“Morphological computation” is an increasingly important concept in robotics, artificial intelligence, and philosophy of the mind. It is used to understand how the body contributes to cognition and control of behavior. Its understanding in terms of "offloading" computation from the brain to the body has been criticized as misleading, and it has been suggested that the use of the concept conflates three classes of distinct processes. In fact, these criticisms implicitly hang on accepting a semantic definition of what constitutes computation. (...) Here, I argue that an alternative, mechanistic view on computation offers a significantly different understanding of what morphological computation is. These theoretical considerations are then used to analyze the existing research program in developmental biology, which understands morphogenesis, the process of development of shape in biological systems, as a computational process. This important line of research shows that cognition and intelligence can be found across all scales of life, as the proponents of the basal cognition research program propose. Hence, clarifying the connection between morphological computation and morphogenesis allows for strengthening the role of the former concept in this emerging research field. (shrink)

In the article I discuss functionalist interpretations of Husserlian phenomenology. The first one was coined in the discussion between Hubert Dreyfus and Ronald McIntyre. They argue that Husserl’s phenomenology shares similarities with computational functionalism, and the key similarity is between the concept of noema and the concept of mental representation. I show the weaknesses of that reading and argue that there is another available functionalist reading of Husserlian phenomenology. I propose to shift perspective and approach the relation between phenomenology and (...) functionalism from a methodological perspective, specifically taking into account the functionalist explanatory strategy called functional analysis. I discuss the notion of function in Husserl’s works and Husserl’s idea of functional phenomenology. The key argument I develop is that in functional phenomenology we can find an explanatory strategy which is analogous to the strategy of functional decomposition used in functional analysis. I conclude that the proposed functionalist reading of phenomenology opens a new approach to the integration of phenomenology with cognitive sciences. (shrink)

The paper is a contribution to the debate on the epistemological status of thought experiments. I deal with the epistemological uniqueness of experiments in the sense of their irreducibility to other sources of justification. In particular, I criticize an influential argument for the irreducibility of thought experiments to general arguments. First, I introduce the radical empiricist theory of eliminativism, which considers thought experiments to be rhetorically modified arguments, uninteresting from the epistemological point of view. Second, I present objections to the (...) theory, focusing on the critique of eliminativism by Tamar Szabó Gendler based on the reconstruction of famous Galileo's Pisa experiment. I show that her reconstruction is simplistic and that more elaborate reconstruction is needed for an appropriate assessment of the epistemic power of general argument. I propose such a reconstruction and demonstrate that general version of Pisa experiment is epistemically equal to the particular one. Thus, from an epistemological perspective, Galileo's thought experiment is reducible to a straightforward argument without particular premises. (shrink)

Clinical Ethics Consultations are an important tool for physicians in solving difficult cases. They are extremely common in North America and to a lesser extent also present in Europe. However, there is little data on this practice in Poland. We present results of a survey of 521 physicians practising in Poland concerning their opinion on CECs and related practices. We analysed the data looking at such issues as CECs’ perceived availability, use of CECs, and perceived usefulness of such support. Physicians (...) in our study generally encounter hard ethics cases, even—surprisingly—those who do not work in hospitals. Most physicians have no CEC access, and those that do still do not employ CECs. However, physicians perceive this form of support as useful—even more so among actual users of CECs. We compared these findings with similar studies from other European countries and the North America. We point out peculiarities of our results as compared to those in other countries, with some possible explanations. We hope the results may encourage regulatory debate on the need to formally introduce CECs into the Polish healthcare system. (shrink)

This book is the first comprehensive study of Plato’s conception of justice. The universality of human rights and the universality of human dignity, which is recognised as their source, are among the crucial philosophical problems in modern-day legal orders and in contemporary culture in general. If dignity is genuinely universal, then human beings also possessed it in ancient times. Plato not only perceived human dignity, but a recognition of dignity is also visible in his conception of justice, which forms the (...) core of his philosophy. Plato’s Republic is consistently interpreted here as a treatise on justice, relating to an individual and not to the state. The famous myth of the cave is a story about education taking place in the world here and now. The best activity is not contemplation, but acting for the benefit of others. Not ideas, but individuals are the proper objects of love. Plato’s philosophy may provide foundations for modern-day human rights protection rather than for totalitarian orders. (shrink)

Sprawiedliwość jako cecha działającego podmiotu jest w swej istocie doskonałością całości, doskonałością jego istnienia. Taka doskonałość („dzielność”) całości zakłada sprawność każdego zasadniczego elementu naszego wnętrza – intelektu, woli i uczuć, choć nie jest po prostu sumą doskonałości tych elementów, jest czymś jakościowo różnym. Niemniej jednak Platona ujęcie doskonalenia elementów „wnętrza” człowieka prowadzi do refleksji nad powiązaniem sprawiedliwości z pozostałymi uniwersalnymi wartościami konstytucyjnymi – prawdą, dobrem i pięknem. Dzielnością (cnotą) właściwą intelektowi, symbolizowanemu przez władców Platońskiego państwa, jest mądrość, a ta nie (...) może się obyć bez prawdy. Dzielnością woli, symbolizowanej przez żołnierzy i policjantów, jest odwaga pojmowana przez Platona jako postępowanie zgodne z własnymi, rozumnymi przekonaniami, a takie postępowanie jest fundamentem dobra (moralnego). Uczucia – symbolizowane przez wytwórców – ukierunkowywane, „pociągane” są przez piękno. Krótko, wiedza – ma być prawdziwa, działanie – dobre, a to, co wytwarzane – piękne. To przesłanie Platona dotyczące naszych uniwersalnych wartości konstytucyjnych. To też przesłanie dotyczące celów, których realizacji powinna służyć kultura duchowa – nauka zmierza do prawdy, moralność do dobra, sztuka do piękna. Platon każe przy tym pamiętać, że rozwój kultury nie jest celem samym w sobie, ale służyć powinien tworzeniu warunków rozwoju konkretnego człowieka, w tym tworzeniu warunków do bycia sprawiedliwym. (shrink)

Descriptions of bodies within the literature of the enactive approach to cognitive science exhibit an interesting dialectical tension. On the one hand, a body is considered to be a unity which instantiates an identity, forming an intrinsic basis for value. On the other, a living body is in a reciprocally defining relationship with the environment, and is therefore immersed and entangled with, rather than distinct from, its environment. In this paper I examine this tension, and its implications for the enactive (...) approach, particularly the enactive conceptions of life and bodies. Following the lead of others, I argue that enactive cognitive science can benefit from a deeper reading and integration with extant work on the complexity and multiplicity of the living body within feminist philosophy and feminist science studies. (shrink)

This essay is an introduction to a lecture course "Elements of Descriptive Psychology" delivered by Anton Marty in around 1903/04. Marty offered courses on descriptive psychology at regular intervals in the course of his career at the University of Prague. The content of these courses follows closely the ideas of Marty’s teacher Franz Brentano, though with some interesting divergences and extrapolations. The present work is a historical and systematic introduction to an extract from notes taken of Marty’s lecture, with some (...) discussion of the work of Dilthey on similar topics, and of Marty’s influence on Franz Kafka and on the Gestalt psychologist Max Wertheimer. (shrink)

Práce se zaměřuje na metodologicko-historické aspekty vývoje neurologie. V roce 2001 přišel Marcus Raichle s překvapujícím objevem, který je nyní obecně známý jako teorie Default Mode Network. DMN s sebou kromě nových poznatků o mozkové aktivitě přináší i kompletní přehodnocení dosavadních přesvědčení o mozku. Vědecká komunita předpokládala, že mozek je „reflexivním" nástrojem k vnějšímu prostředí a od tohoto přesvědčení odvíjela neurologický výzkum. DMN však přichází s pojetím neurální aktivity, jež není závislá na aktivní stimulaci mozku, což je v přímém protikladu (...) s předchozí výzkumnou tradicí. Současné výzkumy DMN vedou ke zcela novým poznatkům, které nebyly dosažitelné v rámci předchozího paradigmatu. Radikální proměna pojetí aktivity mozku s sebou přináší i nutnost přehodnocení neurologického výzkumu z hlediska metodologie. Stať se zabývá otázkou, zda lze považovat DMN za vědeckou revoluci a nové paradigma neurovědy v kontextu analýzy historických událostí, jež formovaly předchozí a stávající neurovědecký výzkum. (shrink)

This paper concerns an important and exciting book by Marek Dobrzeniecki Ukrytość i Wcielenie. Teistyczna odpowiedź na argument Johna L. Schellenberga za nieistnieniem Boga [Hiddenness and the Incarnation: A Theistic Response to John L. Schellenberg’s Argument for Divine Nonexistence]. After a brief discussion of the content of the book’s chapters, critical remarks are presented. They concern the adopted method and approach to Schellenberg’s philosophy in general and the argument from hiddenness in particular. The conceptual framework serving as a typologization (...) of the propositional dimension of the phenomenon of theistic belief/faith is dubious and requires in-depth research. It is worth considering the possibility of asymmetry of the attitudes of belief/faith and unbelief, which requires consideration in the reasoning whose legitimacy would assume the transfer of features from one to the other and the negation functor. Regarding the voluntarism of belief in God, the paper suggests that extreme, purely intellectual, and purely volitional positions should be considered, as well as moderate and mixed ones. It is argued extensively that Dobrzeniecki’s criticism against the arguments of Rea and Mourad is not conclusive. Just the possibility of voluntariness of disbelief undermines the validity of Schellenberg’s argument and should therefore be ruled out as much as possible. The paper suggests supplementing Dobrzeniecki’s approach with a ‘trans-paradigmatic’ approach consisting of external criticism, which, in the light of Schellenberg’s arguments being probably incompatible with the described phenomenon of religious belief in God, leads to a modification of the theoretical apparatus of Schellenberg’s paradigm. Such a modification deprives the latter’s argument of justification. --- Niniejszy artykuł dotyczy ważnej i interesującej książki Marka Dobrzenieckiego Ukrytość i Wcielenie. Teistyczna odpowiedź na argument Johna L. Schellenberga za nieistnieniem Boga. Po krótkim omówieniu zawartości poszczególnych rozdziałów książki prezentuję swoje uwagi krytyczne. Dotyczą one przyjętej metody i podejścia do filozofii Schellenberga w ogólności, a argumentu z ukrytości w szczególności. Wątpliwa i wymagająca pogłębionego badania jest siatka pojęciowa pełniąca funkcję typologizacji propozycjonalnego wymiaru fenomenu wiary teistycznej. Warta rozważania jest możliwość niesymetryczności postaw wiary i niewiary, co wymaga uwzględnienia w rozumowaniach, których zasadność zakładałaby przenoszenie cech z jednej na drugą oraz funktora negacji. W sprawie woluntaryzmu wiary w Boga sugeruję, że należy rozpatrywać nie tylko stanowiska skrajne, czysto intelektualistyczne i czysto wolicjonalne, ale także u miarkowane i mieszane. Argumentuję szeroko, że krytyka Dobrzenieckiego skierowana przeciwko argumentom Rea i Mourada nie jest konkluzywna. Argumentuję, że samo możliwość woluntarności niewiary podważa zasadność argumentu Schellenberga i dlatego powinna ona być wykluczona w sposób maksymalnie możliwie uzasadniony. Sugeruję uzupełnienie podejścia Dobrzenieckiego o podejście ‘transparadygmatyczne’ polegające na rodzaju krytyki zewnętrznej, która w świetle nieprzystawania argumentacji Schellenberga do opisywanego fenomenu prowadzi do modyfikacji aparatu teoretycznego paradygmatu Schellenberga. Taka modyfikacja odbiera argumentowi tego ostatniego moc uzasadniającą. (shrink)

Perceptual modalities have been traditionally considered the product of dedicated biological systems producing information for higher cognitive processing. Psychological and neuropsychological evidence is offered which undermines this point of view and an alternative account of modality from the enactive approach to understanding cognition is suggested. Under this view, a perceptual modality is a stable form of perception which is structured not just by the biological sensitivities of the agent, but by their goals and the set of skills or expertise which (...) they are deploying at a given time. Such a view suggests that there is no such thing as an experience that is purely visual, auditory, or otherwise modal and that our attempts to understand consciousness and the mind must be conducted within a framework that provides an account of embodied, goal-directed adaptive coping with the world. (shrink)

Problem of Axiological Legitimization of the Universal System of the Protection of Human Rights Summary In this paper it is argued that legitimization of the universal system (UN-system) of the protection of human rights depends primary not from the content of values recognised as fundamental but rather from metaaxiological solutions related to the way of existence and to the possibility of cognition of these values. Legitimisation is based on the recognition of an objective nature and of cognoscibility of basic values. (...) Realisation of the primary aim of this paper is linked to the problem of different meanings of the notion of universality, used in the context of the universal system of the protection of human rights. First, descriptive and normative (prescriptive) meanings have to be distinguished. In the case of normative sense, there are moral and legal meanings of “universality”. An axiological justification of the universality of human rights in the legal sense leads to the legitimisation of the universal system. It is shown that modifications of – broadly accepted in the Polish theory of law – definitions of an axiological justification of legal norms are needed. These definitions base such a justification on the valuations made by particular groups of subjects. It is argued that it is much more convenient to refer to valuations understood as meanings of sentences of certain kind. -/- Streszczenie W artykule zmierza się do uzasadnienia tezy, że legitymizacja uniwersalnego systemu ochrony praw człowieka jest oparta nie tyle na treści wartości uznawanych w tym systemie, ale na uznanych w nich rozstrzygnięciach metaaksjologicznych, dotyczących tego, jak istnieją wartości podstawowe dla tego systemu i czy są one poznawalne. Walor legitymizacyjny posiada przede wszystkim uznanie obiektywnego charakteru tych wartości i ich poznawalności (uznanie kognitywizmu aksjologicznego). Realizacja zasadniczego celu zakłada uporządkowanie podstawowych pojęć dotyczących problematyki powszechności praw człowieka – termin „powszechność” stosowany w odniesieniu do praw człowieka w kontekście uniwersalnego systemu ochrony ma wiele znaczeń. Przede wszystkim odróżnić trzeba powszechność w aspekcie opisowym i w aspekcie normatywnym. W przypadku powszechności w aspekcie normatywnym w grę może wchodzić powszechność w sensie ideowym (moralnym) i powszechność w sensie pozytywnoprawnym. Uzasadnienie tej ostatniej jest też uzasadnieniem poszukiwanej tu legitymizacji uniwersalnego systemu ochrony praw człowieka. Prowadzone analizy prowadza także do sformułowania postulatów dotyczących sposobu definiowania uzasadnienia aksjologicznego norm prawnych. Modyfikacji wymagają powszechnie przyjmowane w polskiej teorii prawa definicje relatywizujące takie uzasadnienie do ocen przyjmowanych przez konkretne podmioty oceniające lub ich grupy. (shrink)

Wersja przedostatnia, z 2010 roku. Proszę cytować wersję opublikowaną. Pre-final version, from 2010. Please, quote the published version.

According to The Consensus Gentium Argument from the premise: “Everyone believes that God exists” one can conclude that God does exist. In my paper I analyze two ways of defending the claim that somebody’s belief in God is a prima facie reason to believe. Kelly takes the fact of the commonness of the belief in God as a datum to explain and argues that the best explanation has to indicate the truthfulness of the theistic belief. Trinkaus Zagzebski grounds her defence (...) on rationality of epistemic trust in others. In the paper I argue that the second line of reasoning is more promising and I propose its improved version. (shrink)

The paper links higher education reforms and welfare states reforms in postcommunist Central European countries. It links current higher education debates (and reform pressures) and public sector debates (and reform pressures), stressing the importance of communist-era legacies in both areas. It refers to existing typologies of both higher education governance and welfare state regimes and concludes that the lack of the inclusion of Central Europe in any of them is a serious theoretical drawback in comparative social research. The region should (...) still, after more than two decades of transition and heavy international policy advising, be viewed as a “laboratory of social experimentation”. It is still too risky to suggest generalizations about how Central European higher education and welfare systems fit existing typologies. Consequently, the “transition” period is by no means over: it is over in terms of politics and economics but not in terms of social arrangements. Both higher education and welfare states should be viewed as “work in progress”: permanently under reform pressures, and with unclear future. (shrink)

Philosophizing and the True Knowledge of Human Being -/- The article presents the principles and method of classical philosophy. This kind of philosophy, developed mainly in ancient and medieval times, is still viable and interesting today. What is more important, it can be used as grounds for academic philosophy. Doing so provides a philosopher with resources for autonomy in her philosophical inquiry as well as the usefulness and application of its results for various cultural, social, and political tasks. The last (...) part of the article explains the manner in which the principles of philosophy may be connected with different ways of classical philosopher’s concern the with knowledge of the human being understood as a special, unique being, with her transcendence behind her biological nature and human society. In the conclusion, several tasks for philosophical reflection are given. In all its parts, the article emphasizes the importance of the concept of philosophizing person for the understanding of philosophy. (shrink)

In philosophical literature terms: „natural theology” (or „rational theology”) and „philosophical theology” are used as exchangeable. The author argues that natural and philosophical theology are different philosophical disciplines. It is possible to point out a philosophic theology, different from natural theology, the former aims are not only supposed to show that God exists but to unifícate, interpret and explain (understand) religious faith and her tasks are not primary apologetic. The author considers that the aims of the latter discipline are bound (...) with the preference of cognitive values such as certainty, rationality and being able to use one ’s rationality to convince your opponent. In the end of this article author introduces a sketch of method of philosophical theology as different form natural theology, which could overcome one-sided views about role of philosophical argument in study of religious belief and faith and their propositional content and lead not only to a more adequate analysis of the researched reality but also to the development of other disciplines. (shrink)

PHILOSOPHY OF HUMAN RIGHTS: HUMAN RIGHTS IN LIGHT OF THEIR INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION Summary The book consists of two main parts: in the first, on the basis of an analysis of international law, elements of the contemporary conception of human rights and its positive legal protection are identified; in the second - in light of the first part -a philosophical theory of law based on the tradition leading from Plato, Aristotle, and St. Thomas Aquinas is constructed. The conclusion contains an application (...) of the results of the analysis conducted in the second part. The first part comprises four chapters. The first aims at revealing characteristics of human rights on the basis of an analysis of historical conditioning of the inter-national law of human rights and its development. The historical context displays the practical, vindicative, and critical character of the positive legal protection of human rights. Moreover, the process of change of positive human rights law is distinguished from the process of change of human rights as such. In the second chapter the content of human rights - a topic which is only auxiliary to the conducted analysis - is discussed. Basic typology and catalogues of rights proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and protected in the International Covenants of Human Rights are presented. The review of the content of rights aims at a more precise limitation of the field of research. The examination shows a diversity of rights which poses a serious challenge to the coherence of every philosophical theory of human rights. In the third chapter, central in the first part, international law is analyzed with regard to the characteristics of rights and the foundations of them. The analysis of documents shows a number of solutions referring to the anthropological foundations of rights. The inherent dignity of the human person is the source of all human rights. Each human being is recognized as free, and endowed with both reason and conscience. In the propounded conception of man individuals are not rivals but create a community which is a condition for their development. International law characterizes the rights as universal, inherent, inalienable and inviolable. The reconstructed conception also comprises the following basic elements: on the level of the structure of rights, a recognition of their equality, interdependence, and comprehensiveness; in the grounding of these rights, a recognition of the anthropological foundations of law; in the conception of positive law, a recognition of the secondariness of the positive law of human rights to human rights themselves, and a recognition of human rights and justice as the basis for legal order; in the conception of state, a recognition of the well-being of the individual as the fundamental aim of actions undertaken by political institutions, and recogni¬tion of rights which form an impassable boundary to the power of the state, includ¬ing its legislative actions. The characterization of the international legal paradigm serving for the under¬standing of human rights is supplemented by analyses of the structure of their posi¬tive legal protection. Various meanings of the terms "right" and "freedom" are distinguished. Subjective right, as basic structure of the positive legal protection of human rights, is understood as a complex relation formed by various legal situations of the subject of a right which create a functional whole in respect of the subordi-nation of human person to its good. Subordinating person to a good proper for it, expressed usually in a proclamatory norm, is the central element of particular rights around which further elements aiming at the realization of this good are built. In the second part of the book a philosophical theory is developed which allows for the location of a coherent foundation for the presented characterization of human rights and their positive legal protection. This part consists of two chapters. The first includes a review of some - not entirely satisfactory - means of founding of human rights; the second presents philosophical conceptions of law and man which may form a basis for the constructed theory. The review of arguments contained in the first chapter does not aim at a detailed analysis of various specific ways of argumentation encountered in works on this subject but rather at a concise presentation of the main possible lines of argumentation. These analyses also serve to emphasize the positive solutions which are pro¬posed later and to underscore the explanatory power of the elaborated theory. This theory, retaining accurate intuitions contained in the presented types of argumenta¬tion, helps in avoiding their consequences which are difficult to reconcile with the reconstructed paradigm of human rights. Efforts to base human rights on the norms of international law rightly take into account the necessity of determining the content of the rights and their positive legal protection as a means for the realization of man's good. These attempts, how¬ever, do not properly take into account the inherent character of human rights, which are independent of positive law and provide grounds for applying specific legislative measures and not others. Founding human rights on freedom accurately points at the freedom of an indi¬vidual as a constitutive element of some rights; however, absolutization of freedom leads, to a loss of an important element of the contemporary paradigm of under¬standing human rights. This foundation undermines recognition of the fact that human rights may set limits to both the freedom of others and the freedom of the subject of rights itself. Additionally, attempts at the so-called axiological justification of human rights are discussed. This type of justification has a few variants depending on the as¬sumed conception of value. Subjectivistic conceptions have similar advantages and disadvantages to the conceptions basing human rights on freedom; objectivistic conceptions while providing for the universality of human rights place, the fundamental aim of human rights protection beyond the individual human being - in the idealistically existing world of values; finally, conceptions rooting values and human rights in culture, while accurately noting that human rights are learned through the medium of culture, place the source of human rights beyond a concrete individual - in culture and processes which take place in it - which leads to difficulties in finding a basis for the universality of rights. Furthermore, attempts to ground human rights in specific characteristics of the human being are presented. This type of approach points to an important problem of dependence of the content of rights on what man is. However, recognition of specific characteristics of a human being as an ontic foundation of the existence of rights poses a danger to their universality since one has to accept that it is not enough to be a man to be a subject of rights, but a man possessing specific charac¬teristics. The second chapter aims at outlining solutions worked out by Saint Thomas Aquinas. For a fuller understanding of his propositions selected elements of Plato's and Aristotle's philosophy are presented. It was them who formulated the founda¬tions for reflection on law and justice in the ontological context. A qualification is made that Stoicism is not be analysed in depth. Although Thomas' concept of law was undoubtedly developed under the influence of the Stoic doctrine as well, it is not in this that one should look for the tools to understand the ontic foundations of human rights and law in general since the Stoic moral philosophy and philosophy of law were developed in the context of a theory of being which assumed monistic and pantheistic premises as foundations, leading to the recognition of a total subor¬dination of the human individual to a larger unity of which man is only a part. The analysis of Plato's and Aristotle's texts concentrates on problems of justice. Plato seems to be the first philosopher who reflected on the formula basic in the history of European thought: to render to each his due. It appears that justice as both a characteristic of man and his acts is understood in the perspective of that which is just, that which is a good for another man - the recipient of the act. The basis for determining what is just is the relation of correspondence between some¬one and something. While in the case of Plato this relation is based on something beyond its terms, namely on ideas, in the case of Aristotle the relation occurs on account of the elements of the relation itself. Something is just when it contributes to the develop¬ment of the recipient of an act realizing that which is just. At the same time, the realization of that which is just is a good for the agent. In the analysis of the just two types of relation are revealed: the relation of due-to-recipient occurring on account of the compatibility of that which is due, with the recipient of the act; and - a "superstructure" - a relation of obligation-of-subject occurring on account of the compatibility of the acting subject with the thing which should be done. The basis for being that which is due is formed by various potentialities of development of man - the recipient of agency; the basis of being that which is an obligation is the possibility of development of the subject of action. Aristotle distinguishes various types of freedom and points to the necessity of taking them into account in the discussion of justice. Among other things, as the core of man's freedom, he considers life for its own sake, which can be seen as his expression of the basic indices of the autotelic character of man - which is funda¬mental for later conceptions of dignity. The freedom which is described by him is not, however, inherent and inalienable; being free is conditioned by a factual possi¬bility of undertaking actions, which are not solely means to the realization of aims set by others. Thomas Aquinas takes over the Aristotelian research perspective both in his conception of man and of law. At the same time, however, he significantly enriches it. In anthropology he develops a conception of personal being. Drawing upon his distinction between existence ("that something is") and essence ("what something is"), he sees the basis for being a person in the dignity of personal being which is a certain way of existence of a rational being more perfect than that of non-personal beings. The person is a being which, by virtue of its act of existence, is individual¬ized in a specific way. It is an aim in itself. Expressing it in a negative way, one may say that it does not exist as a means for the realization of the aims of others and, in this sense, that it is free. As distinct from Aristotelian conclusions, being a person is not conditioned by the specific actions of a being. Dignity is inherent, based on that which is the foundation of the factual existence of every rational being. Although freedom requires that a being is rational, dignity still encompasses all being, all its properties and potentialities. Thus an act conforming with dignity has to take into account a whole human being. Among different types of that which is just, ius, the first place, from the point of view of understanding law, falls to "the just thing itself ("ipsa res justa"), which is right in the full meaning of the word. On the one hand, it is that which is due; on the other hand, it determines the way of acting in the utmost degree, since the course of every act is determined in the fullest extent by its aim. The content of ius may be determined both by elements independent of free decisions - ius naturale - and by free decisions taking into account the state of things - ius positivum. Recognition of the objective structure of being as the basis of law does not entail that it is possible or desirable to determine unequivocally "the only right" patterns of conduct. This concept is very well justified within the system proposed by Saint Thomas. Individualization of being is a significant element of the develop¬ment of a person as a person. It is attained by the realization of individual aims which are not unequivocally determined by circumstances and the nature common to all people. By virtue of free choices made in the sphere of that which is not by its nature unjust, the object of action becomes ius. Since in the realization of the person the individualization of human being is central, Aquinas clearly sees the need for the protection of the sphere of "dominion of will". This sphere itself constitutes ius naturale, something which is due to man independently of the acts of will. Therefore "law should forbid nothing which is not unjust" ("nihil debet lege prohiberi quod licite fieri potest", In 3 Sent., dist. 40, q. I, a. 1, 3). Besides the relation of due-to-recipient, ius also includes the relation of obligation-of-subject which is superimposed on the relation of due-to-recipient. As far as the ontic foundations of obligation are concerned, in explaining why man is subordinated to realization of the good of others, Aquinas generally follows Aristotle in accepting that this basis is the subordination to moral good - to actions conforming with the learned truth about reality. Aquinas' systemic solutions allow, however, to reach deeper and understand why moral development is also a development of the whole human being. This was difficult within Aristotle's system, since he was reluc¬tant to decide whether precedence should be given to intellectual or moral develop¬ment. The inclination to realise good of another appears to be a transcendental characteristic of being, based on its very existence. Morality understood as rational and free subordination to realize the good of another is a specifically personal way of the realization of this inclination. Thus just actions contribute to the actualization of being in the aspect of its existence and therefore to the actualization of being as a whole. Thomas' conception of natural law (lex naturalis) as participation in eternal law (lex aeterna), offers possibilities for grasping that which is just as something which is basically accessible cognition, independently of Revelation and independently of faith in God, and at the same time as something based in eternal law, understood as a design of God's wisdom. Eternal law, embracing all particular actions, is not, from the human perspective, accessible cognition directly. It is enacted in the struc-ture of the created being and - in case of human beings - in free choices taking this structure into account. In the concluding remarks, the results obtained earlier are applied directly to the contemporary conception of human rights. Human rights are understood in the first place as "just things" - concrete goods of man; as that which is due because of subordination, based on dignity, to the personal development of man. That which is just is understood as a relational - actual or potential - state of things, which exists by virtue of existing relations. Evaluations referring to that which is right are true when respective relations of due-to-recipient take place; norms of conduct are true when respective relations of obligation-of-subject take place. Examples of the application of the sketched theory outside the field of human rights are also presented. Procedural consequences of the developed theory are shown, such as the discrimination of two types of legislative procedures which differ significantly in the structure of argumentation: the first aims at recognition of that which is just independently of the will of the legislator, and the second, at making individual or collective "projects" of development compatible. Finally the possibilities of applying the theory to the increasingly important problems of the protection of the environment and the "rights" of animals are mentioned. The central issue is a philosophical conception of man and his freedom and a conception of law. It is also indispensable to turn to a general theory of being. The search for a comprehensive theory of human rights requires attention to the Abso¬lute Being - God - as well. This is important for at least two reasons. First, a conception of the Absolute Being is integral to philosophy of the systemic type -of which the present book is a piece. A conception of the Absolute Being is signifi¬cant for understanding all being, including, first of all, man as a personal being. Second, every theory of human rights which does not comprise the problem of the Absolute may be questioned as to whether solutions adopted in it do not lead, in consequence, to eliminating God from the perspective of the understanding of law. It is desirable that a philosophical theory should deal with this problem directly. A theory which eliminates God from the perspective of the understanding of rights will be unacceptable for all those who, for philosophical reasons or relying on faith, consider God as the author of inherent rights. Nevertheless, a theoretical approach to rights from the perspective of the Absolute Being should only be a possible extension of a philosophical approach which bases rights on something which is cognizable independently of the acceptance of the existence of God so that the theory is also acceptable for those who reject the existence of God or suspend their judgment on this subject. The pursued theory should therefore contain, on the one hand, reference to natural, faith-independent foundations of human rights, but on the other hand, point to a possible extension accounting for the Absolute Being. The analyses contained in this chapter have undoubtedly some historical value since they are based on source texts. Nevertheless, the use of these texts and not critical works was dictated, first of all, by a conviction that analyses embrace a given theory in the aspect selected by the interests of the researcher. Therefore to find out what past thinkers say on the subject characterized in the first part it is simpler to reach to the sources than to adopt the existing critical works. The pre¬sented reconstruction of Aquinas' views on philosophy of law incorporates proposi¬tions of supplementing and developing some of the ideas undertaken by him. Obligation to act in this and not an other way arises because human actions are subordinated to the conformity, on the one hand, of aims realized by these actions and, on the one hand, the order of being determining that which is favourable to man or destroys him. The content of the order of being is, on the one hand, determined by the structure of being independent from man's will and, on the other, by free decisions of man. (shrink)

Studie se věnuje čtyřem astronomickým pomůckám, které vytvořil a užíval Gerbert z Aurillacu, remešský a ravennský arcibiskup, opat v Bobbiu a v letech 999–1003 papež. Gerbert vyučoval quadrivium především v Remeši a od jeho žáka Richera z Remeše a z Gerbertových dopisů víme o čtyřech jeho přístrojích, které poskytovaly srozumitelný a názorný úvod do geocentrického výkladu veškerenstva: 1. glóbus světové sféry s nastavitelným horizontem; 2. pozorovací hemisféra s pěti rovnoběžnými kruhy světové sféry ; 3. armilární sféra s vnitřním umístěním ekliptiky (...) a oběžných drah planet; 4. armilární sféra s vnějším umístěním hvězd a souhvězdí. (shrink)

Tato studie se věnuje komentářům a glosám k první kapitole druhé knihy Boethiova Úvodu do aritmetiky, jejímiž autory v poslední čtvrtině 10. století byli Gerbert z Aurillacu, Abbo z Fleury, Notker z Lutychu a anonymní autor textu De arithmetica Boetii. Studie sleduje dva hlavní cíle: nejprve upozorňuje na to, že Boethiův text o převodu číselných posloupností na stejnost lze interpretovat dvěma rozdílnými způsoby, následně se zaměřuje na využití této problematiky v dalších svobodných uměních a při hraní deskové hry rithmomachie.

STRESZCZENIE Opracowanie zmierza do udzielenia odpowiedzi na pytanie, czym – z punktu widzenia struktury procesu wykładni i struktury wchodzących w grę wartości konstytucyjnych – różni się ograniczanie wolności i praw w ramach stosowania „zwykłych środków konstytucyjnych”, od ograniczania wolności i praw dopuszczalnego w stanach nadzwyczajnych. Podjęta zostaje problematyka dotyczącą kwestii materialnych, a poza zakresem rozważanych zagadnień pozostają kwestie dotyczące formalnych warunków dopuszczalności ograniczeń, jak publiczne ogłoszenie zagrożenia czy możliwość wprowadzania ograniczeń w aktach podustawowych. Stawiane tezy są polemiczne wobec poglądów, że (...) zawieszenie wolności lub praw jest skrajnym typem ograniczania i następuje wtedy, gdy wolności czy prawa „już nie ma”, lub że zawieszenie zakłada ograniczenie istoty wolności lub prawa. Okazuje się, że można sensownie mówić o zawieszaniu wolności lub praw także wówczas, gdy są one ograniczane w niewielkim tylko stopniu. Ponadto, możliwe jest zawieszanie, które nie prowadzi do ograniczenia istoty wolności lub prawa. Argumentuje się, że istotą zawieszania wolności lub praw w stanach nadzwyczajnych jest zakwestionowanie podstawowego ich przymiotu, jakim jest – uznawana w prawie międzynarodowym – nienaruszalność „całych” poszczególnych praw człowieka, która jest czymś innym od nienaruszalności ich istoty. Przy okazji prowadzona jest refleksja teoretycznoprawna nad zagadnieniem zawieszania wolności lub praw. Zawieszenie okazuje się czymś istotnie różnym od czasowej utraty mocy obowiązującej przepisów dotyczących wolności czy praw. Ich ciągłe obowiązywanie znajduje wyraz, na przykład, w zasadzie proporcjonalności mającej zastosowanie do zawieszanych wolności lub praw. -/- Extraordinary Measures and Restrictions of Constitutional Freedoms and Rights ABSTRACT The study aims to answer the question on the difference between limitation of freedoms and rights in ordinary situations and their suspension (derogation) when extraordinary measures are introduced. This question is considered from the point of view of the structure of the interpretation process and the structure of the constitutional values. Consideration is given to issues relating to material aspects. However, issues relating to formal conditions for the admissibility of restrictions, such as public announcement of a threat or the possibility of introducing restrictions in sub-statutory acts, are not examined. The theses put forward are critical of the view that suspension of freedoms or rights is an extreme type of limitation and a freedom or a right "is no longer there", and of the view that suspension presupposes violation of the essence of freedom or right. It can be argued that it makes sense to talk about the suspension of freedoms or rights also when they are only slightly restricted. Moreover, it is possible to suspend a freedom or a right without violating their essence. It is argued that suspension of freedoms or rights leads to questioning of their basic characteristic that is their inviolability as recognized in international law. However, this inviolability of freedoms or rights is something different from the inviolability of their essence. In terms of the theory of law, the suspension of freedoms or rights turns out to be something significantly different from the temporary loss of the binding force of the respective provisions. Their continued validity is reflected, for example, in the application of the principle of proportionality to the suspended freedoms or rights. (shrink)

The article aims to determine whether it is possible to build the reliably practiced classical philosophy, understood as a metaphysical research, directed towards the nature of objective reality. The purpose of this kind of philosophizing is knowledge and truth. Moreover, the practice of such philosophizing and its results should meet some of the characteristics of science. The paper establishes a set of conditions that have been imposed on the science of metaphysics by Kazimierz Twardowski. Among the conditions of such philosophizing (...) are anti-dogmatism, criticism, inter-subjectivity of philosophizing and its results, proper epistemic justification of philosophical beliefs, application of the analysis method, rigorous language and reasoning, the use of experience and scientific knowledge. The paper considers these conditions to be correct in most cases and argues that metaphysics can meet them. The existing cases of analytical metaphysics show that metaphysics is possible as a science. Next, the article argues that the late Twardowski failed to substantiate his claim that metaphysical positions which he classified as a world-view philosophy could not be scientifically justified, which could have been possibly done with differentiating ways of understanding what such a scientific justification should be. The article argues that he did not take into account a reductive conception of the metaphysical philosophy, which even though it allows the plurality of metaphysical explanations and does not force anyone to accept one position as the only possible and correct explanation, would have an objective value, if such metaphysics were elaborated indeed. (shrink)

This chapter outlines an embodied conception of noise. From an enactive and ecological perspective noise is an inevitable complement to the richness of bodily sensitivities and complex actions. The world around us, the universe, is replete, full of inexhaustible texture available to be explored at every scale at which we are capable, or can become capable, of making distinctions. Drawing on work in ecological psychology I suggest that noise is our experience of that encompassing fullness, and can be encountered in (...) a number of different ways depending on the organisation of our bodies and activities at different scales across a given period. While that fullness can be overwhelming, and create challenges for us to distinguish and coordinate effectively with the particular aspects of the world most relevant to our present concerns - noise can be intrusive and disruptive - I argue that there are significant positive aspects to the phenomenon. Noise is an inherent part of the rich messiness of the world as discussed in recent enactive work, which provides both robustness to developmental processes as well as opportunities for action that support adaptive agency. In a noisy, messy world there are always more options available to explore. (shrink)

Tato studie se snaží o filosofickou analýzu problematických aspektů neurogeneze. V první řadě se zaměřuje na moderní historii neurogeneze, která je obecně považována za historii dogmatického přesvědčení, které předpokládalo, že v mozku dospělého savce nemohou vzniknout nové neurony. Tato konvence přežívala v neurovědě po několik desítek let a její kořeny sahají až do dob Ramóna y Cajala. Důležitá část této filosofické analýzy se zaměřuje na aspekt tzv. zaštiťování dogmatu pomocí ad hoc hypotéz. Analýza se dále věnuje implicitním definicím, které hrají (...) roli axiomů neurovědy, a problematice falsifikace potenciálních falsifikátorů. Na konci této filosofické analýzy jsou prezentovány argumenty, které dospívají k tomu, že historie neurogeneze není historií dogmatického uvažování, jak většina autorů předpokládá, ale že jde o historii vědeckého pragmatismu. (shrink)

En la Constitución de la República de Polonia del 2 de abril de 19971 se reconocía el carácter objetivo de ciertos valores y un cognoscitivismo axiológico. Si tomamos las disposiciones constitucionales en serio tenemos que aceptar que algunas valoraciones morales o que algunas proferencias [utterances] valorativas pueden ser verdaderas o falsas y que nos informan acerca de una realidad objetiva. Por otro lado, en la teoría del derecho polaca y en los cursos universitarios de lógica para abogados se encuentran definiciones (...) de la justificación axiológica de las normas y de normas axiológicas (normas que poseen una justificación axiológica) que presuponen que ningún valor es objetivo y que no pueden ser conocidos — se presupone un no-cognoscitivismo axiológico. De acuerdo con el no-cognoscitivismo, ninguna valoración y ninguna proferencia valorativa puede ser verdadera o falsa, ni puede informar acerca de la realidad. En este trabajo se analiza la concepción no-cognoscitivista de Zygmunt Ziembiński tal y como ha sido formulada en su libro de texto lógica práctica [Logika praktyczna] — el cual ha formado intelecTraduddo del inglés por Jorge Cerdio; título original: «True Norms in the Light of Axiological Justification of Norms». Relectura: Germán Sucar. La Constitución de la República de Polonia [Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej] del 2 de abril de 1997, Dziennik Ustaw, 1997. No. 78, item 483. Versión en inglés en Gierach, 2009: 21. 6S6 Mark Piechowiak tualmente a dos generaciones de abogados polacos y ha establecido el estándar bajo el que se entienden las justificaciones axiológicas y las normas axiológicas2. Su definición de valoración y de normas excluyen la posibilidad misma de un discurso significativo acerca de las valoraciones o acerca de las normas en términos de verdad o falsedad. (shrink)

The paper refers to the argument from hiddenness as presented in John Schellenberg’s book The Hiddenness Argument and the philosophical views expressed there, making this argument understandable. It is argued that conditionals (1) and (2) are not adequately grounded. Schellenberg has not shown that we have the knowledge necessary to accept the premises as true. His justifications referring to relations between people raise doubts. The paper includes an argument that Schellenberg should substantiate its key claim that God has the resources (...) to accommodate the possible consequences of openness to a relationship with finite persons, making them compatible with the flourishing of all concerned and of any relationship that may come to exist between them. At the end of the text, I propose to treat the argument as a rejection of an anthropomorphic God. (shrink)

"Philosophical Foundations of Understanding of the Common Good". The central question is whether recognizing the common good as the central value in the new Polish Constitution of 1997, means accepting the primacy of the state over an individual. The answer is negative. The preparatory work to the constitution is analyzed and the philosophical perspective is outlined which corresponds to the intentions of the authors of the constitution. The analyses concentrate on the philosophical tradition reaching from Plato to Aristotle and Thomas (...) Aquinas. /////////////////// W nowej Konstytucji Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej przyjętej w 1997 roku, dobro wspólne jest jedną z fundamentalnych wartości. Centralne pytanie brzmi, czy uznanie dobra wspólnego za wartość fundamentalną, nie jest uznaniem prymatu państwa wobec jednostki, czy nie wprowadza do porządku konstytucyjnego idei totalitarystycznych. Odpowiedź na to pytanie jest negatywna. Argumentując, autor dokonuje analizy prac przygotowawczych do Konstytucji, oraz zmierza do zarysowania filozoficznej perspektywy rozumienia dobra wspólnego, perspektywy odpowiadającej intencjom twórców Konstytucji. W analizach położony jest akcent na filozoficzną tradycję refleksji nad dobrem wspólnym sięgającą od Platona poprzez Arystotelesa do Tomasza z Akwinu. -/- . (shrink)

The aim of this article is to introduce the work of Leopold Blaustein — philosopher and psychologist, who studied under Kazimierz Twardowski in Lvov and under Husserl in Freiburg im Breisgau. In his short academic career Blaustein developed an original philosophy that drew upon both phenomenology and Twardowski’s analytical approach. One of his main publications concerns Husserl’s early theory of intentional act and object, introduced in Logische Untersuchungen. In the first part of the article I briefly present Blaustein’s biography and (...) some general features of his philosophy. The second part provides an overview of Blaustein’s dissertation concerning Husserl’s early phenomenology. In the third and final part I summarize Blaustein’s research, including the critical remarks of Roman Ingarden. (shrink)

The author examines the arguments for applicability of the limitation clause which specifies the requirements for limitation of constitutional freedoms and rights (Article 31 para. 3 of the Constitution) to the right to protection of life (Article 38). Even if there is almost a general acceptance of such applicability, this approach does not hold up to criticism based on the rule existing in the Polish legal order that treaty commitments concerning human rights have supremacy over national statutory regulations. Due to (...) an international pattern which does not provide application of the limitation clause to the right to life protection, despite the recognition — at the level of a constitutional standard — of applicability of the clause of Article 31 para. 3 to Article 38, and to protection of life in general, this will be made impossible at any attempt to formulate a statutory standard. He also points out the defectiveness of the reasoning leading to acceptance of certain limitations of a particular value (e.g. life) on the basis of the ex definitione exemptions existing in the international standard to the assumption of applicability of the limitation clause when shaping statutory standards in the Polish legal system. The discussed issues are related to the question of interpretation of the inviolability of human rights. This term takes different meaning in the context of: 1) inviolability of all human rights understood in abstracto as normative structures of a general and abstract nature; 2) right protecting certain values with no exception; 3) rights to which an application of the limitation clause is forbidden; 4) rights not subject to derogation; 5) inviolability of understood in concreto, as that is (here and now) due to the subject of dignity; 6) inviolable essence of freedoms and rights. One should also clearly distinguish between (7) the descriptive and (8) the normative meaning of inviolability. -/- Punktem wyjścia jest analiza argumentacji na rzecz tezy o stosowalności do prawa do ochrony życia (art. 38 Konstytucji RP), klauzuli limitacyjnej określającej warunki ograniczania konstytucyjnych wolności i praw (art. 31 ust. 3). Mimo niemal powszechnej akceptacji tej tezy, nie wytrzymuje ona krytyki opartej na pierwszeństwie, które w polskim porządku prawnym mają zobowiązania traktowe dotyczące praw człowieka, wobec regulacji ustawowych. Ze względu na wzorzec międzynarodowy, który nie przewiduje stosowania klasycznej klauzuli limitacyjnej do prawa do życia, mimo uznania - na poziomie standardu konstytucyjnego - stosowalności klauzuli z art. 31 ust. 3 do art. 38 i ochrony życia w ogóle, stosowalność tej klauzuli będzie uniemożliwiona przy każdej próbie formułowania standardu ustawowego. Autor zwraca uwagę na wadliwość wnioskowania prowadzącego od uznania dopuszczalności pewnych ograniczeń ochrony jakiejś wartości (np. życia) na podstawie wyjątków ex definitione obecnych w standardzie międzynarodowym, do tezy o stosowalności klauzuli limitacyjnej przy kształtowaniu standardu ustawowego w polskim systemie prawnym. (shrink)

The study aims at making explicit the three spheres or planes, essential from the point of view of semiotics, on which the discourse regarding dignity takes place, and at clarifying the relations between these planes. The analysis uses the conception of Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz. There are three principal areas in which the discourse on dignity is conducted – the plane of linguistic expressions on which the name “dignity” is used; the plane of meanings on which the notion of dignity is placed; (...) and the plane of objects on which there is dignity itself. There is a relationship of meaning between the different concepts of dignity and the expression “dignity”, a relationship of signification between expression “dignity” and dignity as its referent, and a relationship of apprehension between the concepts of dignity and their referents. (shrink)

The fact of religious diversity is vital for the philosopher of religion but also, to some extent, for the believer of a given faith. It takes place in such a dimension in which the views of a given believer or the meaning of the practice of a given religion presupposes the truthfulness of specific claims concerning a given religion or the beliefs included in it. If now on the part of the philosopher of religion or the followers of another religion, (...) there is a direct or indirect challenge to such a key proposition, religious disagreement with epistemic dimension is involved. At the same time, it is not the case that any religious diversity is a case of epistemically significant religious dissent. The paper, by distinguishing different aspects of religions and functions performed by religion, tries to show in which situations religious diversification leads to religious disagreement. Both the follower of religion and the philosopher of religion can and should seek the truth in matters of crucial importance to religion. The difference is that the follower of a given religion is more interested in the salvific and practical functions of religion, along with the associated sense of value and meaningfulness of life and, to a lesser degree, the theoretical certainty that her religion is correct at crucial points. On the other hand, the achievement of ‘the soteriological’ purpose of religion based on false belief is impossible, just as the meaningfulness of life 'based on the sand and not on the rock’. It is because the false foundation is devoid of higher value. That is why there is a community of a philosopher of religion and a follower of a given religion to search for the truth of it. (shrink)

Zasadniczym przedmiotem analiz tego opracowania jest pojęcie godności w Karcie praw podstawowych Unii Europejskiej z 7 grudnia 2000 r. Interpretacja Karty prowadzona jest z uwzględnieniem postanowień Traktatu z Lizbony z 13 grudnia 2007 r., który podniósł Kartę do rangi prawa traktatowego. Uwyraźnienie treści pojęcia godności w Karcie dokonywane jest przez pryzmat paradygmatu rozumienia godności utrwalonego już w prawie międzynarodowym praw człowieka na poziomie uniwersalnym, czyli prawa kształtowanego i funkcjonującego w ramach Organizacji Narodów Zjednoczonych. Paradygmat uniwersalny, w którego centrum znajduje się (...) uznanie godności za przyrodzoną (inherent – „nieoddzielalną), powszechną, równą i za źródło wszystkich praw człowieka, był dotąd w systemach prawnych powszechnie akceptowany. Obejmował on elementy prawnonaturalne, które po doświadczeniach z dwudziestowiecznymi systemami totalitarnymi i systemami – mówiąc słowami Gustawa Radbrucha – „ustawowego bezprawia”, uważane były za pożądane, nie tylko w prawie międzynarodowym. Przy bliższym przyjrzeniu się najważniejszym postanowieniom prawa europejskiego dotyczącym godności i podstaw praw człowieka okazuje się, że paradygmat uniwersalny został radykalnie zakwestionowany – w miejsce ugruntowania praw człowieka w czymś obiektywnym, przyjęto ich ugruntowanie w kulturze. (shrink)

Pierwszorzędnym przedmiotem badań są przyjęte w Karcie, wprost lub domyślnie, rozstrzygnięcia typu aksjologicznego. Przez „aksjologiczne podstawy” rozumiane są rozstrzygnięcia dotyczące uznania takich, a nie innych, wartości czy dóbr za przedmiot ochrony; a ponieważ chodzi o „podstawy”, przedmiotem zainteresowania są rozstrzygnięcia fundamentalne w takim sensie, że stanowią one uzasadnienie dla bardziej szczegółowych rozstrzygnięć aksjologicznych i normatywnych. Pozwala to m.in. na formułowanie wniosków co do spójności rozstrzygnięć szczegółowych. Zagadnienie aksjologicznych podstaw obejmuje także problematykę relacji między wartościami a prawami podstawowymi oraz zagadnienie ontologicznego (...) statusu wartości i chronionych praw. Artykuł zawiera także wyniki badań nad wprowadzeniem do preambuły Karty w wersji niemieckojęzycznej zapisu o religijnym dziedzictwie, odbiegającego od brzmienia w innych językach mówiącego o dziedzictwie duchowym. (shrink)

Dawkins’ Ballet In the Garden of Theology. A Critical Assessment of Richard Dawkins’ Epistemological Theses On Theistic Beliefs From The God Delusion. Part I My paper presents a detailed analysis and assessment of Richard Dawkins’ epistemological theses from The God Delusion concerning the nature of religious belief, the existence of God and treating belief in God as a scientific hypothesis. In the first part of the article, I am interpreting Dawkins’ statement that atheism deserves respect as an epistemic achievement. I (...) suggest that rationality of that assessment depends on Dawkins’ success in arguing that science shows that God does not exist. My second aim is to show that the real object of Dawkins’ attack is not some abstract theistic hypothesis, as he suggests, but the Western ethical monotheism, mainly the Christian faith in God. If I am right, then his rejection of thus interpreted theism is not enough to justify his more general thesis that God hypothesis is false or improbable. The first part of the paper prepares the ground for the second, with criticism of Dawkins’ reasoning to the conclusion that almost certainly there is no God. (shrink)

Today, dignity recognized as a fundamental value across legal systems is equal, inherent and inalienable, inviolable, is the source of human rights and is essential for its subject to be recognized as an autotelic entity (an end in itself) that cannot be treated as an object. The analysis of the extract from Plato’s Demiurge’s speech in Timaeus reveals that Plato developed a reflection on something that determines the qualitative difference between certain beings and the world of things, and that forms (...) the basis for the special treatment of these beings, which the modern language can reasonably describe as dignity. The attributes of that dignity seem to overlap with the nature of dignity as we know today. What is more, Plato proposes a response to the question of what dignity is like but also to the question of what dignity is. It is the existential perfection, established in a perfect way of existence based on a specific internal unity of being. As the existential perfection, it covers the entire being along with all its features; it is inseparable from being (inherent and inalienable) – without it, it cannot exist. It is primordial to the particular features and independent of their acquisition or loss. Plato’s approach allows, based on the approach to dignity, the formulation of proposals aligned with today’s personalistic standards prescribing that persons be treated as ends in themselves and prohibiting the treatment of persons like objects. (shrink)

Eric Olson and David Shoemaker argue that our numerical identity over time is irrelevant to such practical issues as moral responsibility or self-concern. Being the same individual at different moments in time may, in our case, can be seen as the preservation of the relevant biological processes (e.g., according to Olson), while psychological continuity, independent of these processes, may be crucial for such issues. I will defend the view that, contrary to the above authors, any conception of our diachronic identity (...) has ethical implications, at least with regard to the aforementioned issues. My argument has two basic assumptions. (1) The dispute over identity of persons is a dispute over the conditions of our persistence in time as the same individuals, whether we consider being a person as our essential property or not (e.g., Olson maintains the latter). The question is under what conditions I am the same as a particular earlier or later individual. (2) The pronoun “I,” on the other hand, is an essential component of practical reasoning, so also of ethical one. Thus, the debate on the persistence of persons concerns the identity conditions of the individuals to whom/which we refer when planning our future actions, formulating our intentions. My rational self-concern or my moral responsibility for past actions regards the individual to whom the pronoun refers. An additional result of my argument is to undermine the influential strategy of defending positions on our diachronic identity against the charge of controversial ethical implications. It cannot be argued in the case of every such controversy that a given ethical issue only apparently involves our identity, while in fact what is relevant to it is a different relation binding persons at different moments in time. (shrink)

Artykuł przedstawia polskie regulacje prawne z lat 1998-2007 będące podstawą lustracji. Analizuje szereg aktów prawnych prezentując zakładane cele lustracji, jej zakres, procedury i przewidywane sankcje karne. Celem autora jest identyfikacja aksjologicznych podstaw regulacji prawnych dotyczących lustracji. W trakcie analiz wskazuje on m. in. na brak proporcji między sankcjami karnymi a winą jednostek, zwłaszcza w niektórych przypadkach penalizacji oświadczeń lustracyjnych niezgodnych z prawdą lub penalizacji niezłożenia oświadczeń. Autor argumentuje także, że analizowane rozwiązania zakładały – wbrew deklarowanym celom – przeniesienie odpowiedzialności za (...) zło systemu politycznego z jego aktywnych twórców na jednostki wbrew woli poddane działaniu tego systemu. Ponadto argumentuje, że lustracja oparta na przeprowadzanym przez państwo „teście moralności” radykalnie ingeruje w wewnętrzną sferę moralności jednostki i stąd zakłada elementy typowe dla aksjologii systemów totalitarnych; państwo nakazuje dokonać działania, które bezpośrednio i wprost zmierza do realizacji ściśle wewnętrznej wartości moralnej opartej na zgodności oświadczenia z przekonaniami, i jednocześnie państwo ustanawia siebie nie tylko obserwatorem i sędzią realizacji tej wartości, ale także autorem wzorca przekonań, z którymi oświadczenie ma być zgodne. (shrink)

This article presents Alvin Plantinga’s views on epistemic justification. The first part situates Plantinga’s epistemological views in the context of his epistemology of religion and debates of general epistemology. The second part discusses Plantinga’s argument that the internalism of 20th century epistemology stems from deontologism and that the views on the epistemic justification of analytic philosophers reflect the relationship between classical deontologism and classical internalism. The last part points to the objections with which the Plantinga’s conception met and tries to (...) balance the depth and weakness of its position. (shrink)