Quels impacts les techniques de procréation médicalement assistée ont-elles sur notre société? En quoi ces techniques nous obligent-elles à remettre en question, voire à repenser certains de nos principes?

Abstract: This working paper focuses on the question whether there is a therapeutic imperative that, in specific situations, would oblige us to perform genome editing at the germline level in the context of assisted reproduction. The answer to this central question is discussed primarily with reference to specific scenarios where preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) does not represent an acceptable alternative to germline genome editing based on either medical, or ethical, or – from the perspective of the potential parents – moral (...) or religious grounds. This article deals with four different types of case constellations that result from these possible reasons against PGD as well as from the necessity or dispensability of a subsequent “control PGD.” These cases are discussed based on hypotheses concerning contextual factors and theoretical assumptions. In conclusion, we point out that if our assumptions are correct, there is probably no therapeutic imperative for genome editing at the germline level. We draw this rationale from the fact that germline interventions are likely not person-affecting. However, we caution the reader that our result is preliminary and needs to be more carefully examined in future work in light of the bioethical debate and potential objections. -/- // Abstract: Im Zentrum dieses Working Papers steht die Frage, ob es einen therapeutischen Imperativ geben kann, der uns, in bestimmten Situationen, verpflichten würde, eine Genomeditierung (genome editing) auf Keimbahnebene im Rahmen der assistierten Befruchtung vorzunehmen. Die Antwort auf diese zentrale Frage wird insbesondere mit Bezug auf Fälle diskutiert, in denen das Verfahren der Präimplantationsdiagnostik (PID) keine aus entweder medizinischen oder ethischen oder – aus Sicht der potentiellen Eltern – moralischen bzw. religiösen Gründen akzeptable Alternative zu einem Keimbahneingriff darstellt. Die möglichen Gründe gegen die PID sowie die Erforderlichkeit oder Verzichtbarkeit einer nachfolgenden «Kontroll-PID» ergeben vier verschiedene Fallkonstellationen, denen sich der Beitrag zuwendet. Auf Grundlage von Hypothesen zu kontextuellen Faktoren und theoretischen Annahmen diskutieren wir diese Fälle. Im Ergebnis verweisen wir darauf, dass es, wenn unsere Annahmen zutreffen, vermutlich keinen therapeutischen Imperativ zum genome editing auf Keimbahnebene gibt. Dies begründet sich daraus, dass der Keimbahneingriff vermutlich nicht als personenbezogen (person-affecting) zu bezeichnen ist. Wir weisen jedoch darauf hin, dass unser Ergebnis vorläufig ist und unter Berücksichtigung der bioethischen Debatte und möglicher Einwände genauer geprüft werden muss. -/- // Résumé: Ce Working Paper se concentre sur la question de l’existence d’un impératif thérapeutique qui, dans des situations spécifiques, nous obligerait à réaliser une édition du génome au niveau de la lignée germinale dans le cadre de la procréation assistée. Afin de répondre à cette question centrale nous développons quatre scénarios spécifiques dans lesquels le diagnostic préimplantatoire (DPI) ne représente pas une alternative acceptable à l’édition du génome germinal pour des raisons médicales, éthiques ou – du point de vue des futurs parents – morales ou religieuses. Cet article traite de quatre constellations différentes de cas résultant des raisons mises en avant pour s'opposer au DPI ainsi que de la nécessité ou de l’inutilité d’un ultérieur « DPI de contrôle » Ces cas sont discutés sur la base d’hypothèses portant sur les facteurs contextuels et sur les présupposés théoriques. En conclusion, nous soulignons que si nos hypothèses sont correctes, il n’y a probablement aucun impératif thérapeutique justifiant l’édition du génome au niveau de la lignée germinale. Nous arrivons à cette conclusion parce qu’une intervention au niveau de la lignée germinale n’est probablement pas susceptible d’affecter la personne. Cependant, nous mettons en garde le lecteur sur le fait que notre conclusion est préliminaire et qu’elle doit être examinée avec soin dans des futurs travaux instruits par le débat bioéthique et par les éventuelles objections. (shrink)

Some argue that procreation is immoral due to its negative environmental impact. Since living an “eco-gluttonous” lifestyle of excessive resource consumption is wrong in virtue of the fact that it increases greenhouse gas emissions and environmental impact, then bringing another human being into existence must also be wrong, for exactly this same reason. I support this position. It has recently been the subject of criticism, however, primarily on the grounds that such a position (1) is guilty of “double-counting” environmental impacts, (...) and (2) that it over-generalizes to condemn other clearly permissible behaviors, such as saving lives, or certain instances of adoption and immigration. Here, I will defend the environmental argument against procreation from these criticisms. I will do this, first, under the assumption that our individual consumption and emissions cause significant harm. I will then address the problem of causal impotence, and argue that, even if our individual contributions to environmental problems ultimately make no difference to the amount of harm that occurs, procreation is still immoral for many, if not most, of those living in the developed world. (shrink)

Many philosophers are attracted to a complaints-based theory of the procreation asymmetry, according to which creating a person with a bad life is wrong (all else equal) because that person can complain about your act, whereas declining to create a person who would have a good life is not wrong (all else equal) because that person never exists and so cannot complain about your act. In this paper, I present two problems for such theories: the problem of impairable-life acceptance and (...) an especially acute version of the problem of improvable-life avoidance. I explain how these problems afflict two recent complaints-based theories of the procreation asymmetry, from Joe Horton and Abelard Podgorski. (shrink)

Philosophical defenses of parents’ rights typically appeal to the interests of parents, the interests of children, or some combination of these. Here I propose that at least in the case of biological, non-adoptive parents, these rights have a different normative basis: namely, these rights should be accorded to biological parents because of the compensatory duties such parents owe their children by virtue of having brought them into existence. Inspried by Seana Shiffrin, I argue that procreation inevitably encumbers the wills of (...) children in otherwise morally objectionable ways. Such subjection generates duties to compensate children, even if the child’s life is on balance a benefit to her. The right to procreate is thus conditioned on prospective parent’s willingness to compensate for the harms of procreation. And because parents bear such compensatory duties, they must be accorded permissions (i.e., rights) to fulfill these duties. These rights include familiar exclusionary rights to promote children’s welfare, etc. Moreover, because subjecting children to harms or the risks thereof violates their autonomy, parental duties (and rights) include the provision of education and other goods that enable their subsequent autonomy as adults. Grounding parental rights in compensatory procreative duties avoids problems associated with appeals to the interests of children (e.g., that these interests do not seem to generate exclusive parental rights) or to the interests of parents (e.g., that these interests do not appear strong enough to permit the creation of a new, vulnerable human individual). (shrink)

The article argues that procreation is intrinsically valuable because it produces persons. The essential thought of the argument is that among the valuable things in the world are not only products, but the actions by which they are produced. The first premise is that persons have great value, for which a common consent argument is offered. The second premise is that, as an action type, procreation has persons as a product. Procreation is always a part of the action that produces (...) a person. This is because procreators take as their goal the creation of an organism that itself has development into a person as a goal. Such a claim also helps explain the moral obligations of procreators, the affective lives of procreators and the common preference for procreation. The third premise is that if an action type has a product of value, then all its tokens have intrinsic value. I argue that even when such actions fail to produce anything outside the agent, they are intrinsically valuable because of how they actualise the powers and virtues of the agent, in part achieving the agent’s goal. I then apply that argument to the case of procreation and person producing. (shrink)

The cause of global environmental decline is clear: an immense and rapidly growing human economy. In response, environmentalists should advocate policies leading to fewer people, lower per capita consumption, and less harmful technologies. All three of these must be addressed, not just one instead of the others. That is our best remaining hope to create sustainable societies and preserve what global biodiversity remains. Sharing Earth justly with other species and protecting it for future human generations are achievable goals, but only (...) if we recognize limits to growth, show restraint in both consumption and procreation, replace maximizing thinking with sufficiency thinking, and cultivate gratitude for what we receive from nature. Efficiency cannot take the place of ethics. Cleverness cannot take the place of wisdom. Humanity must learn to recognize and appreciate ‘enough.’. (shrink)

Kenneth Einar Himma (2009, 2016) argues that the existence of Hell renders procreation impermissible. Jason Marsh (2015) contends that problems of evil motivate anti-natalism. Anti-natalism is principally rejected for its perceived conflict with reproductive rights. I propose a theistic solution to the latter problem. Universalism says that all persons will, postmortem, eventually be eternally housed in Heaven, a superbly good place wherein harm is fully absent. The acceptance of universalism is now widespread, but I offer further reason to embrace one (...) variant of it. If universalism is true and there are opportunities to procreate in Heaven, then reproductive autonomy is largely preserved for everyone. Assuming Heaven is a harm-free place, there are no risks to children born in Heaven, unlike Earth or Hell. While this requires human persons to accept temporary restrictions on procreation during our premortem lives, the bulk of reproductive autonomy is preserved since one will have infinite opportunities to reproduce in Heaven. (shrink)

The pessimistic hypothesis is the hypothesis that life is bad for us, in the sense that we are worse off for having come into existence. Suppose this hypothesis turns out to be correct — existence turns out to be more of a burden than a gift. A natural next thought is that we should stop having children. But I contend that this is a mistake; procreation would often be permissible even if the pessimistic hypothesis turned out to be correct. Roughly, (...) this is because we are often in a position to know that future people will approve of having been created, and their approval will not be inappropriate even if they are worse off for having been created. And our respect for the attitudes of future people can permit us to create them. (shrink)

Many philosophers and members of the public think it is wrong to procreate. If one wants children, it is permissible to adopt. But procreation is allegedly impermissible because there is some respect in which adoption is better than procreation. I show that such objections are unsound.

In this paper, I argue the practice of procreation is immoral regardless of the consequences of human presence such as climate change and overpopulation; the lack of consent, interests and moral desert on the part of nonexistent individuals means someone could potentially suffer in the absence of moral justification. Procreation is only morally justified if there is some method for acquiring informed consent from a non-existent person; but that is impossible; therefore, procreation is immoral.

A book chapter (about 9,000 words, plus references) presenting an act-consequentialist approach to the ethics of climate change. It begins with an overview of act consequentialism, including a description of the view’s principle of rightness (an act is right if and only if it maximizes the good) and a conception of the good focusing on the well-being of sentient creatures and rejecting temporal discounting. Objections to act consequentialism, and replies, are also considered. Next, the chapter briefly suggests that act consequentialism (...) could reasonably be regarded as the default moral theory of climate change, in the sense that a broadly act-consequentialist framework often seems implicit in both scholarly and casual discussions of the ethics of climate change. The remainder of the chapter explores three possible responses to the threat of climate change: having fewer children to reduce the number of people emitting greenhouse gases; taxing greenhouse-gas (GHG) emissions (commonly called a “carbon tax”) to discourage GHG-emitting behavior; and reducing poverty to lessen personal, familial, and community vulnerability to the harms of climate change. (shrink)

The Procreation Asymmetry holds that we have strong moral reasons not to create miserable people for their own sakes, but no moral reasons to create happy people for their own sakes. To defend this conjunction against an argument that it leads to inconsistency, I show how recognizing ‘creation’ as a temporally extended process allows us to revise the conjuncts in a way that preserves their intuitive force. This defense of the Procreation Asymmetry is preferable to others because it does not (...) require us to take on controversial metaphysical or metaethical commitments – in other words, it has the theoretical virtue of portability. (shrink)

Dans notre société de plus en plus digitalisée, avons-nous vraiment le choix d’adopter ou non les technologies? Comment cette digitalisation impacte-t-elle les personnes âgées en particulier et son écosystème? Quels sont les enjeux éthiques soulevés par cette digitalisation? Ce texte vise à amener des éléments de réflexions en lien avec ces enjeux selon le point de vue de divers experts des domaines de la technologie, du vieillissement et de la bioéthique. Ces experts se sont rencontrés lors d’un symposium ayant eu (...) lieu à Angers, France, en octobre 2019. Le texte est un compte-rendu des échanges et points de vue de ces experts, ainsi que des discussions ouvertes qu’ils ont eues avec l’assistance, portant sur les principaux enjeux soulevés par cette digitalisation selon la perspective des personnes âgées, des proches-aidants, des soignants, de la société et de la recherche. (shrink)

La délibération est souvent perçue comme l’œuvre d’une liberté exami­nant de manière autonome les éléments qui conduisent à la prise de décision, elle-même perçue comme le moment premier de l’action. Cette vision des choses n’est-elle pas la conséquence d’une illusion rétrospective ? Le processus décision­nel dans lequel s’inscrit la délibération ne doit-il pas plutôt être envisagé comme un enchaînement causal par lequel les acteurs sont emportés sans être véritable­ment les auteurs du scénario auquel ils participent ? Une telle approche détermi­niste (...) doit-elle pour autant nous conduire à renoncer à « reprendre la main » sur nos décisions ? L’analyse qui est ici conduite porte sur la décision dans le domaine médical. Elle s’inspire de la pensée de Spinoza et tend à montrer que même si nous sommes déterminés, la puissance réflexive de l’esprit est en mesure de mieux éclairer et orienter les différents protagonistes de la délibération et de la décision médicales. (shrink)

Pascal’s wager uses decision theory to argue that it is rational to attempt to nurture belief in God, based on the expected utility of believing (infinite happiness) compared to not believing (at best, only finite happiness). A belief in an eternal conscious torment in hell (infinite suffering) for non-believers makes the differences in expected utility even more apparent, strengthening the argument. Similar reasoning can also be used to calculate the expected moral value of actions, including procreation. Under theism, if possible (...) future children might suffer eternal conscious torment, the expected moral value of procreation is extremely negative. This implies that theists have a moral obligation not to procreate, which for most theists, entails a moral obligation to be celibate or to undergo sterilisation surgery. (shrink)

Many theists believe both (1) that Heaven will be infinitely or maximally good for its residents and (2) that most humans will, eventually, reside in Heaven. Further, most theists believe (3) that human procreation is often all-things-considered morally permissible. I defend three novel arguments for the impermissibility of procreation predicated on the possibility of heavenly overpopulation. First, we shouldn’t be rude to hosts by bringing more people to a party than were invited, which we do if we continue to procreate. (...) Second, justice requires that the goods of Heaven be supremely good for those for whom heavenly existence is (even partially) compensatory, but if Heaven has a fixed and finite number of goods, each successful act (or enough acts) of procreation lowers the expected goodness for those persons and threatens to undermine justice. Third, we should choose the course of action with the least-worst outcome, and it would be worse to overpopulate Heaven than underpopulate it. (shrink)

I formulate and defend a theory of special procreative duties in the context of a liberal egalitarian theory of justice. I argue that (1) the only special duty that procreators owe their offspring is that of ensuring that their life prospects are non-negative (worth living), and (2) the only special duty that procreators owe others is that of ensuring that they are not disadvantaged by the procreators’ offspring (a) violating their rights or (b) adversely affecting their equality rights and duties.

Is it wrong to bring new children into existence when there are so many existing children in need of parental care? Several philosophers have defended the view that prospective parents have a pro tanto​ duty to adopt rather than procreate as a means of fulfilling their interest in parenting. The most prominent argument for this view in the existing literature is the rescue-based argument, which derives an individual duty to adopt rather than procreate from a more general duty to rescue (...) or assist those in need. In this paper, I critically examine the rescue-based argument and explain why it fails. First, I argue that we do not necessarily have a duty to rescue in cases that resemble the global orphan crisis, where one’s intervention is merely sufficient to prevent serious harm to a potential victim. Second, I argue that even if we had such a duty, it would not necessarily generate a duty to adopt rather than procreate given the significant financial, emotional, and agency-related costs of adoption, particularly in current, non-ideal conditions. The upshot of these arguments is that the rescue-based argument can only generate a duty to adopt rather than procreate with respect to a relatively small constituency of orphaned children, many of whom are likely to be adopted anyway by willing volunteers. In the vast majority of cases, then, the rescue-based argument does not entail that it is wrong to create new children when there are already existing children in need of parental care. (shrink)

I argue that Malthus’s Essay on Population is more a treatise in applied ethics than the first treatise in demography. I argue also that, as an ethical work, it is a highly innovative one. The substitution of procreation for sex as the focus makes for a drastic change in the agenda. What had been basically lacking in the discussion up to Malthus’s time was a consideration of human beings’ own responsibility in the decision of procreating. This makes for a remarkable (...) change also in the approach, namely, the discussion becomes an examination of a well-identified issue, taking cause-effect relationships into account in order to assess possible lines of conduct in the light of some, widely shared and comparatively minimal, value judgements. This is more or less the approach of what is now called applied ethics, at least according to one of its accounts, or perhaps to the account shared by a vast majority of its practitioners. In a sense, both the subject matter, sexuality, was substituted with a more restricted issue, namely reproduction, and the traditional approach, moral doctrine, was substituted with a more modest approach, in Malthus’s own words, the ‘moral and political science’. Such a drastic transformation brought about a viable framework, for a discussion of ethical issues that were still unforeseen by Malthus, namely those having to do first with the technical feasibility of eugenics programs and secondly with the scientific discovery of genetics as a field of study but also of possible intervention. Malthus’s ethics had obviously enough nothing to say on those unforeseen issues in so far as it was meant to treat just the ‘quantitative’ dimension of procreation, that is, ‘how many’. Later discussions and controversies will arise around different dimensions, that is, not just ‘how many’ but also ‘how healthy, how strong, how far empowered’. Yet, what Malthus’s lesson can still teach to proponents of opposite views is that the mentioned questions can be construed in such a way as to avoid unending controversy. (shrink)

Current developments in reproductive technology forecast that in the foreseeable future artificially generated gametes might be presented as a possible fertility treatment for infertile couples and for homosexual couples desiring to have children genetically originating from both partners. It is important to evaluate the ethical issues connected to this technology before its emergence. This article first reviews the meaning that gametes (sperm and eggs) might have to those who procreate, as well as their ontology. From this, suggestions are made as (...) to what qualities artificially generated gametes need to be truly called gametes. Finally, different proposed routes for artificial gamete generation are examined on the basis of these qualities, with their prospective problems and advantages highlighted. Autotransplanted gametes (or their progenitors) generated solely from patient-derived tissue are deemed to be the most ethically suitable route for the development of this technology. (shrink)

Nove tehnologije omogućavaju nove postupke i prakse koji moraju da se moralno i pravno opravdaju. IVF i surogat materinstvo, pored ostalih, spadaju u takve nove prakse. Stara pravila o tome šta je dopušteno a šta mora da se zabrani ponekad nisu dovoljna, a ni analogije obično nisu dovoljne. Da bi se došlo do prihvatljive linije razdvajanja izmedju opravdanog i neopravdanog postupanja treba izvršiti adekvatnu etičku analizu tih fenomena. IVF, tehnologija oplodnje „in vitro“, iako na prvi pogled izaziva sumnjičavost, ne sadrži (...) u sebi nikakav prima facie moralni problem. IVF se može uzeti prosto kao tehnika lečenja neplodnosti ili smanjene plodnosti, što je jedan problem koji pogadja veliki broj ljudi danas. Prigovori koji se mogu staviti ne izgledaju odlučujući a koristi koje se ovom tehnikom postižu su očigledno veoma velike. Ali ta tehnika je povezana sa druga momenta, donacijom genetskog materijala i surogat materinstvom, koji povlače razne vrste pitanja koja mogu biti od velikog moralnog i pravnog značaja. U tekstu se, sa etičkog stanovišta, analiziraju najvažnija od tih pitanja i naznačava kriterijum demarkacije koji razdvaja opravdane postupke od onih koji nisu opravdani ili zahtevaju ograničenje kroz pravnu i moralnu regulaciju. (shrink)

© The Author 2017. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Trust. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: [email protected] Boonin’s The Non-Identity Problem and the Ethics of Future People and Rivka Weinberg’s The Risk of a Lifetime: How, When and Why Procreation May Be Permissible are both important books for those interested in procreative ethics. Each argues for surprising and controversial conclusions: Boonin argues that we should solve the non-identity problem by accepting its apparently unacceptable conclusion (...) that actions cannot be wrong due to their effects on future people whose lives are worth living and who would not exist were the actions not performed; Weinberg argues that there is no non-identity problem, that future children have no interest in existing, but significant interest in avoiding harm and that procreation is, therefore, a much more morally risky business than we tend to think. Even if... (shrink)

The dominant framework for addressing procreative ethics has revolved around the notion of harm, largely due to Derek Parfit’s famous non-identity problem. Focusing exclusively on the question of harm treats what procreators owe their offspring as akin to what they would owe strangers (if they owe them anything at all). Procreators, however, usually expect (and are expected) to parent the persons they create, so we cannot understand what procreators owe their offspring without also appealing to their role as prospective parents. (...) I argue that prospective parents can wrong their future children just by failing to act well in their role as parents, whether or not their offspring are ultimately harmed or benefitted by their creation. Their obligations as prospective parents bear on the motivations behind their reproductive choices, including the choice to select for some genetic trait in their offspring. Even when procreators’ motivations aren’t malicious, or purely selfish, they can still fail to recognize and act for the end of the parental role. Procreators can wrong their offspring by selecting for some genetic trait, then, when doing so would violate their obligations as prospective parents, or when their motivation for doing so is antithetical to the end of the parental role. (shrink)

Many people think that the amount of evil and suffering we observe provides important and perhaps decisive evidence against the claim that a loving God created our world. Yet almost nobody worries about the ethics of human procreation. Can these attitudes be consistently maintained? This chapter argues that the most obvious attempts to justify a positive answer fail. The upshot is not that procreation is impermissible, but rather that we should either revise our beliefs about the severity of global arguments (...) from evil or develop new and better defenses of human procreation. Although both possibilities are worthy of pursuit, this chapter focuses on the latter possibility. (shrink)

Ethical vegans and vegetarians believe that it is seriously immoral to bring into existence animals whose lives would be miserable. In this paper, I will discuss whether such a belief also leads to the conclusion that it is seriously immoral to bring human beings into existence. I will argue that vegans should abstain from having children since they believe that unnecessary suffering should be avoided. After all, humans will suffer in life, and having children is not necessary for a good (...) life. Thus vegans, and probably vegetarians as well, should not have children. I will consider several objections against this controversial claim, show why the objections fail and conclude that it would be best for ethical vegans to abstain from procreation. (shrink)

Many contemporary ethical debates turn on claims about the nature and extent of our alleged procreative moral rights: moral rights to procreate or not to procreate as we choose. In this article, I argue that there are no procreative moral rights, in that generally we do not have a distinctive moral right to procreate or not to procreate as we choose. However, interference with our procreative choices usually violates our nonprocreative moral rights, such as our moral rights to bodily autonomy (...) or to privacy. My argument presents hypothetical cases in which a state interferes with a person's procreative choices in order to promote aggregate social welfare, but this interference does not violate any of the person's nonprocreative moral rights. These cases not only undermine frequently made claims that widely recognized nonprocreative moral rights entail procreative moral rights, they also challenge the intuitively plausible claim that interference with our procreative choices as such violates our moral rights. What at first appear to be substantive moral rights are in fact a kind of illusion created by the frequent overlap of other rights, but lacking in substance beyond that overlap. While this argument against the existence of procreative moral rights has substantive implications for ongoing debates in reproductive ethics, I ultimately suggest that it is consistent with a progressive approach to reproductive justice. (shrink)

Most people would agree that adoption is a good thing for children in need of a family. Yet adoption is often considered a second best or even last resort for parents in making their families. Against this assumption, I explore the unique value of adoption for prospective parents. I begin with a criticism of the selective focus on the value of adoption for only those people using assisted reproductive technologies. I focus on the value of adoption for all prospective parents, (...) reflecting on non-relative, non-procreative adoptions. First, adoption can meet the important need that a child has for a family, whereas procreation creates rather than meets needs. Second, adoption provides a morally noble opportunity to extend to a stranger benefits usually withheld for one's genetic kin. As such, adoption offers a unique possibility in which impartial concern for an other can be the starting point for a lifetime of love and care. Finally, adoptions can have transformative power over adoptive parents’ conception of family and self. In highlighting the unique value of adoption, I aim to challenge the widespread assumption that adoption has second best status to procreation. Indeed adoption can exemplify the human potential for moral compassion and impartial concern for the needs of others. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore the prospects for risk-based arguments in favour of anti-natalism, which explain the wrongness of procreation in terms of wrongful risk-imposition on the resultant child. After considering and rejecting two risk-based arguments from the existing literature - David Benatar's and Matti Häyry's - I propose a more promising version that focuses on the lack of appropriate justification for imposing the risks of existence, namely, one that refers to the essential interests of the child on whom those (...) risks are imposed. The paper proceeds in four parts. In Part 2, I set the stage for my discussion by clarifying the basic structure of risk-based arguments and identifying some of their important features. In Parts 3-5, I consider three distinct risk-based arguments for anti-natalism and argue that only the third, justificatory argument has the potential to be successful. (shrink)

Recent work in the psychology of happiness has led some to conclude that we are unreliable assessors of our lives and that skepticism about whether we are happy is a genuine possibility worth taking very seriously. I argue that such claims, if true, have worrisome implications for procreation. In particular, they show that skepticism about whether many if not most people are well positioned to create persons is a genuine possibility worth taking very seriously. This skeptical worry should not be (...) confused with a related but much stronger version of the argument, which says that all human lives are very bad and not worth starting. I criticize the latter stance, but take seriously the former stance and hope it can be answered in future work. (shrink)

I argue that miscarriage, referred to by poet Susan Stewart as “the event that was nothing,” is a liminal event along four distinct and inter-related dimensions: parenthood, procreation, death, and induced abortion. It is because of this liminality that miscarriage has been both poorly addressed in our society, and enrolled in larger debates over women's reproduction and responsibility for reproduction, both conceptually and legally. If miscarriage’s liminality were better understood, if miscarriage itself were better theorized, perhaps it would not so (...) easily be enrolled in these other debates to the detriment of women who miscarry, and their families. However, its very liminality and the fact that it is enrolled in these debates sheds light on the complicated network of concepts within which miscarriage lies. (OPEN ACCESS AT URL). (shrink)

A liberal antinomy of parenting exists: strong liberal intuitions militate in favor of both denying special resources to parenting projects (on grounds of project-neutrality) and granting them (on grounds of respect for personhood). I show that we can reconcile these two claims by rejecting a premise common to both--viz. that liberalism is necessarily committed to extensive procreative liberties--and limiting procreation and subsequent parenting to adults who meet certain psychological and especially financial criteria. I also defend this argument, which provides a (...) Kantian complement to utilitarian arguments for restricting procreation, against a variety of objections. (shrink)

Herjeet Kaur Marway recently proposed the Principle of Procreative Justice, which says that reproducers have a strong moral obligation to avoid completing race and colour injustices through their selection choices. In this article, we analyze this principle and argue, appealing to a series of counterexamples, that some of the implications of Marway's Principle of Procreative Justice are difficult to accept. This casts doubt on whether the principle should be adopted. Also, we show that there are some more principled worries regarding (...) Marway's idea of a strong pro tanto duty not to complete injustices through one's procreative choices. Nonetheless, we believe Marway's arguments point in the right general direction regarding duties and structural injustice. Thus, in the final part, we suggest a positive proposal on how it would be possible to respond to the cases we raise. More specifically, we explore the suggestion that agents have a pro tanto duty to participate in eliminating structural injustice. Importantly, this duty can be satisfied, not only in procreation choices but in multiple ways. (shrink)

This article examines one of the sources of David Benatar’s anti-natalism. This is the view that ‘all procreation is [morally] wrong.’ (Benatar and Wasserman, 2015:12) One of its sources is the claim that each of our lives is objectively bad, hence bad whether we think so or not. The question I will pose is whether the constraints of metaphysical naturalism allow for an objective devaluation of human life sufficiently negative to justify anti-natalism. My thesis is that metaphysical naturalism does not (...) have the resources to support such a negative evaluation. Metaphysical naturalism is the view that causal reality is exhausted by nature, the space-time system and its contents. The gist of my argument is that the ideal standards relative to which our lives are supposed to be axiologically substandard cannot be merely subjective expressions of our desires and aversions; they must be (i) objectively binding standards that are (ii) objectively possible in the sense of concretely realizable. The realizability condition, however, cannot be satisfied on metaphysical naturalism; ergo, failure to meet these ideal standards cannot show that our lives are objectively bad. (shrink)

The author argues for a theory of responsibility for outcomes of imposed risk, based on whether it was permissible to impose the risk. When one tries to apply this persuasive model of responsibility for outcomes of risk imposition to procreation, which is a risk imposing act, one finds that it doesn’t match one’s intuitions about responsibility for outcomes of procreative risk. This mismatch exposes a justificatory gap for procreativity, namely, that procreation cannot avail itself of the shared vulnerability to risks (...) and their constraints—to the balance one is forced to strike between one’s interest in being free to impose risks on others and one’s interest in being safe from harm resulting from the risk imposed by others—which serves to justify risk imposition, generally. Whereas most risk impositions involve trade-offs of liberty and security among people who share the vulnerabilities associated with the taking, imposing, or being constrained from imposing risks, procreation involves the introduction of people into that position of vulnerability in the first place. Thus, when one procreates, one imposes risks in the absence of the shared vulnerability that usually serves as a justification for risk imposition. Procreative risks may not be wrongfully imposed, but they aren’t permissibly imposed in a manner fully comparable to other permissibly imposed risks. This makes procreation a unique form of risk imposition, with unique implications for its justification and for one’s responsibility for its outcomes. This insight can help explain several puzzling procreative asymmetries. (shrink)

This thesis consists of a series of papers in population ethics: a subfield of normative ethics concerned with the distinctive issues that arise in cases where our actions can affect the identities or number of people of who ever exist. Each paper can be read independently of the others. In Chapter 1, I present a dilemma for Archimedean views in population axiology: roughly, those views on which adding enough good lives to a population can make that population better than any (...) other. In Chapter 2, I extend Gustaf Arrhenius’s famous impossibility theorems in population axiology into the domain of choices under risk. My risky impossibility theorems dispense with the assumption that welfare levels are finitely fine-grained, and so tell against lexical views in population axiology. In Chapter 3, I present objections to critical-level and critical-range views in population axiology. I then sketch out what I call the ‘Imprecise Exchange Rates View’ and argue that it is an attractive alternative. In Chapter 4, I address critical-level and critical-range views again. This time, I note that they are vulnerable to objections from biographical identity: identity between lives. I suggest that these objections give us reason to reject critical-level and critical-range views and embrace the Total View. In Chapter 5, I argue that objections of the same form – objections from personal identity – tell against person-affecting views in population ethics. In Chapter 6, I draw out some counterintuitive implications of two recent complaints-based theories of the procreation asymmetry. (shrink)

The goal of Transhumanism is to change the human condition through radical enhancement of its positive traits and through AI (Artificial Intelligence). Among these traits the transhumanists highlight creativity. Here we first describe human creativity at more fundamental levels than those related to the arts and sciences when, for example, childhood is taken into account. We then admit that creativity is experienced on both its bright and dark sides. In a second moment we describe attempts to improve creativity both at (...) the bodily level and in the emulation of human behavior in AI. These developments are presented both as effective results in laboratories and as transhumanist proposals emerging from them. Third, we have introduced the work of some theologians and ethicists, who study such proposals through the lens of the "created co-creator" metaphor. Finally, we analyze these developments through a reflection on the nature of creativity. We identify three problems in the current ideas about enhancement: first, they are bound to Western standards of creativity; second, the tempo and mode of evolution (involving an extended childhood) are not taken into account; third, the enhancement of creativity develops both its healthy and the perverse side. Proponents of the created co-creator metaphor also have difficulties with the problems pointed out. Concerning AI, there is a promising perspective of approaching human creativity, but there are some intrinsic limits: Human emotions are ambiguous, contradictory and far from rational control; human creativity is iconoclastic, thus highlighting the importance of youth and new generations; we do not expect from AI beings to present the perverse side of creativity. Our conclusions are: First, procreation and the new generations are essential to human creativity; in the same way, the wheat does not grow without the chaff; and finally, that birth breaks with causal connections and allows us to act forgiving--at birth, God's creative act is re-enacted. (shrink)

Sarah Conly's One Child is a substantive treatment of the extent to which procreative freedom is curtailed by rising global population and the environmental problems to which it contributes. This review provides an overview of the book's content and closes with a few critical remarks. The book is highly recommended for those interested in the intersection between environmental ethics and the ethics of procreation.

Parenting our biological children is a centrally important matter, but how, if it all, can it be justified? According to a contemporary influential line of thinking, the acquisition by parents of a moral right to parent their biological children should be grounded by appeal to the value of the intimate emotional relationship that gestation facilitates between a newborn and a gestational procreator. I evaluate two arguments in defence of this proposal and argue that both are unconvincing.

Les plus grandes institutions médicales et divers éthiciens préconisent une approche utilitariste en période de crise de santé publique, afin de maximiser les bénéfices pour la société, en conflit direct avec notre vision habituelle (kantienne) du respect des personnes en tant qu'individus. Un problème central de l'utilitarisme est qu'il n'y a pas de moyen clair d'évaluer les choix moraux, y compris dans les décisions médicales. En général, l'éthique médicale kantienne est respectée en médecine. Mais dans une pandémie, lorsque les ressources (...) sont pauvres, des choix profonds de vie ou de mort doivent être faits. Dans ces situations, les principes de l'utilitarisme offrent la meilleure réponse, avec le passage d'un modèle de pensée centré sur le patient à un modèle de pensée centré sur la société. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.34596.30088. (shrink)

Cele mai mari instituții medicale și diverși eticieni pledează pentru o abordare utilitaristă în perioadele de crize de sănătate publică, pentru a maximiza beneficiile pentru societate, în conflict direct cu viziunea noastră obișnuită (kantiană) privind respectul față de persoane ca indivizi. O problemă centrală a utilitarismului este că nu există nicio modalitate clară de a evalua alegerile morale, inclusiv în deciziile medicale. În general, în medicină se respectă etica medicală kantiană. Dar în pandemie, când resursele sunt sărace, trebuie făcute alegeri (...) profunde, de viață și moarte. În aceste situații principiile utilitarismului oferă cel mai bun răspuns, cu trecerea de la un model de gândire centrat pe pacient la un model de gândire centrat pe societate. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.28443.69929. (shrink)

The ethics of biological procreation has received a great deal of attention in recent years. Yet, as I show in this paper, much of what has come to be called procreative ethics is conducted in a strangely abstract, impersonal mode, one which stands little chance of speaking to the practical perspectives of any prospective parent. In short, the field appears to be flirting with a strange sort of practical irrelevance, wherein its verdicts are answers to questions that no-one is asking. (...) I go on to articulate a theory of what I call existential grounding, a notion which explains the role that prospective children play in the lives of many would-be parents. Procreative ethicists who want their work to have real practical relevance must, I claim, start to engage with this markedly first-personal kind of practical consideration. (shrink)

While artificial womb technology is currently being studied for the purpose of improving neonatal care, I contend that this technology ought to be pursued as a means to address the unprecedented rate of unintended pregnancies. But ectogenesis, alongside other emerging reproductive technologies, is problematic insofar as it threatens to disrupt the natural link between procreation and parenthood that is normally thought to generate rights and responsibilities for biological parents. I argue that there remains only one potentially viable account of parenthood: (...) the voluntarist account, which construes parental rights as robust moral obligations that must be voluntarily undertaken. The problem is that this account mistakenly presumes a patriarchal divide between procreation and parenthood. I propose a reframing of procreation and parenthood from a feminist perspective that recognises gestational motherhood as involving robust moral obligations that ought to be voluntarily undertaken. If this were the case, all gestational mothers would be, by definition, willing mothers. To make this happen I argue that ectogenesis technology must be a widely available reproductive option. (shrink)

Can appealing to children’s rights help to solve the non-identity problem in cases of procreation? A number of philosophers have answered affirmatively, arguing that even if children cannot be harmed by being born into disadvantaged conditions, they may nevertheless be wronged if those conditions fail to meet a minimal standard of decency to which all children are putatively entitled. This paper defends the tenability of this view by outlining and responding to five prominent objections that have been raised against it (...) in the contemporary literature: the identifiability objection; the non-existence objection; the waiving of rights objection, the lack of legitimate complaint objection; and the unfairness objection. (shrink)

Aujourd’hui délaissées, parfois devenues gênantes, les collections médicales furent pourtant à l’avant-garde du renouveau de la médecine au début du XIXe siècle, avant que celle-ci ne devienne la médecine telle que nous la connaissons aujourd’hui. Selon une vision courante de l’histoire de la médecine, les collections médicales auraient perdu de leur utilité lorsque la médecine a accédé au statut de science expérimentale, les musées d’anatomie faisant alors place aux laboratoires. Les collections d’anatomie-pathologie comme le musée Dupuytren ne seraient que le (...) reliquat de cette histoire, le témoignage d’un échec méthodologique à opposer aux succès de la physiologie expérimentale. Cette narration de l’histoire de la médecine est-elle cependant correcte ? Dans quels buts épistémologiques les médecins ont-ils créé ces collections ? Quelles connaissances cherchaient-ils à obtenir par ce biais ? Plus généralement, pourquoi collecter en médecine – et en science – et pourquoi collectionner ? Pour répondre à ces questions, je m’intéressai principalement dans cette contribution aux pratiques de collecte et de collection chez les médecins de la Société Anatomique de Paris au XIXe siècle et au rôle joué par ces pratiques dans la construction de la collection Dupuytren. (shrink)

Cunoașterea și informațiile (abordate în ansamblu sau în componentele lor distincte) sunt o preocupare majoră pentru tehnologia informației, sisteme de informații, știința informației și activitatea de informații în general. Procesul obţinerii, prelucrării şi analizei informaţiilor este o preocupare majoră pentru societatea actuală. În acest scop se folosesc procedee şi tehnici specifice pentru culegerea sau generarea de informaţii, prelucrarea acestora prin analiză şi sinteză, generarea de predicţii şi strategii, transmisia şi prezentarea informaţiilor factorilor de decizie, şi stocarea lor. Analiza informațiilor poate (...) fi caracterizată ca o intreprindere epistemologică, care urmărește să dezvolte o înțelegere clară a produselor cunoașterii. Perspectiva lui Polanyi despre cunoaștere servește unor considerații epistemologice fundamentale privind cunoașterea ca produs. Conceptul acesta de cunoaștere personală contribuie la o înțelegere mai profundă a cunoașterii. Perspectiva inversează ierarhia tradițională epistemologică. Cea mai mare provocare ar putea fi aceea de a convinge analiștii, conducerea și clienții lor de avantajele metodelor analitice structurale. O introducere treptată și naturală a acestor metode în fluxul obișnuit de procese și produse de informații ar putea fi mai eficientă decât realinierea la scară largă a gândirii. "Spațiul" activităților de informații s-a extins de la guverne ca actori statali la actori non-statali precum ONG-uri, instituții transnaționale și corporații, firme private și grupuri de interese și presiuni reprezentând comunități, concepte și ideologii diverse. Procesul de luare a deciziilor a devenit dispersat și granular. Actuala "democratizare" a serviciilor de informații are un impact major asupra colectării și analizei informațiilor, și a procesului decizional, determinând serviciile de informații să devină mai transparente, să ia în considerație dezbaterile publice a acțiunilor lor și să fie nevoite, uneori, să le justifice public. Un domeniu de care pot beneficia serviciile de informații este cel al managementului cunoașterii, implicat într-o dezbatere riguroasă asupra conceptelor, teoriilor și abordărilor cunoașterii și utilizării acestora. Noua paradigmă a serviciilor de informații impune schimbări majore la nivel organizațional și de pregătire a profesioniștilor pentru a înțelege și adopta noile concepte și tehnologii. -/- CUPRINS -/- Introducere 1 Cunoaștere - Definirea cunoașterii în filozofie - Comunicarea cunoașterii - Cunoașterea situată - Cunoașterea parțială - Cunoașterea științifică - 1.1 Ontologia - - Prezentare generală - - - Unele întrebări fundamentale - - - Concepte - - - Tipuri - - Istorie - - - Originile - - - - Parmenide și monismul - - - - Pluralismul ontologic - - - - Platon - - Ontologia în știință - - Alte subiecte ontologice - - - Formațiuni ontologice - - - Certitudine ontologică și epistemologică - - - Corpul și mediul, care pun la îndoială semnificația ființei - - - Ontologie și limbă - - - Ontologie și geografia umană - - - Realitate și actualitate - 1.2 Epistemologia - - Context și semnificație - - Cunoașterea - - - Cunoașterea că, cunoașterea cum și cunoașterea directă - - - Credință - - - Adevăr - - - Justificare - - - Problema lui Gettier - - - Externalism și internalism - - - Problema valorii - 1.3 Metodologii - - Prezentare generală - - - Procesul - - - - Formularea unei întrebări - - - - Ipoteza - - - - Predicția - - - - Testarea - - - - Analiza - - - Alte componente - - - - Replicarea - - - - Examinarea externă - - - - Înregistrarea și partajarea datelor - - Investigații științifice - - - Proprietățile cercetării științifice - - - Credințe și prejudecăți - - Elementele metodelor științifice idealizate - - Elemente ale metodei științifice - - - Caracterizări - - - Incertitudine - - - Definire - - - Dezvoltarea ipotezelor - - - Predicții din ipoteze - - - Experimente - - - Evaluare și îmbunătățire - - - Confirmarea - - Modele de cercetare științifică - - - Modelul clasic - - - Modelul ipotetico-deductiv - - - Modelul pragmatic - - Știința sistemelor complexe - 1.4 Hermeneutica - - Etimologie - - Hermeneutica filosofică - - - Hermeneutica modernă - - - - Schleiermacher (1768-1834) - - - - Dilthey (1833-1911) - - - - Heidegger (1889-1976) - - - - Gadamer (1900-2002) și colab. - - - - Noua hermeneutică - - - - Hermeneutica marxistă - - - - Hermeneutica obiectivă - 1.5 Filosofia limbajului - - Subiecte și sub-domenii majore - - - Compoziție și părți - - - Natura sensului - - - Referință - - - Mintea și limba - - - - Înnăscut și învățat - - - - Limba și gândul - - - Interacțiunea socială și limba - - Limbajul și filozofia continentală - - Probleme în filosofia limbajului - - - Imprecizia - - - Problema universalului și a compoziției - - - Natura limbajului - - - Abordări formale versus informale - - - Traducere și interpretare - 1.6 Logica - - Concepte - - Forma logică - 1.7 Filosofia logicii - - Adevăr - - - Purtătorii de adevăr - - - Adevăruri analitice, adevăr logic, valabilitate, consecință logică și implicare - 1.8 Declarații - - Declarația ca o entitate abstractă - 1.9 Dileme - - Utilizarea dilemei în logică - 1.10 Limitările cognitive - - Colin McGinn - - Friedrich Hayek - - John Tyndall - - Noam Chomsky - - Fenomene și obiecte și evenimente care nu se pot simți (numene) - - Noi misterieni - 1.11 Managementul cunoașterii - - Cercetare - - - Dimensiuni - - - Strategii - - - Motivații - 1.12 Ingineria cunoașterii - 1.13 Cunoașterea tacită în activitatea de informații 2 Date - Date, informații, cunoaștere și înțelepciune - În alte domenii - Memoria - - Procese - Înregistrări - 2.1 Referințe - - Etimologie și semnificații - - Semantică - - - Sens - - - Referent absent - - - Semnul lingvistic - - Informatică - - Biblioteci și știința informației - - Psihologie - - Școala - - Lege - - Artă - 2.2 Simboluri - - Etimologie - - Definiții - - Simbolurile și semiotica - - Psihanaliza, retorica și arhetipuri - - Paul Tillich - - Rolul contextului în simbolism - - - Semnificația istorică - - - Context - - Acțiuni simbolice - 2.3 Baze de date - - Baze de date guvernamentale - - - Uniunea Europeană - - Baze de date naționale ADN - 2.4 Metadate - - Definiție - - Identificarea - - - Exemplu - 2.5 Statistici - - Domeniu - - - Statistica matematică - - - Prezentare generală 3 Informații - Abordarea teoriei informației - Ca intrare senzorială - Ca reprezentare și complexitate - Informația ca mesaj - Informația ca determinant al transformărilor - Utilizarea studiului informațiilor - Informații mediate tehnologic - Informații sub forma unor fișiere - Semiotica - 3.1 Teoria informației - - Domeniul de studiu - - Evoluție - - Cantități de informații - - - Entropia unei surse de informații - - - Entropia comună - - - Entropia condițională (echivocă) - - - Informații reciproce (transinformații) - - - Divergența Kullback-Leibler (câștigul de informații) - - - Alte cantități - - Teoria codificării - - - Teoria surselor - - - - Rata - - - Capacitatea canalului - - - - Capacitatea anumitor modele de canale - - Aplicații în alte domenii - - - Utilizări în intelligence și aplicații de secretizare - - - Generarea numerelor pseudoaleatorii - - - Explorarea seismică - - - Semiotica - - - Aplicații diverse - - Unități de informație - - Unități primare - - Unități derivate din biți - - - Octet (byte) - - - Nibble - - - Cuvânt, bloc și pagină - - Exemple de valori - 3.2 Tehnologia informației - - Procesarea datelor - - - Stocarea datelor - - - Regăsirea datelor - - - Transmisia de date - - - Manipularea datelor - - Perspectiva - - - Perspectiva academică - - - Perspectiva etică - 3.3 Confidențialitatea informațiilor - - Tipuri de informații - - - Internet - - - Televiziunea prin cablu - - - Informații medicale - - - Informații financiare - - - Localizarea - - - Informații politice - - - Informații educaționale - - Legalitatea - 3.4 Informații sensibile - - Informații non sensibile - - - Informații publice - - - Informații de rutină în afaceri - - Tipuri de informații sensibile - - - Informații comerciale confidențiale - - - Informații clasificate - - Protecția legală împotriva divulgării neautorizate - - - Informații personale și private - - - Informații de afaceri confidențiale - - - Informații clasificate - - Informații sensibile digitale - 3.5 Informații clasificate - - Clasificări guvernamentale - - Nivele de clasificare - - - Top Secret (TS) - - - Secret - - - Confidențial - - - Resticționat - - - Neclasificat - - Permisul de acces - - Informații compartimentate - - Informații nucleare - - Internațional - - - Clasificările NATO - - - Organizații internaționale - - - Clasificări echivalente în diferite țări - - Clasificarea corporativă - - Protocolul luminii de trafic - 3.6 Tipuri de informații clasificate 4 Activitatea de informații - 4.1 Istoria activității de informații - 4.2 Știința informației - - Fundamente - - - Domeniu de aplicare și abordări - - - Definiții ale științei informației - - - Filozofia informației - - - Ontologie - - Extragerea informațiilor - - Vectori de cercetare și aplicații - - - Accesul la informații - - - Arhitectura informațiilor - - - Managementul informațiilor - - - Extragerea informațiilor - - - Societatea informațională - - - Reprezentarea cunoașterii și raționamentul - 4.3 Ontologia activității de informații - 4.4 Economia informațională - - Valoarea informațiilor - - Informațiile, mecanismul prețurilor și organizațiile - - Asimetria informațională - - - Semnalizare - - - Screening - - Bunuri informaționale - - - Împachetarea - 4.5 Economia informațiilor industriale - 4.6 Managementul informațiilor - - Aspecte teoretice - - - Teorii comportamentale și organizaționale - - - Teoria economică - - Managementul informațiilor strategice - - - Alinierea tehnologiilor și strategiilor de afacere cu managementul informațiilor - - - Un model de portofoliu contemporan pentru informații - - - Competențe pentru gestionarea calității informațiilor - - - Rezumat - - Operaționalizarea managementului informațiilor - - - Gestionarea schimbării necesare - - - Opera timpurie a lui Galbraith - - - Organizații matriceale - - Informații în sursă deschisă - - - Surse deschise pentru informații - - - Definiții pentru OSINT - - - Informații competitive - - - OSINT în afaceri - 4.7 Ciclul de informații - 4.8 Managementul ciclului de informații - - Prezentare generală - - - Definirea intelligence - - - Managementul ciclului de informații - - - Planificarea și prezentarea generală a direcției - - Cerințe - - - Naționale / strategice - - - Militare / operaționale - - Arhitectura intelligence - - - Bugetarea - - - Factori politici - - - Echilibrarea aplicării legii și securitatea națională - - - Public versus privat - - Planificarea colectărilor - - - CCIRM - - Emiterea de ordine și cereri - - - Prioritizare - - Alte subiecte - - - Folosirea politică greșită - - - Intelligence clandestină față de acțiunea sub acoperire - - - - Coordonarea acțiunii HUMINT și a acțiunii sub acoperire - - - - Riscuri și resurse comune - - Eșecurile din ciclul intelligence - - Alte cicluri - - - Bucla Boyd OODA - 4.9 Informațiile în afaceri (Business intelligence) - - Componente - - Istorie - - Depozitarea datelor - - Comparație cu inteligența competitivă - - Comparație cu cercetarea analitică de afaceri - - Aplicații într-o întreprindere - - Prioritizarea proiectelor - - Factori de succes în implementare - - - Suportul afacerii - - - Nevoile afacerii - - - Cantitatea și calitatea datelor disponibile - - Aspect utilizator - - Date semistructurate sau nestructurate - - - Date nestructurate vs. date semistructurate - - - Probleme cu date semistructurate sau nestructurate - - - Utilizarea de metadate - 4.10 Informații competitive - - Dezvoltare istorică - - Tendințe recente - - Domenii similare - - Etica - - Externalizarea - 4.11 Analogii cu alte discipline - - Știința - - Arheologia - - Afaceri - - Medicina 5 Comunitatea - 5.1 Sisteme informaționale - - Prezentare generală - - Tipuri de sisteme informaționale - 5.2 Comunicarea - - Comunicare nonverbală - - Comunicare verbală - - Comunicarea scrisă și dezvoltarea sa istorică - - Comunicare de afaceri - - Comunicare familială - - Comunicarea interpersonală - - Proiectarea comunicării - - Revoluția comunicării informațiilor - - Consultanța - 5.3 Societatea informațională - - Ce este? - - Creșterea informației în societate - - Dezvoltarea modelului societății informaționale - - - Tranziția economică - - Procesarea informațiilor sociale - 5.4 Guvernarea electronică - - Definirea e-guvernării - - Indicele ONU de dezvoltare a e-guvernării - - Exemple de e-guvernare și e-guvernanță - 5.5 Servicii secrete - - Relația dintre serviciile aceleiași țări - 5.6 Epistemologia activității de informații - 5.7 Comunități epistemice - 5.8 Comunități epistemice în UE - - Conceptul comunităților epistemice și limitele sale - - Agenția Europeană de Apărare - - Centrul UE de analiză a informațiilor - - Concluzie 6 Contrainformații - 6.1 Istoria spionajului - - Istoria timpurie - - Europa timpurie modernă - - Secolul al 18-lea - - - Franța - - - Marea Britanie - - - Spionaj industrial - - - Revoluția americană, 1775-1783 - - - Revoluția franceză și războaiele napoleoniene, 1793-1815 - - Secolul al 19-lea - - - Războiul civil american 1861-1865 - - - Informații militare - - - - Austria - - - - Marea Britanie - - - - Franța - - - - Germania - - - - Italia - - - - Rusia - - - Informații navale - - - Contraspionaj - - Secolul 20 - - - Agenții de informații civile - - - Primul Razboi Mondial - - - - Decodarea - - - Revoluția rusă - - - Perioada interbelică - - - - Germania nazistă - - - Al doilea razboi mondial - - - - MI6 în Marea Britanie - - - - MAGIC: SUA sparge codul japonez - - - - OSS în Statele Unite - - - - Contraspionaj - - - Războiul rece - - - Războiul post-rece - - - - Războiul din Irak 2003 - - - - Antiterorism - - - - - Israel - 6.2 Spionajul - - Țintele spionajului - - Metode și terminologie - - - Tehnologii și tehnici - 6.3 Contraspionaj - - Operațiunile de contraspionaj defensive - - - Contra-HUMINT - - - Motivații pentru divulgarea informațiilor și operațiunilor - - Teoria contraspionajului ofensiv - 6.4 Securitatea - - Clasificarea securității - - Concepte de securitate - - Managementul securității în organizații - 6.5 Terorism - - Lupta UE împotriva terorismului - - - Strategia UE - - - - Prevenirea - - - - Protecția - - - - Urmărirea - - - - Răspunsul - 6.6 O teorie a contrainformațiilor - - Definiții concurente - - Serviciile de informații - - - Factorii care determină comportamentul serviciilor de informații - - Contrainformații aplicate - - - Asistență politică - - - Suport operațional - - - Evidențierea documentelor - - Operațiuni de contrainformații - - Contraspionaj - - Domenii de studiu 7 Culegerea de informații - 7.1 Extragerea cunoașterii - - Privire de ansamblu - - Extragerea din surse structurate în RDF - - - Maparea din tabele/vizionări RDB în entități/atribute/valori RDF - - - Mapări complexe ale bazelor de date relaționale RDF - - - XML - - Extracția din surse naturale de limbaj - - - Extracție de informații (EI) tradițională - - - Extracția de informații bazată pe ontologie (EIBO) - - - Învățarea ontologiei - - - Adnotare semantică - - - Instrumente - - Descoperirea de cunoștințe - 7.2 Colectarea de informații umane - - Surse - - Operații de bază HUMINT - - - Pregătirea ofițerilor pentru lucrul în culturi - - - Diferențierea de bază pe tip de subiect - - - Selectarea surselor potențiale - - - Identificare - - - Tipuri de interviuri - - - - Informarea (debriefing) - - - - Interogare - - - Planificarea interviului inițial - - - - Caracteristicile interogatorului (anchetatorilor)â - - - - Sprijinirea nevoilor - - - - Atitudini ale subiectului - - - Planificarea interviurilor suplimentare - - Principii de interogare - - - Raport de construcție - - - Utilizarea înregistratoarelor - - - Lucrul cu interpreți - - Surse recrutate / de încredere - - - Spionaj - - Analiza relațiilor dintre subiecții HUMINT - 7.3 Investigații - - Surse clasice - - - Deducția - - - Inducția - - - Abducția - - Investigații criminale - 7.4 Profilarea infractorilor - 7.5 Informația asimetrică - - Modele de informații asimetrice - - Selecția adversă - - - Semnalizare (Signaling) - - - Investigare (Screening) - - Aplicarea asimetriei de informații în domeniul cercetării - - Surse de asimetrie informațională - - Efectul blogurilor asupra asimetriei informaționale - - Efectul inteligenței artificiale asupra asimetriei informaționale - 7.6 Proiectarea mecanismului - - Intuiția - - Proiectarea - - - Mecanismul - - - Principiul revelației - - - Gradul de implementare - 7.7 Raportul circular - - Exemple specifice - 7.8 Liberul acces la informații 8 Supravegherea - Tipuri - - Calculator - - Telefoane - 8.1 Camere de supraveghere - 8.2 Camere IP - - Standarde - - Avantaje ale camerelor IP - - Dezavantaje potențiale - 8.3 Camere web - - Probleme de intimitate - - Efecte asupra societății moderne - - Utilizări ale camerelor web - - - Monitorizare video pentru îngrijirea copiilor - - - Comerț - - - Apeluri video și videoconferințe - - - Video de securitate - - - Clipuri video și fotografii - - - Dispozitive de control al intrărilor - - Tehnologia camerelor web - 8.4 Supravegherea în IR - - Applicații - - Specificații - - Cum funcționează supravegherea în IR - 8.5 Supravegherea în masă - - Supravegherea în masă în Uniunea Europeană - - - INDECT - - - HIDE - 8.6 Supravegherea aeriană - 8.7 Supravegherea calculatoarelor - - Emanații - - Policeware - 8.8 Interceptarea convorbirilor telefonice - - Aspecte legale - - Supravegherea electronică a telefoanelor - 8.9 Identificarea automată și captura de date (AIDC) - 8.10 Captarea datelor din documente tipărite - - Cele mai cunoscute tipuri de aplicații - - - ABBYY - - - Accusoft - - - AnyDoc Software - - - Cvision Technologies - - - Expervision - - - I.R.I.S. Group - - - LEADTOOLS - - - Nuance Communications - - - PSIGEN Software - 8.11 Ingineria securității - - Calificări - - Atitudini privind securitatea - - Practici de bază - - Subdomenii - 8.12 Securitatea calculatoarelor - - Securitate prin proiectare - 8.13 Biometria - - Sisteme biometrice adaptive - - Direcții noi de dezvoltare - - - Accesul în rețele publice - - Supravegherea biometrică - - Funcționalitatea biometrică 9 Analiza informațiilor - Prezentare generală - Metoda analitică - - Stabilirea obiectivelor pentru o analiză de informații - - - Fii îndrăzneț și cinstit - - - Acord privind conținutul - - - Orientarea spre clienți - - - Orientarea spre colegi - - Organizând ceea ce aveți - Natura analizei - - Tipuri de raționament - - - Inducție: căutarea cauzalității - - - Deducția: aplicarea generalului - - - Intuiția instruită - - - Metoda științifică - - Metode de analiză - - - Analiza oportunităților - - - Analiza cuiului de siguranță - - - Analiza ipotezelor concurente - - - Analogie - Procesul analitic - - Definirea problemei - - Generarea de ipoteze - - Determinarea nevoilor de informații și colectarea de informații - - Evaluarea surselor - - Evaluarea ipotezelor (teste) - - Producția și ambalarea - - Evaluarea colegială - - Feedback de la client și evaluarea producției - Nu uitați niciodată utilizatorul final - 9.1 Conceptualizarea funcțiilor analizei de informații - 9.2 Metodologii în analiza informațiilor - 9.3 Euristica în analiza de informații - - Puterea de expertiză - - Paradoxul de expertiză - - Sarcinile analiștilor de informații - - Pro și contra echipelor - - Tehnologii - - Metodologii analitice - - Euristica - 9.4 Raționamentul inductiv - - Raționamentul inductiv vs. raționamentul deductiv - - Critici - - - Prejudecăți - - Tipuri de raționament inductiv - - - Generalizare - - - Silogismul statistic - - - Inducția simplă - - - Argumentul din analogie - - - Inferența cauzală - - - Predicția - - Inferența bayesiană - - Inferența inductivă - 9.5 Evaluarea informațiilor - - Procesul de evaluare a informațiilor - - Ciclul informațiilor centrice specifice - - Evaluarea informațiilor criminale - - - Utilizarea de Armata SUA - - - Procesul CRIMINT - - Analiza informațiilor criminale - 9.6 Abordarea orientată spre țintă a ciclului de informații - - Analiza orientată pe țintă - - - Procesul de intelligence - - Crearea modelului - - - Modele în intelligence - - - Surse de informații de intelligence - - - Popularea modelului - - Analiza organizațională - - Aplicarea abordării centrate pe țintă în intelligence - - Critici - 9.7 Analiza ipotezelor competitive - - Proces - - Puncte forte - - Puncte slabe - - - Analiza structurată a ipotezelor concurente - - - Alte abordări ale formalismului - 9.8 Analiza indicatorilor - - Istorie - - Elemente de analiză a indicatorilor - - - Tehnici analitice structurate - - - Cerință - - - Categorii - - - Factori - - - Scenarii - - - Indicatori - - Proces - - Beneficii - - Puncte slabe - - Tehnici analitice structurate înrudite - 9.9 Cuvinte de probabilitate estimativă - - Istorie - - - Informații - - - - Eșecuri de politică și de informații legate de CPE - - Reformele metodologiei - - - Cuantificarea fiabilității sursei și a încrederii analitice - - - Analiza stocastică - - - Standardizare - - - - Experiența Mercyhurst cu CPE standardizate - 9.10 Predicții - - Predicții informale pe bază de ipoteze - - Sondaje de opinie - - Statistici - - Supranaturalul (profeții) - - Predicția în știință - - Finanțe 10 Media și rețele sociale - Studiul - Istoria - Nivele de analiză a rețelelor sociale - - Nivel micro - - Nivel mediu - - Nivel macro - Legături teoretice - - Teorii importate - - Teorii specifice - Decalaje structurale - Clustere de cercetare - - Comunicare - - Comunitate - - Rețele complexe - - Rețele criminale - - Difuzarea inovațiilor - - Demografie - - Sociologia economică - - Sănătate - - Ecologie umană - - Limba și lingvistica - - Rețele literare - - Studii organizatorice - - Capitalul social - - Poziția și beneficiile rețelei - - Media socială - Servicii în rețele sociale - - Impactul social - - Caracteristici tipice - - Caracteristici suplimentare - 10.1 Media socială - - Clasificarea mediei sociale - - - Viralitate - - Bloguri - - Comunicarea prin calculator - - Defăimarea - - Jurnalism - - - Mass media - - Facebook - - Twitter - - YouTube - 10.2 Știri - - Caracteristici - - - Noutatea - - - Marfă - - - Tonul - - - Valoarea de noutate a știrii - - Media de știri - - - Ziare - - - Televiziunea - - - Internet - 10.3 Psihologia mulțimilor - 10.4 Manipularea prin media - - Contexte - - - Activism - - - Publicitate - - - Farsa - - - Propaganda - - - Război psihologic - - - Relații publice - - Tehnici - - - Marketingul motoarelor de căutare - - Profesioniști în conformitate - - - Tehnici - 10.5 Psihologia rețelelor sociale - - Neuroplasticitatea - 10.6 Analiza rețelelor sociale 11 Etica - Definirea eticii - 11.1 Relativismul moral - - Variații - - - Descriptiv - - - - Meta-etic - - - - Normativ - 11.2 Utilitarism - - Etimologie - - Fundal istoric - - - Filozofia chineză - - - Filosofia occidentală - 11.3 Dileme etice - - Exemple de dileme etice - - Răspunsuri la argumente - - Dileme morale - - - Exemple - - - Conceptul - - - Probleme - 11.4 Codul de conduită FBI - 11.5 Meta-etica - - Întrebări meta-etice - - Teoriile semantice - - - Centralism și non-centralism - 11.6 Filosofia dreptului - - Jurisprudență analitică - - Jurisprudența normativă - - Abordări filosofice ale problemelor juridice Încheiere Resurse Despre autor - Nicolae Sfetcu - - De același autor - - Contact Editura - MultiMedia Publishing . 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The concept of antinatalism is now becoming popular on the Internet. Many online newspaper articles deal with this topic, and numerous academic papers on antinatalism have been published over the past ten years in the fields of philosophy and ethics. The word “antinatalism” was first used in the current meaning in 2006, when the two books that justify the universal negation of procreation were published: one by David Benatar and the other by Théophile de Giraud. However, we can find various (...) prototypes of antinatalistic thoughts in ancient Greece, ancient India, and modern Europe. You might recall the name Schopenhauer. In this paper, I briefly summarize the history of antinatalistic thoughts and propose a set of categories on antinatalism and related thoughts. (shrink)

După declararea pandemiei COVID-19, Slavoj Žižek a publicat o carte numită „Pandemic!: COVID-19 Shakes the World”, care a declanșat un val de reacții. În carte, el prezintă modul în care media a exploatat fără milă acest subiect, accentuând panica. Multe studii majore au prezis apariția unei astfel de pandemii, dar au fost ignorate de toate guvernele, declarându-le ca fiind exagerate. Žižek crede că actuala pandemie a dus la falimentul actualului capitalism ”barbar”, întrebându-se dacă nu cumva drumul pe care îl va (...) lua omenirea este un neo-comunism (el însuși se descrie ca un „radical de stânga” și un „comunist în sens calificat”). Žižek argumentează aceste idei cu măsurile socio-politice din pandemie ale cancelarului Germaniei, Angela Merkel și a președintelui Franței, și naționalizarea temporară a căilor ferate de către Boris Johnson. ”Chiar și președintele SUA, Donald Trump, a transferat miliarde de dolari americanilor. El a emis apeluri pentru preluarea sectorului privat în ceea ce privește materialele medicale.” DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.31451.80167. (shrink)