Resumo A transferência de embriões em bovinos tem o objetivo principal de aprimorar o melhoramento genético e otimizar a reprodução bovina A importância dessa prática é destacada pela sua contribuição para a maximização de características desejadas nos rebanhos, como qualidade de carne, eficiência reprodutiva e resistência a condições ambientais adversas. Este trabalho descreve e analisa as técnicas avançadas utilizadas nesse processo, incluindo seleção genômica, sexagem de embriões, produção in vitro, protocolos não cirúrgicos, sincronização reprodutiva, criopreservação de embriões e uso de (...) marcadores de fertilidade. A compreensão aprofundada dessas técnicas é fundamental para o sucesso da transferência de embriões, bem como para a capacidade de personalizar e aprimorar as características específicas dos rebanhos. Enfatizando a importância da expertise de profissionais especializados em reprodução bovina, este trabalho busca oferecer uma visão abrangente das práticas atuais e avanços tecnológicos nesse campo. Ao unir ciência e prática, torna-se importante a comparação de técnicas, bem como relacionar resultados eficientes para promover qualidade genética, trazer a sustentabilidade e envolver a técnica em um cenário atualizado da indústria. Palavras-chave: Embriões; Hormônio; Reprodutor. -/- Abstract Embryo transfer into cattle has the main objective of improving genetic improvement and optimizing bovine reproduction. The importance of this practice is highlighted by its contribution to maximizing desired characteristics in herds, such as meat quality, reproductive efficiency and resistance to environmental conditions adverse. This work describes and analyzes the advanced techniques used in this process, including genomic selection, embryo sexing, in vitro production, non-surgical protocols, reproductive synchronization, embryo cryopreservation and the use of fertility markers. An in-depth understanding of these techniques is critical to the success of embryo transfer, as well as the ability to customize and enhance specific herd characteristics. Emphasizing the importance of the expertise of professionals specialized in bovine reproduction, this work seeks to offer a comprehensive view of current practices and technological advances in this field. When combining science and practice, it becomes important to compare techniques, as well as relate efficient results to promote genetic quality, bring sustainability and involve the technique in an updated industry scenario. Keywords: Embryos; Hormone; Reproducer. -/- REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS ABIEC. Associação Brasileira das Indústrias Exportadoras de Carnes. Beef Report. Perfil da Pecuária no Brasil. v.6, p. 7, 2021. ALVAREZ, R. Transfer of blastocysts derived short-term in culture of quality morulae in vivo. Domestic Animals. v.9, p. 790, 2007. ALVES, N. G. Atividade Ovariana em Fêmeas Bovinas da Raça Holandesa e Mestiças Holandês x Zebu, Durante Dois Ciclos Estrais Normais Consecutivos. Revista Zootecnia. v.7, p. 86, 2002. ANDRADE, J. Use of hormone treatments to superovulation Nelore donors. Reproduction Science. v.9, p. 70, 2002. Associação Brasileira de Inseminação Artificial (ASBIA). Index Asbia 2021. v.7, p. 6, 2021. Associação Brasileira de Inseminação Artificial (ASBIA). Index ASBIA Mercado, v.8, p. 6, 2019. BARROS, C. M. Tratamentos superestimulatórios utilizados em protocolos para a transferência de embriões bovinos. Acta Scientiae Veterinariae. v.9, p.8, 2007. BARUSELLI, P. S. Avaliação do mercado de IATF no Brasil. Boletim Eletrônico do Departamento de Reprodução Animal – FMVZ/USP, 1. ed., v.8, p.7, 2019. BARUSELLI, P. S.; CATUSSI, B. L. C.; ABREU, L. A.; ELLIFF, F. M.; SILVA, L. G.; BATISTA, E. S.; CREPALDI, G. A. Evolução e perspectivas da Inseminação Artificial em bovinos. Revista Brasileira de Reprodução Animal, v.43, n.2, p.308-314, 2019. 13 BARUSELLI, P. S. IATF gera ganhos que superam R$ 3,5 bilhões nas cadeias de produção de carne e de leite. Boletim Eletrônico do Departamento de Reprodução Animal/FMVZ/USP, 2.ed., v.8, n.8, p.7, 2019. BINELLI, M. Anti-luteolytic to improve in cattle. Acta Scientiae Veterinariae. v.9, p.8, 2001. BÓ, G. A. Manipulação hormonal do ciclo estral em doadoras e receptoras de embrião bovino. Acta Scientiae Veterinariae. v.9, p.7, 2004. BÓ, G.; MAPLETOFT, R. Evaluation and of bovine. Animal Reproduction. v.8, p.9, 2013. BUSS, V. Efeito da dose e momento da administração de eCG em protocolos de IATF aplicados e vacas de corte em anestro. Universidade Federal do Pampa, Dissertação – Programa de Pós-Graduação em Ciência Animal, v.8, n.8, p.9, 2020. Centro de Estudos Avançados em Economia Aplicada (CEPEA). Boletim do leite. São Paulo, Ano 25, n.286, 2019. CHAVES, D. F.; ALVES, M. J. Protocolo de receptoras de embriões: índices de aproveitamento de corpo lúteo e taxa de prenhez. Animal Reproduction. v.9, p.7, 2023. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Fisiologia Clínica do Ciclo Estral de Vacas Leiteiras: Desenvolvimento Folicular, Corpo Lúteo e Etapas do Estro. 2020. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Transferência de Embriões nos Animais e a Indústria de Embriões no Brasil. 2020. DALCIN, L.; LUCCI, C. M. Criopreservação de embriões de animais de produção: princípios criobiológicos e estado atual. Rev. Bras. Reprod. Anim. v.7, p.7, 2010. DANTAS, K. S. A. Seleção de receptoras em um programa de transferência de embriões (PIVE) em bovinos no nordeste do Brasil. Ciência Animal. v.9, p.7, 2018. D’AVILA, C. A.; MORAES, F. P.; LUCIA J. R. T.; GASPERIN, B. G. Hormônios utilizados na indução da ovulação em bovinos – Artigo de revisão. Revista Brasileira de Reprodução Animal, v.43, n.4, p.797-802, 2019. DEMÉTRIO, D. G. B. Colheita e transferência de embriões bovinos. Dissertação (Mestrado em Reprodução Animal) – Faculdade de Medicina Veterinária e Zootecnia da UNESP, Campus de Botucatu, São Paulo. v.9, p.76, 2003. FAO – Organização das Nações Unidas para a Alimentação e Agricultura. O Estado da Insegurança Alimentar e Nutrição no Mundo (SOFI) 2021. Faculdade de Medicina Veterinária e Zootecnia da UNESP. v.4, n.6, p.6, 2021. FILHO, L. C. C. Fatores que interferem na eficiência reprodutiva de receptoras de embrião bovino. Arq. Ciênc. Vet. Zool. v.7, p.9, 2013. GONZÁLEZ, F. H. D. Introdução a Endocrinologia Reprodutiva Veterinária. UFRGS. v.9, p.7, 2002. GOODHAND, K. In vivo recovery and vitro embryo from bovine aspirated at frequencies or FSH treatment. Animal Reproduction. v.8, p.87, 1999. 14 HAFEZ, E. S. E.; HAFEZ, B. Reprodução animal. 7ed. Barueri: Manole. v.7, p.7, 2004. HONORATO, M.T. Importância da escolha de receptoras em um programa de transferência de embriões em bovinos. Barueri: Manole. v.8, p.6, 2013. HOPPER, R. Bovine Reproduction. Blackwell. v.8, p.8, 2015. IBGE. Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística. Pesquisa da Pecuária Municipal 2021 (PPM 2021). IBGE. v.9, n.7, p.7, 2021. KONIG, H. E.; LIEBICH, H. G. Anatomia dos animais domésticos: texto e atlas colorido. Vol.2. Porto Alegre: Artmed, v.2, p.4, 2004. MARTINS, F. S. Fatores reguladores da foliculogênese em mamíferos. Rev Bras Reprod Anim. v.3, p.9, 2008. MELLO, R. R. C. Desenvolvimento folicular inicial em bovinos. Rev. Bras. Reprod. Anim. v.8, p.9, 2013. OLIVEIRA, A. F. M. Principais hormônios que controlam o comportamento reprodutivo e social das fêmeas ruminantes – Revisão. Rev. Bras. Reprod. v.9, p.8, 2014. OLIVEIRA, C. S. Biotécnicas da Reprodução em Bovinos. EMBRAPA, v.8, p.8, 2014. PASA, C. Transferência de embriões em bovinos. Biodiversidade. v.9, p.9, 2008. PENITENTE FILHO, J. M. Produção de embriões bovinos in vivo e in vitro. Revista CFMV, Ano XX. v.8, p.8, 2014. PHILLIPS, P. E.; JAHNKE, M. M. Embryo Transfer (Techniques, Dono rs, and Recipients). Vet Clin Food Anim, v.9, p.8, 2016. RODRIGUES, J.; BERTOLINI, M. Biotecnologias da reprodução animal: de Aristóteles à edição gênica. Rev. Bras. Reprod. Anim. v.8, p.7, 2019. SANTOS, K. J. G. Biotecnologias reprodutivas e fisiologia reprodutiva da fêmea bovina – conhecimento para o sucesso. Rev. Bras. Reprod. Anim. v.8, p.98. 2012. SANTOS, P. H. Impactos da superestimulação ovariana sobre a diferenciação das células da granulosa bovina. Dissertação de Mestrado em Farmacologia e Biotecnologia – UNESP, v.8, p.8. 2017. SILVA, P. R. B. Regulação farmacológica do ciclo estral de bovinos. UNESP. v.9, p.8. 2011. (shrink)

A good number of people currently thinking and writing about reasons identify a reason as a consideration that counts in favor of an action or attitude.1 I will argue that using this as our fundamental account of what a reason is generates a fairly deep and recalcitrant ambiguity; this account fails to distinguish between two quite different sets of considerations that count in favor of certain attitudes, only one of which are the “proper” or “appropriate” kind of reason for them. (...) This ambiguity has been the topic of recent discussion, under the head “the wrong kind of reasons problem.”2 I will suggest that confusion about “the wrong kind of reason” will be dispelled by changing our account of what a reason is. While I agree both that reasons are considerations and that certain.. (shrink)

Many assume that we can be responsible only what is voluntary. This leads to puzzlement about our responsibility for our beliefs, since beliefs seem not to be voluntary. I argue against the initial assumption, presenting an account of responsibility and of voluntariness according to which, not only is voluntariness not required for responsibility, but the feature which renders an attitude a fundamental object of responsibility (that the attitude embodies one’s take on the world and one’s place in it) also guarantees (...) that it could not be voluntary. It turns out, then, that, for failing to be voluntary, beliefs are a central example of the sort of thing for which we are most fundamentally responsible. (shrink)

I hope to show that, although belief is subject to two quite robust forms of agency, "believing at will" is impossible; one cannot believe in the way one ordinarily acts. Further, the same is true of intention: although intention is subject to two quite robust forms of agency, the features of belief that render believing less than voluntary are present for intention, as well. It turns out, perhaps surprisingly, that you can no more intend at will than believe at will.

According to ‘Excluders’, descriptive uncertainty – but not normative uncertainty – matters to what we ought to do. Recently, several authors have argued that those wishing to treat normative uncertainty differently from descriptive uncertainty face a dependence problem because one's descriptive uncertainty can depend on one's normative uncertainty. The aim of this paper is to determine whether the phenomenon of dependence poses a decisive problem for Excluders. I argue that existing arguments fail to show this, and that, while stronger ones (...) can be found, Excluders can escape them. (shrink)

In this paper I consider fairness of blaming a wrongdoer. In particular, I consider the claim that blaming a wrongdoer can be unfair because blame has a certain characteristic force, a force which is not fairly imposed upon the wrongdoer unless certain conditions are met--unless, e.g., the wrongdoer could have done otherwise, or unless she is someone capable of having done right, or unless she is able to control her behavior by the light of moral reasons. While agreeing that blame (...) has a characteristic force, I am skeptical of this charge of unfairness. My skepticism concerns itself less with the particular conditions of fairness proposed than with the idea that blame can be rendered unfair by its characteristic force. If to blame a person were simply to perform certain intentional actions, then, as we will see, blame could be rendered unfair by its force. But to blame a person is not just to act in certain ways. It is, at least in large part, to make certain judgments or adopt certain attitudes. However, it is unclear how these attitudes or judgments carry "force"? and also unclear whether they can be rendered unfair by their force. Examining these issues, I will suggest that much of the force of blame is found in a set of judgments--most centrally, the judgment that one person failed to show proper regard for others. But, I will argue, once it is granted that such judgments are true, their characteristic force cannot render them unfair. (shrink)

A common line of thought claims that we are responsible for ourselves and our actions, while less sophisticated creatures are not, because we are, and they are not, self-aware. Our self-awareness is thought to provide us with a kind of control over ourselves that they lack: we can reflect upon ourselves, upon our thoughts and actions, and so ensure that they are as we would have them to be. Thus, our capacity for reflection provides us with the control over ourselves (...) that grounds our responsibility. I argue that this thought is subtly, but badly, confused. It uses, as its model for the control that grounds our responsibility, the kind of control we exercise over ordinary objects and over our own voluntary actions: we represent to ourselves what to do or how to change things, and then we bring about that which we represent. But we cannot use this model to explain our responsibility for ourselves and our actions: if there is a question about why or how we are responsible for ourselves and our actions, it cannot be answered by appeal to a sophisticated, self-directed action. There must be some more fundamental account of how or why we are responsible. I replace the usual account with a novel but natural view: responsible mental activity can be modeled, not as an ordinary action, but as the settling of a question. This shift will require abandoning the tempting but troublesome thought that responsible activity involves discretion and awareness—which, I argue, we must abandon in any case. (shrink)

I argue to a conclusion I find at once surprising and intuitive: although many considerations show trust useful, valuable, important, or required, these are not the reasons for which one trusts a particular person to do a particular thing. The reasons for which one trusts a particular person on a particular occasion concern, not the value, importance, or necessity of trust itself, but rather the trustworthiness of the person in question in the matter at hand. In fact, I will suggest (...) that the degree to which you trust a particular person to do a particular thing will vary inversely with the degree to which you must rely, for the motivation or justification of your trusting response, on reasons that concern the importance, or value, or necessity of having such a response. (shrink)

Here I defend my solution to the wrong-kind-of-reason problem against Mark Schroeder’s criticisms. In doing so, I highlight an important difference between other accounts of reasons and my own. While others understand reasons as considerations that count in favor of attitudes, I understand reasons as considerations that bear (or are taken to bear) on questions. Thus, to relate reasons to attitudes, on my account, we must consider the relation between attitudes and questions. By considering that relation, we not only solve (...) the wrong-kind-of-reason problem, but we also bring into view rational agency—the use of reasons in thought. (shrink)

Donald Davidson opens ‘Actions, Reasons, and Causes’ by asking, ‘What is the relation between a reason and an action when the reason explains the action by giving the agent's reason for doing what he did?’ His answer has generated some confusion about reasons for action and made for some difficulty in understanding the place for the agent's own reasons for acting, in the explanation of an action. I offer here a different account of the explanation of action, one that, though (...) minimal and formal, preserves the proper role for the agent's own reasons for acting. (shrink)

In the classical Turing test, participants are challenged to tell whether they are interacting with another human being or with a machine. The way the interaction takes place is not direct, but a distant conversation through computer screen messages. Basic forms of interaction are face-to-face and embodied, context-dependent and based on the detection of reciprocal sensorimotor contingencies. Our idea is that interaction detection requires the integration of proprioceptive and interoceptive patterns with sensorimotor patterns, within quite short time lapses, so that (...) they appear as mutually contingent, as reciprocal. In other words, the experience of interaction takes place when sensorimotor patterns are contingent upon one’s own movements, and vice versa. I react to your movement, you react to mine. When I notice both components, I come to experience an interaction. Therefore, we designed a “minimal” Turing test to investigate how much information is required to detect these reciprocal sensorimotor contingencies. Using a new version of the perceptual crossing paradigm, we tested whether participants resorted to interaction detection to tell apart human from machine agents in repeated encounters with these agents. In two studies, we presented participants with movements of a human agent, either online or offline, and movements of a computerized oscillatory agent in three different blocks. In each block, either auditory or audiovisual feedback was provided along each trial. Analysis of participants’ explicit responses and of the implicit information subsumed in the dynamics of their series will reveal evidence that participants use the reciprocal sensorimotor contingencies within short time windows. For a machine to pass this minimal Turing test, it should be able to generate this sort of reciprocal contingencies. (shrink)

There seems to be widespread agreement that to be responsible for something is to be deserving of certain consequences on account of that thing. Call this the “merited-consequences” conception of responsibility. I think there is something off, or askew, in this conception, though I find it hard to articulate just what it is. The phenomena the merited-consequences conception is trying to capture could be better captured, I think, by noting the characteristic way in which certain minds can rightly matter to (...) other such minds—the way in which certain minds can carry a certain kind of importance, made manifest in certain sorts of responses. Mattering, not meriting, seems to me central. However, since I cannot yet better articulate an alternative, I continue in the merit-consequences framework. I focus on a particular class of consequences: those that are non-voluntary, in a sense explained. The non-voluntariness of these reactions has two important upshots. First, questions about their justification will be complex. Second, they are not well thought of as consequences voluntarily imposed upon the wrongdoer by the responder. By focusing on merited consequences and overlooking non-voluntariness, we risk misunderstanding the significance of moral criticism and of certain reactions to moral failure. (shrink)

I here defend an account of the will as practical reason —or, using Kant's phrase, as " reason in its practical employment"—as against a view of the will as a capacity for choice, in addition to reason, by which we execute practical judgments in action. Certain commonplaces show distance between judgment and action and thus seem to reveal the need for a capacity, in addition to reason, by which we execute judgment in action. However, another ordinary fact pushes in the (...) other direction: the activities of the will are activities for which the person is answerable in a very particular sort of way. This answerability is most easily understood if willing involves settling a question. Settling a question seems to be a capacity of reason. Thus it can seem that activities of will are activities of our capacity for reasoning. I will suggest that we can accommodate the commonplaces while still understanding the will as reason in its practical employment, by abandoning the assumption that practical reasoning concludes in a judgment. Rather, reasoning which concludes in a judgment—reasoning directed at the question of whether p—is theoretical reasoning. In its practical employment, reason is directed at the question of whether to x; it concludes, not in a judgment about x-ing, but rather in an intention to x. (shrink)

In "Rational Capacities" Michael Smith outlines the sense of capacity he believes to be required before blame is appropriate. I question whether this sense of capacity is required. In so doing, I consider different ways in which blame might be conditioned.

In 1982, when T. M. Scanlon published “Contractualism and Utilitarianism,” he noted that, despite the widespread attention to Rawls’ A Theory of Justice, the appeal of contractualism as a moral theory had been under appreciated. In particular, the appeal of contractualism’s account of what he then called “moral motivation” had been under appreciated.1 It seems to me that, in the intervening quarter century, despite the widespread discussion of Scanlon’s work, the appeal of contractualism, in precisely this regard, has still been (...) under appreciated—even though Scanlon makes what he once called “moral motivation” central, throughout his work. My first aim, then, is to do my best to draw out and make vivid this appeal. I will do this by first considering the two questions that Scanlon thinks must be addressed by any moral theory, what he once called “the question of subject matter” and “the question of motivation.” I will spend some time first locating and explicating the second question, of motivation, and then displaying Scanlon’s answer to it—it is this answer which provides contractualism with its under-appreciated appeal. I will then return to the question of subject matter—which will, by that point, have been revealed as not wholly distinct from the question of motivation, as Scanlon understands it. But it is as an answer to this question that Scanlon’s theory is most often.. (shrink)

Many think of reasons as facts, propositions, or considerations that stand in some relation (or relations) to attitudes, actions, states of affairs. The relation may be an explanatory one or a “normative” one—though some are uncomfortable with irreducibly “normative” relations. I will suggest that we should, instead, see reasons as items in pieces of reasoning. They relate, in the first instance, not to psychological states or events or states of affairs, but to questions. That relation is neither explanatory nor “normative.” (...) If we must give it a label, we could call it “rational”—but that will mean, I think, only that the consideration bears on the question. By thus putting reasoning first, we not only avoid a handful of difficulties that have plagued thinking about reasons, but we also bring back to center-stage the importance of rational agency. (shrink)

I here press an often overlooked question: Why does the fairness of a sanction require an adequate opportunity to avoid it? By pressing this question, I believe I have come to better understand something that has long puzzled me, namely, what philosophers (and others) might have in mind when they talk about “true moral responsibility,” or the “condemnatory force” of moral blame, or perhaps even “basic desert.” In presenting this understanding of “condemnation” or of “basic desert,” I am presenting an (...) idea that I do not, myself, endorse—one to which I am, myself, opposed. I present and defend it, hoping that, if what I say accurately captures what people have in mind, it will also show how condemnation or desert, in this sense, can be left behind. (shrink)

I consider Paulina Sliwa’s fruitful account of “taking responsibility” as “owning the normative footprint” of a wrong. Unlike most, Sliwa approaches the topic without concern for what I call “responsible agency.” I raise the possibility that this is virtue. I then question whether the “footprint” is simply given with the wrong or whether it must instead be made determinate through subsequent interaction, perhaps through conversation. I next distinguish two different kinds of conversation: a cooperative negotiation and a low-level power struggle. (...) The later is often part of what I call “the blame game.” I suggest that the “blame” of the blame game is the blame of ordinary life, to be distinguished from the technical term in the current philosophical literature, and I give an account of it. I note that one may sometimes opt out of the blame game simply by owning a generous interpretation of the footprint, something Sliwa discusses. I note that doing so is sometimes, but not always, virtuous. (shrink)

I suggest that Fischer concedes too much to the consequence argument when he grants that we may not make a difference. I provide a broad sketch of (my take on) the dispute between compatibilists and incompatibilists, while suggesting that some of the discussion may have confused the freedom required for moral responsibility with a very different notion of autonomy. I introduce that less usual notion of autonomy and suggest that those who are autonomous, in this sense, do make a difference.

This paper proposes an intermediate account of personhood, based on the capacity to participate in intersubjective interactions. We articulate our proposal as a reply to liberal and restrictive accounts, taking Mark Rowlands’ and Stephen Darwall’s proposals as contemporary representatives of each view, respectively. We argue that both accounts fall short of dealing with borderline cases and defend our intermediate view: The criteria of personhood based on the second-person perspective of mental state attribution. According to it, a person should be able (...) to participate in intersubjective interactions. We apply our proposal to the borderline cases of non-human primates and human infants. (shrink)

Recently, there has been an insurgence of corporations that bioprospect in Third World countries (going into these areas in hopes of utilizing traditional knowledge about local natural resources so as to eventually develop a synthetic alternative that they can then market). Although this type of bioprospecting does not encounter the problem of depleting environmental resources, other problems arise. Two primary problems are: (1) determining who has legal ownership of these resources, and (2) who should share in the profits that were (...) derived, in part, from these resources. Despite the attention that these problems have received, there has been little attention focused on the issue that I believe underlies these problems -- the differing views of nature between corporations (who consider nature to be an individually owned resource) and Third World communities (many of whom consider nature to be a communally owned resource). In this paper, I present what I believe is an additional useful tool for policy makers in resolving the current problems regarding bioprospecting in Third World countries. The tool I have in mind is a set of method components that can be used as guidelines as well as a test for inclusiveness. To arrive at these components, I will look to James D. Proctor's methodological proposal for resolving conflicts between those with differing views of nature. Because he presents this methodology in a limited context (as a means of resolving the Ancient Forest debate), I will clarify and expand his methodology so as to arrive at a set of methods that I believe can be helpful in arriving at a fair global policy regarding bioprospecting in Third World countries. (shrink)

I first present what Peter Strawson calls his “Social Naturalism,” as applied to ethics. I then briefly present the way in which his Naturalism allows Strawson to resist skepticism about moral responsibility and free will, as argued in “Freedom and Resentment.” His way of resisting this kind of skepticism opens his Naturalism to another challenge: it can seem objectionably relativistic. I have provided a response to this challenge, on Strawson’s behalf, in the final chapter of my _Freedom, Resentment, and the (...) Metaphysics of Morals_ (2020). In this paper I expand upon that response—in particular, on the way in which the introduction of admittedly contested ideals might provide sufficient critical purchase to avoid objectionable relativism while remaining broadly naturalistic. (shrink)

This chapter presents two contrasting pictures of the will. On the first, “the will” is a psychological structure or module within a person that originates spontaneous or endogenous activity, independently of external influence. On the second, “the will” is that collection of ordinary states of mind (cares, concerns, beliefs, desires, commitments, fears, etc.) that generates intentional, or voluntary, or responsible activity—it is the functioning together of those aspects of mind that account for human activity. A challenge is posed for each. (...) The challenge for the first is to say how the outputs of this module are the activity of the person. The challenge for the second is to say how psychological activity that might be entirely explained by a person’s history and environment can nonetheless be free and responsible activity. The replies take up an important question about the role of consciousness, in each picture. (shrink)

This chapter presents four different senses of “voluntary” that might be in play. First, voluntary1 movement contrasts with bodily movement not guided by the person—such as blinking or digesting, which are involuntary1. Second, you might move voluntarily1, and yet make a mistake—you might send an email to the wrong person—you then act involuntarily2. In contrast, voluntary2 action is successful. Third, you might purposely and even successfully do something you didn’t want to do—through the cargo overboard during the storm. In such (...) cases, you act involuntarily3. In contrast, you might act happily, as a volunteer, so to speak. You then act voluntarily3. Finally, sometimes you can be manipulated or deceived into acting as a volunteer—in which case you lack an important form of freedom. We might say that you act involuntarily4. I suggest that the first two senses might be fruitfully studied by neuroscience, while the final sense marks a distinction draw by ethical reflection. (shrink)

The book intends to interpret how different religions articulate their territories and manage the relationship with other religions, understanding systems and multiple everyday spaces, in a dynamic that is not only a component of contemporary reality, but is central to living it. The underlying thesis is that religion is the great geopolitical issue of our time, but an interpretation is only possible in terms of religious plurality and how ideas, symbolism, subjectivities and practices are incorporated in the daily life of (...) those who share the religious times and spaces, producing territorial identities and imaginary concrete cartographies as world projects. The volume has articles that focus on the religious space being gestated, expanded, contracted, celebrated or represented as a foundation for common life, as well as inter-religious conflicts arising in a world of diverse and differential coexistence. It is not a debate about classical geopolitics, but how geopolitical relations cross cultural-religious experience. (shrink)

I first sketch the different things we might have in mind, when thinking about responsibility. I then relate each of those to possible investigations of human agency. The most interesting such relation, in my opinion, is that between agency and what I call “responsibility as mattering.” I offer some hypotheses about that relation.

In this document I survey my work to date (i.e., to September 2010) and connect it to the larger themes that have been animating it.

This article re-examines the theoretical basis for environmental and heritage interpretation in tourist settings in the light of hermeneutic philosophy. It notes that the pioneering vision of heritage interpretation formulated by Freeman Tilden envisaged a broadly educational, ethically informed and transformative art. By contrast, current cognitive psychological attempts to reduce interpretation to the monological transmission of information, targeting universal but individuated cognitive structures, are found to be wanting. Despite growing signs of diversity, this information processing approach to interpretation remains dominant. (...) The article then presents the alternative paradigm of hermeneutics through the works of Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger and Gadamer, to provide a broader interpretation of interpretation. This not only captures the essence of Tilden’s definition but construes heritage interpretation as a more inclusive, culturally situated, critically reflexive and dialogical practice. (shrink)

The philosophical or theoretical commitments informing psychological research are sometimes characterized, even by theoretical psychologists themselves, as nonempirical, outside the bounds of methodological consideration, and/or nonrational. We argue that this characterization is incoherent. We illustrate our concern by analogy with problematic appeals to Kuhn’s work that have been influential in theoretical psychology. Following the contemporary pragmatist tradition, we argue that our philosophical/theoretical commitments are part of our larger webs of belief, and that for any of these beliefs to have meaning (...) their content must be informed by our practical engagement with the world, i.e., they are based on empirical evidence, broadly construed. It is this empirical basis that allows us to recognize our commitments at all and rationally to assess and criticize them when necessary. We conclude by demonstrating a rational assessment of the philosophical/theoretical commitments underlying a recent study in the social psychology of religion. (shrink)

Kevin McCain’s Evidentialism and Epistemic Justification is the most thorough defense of evidentialism to date. In this work, McCain proposes insightful new theses to fill in underdeveloped parts of evidentialism. One of these new theses is an explanationist account of evidential fit that appeals to dispositional properties. We argue that this explanationist account faces counterexamples, and that, more generally, explanationists should not understand evidential fit in terms of dispositional properties.

Joint attention is a social-cognitive phenomenon in which two or more agents direct their attention together towards the same object. Definitions range from this rather broad conception to more specific definitions which require that, in addition, attention be directed to the same aspect of that object and that agents need to be mutually aware of their jointly attending. Joint attention is an important coordination mechanism in joint action. The capacity for engaging in joint attention, in particular in the sense of (...) this narrower definition, is frequently taken to indicate the presence of theory of mind in the participating agents, and is also implicated in the development of theory of mind. However, the prominence of sensorimotor components in establishing and sustaining episodes of joint attention — e.g., eye and head movements, pointing and vocalizations — suggests that sensorimotor approaches to social interaction may be well-placed to account for important parts of joint attention without invoking theory-of-mind abilities, and may therefore provide a valuable alternative to approaches emphasizing theory of mind. In particular, sensorimotor accounts may explain aspects of joint attention through the dynamics and regularities in the sensorimotor processes that coordinate the activities of the agents. (shrink)

The article fits into the debate regarding space, time and nature in dialogue with the world lived by subjects that build up themselves or are built as mythological heroes, source of speech and spacial concrete practices. It's a poorly explored field in Geography that recently approaches to the cultural dynamic debate, to the symbolic field and also to their spacialization processes. The aim is to discuss the possibility of understanding in the present time about the space organization processes related to (...) the society's previous moments, in a space/time dialectics which articulate the present and past times in a complex and non linear way. Methodologically, starting from a literature review about the theme, the present study was linked to the field and documental research about migration to the vicinal ways of Transamazônica Highway (BR-230 Highway), the creation of the "Centro Espírita União do Vegetal", a religion that arises in the Amazon and set up its headquarters in Brasília and the construction of Brasilia as a modern metropolis without a past. The conclusion points at the possibility of space/time nexuses linking the Myth of Nature to the Creation of Heroes, constantly appropriated and with new meanings, in order to support speeches and new actions dialectically throughout the Brazilian contemporaneous space. (shrink)

The nursing profession must address climate change to protect and promote human health. Climate change activities as corporate social responsibility provide a promising avenue to both scale successful organizational initiatives and to generate hope, transformative improvements, and renewed professional commitments for nursing. Addressing climate change through corporate social responsibility is urgent and timely in the COVID-19 disaster recovery period for the nursing profession.

La investigación se llevó a cabo en el Hospital Básico de Baeza, ubicado en el cantón Quijos, provincia de Napo, con el objetivo de utilizar el Mapa Cognitivo Neutrosófico para analizar los factores que contribuyen al desabastecimiento de insumos médicos. A través de este enfoque, se identificaron varios elementos críticos que afectan la disponibilidad de insumos médicos en el hospital. Entre los factores más significativos se encontraron la falta de proveedores, la ausencia de postulación para la adjudicación de órdenes de (...) compra, proveedores impagos, y prolongados tiempos de entrega de medicamentos y dispositivos médicos. Además, se observó que las compras centralizadas y la carencia de vehículos para el transporte de insumos obstaculizaban el proceso de abastecimiento. Otra complicación radicó en que las cantidades de medicamentos y dispositivos entregados eran mínimas y la falta de espacio físico adecuado para su almacenamiento dificultaba aún más la situación. A pesar de que se realizó un levantamiento de necesidades, se evidenció una deficiencia en la comunicación entre el personal del hospital y quienes manejan los procesos de adquisición, lo que contribuyó al problema. Como parte de la propuesta de solución, se implementó un plan de intervención que incluyó un monitoreo diario, destinado a reducir los factores que provocan el desabastecimiento de insumos médicos. Esta estrategia no solo busca mejorar el flujo de insumos, sino también optimizar la coordinación entre los diferentes actores involucrados en el proceso de adquisición, fomentando así una atención médica más eficiente en el Hospital Básico de Baeza. (shrink)

According to the classical finance theory it is assumed that investors show rational behaviour in order to achieve maximum gain.but this approach has changed since 1980s. There are a lot of academic studies emphasizing the determining effect of human psychology in financial decisions. Behavioral finance considers the interaction between emotions and investors decisions. According to the New financial approach investors show irrational behaviours and take prejudices into the account for investment decisions as opposed to traditional perspective. Behavioral finance analyzes the (...) market anomalies which conventional financial theories are inadequate to explain based on an assumption that individuals are not rational. While doing this, it benefits from the other sciences such as psychology, sociology, and antropology, etc. One type of behavioral finance is herd behavior. In this paper, domestic and foreign literature research on herd behavior in financial markets were analyzed. (shrink)

Medical scientists employ ‘quality assessment tools’ (QATs) to measure the quality of evidence from clinical studies, especially randomized controlled trials (RCTs). These tools are designed to take into account various methodological details of clinical studies, including randomization, blinding, and other features of studies deemed relevant to minimizing bias and error. There are now dozens available. The various QATs on offer differ widely from each other, and second-order empirical studies show that QATs have low inter-rater reliability and low inter-tool reliability. This (...) is an instance of a more general problem I call the underdetermination of evidential significance. Disagreements about the strength of a particular piece of evidence can be due to different—but in principle equally good—weightings of the fine-grained methodological features which constitute QATs. (shrink)

There are few who would deny that P. F. Strawson’s “Freedom and Resentment” (1962) ranks among the most significant contributions to modern moral philosophy. Although any number of essays have been devoted to it, Pamela Hieronymi’s 'Freedom, Resentment, and the Metaphysics of Morals' is the first book-length study. The aim of Hieronymi’s study is to show that Strawson’s “central argument” has been “underestimated and misunderstood.” Hieronymi interprets this argument in terms of what she describes as Strawson’s “social naturalism”. Understood (...) this way, Hieronymi maintains, “the argument is powerful”. In what follows I argue that while Hieronymi’s discussion is stimulating and provides valuable insights into “Freedom and Resentment,” neither the interpretation advanced nor the social naturalist position that it describes is convincing. (shrink)

Authors' affiliation: Centre Emile Bernheim, Solvay Brussels School of Economics & Management, Université Libre de Bruxelles; 50 Avenue Franklin D. Roosevelt, B-1050, Bruxelles, Belgium. ... Journal: Economic Studies, Volume 44, Number 9, Serial Number 316. ... Publisher: Vietnamese Academy of Social Sciences – Vietnam Institute of Economics. ... Suggested citation: Farber, A. & Vuong, QH (2004) “New empirical results on anomalies and herd behaviors: Vietnam stock market 2000-2004,” Economic Studies.

Hành vi bầy đàn là hiện tượng khi các cá nhân, trong các quyết định tài chính hoặc đầu tư, hành động theo số đông, bất chấp thông tin cá nhân hoặc phân tích riêng biệt của họ. Lý thuyết mindsponge có thể cung cấp cách tiếp cận hữu ích để khắc phục hiệu ứng bầy đàn trong đầu tư chứng khoán, thông qua việc giúp nhà đầu tư quản lý và xử lý thông tin một cách hiệu quả hơn.

In a recent article, Ethan Bradley and Mark Navin (2021) argue that vaccine refusal is not akin to free riding. Here, I defend one connection between vaccine refusal and free riding and suggest that, when viewed in conjunction with their other arguments, this might constitute a reason to mandate Covid-19 vaccination.

As we have seen in the transition form Part I to Part II of this book, the inductive riskiness of doxastic methods applied in testimonial uptake or prescribed as exemplary of religious faith, helpfully operationalizes the broader social scientific, philosophical, moral, and theological interest that people may have with problems of religious luck. Accordingly, we will now speak less about luck, but more about the manner in which highly risky cognitive strategies are correlated with psychological studies of bias studies and (...) human cognitive ecology. Chapter Four is concerned with connections between psychological study of biases and heuristics, and the comparative study of fundamentalism. The first section looks at work by psychologists and philosophers on our bias blind spot. Later sections ask, ‘In what ways might biases and heuristics play a special role in aiding our understanding of, and response to, fundamentalist orientation?’. The judgments we make in ignorance of our own biases Montaigne calls our importunate presumptions, and he suggests a host of practical factors that make them appealing. Montaigne, as I discuss in the first section, associates many of our errors with one or another kind of presumption, often about our similarity or differences from others, or from God. Our obvious psychographic diversity, and the polemical ground dynamics involved in our ‘culture wars’ are compounded on the agential side by the invisibility of our biases to ourselves. A number of person and social biases are described that plausibly affect all of our beliefs in domains of controversial views, religious views included. The second section continues to study of how etiological symmetry (similar patterns of belief-uptake) gives rise to religious contrariety (diverse narratives and theologies) in testimonial faith traditions, and what the implications of this are for philosophy of religion, generally, and for an improved comparative study of fundamentalism, in particular. Utilizing the work of philosophers such as Rachel Fraser and psychologists such as Emily Pronin and her co-authors, I offer a four-step genealogical account for how etiological symmetry so easily gives rise to religious contrariety. This account begins with the narrative nature of testimony in the Abrahamic family of religions, and how narrative content confounds our “source monitoring.” My genealogy also introduces what I term biased-closure inferences (BCI) as one of the key enablers of religious exclusivism and absolutism. These are the seemingly ‘logical’ but actually very self-serving inferences people often make, inferences from their own belief being true, to any belief contrary to it being false. Those who claim unique truth, epistemic access, and/or virtue and religious value for the home religion are no exception to the broad pertinence of bias studies across domains of controversial view. The proximate causes of belief are all that we can study, and in these there may be significant etiological symmetries. Yet those groups themselves, especially to the extent that they are exclusivist, are tunnel-visioned on claims of doctrinal uniqueness: on content differences of a theological sort. Comparative philosophy is met with the puzzlement that symmetric or essentially similar doxastic strategies should give rise not just to cognitive diversity, but to what we can call polarized or polemical contrariety, contrariety of a kind where each view adamantly rejects all others. Arguably, the more that theologies offer explanations of a counter-inductive sort, or profess counter-inductive thinking as exemplary of faith, the better evidential ground there for inferring that bias involved in the acquisition or maintenance of beliefs. This provides more substance to the question of when censure, and etiological challenges to faith-based beliefs are philosophically well-motivated. (shrink)

Contra the dominant readings, Hieronymi—refusing to sideline concerns of metaphysics for the impasse of normativity—argues that the core of Strawson's argument in "Freedom and Resentment" rests on an implicit and overlooked metaphysics of morals grounded in social naturalism, focusing her discussion on Strawson's conception of objective attitudes. The objective attitude deals with exemption, rather than excuse. This distinction is critical to Strawson's picture of responsibility: In addition to our personal reactive attitudes are their impersonal or vicarious analogues. There are two (...) such cases: first, cases where we suspend or modify reactive attitudes due to error about the quality of the will. In these cases of excuse, we might include an actor who we learn was innocently ignorant, or whose behavior was an accident, and so we see that he or she really meant no harm. Consequently, we exculpate the injury in question. In cases of excuse, we are mistaken about the quality of the actor's will and, thus, our reactive attitude changes, but the moral demands stay. However, one might view other people as equipped with mental attributes and as people about whom one is disposed not to indulge in with those reactive attitudes of resentment, approbation, and so on; this involves viewing others objectively. We encounter these scenarios in the case of small children, people suffering from dementia, or those with forms of other serious mental illness. This second category involves exemption: Rather than reacting with the corresponding reactive attitudes, we view those actors—who lack the capacities required to fit into the usual system tolerably well—objectively, thereby exempting them from the usual demands of ordinary interpersonal relating. (shrink)

The statement that we are currently failing to address some of humanity’s greatest challenges seems uncontroversial—we are not doing enough to limit global warming to a maximum of 2 °C and we are exposing vulnerable people to preventable diseases when failing to produce herd immunity. But what singles out such failings from all the things we did not do when all are unintended? Unlike their individualist counterparts, collective inaction and omission have not yet received much attention in the literature. (...) collective inaction, I argue, can be attributed to a group of agents where a collective action x that the agents did not perform was collectively feasible at time t where each agent in that group had sufficient reason to contribute to performing x or others had a reasonable expectation that they would perform x. I show that, perhaps surprisingly, we can speak of collective inaction even where only one member of the group fails to act. However, where large and dispersed groups of agents are concerned, there is often no meaningful way of attributing collective failings. Still, I contend that the failure to close the global emissions gap and—in some cases—to generate herd immunity are indeed on us. (shrink)

The abstract Everyone who gets to know deeper with the Nietzsche philosophy is forced to think about a mutual relationship of a culture and a biology. The main problem to correct show of above relationships is the understanding of the meaning of a language with reference to the culture and the biology. Considerations which are represented here are inspired by the Nietzsche philosophy. They are split by three parts. In the first part there is shown the meaning of the language (...) to create the herd in the Nietzsche philosophy. The second part develops his qualification of the language as a shortening of communication. The final part tries to refer the functioning of the language to the sphere of a biological human being. As I think, only the biological perspective permits to overstep the rhetoric of the individualism expressed in the Nietzsche philosophy by the opposition among weak and strong, or else among a priest and a superman. Thanks to drawn consequence from accepted by Nietzsche of the reduction my to the animal sort we are forced to the reversal of the perspective of his thought. The herd is not a centre to create the superman as the aim of the all mankind, but the sense of the exceptionality of an each subject is a centre to a fixation of the reproduction of the genetic definite population. (shrink)

Freiwilligkeit, personale Identität (im Sinne eines harmonisch verfassten und stabilen Selbst) und epistemische Gewissheit sind bei den meisten antiken Philosophieschulen untrennbar miteinander verbunden und garantieren im Rahmen einer als Lebenskunst verstandenen Philosophie das Glück. Im Anlehnung an Überlegungen bei Aristoteles und dem zeitgenössischen Philosophen Peter Bieri analysieren wir, wie Entscheidungen, die zum Zeitpunkt ihres Treffens als bedingt frei und selbstbestimmt wahrgenommen wurden, im Nachhinein vom Han-delnden aufgrund des damals fehlenden Wissens über die Handlungsumstände als unfrei wahrgenommen werden und zu Erfahrungen (...) der Selbstentfremdung führen können. Anknüpfend an Pamela Hieronymis Unterscheidung zwischen zwei Formen der Ausübung mentaler Freiheit zeigen wir anhand von fiktiven Fallbeispielen, wie die Protagonisten trotz epistemischer Ungewissheit zur Autorität über ihren Geist sowie zu einer funktionalen Selbstbeziehung zurückfinden können, und stellen dies in den Kontext einer zeitgenössischen Philosophie als Lebenskunst. (shrink)

This work aims to understand the affective dimension that permeates human relationships and the variation that characterizes their forms. The concepts presented here aim to situate man in relation to these two poles of his existence, servitude and freedom, which are urgent for us to reflect on the subject of ethics today. Considering instability as a constitutive mark of the affective field through which man relates, we will resort to concepts which will support and illustrate the idea which we intend (...) to present, namely the economic nature of the bodily forces which motivate and intervene in such relations which pass, as they are established, to a configuration of power. From the philosophical concepts of affection, servitude and freedom, according to Spinoza, it is possible to understand the existential and ethical dimension that runs through human life. The Freudian concepts of herd instinct, identification and love can be understood as affections belonging to the soul of the herd which, in its psychic process, leads man to his state of servitude. From these foundations, one can think about human freedom and how man can, through sublimatory processes, become the cause of himself, and thus show new possibilities, outlets that man has under his own power to make his life more joyful and, in this way, not to live at the mercy of external causes that result in shocks, condemning him to the bondage of his own passions. This research brings these questions to reflection to show how the traditional way of thinking directly impacts man in his way of relating, freely or not, to the world and, finally, how another perspective of understanding this which constitutes its nature allows a new posture in the face of desire itself. -/- . (shrink)

Influentially, Pamela Hieronymi has argued that any account of forgiveness must be both articulate and uncompromising. It must articulate the change in judgement that results in the forgiver’s loss of resentment without excusing or justifying the misdeed, and without comprising a commitment to the transgressor=s responsibility, the wrongness of the action, and the transgressed person=s self-worth. Non-articulate accounts of forgiveness, which rely on indirect strategies for reducing resentment (for example, reflecting on the transgressor’s bad childhood) are said to fail (...) to explain forgiveness. I argue that the articulateness condition is not a necessary condition for forgiveness. I respond to numerous objections advanced against non-articulate accounts, including the claim that the resentment-mitigating practices they involve amount to excusing. Appealing to P.F. Strawson=s distinction between objective and participant attitudes, I argue that forgivers can take transgressors to be detrimentally causally shaped by their past while holding him them to be morally responsible. (shrink)