that allows us to believe that we will never be looked upon by anyone with such unspoken words as, “I wish you were never born” or “I wish you would disappear from the world.” Thirdly, we (...) argue that the loss of the fundamental sense of security is connected with the disappearance of “conviction of love” in the age of human biotechnology. And finally, all these issues are examined from the viewpoint of “painless civilization.” Our society is filled with a variety of “preventive reduction of pain,” of which prenatal screening is a good example. By preventively reducing pain and suffering, we lose the chance to transform the basic structure of our way of thinking and being; as a result, we are deprived of opportunities to know precious truths indispensable to our meaningful life. Hence, it is concluded that what is most needed is an academic research on “philosophy of life.”. (shrink)

History can be understood as involving a problematic interplay between the long-term legacy of human evolution, still tempered into the human body today, and the shorter-term heritage of civilization from its beginnings to the present. Each of us lives in a tension between our indigenous bodies and our civilized selves, between the philosophy of the earth and that which I characterize as “the philosophy of escape from the earth.” The standard story of civilization is one of linear upward progress, a (...) story that I contest with an alternative philosophy of history, picturing history instead as a set of concentric circles. I have devised a new philosophy of history with a three-part approach to understanding human development, taking civilization not as a linear advance of progress, but rather as a progress in precision, paradoxically counteracted by a regression in mind: history as a contraction of mind. I describe three stages in the contraction of mind: 1) animate mind as the evolved outlook of foraging life; 2) anthropocentric mind as representing the contracting transformation of consciousness produced by agriculturally-based civilization; 3) mechanico-centric mind as representing a further contraction from human-centered to a machine-centered consciousness, produced by the rise of modern civilization and the mechanical scientific worldview. Hence, this progressive contraction is marked by a turn from original practical and reverential attunement to the living earth in hunting and gathering societies, or animate mind, to a narrower focus of anthropocentric mind beginning with the development of early civilizations, where the human element became central and the wild devalued. And it moves to an even more narrow focus of mechanico-centric mind, expanding out of late medieval Europe and the development of modern science, where the machine became model of the ultimate, the objectivist filter through which the world is to be understood and made to fit. Far from controlling nature, humans have been consuming it in an unsustainable Malthusian-like trajectory whose limits are being reached in our time. (shrink)

Rawls’s notion of civil disobedience, which still dominates the literature on this subject, comprises at least these three characteristics: it involves breaking the law, is non-violent and public. But implicit in this notion is a certain tension: it shows pessisimism about the proper functioning of the public sphere as earlier normal appeals have failed, but it also displays a certain optimism about its proper functioning as it assumes that civil disobedience may be effective. In my paper I argue that Rawls (...) cannot explain how civil disobedience may be effective as a public appeal for social justice because he does not fully understand what it means for civil disobedience to be public in relation to the public sphere. His analysis would require an additional notion of publicity which, as I argue, is the notion of hermeneutical publicity. From a Bourdieusian perspective I then make a case for the claim that public spheres always suffer from hermeneutic invisibility. This may explain why non-violent appeals for social justice fail as dialogical practices. Finally I suggest how we nevertheless could understand that civil disobedience can be effective as a dialogical practice. (shrink)