Luke Elson defends carbon offsetting on the basis that it is not morally objectionable to shift harms or risks around. As long as emitting and offsetting does not increase the overall harms or risks—and merely shifts them—compared to refraining from emitting, he suggests there is no injustice involved. I respond in several ways, suggesting that the time delay involved in offsetting can increase these risks but, regardless, there is a defensible default which could justify refraining from emitting, even when (...) planning to offset. [Open access]. (shrink)

Do carbon-offsetting schemes morally offset emissions? The moral equivalence thesis is the claim that the combination of emitting greenhouse gasses and offsetting those emissions is morally equivalent to not emitting at all. This thesis implies that in response to climate change, we need not make any lifestyle changes to reduce our emissions as long as we offset them. An influential argument in favor of this thesis is premised on two claims, one empirical and the other normative: (1) When you (...) emit + offset, the net result is the same as that of not emitting. (2) With emissions, the net result is what matters morally. I argue against both premises. The net result of emitting + offsetting is never equivalent to that of not emitting, and even if it were equivalent, the net result is not the only thing that matters morally. My conclusion is that although we should offset our emissions, avoiding emissions is morally preferable. This conclusion supports a stronger claim: that carbon offsets cannot relieve us of our duty to make significant lifestyle changes so as to reduce emissions and thus lesson our contribution to the harms of climate change. (shrink)

Carbon offsetting remains contentious within, at least, philosophy. By posing and then answering a general question about an aspect of the morality of carbon offsetting—Does carbon offsetting make luxury emissions morally permissible?—this essay helps to lessen some of the topic’s contentiousness. Its central question is answered by arguing and defending the view that carbon offsetting makes luxury emissions morally permissible by counteracting potential harm. This essay then shows how this argument links to and offers a common (...) starting point for further examination of offsetting across various disciplines and domains, such as policy and other branches of philosophy like the ethics of risk. (shrink)

A recent report revealed a staggering 61% drop in the market value of carbon offsets, attributed to adverse findings from both the scientific community and the media. These findings have raised concerns about the effectiveness of carbon credit projects, leading investors to reduce their involvement or withdraw completely, thereby substantially decreasing the market’s overall value [1,2]. This reluctance among buyers is fueled by escalating skepticism about the actual environmental impact of these projects and concerns over potential “greenwashing,” (...) where companies misleadingly present their environmental practices as more eco-friendly than they are. (shrink)

Many real-world agents recognise that they impose harms by choosing to emit carbon, e.g., by flying. Yet many do so anyway, and then attempt to make things right by offsetting those harms. Such offsetters typically believe that, by offsetting, they change the deontic status of their behaviour, making an otherwise impermissible action permissible. Do they succeed in practice? Some philosophers have argued that they do, since their offsets appear to reverse the adverse effects of their emissions. But we (...) show that they do not. In practice, standard carbon offsetting does not reverse the harms of the original action, nor does it even benefit the same group as was harmed. Standard moral theories hence deny that such offsetting succeeds. Indeed, we show that any moral theory that allows offsetting in this setting faces a dilemma between allowing any wrong to be offset, no matter how grievous, and recognising an implausibly sharp discontinuity between offsettable actions and non-offsettable actions. The most plausible response is to accept that carbon offsetting fails to right our climate wrongs. (shrink)

This paper reviews current initiatives to establish carbon offset forests in suburban and peri-urban environments. While moments of density occur within urban territories the general spatial condition is one of fragmented and patchy networks made up of a heterogeneous mix of residential enclaves, industrial parks, waste sites, infrastructure easements interspersed with forests, agriculture, leftover voids and overlooked open space. These overlooked open spaces have the potential to form a new green urban structure of carbon offset forests as cities (...) respond to the carbon economy. Furthermore such urban spaces are not likely to diminish over time as cities are not only growing larger but are becoming more dispersed according to recent World Bank reports. This strong trend is not limited to developed or developing cities but is a worldwide phenomenon. In the future, policy incentives for carbon sequestration will drive land use change in rural and urban areas alike. The paper documents projects in Blacktown City Council in Western Sydney. (shrink)

It is typically wrong to act in a way that foreseeably makes some impending harm worse. Sometimes it is permissible to do so, however, if one also offsets the harm increasing action by doing something that decreases the badness of the same harm by at least as much. This chapter argues that the standard deontological constraint against doing harm is not compatible with the permissibility of harm increases that have been offset. Offsetting neither prevents one's other actions from doing (...) harm nor ensures that the harm those actions do is made permissible by any of the constraint's familiar provisos. To make sense of offsetting, the old constraint against doing harm should be replaced with a new constraint against making unoffset harm increases. The chapter discusses how to formulate the new constraint so that it can handle both the offsetting cases that the old constraint gets wrong as as well as the non-offsetting cases that the old constraint gets right. Adopting this constraint against unoffset harm increases may have important implications both for theoretical questions about the sources of deontological constraints as well as for practical questions, such as whether buying carbon offsets can make emitting carbon dioxide permissible. (shrink)

This paper explores the idea of moral offsetting: the idea that good actions can offset bad actions in a way roughly analogous to carbon offsetting. For example, a meat eater might try to offset their consumption of meat by donating to an animal welfare charity. In this paper, I clarify the idea of moral offsetting, consider whether the leading moral theories and theories of moral worth are consistent with the possibility of moral offsetting, and consider potential benefits of moral (...) offsetting. I also compare moral offsetting to a related practice that I call ‘moral triaging’. (shrink)

Vietnam’s forests are at risk - carbon offset schemes could be the best chance of saving them, say Dr. Quan-Hoang Vuong and Minh-Hoang Nguyen. The value of forests is deeply ingrained in Vietnamese culture. Rừng vàng, biển bạc” [“forests of gold and seas of silver”] is both a metaphor for Vietnam, and a description of its natural wealth. The phrase is everywhere, from political speeches to daily conversation, as is Nhất phá sơn lâm, nhì đâm hà bá [“the worst (...) crime is to destroy the mountains and forests, the second worst is to kill the river”]. Deforestation is a Vietnamese taboo. (shrink)

ABSTRACT We have previously argued that there are forms of greenhouse gas offsetting for which, when one emits and offsets, one imposes no risk. Orri Stefansson objects that our argument fails to distinguish properly between the people who stand to be harmed by one’s emissions and the people who stand to be benefited by one’s offsetting. We reply by emphasizing the difference between acting with a probability of making a difference to the distribution of harm and acting in a (...) way that worsen’s someone’s prospect. (shrink)

In this article I maintain that a progressive and leftist carbon tax should be revenue-neutral through a dual policy package: first, it should use some revenues to offset price increases for the poor and middle classes; second, it should use the remaining part of revenues to lower taxes on labour income (both employed and self-employed income) for those below a middle-income threshold. I will briefly examine three reasons why such a revenue-neutral and dual-package carbon tax (RN-DP-CT) could (and (...) should) become central in the political agenda of the European Left – even though much of what I will suggest can reasonably hold also with respect to other countries. First, the tax wage on labour in the euro area is one of the highest in the world. Second, the revenue-neutral and dual policy package carbon tax will tax more capital that yields income without a proportional increase in labour demand, rather than capital that creates new job opportunities. Third, we live in societies that are highly unequal, hence I see no moral reason why a carbon tax reform should not aim, among other things, to take wealth away from the richest. (shrink)

Our latest contribution to the world’s battle against climate and biodiversity crises was an expert commentary on Vietnamese forests and the prospect of carbon credits trade. The article appeared in the Land and Climate Review on Feb. 2, 2024.

I consider cases where you increase the risk that, e.g., someone will die, without increasing the risk that you will kill them: in particular, cases in which that increasing of risk is accompanied by a decreasing of risk of the same degree such that the risk imposition has been offset. I defend the moral legitimacy of such offsetting, including carbon-offsetting.

The market failures approach to business ethics has recently garnered substantial critical attention (see, e.g., Cohen and Peterson 2019; Moriarty 2020; Steinberg 2017; Hsieh 2017; von Kriegstein 2016; Smith 2018; Endorfer and Larue 2022; Singer 2018). Though precursors of this view can be found in the literature (e.g., McMahon 1981; Friedman 1970), it was Joseph Heath (2004, 2006, 2014, 2023) who developed the approach and gave it its name. The market failures approach (henceforth: MFA) is concerned with the ethical obligations (...) of managers of firms (Heath 2014, 69). Roughly, it holds that managers ought not to conduct their businesses in a way that exploits market failures. “Market failure” is a technical term, meaning any failure of the conditions of the first fundamental welfare theorem, sometimes called the “Pareto conditions” (see Arrow 1951). The theorem states that if the Pareto conditions hold, then the market equilibrium will use society’s scarce resources efficiently, meaning that no one could be made better-off without making anyone else worse off. Efficiency, according to Heath (2014, chapter 7), is the implicit morality of the market. We coordinate much of our shared activity using markets, Heath claims, because of their ability to produce efficient results. Markets are good forms of social organization, according to Heath, because they are the best way to promote our values given empirical facts about the frailties of human psychology and the informational constraints that we face. As such, managers ought not compromise the very conditions that justify a market economy by profiting from breakdowns in the market’s efficiency. Managers are permitted to maximize profits, so long as they do not violate the market’s norm of efficiency in so doing. This is because the fundamental justification for the profit motive is that it is necessary for the operation of the price system which is essential to the efficiency properties of markets. In this paper, I will argue that the MFA is more general than even Heath himself claims. The MFA describes the professional obligations of managers, but the view I develop, the generalized market failures approach, describes the obligations of all market participants. Since efficiency is the implicit morality of the market, it binds not just managers, but all market participants, including consumers, investors and workers. Market participants are permitted to maximize the benefit they gain from market interactions, as long as they do so in a way that does not take advantage of any market failures. Generalizing the MFA in this way has three benefits: first, we gain a unified understanding of the ethics of non-managerial market roles; second, we will develop an even better understanding of the duties of managers; finally, it gives us the resources to respond to some familiar objections to the MFA found in the literature. In the next section, I will further motivate the MFA and explain how this motivation can be easily generalized to other market roles. Importantly, one can avoid benefiting from a market failure in two distinct ways: by avoiding transactions that exploit market failures or by transacting in such markets and then remediating the harm done, by compensating those negatively affected by the market failure. This section concludes by discussing how the remediation duties are to be split between the transacting parties and how to identify the parties to whom compensation is owed. In section 3, I use the tools of the generalized MFA to develop a unified ethics of consumption, investment and labor, respectively. This is the basis of a grand abductive argument for the generalized MFA. The view is strongly supported by the fact that it provides attractive and unifying explanations of our obligations in domains as variegated as carbon offsetting, CEO compensation, the reparations white Americans owe to black Americans and occupational licensure. Section 4 briefly concludes. (shrink)

First, with respect to our personal relationship to fossil fuels, this chapter introduces arguments about whether we should or even can address our own usage of fossil fuels. This involves determining whether offsetting emissions is morally required and practically possible. Second, with respect to our relationship with fossil fuels at the national level, it discusses forms of local resistance, especially divestment and pipeline protesting. Finally, with respect to our relationship with fossil fuels at the international level, it considers two types (...) of policy. On the one hand, some have argued that we should stop most trade in oil, on the basis that most oil that is traded is not subject to the control of citizens. On the other hand, some have argued that we should price the costs of fossil fuels so that there are market incentives to avoid digging them out of the ground. (shrink)

The topic of my thesis is individual and collective responsibility for collectively caused systemic harms, with climate change as the case study. Can an individual be responsible for these harms, and if so, how? Furthermore, what does it mean to say that a collective is responsible? A related question, and the second main theme, is how ignorance and knowledge affect our responsibility. -/- My aim is to show that despite the various complexities involved, an individual can have responsibility to address (...) climate change. I argue that climate change is not a problem just for states and international bodies, but also for individuals. There are three possible sources of moral responsibility for individuals in relation to climate change harms: direct responsibility (individuals qua individuals), shared responsibility as members (individuals qua members of collective agents), and shared responsibility as constituents (individuals qua constituents of unorganised collectives). -/- Accounts that deny individual responsibility fail to either take our interdependent reality seriously or fail to understand marginal participation (or in the case direct responsibility, fail to appreciate the nature of the climate change phenomenon). Individuals can be complicit in climate change harms, either as members of collective agents (e.g. as citizens of states or employees of a corporation) or as constituents of unorganised collectives (e.g. as consumers or polluters). -/- Although I focus on individual complicity, I do not deny the obligations of collective agents. However, nation-states, governments, and international bodies are not the only relevant collective agents in climate ethics: other collective agents, such as corporations, matter also and can have obligations concerning making sure that their activities are as carbon-neutral as possible. In addition, those corporations that have engaged in lobbying against climate regulation through creating and disseminating misleading information have acquired themselves additional obligations to mitigate climate change and compensate for the harm they have caused. Even so, the ethical claims can only be understood by individual members of these collective agents because only they can feel the pull of moral claims. I suggest that we could distinguish between what one must possess in order to be capable of making moral claims (i.e. moral agency conditions), and what it means to have the ability to exhibit such claims through one’s conduct. -/- Individual direct responsibility is to not to increase the probable risk of serious harm to other people, at least as long as we can do so at a less than significant cost to ourselves. It is limited to relatively wealthy individuals. Offsetting is not a reliable way to meet this duty; we need to look at the emissions from our lifestyle choices (within the available infrastructure). Shared responsibility qua members of collective agents is the key individual responsibility, and it presses especially on those occupying key positions within key collective agents. Saying that, our shared responsibility qua constituents of unorganised collectives has the potential to be decisive in whether some action is taken or not, either through a set of actions that can signal certain acceptance or support, or as a form of political support from the grass roots. (shrink)

In his Christian and Metaphysical Meditations (1683) Malebranche develops a reflection in which the self discovers in its interiority that the interlocutor able to answer some of its questions is the divine Word. Through references to the Holy Scriptures and to Augustine, Malebranche constructs a meditative itinerary that differs from the one proposed by Descartes, as it moves from the lumière naturelle in the Cartesian sense to the lumière of the Word. In the light of these historical-theoretical data, we propose (...) a reconstruction of the role played by interiority and meditation in certain texts by Malebranche, highlighting the moments in which he appropriated the Cartesian heritage and those in which he distanced himself from Descartes’ philosophical paradigm. (shrink)

Statements such as “X is beautiful but I don’t like how it looks” or “I like how X looks but it is not beautiful” sound contradictory. How contradictory they sound might however depend on the object X and on the aesthetic adjective being used (“beautiful”, “elegant”, “dynamic”, etc.). In our study, the first sentence was estimated to be more contradictory than the latter: If we describe something as beautiful, we often intend to evaluate its appearance, whereas it is less counterintuitive (...) to appreciate an appearance without finding it beautiful. Furthermore, statements including “beautiful” appeared more contradictory than those including “elegant” and “dynamic”, pointing to its greater evaluative component. When related to artworks, sentences could appear less contradictory due to readers’ consideration of the divergence between conventional beauty and art-related sensory pleasures that can even include negative valence. Such ambivalence might be more frequent in art-objects than in other artefacts. Indeed, in our study, sentences referring to artworks were estimated to be less contradictory compared to sentences referring to other artefacts. Meanwhile, an additional small group of graphic design students showed a less clear difference between art-related and non-art-related sentences. We discuss the potential influence of art experience and interest as well as theoretical and methodological challenges like the conceptualization of beauty. (shrink)

Biological ontologies are used to organize, curate, and interpret the vast quantities of data arising from biological experiments. While this works well when using a single ontology, integrating multiple ontologies can be problematic, as they are developed independently, which can lead to incompatibilities. The Open Biological and Biomedical Ontologies Foundry was created to address this by facilitating the development, harmonization, application, and sharing of ontologies, guided by a set of overarching principles. One challenge in reaching these goals was that the (...) OBO principles were not originally encoded in a precise fashion, and interpretation was subjective. Here we show how we have addressed this by formally encoding the OBO principles as operational rules and implementing a suite of automated validation checks and a dashboard for objectively evaluating each ontology’s compliance with each principle. This entailed a substantial effort to curate metadata across all ontologies and to coordinate with individual stakeholders. We have applied these checks across the full OBO suite of ontologies, revealing areas where individual ontologies require changes to conform to our principles. Our work demonstrates how a sizable federated community can be organized and evaluated on objective criteria that help improve overall quality and interoperability, which is vital for the sustenance of the OBO project and towards the overall goals of making data FAIR. Competing Interest StatementThe authors have declared no competing interest. (shrink)

The Planteome project provides a suite of reference and species-specific ontologies for plants and annotations to genes and phenotypes. Ontologies serve as common standards for semantic integration of a large and growing corpus of plant genomics, phenomics and genetics data. The reference ontologies include the Plant Ontology, Plant Trait Ontology, and the Plant Experimental Conditions Ontology developed by the Planteome project, along with the Gene Ontology, Chemical Entities of Biological Interest, Phenotype and Attribute Ontology, and others. The project also provides (...) access to species-specific Crop Ontologies developed by various plant breeding and research communities from around the world. We provide integrated data on plant traits, phenotypes, and gene function and expression from 95 plant taxa, annotated with reference ontology terms. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Offsetting is a very ineffective way to do good. Offsetting your lifetime emissions may increase aggregated life expectancy by at most seven years, while giving the amount it costs to offset your lifetime emissions to a malaria charity saves in expectation the life of at least one child. Is there any moral reason to offset rather than giving to some charity that does good so much more effectively? There might be such a reason if your offsetting compensated or somehow (...) benefitted the victims of your emission, since that could mean that you would satisfy the duty not to harm others by emitting and offsetting. But that is typically not true. If your emission harms some person and your offsetting benefits some person, then these are most likely different people. Hence, I conclude, we have a stronger reason to give to effective charities than we have to offset our emissions. (shrink)

Ideal carbon tax policy is internationally coordinated, fully internalizes externalities, redistributes revenues to those harmed, and is politically acceptable, generating predictable market signals. Since nonideal circumstances rarely allow all these conditions to be met, moral issues arise. This paper surveys some of the work in moral philosophy responding to several of these issues. First, it discusses the moral drivers for estimates of the social cost of carbon. Second, it explains how national self-interest can block climate action and suggests (...) international policies—carbon border tax adjustments and carbon clubs—that can help address these concerns. Third, it introduces some of the social science literature about the political acceptability of carbon taxes before addressing a couple common public concerns about carbon taxes. Finally, it introduces four carbon revenue usage options, arguing that redistributive and climate compensation measures are most morally justified. [Open access]. (shrink)

The three main types of policies for addressing climate change are command and control regulation, carbon taxes (or price instruments), and cap and trade (or quantity instruments). The first question in the ethics of carbon pricing is whether the latter two (price and quantity instruments) are preferable to command and control regulation. The second question is, if so, how should we evaluate the relative merits of price and quantity instruments. I canvass relevant arguments to explain different ways of (...) addressing these important policy questions, suggesting that carbon pricing is preferable to command and control regulation, and that price instruments have the theoretical edge over quantity instruments. [Open access]. (shrink)

The coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) crisis ought to serve as a reminder about the costs of failure to consider another long-term risk, climate change. For this reason, it is imperative to consider the merits of policies that may help to limit climate damages. This essay rebuts three common objections to carbon taxes: (1) that they do not change behaviour, (2) that they generate unfair burdens and increase inequality, and (3) that fundamental, systemic change is needed instead of carbon (...) taxes. The responses are (1) that there is both theoretical and empirical reason to think that carbon taxes do change behaviour, with larger taxes changing it to a greater extent; (2) that undistributed carbon taxes are regressive but distributing the tax receipts can alleviate that regressivity (and, in many cases, make the overall effect progressive); and (3) that while small changes for increasing democratic decision-making may be helpful, (fundamental) change takes time and the climate crisis requires urgent action. [Open access] //// -/- La crise de lamaladie à coronavirus 2019 (COVID-19) devrait servir de rappel sur les coûts de la non-prise en compte d’un autre risque à long terme, les changements climatiques. Pour cette raison, il est impératif de considérer lesmérites des politiques susceptibles de contribuer à limiter les changements climatiques. Cet essai réfute trois objections courantes aux taxes sur le carbone : (1) qu’elles ne changent pas les comportements (2) qu’elles génèrent des charges injustes et augmentent les inégalités, et (3) qu’un changement fondamental et systémique est nécessaire au lieu de taxes sur le carbone. Les réponses sont (1) qu’il existe des raisons à la fois théoriques et empiriques de penser que les taxes sur le carbone modifient effectivement les comportements, et que des taxes plus élevées les modifient dans une plus grande mesure; (2) que les taxes sur le carbone non distribuées sont régressives,mais que la distribution des recettes fiscales peut atténuer cette régressivité (et, dans de nombreux cas, rendre l’effet global progressif); et (3) que, bien que de petits changements pour l’amélioration de la prise de décision démocratique peuvent être utiles, un changement (fondamental) prend du temps et la crise climatique exige une action urgente. (shrink)

A question arising from the COVID-19 crisis is whether the merits of cases for climate policies have been affected. This article focuses on carbon pricing, in the form of either carbon taxes or emissions trading. It discusses the extent to which relative costs and benefits of introducing carbon pricing may have changed in the context of COVID-19, during both the crisis and the recovery period to follow. In several ways, the case for introducing a carbon price (...) is stronger during the COVID-19 crisis than under normal conditions. Oil costs are lower than normal, so we would expect less harm to consumers compared to normal conditions. Governments have immediate need for diversified new revenue streams in light of both decreased tax receipts and greater use of social safety nets. Finally, supply and demand shocks have led to already destabilized supply-side activities, and carbon pricing would allow this destabilization to equilibrate around greener production for the long-term. The strengthening of the case for introducing carbon pricing now is highly relevant to discussions about recovery measures, especially in the context of policy announcements from the European Union and United States House of Representatives. Key Policy Insights: • Persistently low oil prices mean that consumers will face lower pain from carbon pricing than under normal conditions. • Many consumers are more price-sensitive during the COVID-19 context, which suggests that a greater relative burden from carbon prices would fall upon producers as opposed to consumers than under normal conditions. • Carbon prices in the COVID-19 context can introduce new revenue streams, assisting with fiscal holes or with other green priorities. • Carbon pricing would contribute to a more sustainable COVID-19 recovery period, since many of the costs of revamping supply chains are already being felt while idled labor capacity can be incorporated into firms with lower carbon-intensity. (shrink)

The practice of trading forest carbon credits has gained significant attention as a strategy to combat climate change. By allowing companies to buy and sell credits representing forest carbon sequestration, it aims to create financial incentives for forest preservation. However, a recent report highlights the dangers of commodifying forest carbon if such financial mechanisms overshadow other vital environmental and social values. To understand the complexities of this issue, we can turn to the mindsponge theory (MT), particularly its (...) information-value nexus hypothesis, for valuable insights. (shrink)

Critics of carbon mitigation often appeal to what Jonathan Glover has called ‘the argument from no difference’: that is, ‘If I don’t do it, someone else will’. Yet even if this justifies continued high emissions by the industrialised countries, it cannot excuse business as usual. The North’s emissions might not harm the victims of climate change in the sense of making them worse off than they would otherwise be. Nevertheless, it receives benefits produced at the latter’s expense, with the (...) result that it has more than it deserves, and that victims will have less. This enrichment is unjust; unjustly enriched agents ought to make compensation. The best form of compensation is vigorous action against climate change. (shrink)

While there are a variety of moral issues that relate to carbon pricing policies, I will focus on one that has received a large amount of attention: is carbon pricing unjust? Campaigners and civil society groups, especially those involved in environmental and climate justice spaces, have rejected carbon pricing as unjust. This claim deserves some discussion and, in this perspective, I discuss a few potential dimensions of justice that could be relevant to this claim. My goal is (...) to show that, for the most important dimensions of justice, distributive and procedural, carbon pricing is not unjust as a policy instrument for addressing climate change. [Open access]. (shrink)

In an era where digital screens are as ubiquitous as the air we breathe, Toward an Anthropology of Screens by Mauro Carbone and Graziano Lingua offers a seminal exploration into screens’ crucial functions and profound impact on human culture. This scholarly work dissects the screen’s evolution, anthropological significance and philosophical implications, offering an enlightening narrative on our mediated reality.

[Newspaper opinion] To give carbon storage sites the greatest chance of success, it makes sense to develop them in places where the geology has been thoroughly explored and where there is lots of relevant expertise. This would imply pumping carbon into underground storage sites in northern Europe, the Middle East and the US, where companies have spent centuries looking for and extracting fossil fuels. On the other hand, it might be important to develop storage sites in economies where (...) the current and future demand for carbon capture and storage is greatest. The regions with the best prospects are not often those with the greatest expected need. [Open access]. (shrink)

The protracted history of consuming carbon-based energy sources in Iran culminated in 1908 with the momentous discovery of the inaugural oil field in Masjed Soleyman. This newfound carbon-based source not only brought a lot of revenues to Iran but also, brought forth a multitude of materialities like pipelines, roads, bridges, refinery factories, tankers, and rigs into Iran. This new materiality exerted a profound influence on the perception and imagination of Iranians, particularly Iranian artists. Consequently, carbon permeated diverse (...) manifestations within Iranian artworks assuming various artistic approaches; in other words, carbon was inevitably introduced into aesthetics. Serendipitously, the ascension of Reza Shah Pahlavi to power in Iran almost coincided with the discovery of oil. Reza Shah and his successor, Mohammadreza Shah, sought to position themselves as a novel international force governing a "developed" nation for which they needed to lubricate the production-consumption cycle in Iran. To achieve this objective, they championed extensive governmental propagandas that celebrated carbon-based consumerism, and with that, they introduced aesthetics into carbon. Drawing inspiration from Walter Benjamin's notions “politicizing aesthetic” and “aestheticizing politics” and insisting that in Iran, oil/carbon is politics, this paper aims to historicize the process of carbonization of aesthetics in Iranian art realm on the one hand, and aestheticization of carbon in governmental propaganda on the other hand. This paper focuses on visual ideologies in visual artworks, including architecture, painting, and sculpture in the artwork realm and postal stamps, postcards, and paper moneys, on the other hand. (shrink)

A book chapter (about 9,000 words, plus references) presenting an act-consequentialist approach to the ethics of climate change. It begins with an overview of act consequentialism, including a description of the view’s principle of rightness (an act is right if and only if it maximizes the good) and a conception of the good focusing on the well-being of sentient creatures and rejecting temporal discounting. Objections to act consequentialism, and replies, are also considered. Next, the chapter briefly suggests that act consequentialism (...) could reasonably be regarded as the default moral theory of climate change, in the sense that a broadly act-consequentialist framework often seems implicit in both scholarly and casual discussions of the ethics of climate change. The remainder of the chapter explores three possible responses to the threat of climate change: having fewer children to reduce the number of people emitting greenhouse gases; taxing greenhouse-gas (GHG) emissions (commonly called a “carbon tax”) to discourage GHG-emitting behavior; and reducing poverty to lessen personal, familial, and community vulnerability to the harms of climate change. (shrink)

[Newspaper Opinion] Before the COVID-19 pandemic and the accompanying fall in oil prices, a carbon price would have been immediately painful for the countries that imposed it, but far better for everyone over the longer term. In this unprecedented moment, introducing a carbon price would be beneficial both now and for the future.

The relationship between carbon markets, especially voluntary ones, and climate justice is complex. While carbon markets are designed with positive intentions, such as supporting reforestation or renewable energy projects in developing countries, they can unintentionally exacerbate inequalities.

Abstract: This study has effectively tackled the critical challenge of accurate calorie prediction in dishes by employing a robust neural network-based model. With an outstanding accuracy rate of 99.32% and a remarkably low average error of 0.009, our model has showcased its proficiency in delivering precise calorie estimations. This achievement equips individuals, healthcare practitioners, and the food industry with a powerful tool to promote healthier dietary choices and elevate awareness of nutrition. Furthermore, our in-depth feature importance analysis has shed light (...) on the indispensable role played by specific nutritional attributes in calorie estimation. This unveiling of crucial factors provides valuable insights for further research endeavors and practical applications. Notably, this research extends its impact beyond the immediate context by making substantial contributions to the domains of nutrition science and dietary planning. It underscores the transformative potential of artificial intelligence, demonstrating how it can revolutionize our approach to food, nutrition, and health. As the world grapples with the challenges of diet-related health issues and environmental concerns, the accuracy and precision achieved in calorie prediction through neural networks represent a significant stride towards more informed and conscientious dietary practices. In this era of data-driven decision-making, our research paves the way for healthier lifestyles, heightened nutritional awareness, and a more health-conscious society. (shrink)

The fail-safe makes sure the fee is high enough to meet carbon emission reduction targets. The safeguard keeps the fee from getting any higher than needed. -/- One of the ways that we could account for the unpredictability of the price elasticity of demand for carbon would be to provide a fail-safe mechanism to ensure that we definitely stay on the carbon reduction schedule. If we keep Energy Innovation Act (HR 763) essentially as it is and scale (...) up the annual carbon fee increase by Number-of-Years-Behind-Schedule * 0.15. (shrink)

Climate change and other harmful large-scale processes challenge our understandings of individual responsibility. People throughout the world suffer harms—severe shortfalls in health, civic status, or standard of living relative to the vital needs of human beings—as a result of physical processes to which many people appear to contribute. Climate change, polluted air and water, and the erosion of grasslands, for example, occur because a great many people emit carbon and pollutants, build excessively, enable their flocks to overgraze, or otherwise (...) stress the environment. If a much smaller number of people engaged in these types of conduct, the harms in question would not occur, or would be substantially lessened. However, the conduct of any particular person (and, in the case of climate change, of even quite large numbers of people) could make no apparent difference to their occurrence. My carbon emissions (and quite possibly the carbon emissions of much larger groups of people dispersed throughout the world) may not make a difference to what happens to anyone. When the conduct of some agent does not make any apparent difference to the occurrence of harm, but this conduct is of a type that brings about harm because many people engage in it, we can call this agent an overdeterminer of that harm, and their conduct overdetermining conduct. In this essay we explore the moral status of overdetermining harm. (shrink)

Thị trường tín chỉ carbon tự nguyện là một cơ chế quen tên, đã được triển khai rộng rãi trên thế giới với mục tiêu giảm lượng phát thải khí nhà kính (GHG). Thị trường này hoạt động bằng cách đặt ra giới hạn về lượng phát thải cho các công ty và cho phép họ mua bán ‘tín chỉ carbon’ tương ứng với mỗi tấn phát thải được loại bỏ. Những giao dịch này được thiết kế với (...) hy vọng tạo ra một cơ chế tự điều chỉnh để cân bằng lượng carbon trong khí quyển bằng cách giảm hoặc loại bỏ CO2 (hoặc các khí nhà kính khác) ở một địa điểm nhằm bù đắp cho lượng phát thải được tạo ra ở nơi khác. -/- Thị trường tín chỉ carbon là một ví dụ cơ bản của lối tư duy kinh tế tân cổ điển, cho rằng các hoạt động kinh tế như sản xuất và tiêu dùng gây ra tác động tiêu cực đến môi trường, nhưng những chi phí này thường không được các bên gây ra gánh chịu, dẫn đến một dạng thức thất bại thị trường. Vì thế, khi những ngoại tác tương tự (các vấn đề biến đổi khí hậu hay suy thoái môi trường v.v) được tích hợp vào hệ thống kinh tế, thị trường được kỳ vọng sẽ cải thiện năng lực và hiệu quả phân bổ nguồn lực cũng như nhân lực trong xã hội một cách tối ưu để giải quyết các vấn đề môi trường. -/- Tuy nhiên, sau gần 30 năm đi vào vận hành, thị trường tín chỉ carbon đã thể hiện nhiều điểm bất hợp lý và xa rời thực tế của nó trong công cuộc chống biến đổi khí hậu. (shrink)

Sau gần 30 năm đi vào vận hành, thị trường tín chỉ carbon đã thể hiện nhiều điểm bất hợp lý và xa rời thực tế của nó trong công cuộc chống biến đổi khí hậu.

Trong nhiều biện pháp chống biến đổi khí hậu thế giới đang nghiên cứu và áp dụng, không phải lúc nào cũng là những thứ tối tân, hiện đại và lớn lao kỳ vĩ. Có những biện pháp thuộc về cải tiến phương thức nuôi trồng, và thực tế đã cho thấy, hiệu quả đo đếm được, bằng những tín chỉ có khả năng quy đổi thành giá trị tiền tệ thông qua mậu dịch carbon. Hiệu quả này có (...) thể xem như vế số 1 của mệnh đề nguyên lý trao đổi giá trị môi sinh-tiền tệ, trường hợp tạo ra thặng dư sinh thái. Bài viết này đề cập tới một trường hợp tiêu biểu của thế giới, và xem xét cơ sở khoa học của nguyên lý vận hành, trực tiếp liên quan. Sau cùng, một số ý kiến về những điều kiện cần có chuẩn bị cho triển khai trong thực tiễn tại Việt Nam sẽ được trình bày. (Tạp chí Kinh tế & Dự báo; ngày 4-10-2023). (shrink)

Trong bối cảnh toàn cầu đang đối mặt với những thách thức ngày càng nghiêm trọng từ biến đổi khí hậu, tín chỉ carbon đã được xem như một giải pháp tài chính nhằm khuyến khích việc giảm phát thải khí nhà kính. Tuy nhiên, liệu giải pháp này có thực sự hiệu quả trong việc bảo vệ môi trường, hay chỉ đơn thuần là một cách để thương mại hóa thiên nhiên, mang lại lợi ích ngắn hạn nhưng (...) tiềm ẩn nhiều rủi ro lâu dài? (shrink)

Governments or international organizations set limits on the amount of emissions that a company or country can release. If a company exceeds this limit, it must purchase carbon credits from others who have reduced emissions below the allowed levels. -/- Carbon credits were initially created to encourage countries and businesses to reduce emissions through a market mechanism. Each credit represents one ton of CO2 or an equivalent greenhouse gas that is not emitted into the atmosphere. This mechanism has (...) created a new financial market where companies can trade the right to emit, generating immediate profit. It is expected to not only provide short-term economic benefits but also incentivize investment in green technology, raising environmental awareness and supporting sustainable initiatives. -/- However, a deeper analysis reveals significant concerns about the real effectiveness of commodifying nature and the potential for negative consequences. Companies can manipulate the credit system to “greenwash” their image without a genuine commitment to emission reductions. Imagine a corporation that pollutes and severely impacts the environment but has enough financial resources to purchase the necessary carbon credits. In this case, nature becomes a business tool, stripped of its intrinsic value. (shrink)

This teaching and learning guide accompanies the following article: Mintz-Woo, K., 2022. Carbon Pricing Ethics. Philosophy Compass 17(1):article e12803. doi:10.1111/phc3.12803. [Open access].

This paper puts forward two claims about funding carbon capture and storage. The first claim is that there are moral justifications supporting strategic investment into CO2 storage from global and regional perspectives. One argument draws on the empirical evidence which suggests carbon capture and storage would play a significant role in a portfolio of global solutions to climate change; the other draws on Rawls' notion of legitimate expectations and Moellendorf's Anti-Poverty principle. The second claim is that where to (...) pursue this strategic investment poses a morally non-trivial problem, with considerations like near-term global distributive justice and undermining legitimate expectations favouring investing in developing regions, especially in Asia, and considerations like long-term climate impacts and best uses of resources favouring investing in the relatively wealthy regions that have the best prospects for successful storage development. [Open access]. (shrink)

Much of the climate ethics discussion centers on considerations of compensatory justice and historical accountability. However, little attention is given to supporting and defending the Beneficiary Pays Principle as a guide for policymaking. This principle states that those who have benefitted from an instance of harm have an obligation to compensate those who have been harmed. Thus, this principle implies that those benefitted by industrialization and carbon emission owe compensation to those who have been harmed by climate change. Beneficiary (...) Pays is commonly juxtaposed with Polluter Pays Principle and the Ability to Pay Principle in the relevant literature. Beneficiary Pays withstands objections that raise suspicion for the latter two. (shrink)

The social cost of carbon (SCC) is a central concept in climate change economics. This chapter explains the SCC and investigates it philosophically. As is widely acknowledged, any SCC calculation requires the analyst to make choices about the infamous topic of discount rates. But to understand the nature and role of discounting, one must understand how that concept—and indeed the SCC concept itself—is yoked to the concept of a value function, whose job is to take ways the world could (...) be across indefinite timespans and to rank them from better to worse. A great deal, therefore, turns on the details of the value function and on just what is meant by “better” and “worse.” This chapter seeks to explicate these and related issues, and then to situate them within the evolving landscape of federal climate policy in the United States. (shrink)

One of the ways that we could account for the unpredictability of the price elasticity of demand for carbon would be to provide a fail-safe mechanism to ensure that we definitely stay on the carbon reduction schedule. If we kept Energy Innovation Act (HR 763) essentially as it is and scale up the annual carbon fee increase by Number-of-Years-Behind-Schedule * 0.15.

We have defined the Neutrosophic Over- /Under-/Off-Set and -Logic for the first time in 1995 and published in 2007. During 1995-2016 we presented them to various national and international conferences and seminars ([16]-[37]) and did more publishing during 2007-2016 ([1]-[15]). These new notions are totally different from other sets/logics/probabilities. We extended the neutrosophic set respectively to Neutrosophic Overset {when some neutrosophic component is > 1}, to Neutrosophic Underset {when some neutrosophic component is < 0}, and to Neutrosophic Offset {when some (...) neutrosophic components are off the interval [0, 1], i.e. some neutrosophic component > 1 and other neutrosophic component < 0}. This is no surprise since our real-world has numerous examples and applications of over-/under-/off-neutrosophic components. (shrink)

Low-carbon agriculture is essential for protecting the global climate and sustainable agricultural economics. Since China is a predominantly agricultural country, the adoption of low-carbon agricultural technologies by local farmers is crucial. The past literature on low-carbon technologies has highlighted the influence of demographic, economic, and environmental factors, while the psychological factors have been underexplored. A questionnaire-based approach was used to assess the psychological process underlying the adoption of low-carbon agricultural technologies by 1,114 Chinese rice farmers in (...) this paper, and structural equation modeling (SEM) was empirically employed to test our theoretical model. (shrink)

Trong mối quan tâm lớn của nhân loại đối với việc hạn chế tác hại của biến đổi khí hậu, rừng được kỳ vọng là nơi có thể thu giữ và trữ carbon (“carbon sink”).