In this essay, I argue that Søren Kierkegaard’s oeuvre can be seen as a theater of ideas. This argument is developed in three steps. First, I will briefly introduce a theoretical framework for addressing the theatrical dimension of Kierkegaard’s works. This framework is based on a distinction between“performative writing strategies” and “categories of performativity.” As a second step, I will focus on Repetition: A Venture in Experimenting Psychology, by Constantin Constantius, one of the best examples of Kierkegaard’s innovative way of (...) doing philosophy. This strange and elusive book introduces the difficult and counter-intuitive notion of repetition. Repetition is a category of performativity that aims to activate the subjectivity of the reader. This performative effect is achieved by confronting the reader with an “unresolved”existential problem that is not yet drawn into clarity but is staged in all its confusions and contradictions. Kierkegaard’s pseudonym Constantius relies here on a performative writing strategy that is animated by a dialectic of advance and withdrawal. In the last and third step, I will analyze Constantius’s own reflection on the performative dimension of his text. Constantius has left several clues behind, each of which suggests that he deliberately developed a performative writing strategy. (shrink)

This article demonstrates a novel conceptualization of sublimity: the sublime in the pedestrian. This pedestrian mode of sublimity is exemplified by the Biblical Abraham, the central figure of Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous Fear and Trembling. It is rooted in the analysis of one of the foundational stories of the three monotheistic religions: Abraham’s averted sacrifice of his son Isaac. The defining feature of this new, pedestrian mode of sublimity is that is remains hidden behind what I call a total incognito. It is (...) similar to the classical ‘elevated mode of sublimity’ as developed by Burke, Kant, and Schiller insofar as it denotes two contrasting feelings at once: repulsion and attraction. It is different insofar as Kierkegaard’s pedestrian mode of sublimity remains hidden from view and can only be shown indirectly. This article expounds the new, pedestrian mode of sublimity by investigating the relation between the incognito and the sublime in Fear and Trembling. It achieves that goal by engaging three perspectives: (1) the sublime failure that comes to the fore in the incognitos of an imaginary Abraham; (2) the ‘fear without being afraid’ that is invoked by God’s incognitos; (3) the total incognito of the pedestrian which conceals Abraham’s sublimity. (shrink)

Privacy is valued by many. But what it means to have privacy remains less than clear. In this paper, I argue that the notion of privacy should be understood in epistemic terms. What it means to have (some degree of) privacy is that other persons do not stand in significant epistemic relations to those truths one wishes to keep private.

The Danish word 'incognito' means to appear in disguise, or to act under an unfamiliar, assumed name (or title) in order to avoid identification. As a concept, incognito occurs in several of Kierkegaard’s works, but only becomes a subject of reflection in two: the Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments by Johannes Climacus and Practice in Christianity by Anti-Climacus. Both pseudonyms develop the concept from their own perspective and must be understood on their own terms. Johannes Climacus treats incognito as (...) a category of existence, defining it as a comic contradiction that creates a disguise in order to hide and protect the inwardness of the existing individual. However, Anti-Climacus treats incognito as a category of communication. He defines it as “a sign of contradiction” that creates a disguise in order to activate and disclose the inwardness of a listener or reader. (shrink)

In almost all of his early works Gilles Deleuze is concerned with one and the same problem: the problem of genesis. In response to this problem, Deleuze argues for a system of heterogenesis. In this article, I argue that Deleuze’s system of heterogenesis operates on three levels: (1) the differential multiplicity of virtual Ideas; (2) the implied multiplicity of intensive dramas; (3) the extensive and qualitative diversity of actual concepts. As I hope to show, the relation between these three levels (...) can be explained in terms of the logic of expression that Deleuze develops in 'Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza.' In this way, I hope to gain clarity without losing nuance. The rather technical and abstract language of expression will become more concrete and understandable when it is understood in terms of intensive dramas, virtual Ideas and actual concepts. At the same time, the three levels of expression make it possible to show how these notions are interlinked. Accordingly, this article is divided in four parts. In the first part, I will explain how Deleuze takes up Kant’s discovery of the principle of difference as a reaction against the model of representation. The second part focuses on the two multiplicities (virtual Ideas and intensive dramas) that produce diversity (actual concepts). In the third part, these two multiplicities are linked to each other with the help of the logic of expression that Deleuze derives from Spinoza. The fourth, concluding part will connect the logic of expression to the complex dynamic of difference and repetition. (shrink)

This article discusses the possibility of a rationally justified choice between two options neither of which is better than the other while they are not equally good either (‘3NT’). Joseph Raz regards such options as incomparable and argues that reason cannot guide the choice between them. Ruth Chang, by contrast, tries to show that many cases of putative incomparability are instead cases of parity—a fourth value relation of comparability, in addition to the three standard value relations ‘better than’, ‘worse than’ (...) and ‘equally good as’. It follows, she argues, that many choice situations in which rationally justified choice seems precluded are in fact situations within the reach of practical reason. This article has three aims: (1) it challenges Chang’s argument for the possibility of parity; (2) it demonstrates that, even if parity would exist, its problematic implications for practical reason would not differ from those of Raz’s incomparability; (3) it discusses the underlying cause of hard cases of comparison: the fact that none of the three standard value relations applies (‘3NT’). It will be shown that the problematic implications for the rational justification of the choice are due to 3NT itself, irrespective of whether 3NT is explained as incomparability or parity. (shrink)

This essay discusses implications of incommensurability of values for justified decision-making, ethics and justice. Under particular conditions incommensurability of values causes what might be called ‘incomplete comparability’ of options. Some leading theorists interpret this in terms of ‘imprecise equality’ and ‘imprecise comparability.’ This interpretation is mistaken and conceals the implications of incommensurability for practical and ethical reasoning. The aim of this essay is to show that, in many cases, incommensurability prevents the assignment of determinate weights to competing values. This may (...) have problematic consequences for a complete and impartial justification of decisions concerning conflicting values to the extent that they depend on the need of weighing them. (shrink)

Amartya Sen argues that for the advancement of justice identification of ‘perfect’ justice is neither necessary nor sufficient. He replaces ‘perfect’ justice with comparative justice. Comparative justice limits itself to comparing social states with respect to degrees of justice. Sen’s central thesis is that identifying ‘perfect’ justice and comparing imperfect social states are ‘analytically disjoined’. This essay refutes Sen’s thesis by demonstrating that to be able to make adequate comparisons we need to identify and integrate criteria of comparison. This is (...) precisely the aim of a theory of justice (such as John Rawls’s theory): identifying, integrating and ordering relevant principles of justice. The same integrated criteria that determine ‘perfect’ justice are needed to be able to adequately compare imperfect social states. Sen’s alternative approach, which is based on social choice theory, is incapable of avoiding contrary, indeterminate or incoherent directives where plural principles of justice conflict. (shrink)

[Presented at the 52nd Annual Conference of the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (SPEP), University of Oregon, 24-26 October. Part of the panel Events, Actions and the Problem of Agency in the Wake of Deleuze’s Logic of Sense, organized in collaboration with Sean Bowden and James Williams.] In this paper I will bring the positions of Gilles Deleuze and Paul Ricoeur into proximity with each other in order to draw out points of conflict. I do not aim to solve (...) these conflicts, nor to develop them into a full clash. Rather, I will show that both Ricoeur and Deleuze develop a theory of novelty that can be characterized as a reversal of Platonism. These theories are not opposed per se, but they differ in orientation. Deleuze situates novelty in the virtual event. This virtual event can be understood as a singular point of transition that transforms one system into another. Or to catch the event in a somewhat more concrete image, it is a kind of metamorphosis (in Kafka’s sense). In contrast, Ricoeur situates novelty in human actions that are played out as a fruitful tension between two poles. This tension opens up a field of potentiality in which new ideas and novel meanings can emerge. Ricoeur has analysed this tension on many levels. Its most basic structure can be found in what Ricoeur calls a living metaphor. This living metaphor is itself something ‘in action’; it brings two opposed semantic fields into a fruitful tension with each other. This tension reveals a previously unnoticed proximity between these two semantic fields, without destroying their distance. In this way a new, third semantic field is opened up that is only given in potential. Ricoeur argues that it is within tensions like this that generative differences arise, resulting in new ideas and novel meanings. The main point of divergence between Deleuze and Ricoeur can therefore be framed in two contrasting pairs: virtual event versus human action; point of transition versus tension (or: metamorphosis versus metaphor). (shrink)

In this essay, I advance a reading of Philosophical Crumbs or a Crumb of Philosophy, published by Søren Kierkegaard under the pseudonym Johannes Climacus. I argue that this book is animated by a poetics of self-incrimination. Climacus keeps accusing himself of having stolen his words from someone else. In this way, he deliberately adopts the identity of a thief as an incognito. To understand this poetics of self-incrimination, I analyze the hypothetical thought-project that Climacus develops in an attempt to show (...) what it means to go further than Socrates. In my reading, I distinguish between a Socratic and a non-Socratic conception of education, both of which rely on an incognito. Socrates takes on the maieutic incognito of an ignorant bystander in order to force his interlocutors to turn inward so that the truth that is already within them can be born. In contrast, the non-Socratic education that Climacus advances as a hypothesis relies on what I call ‘the incognito as a true form’. It is an incognito insofar as it confronts the pupils with a paradox on which the understanding runs aground. It is a true form insofar as its immediate appearance is not a disguise, but a true form. This indirect mode of communication is necessary, without it pupils will not be able to encounter a truth that is not inherent within them. Climacus’ poetics of self-incrimination, I argue, tries to repeat this indirect mode of communication by adopting the incognito of a thief as a true form. (shrink)

From the beginning, Augustine's "Confessions" presents itself as a dialogue with God. Taking a cue from Ludwig Feuerbach’s "The Essence of Christianity [Das Wesen des Christentums]," this dialogue can easily be dismissed as a projection of the self. This would imply that the divine otherness is nothing more than a mirror of one’s own fears and preferences. “Does this critique,” I asked myself in this piece, “really do justice to a position like that of Augustine?” For a long time, I (...) did not know how to approach what I had — provisionally — called Augustine’s dialogue with God. It appeared to me that Augustine, in an accidental and indirect way, had re-invented the Platonic dialogue and had turned it into a new Christian genre. “It is true,” I told myself, “that the genre of the Confessions shows family resemblances with the hagiography and the autobiography. But most certainly it cannot be reduced to these genres.” The Greek words ‘hagios’ (holy) and ‘autos’ (self) are in flagrant contradiction with the intention of the Confessions. Augustine tries to stay clear of any claim of holiness and only highlights his own ‘self’ to immediately question it. “Is the Platonic dialogue,” I asked myself, “not a far more appropriate predecessor for Augustine’s dialogue with God?” Both types of dialogues can be seen as true dia logoi in which at least two different voices emerge. However, contrary to what one would expect, it is not the dialogue form itself that frames these two voices. Instead the two voices emerge within the discourse of a single speaker, incorporating true otherness within the discourse of the self. Building on these reflections, I explore how Augustine's dialogue with God succeeds in eluding Feuerbach's charge of self-projection. (shrink)

In this chapter I will concentrate on compromise in ethical conflict and disagreement. I will discuss compromises related to disagreement with respect to public decisions between options that represent conflicting incommensurable human values. The central question will be whether in those cases a principled compromise is possible. A ‘principled compromise’ can be defined as a rational way to achieve a trade-off or balance between conflicting values, for instance, by rational assignment of relative weights. I will argue that in some cases (...) incommensurability will prevent a principled compromise in the defined sense. I will show why phrases used by some philosophers, such as ‘making a rational trade-off’, ‘striking the right balance’, ‘finding the Aristotelian Mean’ or ‘splitting the difference’, are based on misunderstandings about the characteristics of incommensurable values that are usually at stake in the pursuit of a compromise. I will show that incommensurable values lack an equivalence relation and how this prevents a determinate trade-off or balance between them. This is especially important with respect to the pursuit of compromises in ethical conflicts, including conflicts of justice, where we need a rational and ethical justification for the final decision. I will argue that the model of deliberative democracy presents a promising procedure for making the final decision legitimate but that, in the relevant cases, it cannot avoid an ethical deficit. (shrink)

This paper seeks to initiate a theory of “imaginative dialogues” by articulating four dialogical principles that enable such a dialogue to occur. It is part of a larger project that takes the Socratic dialogue, a widely utilized conversation technique in philosophy education, as a starting point and aims to reinterpret it by shifting emphasis to the pre-reflective, pre-linguistic, and multimodal aspects of dialogues, involving both their verbal and embodied dimensions. To integrate the verbal dimensions of a dialogue with its more (...) elusive embodied dimensions, the paper will examine the notion ‘dialogue’ from the perspective of two different strategies. The first strategy chiefly focuses on the dialogic encounter. The ‘in-between’ of this dialogic encounter enables something to emerge that transcends the individual perspective of the speakers involved. The second strategy is primarily concerned with internal differentiation. The minor differences that constitute this internal differentiation, differentiate a dialogue from within. These strategies are not mutually exclusive but indicate a variation in starting point and orientation. This paper proposes to combine these two strategies by linking accounts of the productive moments in verbal dialogues to an account of the imaginative potential of embodied dialogues. This will enable the articulation of four dialogical principles (derived from Lev Yakubinsky, Oswald Ducrot, Martin Buber, and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz) through which an imaginative dialogue can proceed. (shrink)

-/- In Plato's work the "Sophist", Socrates, who typically occupies a central position in Plato's dialogues, is assigned a supporting role. This has led some scholars to argue for a shift in Plato's oeuvre, where he distances himself from Socrates and introduces a new main protagonist. However, this new protagonist remains unnamed and is only identified by his social position as Xenos, indicating that he is an outsider and a stranger whose identity is ambiguous. In this article, I argue that (...) Plato's decision to leave the character unnamed serves to raise a first problem: the question of whether this stranger is a friend or an adversary of philosophy. At the beginning of the dialogue, Socrates employs a series of references to Homer to bring into play a second problem: the problem of disguise. The third problem, “What is a sophist?”, is attributed to the Xenos. This is the only problem that is explicitly developed and is, therefore, the most prominent in the dialogue. If we relate these three problems to each other, it becomes clear that they represent contradictory intuitions without providing us with a strict criterion for deciding which of these intuitions is correct. By presenting these problems in their entanglement without providing a way out, Plato invites his readers to think without making explicit what the outcome of this thinking should be. -/- [In Dutch: In de "Sofist" speelt Sokrates, vaak het meest prominente personage in Plato’s dialogen, alleen maar een bijrol. Dit heeft veel interpreten ertoe verleid om een breuk in het oeuvre van Plato te postuleren, waarbij Plato afstand zou nemen van Sokrates ten behoeve van een nieuw personage. Ik zal echter laten zien dat Plato er bewust voor kiest om dit nieuwe personage naamloos te laten en hem alleen aan te duiden via zijn sociale positie als xenos (vreemdeling). Hiermee roept Plato, zo zal ik betogen, impliciet een eerste probleem op: is deze naamlo- ze Xenos een vriend of een vijand van de filosofie? Aan het begin van de dialoog wordt er door Sokrates een tweede probleem in spel gebracht: het probleem van de vermomming. Het derde probleem — ‘wat is een sofist?’ — wordt toegeschreven aan de Xenos. Dit is het enige probleem dat expliciet wordt uitgewerkt en is dan ook het meest prominent aanwezig in de dialoog. Als we deze drie problemen op elkaar betrekken dan wordt duidelijk dat ze tegenstrijdige intuïties vertolken, zonder dat we een strikt criterium krijgen aangereikt om te beslissen welke van deze intuïties de juiste is. Door deze problemen in een nog niet ontwarde kluwen te presenteren, nodigt Plato zijn lezers uit tot denken, zonder expliciet te maken wat de uitkomst van dit denken zou moeten zijn.]. (shrink)

In 1842, Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard published Repetition: A Venture in Experimenting Psychology under the pseudonym Constantin Constantius. In this complex and distinctive work, he introduced a novel approach to philosophical inquiry. In Gilles Deleuze’s apt summary, Kierkegaard invents “an incredible equivalent of theater within philosophy” and establishes repetition as “the fundamental category of the philosophy of the future.” -/- [In Dutch: In 1842 publiceert de Deense filosoof Søren Kierkegaard De herhaling: een proeve van experimenterende psychologie onder het pseudoniem Constantin (...) Constantius. In dit curieuze en eigenzinnige boek introduceert hij een nieuwe manier van filosofie bedrijven. Kierkegaard, zo vat Gilles Deleuze het treffend samen, verzint “een verbluffend equivalent van het theater in de filosofie” en maakt de herhaling tot “de fundamentele categorie van de filosofie van de toekomst”.]. (shrink)

Is the primary function of an educator to elucidate and convey their own knowledge? French philosopher Jacques Rancière demonstrates that an incidental experiment by Joseph Jacotot presents an alternative paradigm: the ignorant schoolmaster. In his work The Ignorant Schoolmaster: Five Lessons in Intellectual Emancipation [Le maître ignorant: cinq leçons sur l'émancipation intellectuelle], Rancière posits that the ignorant schoolmaster is equally, if not more, capable of instructing students compared to the knowledgeable educator. Rancière examines two educational methodologies: the conventional approach of (...) the knowledgeable educator who explicates and imparts knowledge, and the experimental approach of the ignorant schoolmaster who refrains from explanation and primarily focuses on verifying attentiveness. By providing a brief analysis of these two methodologies, this article aims to demonstrate how Rancière’s work can be utilized to construct a model for articulating the implicit theoretical principles in educational practices. This model is predicated on the following premise: by taking either a successful or a problematic educational practice as an example, one can articulate the theoretical principles inherent within it. The article hopes to facilitate a shift in focus from practices to principles, thereby offering a novel perspective on educational practices and enabling its theoretical explication......... [In Dutch: Bestaat de kernactiviteit van de meester erin om zijn eigen kennis uit te leggen en over te dragen? De Franse filosoof Jacques Rancière laat zien dat een gelegenheidsexperiment van Joseph Jacotot ons een ander voorbeeld aanreikt: de onwetende meester. In zijn boek De onwetende meester: vijf lessen over intellectuele emancipatie (Le maître ignorant: Cinq leçons sur l'émancipation intellectuelle) stelt hij dat de onwetende meester evengoed of zelfs beter in staat is leerlingen iets te leren dan de wetende meester. Rancière neemt in feite twee onderwijspraktijken als voorbeeld: de traditionele praktijk van de wetende meester die uitleg geeft en kennis overdraagt en de experimentele praktijk van de onwetende meester die geen uitleg geeft maar vooral gericht is op de verificatie van aandacht. In dit artikel wil ik op basis van een korte analyse van deze twee praktijken laten zien hoe we uit Rancière’s boek een model kunnen afleiden voor het articuleren van de theoretische principes die impliciet in onderwijspraktijken werkzaam zijn. Dit model is gestoeld op het volgende uitgangspunt: door een succesvolle of juist problematische onderwijspraktijk als voorbeeld te nemen kunnen we de theoretische principes articuleren die erin werkzaam zijn. Dit schept de mogelijkheid om de focus van de van de praktijken naar de principes te verleggen. Hierdoor wordt de onderwijspraktijk op een nieuwe manier inzichtelijk en kunnen we haar theoretisch expliciteren.]. (shrink)

Paul Valéry is the poet who maintains silence; the thinker who refuses to be a philosopher; the writer who takes language to court; the expert who insists on being an amateur; the mystic who seeks refuge in mathematics; the stutterer who suffers from an ailment of precision; the Narcissus who might have preferred to embody Orpheus. He is the chronicler of thought and the master of contradiction. I try to imagine him. It is 1894, Valery sits at his table, writing (...) in the notebooks in which he records his thoughts every morning "entre la lampe et le soleil," resulting in approximately 30,000 pages of unstructured incompleteness: the Cahiers. -/- [In Dutch] Paul Valéry is de dichter die zwijgt; de denker die weigert filosoof te zijn; de schrijver die de taal in staat van beschuldiging stelt; de expert die volhoudt een amateur te zijn; de mysticus die zijn heil zoekt bij de wiskunde; de stamelaar die aan een kwaal van precisie lijdt; de Narcissus die misschien toch liever Orpheus had willen zijn. Hij is de chroniqueur van het denken en de meester van de tegenspraak. Ik probeer me hem voor te stellen. Het is 1894 en hij zit gebogen te schrijven in de schriftjes waarin hij elk ochtend 'entre la lampe et le soleil' zijn denken fileert, een project dat uitmondde in ca. 30.000 bladzijden weerbarstige onvoltooidheid: de Cahiers. (shrink)

The focus of this essay is on conflicts of values and rival options in public decision-making, ethics and justice that seem to require us to balance the values or options against each other. The aim is to investigate implications of the so-called fourth value relation between competing valuable options for the possibility to weigh and balance them. The fourth value relation applies to many alternatives that represent important but conflicting or incompletely compatible human values. In this essay I will try (...) to show that in those cases it is implausible that relative weights and right balances can be determined or that they exist at all. The fourth value relation has significant implications for the resolution of the relevant value conflicts because it renders the answer to the question ‘what’s the right thing to do?’ indeterminate as far as this answer depends on comparative weights of the alternatives. (shrink)

For Kierkegaard the ‘psychological experiment’ is a literary strategy. It enables him to dramatize an existential conflict in an experimental mode. Kierkegaard’s aim is to study the source of movement that animates the existing individual (this is the psychological part). However, he is not interested in the representation of historical individuals in actual situations, but in the construction of fictional characters that are placed in hypothetical situations; this allows him to set the categories in motion “in order to observe completely (...) undisturbed what these require” without caring to what extent someone has met this requirement or is able to meet it (this is the experimental part). -/- The ‘psychological experiment’ is a category of indirect communication that is developed most extensively by Frater Taciturnus, the pseudonymous author of the third part of Stages on Life’s Way. (I) Taciturnus introduces the psychological experiment as a new trajectory in modern literature that offers an alternative to poetry and speculative drama. He develops this new trajectory in praxis (in the novella ‘“Guilty?”/“Not Guilty?” A Story of Suffering: A Psychological Experiment by Frater Taciturnus’) as well as in theory (in the ‘Letter to the Reader’ that accompanies his novella). (II) Two other pseudonymous authors further enrich the conceptual field of the psychological experiment. Constantin Constantius develops the notion ‘experimenting psychology’; Johannes Climacus reflects on the reader’s contemporaneity with the character. (shrink)

In the realm of the humanities, Paul Ricoeur (1913–2005) is widely viewed as one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century. He published an impressive and comprehensive oeuvre that made an impact on almost all areas of the humanities. By combining the resources and insights of phenomenology and hermeneutics, he developed new perspectives on the text, on metaphor, on narrative, and on personal identity that pervaded theology, history, linguistics, psychoanalysis, ethics,(philosophical) anthropology, cognitive sciences, and so on. In light (...) of his centennial in 2013, the question arises whether his theories have a future and can be extended to capture new phenomena studied in the humanities: What is the impact and meaning of the oeuvre of Paul Ricoeur for the humanities? In particular, one may develop this question as follows: Which of Ricoeur’s major contributions can be expected to remain relevant for the humanities? In what way can we relate Ricoeur’s oeuvre to ideas and methods of other philosophers and scientists? Does Ricoeur’s paradigm of the text still provide a relevant framework for thinking about the basic questions that concern the humanities today? If so, how can we bring Ricoeur’s perspective in a fruitful tension or dialogue with other, competing paradigms? (shrink)

Many religious, ideological and other beliefs are induced by upbringing. In ‘Paradoxes of Conviction’ G.A. Cohen asks why we persist in a belief, when we know we have this belief rather than a rival one, because we were brought up to believe it. Cohen adduces a syllogistic argument (named ‘the Argument’) that seems to demonstrate the irrationality of holding on to such a nurtured belief. If the Argument is right, it has far-reaching consequences because many nurtured religious and other beliefs (...) should then be abandoned as being irrational. This essay shows that the Argument is fallacious. (shrink)

Persons and nations agree on the importance of justice but disagree on its requirements. In The End of History and the Last Man Francis Fukuyama argues that human history moves towards liberal democracy as the final ideal for all societies. It is conceivable that liberal democratic societies will converge to similar conceptions of justice and that global spread of liberal democracies will promote consensus. This paper tries to show that consensus on justice is, nevertheless, unlikely, due to reasonable disagreement. Reason (...) does not give a single rational or reasonable solution to conflicting demands of justice. This means that apart from reason, other factors play a role in what is regarded as just. Jurisdiction is influenced by tradition and zeitgeist. This explains why also liberal democracies, which may recognize similar principles of justice, still arrive at differing rankings of these principles and divergent results of jurisdiction in time and place. (shrink)

There is uncertainty and disagreement about the question which preventive actions are rationally justified with regard to moderately elevated levels of nuclear radiation. This may have at least four causes: ignorance, insufficient information, inconclusiveness and indeterminability. After the nuclear disaster with the Fukushima nuclear power plant the advice, given by some authorities, to leave Tokyo was largely based on the former two factors: ignorance and insufficient information. By contrast, the uncertainty and disagreement amongst experts about the size of the area (...) to be evacuated was mainly caused by the latter two factors: inconclusiveness and indeterminability. Inconclusiveness concerns the question whether moderately elevated radiation levels cause real and significant health risks that require drastic measures. Indeterminability concerns the problem of rationally weighing disparate benefits and costs of the preventive measures, to wit, expected health benefits versus the costs and burdens of mass evacuation. The International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) recommends that no measures should be taken unless they produce a positive net benefit. Exposure to moderately increased levels of radiation may increase the risk of fatal cancer in the future, while mass evacuation has burdensome and disruptive consequences for the society and for the persons who have to leave their residential and/or working area for a long time. Ordering of mass evacuation seems rationally and ethically justified only if the expected future benefits outweigh the present and future burdens. Small or uncertain future health benefit may be outweighed by large costs and burdens of mass evacuation. Because we have to take into consideration not only public but also individual costs and benefits, it is important to take into account the personal absolute increase in health risk of elevated radiation in addition to relative risk. Unlike relative risk, absolute risk reveals the individual chance of getting a radiation-based disease. The increase in absolute risk – that is, the difference between the chances of getting the disease with and without the exposure to the increased level of radiation – is a useful measure to reveal the personal chance of health benefit from evacuation. This personal benefit must be balanced against the personal costs and burdens. The key question is which levels of radiation absorption and health risks outweigh the burdens of mass evacuation. There seems consensus amongst experts about the justification of mass evacuation in cases of expected individual radiation absorption > 500 mSv over a year. Similarly, experts agree that expected extra radiation absorption < 10 mSv does not justify mass evacuation. But between these two extremes there is a wide range of 50-fold increasing radiation levels in which it is not clear whether the personal and public benefits from mass evacuation outweigh the personal and public costs. This may partly explain why experts and authorities gave conflicting advice about the radius of the area around the Fukushima nuclear power plant within which people had to be evacuated. The uncertainty about the right thing to do with respect to a wide range of moderately elevated levels of radiation seems to be caused not only by inconclusiveness but also by indeterminability, that is, impossibility of determinately weighing disparate costs and benefits. (shrink)

This article develops a hermeneutic framework for analyzing the representation of imminent future threats. The framework will be derived from the later works of Paul Ricoeur, in which he employs the concept of 'imagination' rather than 'fantasy' (both originating from the Greek term phantasia). Ricoeur posits the significance of what shall be referred to as 'the site of initiative'. It is within this site of initiative that two types of events converge: events that happen to us and events that we (...) make happen. Furthermore, the site of initiative is constituted between two orders of imagination: the space of experience (reproductive) and the horizon of expectation (productive). To enhance the framework's relevance for political and social theory, it will be extended to incorporate Ricoeur's analysis of ideology and utopia. This extension facilitates a preliminary analysis of contemporary dystopias in which fears are exploited for political gain. It will be argued that these dystopias have the tendency to spur a society into arbitrary and unwarranted actions that eclipse the site of initiative. (shrink)

In Simultaneity and Delay: A Dialectical Theory of Staggered Time, the Canadian philosopher Jay Lampert challenges theories that define time in terms of absolute simultaneity and continuous succession. To counter these theories he introduces an alternative: the dialectic of simultaneity and delay. According to Lampert, this dialectic constitutes a temporal succession that is no longer structured as a continuous line, but that is built out of staggered time-flows and delayed reactions. The bulk of the book consists of an attempt to (...) give a conceptual order to the ‘unsystematic analyses of simultaneity and delay sprinkled through the history of philosophy’ (2). This conceptual analysis leads us through ancient (Plato and Plotinus), medieval (Origen) and late modern issues (Kant, Hegel and Lessing), as well as scientific discussions (Einstein, McTaggart), and culminates in the central chapter of the book, which attempts to show ‘how the problems of the great simultaneity philosophers - Husserl and Bergson - might be solved by the great delay philosophers - Derrida and Deleuze’ (147). In this review, I will focus on three points. 1. The problem of synchronization. 2. The problem of synthesis. 3. Theproblem of localization. (shrink)

The Netherlands has been known as one of the pioneers in the sharing economy. At the beginning of the 2010s, many local initiatives such as Peerby, SnappCar, and Thuisafgehaald launched that enabled consumers to share underused resources or provide services to each other. This was accompanied by a wide interest from the Dutch media, zooming in on the perceived social and environmental benefits of these platforms. Commercial platforms such as Uber, UberPop and Airbnb followed soon after. After their entrance to (...) the market, the societal debate about the impact of these platforms also started to include the negative consequences. Early on, universities and national research and policy institutes took part in these discussions by providing definitions, frameworks, and analyses. In the last few years, the attention has shifted from the sharing economy to the much broader defined platform economy. (shrink)

Is de herhaling mogelijk? Deze ogenschijnlijk simpele vraag vormt het uitgangspunt van De herhaling. Een proeve van experimenterende psychologie door Constantin Constantius (1843), een van de meest curieuze geschriften uit het oeuvre van Søren Kierkegaard. In dit artikel worden twee aspecten aan de orde gesteld die De herhaling tot een nog altijd belangrijk boek maken: 1) De ongewone filosofische stijl die in dit boek ontwikkeld wordt en 2) De eigenzinnige opvatting over vrijheid en subjectiviteit die er onder de noemer 'de (...) herhaling' in naar voren wordt gebracht. Zoals de ondertitel 'een proeve van experimenterende psychologie' al aangeeft, is De herhaling geen klassieke filosofische verhandeling waarin op systematische wijze wordt uitgelegd wat er onder de herhaling - als filosofische begrip - verstaan moet worden. Integendeel, het is een uiterst experimenteel boek waarin een nieuwe filosofische stijl wordt geïntroduceerd. Er wordt zodoende nergens een eenduidige definitie gegeven van de herhaling in filosofische zin die ik in het vervolg zal aanduiden als de 'existentiële herhaling'. Sterker nog, de twee verschijningsvormen van de herhaling - de alledaagse en de existentiële herhaling - worden telkens welbewust met elkaar verward. Pas in de afsluitende brief aan de echte lezer van dit boek wordt duidelijk in welke richting we het verschil tussen deze twee vormen van herhaling moeten zoeken. (shrink)

In philosophical discourse, the notion of freedom demands rigorous examination. Traditionally, a distinction has been made between negative freedom (freedom from external constraints that impede one's self-realization) and positive freedom (freedom to utilize one's own capabilities). In the essay "A Strange Freedom: New Meanings of Liberalism and Humanism in the 21st Century [De vreemde vrijheid. Nieuwe betekenissen van vrijzinnigheid en humanisme in de 21ste eeuw]," philosopher and theologian Laurens ten Kate proposes a conceptualization of freedom that transcends this traditional dichotomy. (...) This is a creative freedom that is no longer bound to self-realization, but manifests itself precisely at the moment when the self is called into question. -/- The approximately seventy-page essay was published by Sjibbolet Publishers, a small, independent publishing house that emphasizes hermeneutics and is mostly known for publishing several translations of Giorgio Agamben's works into Dutch. In addition to these translations, Sjibbolet also publishes original Dutch-language philosophical works that merit inclusion in this category. The name Sjibbolet is derived from the work of Jacques Derrida and denotes the boundary between the self and the other. As the title "The Strange Freedom" suggests, this essay also explores this boundary. It is an expanded version of Ten Kate's inaugural address, delivered upon accepting the chair of Liberal Religiosity and Humanism [Vrijzinnige religiositeit en humanism]. Two closely intertwined themes are central to the work: the liberal condition and alien freedom. -/- In the Dutch word "vrijzinnigheid [liberal]” the root word "vrijheid [freedom]" is already present, accompanied by the root word "zin [sense]." In the first part of his essay, Ten Kate focuses primarily on sense in relation to what he terms the liberal condition. He states, "Freedom is not primarily a choice of a particular philosophy of life, but a situation to which everyone participates to some extent and to which one must relate (...)." According to Ten Kate, this is the situation in which the meaning of human life is no longer given nor received from above, but must be constructed. (shrink)

Willem Witteveen, a member of the Upper House for the Dutch Labour Party and professor at Tilburg University, was among the passengers on the MH17 aircraft that crashed in eastern Ukraine in July 2014. Prior to this tragic incident, he had submitted the manuscript of “De wet als kunstwerk [The Law as a Work of Art]”. The posthumous edition of the book has been augmented with a foreword by his son, Freek Witteveen, and a series of collages and miniatures. Consequently, (...) it serves as a tribute and memorial to a distinguished jurist and esteemed politician. In his book, Witteveen presents a measured critique of the neoliberal ideology that has predominated in Dutch society for numerous years and has been embraced by both conservative and progressive political factions. He posits that this ideology demonstrates limited regard for the law as an end in itself, instead primarily utilizing the law as a means for addressing social issues: 'As soon as someone discovers the possibility of establishing rules, whether or not enforced with power or carried by authority, the temptation arises to see the rule as a solution to a problem, as the instrument in the hands of the community to make the problem manageable.' (450) Witteveen problematizes this inclination by examining the central metaphor underlying it: the metaphor of the tool. In this context, the laws enacted by the legislature are analogous to the tools employed by a craftsman, such as a mechanic or carpenter. [in Dutch: Willem Witteveen, Eerste Kamerlid voor de PvdA en hoogleraar in Tilburg, was een van de inzittenden van het passagiersvliegtuig MH17 dat in juli 2014 neerstortte in Oost-Oekraïne. Vlak voor deze tragische vlucht had hij het manuscript van De wet als kunstwerk ingeleverd. De postume uitgave van het boek is uitgebreid met een voorwoord van zoon Freek Witteveen en een serie collages en miniaturen. Het functioneert zodoende als eerbetoon en nagedachtenis aan een begaafd jurist en een bevlogen politicus. In zijn boek verzet Witteveen zich op ingetogen wijze tegen de neoliberale ideologie die de Nederlandse samenleving al vele jaren domineert en die door zowel de rechter als de linkerflank van de politiek is omhelsd. Volgens hem heeft deze ideologie weinig oog voor de wet als een doel op zichzelf, maar gebruikt ze de wet vooral als middel voor het oplossen van maatschappelijke problemen: ‘Zodra iemand de mogelijkheid ontdekt om regels vast te stellen, al dan niet met macht gehandhaafd of door gezag gedragen, doet zich de verleiding voor om de regel als een oplossing van een probleem te zien, als het instrument dat de gemeenschap in handen heeft om het probleem hanteerbaar te maken.’ (450) Witteveen problematiseert deze impuls door te kijken naar de centrale metafoor die eraan ten grondslag ligt: de metafoor van het gereedschap. Hierin worden de wetten van de wetgever vergeleken met het gereedschap van een ambachtsman, zoals een monteur of timmerman.]. (shrink)

In Kierkegaard and the Staging of Desire: Rhetoric and Performance in a Theology of Eros Carl S. Hughes develops an original approach to Søren Kierkegaard’s religious writings. As is well known, Kierkegaard published these religious writings under his own name. Some interpreters take this to mean that he no longer relies on the poetics of indirect communication that underlies his pseudonymous works. According to them, the religious writings finally formulate Kierkegaard’s true views in a direct and unambiguous way. Others have (...) suggested that these religious writings are just as indirect as all the others. Hughes belongs to the second camp. In his illuminating book, he convincingly shows that the indirect method of writing is not undermining the religious content of Kierkegaard’s works, as is feared by many interpreters from the first camp, but is essential for sustaining it. That is why Hughes believes that Kierkegaard’s indirect mode of writing is of vital importance for contemporary theology as a discipline. (shrink)

In this rich and impressive new book, Henry Somers- Hall gives a nuanced analysis of the philosophical relationship between G. W. F. Hegel and Gilles Deleuze. He convincingly shows that a serious study of Hegel provides an improved insight into Deleuze’s conception of pure difference as the transcendental condition of identity. Somers- Hall develops his argument in three steps. First, both Hegel and Deleuze formulate a critique of representation. Second, Hegel’s proposed alternative is as logically consistent as Deleuze’s. Third, Deleuze (...) can account for evolution, whereas Hegel cannot. (shrink)

In 'Literature Suspends Death: Sacrifice and Storytelling in Kierkegaard, Kafka and Blanchot' Chris Danta takes Genesis 22 as the starting point for an investigation of the role of literary imagination. His aim is to read the Genesis story from a literary-theoretical perspective in order to show how it can 'illuminate the secular situation of the literary writer.' To do this, Danta stages a fruitful confrontation between Søren Kierkegaard as defender of religion and inwardness and Franz Kafka and Maurice Blanchot as (...) defenders of literature. In this review, three important points in this confrontation are highlighted. 1. The problem of identification. 2. The moment of substitution. 3. The spectrality of the writer. (shrink)

In his new book ‘When the Grain of Wheat Doesn't Die. A Philosophical Archaeology of Revelation, Ruud Welten examines the concept of revelation from a philosophical, rather than a religious perspective. The focus is not on a higher power revealing itself to humanity, but on the revelation of human nature itself. Central to this examination is the phenomenological question regarding the nature of appearance. The primary concern is not what appears, but rather how the appearance itself occurs. Welten posits that (...) the notion of revelation and religious discourse surrounding it elucidate fundamental aspects of this phenomenological inquiry. -/- Interestingly, the seemingly peculiar title ‘When the Grain of Wheat Doesn't Die’ remains unexplained within the text. Those familiar with the New Testament will recognize a reference to the parable of the grain of wheat described in John 12:24: " Most assuredly, I say to you, unless a grain of wheat falls into the ground and dies, it remains alone; but if it dies, it produces much grain. He who loves his life will lose it, and he who hates his life in this world will keep it for eternal life." The core principle underlying this parable is that new possibilities emerge only through risking or relinquishing the old. The title thus alludes to a structure reminiscent of Christian concepts of rebirth or conversion, wherein a rupture with existing frameworks creates an opening for a new mode of existence. The question arises as to how this structure relates to the research described in the subtitle as "A Philosophical Archaeology of Revelation." -/- The subtitle first specifies a particular method ("a philosophical archaeology") and subsequently indicates the subject under investigation using this method ("revelation"). Archaeology as a philosophical method has gained prominence following Foucault's work. However, Welten employs the term archaeology not primarily in the Foucauldian sense, but rather views phenomenology and psychoanalysis as forms of archaeology that aim to uncover elements previously obscured from view. Upon initial examination, the metaphor of the grain of wheat and that of archaeology appear somewhat incongruous. Archaeology suggests the unearthing of the hidden, the revelation of an origin that has been obscured. The sowing of a grain, conversely, appears more indicative of something buried and concealed, deposited in the ground to facilitate the genesis of something new. For Welten, however, the point is that in both cases something must first be taken away before a new opening can occur that disrupts the existing order. This is exemplified in one case by the dying of the grain, and in the other, by the removal of the barren leaves. (shrink)

“According to the principle by which it is only in the burning house that the fundamental architectural problem becomes visible for the first time, art, at the furthest point of its destiny, makes visible its original project.” The Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben, in the final sentence of his book The Man Without Content (L'uomo senza contenuto), just quoted, compares the current state of art to a burning house. At the same time, he points out that precisely at this moment of (...) absolute crisis, we can regain sight of the original stakes of art. Man Without Content, Agamben's most explicit contribution to the philosophy of art, is his debut. The book was first published in 1970 and reissued in 1994. Almost 35 years later, in 2014, he published the collection of essays Il fuoco e il racconto, which was recently translated into English under the title The Fire and the Tale. Although Agamben often focuses on literature in this collection of stand-alone essays, it can be read as a further elaboration of his philosophy of art. This philosophy of art can be summarized as a poetics of inoperativity, which at the same time implies a certain politics. To figure out how to understand Agamen's philosophy of art, this review will place this poetics in the broader framework of The Man Without Content. (shrink)

In Chronopathologies, the Australian philosopher Jack Reynolds gives an exciting analysis of the intimate connection between time and politics in three trajectories of contemporary philosophy: analytic philosophy, poststructuralism and phenomenology. These trajectories are incompatible in the sense that internalizing the norms of any one of them 'makes taking the other(s) seriously very difficult' (p. 225). Given this incompatibility, Reynolds convincingly argues that the only way forward is to draw out the differences between these trajectories, in order to address the problems (...) and limitations of each from the perspective of the others. Reynolds's fruitful approach uncovers that each trajectory is threatened by a disease of time or 'chronopathology' (a key term that is never fully defined). Such a chronopathology can be characterized as a pathological condition that is the result of two factors: the reduction of the plurality of time to only one of its dimensions; a biased and one-sided view on ethics and politics. Reynolds convincingly identifies the root of the threat. He develops his diagnosis in three steps. 1. Analytic philosophy over-emphasizes the synchronic dimension of time, without making any room for its diachronic dimension. 2. Poststructuralism acknowledges the necessity of a reciprocal relation between the synchronic and the diachronic dimension of time, but ultimately privileges the latter (i.e., the relation remains asymmetrical). 3. An embodied phenomenology opens up a way to bring the synchronic and diachronic dimension of time in a reciprocal and symmetrical relation that does not privilege the one over the other. (shrink)

Hub Zwart's latest book, "The Truth on the Wall: A Psychoanalysis of Knowledge," establishes compelling connections between the literary and the scientific imagination. The author explores how seemingly fantastical literary tropes can serve as reflections of scientific progress. A notable example is the vampire archetype, traditionally depicted as a nocturnal, undead entity that sustains itself by consuming the blood of the living. This imagery, Zwart argues, can be interpreted as a metaphorical representation of scientific developments. He analyzes the central motif (...) of blood exchange between vampire and victim as an allegory for the scientific discourse surrounding blood transfusion in the late 19th century. During this period, blood transfusion posed significant challenges due to the undiscovered nature of blood groups. Furthermore, Zwart draws parallels between vampire-hunting strategies and scientific efforts to combat mysterious, potentially epidemic diseases, viewing both as attempts to control unknown and threatening forces. -/- [In Dutch: In "De waarheid op de wand: psychoanalyse van het weten", het nieuwste boek van Hub Zwart, worden de literaire en de wetenschappelijke verbeelding op inspirerende wijze aan elkaar gekoppeld. Zo blijkt het schijnbaar fantastische beeld van de vampier, de levende dode die in de nachtelijke uren tevoorschijn komt om zich te voeden met het bloed van de levenden, gelezen te kunnen worden als een reflectie op wetenschappelijke ontwikkelingen. De eerste associatie die het beeld van de vampier oproept, de uitwisseling van bloed tussen prooi en slachtoffer, interpreteert Zwart als een verbeelding van het wetenschappelijke debat over bloedtransfusie aan het eind van de 19e eeuw. Bloedtransfusie was destijds nog zeer problematisch omdat men nog niet wist van het bestaan van bloedgroepen. De strategieën die worden ingezet bij het bestrijden van vampiers, ziet Zwart als een beeld voor het wetenschappelijke gevecht tegen onbekende, geheimzinnige ziektes die uit kunnen groeien tot een nauwelijks te bestrijden epidemie. (shrink)

Worker well-being is a hot topic in organizations, consultancy and academia. However, too often, the buzz about worker well-being, enthusiasm for new programs to promote it and interest to research it, have not been accompanied by universal enthusiasm for scientific measurement. Aim to bridge this gap, we address three questions. To address the question ‘What is worker well-being?’, we explain that worker well-being is a multi-facetted concept and that it can be operationalized in a variety of constructs. We propose a (...) four-dimensional taxonomy of worker well-being constructs to illustrate the concept’s complexity and classify ten constructs within this taxonomy. To answer the question ‘How can worker well-being constructs be measured?’, we present two aspects of measures: measure obtrusiveness (i.e., the extent to which obtaining a measure interferes with workers’ experiences) and measure type (i.e., closed question survey, word, behavioral and physiological). We illustrate the diversity of measures across our taxonomy and uncover some hitherto under-appreciated avenues for measuring worker well-being. Finally, we address the question ‘How should a worker well-being measure be selected?’ by discussing conceptual, methodological, practical and ethical considerations when selecting a measure. We summarize these considerations in a short checklist. It is our hope that with this study researchers – working in organizations, in academia or both – will feel more competent to find effective strategies for the measurement worker well-being and eventually make policies and choices with a better understanding of what drives worker well-being. (shrink)

The article outlines the Multiple-Field-Approach ("Mehr-Felder-Ansatz") in Gestalt Theoretical Psychotherapy and in psychotherapy in general. This Gestalt theory based approach deals 1) with the conditions under which a secondary phenomenal field (containing a secondary phenomenal ego and a secondary phenomenal environment) segregates within the primary phenomenal field, 2) with the dynamic field interaction between primary and secondary field and their role in psychotherapy, 3) with psychotherapeutic techniques favouring the segregation and favouring the dissolution of a secondary field . Some (...) of these phenomena have been discussed as mind-wandering, daydreaming, or - in a pathological context - as dissociation. But it seems that the Gestalt psychological approach presented in this paper has to offer a more promising framework for these phenomena and their dynamics. (shrink)

Der Artikel beschäftigt sich mit dem englischen Philosophen Alfred North Whitehead und mit dem Vorstellungshintergrund, der seiner Philosophie zugrundeliegt. Der direkte Hintergrund seiner Philosophie ist die moderne Physik seit Michael Faraday und Maxwell, die als erste auf die elektromagnetischen Wellen und Schwingungen und Beziehungsgeflechte hingewiesen haben, die zwischen den Dingen liegen und die von Albert Einstein "Felder" genannt wurden. Wie sie aussehen, wissen wir bis heute nicht so genau, weil es Modellvorstellungen sind, deren Realität eigentlich nur durch Messungen belegt (...) ist. Das was zwischen den Dingen passiert ist später zu einer Hauptidee von Albert Einstein geworden, man denke nur an die Gravitationswellen, die erst vor wenigen Jahren entdeckt wurden. Einstein hatte sie vorausgesehen oder vorhergesagt. Die Quantenphysik ist voll von Wechselwirkungen zwischen den Objekten und von Verschränkungen, von Quantenverschränkungen. Deshalb spricht der Quantenphysiker Carlo Rovelli seit dem Jahre 2000 von einer "relationalen Quantenphysik". Diese Art von Relationen stellen den Hintergrund der Philosophie Whiteheads dar. (shrink)

Die moderne Physik besteht nicht nur aus neuen Entdeckungen und Erfindungen, sondern auch aus ganz neuen Denkweisen und Sichtweisen, bei denen nicht mehr die Objekte im Mittelpunkt stehen, sondern das, was zwischen den Dingen passiert: Verbindungen zwischen den Dingen, Verschränkungen, Zusammenhänge, energetische Felder, Übergänge,.

Title: "A Rose for Emily" ("Een roos voor Emily") Author: William Faulkner Translators: Martijn Boven and Maarten Jansen Original language: English Target language: Dutch -/- William Faulkner's "A Rose for Emily", presented her in a Dutch translation, was first published in 1930, in the April issue of Forum magazine. By 1930, Faulkner had already authored four novels; however, "A Rose for Emily" marked his debut in the short story genre. While not as experimental as his novels The Sound and (...) the Fury and Absalom, Absalom!, it nonetheless incorporates certain characteristic Faulknerian elements, such as an unconventional narrative perspective and a non-linear chronology. Consistent with the majority of Faulkner's oeuvre, this narrative is situated in the fictional Southern setting to which Faulkner gave the name Yoknapatawpha County. -/- [In Dutch: Wiliam Faulkners 'Een roos voor Emily’ (‘A Rose for Emily’) werd voor het eerst gepubliceerd in 1930, in het aprilnummer van het tijdschrift Forum. Faulkner had in 1930 al vier romans op zijn naam staan, maar ‘Een roos voor Emily’ was het eerste korte verhaal dat hij publiceerde. Het is niet zo experimenteel als zijn romans The Sound and the Fury (Het geraas en gebral) en Absalom, Absalom! Desondanks bevat het toch enkele karakteristieke Faulkneriaanse elementen, zoals een ongebruikelijk vertel perspectief en een gefragmenteerde chronologie. Net als het merendeel van Faulkners oeuvre speelt ook dit verhaal zich af in het fictionele Zuiden waar Faulkner de naam Yoknapatawpha County aan gaf."]. (shrink)

This paper defends the claim that social scientists who are interested in the study of institutions should not conduct fights about the meaning of the terms "institution", "organization" and the other terms that are used in the theory of institutions. They should instead concentrate on constructing theories in order to explain the phenomena they are interested in. Defining the terms that one wants to use is a legitimate part of the theoretical endeavor, but it is by no means as important (...) as most institutional theorists tend to think. The paper argues in favor of this claim by drawing on a relevant discussion in the philosophy of science which deals with the role of definitions in the process of constructing a theoretical system. (shrink)

Die Skeptikerin fragt, wie wir ausschließen können, dass all unsere Erlebnisse auf einem umfassenden Traum beruhen. Träfe ihre Befürchtung zu, dann wären alle unsere Meinungen über die äußere Welt falsch, und da wir das nicht ausschließen können, haben wir (so folgert sie) keinerlei Wissen über die Welt. Um dem zu begegnen, könnte man der Skeptikerin vorwerfen, dass sie unsere gemeinsame Sprache missbraucht. Welche Wörter missbraucht sie? Welche Wörter gebraucht sie so anders, dass wir uns um ihre Überlegung nicht scheren müssen? (...) Ich spiele das sprachkritische Manöver gegen die Skeptikerin zunächst anhand des Wissensbegriffs durch (und komme zu dem Ergebnis, dass wir nicht klar genug sagen können, worin die unstrittige Bedeutung des Wortes "Wissen" besteht). Dann versuche ich es mit weniger tiefsinnigen Wörtern wie "Tiger". Wer stets träumt, gebraucht solche Wörter anders als wir, so die Überlegung. Dieser Gedanke funktioniert nur, wenn wir die Existenz von Außenwelt-Dingen voraussetzen dürfen; und diese Voraussetzung bestreitet die Skeptikerin. Daher spiele ich das sprachkritische Manöver zuguterletzt anhand des Traumbegriffs durch. Jemand kann das Wort "Traum" überhaupt nur dann gelernt haben, wenn er manchmal, aber nicht immer geträumt hat. Ergebnis: Entweder ich verstehe das Wort "Traum". Dann träume ich nicht seit jeher. Oder ich verstehe das Wort nicht. Dann brauche ich mich vom Traum-Argument auch nicht an meinen Wissens-Ansprüchen irre machen zu lassen. (shrink)