Results for 'Tarski's consequence operation,'

111 found
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  1.  33
    Teoria zdań odrzuconych.Urszula Wybraniec-Skardowska - 1969 - Dissertation, Opole University
    This is the PhD dissertation, written under supervision of Professor Jerzy Słupecki, published in the book: U.Wybraniec-Skardowska i Grzegorz Bryll "Z badań nad teorią zdań odrzuconych" ( "Studies of theory of rejected sentences"), Zeszyty Naukowe Wyższej Szkoły Pedagogicznej w Opolu, Seria B: Studia i Monografie nr 22, pp. 5-131. It is the first, original publication on the theory of rejected sentences on which are based, among other, papers: "Theory of rejected propositions. I"and "Theory of rejected propositions II" with Jerzy Słupecki (...)
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  2. The Absence of Multiple Universes of Discourse in the 1936 Tarski Consequence-Definition Paper.John Corcoran & José Miguel Sagüillo - 2011 - History and Philosophy of Logic 32 (4):359 - 374.
    This paper discusses the history of the confusion and controversies over whether the definition of consequence presented in the 11-page 1936 Tarski consequence-definition paper is based on a monistic fixed-universe framework?like Begriffsschrift and Principia Mathematica. Monistic fixed-universe frameworks, common in pre-WWII logic, keep the range of the individual variables fixed as the class of all individuals. The contrary alternative is that the definition is predicated on a pluralistic multiple-universe framework?like the 1931 Gödel incompleteness paper. A pluralistic multiple-universe framework (...)
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  3.  84
    On the Mutual Definability of the Notions of Entailment, Rejection, and Inconsistency.Urszula Wybraniec-Skardowska - 2016 - Axioms 5 (15).
    In this paper, two axiomatic theories T− and T′ are constructed, which are dual to Tarski’s theory T+ (1930) of deductive systems based on classical propositional calculus. While in Tarski’s theory T+ the primitive notion is the classical consequence function (entailment) Cn+, in the dual theory T− it is replaced by the notion of Słupecki’s rejection consequence Cn− and in the dual theory T′ it is replaced by the notion of the family Incons of inconsistent sets. The author (...)
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  4. CORCORAN REVIEWS THE 4 VOLUMES OF TARSKI's COLLECTED PAPERS.John Corcoran - 1991 - MATHEMATICAL REVIEWS 91 (I):110-114.
    CORCORAN REVIEWS THE 4 VOLUMES OF TARSKI’S COLLECTED PAPERS Alfred Tarski (1901--1983) is widely regarded as one of the two giants of twentieth-century logic and also as one of the four greatest logicians of all time (Aristotle, Frege and Gödel being the other three). Of the four, Tarski was the most prolific as a logician. The four volumes of his collected papers, which exclude most of his 19 monographs, span over 2500 pages. Aristotle's writings are comparable in volume, but most (...)
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  5.  37
    Gómez-Torrente on Modality and Tarskian Logical Consequence.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2010 - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 18 (2):159-170.
    Gómez-Torrente’s papers have made important contributions to vindicate Tarski’s model-theoretic account of the logical properties in the face of Etchemendy’s criticisms. However, at some points his vindication depends on interpreting the Tarskian account as purportedly modally deflationary, i.e., as not intended to capture the intuitive modal element in the logical properties, that logical consequence is (epistemic or alethic) necessary truth-preservation. Here it is argued that the views expressed in Tarski’s seminal work do not support this modally deflationary interpretation, even (...)
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  6. Tarski's Nominalism.Greg Frost-Arnold - 2008 - In Douglas Patterson (ed.), New Essays on Tarski and Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
    Alfred Tarski was a nominalist. But he published almost nothing on his nominalist views, and until recently the only sources scholars had for studying Tarski’s nominalism were conversational reports from his friends and colleagues. However, a recently-discovered archival resource provides the most detailed information yet about Tarski’s nominalism. Tarski spent the academic year 1940-41 at Harvard, along with many of the leading lights of scientific philosophy: Carnap, Quine, Hempel, Goodman, and (for the fall semester) Russell. This group met frequently to (...)
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  7. Was Tarski's Theory of Truth Motivated by Physicalism?Greg Frost-Arnold - 2004 - History and Philosophy of Logic 25 (4):265-280.
    Many commentators on Alfred Tarski have, following Hartry Field, claimed that Tarski's truth-definition was motivated by physicalism—the doctrine that all facts, including semantic facts, must be reducible to physical facts. I claim, instead, that Tarski did not aim to reduce semantic facts to physical ones. Thus, Field's criticism that Tarski's truth-definition fails to fulfill physicalist ambitions does not reveal Tarski to be inconsistent, since Tarski's goal is not to vindicate physicalism. I argue that Tarski's only published (...)
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  8. Tarski’s Convention T: Condition Beta.John Corcoran - forthcoming - South American Journal of Logic 1 (1).
    Tarski’s Convention T—presenting his notion of adequate definition of truth (sic)—contains two conditions: alpha and beta. Alpha requires that all instances of a certain T Schema be provable. Beta requires in effect the provability of ‘every truth is a sentence’. Beta formally recognizes the fact, repeatedly emphasized by Tarski, that sentences (devoid of free variable occurrences)—as opposed to pre-sentences (having free occurrences of variables)—exhaust the range of significance of is true. In Tarski’s preferred usage, it is part of the meaning (...)
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  9. Lies, Half-Truths, and Falsehoods About Tarski’s 1933 “Liar” Antinomies.John Corcoran & Joaquin Miller - 2012 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 18 (1):140-141.
    We discuss misinformation about “the liar antinomy” with special reference to Tarski’s 1933 truth-definition paper [1]. Lies are speech-acts, not merely sentences or propositions. Roughly, lies are statements of propositions not believed by their speakers. Speakers who state their false beliefs are often not lying. And speakers who state true propositions that they don’t believe are often lying—regardless of whether the non-belief is disbelief. Persons who state propositions on which they have no opinion are lying as much as those who (...)
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  10. REVIEW OF Alfred Tarski, Collected Papers, Vols. 1-4 (1986) Edited by Steven Givant and Ralph McKenzie. [REVIEW]John Corcoran - 1991 - MATHEMATICAL REVIEWS 91 (h):01101-4.
    Alfred Tarski (1901--1983) is widely regarded as one of the two giants of twentieth-century logic and also as one of the four greatest logicians of all time (Aristotle, Frege and Gödel being the other three). Of the four, Tarski was the most prolific as a logician. The four volumes of his collected papers, which exclude most of his 19 monographs, span over 2500 pages. Aristotle's writings are comparable in volume, but most of the Aristotelian corpus is not about logic, whereas (...)
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  11. The Formal-Structural View Of Logical Consequence.Gila Sher - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):241-261.
    This paper offers a response to William’s Hanson’s criticism of Sher’s formal-structural conception of logical consequence and logical constants.
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  12. Boole's Criteria for Validity and Invalidity.John Corcoran & Susan Wood - 1980 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 21 (4):609-638.
    It is one thing for a given proposition to follow or to not follow from a given set of propositions and it is quite another thing for it to be shown either that the given proposition follows or that it does not follow.* Using a formal deduction to show that a conclusion follows and using a countermodel to show that a conclusion does not follow are both traditional practices recognized by Aristotle and used down through the history of logic. These (...)
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  13. Nihilism and Tarski's truth definition: an interests incompatibility.Maurilio Lovatti - 1998 - Per la Filosofia (43):46-56.
    In this paper the importance of Tarski's truth definition is evaluated like a productive resource to criticize Nietzsche's nihilistic view and any pragmatic understanding of truth.
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  14. Brentano's Criticism of the Correspondence Conception of Truth and Tarski's Semantic Theory.Jan Woleński - 1989 - Topoi 8 (2):105-110.
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  15.  41
    There’s A Nice Knockdown Argument For You: Donald Davidson And Modest Intentionalism.Kalle Puolakka - 2006 - Postgraduate Journal of Aesthetics 3 (1):15-24.
    It might come as a surprise for someone who has only a superficial knowledge of Donald Davidson’s philosophy that he has claimed literary language to be ‘a prime test of the adequacy of any view on the nature of language’.1 The claim, however, captures well the transformation that has happened in Davidson’s thinking on language since he began in the 1960’s to develop a truth-conditional semantic theory for natural languages in the lines of Alfred Tarski’s semantic conception of truth. About (...)
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  16. Review of Macbeth, D. Diagrammatic Reasoning in Frege's Begriffsschrift. Synthese 186 (2012), No. 1, 289–314. Mathematical Reviews MR 2935338.John Corcoran - 2014 - MATHEMATICAL REVIEWS 2014:2935338.
    A Mathematical Review by John Corcoran, SUNY/Buffalo -/- Macbeth, Danielle Diagrammatic reasoning in Frege's Begriffsschrift. Synthese 186 (2012), no. 1, 289–314. ABSTRACT This review begins with two quotations from the paper: its abstract and the first paragraph of the conclusion. The point of the quotations is to make clear by the “give-them-enough-rope” strategy how murky, incompetent, and badly written the paper is. I know I am asking a lot, but I have to ask you to read the quoted passages—aloud if (...)
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  17. Conceptual Structure of Classical Logic.John Corcoran - 1972 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 33 (1):25-47.
    One innovation in this paper is its identification, analysis, and description of a troubling ambiguity in the word ‘argument’. In one sense ‘argument’ denotes a premise-conclusion argument: a two-part system composed of a set of sentences—the premises—and a single sentence—the conclusion. In another sense it denotes a premise-conclusion-mediation argument—later called an argumentation: a three-part system composed of a set of sentences—the premises—a single sentence—the conclusion—and complex of sentences—the mediation. The latter is often intended to show that the conclusion follows from (...)
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  18. Surprises in Logic.John Corcoran & William Frank - 2013 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 19 (3):253.
    JOHN CORCORAN AND WILIAM FRANK. Surprises in logic. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic. 19 253. Some people, not just beginning students, are at first surprised to learn that the proposition “If zero is odd, then zero is not odd” is not self-contradictory. Some people are surprised to find out that there are logically equivalent false universal propositions that have no counterexamples in common, i. e., that no counterexample for one is a counterexample for the other. Some people would be surprised to (...)
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  19. Book Reviews: Anita Burdman Feferman and Solomon Feferman, "Alfred Tarski: Life and Logic", Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.Walter Carnielli - 2006 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 15 (1):91-96.
    Anita Burdman Feferman and Solomon Feferman, "Alfred Tarski: Life and Logic", Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2004, pp. 432.
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  20.  43
    Questions and Answers About Oppositions.Fabien Schang - 2011 - In Jean-Yves Beziau & Gillman Payette (eds.), The Square of Opposition: A General Framework for Cognition. Berne, Suisse: pp. 289-319.
    A general characterization of logical opposition is given in the present paper, where oppositions are defined by specific answers in an algebraic question-answer game. It is shown that opposition is essentially a semantic relation of truth values between syntactic opposites, before generalizing the theory of opposition from the initial Apuleian square to a variety of alter- native geometrical representations. In the light of this generalization, the famous problem of existential import is traced back to an ambiguous interpretation of assertoric sentences (...)
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  21. Logic in the Tractatus.Max Weiss - 2017 - Review of Symbolic Logic 10 (1):1-50.
    I present a reconstruction of the logical system of the Tractatus, which differs from classical logic in two ways. It includes an account of Wittgenstein’s “form-series” device, which suffices to express some effectively generated countably infinite disjunctions. And its attendant notion of structure is relativized to the fixed underlying universe of what is named. -/- There follow three results. First, the class of concepts definable in the system is closed under finitary induction. Second, if the universe of objects is countably (...)
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  22. A Correspondence Theory of Truth.Jay Newhard - 2002 - Dissertation, Brown University
    The aim of this dissertation is to offer and defend a correspondence theory of truth. I begin by critically examining the coherence, pragmatic, simple, redundancy, disquotational, minimal, and prosentential theories of truth. Special attention is paid to several versions of disquotationalism, whose plausibility has led to its fairly constant support since the pioneering work of Alfred Tarski, through that by W. V. Quine, and recently in the work of Paul Horwich. I argue that none of these theories meets the correspondence (...)
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  23.  61
    Tarski.Benedict Eastaugh - 2017 - In Alex Malpass & Marianna Antonutti Marfori (eds.), The History of Philosophical and Formal Logic: From Aristotle to Tarski. London: Bloomsbury. pp. 293-313.
    Alfred Tarski was one of the greatest logicians of the twentieth century. His influence comes not merely through his own work but from the legion of students who pursued his projects, both in Poland and Berkeley. This chapter focuses on three key areas of Tarski's research, beginning with his groundbreaking studies of the concept of truth. Tarski's work led to the creation of the area of mathematical logic known as model theory and prefigured semantic approaches in the philosophy (...)
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  24. Introduction. The School: Its Genesis, Development and Significance.U. Wybraniec-Skardowska - 2018 - In Urszula Wybraniec-Skardowska & Ángel Garrido (eds.), in: The Lvov-Warsaw School. Past and Present. Cham, Switzerland: Springer. pp. 3-14.
    The Introduction outlines, in a concise way, the history of the Lvov-Warsaw School – a most unique Polish school of worldwide renown, which pioneered trends combining philosophy, logic, mathematics and language. The author accepts that the beginnings of the School fall on the year 1895, when its founder Kazimierz Twardowski, a disciple of Franz Brentano, came to Lvov on his mission to organize a scientific circle. Soon, among the characteristic features of the School was its serious approach towards philosophical studies (...)
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  25. Vagueness and Intuitionistic Logic.Ian Rumfitt - forthcoming - In Alexander Miller (ed.), Language, Logic,and Mathematics: Themes from the Philosophy of Crispin Wright. Oxford University Press.
    In his essay ‘“Wang’s Paradox”’, Crispin Wright proposes a solution to the Sorites Paradox (in particular, the form of it he calls the ‘Paradox of Sharp Boundaries’) that involves adopting intuitionistic logic when reasoning with vague predicates. He does not give a semantic theory which accounts for the validity of intuitionistic logic (and the invalidity of stronger logics) in that area. The present essay tentatively makes good the deficiency. By applying a theorem of Tarski, it shows that intuitionistic logic is (...)
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  26. Ordinary Truth in Tarski and Næss.Joseph Ulatowski - 2016 - In Adrian Kuzniar & Joanna Odrowąż-Sypniewska (eds.), Uncovering Facts and Values. Brill. pp. 67-90.
    Alfred Tarski seems to endorse a partial conception of truth, the T-schema, which he believes might be clarified by the application of empirical methods, specifically citing the experimental results of Arne Næss (1938a). The aim of this paper is to argue that Næss’ empirical work confirmed Tarski’s semantic conception of truth, among others. In the first part, I lay out the case for believing that Tarski’s T-schema, while not the formal and generalizable Convention-T, provides a partial account of truth that (...)
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  27. Tarski and Primitivism About Truth.Jamin Asay - 2013 - Philosophers' Imprint 13:1-18.
    Tarski’s pioneering work on truth has been thought by some to motivate a robust, correspondence-style theory of truth, and by others to motivate a deflationary attitude toward truth. I argue that Tarski’s work suggests neither; if it motivates any contemporary theory of truth, it motivates conceptual primitivism, the view that truth is a fundamental, indefinable concept. After outlining conceptual primitivism and Tarski’s theory of truth, I show how the two approaches to truth share much in common. While Tarski does not (...)
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  28. Truth, Correspondence, Models, and Tarski.Panu Raatikainen - 2007 - In Approaching Truth: Essays in Honour of Ilkka Niiniluoto. London: College Press. pp. 99-112.
    In the early 20th century, scepticism was common among philosophers about the very meaningfulness of the notion of truth – and of the related notions of denotation, definition etc. (i.e., what Tarski called semantical concepts). Awareness was growing of the various logical paradoxes and anomalies arising from these concepts. In addition, more philosophical reasons were being given for this aversion.1 The atmosphere changed dramatically with Alfred Tarski’s path-breaking contribution. What Tarski did was to show that, assuming that the syntax of (...)
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  29. More on Putnam and Tarski.Panu Raatikainen - 2003 - Synthese 135 (1):37 - 47.
    Hilary Putnam's famous arguments criticizing Tarski's theory of truth are evaluated. It is argued that they do not succeed to undermine Tarski's approach. One of the arguments is based on the problematic idea of a false instance of T-schema. The other ignores various issues essential for Tarski's setting such as language-relativity of truth definition.
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  30. The Semantic Theory of Truth: Field’s Incompleteness Objection.Glen A. Hoffmann - 2007 - Philosophia 35 (2):161-170.
    According to Field’s influential incompleteness objection, Tarski’s semantic theory of truth is unsatisfactory since the definition that forms its basis is incomplete in two distinct senses: (1) it is physicalistically inadequate, and for this reason, (2) it is conceptually deficient. In this paper, I defend the semantic theory of truth against the incompleteness objection by conceding (1) but rejecting (2). After arguing that Davidson and McDowell’s reply to the incompleteness objection fails to pass muster, I argue that, within the constraints (...)
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  31. CORCORAN'S 27 ENTRIES IN THE 1999 SECOND EDITION.John Corcoran - 1999 - In Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. CAMBRIDGE UP. pp. 65-941.
    Corcoran’s 27 entries in the 1999 second edition of Robert Audi’s Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy [Cambridge: Cambridge UP]. -/- ancestral, axiomatic method, borderline case, categoricity, Church (Alonzo), conditional, convention T, converse (outer and inner), corresponding conditional, degenerate case, domain, De Morgan, ellipsis, laws of thought, limiting case, logical form, logical subject, material adequacy, mathematical analysis, omega, proof by recursion, recursive function theory, scheme, scope, Tarski (Alfred), tautology, universe of discourse. -/- The entire work is available online free at more than (...)
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  32. How Tarski Defined the Undefinable.Cezary Cieśliński - 2015 - European Review 23 (01):139 - 149.
    This paper describes Tarski’s project of rehabilitating the notion of truth, previously considered dubious by many philosophers. The project was realized by providing a formal truth definition, which does not employ any problematic concept.
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  33.  67
    The Truth Assignments That Differentiate Human Reasoning From Mechanistic Reasoning: The Evidence-Based Argument for Lucas' Goedelian Thesis.Bhupinder Singh Anand - 2016 - Cognitive Systems Research 40:35-45.
    We consider the argument that Tarski's classic definitions permit an intelligence---whether human or mechanistic---to admit finitary evidence-based definitions of the satisfaction and truth of the atomic formulas of the first-order Peano Arithmetic PA over the domain N of the natural numbers in two, hitherto unsuspected and essentially different, ways: (1) in terms of classical algorithmic verifiabilty; and (2) in terms of finitary algorithmic computability. We then show that the two definitions correspond to two distinctly different assignments of satisfaction and (...)
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  34. Formalizing Euclid’s First Axiom.John Corcoran - 2014 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 20 (3):404-405.
    Formalizing Euclid’s first axiom. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic. 20 (2014) 404–5. (Coauthor: Daniel Novotný) -/- Euclid [fl. 300 BCE] divides his basic principles into what came to be called ‘postulates’ and ‘axioms’—two words that are synonyms today but which are commonly used to translate Greek words meant by Euclid as contrasting terms. -/- Euclid’s postulates are specifically geometric: they concern geometric magnitudes, shapes, figures, etc.—nothing else. The first: “to draw a line from any point to any point”; the last: the (...)
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  35. Three Dogmas of First-Order Logic and Some Evidence-Based Consequences for Constructive Mathematics of Differentiating Between Hilbertian Theism, Brouwerian Atheism and Finitary Agnosticism.Bhupinder Singh Anand - manuscript
    We show how removing faith-based beliefs in current philosophies of classical and constructive mathematics admits formal, evidence-based, definitions of constructive mathematics; of a constructively well-defined logic of a formal mathematical language; and of a constructively well-defined model of such a language. -/- We argue that, from an evidence-based perspective, classical approaches which follow Hilbert's formal definitions of quantification can be labelled `theistic'; whilst constructive approaches based on Brouwer's philosophy of Intuitionism can be labelled `atheistic'. -/- We then adopt what may (...)
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  36. The Epistemic Significance of Valid Inference – A Model-Theoretic Approach.Constantin C. Brîncuș - 2015 - In Sorin Costreie & Mircea Dumitru (eds.), Meaning and Truth. Bucharest: PRO Universitaria Publishing. pp. 11-36.
    The problem analysed in this paper is whether we can gain knowledge by using valid inferences, and how we can explain this process from a model-theoretic perspective. According to the paradox of inference (Cohen & Nagel 1936/1998, 173), it is logically impossible for an inference to be both valid and its conclusion to possess novelty with respect to the premises. I argue in this paper that valid inference has an epistemic significance, i.e., it can be used by an agent to (...)
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  37. The Development of Mathematical Logic From Russell to Tarski, 1900-1935.Paolo Mancosu, Richard Zach & Calixto Badesa - 2009 - In Leila Haaparanta (ed.), The Development of Modern Logic. Oxford University Press.
    The period from 1900 to 1935 was particularly fruitful and important for the development of logic and logical metatheory. This survey is organized along eight "itineraries" concentrating on historically and conceptually linked strands in this development. Itinerary I deals with the evolution of conceptions of axiomatics. Itinerary II centers on the logical work of Bertrand Russell. Itinerary III presents the development of set theory from Zermelo onward. Itinerary IV discusses the contributions of the algebra of logic tradition, in particular, Löwenheim (...)
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  38. Conceptual Marxism and Truth: Inquiry Symposium on Kevin Scharp’s Replacing Truth.Patrick Greenough - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (4):403-421.
    In Replacing Truth, Scharp takes the concept of truth to be fundamentally incoherent. As such, Scharp reckons it to be unsuited for systematic philosophical theorising and in need of replacement – at least for regions of thought and talk which permit liar sentences and their ilk to be formulated. This replacement methodology is radical because it not only recommends that the concept of truth be replaced, but that the word ‘true’ be replaced too. Only Tarski has attempted anything like it (...)
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  39.  34
    Tarski Undefinability Theorem Terse Refutation.P. Olcott - manuscript
    Both Tarski and Gödel “prove” that provability can diverge from Truth. When we boil their claim down to its simplest possible essence it is really claiming that valid inference from true premises might not always derive a true consequence. This is obviously impossible.
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  40. Information-Theoretic Logic and Transformation-Theoretic Logic,.John Corcoran - 1999 - In R. A. M. M. (ed.), Fragments in Science,. World Scientific Publishing Company,. pp. 25-35.
    Information-theoretic approaches to formal logic analyze the "common intuitive" concepts of implication, consequence, and validity in terms of information content of propositions and sets of propositions: one given proposition implies a second if the former contains all of the information contained by the latter; one given proposition is a consequence of a second if the latter contains all of the information contained by the former; an argument is valid if the conclusion contains no information beyond that of the (...)
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  41. ‘‘Quine’s Evolution From ‘Carnap’s Disciple’ to the Author of “Two Dogmas.Greg Frost-Arnold - 2011 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 1 (2):291-316.
    Recent scholarship indicates that Quine’s “Truth by Convention” does not present the radical critiques of analytic truth found fifteen years later in “Two Dogmas of Empiricism.” This prompts a historical question: what caused Quine’s radicalization? I argue that two crucial components of Quine’s development can be traced to the academic year 1940–1941, when he, Russell, Carnap, Tarski, Hempel, and Goodman were all at Harvard together. First, during those meetings, Quine recognizes that Carnap has abandoned the extensional, syntactic approach to philosophical (...)
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  42. Willard Van Orman Quine's Philosophical Development in the 1930s and 1940s.Frederique Janssen-Lauret - 2018 - In Walter Carnielli, Frederique Janssen-Lauret & William Pickering (eds.), The Significance of the New Logic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    As analytic philosophy is becoming increasingly aware of and interested in its own history, the study of that field is broadening to include, not just its earliest beginnings, but also the mid-twentieth century. One of the towering figures of this epoch is W.V. Quine (1908-2000), champion of naturalism in philosophy of science, pioneer of mathematical logic, trying to unite an austerely physicalist theory of the world with the truths of mathematics, psychology, and linguistics. Quine's posthumous papers, notes, and drafts revealing (...)
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  43. Aristotle’s Semiotic Triangles and Pyramids.John Corcoran - 2015 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 21 (1):198-9.
    Imagine an equilateral triangle “pointing upward”—its horizontal base under its apex angle. A semiotic triangle has the following three “vertexes”: (apex) an expression, (lower-left) one of the expression’s conceptual meanings or senses, and (lower-right) the referent or denotation determined by the sense [1, pp. 88ff]. One example: the eight-letter string ‘coleslaw’ (apex), the concept “coleslaw” (lower-left), and the salad coleslaw (lower-right) [1, p. 84f]. Using Church’s terminology [2, pp. 6, 41]—modifying Frege’s—the word ‘coleslaw’ expresses the concept “coleslaw”, the word ‘coleslaw’ (...)
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  44. Two-Method Errors: Having It Both Ways.John Corcoran & Idris Samawi Hamid - forthcoming - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic.
    ►JOHN CORCORAN AND IDRIS SAMAWI HAMID, Two-method errors: having it both ways. Philosophy, University at Buffalo, Buffalo, NY 14260-4150, USA E-mail: corcoran@buffalo.edu Philosophy, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO 80523-1781 USA E-mail: ishamid@colostate.edu Where two methods produce similar results, mixing the two sometimes creates errors we call two-method errors, TMEs: in style, syntax, semantics, pragmatics, implicature, logic, or action. This lecture analyzes examples found in technical and in non-technical contexts. One can say “Abe knows whether Ben draws” in two other (...)
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  45. Russell’s Many Points.Thomas Mormann - 2009 - In Alexander Hieke & Hannes Leitgeb (eds.), Reduction, Abstraction, Analysis. Ontos Verlag. pp. 11--239.
    Bertrand Russell was one of the protagonists of the programme of reducing “disagreeable” concepts to philosophically more respectable ones. Throughout his life he was engaged in eliminating or paraphrasing away a copious variety of allegedly dubious concepts: propositions, definite descriptions, knowing subjects, and points, among others. The critical aim of this paper is to show that Russell’s construction of points, which has been considered as a paradigm of a logical construction überhaupt, fails for principal mathematical reasons. Russell could have known (...)
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    Physics Avoidance & Cooperative Semantics: Inferentialism and Mark Wilson’s Engagement with Naturalism Qua Applied Mathematics.Ekin Erkan - 2020 - Cosmos and History 16 (1):560-644.
    Mark Wilson argues that the standard categorizations of "Theory T thinking"— logic-centered conceptions of scientific organization (canonized via logical empiricists in the mid-twentieth century)—dampens the understanding and appreciation of those strategic subtleties working within science. By "Theory T thinking," we mean to describe the simplistic methodology in which mathematical science allegedly supplies ‘processes’ that parallel nature's own in a tidily isomorphic fashion, wherein "Theory T’s" feigned rigor and methodological dogmas advance inadequate discrimination that fails to distinguish between explanatory structures that (...)
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  47. Aristotle's Prior Analytics and Boole's Laws of Thought.John Corcoran - 2003 - History and Philosophy of Logic. 24 (4):261-288.
    Prior Analytics by the Greek philosopher Aristotle (384 – 322 BCE) and Laws of Thought by the English mathematician George Boole (1815 – 1864) are the two most important surviving original logical works from before the advent of modern logic. This article has a single goal: to compare Aristotle’s system with the system that Boole constructed over twenty-two centuries later intending to extend and perfect what Aristotle had started. This comparison merits an article itself. Accordingly, this article does not discuss (...)
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  48.  71
    The Significance of Evidence-Based Reasoning for Mathematics, Mathematics Education, Philosophy and the Natural Sciences.Bhupinder Singh Anand - manuscript
    In this multi-disciplinary investigation we show how an evidence-based perspective of quantification---in terms of algorithmic verifiability and algorithmic computability---admits evidence-based definitions of well-definedness and effective computability, which yield two unarguably constructive interpretations of the first-order Peano Arithmetic PA---over the structure N of the natural numbers---that are complementary, not contradictory. The first yields the weak, standard, interpretation of PA over N, which is well-defined with respect to assignments of algorithmically verifiable Tarskian truth values to the formulas of PA under the interpretation. (...)
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  49. Meanings of Implication.John Corcoran - 1973 - Diálogos. Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad de Puerto Rico 9 (24):59-76.
    Thirteen meanings of 'implication' are described and compared. Among them are relations that have been called: logical implication, material implication,deductive implication, formal implication, enthymemic implication, and factual implication. In a given context, implication is the homogeneous two-place relation expressed by the relation verb 'implies'. For heuristic and expository reasons this article skirts many crucial issues including use-mention, the nature of the entities that imply and are implied, and the processes by which knowledge of these relations are achieved. This paper is (...)
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  50. Self-Consciousness.George Bealer - 1997 - Philosophical Review 106 (1):69-117.
    Self-consciousness constitutes an insurmountable obstacle to functionalism. Either the standard functional definitions of mental relations wrongly require the contents of self-consciousness to be propositions involving “realizations” rather than mental properties and relations themselves. Or else these definitions are circular. The only way to save functional definitions is to expunge the standard functionalist requirement that mental properties be second-order and to accept that they are first-order. But even the resulting “ideological” functionalism, which aims only at conceptual clarification, fails unless it incorporates (...)
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