This is an updated and expanded version of my book “Our Incorrigible Ontological Relations and Categories of Being”, originally published in 2017. The subject matter of this version includes other innate a priori constituents of knowledge. Among the main conclusions arrived is that reality is para-rational in nature. The work can thus be said to be about the role in cognition of innate information of the sensorial and of the structure of the non-sensorial rational aspect of a para-rational reality. This (...) augmented version preserves the previous content of the former book, but also addresses the innate a priori forms with which the intellect responds to sensorial activation and represents to itself the sensorily given -that is, what acts in our senses- and the forms with which it represents or makes patent to itself the things in the world which do not act on our sensory organs, such as the feeling brought forth by beauty or the emotion of the sublime in mystical experiences, and how these too, constitute a limit to possible knowledge. As the former version it refers to the innate a priori information about reality in itself, with which the intellect makes possible its cognition, yet also constrains our possible knowledge of what there is to the rational aspect of what exists. As shown in this work, the information they provide, no matter the extent of empirical data, does not suffice to explain reality, which makes necessary to presuppose the existence of, either a higher order of reality beyond the rational cognitive reach, or that the nature of what is judged rational reality be a mere aspect of what there is. In other words, that mankind is doomed to have a mere glimpse of what exists and its nature, and totally unable to attain an ultimate explanation of reality. August 16, 2023 . (shrink)

Concebir los derechos como una protección no-paternalista de los intereses de sus titulares supone aceptar que su aspecto más relevante consiste en la provisión de una competencia para renunciar o consentir su inobservancia por terceros, lo cual no tiene por qué coincidir con la mejor estimación de sus intereses, aun cuando estos últimos juegan un papel importante en la justificación de las posiciones jurídicas implicadas. A partir de la tesis de la correlatividad, los conceptos jurídicos fundamentales de W.N. Hohfeld y (...) una tesis de la combinación que armoniza los elementos de la voluntad e interés en la explicación de los derechos, en el presente artículo se tratará de mostrar por qué afirmar el carácter inalienable de los derechos contradice la función que estos desempeñan en los ordenamientos jurídicos modernos. // The understanding of rights as non-paternalistic protections of its holder’s concerns entails that the most important aspect of them is the provision of a power either to waive or to consent their encroachment by others, which does not necessarily coincide with the best appraisal of his/her interests, even when they play an important role in the justification of the subjective legal positions. From the correlativity thesis, the fundamental legal conceptions devised by W.N. Hohfeld and a combination thesis that merges the elements of will and interest in the explanation of rights, I will try to show why to stand up for the inalienable character of rights contradicts the function they perform in modern legal systems. (shrink)

Seen from the point of view of evaluation conditions, a usual way to obtain a connexive logic is to take a well-known negation, for example, Boolean negation or de Morgan negation, and then assign special properties to the conditional to validate Aristotle’s and Boethius’ Theses. Nonetheless, another theoretical possibility is to have the extensional or the material conditional and then assign special properties to the negation to validate the theses. In this paper we examine that possibility, not sufficiently explored in (...) the connexive literature yet.We offer a characterization of connexive negation disentangled from the cancellation account of negation, a previous attempt to define connexivity on top of a distinctive negation. We also discuss an ancient view on connexive logics, according to which a valid implication is one where the negation of the consequent is incompatible with the antecedent, and discuss the role of our idea of connexive negation for this kind of view. (shrink)

Entre las virtudes de la explicación de Gewirth, destaca su potencial para delimitar el objeto de los derechos humanos y contener la expansión incontrolada del discurso de los derechos. Al ceñirse al contexto de la acción y a los rasgos necesarios para la agencia intencional, dicha explicación proporciona un fundamento basado en la autonomía y libertad de los agentes intencionales prospectivos, tan solo limitadas por aquellas exigencias racionales derivadas de la igual consideración del status moral de todos los demás agentes (...) intencionales prospectivos quienes, en última instancia, se identifican con la humanidad en su conjunto mediante las ideas implícitas de reciprocidad y responsabilidad moral por los actos propios. En definitiva, el argumento de Gewirth desemboca en el PCG para proporcionar un fundamento racional de los derechos humanos limitado a la estructura normativa de la acción, la agencia intencional prospectiva potencial o actual de todos los seres humanos y los bienes necesarios para la acción intencional: la libertad y el bienestar. (shrink)

For some time now we have noticed an increasing scepticism regarding the effectiveness of democracy, and its ability to represent citizens through elections. Elections are the central mechanism of political decision taking. However, there is a clear tendency to exploit electo­ rial processes by populist politicians. The ancient ideal of paideia was to educate citizens by following a civic program. Its aim was to enable the citizen to exercise the civil rights and duties. Since the 1970s, however, we had observed (...) two contrasting tendencies: a growth of individualization, and a ecrease of the level of civic education. In the 1990s populist politi­ cal parties entered the political scene of European democracies, some of which have man­ aged to establish a mob rule or ochlocracy (ὀχλοκρατία). Since then, ochlocratic parties have systematically intended to win the votes of politically less educated citizens by offering them a simplified political discourse. In fact, these parties have managed to neutralize the two­party system in many European countries. Thus they managed to block majority­based governments, forcing parties to form coalitions with ideologically opposing smaller parties. This has created a situation in which the “punishment vote” becomes the mean to gain the votes of undecided people who may be characterized as rebels without political culture. (shrink)

It is widely held that there is a distinctive norm of assertion. A plausible idea is that there is an analogous, perhaps weaker, norm for indirect communication via implicatures. I argue against this type of proposal. My claim is that the norm of assertion is a social norm governing public updates to the conversational record. Off the record implicatures are not subject to social norms of this type. I grant that, as happens in general with intentional actions, off the record (...) communicative acts may be subject to normative assessments on different levels (for instance, regarding their moral or prudential appropriateness). However, such assessments do not generate distinctive norms that apply to all cases of implicature. (shrink)

In times of climate change and public debt, a concern for intergenerational justice should lead us to have a closer look at theories of intergenerational justice. It should also press us to provide institutional design proposals to change the decision-making world that surrounds us. This book provides an exhaustive overview of the most important institutional proposals as well as a systematic and theoretical discussion of their respective features and advantages. It focuses on institutional proposals aimed at taking the interests of (...) future generations more seriously, and does so from the perspective of applied political philosophy, being explicit about the underlying normative choices and the latest developments in the social sciences. It provides citizens, activists, firms, charities, public authorities, policy-analysts, students, and academics with the body of knowledge necessary to understand what our institutional options are and what they entail if we are concerned about today's excessive short-termism. (shrink)

Our goal in this paper is to articulate a precise concept of at least a certain kind of disease-mongering, showing how pharmaceutical marketing can commercially exploit certain diseases when their best definition is given through the success of a treatment in a clinical trial. We distinguish two types of disease-mongering according to the way they exploit the definition of the trial population for marketing purposes. We argue that behind these two forms of disease-mongering there are two well-known problems in the (...) statistical methodology of clinical trials (the reference class problem and the distinction between statistical and clinical significance). Overcoming them is far from simple. (shrink)

Diversas fuentes culturales explican los orígenes del marcado individualismo imperante en nuestras sociedades actuales. Posiblemente, una de las manifestaciones más aclamadas de este individualismo sea la primacía de la autonomía individual, elemento clave en la articulación y fundamentación de las posiciones jurídicas subjetivas presentes en la práctica totalidad de los ordenamientos jurídicos contemporáneos, y como resultado de la expansión de la cultura occidental. Sin embargo, en ocasiones, el peso otorgado a la autonomía se antoja desproporcionado, especialmente cuando conduce a la (...) inobservancia, ya sea total o parcial, del bien común o alguna de sus manifestaciones, presupuesto de toda relación social y exigencia del principio de justicia. Junto a la autonomía, en tanto que elemento necesario para el florecimiento individual, la búsqueda del bien común debe asimismo servir a la configuración de los diversos instrumentos de decisión política y jurídica que regulan la vida en común, lo que requiere el justo equilibrio de los intereses en juego, tal y como aconseja el principio de proporcionalidad. El paradigma de las enfermedades contagiosas proporciona un claro ejemplo de lo anterior, pues la protección de la salud pública, entendida como una manifestación del bien común, no solo justifica, sino que incluso exige la restricción de ciertas posiciones jurídicas subjetivas que sirven a la especificación de la autonomía individual de sus titulares. (shrink)

Political theorists have recently sought to replace the liberal, contractual theory of the firm with a political view that models the authority relation of employee to firm, and its appropriate regulation, on that of subject to state. This view is liable to serious difficulties, however, given existing discontinuities between corporate and civil authority as to their coerciveness, entry and exit conditions, scope, legal standing, and efficiency constraints. I here inspect these, and argue that, albeit in some cases significant, such discontinuities (...) fail to undermine the firm/state analogy, either because they are not significant enough to do so or because the particular trait on which they hinge is not decisive for how authority, in the state and in the firm, should be regulated to be legitimate. A pro tanto requirement exists, I thus argue, that corporate authority be held to regulatory norms comparable to those legitimate states abide by, including civil liberties, rule-of-law constraints, and accountability to subjects. (shrink)

The idea that appearances provide justifications for beliefs—the principle of phenomenal conservatism—is self-evidently true. In the case of cognitive penetration, however, it seems that certain irrational etiologies of a belief may influence the epistemic quality of that belief. Susanna Siegel argues that these etiologies lead to ‘epistemic downgrade.’ Instead of providing us with a decisive objection, cognitive penetration calls for us to clarify our epistemic framework by understanding the formative parts of appearances. In doing so, the two different but inseparable (...) ideas of sensation and intellection provide us with a basis of our appearances. These appearances, in turn, provide us with the objective evidence needed to test our judgements. Thus, the extra-sensory concepts of intellectual identification and the appearances they help form become an epistemic groundwork. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that, contrary to scholarly consensus, Antonio Caso draws inspiration from important principles and ideas from Kant’s philosophy in his critique of positivism. I first examine the prima facie textual reasons why someone might believe that Caso and Kant are philosophical enemies. To contradict this notion, I proceed by noting and developing three core ideas that the two share in common. First, Caso and Kant are both ardent critics of dogmatic philosophizing. Second, both Caso and Kant (...) carve out special room for intuition in their respective accounts of cognition, resisting the idea that the understanding has a more prominent role in the formation of knowledge. Third, Kant’s doctrine of aesthetic judgment paves the way for Caso’s de-intellectualized aesthetics. In the end, we see that Kant and Caso are closer to being philosophical friends than enemies. (shrink)

A partir de los postulados de una concepción semántica de norma y su clasificación en reglas y principios, Robert Alexy ha enunciado una tesis fuerte de la separación, al concebir que entre ambos tipos de normas no solo existe una diferencia gradual, sino también cualitativa. En este contexto, los principios son descritos como mandatos de optimización, caracterizados por un cumplimiento gradual en atención a las posibilidades reales y jurídicas, y a través de la denominada técnica de la ponderación. A pesar (...) de las objeciones recibidas, la vigencia de esta tesis resulta incuestionable, sirviendo todavía de inspiración a las nuevas generaciones de juristas interesados en la Teoría del Derecho. En el presente capítulo se pretende exponer de manera sucinta pero precisa los postulados del principialismo alexyano, las críticas más recurrentes y sus posibles respuestas, para terminar con algunas notas interpretativas que persiguen contribuir a la continuación del camino trazado por el insigne profesor alemán. (shrink)

El consentimiento informado del paciente se inserta en el ámbito de su autonomía decisoria. Aunque presenta un sustrato corporal, este aparece combinado con elementos de índole moral que presuponen una noción concreta de persona como libre y autónoma. Tanto de las definiciones doctrinales como del material normativo se desprende que se trata de una posición jurídica subjetiva del paciente, alternativamente calificada como una “pretensión” o “derecho subjetivo en sentido estricto”, en términos hohfeldianos; un “derecho negativo de defensa”, o una “inmunidad”. (...) En España, el Tribunal Constitucional ha vinculado el consentimiento informado del paciente al derecho fundamental a la integridad física y moral (15 CE), lo cual permite plantear el análisis en clave iusfundamental. Con todo, se advierten dudas e incompatibilidades entre la explicación habitual del consentimiento informado, su fundamento constitucional y su regulación jurídica. El objetivo del presente libro consiste en proporcionar una definición integral del consentimiento informado como derecho subjetivo del paciente y como manifestación de un derecho fundamental, a partir de una óptica poliédrica que aporta certeza en la práctica asistencial y jurídica. // The patient's right to informed consent is inserted within the scope of his decisional autonomy. Although it has a bodily background, it is combined with features of moral nature, which presupposes a concrete notion of the person as free and autonomous. Both, doctrinal approaches and normative legal material show that it is a subjective legal position of the patient, being alternatively qualified as a Hohfeldian “claim” or a “subjective right in a strict sense”; a "negative right" or an "immunity." The Spanish Constitutional Court has linked the informed consent of the patient to the fundamental right to physical and moral integrity (15 CE), which allows us to propose a fundamental rights-based analysis. Nonetheless, doubts and inconsistencies are perceived between the customary explanation of informed consent, its constitutional foundation and its legal regulation. The aim of this book is to provide a comprehensive definition of informed consent as subjective right of the patient and expression of a fundamental right, from a multi-fold perspective that provides certainty in both legal and health care practice. (shrink)

The purpose of this book is to address the controversial issues of whether we have a fixed set of ontological categories and if they have some epistemic value at all. Which are our ontological categories? What determines them? Do they play a role in cognition? If so, which? What do they force to presuppose regarding our world-view? If they constitute a limit to possible knowledge, up to what point is science possible? Does their study make of philosophy a science? Departing (...) from the novelty –but no exclusively- of considering distinctions to be the subject matter of thought and language -that is, of reference and meaning- the author arrives at a radical novel conception of the ontological categories. The observations and arguments presented in it constitute a strong case against established and well-rooted tenets, if not paradigms, of contemporary philosophy, beyond ontology and epistemology. The entailing conclusions, open the door to a revival of the discipline and the importance of its studies, as the science of the constitutive elements of knowledge of a non-empirical nature. (shrink)

The paper makes a twofold contribution. Firstly, it advances a preliminary account of the conditions that need to obtain for constitutional rights to be democratic. Secondly, in so doing, it defends precommitment-based theories from a criticism raised by Jeremy Waldron—namely, that constitutional rights do not become any more democratic when they are democratically adopted, for the people could adopt undemocratic policies without such policies becoming democratic as a result. The paper shows that the reductio applies to political rights, yet not (...) to non-political rights, such as reproductive, environmental, or privacy rights. The democratic status of the former is process-independent. The latter, by contrast, are democratic precisely when they are adopted by democratic means. (shrink)

Subjective rights enjoy limited import in Kelsenian theory for whereas the concept of duty underlies every legal norm, that of rights is merely possible and only emerges when the imposition of the sanction attached to the breach of the duty is made dependent upon a subject's will to bring legal action. The presence of secondary norms establishing certain duties of medical professionals on informed consent displays the existence of correlative reflex rights of patients. Yet, together with secondary norms, Western legal (...) systems typically institute norms of competence enabling patients to take legal action when those duties correlative to their reflex right to informed consent have been infringed. Thus, informed consent constitutes a set of subjective legal positions of patients and medical professionals. Despite its excessive formalism and questionable neutrality, the Kelsenian approach permits to define and clearly distinguish patients' genuine rights from mere aspirations devoid of legal basis. (shrink)

Workplace democracy is often advocated on two intertwined views. The first is that the authority relation of employee to firm is akin to that of subject to state, such that reasons favoring democracy in the state may likewise apply to the firm. The second is that, when democratic controls are absent in the workplace, employees are liable to objectionable forms of subordination by their bosses, who may then issue arbitrary directives on matters ranging from pay to the allocation of overtime (...) and to relocation and promotion. Daniel Jacob and Christian Neuhäuser have recently submitted these views to careful criticism. They argue that the parallel between firms and states is unwarranted. For, unlike managerial authority, state authority is final. The state grants firms their legal status and subjects their authority to its regulations, which citizens in democracies already control. And they also argue that suitable workplace regulation alongside meaningful exit options may suffice to prevent, with no need for democratization, objectionable forms of workplace subjection. Neither view offers, they resolve, compelling reasons to believe that justice requires that firms be democratic. I here inspect these criticisms in turn, and offer reasons for skepticism. (shrink)

News about the first baby born after a mitochondrial replacement technique (MRT; specifically maternal spindle transfer) broke on September 27, 2016 and, in a matter of hours, went global. Of special interest was the fact that the mitochondrial replacement procedure happened in Mexico. One of the scientists behind this world first was quoted as having said that he and his team went to Mexico to carry out the procedure because, in Mexico, there are no rules. In this paper, we explore (...) Mexico's rule of law in relation to mitochondrial replacement techniques and show that, in fact, certain instances of MRTs are prohibited at the federal level and others are prohibited at the state level. According to our interpretation of the law, the scientists behind this first successful MRT procedure broke federal regulations regarding assisted fertilization research. (shrink)

El libro que reseñamos estudia la naturaleza humana desde una perspectiva muy amplia al abordar el “potencial moral”. Efectivamente, la expresión inglesa “moral powers” es compleja de trasladar al castellano ya que hace referencia a la fuerza moral, aludiendo pues al rendimiento o la potestad moral; así como, la potencia humana y su capacidad moral. Nos encontramos ante un hito que estudia el valor en la vida y el pensamiento humano, escrito por uno de los pensadores contemporáneos más activos e (...) importantes del momento. Estamos pues ante una investigación filosófica sobre las potencialidades y sensibilidades morales de los seres humanos, del significado de la vida humana y el lugar que ocupa la muerte en la vida. Se nos presentan unas reflexiones sobre antropología filosófica, es decir el estudio del marco conceptual mediante el cual pensamos, hablamos e investigamos acerca del ser humano, entendido en su horizonte social y cultural. El volumen examina la diversidad de valores en la vida humana y el lugar del valor moral dentro de las variedades de estos valores. El asunto crucial gira alrededor de la naturaleza del bien y el mal y la propensión humana a la virtud y al vicio. Examina las concepciones tradicionales sobre el valor ético y repasa críticamente los conceptos erróneos que se han ido introduciendo en la filosofía, la psicología o la neurociencia cognitiva. (shrink)

Con su teoría crítica de la resonancia, Hartmut Rosa ha propuesto las bases de un modelo para evaluar normativamente y afrontar en la práctica las consecuencias de la aceleración social y su inherente tendencia al crecimiento y la innovación. Dicho modelo ha supuesto una bocanada de aire fresco en la Teoría Crítica para reflexionar sobre una dinámica que atraviesa la práctica totalidad de las actividades sociales. No obstante, también ha sido asociado a determinadas características que podrían hacerlo merecedor de dos (...) calificativos siempre reprobados por la Teoría Crítica: el paternalismo y el totalitarismo. Con el fin de contribuir a los debates suscitados por el trabajo de Rosa, la pretensión de este artículo es mostrar el modo en que su planteamiento pretende sortear esas acusaciones al apoyarse especialmente en el concepto de Weltbeziehung [relaciones con el mundo]. (shrink)

En el presente artículo se reflexiona sobre dos propuestas de Arturo Andrés Roig: la conciencia de la alteridad y el a priori antropológico para reconocer sus posibilidades de cara al progreso de la ideas y programas filosóficos. Para ello, se muestran las insuficiencias y posibilidades. Las primeras emergen al adoptar uno de los principios más importantes que sostienen el programa filosófico de la modernidad: el mantenimiento del ser humano como fundamento del mundo. Las posibilidades de sus aportes cobran fuerza a (...) la luz de las nuevas propuestas filosóficas que pretenden superar los postulados de la modernidad. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that some human reproductive genome editing interventions can be therapeutic in nature, and thus that it is false that all such interventions just create healthy individuals. I do this by showing that the conditions established by a therapy definition are met by certain reproductive genome editing interventions. I then defend this position against two objections: (a) reproductive genome editing interventions do not attain one of the two conditions for something to be a therapy, and (b) (...) some reproductive genome editing interventions are therapeutic but in a nonstandard way. In the Conclusion I call for a more nuanced discussion of the nature of reproductive genome editing interventions. (shrink)

El Test de Turing es un método tan controvertido como desafiante en Inteligencia Artificial. Se basa en la imitación de la conducta lingüística de humanos, y tiene como objetivo recabar evidencia empírica en favor de la tesis de que las máquinas programadas podrían pensar. Alan Turing, su creador, ha sido catalogado como conductista por la mayor parte de los comentaristas. En este capítulo muestro que no lo es. Por el contrario, Turing es un funcionalista, porque todo el énfasis del juego (...) de la imitación está en el engaño de la máquina hacia los humanos. Por ello el género es importante en dicho juego, al menos en su versión preliminar. (shrink)

This paper examines the link between political liberties and social equality, and contends that the former are constitutive of, i.e. necessary to secure, the latter. Although this constitutive link is often assumed in the literature on political liberties, the reasons why it holds true remain largely unexplored. Three such reasons are examined here. First, political liberties are constitutive of social equality because they bestow political power on their holders, leaving disenfranchised individuals excluded from decisions that are particularly pervasive, coercively enforced, (...) hard to avoid, monopolistic, and final. Second, they are constitutive of social equality due to their positional value, such that those who are denied such liberties are socially downgraded because and to the extent that others enjoy them. Third, they are constitutive of social equality due to their expressive value, in the sense that, by disenfranchising some individuals, the state publicly fails to recognize their equal moral agency. While unpacking these reasons, we address some criticisms of this constitutive link recently raised by Steven Wall and Jason Brennan. (shrink)

Arguments for a theory about the nature of the ontological categories, the relations that determine them and their epistemic role in the construction of different kinds of limited, but true knowledge of reality in itself.

Self-employment merits protection and promotion, we often hear, because it confers independence from a boss. But what, if anything, is wrong with having a boss? On one of the two views that this chapter inspects, being under the power of a boss is objectionable as such, no matter how suitably checked this power may be, for it undermines workers’ agency. On a second view, which republican theorists favor, what is objectionable is subjection not to the power of a boss as (...) such but to their arbitrary power. The first view is unconvincing, I argue, as it entails (implausibly) that being under the power of others in realms like the family or the state is likewise objectionable as such. And although the second view yields compelling reasons for self-employment, it only does so when employers’ power is not suitably checked. When it is, such reasons are more easily outweighed by competing considerations, like those stemming from the further forms of dependence—on suppliers and purchasers—that self-employment may prompt. (shrink)

Workplace democracy is often defined, and has recently been defended, as a form of intra-firm governance in which workers have control rights over management with no ownership requirement on their part. Using the normative tools of republican political theory, the paper examines bargaining power disparities and moral hazard problems resulting from the allocation of control rights and ownership to different groups within democratic firms, with a particular reference to the European codetermination system. With various qualifications related to potentially mitigating factors, (...) such as workforce and shareholder composition or risk aversion and reallocation, the paper contends that forms of workplace democracy in which workers control and own the firm, such as cooperativism, are preferable to other forms, such as codetermination, in which ownership and control rights are formally separated. (shrink)

The republican case for workplace democracy is presented and defended from two alternative means of ensuring freedom from arbitrary interference in the firm—namely, the right to freely exit the firm and workplace regulation. This paper shows, respectively, that costless exit is neither possible nor desirable in either perfect or imperfect labor markets, and that managerial discretion is both desirable and inevitable due to the incompleteness of employment contracts and labor legislation. The paper then shows that WD is necessary, from a (...) republican standpoint, if workers’ interests are to be adequately tracked in the exercise of managerial authority. Three important objections are finally addressed— that WD is redundant, that it is unnecessary provided that litigation and unionism can produce similar outcomes, and that it falls short of ensuring republican freedom compared to self-employment. (shrink)

In a recent publication Tom Douglas and Katrien Devolder have proposed a new account of genetic parenthood, building on the work of Heidi Mertes. Douglas and Devolder’s account aims to solve, among other things, the question of who are the genetic parents of an individual created through somatic cell nuclear transfer (i.e. cloning): (a) the nuclear DNA provider or (b) the progenitors of the nuclear DNA provider. Such a question cannot be answered by simply appealing to the folk account of (...) genetic parenthood, according to which the genetic parents of an individual are those individuals who produced the egg and sperm, respectively, which fused to create the embryo. It cannot be so as in cloning there is no fertilization as such. In this article I critically examine Douglas and Devolder’s new account of genetic parenthood and demonstrate that it is vulnerable to counterexamples that exploit the lack of a condition specifying that genetic parents should cause a child’s coming into existence. (shrink)

In this essay, I offer a critical analysis of one of the most provocative aspects of Heidegger’s unfinished confrontation with Aristotle’s thinking. Over the course of his lifelong engagement with Aristotle’s texts, Heidegger rarely failed to notice the constitutive ambiguity of the ancient Greek philosopher’s position within the history of being. On the one hand, Aristotle appeared to be the founder of the Western metaphysical tradition of ontotheology, whereby God was understood as the supreme principle and being of all beings. (...) But on the other hand, there were traces or echoes of a more originary thinking in Aristotle’s texts that, according to Heidegger, could be developed for the sake of another beginning. In this essay, I draw on this constitutive ambiguity by focusing on Heidegger’s partial translation of Metaphysics Λ 6, where Aristotle most explicitly discusses the being (οὐσία) of the unmoved being. Using Heidegger’s translation as an aid, I argue that Aristotle’s account of the unmoved being in Metaphysics Λ 6 is perhaps best understood as of- fering an enigmatic description of the origin of movement and time as an act of pure temporalizing (reine Zeitigung), which is how Heidegger translates the notion of ἐνέργεια. In the conclusion of this essay, I suggest that the temporal account of being and time as pure temporalizing offers a possible way to reappropriate Aristotle’s thinking in a phenomenological context. (shrink)

Higher‐order evidence can make an agent doubt the reliability of her reasoning. When this happens, it seems rational for the agent to adopt a cautious attitude towards her original conclusion, even in cases where the higher‐order evidence is misleading and the agent's original reasons were actually perfectly good. One may think that recoiling to a cautious attitude in the face of misleading self‐doubt involves a failure to properly respond to one's reasons. My aim is to show that this is not (...) so. My proposal is that (misleading) higher‐order evidence can undermine the agent's possession of her first‐order reasons, constituting what I call a dispossessing defeater. After acquiring the higher‐order evidence, the agent is no longer in a position to rely competently on the relevant first‐order considerations as reasons for her original conclusion, so that such reasons stop being available to her (even if they remain as strong as in the absence of the higher‐order evidence). In this way, an agent with misleading higher‐order evidence can adopt a cautious stance towards her original conclusion, while properly responding to the set of reasons that she possesses–a set that is reduced due to the acquisition of higher‐order dispossessing defeaters. (shrink)

El propósito del presente ensayo es desarrollar una lectura existencial del poema “Del país de la pena” escrita por la poeta venezolana Hanni Ossott con el fin de pensar el término “expatriación” como concepto filosófico. Luego de una introducción histórica que busca situar el poema de Ossott al filo de una tradición poética que busca recuperar la sensación de extranjeridad frente a lo propiamente nacional, éste ensayo se propone trazar los horizontes metodológicos de la interpretación del poema a través de (...) una lectura del ensayo “Paysage avec dépaysement” [Paisaje en desorientación] escrito por el filósofo francés Jean-Luc Nancy. La lectura del ensayo de Nancy posibilitará la lectura existencial del poema de Ossott con la que el presente ensayo buscará demonstrar la riqueza filosófica de este poema y la manera en que tematiza la expatriación. A modo de conclusión, se sugerirá que la expatriación puede entenderse como una condena pero no necesariamente de modo negativo sino a través de una valencia positiva que éste término puede tener para la conceptualización contemporánea sobre América Latina. -/- The purpose of this paper is to develop an existential reading of the poem “Del país de la pena” written by the Venezuelan poet Hanni Ossott with the aim of thinking the term “expatriation” as a philosophical concept. Following a historical introduction that seeks to situate Ossott’s poem within a poetic tradition that tries to recuperate the feeling of strangeness in the face of the properly national, this essay attempts to trace the interpretative and methodological horizons of the poem through a reading of the essay “Paysage avec dépaysement” [Uncanny Landscapes] written by the French philosopher Jean- Luc Nancy. The reading of Nancy’s essay will facilitate the existential reading of Ossott’s poem with which the present essay will seek to demonstrate the philosophical richness of this poem and the way in which it thematizes expatriation. By way of conclusion, it will be suggested that expatriation can be understood as a sentence, but not necessarily in a negative manner; rather, it can be thought through a positive valence that can aid in the contemporary conceptualization about Latin America. (shrink)

In this paper, I consider the contribution of Geoffrey Bennington's book, _Scatter 1_, to the ongoing discussion of the political dimension of deconstruction. Focusing on the resonances between Bennington's "politics of politics" and the notion of infrapolitics, I suggest that Bennington's major contribution revolves around the introduction of undecidability into political action and thought.

En este artículo argumento que, pese al llamado “escepticismo cartesiano”, el significado y alcance de la refutación cartesiana del escéptico y del ateo pueden comprenderse a la luz de tres hitos metafísicos. En la primera sección examino de qué forma este filósofo emplea argumentos escépticos como método, no como fin. Tal como enfatizo, el cogito es el punto en que la duda hiperbólica debe detenerse. Luego, en la segunda sección, discuto por qué Descartes es contrario al fideísmo. Debido a que (...) este se relaciona con el escepticismo, y con la imposibilidad de probar la existencia de Dios, Descartes prueba que Él existe. Sostengo, en la sección final, que Dios es garante de la certeza epistemológica, incluso en el caso de las ideas claras y distintas, cuya confiabilidad pareciera en peligro debido a la hipótesis escéptica del genio maligno. Según el francés, entonces, probar que Dios existe es necesario para garantizar el conocimiento cierto, y es base para inferir la existencia del mundo externo. Los tres hitos, entonces, parecen suficientes para delimitar el sentido y alcance del llamado escepticismo cartesiano. (shrink)

Despite renewed interest in work, philosophers have largely ignored self-employment. This neglect is surprising, not just because self-employment was central to classic philosophizing about work, but also given that half of the global workforce today, including one in seven workers in OECD countries, are self-employed. We start off by offering a definition of self-employment, one that accounts for its various forms while avoiding misclassifying dependent self-employed workers as independent contractors, and by mapping the barriers to becoming and remaining self-employed (section (...) 2). We then examine five arguments why governments ought to promote self-employment, despite the forgone opportunities to promote employee work instead that this often entails (sections 3-7): the argument from job creation, the argument from job satisfaction, the argument from independence, the argument from occupational freedom, and the argument from subsistence under non-ideal circumstances. Some of these are unconvincing, we argue, but others are not. Although the strength of the latter arguments hangs on various context-dependent conditions, such that they need to be carefully weighed against considerations of efficiency and equality, they nonetheless offer compelling pro tanto reasons to promote, and not just to protect, self-employment. (shrink)

My aim is to discuss the impact of higher-order evidence on aesthetic appreciation. I suggest that this impact is different with respect to aesthetic beliefs and to aesthetic affective attitudes (such as enjoyment). More specifically, I defend the view that higher-order evidence questioning the reliability of one’s aesthetic beliefs can make it reasonable for one to revise those beliefs. Conversely, in line with a plausible account of emotions, aesthetic affective attitudes are not directly sensitive to this type of higher-order evidence; (...) they are sensitive only to those features of objects that make such attitudes (un)fitting. Thus, I argue, there are cases of non-defective recalcitrant aesthetic attitudes where the subject has both a non-defective, fitting aesthetic affective attitude and a reasonable belief questioning the fittingness of this attitude. I further discuss whether, in this type of case, the subject has decisive reasons to try to change her recalcitrant attitudes—say by trying to modify her aesthetic affective dispositions. My answer is negative. Even granting that subjects always have aesthetic reasons to try to avoid aesthetically unfitting attitudes, these can be outweighed by further reasons not to do so—perhaps including aesthetic reasons related to the construction of valuable aesthetic identities or to the value of aesthetic engagement. (shrink)

This paper examines an insoluble Cartesian problem for classical AI, namely, how linguistic understanding involves knowledge and awareness of u’s meaning, a cognitive process that is irreducible to algorithms. As analyzed, Descartes’ view about reason and intelligence has paradoxically encouraged certain classical AI researchers to suppose that linguistic understanding suffices for machine intelligence. Several advocates of the Turing Test, for example, assume that linguistic understanding only comprises computational processes which can be recursively decomposed into algorithmic mechanisms. Against this background, in (...) the first section, I explain Descartes’ view about language and mind. To show that Turing bites the bullet with his imitation game, in the second section I analyze this method to assess intelligence. Then, in the third section, I elaborate on Schank and Abelsons’ Script Applier Mechanism (SAM, hereby), which supposedly casts doubt on Descartes’ denial that machines can think. Finally, in the fourth section, I explore a challenge that any algorithmic decomposition of linguistic understanding faces. This challenge, I argue, is the core of the Cartesian problem: knowledge and awareness of meaning require a first-person viewpoint which is irreducible to the decomposition of algorithmic mechanisms. (shrink)

En aras del universalismo y en contra del totalitarismo, la ética discursiva ha mostrado con Jürgen Habermas un déficit práctico al negar a la filosofía moral la posibilidad de reflexionar sobre las condiciones alienantes del diálogo desde un ethos concreto. Este artículo analiza el modo en que la teoría de la resonancia formulada por Hartmut Rosa permite revitalizar el debate sobre las condiciones que pueden minar las bases para el diálogo en las sociedades aceleradas sin apoyarse en el concepto de (...) ethos, sino en el de modo de relacionarse con el mundo [Modus der Weltbeziehung]. (shrink)

Jellinek define “estatus” como la “relación con el Estado que califica al individuo”. Su teoría distingue cuatro tipos: pasivo o subiectionis, negativo o libertatis, positivo o civitatis y activo o de la ciudadanía activa. Al margen de las polémicas sobre su vigencia, se pretende relacionar la aportación de Jellinek con la concepción del consentimiento informado del Tribunal Constitucional español, quien lo ha definido como deber de abstención de los profesionales sanitarios (STC 37/2011, de 28 de marzo, entre otras), es decir, (...) como una negación de su competencia en la terminología de Hohfeld, o como un derecho de defensa. Debido a la adecuación de su estructura al contenido del consentimiento informado, el análisis se centrará en los estatus negativo y positivo. La cuestión versa sobre la posición de los derechos de defensa en la tesis de Jellinek y si es viable su empleo en la conceptualización de los actuales derechos fundamentales. (shrink)

Abstract. Following the tracks of Ryle and based upon the theory of complex systems, we shall develop a characterization of action-based consciousness as an embodied, embedded, selforganized process in which action and dispositions occupy a special place. From this perspective, consciousness is not a unique prerogative of humans, but it is spread all around, throughout the evolution of life. We argue that artificial systems such as robots currently lack the genuine embodied embeddedness that allows the type of self-organization that is (...) relevant to consciousness. -/- Sommario. Seguendo la linea tracciata da Ryle e basata sulla teorie dei sistemi complessi, svilupperemo una caratterizzazione della coscienza basata sull’azione come un processo incarnato, situato e auto organizzante nel quale le azioni e le disposizioni occupano un ruolo decisivo. Da questo punto di vista, la coscienza non è una prerogativa esclusiva degli esseri umani, ma è diffusa nel mondo naturale grazie ai processi evolutivi. Noi sosteniamo che i sistemi artificiali come i robot attualmente sono carenti del tipo di relazione con la corporeità e con l’ambiente che consente quel tipo di auto-organizzazione indispensabile per l’emergenza della coscienza. (shrink)

In response to the COVID‐19 pandemic philosophers and governments have proposed scarce resource allocation guidelines. Their purpose is to advise healthcare professionals on how to ethically allocate scarce medical resources. One challenging feature of the pandemic has been the large numbers of patients needing mechanical ventilatory support. Guidelines have paradigmatically focused on the question of what doctors should do if they have fewer ventilators than patients who need respiratory support: which patient should get the ventilator? There is, however, an important (...) higher level allocation problem. Namely, how are we to ethically distribute newly obtained ventilators across hospitals: which hospital should get the ventilator(s)? In this paper, we identify a set of principles for allocating newly obtained ventilators across hospitals. We focus particularly on low and middle income countries, who frequently have limited pre‐existing intensive care capacity, and have needed to source additional ventilators. We first provide some background. Second, we argue that the main population healthcare aim during the COVID‐19 pandemic should be to save the most lives. Next, we assess a series of potential heuristics or principles that could be used to guide allocation: allocation to the most densely populated cities, random allocation, allocation based on the ratio of patients to ICU personnel, prioritisation in terms of intrahospital mortality, prioritisation of younger populations, and prioritisation in terms of population mortality. We conclude by providing a plausible ranking of the principles, while noting a number of epistemological challenges, in terms of how they best further the aim of increasing the probability of saving the most lives. (shrink)

Some Comments on de Melo-Martin and Harris.

This paper aims to contribute to the existing literature on normative cognition by providing a lineage explanation of human social norm psychology. This approach builds upon theories of goal-directed behavioral control in the reinforcement learning and control literature, arguing that this form of control defines an important class of intentional normative mental states that are instrumental in nature. I defend the view that great ape capacities for instrumental reasoning and our capacity (or family of capacities) for shared intentionality coadapted to (...) each other and argue that the evolution of this capacity has allowed the representation of social norms and the emergence of our capacity for normative guidance. (shrink)

Con su teoría crítica de la resonancia, Hartmut Rosa ha propuesto las bases de un modelo para evaluar normativamente y afrontar en la práctica las consecuencias de la aceleración social y su inherente tendencia al crecimiento y la innovación. Dicho modelo ha supuesto una bocanada de aire fresco en la Teoría Crítica para reflexionar sobre una dinámica que atraviesa la práctica totalidad de las actividades sociales. No obstante, también ha sido asociado a determinadas características que podrían hacerlo merecedor de dos (...) calificativos siempre reprobados por la Teoría Crítica: el paternalismo y el totalitarismo. Con el fin de contribuir a los debates suscitados por el trabajo de Rosa, la pretensión de este artículo es mostrar el modo en que su planteamiento pretende sortear esas acusaciones al apoyarse especialmente en el concepto de Weltbeziehung [relaciones con el mundo]. (shrink)

We discuss the role of practical costs in the epistemic justification of a novice choosing expert advice, taking as a case study the choice of an expert statistician by a lay politician. First, we refine Goldman’s criteria for the assessment of this choice, showing how the costs of not being impartial impinge on the epistemic justification of the different actors involved in the choice. Then, drawing on two case studies, we discuss in which institutional setting the costs of partiality can (...) play an epistemic role. This way we intend to show how the sociological explanation of the choice of experts can incorporate its epistemic justification. (shrink)

Una de las manifestaciones más ejemplificadoras del aumento de las velocidades y del cambio social, característico de las sociedades aceleradas, se da en la creación de tendencias laborales basadas en la hibridación entre trabajo y tiempo libre. Proyectadas sobre una idea positiva de la flexibilidad y del autocontrol, mantienen una estrecha relación con niveles altos de autointensificación. Este artículo reconstruye los rasgos básicos de prácticas formalizadas como el bleisure o el workation para caracterizar un fenómeno de la aceleración más específico (...) dentro de esta tendencia, al que denomino “turistificación del trabajo”. Este concepto resalta la atribución específica de rasgos atractivos de la práctica turística al trabajo con fines productivos. Frente a los discursos positivos sobre la movilidad y el turismo asociados a este fenómeno, se sugieren las bases de un modelo de crítica para reconocer sus implicaciones alienantes negativas en relación con la vida buena. (shrink)