The aim of this contribution is to critically explore the understanding, the goals and the meaning of education in the philosophy of education by Jean-Jacques Rousseau. In his educational novel Emile: or On Education [Emile ou De l’éducation] (1762) he depicts his account of the natural education. Rousseau argues that all humans share one and the same development process which is independent of their social background. He regards education as an active process of perfection which is curiosity-driven and intrinsic to (...) each child. Rousseau’s educational goals are autarky, happiness and freedom. (shrink)

Michèle Le Dœuff considers the relationship between Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir as a paradigmatic case of what she calls an "erotico-theoretical transference" relationship: De Beauvoir devoted herself to Sartre theoretically by adopting his existentialist perspective for the analysis of reality in general and the analysis of women's oppression in particular. The latter is especially strange since Sartre used strongly sexist metaphors and adopted a macho attitude towards women. In her book Hipparchia's Choice, Le Dœuff speaks in this context (...) of "theoretical masculinism." She convincingly shows in this book that Sartre without using images could not have closed his existentialist philosophy: without the feminine drawback he would not have been able to explain why man cannot become god. Sartre not only understands gaining knowledge as a rape of a woman he also fears that the possessed feminine (body) could reverse its position from being dominated to the dominating force by appropriating the masculine through slime. In Being and Nothingness Sartre states that "slime is the revenge of the In-itself. A sickly–sweet, feminine revenge." Despite of the fact that De Beauvoir used Sartre's heterosexist ontology and metaphysics she managed to provide a highly influential depiction of women's condition and offered an original approach to the understanding of selfhood which places woman inside the subject. (shrink)

En las actividades ordinarias de nuestra vida cotidiana encontramos nuestros actos de percepción confrontados por las cosas materiales. A ellos ─actos de percepción─ les atribuimos una existencia "real" asumiéndolos de tal manera que los sumergimos y transfundimos, de forma múltiple e indefinida, dentro del entorno de realidades análogas que se unen para formar un único mundo al que yo, con mi propio cuerpo, pertenezco. Ahora bien sí frente a la cotidianidad descrita anteriormente asumimos una actitud escéptica acerca de lo que (...) es “real” en el mundo,nos descubriremos haciendo una reflexión filosófica. Bajo esta deliberación encontramos que, por ejemplo, la cualidad "verde", tiene existencia por medio de la sensación "verde"asociada a un objeto dado por la percepción, lo que nos lleva a pensar que no tiene sentido vincularla sensación como cosa en sí misma a cosas materiales existentes en sí mismos , esto nos lleva a pensar que las cualidades de los sentidostienen carácter subjetivo.A pesar de esta reflexión es conveniente acotar que esta subjetividad no interesaa las ciencias exactas ya que éstas procuran lo objetivo. -/- Desde este punto de vista,encontramos dentro de los estudios de Galileo Galilei el principio que subyace al método matemáticoconstructivo de nuestra física moderna ; de esta manera, y bajo este principio,los colores ─ por ejemplo “verde”─ son solo vibraciones en un medio repudiando de esta forma el carácter subjetivo a la vez que se mantiene la objetividad. Sin embargo, dentro del campo de la filosofía el idealismo transcendental de Kant marca un cambio de paradigma en relación a lo anterior. Kant sostiene que no solamente las cualidades de los sentidos tienen carácter subjetivo, sino que espacio y tiempo, conceptos fundacionales dentro de la física, no tienen significación absoluta; en otras palabras, espacio y tiempo son formas de nuestra percepción . Para Kant aquello que sustenta nuestra percepción y aquello que sustenta el conocimiento matemático aplicado a la experiencia son lo mismo: intuiciones puras a priori del espacio y el tiempo. De esta manera, y bajo esta perspectiva, sólo la teoría de la relatividad deja muyen claro que las dos esencias: espacio y tiempo, como formas de la intuición en términos kantianos, no tienen lugar en el mundo construido por la física matemática concebida por Galileo . -/- Según esto, los colores no son siquiera vibraciones en un medio sino simplemente una serie de valores de funciones matemáticas en las que se producen cuatro parámetros independientes que corresponden a las tres dimensiones del espacio y la del tiempo, expresado como principio general esto significa que el mundo real y cada uno de sus constituyentes con sus características sólo pueden ser, en términos husserlianos, objetos intencionales de actos de conciencia . En otras palabras: los datos inmediatos que recibo son las experiencias de la conciencia. Esto nos permite afirmar que la sensación de un objeto está presente de una forma físicamente real para mí con quien esa sensación se relaciona. Esto es lo que Brentano llama objeto intencional ;es así como al percibir un objeto, por ejemplo: veo este “libro” mi atención está totalmente dirigida hacia él. Yo "tengo" la percepción, pero sólo cuando hago de esta percepción ─ acto libre de reflexión ─algo que "conozco" con respecto a ella ─y no sólo el “libro”─ llego precisamente a un segundo acto: objetos intencionales de actos de conciencia, que son a los que referíamos antes . -/- El objeto intencional es inmanente y lo que es inmanente es absoluto ; es exactamente lo que es en la forma en que lo tengo, y puedo reducir esto, su esencia, por los actos de reflexión . En otras palabras, es un componente real de mis experiencias; contrario a lo que sucede con el acto primario de percepción, donde el objeto es trascendental , esto es, se da en una experiencia de conciencia pero no es un componente real de la misma. Por otra parte, los objetos trascendentales tienen sólo una existencia fenoménica; son apariencias que se presentan de múltiples maneras. Ninguno de estos modos de aparición puede pretender presentar aquello que percibimos – por ejemplo el libro- tal como es en sí, además en toda percepción está involucrada la tesis de la realidad del objeto que aparece en ella; este último es, de hecho, un elemento fijo y duradero de la tesis general de la realidad del mundo . En resumen, lo que interesa ver claramente es la importancia enel dato de la conciencia como punto de partida en el que debemos situarnos si queremos comprender el significado absoluto . (shrink)

El exilio de académicos y científicos venezolanos, representa un desastre para una colectividad emergente y joven dentro del país. La desatención a la comunidad académica venezolana en el exilio, puede llevar a una desconexión, pérdida y aislamiento de la Ciencia venezolana ─formada antes y durante los primeros años del periodo totalitario─ dentro del contexto nacional e internacional. Actualmente los intentos por mantener la cohesión de la comunidad académica venezolana en el exilio están fragmentados y desvinculados entre sí, lo que se (...) traduce en desaprovechamiento de las distinta iniciativas y perjuicio a la población académica-científica. No existe una adecuada organización que permita cohesionar a los académicos y científicos venezolanos en riesgo. Esta desorganización conlleva la “no integración” del talento venezolano académico-científico en programas internacionales en países de acogida. Y digo “académica” y no “científica”, porque la mayoría de programas e iniciativas internacionales están dirigidas solo ciencias exactas dejando de lado las ciencias humanísticas. Sin embargo, son las investigaciones humanísticas las que muestran el devenir de científicos exiliados. En los países que han sufrido regímenes totalitarios, guerras y/o situaciones de conflicto, el desvanecimiento de la investigación y acción humanística representa uno de los primeros objetivos. Es por esto, que he querido usar el término “Academia” en lugar de “Ciencia” ya que la primera acepción tiene un mayor radio de inclusión, evitándose posibles disertaciones positivistas y neopositivistas —desde el ámbito filosófico—en torno a lo que entendemos o categorizamos por “Ciencia. (shrink)

Whether Albert Camus’s “existentialist” thought expresses an “ethics” is a subject of disagreement among commentators. Yet, there can be no reading of Camus’s philosophical and literary works without recognizing that he was engaged in the post-WW2 period with two basic questions: How must we think? What must we do? If his thought presents us with an ethics, even if not systematic, it seems to be present in his ideas of “remaking” both man and world that are central to his The (...) Myth of Sisyphus and The Rebel. Curiously, however, this apparent recommendation is ambiguous for the fact that while Camus proposes as much he does so “comme si,” i.e., form a perspective of “as if.” A clarification of this qualification is presented here in the light of the fact that Camus rejects any nihilist project that countenances either suicide or murder. Thereby one may argue that Camus indeed has an ethics that remains pertinent to today. (shrink)

This articles presents the creation of the world and of man, and especially the relation between God and His creation. In the act of creation, God Shows His love for man. The man is the companion of God and the continuer of creation.This article presents the creation of man and alienation from God by sin and has the following themes: The image of God and man's relationship with God, Man's ikeness to God. Man was created as being different from the (...) angels and animals, Man's fall into sin and the consequences of sin. We can see the following aspects of the sin: origin, universality and consequences of original sin: alteration of the image of God, which means the darkening of the mind, weakening the will and hardning of feeling. The state of man as the slave of sin and of passions has a sole consequence: death. (shrink)

This study is an analysis of the relationship between homo religiosus and the Christian man, as it emerges from Mircea Eliade’s work. His ideas concerning the dialectics sacred-profane are related to homo religiosus, the man of the traditional societies. According to Eliade’s vision, one can use the term homo religiosus only within the context of his universe. Many mythical themes are present in the modern world, but it is difficult to identify them, going through the process of desacralization. The “mythical” (...) elements became Christian from the very beginnings and they are still significant for Christianity which characterizes itself by rendering value to history. The issue that Eliade analyses is whether Christianity can develop the sacred horizon of the archaic societies. As a conclusion of this research, one cannot say that there is a separation of homo religious from Christian man. The reader’s impression is that the scientist refers to Christianity as having lost the real meaning, as it was discovered in its early beginnings. Although the modern man still keeps the Christian elements, is far from what represented the Christian man from his early centuries. However, there are many common points of homo religiosus with the archaic societies. The critics treat the issue from some perspectives which are different from the ideas of the scientist from Chicago: either as being based on the protestant theology of “God’s Death” as the cases of Kenneth Hamilton and J. J. Altizer, either from partial position, the accusations not having a real basis. Dubuisson’s case is this way. This work was meant to be a step of an approach that attempts to discover correspondence between the scientist’s ideas and Christianity. (shrink)

Ecosophy or ecological wisdom – the new philosophy of contemporary life is also a philosophy of security, digital content, tolerance; it is a philosophy of survival and sustainable development of man, society and nature. Man, society as well as science currently need and will need a new philosophy – ecosophy. All together and each one in part they are based on security, first of all on human security. The interaction of philosophy with science occurs historically through three main stages. The (...) first one is characterized by the ancient belief that all the theoretical knowledge is philosophy. The second one, which has started approximately in the 15th century, suggests that the science is apparently independent from philosophy as a main focus. The third stage, that has just started, treats the scientific knowledge as complementary to the philosophical one. Both of them can successfully develop and function only with reciprocal interaction. Studying and understanding of the scientific knowledge leads to the professional development. The study of philosophy develops and strengthens the spirituality, the core of a developed personality. (shrink)

This unpublished manuscript of the Spanish Dominican Domingo Báñez reflects his personal account of the proceedings held during July 1602 in Valladolid in defense of his own doctrine against suspicious theses formulated by some Jesuits from Alcalá de Henares the previous March. The Jesuits denied that the adhesion of faith to the Roman Pontiff included him as a specific man, e.g. Pope Clement VIII. In support of their thesis, they provided the authority of Báñez. The Dominican theologian clarified in Valladolid (...) that the fact that Clement VIII was Pope did belong to the faith indeed but not in a primary and immediate sense, although this was later supported by other Jesuits in a third session held a few days later, again in Valladolid. (shrink)

In questo saggio si propone una lettura congetturale delle brevi note sulla questione dell’utilità del pensiero filosofico che Hans Jonas appunta in chiusura della conferenza Sulle cause e gli usi della filosofia (1955). A tal fine mi rivolgo innanzitutto alla ricostruzione dell’etica socratica che Jonas elabora nello scritto Virtù e saggezza in Socrate e in seconda battuta alla discussione della dottrina della scienza di Bacon abbozzata in Prospettive filosofiche sulla rilevanza della conoscenza per l’uomo e poi ripresa in scritti successivi. (...) In conclusione offro una ricostruzione dell’idea jonasiana dell’utilità della filosofia come scienza dell’immagine dell’uomo e mostro come tale approccio possa essere significativo anche e soprattutto nell’attuale età tecnologica. -/- English: In this essay I submit an hypothetical reading of the short notes concerning the practical use of phi-losophy which Hans Jonas wrote down at the end of the manuscript Of the causes and uses of phi-losophy. In order to do that, I focus the attention on Socratic Wisdom and Virtue first, where Jonas discussed Socrate’s ethics, and secondly on Jonas’s critique to Francis Bacon's doctrine of science, which he sketched in Some philosophers’ views on the human relevance of knowledge and devel-oped in later writings. My aim is to try and reconstruct Jonas’s ideas concerning the practical value of philosophy as the science of the image of man and to show how this may be relevant to our technological age. (shrink)

SPANISH Nuestra época se caracteriza por la casi indiscutida vigencia del modelo de economía de mercado. Esto coincide con un esfuerzo notorio por ocultar la presencia de la muerte, movido por la aguda percepción de la contigencia que emerge en la Modernidad. La lógica subyacente a estos elementos es que la monetarización puede entenderse como una respuesta al acrecentamiento de la conciencia de la muerte. Esto tiene lugar en el contexto de una nueva comprensión de sí marcada por la importancia (...) de la memoria. Así, la lucha del hombre moderno contra la conciencia de la muerte se desarrolla en los frentes de la acumulación de riquezas, y de la memoria. -/- ENGLISH One of the main features of our time is the presence of a widespread market economy. At the same time, notororious efforts to conceal the presence of death can be easily identified in our society; they are likely driven by an acute perception of finitude originated in Modernity. The rationale behind both aspects is that monetarisation can be regarded as a reaction to the increasing awareness of death. All of this is framed by a new self-understanding, heavily characterized by the relevance of memory. Thus, the fight of the modern man against the awareness of death is led in both fronts of wealth accumulation and memory. (shrink)

I intend to: a) clarify the origins and de facto meanings of the term relativism; b) reconstruct the reasons for the birth of the thesis named “cultural relativism”; d) reconstruct ethical implications of the above thesis; c) revisit the recent discussion between universalists and particularists in the light of the idea of cultural relativism.. -/- 1.Prescriptive Moral Relativism: “everybody is justified in acting in the way imposed by criteria accepted by the group he belongs to”. Universalism: there are at least (...) some judgments which are valid inter-culturally Absolutism: there are at least some particular prescriptions which are valid without exception everywhere and always -/- 2. The traditional proof of prescriptive moral relativism: the argument from variability: Judgments, rules, and shared values are de facto variable in time and space. The traditional counter-proof: examples of variability do not prove what skeptics contend. -/- 3. Pre-history of the doctrine -Ancient sophists: either immoralist or contractualist -Modern moral scepticism (xvii c.): variability as an historical and ethnographic fact supports a sceptical conclusion more moderate than sheer immoralism. - Voltaire, Kant, Reid counter-attack pointing at a universally shared moral sense - Romantics and idealists stage an even more moderate reformulation: instead of universally shared moral sense they point at the Spirit of a People which is: a)alternative to abstract and universal philosophical systems as far as it is lived ‘culture’; b) indivisible unity with an inner harmony and a source of normative standards; c) dynamic, in so far as it is a manifestation of the Spirit through the becoming of National cultures. -/- 4. The birth of Cultural Relativism and its ethical implications 4.1. The 18th c. doctrine was the noble savage (a non-historical doctrine: state of nature vs. social state) 4.2 Edward Tylor (1832-1817) and ethnocentric historicism Savage moral standards are real enough, but they are far and weaker than ours. 4.3 Boas and Malinowski and an holistic reaction to ethnocentric historicism -/- Franz Boas (1858-1942): a) Development of civilizations is not ruled by technical progress nor does it follow a one-way path; instead there are parallel developments (for ex. Agriculture does not follow stock-raising); b) racial characters have no relevance in development of civilization; c) we are not yet in a position to compare externally identical kinds of behaviour till we have not yet understood beliefs and intentions laying at their roots (for ex.: “From an ethnological point of view murder cannot be considered as a single phenomenon”; d) we should distinguish among different practices which are only superficially similar (fro ex. practices traditionally classified under the label “tabù”); e) there is as a fact just one normative ethic, constant in its contents but varying in its extension; f) the implication is not that we cannot judge behavior by members of other groups; it is only a recommendation of caution. -/- Bronislaw Malinowski (1884-1942): a) against Tylor’s and Frazer’s “magpie” methodology, field-work is required, a culture as a whole should be observed from inside; individual elements are incomprehensible; b) a culture is an organic whole; c) its elements are accounted for by their function (economy), avoiding non-observables (empio-criticism). -/- Ruth Benedict and Melville Herskovitz identify Boas’s approach with “cultural relativism”. Benedict: what is normal and abnormal is to be judged on a culture’s own standards, not on our own (“Anthropology and the Abnormal”). Herskovits: “Boas adumbrates what we have come to call cultural relativism” (The Mind, p. 10); “Judgements are based on experience, and experience is interpreted by each individual in terms of his own enculturation” (Man and his Works). -/- 4. How analytic philosophy understood and misunderstood the discussion 4.1. At the beginning of the 20th c., the new view in ethics was non-cognitivism (emotivist and subjectivist). Eric Westermark combines this view with an old-style ethnographic approach in support of relativity of moralities. Moralities are codes, or systems of emotive ‘disinterested’ reactions selected by evolution on their usefulness in terms of survival value for the society that is the carrier of such systems or codes. The moral relativity thesis: there are cases of disagreement that cannot be settled even after agreement about facts. 4.2 Anti-realists Brandt, Mackie, Gilbert, Harman adopt Westermark’s approach in a more sophisticated version: a) moralities are codes with an overall function and may be appraised only as wholes; b) variability is an argument for moral subjectivism; c) apparent legitimacy of deriving shift from ought is legitimized only within one institution d) morality should not be described but instead made, and existing moralities may be improved. Is it ‘real’ relativism? It is clearly subjectivism (a metaethical thesis). The normative thesis is that there better and worse codes, and survival values is the normative standard. -/- 4.3 Particularists MacIntyre, Sandel, Taylor, Wiggins, McDowell ‘Wittgensteinian’ prospectivist arguments bent to support weak-relativist claims MacIntyre: there is ‘incommensurability’ between different theoretical systems in both science and ethics. No argument is possible through different systems Different traditions may coexist for a long time without being able to bring their conflicts to a rational solution. -/- 4.4 Kantian universalists Baier, Gewirth, Rawls, Apel, Habermas Shared claim: justice concerns the right and is universal in so far as it may be based on minimal assumptions Other virtues are relative to context in so far as they are related to comprehensive views of the good - O’Neill criticism: a) it is an assumption shared by both alignments; b) after an alleged crisis brought about by alleged loss of metaphysical certainties, theories of justice have dropped demanding assumptions and kept universalism, virtue theories have kept demanding assumptions and dropped universalism; c) the opposition of virtue and justice has arisen in an unjustified way. O’Neill’s positive proposal: ‘constructive’ procedures may be adopted both (i) concerning all the range of virtues and (ii) across cultures once we abandon idealization and confine ourselves to abstraction from real-world cases. -/- 4.5 A metaethical relativist and anti-relativist normative ethicists: Bernard Williams Williams: vulgar relativism may be assumed to claim that: a) 'just' means 'just in a given society'; b) 'just in a given society' is to be understood in functionalist sense; c) it is wrong for one society’s members to condemn another society’s values. It is inconsistent since in (c) uses ‘just’ in a non-relative way that has been excluded in (a). William’s positive proposal: i) keep a number of substantive or thick ethical concepts that will be different in space and time; ii) admit that public choices are to be legitimized through recourse to more abstract procedures and relying on more thin ethical concepts. -/- 5. Critical remarks 5.1 The only real relativism available is ‘vulgar’ relativism (Westermark?) 5.2. Descriptive universalism (or absolutism) has a long pedigree, from Cicero on, reaching Boas himself but it is useless as an answer to normative questions 5.3. Twentieth-century philosophical discussion seems to discuss an ad hoc doctrine reconstructed by assembling obsolete philosophical ideas but ignoring the real theory of cultural relativism as formulated by anthropologists. -/- 6. A distinction between ethoi and ethical theories as a way out of confusions a)There are systems of conventions de facto existing. These may be studies from outside as phenomena or facts. b)There is moral argument and this, when studies from outside, is a fact, but this does not influence in any degree the possible validity of claims advanced. c) the difference between the above claims and Mackie’s criticism to Searle’s argument of the promising game is that promises, arguments etc. are also phenomena, but they are also communicative phenomena with a logical and pragmatic structure. -/- 7.Conclusions: a) cultural relativism, as a name for Boas’s methodology is a valuable discovery, and in this sense we are all relativists; b) ethical relativism, as an alleged implication of cultural relativism, has been argued in a philosophically quite unsophisticated way by Benedict and Herskovits; philosophers apparently discussed ethical relativism in the basis of a rather faint impression of what cultural relativism had been. c) a full-fledged ethical relativism has hardly been defended by anybody among philosophers; virtually no modern philosopher really argued a prescriptive version of the thesis; d) we may accept the grain of truth in ethical relativism by including relativist critique to ethical absolutism into a universalist normative doctrine that be careful in separating open-textured formulations of universal claims from culturally conditioned particular prescriptions. -/- . 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Il saggio tratta della figura di Empedocle – pensiero e uomo insieme, per­fettamente coerenti uno con l’altro – considerandolo come un pensatore di confine, un symbolon, nel quale s’incontrano senza fondersi e senza pre­varicarsi due universi, quello del mythos e quello del logos, con tutte le lo­ro rispettive e complesse implicazioni. Tutto ciò è necessario per com­prendere la lettura che Empedocle presenta della physis, processo naturale e modo di essere ad un tempo, che si esplicita nelle quattro radici – acqua, (...) aria, terra e fuoco – che costituiscono il tutto, relazionandosi attraverso Philia e Neikos, le due forze contrarie e polari che tengono insieme l’es­sere uno e molteplice. The essay deals with the Empedocle’s figure – both man and mind per­fectly acting consistently each other – considering him like a border thin­ker, a symbolon, in wich two universes, one of the mythos and one of the logos with their respective and complex implications, meet without mixing and without prevaricating. All this is necessary to understand the Empe­docle’s reading about the physis, either a natural process or a way of being at the same time expressing itself in four roots – water, air, land and fire – which consisted the whole reporting each other through Philia and Neikos, two opposite and polar forces that keep together the one and various being. (shrink)

The human person has been analyzed from several points of view throughout the history. Great theologians, philosophers, anthropologists and sociologists and other specialists have written extensively on the subject. The philosophical contribution centered on the human person has been significant throughout history. In the last century, Romano Guardini, who received the Erasmus Prize for Best European Humanist and called "Master of Life" offers a view of reality man-centered, through a thin, deep and coherent approach on the individual. His work has (...) been labeled by some philosophers within the personalist current, and although his contributions were many, we want to highlight the elements of the meeting, the language and the self-acceptance. In this paper we propose how this approach to the human person can become an intinerary embodied in reality, that can help today to seek clarification and start delving into own personal knowledge enlightened by faith. -/- La persona humana ha sido analizada desde varios puntos de vista a lo largo de la historia. Grandes teólogos, filósofos, antropólogos y sociólogos entre otros especialistas han escrito profusamente acerca del tema. El aporte de una filosofía centrada en la persona humana ha sido significativo a lo largo de la historia. En el último siglo, Romano Guardini, quien recibió el Premio Erasmo al Mejor Humanista Europeo y llamado “Maestro de Vida”, propone una visión de la realidad centrada en el hombre, a través de una aproximación fina, profunda y coherente sobre la persona humana. Su trabajo ha sido catalogado por algunos filósofos dentro de la corriente personalista, y si bien sus aportes fueron muchos queremos resaltar los elementos del encuentro, el lenguaje y la aceptación de sí mismo. En este trabajo proponemos cómo dicha aproximación a la persona humana se puede convertir en un itinerario encarnado en la realidad que puede ayudar hoy en día a quienes buscan esclarecer y comenzar a ahondar en el propio conocimiento personal iluminados por la fe. (shrink)

CUPRINS CONTUR Re-Introducere sau: Dincolo de „teoria şi practica” informării şi documentării – Spre o hermeneutică posibilă şi necesară ......................................................... 11 Desfăşurătorul întâlnirilor Atelierului Hermeneutica Bibliohtecaria (Philobiblon) .................................................................................................... ......... 21 FOCUS Noul Program al revistei şi Politica ei Editorială: PHILOBIBLON – Transylvanian Journal of Multidisciplinary Research in Humanities .............. 29 Raluca TRIFU, István KIRÁLY V., Consideraţii filosofice, epistemologice şi scientometrice legate de sensurile ştiinţei şi profesiei bibliotecare – Pentru situarea proiectului unei cercetări ............................................................ 31 Valeria SALÁNKI, Cultura organizaţională şi comunicarea în (...) bibliotecă - Studiu asupra culturii organizaţionale în Biblioteca Centrală Universitară „Lucian Blaga” din Cluj ........................................................................................ 44 Raluca TRIFU, István KIRÁLY V., Globalizare şi Individualizare, sau: Marketingul ca metaforă pentru reasumarea şi reconturarea sensurilor serviciilor de bibliotecă – O iniţiativă şi o experienţă românească .................114 Claudiu GAIU, Gabriel Naudé (1600-1653 ) – în slujba Puterii şi a Cărţii ..... 128 Alin Mihai GHERMAN, Timpul scrierii – Manuscrisele .................................... 140 Dana Maria MĂRCUŞ, Sărbătoarea cărţii. Percepţia societăţii româneşti interbelice asupra cărţii şi lecturii ...................................................................... 148 Orsolya ANTAL,Taine în jurul unei satire în spirit voltairian în limbă maghiară de la sfârşitul secolului al XVIII-lea .................................................................... 197 Kinga PAPP, Colligatul Ms 354 şi dramele pierdute ale lui József Mártonfi ....213 Gabriela RUS, Roxana BĂLĂUCĂ, Venceslav Melka în colecţia Bibliotecii Centrale Universitare „Lucian Blaga” Cluj-Napoca ........................................ 222 5 Hermeneutica Bibliothecaria – Antologie Philobiblon - Volumul V Nicolina HALGAŞ, Dimensiunea educativă a bibliotecii publice prin servicii de animaţie pentru copii ....................................................................................... 249 Tünde JANKÓ, Alina NEALCOŞ, Maria CRIŞAN, Mariana GROS, Carmen GOGA, Biblioteca Filială de Ştiinţe Economice - Tradiţional versus modern ................271 Adriana MAN SZÉKELY, Emil SALAMON, Colaborarea Bibliotecii Centrale Universitare „Lucian Blaga” din Cluj-Napoca cu Banca Mondială ............. 290 ORIZONTURI Aurel Teodor CODOBAN, Mass-media şi filosofia – Filosoful ca jurnalist, sau sinteza unei ideologii ostensive ............................................................................. 301 Marian PETCU, Şcoala de ziaristică de la Bucureşti (1951-1989) – Istorii recente .................................................................................................... .. 314 Marcel BODEA S., Timpul matematic în mecanica clasică – o perspectivă epistemologică...................................................................................... ................... 332 Florina ILIS, Fenomenul science fiction şi feţele timpului ................................ 354 Rodica FRENŢIU, Yasunari Kawabata şi nostalgia timpului fără timp ......... 373 Rodica TRANDAFIR, Timpul şi muzica .............................................................. 390 István KIRÁLY V., Întemeierea filosofiei şi ateismul la tânărul Heidegger - Prolegomene la o perspectivă existenţial-ontologică ......................................423 Elena CHIABURU, Consideraţii privitoare la vînzarea la Cochii Vechi şi mezat .................................................................................................... ............... 437 Vlad POPOVICI, Istoriografia medicală românească (1813-2008) .................463 Gheorghe VAIS, Remodelări urbane în Clujul perioadei dualiste (1867-1918)..... 481 Cristina VIDRUŢIU, Ciuma – profilul unei recurenţe istorice supusă unui transplant artistic .................................................................................................. 497 Anna Emese VINCZE, Iluziile pozitive din perspectiva psihologiei evoluţioniste .................................................................................................... 506 6 Hermeneutica Bibliothecaria – Antologie Philobiblon - Volumul V REFLEXII Florentina RĂCĂTĂIANU, Irina Petraş, Literatura română contemporană - O panoramă - Recenzie ...................................................................................... 527 Raluca TRIFU, Filosofia informaţiei si cibernetica – Recenzie ......................... 530 Iulia GRAD, Tematizări în eticile aplicate – perspective feministe (Mihaela Frunză) - Recenzie ................................................................................534 Adrian GRĂNESCU, Biblioteca lui Hitler, cărţile care i-au format personalitatea, de Timothy W. Ryback – Recenzie ............................................. 537 În colecţia BIBLIOTHECA BIBLIOLOGICA au apărut ..............................551 Revista PHILOBIBLON – Volumele apărute ......................................... 556. (shrink)

(Spanish) RESUMEN: La libertad absoluta postulada por Viktor Emil Frankl y Jean-Paul Sartre, la Shoah y la creencia en un dios omnipotente, bueno y justo parecen contradecirse. La pregunta por el sentido del sufrimiento de las víctimas del Holocausto (la verdadera catástrofe, el mayor crimen contra la humanidad), simbolizado por Auschwitz, y como punto de inflexión en la historia, es terriblemente dolorosa y parece no tener una respuesta filosófica ni teológica. A mi juicio, es importantísimo distinguir entre las víctimas inocentes (...) de la Shoah que perecieron y las víctimas inocentes que sufrieron un verdadero infierno y perdieron a sus seres queridos, pero que lograron sobrevivir. Ambas son víctimas, por supuesto, pero así como encontrarle un posible sentido al sufrimiento de las víctimas masacradas y gaseadas podría suponer un insulto a su sufrimiento y agonía –en especial, al horror que sufrieron los niños–, el horrible sufrimiento de los supervivientes pudo dar, tal vez, de alguna manera, un sentido a sus vidas después de la liberación de los campos de concentración y exterminio, ya fuera como voz, como protesta o como simple supervivencia. Frankl apuesta por un sentido último (que abraza el sentido del sufrimiento de las víctimas), y Sartre, aunque parezca no apostar por sentido alguno, volcó su vida al compromiso político después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, y ello parece vislumbrar una minúscula pizca de sentido después de la barbarie. La filosofía de Frankl es un sí a la vida incluso en las situaciones más extremas, un grito casi nietzscheano que exalta el valor de la vida más allá de cualquier sufrimiento. Frankl, padre de la logoterapia y superviviente del Holocausto, abre una puerta a Dios al hablar de un dios inconsciente, una dimensión suprahumana y una fe incondicional, y define la religión como espiritualidad y como la búsqueda del hombre por el sentido último. Según Frankl, la libertad no se contradice con Dios, y la religión existe no a raíz de la barbarie, sino a pesar de la barbarie. El existencialismo sartreano es una filosofía de la libertad radical y de la responsabilidad. El hombre está condenado a ser libre. El ser humano es un ser en el que la existencia precede a la esencia. Somos totalmente responsables de lo que somos. Sartre afirma que la libertad humana es incompatible con Dios. En un mundo sin Dios, la moral la construyen los hombres, con sus propias decisiones y sus acciones, y la existencia y el sufrimiento de las víctimas no tienen sentido alguno. Sartre define al hombre como libertad, responsabilidad, angustia y contingencia. Frankl define al hombre como libertad, responsabilidad, espiritualidad y búsqueda de sentido. Con esta tesis me propongo entrar en la resbaladiza dimensión del dolor, la desesperación, el sentido y sinsentido del sufrimiento de las víctimas (teniendo presente los horrores de Auschwitz, que en teología y filosofía ha simbolizado desde la liberación de los campos la muerte de Dios y la muerte de la moral). Es verdad que no solo los hombres, mujeres y niños judíos fueron víctimas de la barbarie alemana, pero, como reza el mensaje de Elie Wiesel en la exposición permanente del Block 27 del Auschwitz-Birkeanu State Museum: "Not all victims were Jewish in this place, but all Jews were victims". La Shoah no es un episodio dentro de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, sino un punto de inflexión en la historia de la humanidad, y es una catástrofe que nos concierne a todos, hombres y mujeres judíos y no judíos, religiosos e irreligiosos, creyentes e increyentes, como seres libres, responsables y morales que somos –o que deberíamos ser. Muchas de las víctimas del Holocausto, en medio de la desesperación, entraron en las cámaras de gas orando, aferrándose a la esperanza de que ese final espeluznante no era un punto final. Con esta tesis no me propongo de ninguna manera responder a la eterna pregunta de si Dios existe o no, sino que propongo interpretar ese grito hacia Dios como un desesperado anhelo de esperanza. También me propongo encontrar una coherencia en las posturas de estos dos grandes pensadores para quienes la libertad y la responsabilidad definen al hombre: Frankl (quien apuesta por una dimensión suprahumana donde existe un sentido último en el que el sufrimiento de las víctimas tiene que tener algún sentido, aunque ese sentido sea completamente incomprensible en la dimensión humana) y Sartre (el existencialista ateo por excelencia, para quien el mundo, la existencia y el sufrimiento son absolutamente contingentes). En el primer capítulo expongo la logoterapia y el existencialismo sartreano: describo las tres dimensiones del hombre y las tres búsquedas de sentido propuestas por Frankl, y expongo las cinco consecuencias de "l'existence précède l'essence", centrándome en la libertad y la responsabilidad, y hablo del suicidio. El segundo capítulo está dedicado al dios inconsciente frankleano, la dimensión suprahumana, la búsqueda por el sentido último y la fe incondicional. En el tercer capítulo ilustro la libertad sin Dios sartreana, la ontología sartreana, el ateísmo sartreano y el humanismo sartreano, y hablo sobre la responsabilidad, la mauvaise foi, la contingencia, la situation y la angustia. El cuarto capítulo es necesariamente histórico (sin dejar de ser filosófico): me pregunto por la muerte de Dios después de Auschwitz, argumento y defiendo la unicidad del Holocausto (la Shoah es un punto de inflexión en la historia de la humanidad), describo las masacres antes de los campos de exterminio (Einsatzgruppen, Ordnungspolizei y Wehrmacht), el gigantesco complejo de Auschwitz (Stammlager, Auschwitz-Birkenau y Monowitz-Buna), reflexiono sobre Dios y el mal (centrándome en los niños de Auschwitz), describo los días de Frankl en Auschwitz, hablo de Dios como esperanza, de la inmortalidad y la escatología, de la crueldad de Dios, de la relación entre el cristianismo y el antisemitismo, del islam y el antisemitismo, critico el silencio de Dios, hablo de la muerte de Dios y del juicio contra Dios. En el quinto capítulo expongo la moral frankleana (una moral que atañe al hombre y no a Dios), basándome en su teoría del amor y en su única obra de teatro (Synchronisation in Binkerwald), y la moral sartreana (una moral que atañe a una humanidad sin Dios), recordando a Dostoyevsky, analizando la famosa cita de Garcin en Huis clos "L'enfer, c'est les Autres", criticando el marxismo de Sartre y cuestionando (con la mirada de Frankl y Sartre) el verso de Brecht "Erst kommt das Fressen, dann kommt die Moral"; al final del capítulo incluyo una reflexión propia y las críticas frankleana y sartreana sobre la impunidad de los verdugos y colaboradores después del Holocausto (con el permiso de Dios). Después de la Conclusión, añado un Apéndice sobre las vidas de Frankl y Sartre, para poder entender mejor su obra. PALABRAS CLAVE: logoterapia, existencialismo sartreano, búsqueda de sentido, libertad, responsabilidad, moral, angustia, sufrimiento, supervivientes, víctimas, contingencia, espiritualidad, religión, Dios, esperanza, antisemitismo, culpa, Auschwitz, Holocausto, Shoah. /// (English) ABSTRACT: The absolute freedom defended by Viktor Emil Frankl and Jean-Paul Sartre, the Shoah and the belief in an omnipotent, benevolent and just God seem to contradict each other. The question of the meaning of the victims' suffering of the Holocaust (the true catastrophe, the biggest crime against humanity), simbolised by Auschwitz and as a turning point in History, is terribly painful and doesn't seem to have an answer. In my opinion, it's crucial to distinguish between the innocent victims of the Shoah who perished and the innocent victims who sufferend a real hell and lost their loved ones, but managed to survive. Both are victims, of course, but just as finding a possible meaning to the suffering of the massacred and gassed victims could result in an insult to their suffering and agony –especially to the horror that the children suffered– the gigantic suffering of the survivors could, maybe, somehow, give a meaning to their lives after the liberation of the concentration and extermination camps, either as a voice, as a protest, or as a simple survival. Frankl believes in an ultimate meaning (that embraces the meaning of the victims' suffering), and Sartre, even if it appears not to embrace any meaning, turned his life to political engagement after War World II, and that attitude seems to give a tiny glimpse of meaning after the barbarity. Frankl's philosophy says yes to life even in the most extreme situations, and it's a Nietzschean-like scream that exalts the value of life beyond any monstrous suffering. Frankl, the father of logotherapy and a Holocaust survivor, opens a door to God when he talks about an unconscious God, a supra-human dimension and an unconditional faith; he defines religion as spirituality and as man's search for ultimate meaning. According to Frankl, freedom is not contradictory with God, and religion exists not because of the barbarity but in spite of the barbarity. Sartrean existentialism is a philosophy of radical freedom and responsibility. Men are condemned to be free. We are beings where the existence precedes the essence. We are completely responsible of what we are. Sartre argues that human freedom is incompatible with God. In a godless world, morality is constructed by people, with their own choices and actions, and human existence and the suffering of the victims don't have any meaning. Sartre defines man as freedom, responsibility, Angst and contingency. Frankl defines man as freedom, responsibility, spirituality and search for meaning. With this dissertation I attempt to enter in the slippery dimension of the pain, despair, meaning and meaninglessness of the victims' suffering (having in mind the horrors of Auschwitz, that in theology and in philosophy have simbolised, since the liberation of the camps, the death of God and the death of morality). It's true that not only Jewish men, women and children were victims of the German barbarity, but, as Elie Wiesel's message from the permanent exhibition from Block 27 of the Auschwitz-Birkeanu State Museum reads: "Not all victims were Jewish in this place, but all Jews were victims". The Shoah is not an episode inside War World II, but a turning point in the history of humankind, and a catastrophe that embraces us all, Jewish and not not Jewish men and women, religious and not religious, believers and not believers, as the free, responsible and moral beings that we all are –or that we should be. A lot of the victims, in the midst of their desperation, entered into the gas chambers praying, holding to the hope that their horrifying end was not the ultimate end. With this dissertation I do not attempt to answer the eternal question of the existence of God, rather, I will try to interpret that scream to God as a longing for hope. I also intend to find a coherence between the thought of these two great thinkers for whom freedom and responsibilty define man: Frankl (who argues that there is a suprahuman dimension where an ultimate meaning exists and where the victims' suffering has to have a meaning, even if this meaning is completely incomprehensible in the human dimension) and Sartre (the atheist existentialist par excellence, for whom the world, human existence and suffering are absolutely contingent). In the first chapter I expose logotherapy and Sartrean existentialism: I describe the three dimensions of man, the three searches for meaning, the five consequences of "l'existence précède l'essence" and I speak about suicide. The second chapter delves into the unconscious God, the supra-human dimension, the ultimate meaning and the unconditional faith. In the third chapter I expose the freedom without God defended by Sartre, Sartre's ontology, Sartre's atheism, Sartre's humanism, and his ideas about responsibility, mauvaise foi, contingency, situation, and Angst. The fourth chapter is necessarily historical (while being philosophical too): I wonder about the death of God after Auschwitz, I argue and defend the uniqueness of the Holocaust (the Shoah is a turning point in the history of humankind), I describe the massacres before the extermination camps (Einsatzgruppen, Ordnungspolizei y Wehrmacht), the gigantic Auschwitz camp complex (Stammlager, Auschwitz-Birkenau y Monowitz-Buna), I reflect on God and evil (focusing on the children of Auschwitz), I describe Frankl's days in Auschwitz, I talk about God as hope, about immortality and escathology, I discuss God's cruelty, the relationship between Christianity and antisemitism and Islam and antisemitism, I question the silence of God, and I talk about the death of God and about the trial against God. In the fifth chapter I talk about the Franklean morality (a morality that concerns man and not God), on the basis of his love theory and his only work of theater (Synchronisation in Binkerwald), and the Sartrean morality (a morality that concerns a humanity without God), remembering Dostoyevsky, analysing Garcin's famous quote in Huis clos "L'enfer, c'est les Autres", crticizing Sartre's marxism and questioning (with Frankl's and Sartre's eyes) Brecht's verse "Erst kommt das Fressen, dann kommt die Moral"; at the end of the chapter I include my own reflection (and Frankl and Sartre's critique) about the impunity of the executioners and collaborators after the Holocaust (with God's permission). After the Conclusion, I add an Appendix about the lives of Frankl and Sartre, which helps understanding better their work. KEYWORDS: logotherapy, existentialism, search for meaning, freedom, responsibility, morality, Angst, suffering, survivors, victims, contingency, spirituality, religion, God, hope, antisemitism, guilt, Auschwitz, Holocaust, Shoah. (shrink)

En un escrito de juventud de Peirce publicado en 1868 para el Journal of Speculative Philosophy, titulado “Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimen for Man”, el autor norteamericano intenta mostrar por qué carecemos de la capacidad para reconocer cogniciones inmediatas y por qué, a falta de tal facultad, no es posible sostener la existencia de ese tipo de cogniciones; de ahí se desprende su postura anticartesiana y antifundacionista: si no hay cogniciones inmediatas, entonces todas las cogniciones están determinadas por cogniciones previas (...) y, en consecuencia, no hay cogniciones infalibles. Esta concepción del joven Peirce según la cual toda cognición está lógica o inferencialmente determinada por una cognición previa implicaría, entonces, que toda cognición, a su vez, determinaría lógicamente a una cognición posterior. Al seguir esta tesis obtenemos, en consecuencia, una doble determinación, a saber, la de una cognición(n) siendo determinada por otra cognición(n-1) anterior, y la de esa misma cognición(n) determinando a una cognición(n+1) posterior. La tesis de la doble determinación daría lugar, por tanto, no solo a una regresión infinita de determinaciones, sino también a una progresión infinita de determinaciones. [...] Aún hoy sigue abierta la discusión acerca de si en su madurez intelectual y en los albores de su vejez Peirce continuó sosteniendo sus tesis anticartesiana y antifundacionista, de sus escritos de juventud, en relación con la determinablidad de las cogniciones previas, y si aún, en sus escritos de madurez, renunció a la tesis de la progresión infinita de determinaciones. Pero no es mi interés aquí tomar partido en esta discusión. En este escrito me concentraré solamente en dos problemas: a saber, la indeterminabilidad del significado y la explicación del error, y mostraré cómo podría ser posible enfrentarlos adoptando algunos conceptos del pragmaticismo. (shrink)

Katulad ng laging binabanggit ni Prop. Michael Charleston B. Chua ng Pamantasan ng De La Salle, "Hindi man ako naging direktang naging mag-aaral ni Dr. Salazar, mapalad pa rin akong nakilala ko siya at natuto ng kahalagahan ng Pantayong Pananaw." Marahil ito rin ang sumasambulat sa mga nais maging mag-aaral ng paham na si Salazar. Isang metapora ng kometa o isang bakunawa ang pagdating ng isang Dr. Salazar sa Sintang Paaralan partikular na sa Kagawaran ng Kasaysayan dahil pinagyaman niya/tinutulungang makaalpas (...) ang ningning ng aming kagawaran tungo sa mayamang pag-aaral sa kasaysayan. (shrink)

La cuestión principal que se plantea pretende averigüar si la tecnocracia en nuestra sociedad postsecular es un elemento que contribuye o dificulta el desarrollo integral del hombre del que hablaba Popolurum progressio. Divido mi exposición en tres partes recogiendo los mismos términos que aparecen en el título que la encabeza. Hablaré, en primer lugar, de la tecnocracia o de la cultura tecnológica, es decir, el modo en el que es la técnica es vivida y aplicada en los contextos sociales actuales. (...) Situaré después la cuestión en el marco postsecular de nuestra sociedad intentando profundizar en la relación entre ambas magnitudes, la tecnocracia y la postsecularidad. Concluiré mi reflexión analizando las consecuencias, y las oportunidades también, de un nuevo humanismo en continuidad con la propuesta levinasiana, o sea, orientando mi valoración final hacia posibilidad de un humanismo de otro hombre. The main question that is tackled is to find out whether the technocracy in our postsecular society is contributing to the integral development that Populorum Progressio talked about, or it is making it difficult. The paper is divided into three parts. First of all, it talks about technocracy or technological culture, that is to say the way in which technique is lived and applied in current social contexts. Secondly, the question is placed in the postsecular framework of our society, trying to deepen the relationship between both issues: technocracy and postsecularity. The reflection concludes by analyzing the consequences, and also the opportunities, of a new humanism in continuity with the Levinasian proposal, that is, orienting the final assessment towards the possibility of a humanism of another man. -/- . (shrink)

La cuestión principal que se plantea pretende averigüar si la tecnocracia en nuestra sociedad postsecular es un elemento que contribuye o dificulta el desarrollo integral del hombre del que hablaba Popolurum progressio. Divido mi exposición en tres partes recogiendo los mismos términos que aparecen en el título que la encabeza. Hablaré, en primer lugar, de la tecnocracia o de la cultura tecnológica, es decir, el modo en el que es la técnica es vivida y aplicada en los contextos sociales actuales. (...) Situaré después la cuestión en el marco postsecular de nuestra sociedad intentando profundizar en la relación entre ambas magnitudes, la tecnocracia y la postsecularidad. Concluiré mi reflexión analizando las consecuencias, y las oportunidades también, de un nuevo humanismo en continuidad con la propuesta levinasiana, o sea, orientando mi valoración final hacia posibilidad de un humanismo de otro hombre. The main question that is tackled is to find out whether the technocracy in our postsecular society is contributing to the integral development that Populorum Progressio talked about, or it is making it difficult. The paper is divided into three parts. First of all, it talks about technocracy or technological culture, that is to say the way in which technique is lived and applied in current social contexts. Secondly, the question is placed in the postsecular framework of our society, trying to deepen the relationship between both issues: technocracy and postsecularity. The reflection concludes by analyzing the consequences, and also the opportunities, of a new humanism in continuity with the Levinasian proposal, that is, orienting the final assessment towards the possibility of a humanism of another man. -/- . (shrink)

La prima cosa che dobbiamo tenere a mente è che quando diciamo che la Cina dice questo o la Cina lo fa, non stiamo parlando del popolo cinese, ma dei Sociopatici che controllano il Partito Comunista Cinese CCP, cioè i Sette Killer Seriali Senile (SSSSK) del Comitato permanente del PCC o dei 25 membri del Politburo ecc. I piani del CCP per la terza guerra mondiale e il dominio totale sono strutturati abbastanza chiaramente nelle pubblicazioni e nei discorsi govt cinesi (...) e questo è il "sogno di Cina" di Xi Jinping. È un sogno solo per la piccola minoranza (forse da poche decine a poche centinaia) che governa la Cina e un incubo per tutti gli altri (tra cui 1,4 miliardi di cinesi). I 10 miliardi di dollari all'anno che si stima spendano in propaganda in tutto il mondo permette loro o i loro burattini di possedere o controllare giornali, riviste, canali televisivi e radiofonici e di inserire notizie false nella maggior parte dei principali media ovunque decine o centinaia di migliaia di volte ogni giorno. They hanno un esercito (forse milioni di persone) che oltre alla censura totale e immediata di tutti i media all'interno della Cina, troll tutti i media del mondo, mettendo più propaganda e annegando legittimo commento (l'esercito 50 centesimi). Oltre a spogliarerd il terzo mondo di risorse, una spinta importante della multi-trilionaria Belt and Road Initiative sta costruendo basi militari in tutto il mondo. Stanno costringendo il mondo libero in una massiccia corsa agli armamenti ad alta tecnologia che fa sembrare la guerra fredda con l'Unione Sovietica un picnic. Anche se la SSSSK, e il resto dell'esercito mondiale, stanno spendendo enormi somme su hardware avanzato, è altamente probabile che WW3 (o gli impegni più piccoli che portano ad esso) sarà software dominato. Non è fuori questione che la SSSSK, con probabilmente più hacker (programmatori) che lavorano per loro allora tutto il resto del mondo combinato, vincerà WW3 con minimo conflitto fisico, solo paralizzando i loro nemici tramite la rete. Niente satelliti, niente telefoni, niente comunicazioni, niente transazioni finanziarie, niente rete elettrica, niente internet, niente armi avanzate, niente veicoli, treni, navi o aerei. Ci sono solo due percorsi principali per rimuovere il PCC, liberare 1,4 miliardi di prigionieri cinesi e porre fine alla marcia folle per la terza guerra mondiale. Quello pacifico è quello di lanciare una guerra commerciale a tutto campo per devastare l'economia cinese fino a quando i militari si stancano e si avvia il PCC. Un'alternativa alla chiusura dell'economia cinese è una guerra limitata, come uno sciopero mirato di conlsi 50 droni termobarici sul 20congresso del PCC, quando tutti i membri migliori sono in un unico posto, ma che non avrà luogo fino al 2022 in modo da poter colpire la riunione plenaria annuale. I cinesi sarebbero stati informati, come è avvenuto l'attacco, che devono deporre le armi e prepararsi a tenere un'elezione democratica o essere inglobito nell'età della pietra. L'altra alternativa è un attacco nucleare a tutto campo. Il confronto militare è inevitabile, visto l'attuale corso del PCC. Accadrà probabilmente sulle isole del Mar Cinese Meridionale o Taiwan entro pochi decenni, ma man mano che stabiliscono basi militari in tutto il mondo potrebbe accadere ovunque (vedi il libro Tigre accovacciata ecc.). I futuri conflitti avranno aspetti hardkill e softkill con gli obiettivi dichiarati del PCC per enfatizzare la guerra informatica hackerando e paralizzando i sistemi di controllo di tutte le comunicazioni militari e industriali, attrezzature, centrali elettriche, satelliti, internet, banche e qualsiasi dispositivo o veicolo collegato alla rete. La SSSSK sta lentamente schierando una serie mondiale di sub o droni di superficie e subacquei con equipaggio e autonomi in grado di lanciare armi convenzionali o nucleari che possono rimanere domeggiati in attesa di un segnale dalla Cina o addirittura alla ricerca della firma di navi o aerei statunitensi. Mentre distruggevano i nostri satelliti, eliminando così la comunicazione tra gli Stati Uniti e le nostre forze in tutto il mondo, useranno i loro, insieme ai droni per colpire e distruggere le nostre forze navali attualmente superiori. Naturalmente, tutto questo è sempre più fatto automaticamente dall'IA. Di gran lunga il più grande alleato del PCC è il partito democratico degli Stati Uniti. La scelta è quella di fermare il PCC ora o guardare come estendere la prigione cinese su tutto il mondo. Naturalmente, la sorveglianza universale e la digitalizzazione delle nostre vite è inevitabile ovunque. Chi non la pensa così è profondamente fuori contatto. Naturalmente, è l'optinebbie che si aspettano che i sociopatici cinesi a governare il mondo, mentre i pessimisti (che si vedono come realisti) si aspettano AI (Intelligenza Artificiale, o come lo chiamo it Imbecility artificiale o Unalien follia) a prendere il sopravvento, forse non appena 2030. Coloro che sono interessati a ulteriori dettagli sul percorso folle della società moderna possono consultare le mie altre opere come Suicide by Democracy-an Obituary for America and the World 4th Edition 2020 e Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century: Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization 5th ed (2020) . (shrink)

Det er min strid at tabellen av intensjonalitet (rasjonalitet, bevissthet, sinn, tanke, språk, personlighet etc.) som har fremtredende her beskriver mer eller mindre nøyaktig, eller i det minste fungerer som en heuristisk for, hvordan vi tenker og oppfører oss, og så omfatter det ikke bare filosofi og psykologi, men alt annet (historie, litteratur, matematikk, politikk etc.). Legg spesielt merke til at intensjonalitet og rasjonalitet som jeg (sammen med Searle, Wittgenstein og andre) ser det, inkluderer både bevisst deliberativspråklig system 2 og (...) bevisstløs automatisert prelinguistic System 1 handlinger eller reflekser. Jeg gir en kritisk undersøkelse av noen av de viktigste funnene fra to av de mest eminente studentene i moderne tid, Ludwig Wittgenstein og John Searle, om den logiske strukturen av intensjonalitet (sinn, språk, bevissthet, oppførsel), tar som utgangspunkt Wittgensteins grunnleggende oppdagelse - at alle virkelig "filosofiske" problemer er de samme - forvirringer om hvordan man bruker språk i en bestemt sammenheng, og så alle løsninger er de samme - ser på hvordan språket kan brukes i sammenheng en sammenheng slik at sannheten forhold (Vilkår for tilfredshet eller COS) er klare. Det grunnleggende problemet er at man kan si noe, men man kan ikke bety (stat klar COS for) noen vilkårlig ytring og mening er bare mulig i en svært spesifikk sammenheng. Jeg analyserer ulike skrifter av og om dem fra det moderne perspektivet til de to tankesystemene (popularisert som "tenker raskt, tenker sakte"), ved hjelp av en ny tabell med intensjonatitet og nye doble systemer nomenklatur. Jeg viser at dette er en mektig heuristisk for å beskrive atferd. Dermed er all oppførsel nært forbundet hvis man tar riktig synspunkt. Den fenomenologiske illusjonen (glemsel en automatisert system 1) er universell og strekker seg ikke bare gjennom filosofi, men gjennom hele livet. Jeg er sikker på at Chomsky, Obama, Zuckerberg og paven ville være vantro hvis fortalt at de lider av det samme problemet som Hegel, Husserl og Heidegger, (eller at de skiller seg bare i grad fra narkotika- og sexavhengige i å være motivert av stimulering av deres frontale kortices ved levering av dopamin (og over 100 andre kjemikalier) via ventral tegmentum og kjernen accumbens), men det er helt klart sant. Mens fenomenologene bare kastet bort mye folks tid, kaster de bort jorden og deres etterkommers fremtid. (shrink)

Det er min strid at tabellen av intensjonalitet (rasjonalitet, bevissthet, sinn, tanke, språk, personlighet etc.) som har fremtredende her beskriver mer eller mindre nøyaktig, eller i det minste fungerer som en heuristisk for, hvordan vi tenker og oppfører oss, og så omfatter det ikke bare filosofi og psykologi, men alt annet (historie, litteratur, matematikk, politikk etc.). Legg spesielt merke til at intensjonalitet og rasjonalitet som jeg (sammen med Searle, Wittgenstein og andre) ser det, inkluderer både bevisst deliberativspråklig system 2 og (...) bevisstløs automatisert prelinguistic System 1 handlinger eller reflekser. Jeg gir en kritisk undersøkelse av noen av de viktigste funnene fra to av de mest eminente studentene i moderne tid, Ludwig Wittgenstein og John Searle, om den logiske strukturen av intensjonalitet (sinn, språk, bevissthet, oppførsel), tar som utgangspunkt Wittgensteins grunnleggende oppdagelse - at alle virkelig "filosofiske" problemer er de samme - forvirringer om hvordan man bruker språk i en bestemt sammenheng, og så alle løsninger er de samme - ser på hvordan språket kan brukes i sammenheng en sammenheng slik at sannheten forhold (Vilkår for tilfredshet eller COS) er klare. Det grunnleggende problemet er at man kan si noe, men man kan ikke bety (stat klar COS for) noen vilkårlig ytring og mening er bare mulig i en svært spesifikk sammenheng. Jeg analyserer ulike skrifter av og om dem fra det moderne perspektivet til de to tankesystemene (popularisert som "tenker raskt, tenker sakte"), ved hjelp av en ny tabell med intensjonatitet og nye doble systemer nomenklatur. Jeg viser at dette er en mektig heuristisk for å beskrive atferd. Dermed er all oppførsel nært forbundet hvis man tar riktig synspunkt. Den fenomenologiske illusjonen (glemsel en automatisert system 1) er universell og strekker seg ikke bare gjennom filosofi, men gjennom hele livet. Jeg er sikker på at Chomsky, Obama, Zuckerberg og paven ville være vantro hvis fortalt at de lider av det samme problemet som Hegel, Husserl og Heidegger, (eller at de skiller seg bare i grad fra narkotika- og sexavhengige i å være motivert av stimulering av deres frontale kortices ved levering av dopamin (og over 100 andre kjemikalier) via ventral tegmentum og kjernen accumbens), men det er helt klart sant. Mens fenomenologene bare kastet bort mye folks tid, kaster de bort jorden og deres etterkommers fremtid. (shrink)

Ruth Boeker offers a new perspective on Locke’s account of persons and personal identity by considering it within the context of his broader philosophical project and the philosophical debates of his day. Her interpretation emphasizes the importance of the moral and religious dimensions of his view. By taking seriously Locke’s general approach to questions of identity, Boeker shows that we should consider his account of personhood separately from his account of personal identity over time. On this basis, she argues (...) that Locke endorses a moral account of personhood, according to which persons are subjects of accountability, and that his particular thinking about moral accountability explains why he regards sameness of consciousness as necessary for personal identity over time. In contrast to some Neo-Lockean views about personal identity, Boeker argues that Locke’s account of personal identity is not psychological per se, but rather his underlying moral, religious, metaphysical, and epistemic background beliefs are relevant for understanding why he argues for a consciousness-based account of personal identity. Taking his underlying background beliefs into consideration not only sheds light on why many of his early critics do not adopt Locke’s view, but also shows why his view cannot be as easily dismissed as some of his critics assume. -/- . (shrink)

Heidegger argues that modern technology is quantifiably different from all earlier periods because of a shift in ethos from in situ craftwork to globalised production and storage at the behest of consumerism. He argues that this shift in technology has fundamentally shaped our epistemology, and it is almost impossible to comprehend anything outside the technological enframing of knowledge. The exception is when something breaks down, and the fault ‘shows up’ in fresh ways. Stiegler has several important addendums to Heidegger’s thesis. (...) Firstly, that Heidegger fails to fully appreciate the early Greek myth of Prometheus, and the technological depth that fire offers all human societies. Secondly, the fall, or failure, which is doubled in the myth of Prometheus, and shows up in epistemology accordingly. Thirdly the acceleration of technology since the onset of Information Technology, and the way this is disorientating our Being. I argue the fall in both Heidegger and early Stiegler has encaptured their imagination. In later work, Stiegler argues that acceleration is fused with algorithmic pretensions, that are distorting and undermining the creative political imaginary, and making it difficult to revalue the values that underpin the nihilist Anthropocene. The overcoming of the Anthropocene engages politics, economics, power, physics, and ecology. (shrink)

This Element offers the first detailed study of Catharine Trotter Cockburn's philosophy and covers her contributions to philosophical debates in epistemology, metaphysics, moral philosophy, and philosophy of religion. It examines not only Cockburn's view that sensation and reflection are the sources of knowledge, but also how she draws attention to the limitations of human understanding and how she approaches metaphysical debates through this lens. In the area of moral philosophy, this Element argues that it is helpful to take seriously Cockburn's (...) distinction between questions concerning the metaphysical foundation of morality and questions concerning the practice of morality. Moreover, this Element examines Cockburn's religious views and considers her understanding of the relation between morality and religion and her religious views concerning the resurrection and the afterlife. (shrink)

Understanding climate change is becoming an urgent requirement for those in education. The normative values of education have long been closely aligned with the global, modernised world. The industrial model has underpinned the hidden and overt curriculum. Increasingly though, a new eco-centric orientation to economics, technology, and social organisation is beginning to shape up the post-carbon world. Unless education is up to date with the issues of climate change, the estate of education will be unable to meet its task of (...) knowledge transfer. This paper covers the basic science and ethical policy debates, and begins to outline the questions that will necessarily entangle education as we orientate ourselves to the new world that is upon us. (shrink)

In this essay we provide (1) an argument for why ethics should be naturalized, (2) an analysis of why it is not yet naturalized, (3) a defense of ethical naturalism against two fallacies—Hume’s and Moore’s—that ethical naturalism allegedly commits, and (4) a proposal that normative ethics is best conceived as part of human ecology committed to pluralistic relativism. We explain why naturalizing ethics both entails relativism and also constrains it, and why nihilism about value is not an especially worrisome for (...) ethical naturalists. The substantive view we put forth constitutes the essence of Duke Naturalism. (NOTE: This is a slightly modified reprint of Flangan et al 2007 of the same title.). (shrink)

Feminist bioethicists of a variety of persuasions discuss the 2013 case of Marlise Munoz, a pregnant woman whose medical care was in dispute after she became brain dead.

In this essay we provide (1) an argument for why ethics should be naturalized, (2) an analysis of why it is not yet naturalized, (3) a defense of ethical naturalism against two fallacies—Hume’s and Moore’s—that ethical naturalism allegedly commits, and (4) a proposal that normative ethics is best conceived as part of human ecology committed to pluralistic relativism. We explain why naturalizing ethics both entails relativism and also constrains it, and why nihilism about value is not an especially worrisome for (...) ethical naturalists. The substantive view we put forth constitutes the essence of Duke Naturalism. (shrink)

Algorithms can now identify patterns and correlations in the (big) datasets, and predict outcomes based on those identified patterns and correlations with the use of machine learning techniques and big data, decisions can then be made by algorithms themselves in accordance with the predicted outcomes. Yet, algorithms can inherit questionable values from the datasets and acquire biases in the course of (machine) learning, and automated algorithmic decision-making makes it more difficult for people to see algorithms as biased. While researchers have (...) taken the problem of algorithmic bias seriously, but the current discussion on algorithmic fairness tends to conceptualize ‘fairness’ in algorithmic fairness primarily as a technical issue and attempts to implement pre-existing ideas of ‘fairness’ into algorithms. In this paper, I show that such a view of algorithmic fairness as technical issue is unsatisfactory for the type of problem algorithmic fairness presents. Since decisions on fairness measure and the related techniques for algorithms essentially involve choices between competing values, ‘fairness’ in algorithmic fairness should be conceptualized first and foremost as a political issue, and it should be (re)solved by democratic communication. The aim of this paper, therefore, is to explicitly reconceptualize algorithmic fairness as a political question and suggest the current discussion of algorithmic fairness can be strengthened by adopting the accountability for reasonableness framework. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to show that Shaftesbury’s thinking about liberty is best understood in terms of self-mastery. To examine his understanding of liberty, I turn to a painting that he commissioned on the ancient theme of the choice of Hercules and the notes that he prepared for the artist. Questions of human choice are also present in the so-called story of an amour, which addresses the difficulties of controlling human passions. Jaffro distinguishes three notions of self-control that (...) are present in the story of an amour. Although I agree with many aspects of Jaffro’s interpretation, I question his conclusion that self- control in the Stoic sense is best reserved for ‘moral heroes.’ I propose an alternative developmental interpretation, according to which all human beings are on an intellectual journey aimed at personal and moral improvement. My interpretation takes seriously that for Shaftesbury philosophy is meant to be practical and help improve our lives. I end by arguing that rather than trying to situate Shaftesbury’s concept of liberty within debates among compatibilists and incompatibilists it is more promising to understand it in terms of self- mastery and thus regard it as a version of positive liberty. (shrink)

This essay examines Locke’s chapter “Of Identity and Diversity” (Essay 2.27) in the context of the series of chapters on ideas of relations (Essay 2.25–28) that precede and follow it. I begin by introducing Locke’s account of how we acquire ideas of relations. Next, I consider Locke’s general approach to individuation and identity over time before I show how he applies his general account of identity over time to persons and personal identity. I draw attention to Locke’s claim that “person” (...) is a forensic term and analyse his arguments for why the sameness of a human being and the sameness of a substance or soul are neither necessary nor sufficient for personal identity. Instead, Locke argues that personal identity consists in sameness of consciousness. Locke regards persons as moral agents who are accountable for their actions. If a person now is held accountable for a past action it is important that the person now is the same person as the person who did the action. This means that moral accountability presupposes personal identity. Additionally, it will be important to consider whether the person deserves reward or punishment for the action. Locke’s account of moral relations, which he develops in Essay 2.28, addresses this issue and I show how it supplements his account of persons and personal identity. (shrink)

John Locke accepts that every perception gives me immediate and intuitive knowledge of my own existence. However, this knowledge is limited to the present moment when I have the perception. If I want to understand the necessary and sufficient conditions of my continued existence over time, Locke argues that it is important to clarify what ‘I’ refers to. While we often do not distinguish the concept of a person from that of a human being in ordinary language, Locke emphasizes that (...) this distinction is important if we want to engage with questions of identity over time. According to Locke, persons are thinking intelligent beings who can consider themselves as extended into the past and future and who are concerned for their happiness and accountable for their actions. Moreover, for Locke a self is a person, considered from a first-personal point of view. I show that the concept of self that he develops in the context of his discussion of persons and personal identity is richer and more complex than the I-concept that he invokes in his version of the cogito. I further argue that Locke’s moral and religious views explain why he emphasizes the need for a conceptual distinction between persons and human beings. In the final section I turn to the reception of Locke’s view by some of his early critics and defenders, including Elizabeth Berkeley Burnet, an anonymous author, and Catharine Trotter Cockburn. (shrink)

This paper takes a new look at Francis Hutcheson's moral sense theory and examines it in light of the views of his rationalist critics and opponents who claim that there has to be an antecedent moral standard prior to any sense or affections. I examine how Gilbert Burnet, Samuel Clarke, and Catharine Trotter Cockburn each argue for the priority of reason over a moral sense and how Hutcheson responds or could respond to their views. Furthermore, I consider the proposal that (...) rather than regarding Hutcheson's moral sense theory as fundamentally opposed to moral rationalism, Hutcheson and Clarke endorse a shared moral metaphysics, as argued by Patricia Sheridan. Although I consider this proposal as too broad and believe it overlooks relevant metaphysical differences between Clarke and Hutcheson, I argue that the dispute between Hutcheson and his critics and opponents will not be settled without taking their underlying moral metaphysics into consideration. (shrink)

The puzzle of material constitution can be expressed in at least two ways. First, how can the constituting object and the constituted object, which are materially and spatially coincident, be regarded as different objects? Second, how can the constituting object and the constituted object, which are qualitatively distinct, be regarded as identical objects? Monists argue that the constituting and constituted objects are identical since they are materially and spatially coincident and the property differences between then are simply differences in description, (...) perspective or context. In contrast, pluralists argue that the constituting and constituted objects are not identical even if they are materially and spatially coincident since they are qualitatively distinct. This paper proposes a solution to the puzzle of material constitution called ‘Fregean Monism’ (FM), and shows that it can better account for the property differences between the constituting and constituted objects without the need to regard them as two distinct objects. On the FM view, the puzzle of material constitution is partly a semantic puzzle and partly a metaphysical puzzle, and shows how a solution to the semantic part of the puzzle, based on the Fregean distinction between sense and reference, can yield a satisfactory solution to the metaphysical part of the puzzle. The key idea is that while the reference of a term picks out both the referent object and referent properties, the sense of the term determine which referent properties are picked out. (shrink)

Hume’s theory of personal identity is developed in response to Locke’s account of personal identity. Yet it is striking that Hume does not emphasize Locke’s distinction between persons and human beings. It seems even more striking that Hume’s account of the self in Books 2 and 3 of the Treatise has less scope for distinguishing persons from human beings than his account in Book 1. This is puzzling, because Locke originally introduced the distinction in order to answer questions of moral (...) accountability and Hume’s discussion of the self in Book 2 provides the foundation of his moral theory in Book 3. In response to the puzzle I show that Locke and Hume hold different moral and religious views and these differences are important to explain why their theories of personal identity differ. (shrink)

Shaftesbury’s major work Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times was one of the most influential English works in the eighteenth century. This paper focuses on his contributions to debates about persons and personal identity and shows that Shaftesbury regards metaphysical questions of personal identity as closely connected with normative questions of character development. I argue that he is willing to accept that persons are substances and that he takes their continued existence for granted. He sees the need to supplement metaphysical (...) debates of personal identity and believes that we have to turn to the character that is realized by a substance if we want to understand who we are. For Shaftesbury persons have a particular character, can act, and govern themselves. I propose that Shaftesbury’s approach to persons has a developmental dimension, which is meant to encourage personal development and improvement of character. The developmental dimension can be understood as an intellectual journey that invites us to search for our true self, to develop our character, and to seek happiness, which ultimately involves understanding our place as persons in the order of the universe. I show that my developmental interpretation is preferable to other existing interpretations. (shrink)

There is a wide range of things we do out of emotion. For example, we smile with pleasure, our voices drop when we are sad, we recoil in shock or jump for joy, we apologize to others out of remorse. It is uncontroversial that some of these behaviors are actions. Clearly, apologizing is an action if anything is. Things seem less clear in the case of other emotional behaviors. Intuitively, the drop in a sad person’s voice is something that happens (...) to her, rather than something she actively performs. Perhaps more interestingly, even jumping for joy can seem a problematic case: although its execution involves the active performance of certain movements, it has been argued to contrast, e.g., with an act of apology, in that it is not performed in order to achieve some end, such as repairing a relationship. This can make this behavior seem considerably different from paradigm actions. Our central concern in this paper is with which emotional behaviors should be classed as actions and why... (shrink)

This paper argues for the existence of a fourth positive generic value relation that can hold between two items beyond ‘better than’, ‘worse than’, and ‘equally good’: namely ‘on a par’.

This paper is the introduction to the volume. It gives an argumentative view of the philosophical landscape concerning incommensurability and incomparability. It argues that incomparability, not incommensurability, is the important phenomenon on which philosophers should be focusing and that the arguments for the existence of incomparability are so far not compelling.

Recently, some of the leading proponents of the view that there is widespread incommensurability among goods have suggested that the incommensurability of some goods is a constitutive feature of the goods themselves. So, for example, a friendship and a million dollars are incommensurable because it is part of what it is to be a friendship that it be incommensurable with money. According to these ‘constitutive incommensurabilists’ incommensurability follows from the very nature of certain goods. In this paper, I examine this (...) idea and argue that constitutive incommensurabilists have mistaken for constitutive incommensurability a particular emphatic kind of comparability. This examination involves an account of ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ goods and an explanation of how goods of different ‘types’ figure in practical conflict. (shrink)

Can quite different values be rationally weighed against one another? Can the value of one thing always be ranked as greater than, equal to, or less than the value of something else? If the answer to these questions is no, then in what areas do we find commensurability and comparability unavailable? And what are the implications for moral and legal decision making? This book struggles with these questions, and arrives at distinctly different answers.".

This paper aims to reconstruct Francis Hutcheson's thinking about liberty. Since he does not offer a detailed treatment of philosophical questions concerning liberty in his mature philosophical writings I turn to a textbook on metaphysics. We can assume that he prepared the textbook during the 1720s in Dublin. This textbook deserves more attention. First, it sheds light on Hutcheson's role as a teacher in Ireland and Scotland. Second, Hutcheson's contributions to metaphysical disputes are more original than sometimes assumed. To appreciate (...) his independent thinking, I argue, it is helpful to take the intellectual debates in Ireland into consideration, including William King's defence of free will and discussions of Shaftesbury's views in Robert Molesworth's intellectual circle. Rather than taking a stance on the philosophical disputes about liberty, I argue that Hutcheson aims to shift the focus of the debates towards practical questions concerning control of desire, cultivation of habits, and character development. (shrink)

My chapter examines Isaac Watts’s and Catharine Trotter Cockburn’s views concerning the metaphysics of the mind and their underlying accounts of powers and substances. In Philosophical Essays on Various Subjects Watts criticizes Locke’s account of substances and argues for his own preferred account of substance. Watts argues that there is no need to postulate an unknown substratum, as Locke does. Instead, Watts searches for a better explanation of what substances are. His proposal is that bodily substance just is solid extension (...) and that mental substance is identical with the power of thinking. This means that Watts believes that some powers can be substances. I will show how Watts defends his account of substances against various objections. Cockburn was not satisfied by Watts’s account of substance and disagrees with Watts’s understanding of powers. She believes that Watts is too quick to draw metaphysical conclusions. Cockburn takes seriously the limitations of human understanding and emphasizes that humans are ignorant about many metaphysical truths. I end by assessing the strengths and weaknesses of Watts’s and Cockburn’s accounts of powers and substances. (shrink)

In virtue of what is something a reason for action? That is, what makes a consideration a reason to act? This is a metaphysical or meta-normative question about the grounding of reasons for action. The answer to the grounding question has been traditionally given in ‘pure’, univocal terms. This paper argues that there is good reason to understand the ground of practical normativity as a hybrid of traditional ‘pure’ views. The paper 1) surveys the three leading ‘pure’ answers to the (...) question of a normative ground, 2) examines one or two of the most difficult problems for each, proposing along the way a new objection to one, and 3) argues that a particular hybrid view about normative grounds –‘hybrid voluntarism’ – avoids each of the main problems faced by the three leading ‘pure’ views. (shrink)

Political liberals assume an accessibility requirement, which means that, for ensuring civic respect and non-manipulation, public officials should offer accessible reasons during political advocacy. Recently, critics have offered two arguments to show that the accessibility requirement is unnecessary. The first is the pluralism argument: Given the pluralism in evaluative standards, when officials offer non-accessible reasons, they are not disrespectful because they may merely try to reveal their strongest reason. The second is the honesty argument: As long as officials honestly confess (...) their beliefs after offering non-accessible reasons, disrespect and non-manipulation do not occur. This paper defends the accessibility requirement and asserts that these two arguments overlook a unique feature of the political domain. While all citizens collectively own political power as a corporate body, an official does not privately own her political power. Instead, she is a trustee who has a duty to act on behalf of the corporate body, that is, she has to make decisions on grounds that are accessible to others. This duty explains why, despite pluralism, the accessibility requirement is necessary. Moreover, given that political decisions are profoundly influential to each person, requiring people to be honest is ineffective in discouraging disrespectful and manipulative acts. (shrink)

William Molyneux (1656–1698) was an Irish experimental philosopher and politician, who played a major role in the intellectual life in seventeenth-century Dublin. He became Locke’s friend and correspondent in 1692 and was probably Locke’s philosophically most significant correspondent. Locke approached Molyneux for advice for revising his Essay concerning Human Understanding as he was preparing the second and subsequent editions. Locke made several changes in response to Molyneux’s suggestions; they include major revisions of the chapter ‘Of Power’ (2.21), the addition of (...) the chapter ‘Of Identity and Diversity’ (2.27), and the addition of the so-called Molyneux Problem (2.9.8). Molyneux repeatedly requested that Locke develops his views on morality. Additionally, their correspondence turned to questions concerning education and Molyneux’s keen interest in the topic likely prompted Locke to publish Some Thoughts Concerning Education in 1693. Moreover, Molyneux drew on Locke’s anonymously published Two Treatises of Government in his The Case of Ireland’s Being Bound by Acts of Parliament in England, Stated, which was first published in the spring of 1698. Molyneux revealed Locke’s authorship of Two Treatises against Locke’s will, yet their friendship continued until Molyneux’s untimely death in October 1698. (shrink)

Clayton and Stevens argue that political liberals should engage with the religiously unreasonable by offering religious responses and showing that their religious views are mistaken, instead of refusing to engage with them. Yet they recognize that political liberals will face a dilemma due to such religious responses: either their responses will alienate certain reasonable citizens, or their engagements will appear disingenuous. Thus, there should be a division of justificatory labour. The duty of engagement should be delegated to religious citizens. In (...) this comment, I will argue that the division of justificatory labour is indefensible. This dilemma can be avoided if politicians and political philosophers correctly use conjecture, a form of discourse that involves non-public reason. As a conditional response, conjecture avoids alienating any reasonable citizens. Also, if conjecture is given in a sincere and open-minded manner, then the problem of disingenuousness can be overcome. My comment concludes that while the engagement of politicians and political philosophers does not necessarily jeopardize overlapping consensus, they should be permitted, or perhaps even required, to engage with the religiously unreasonable due to the natural duty of justice. (shrink)

What is the feeling of religious longing and how, if at all, can religious longing justify religious beliefs? Starting with an analogy between religious longing and basic physical needs and an analogy between religious longing and musical longing, I argue that the feeling of religious longing is characterized by four features: its generality, its indeterminate transcendent object which by its nature is not capable of empirical verification or falsification, its mode of being infinitely interested in passion and its ambiguity with (...) regard to our own power and powerlessness. Religious longing can neither epistemically nor pragmatically justify religious beliefs. If we want to account for the rationality of religious beliefs motivated by religious longing, we have to consider passionate rationality as a third kind of rationality. We wholeheartedly take as true what we experience as a condition of the possibility of life. (shrink)