Results for 'cognitive states'

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  1. Against Group Cognitive States.Robert D. Rupert - 2014 - In Gerhard Preyer, Frank Hindriks & Sara Rachel Chant (eds.), From Individual to Collective Intentionality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 97-111.
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  2. Knowing in Aristotle part 1: Epistēmē, Nous, and non‐rational cognitive states.Caleb Murray Cohoe - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 17 (1):e12801.
    Philosophy Compass, Volume 17, Issue 1, January 2022.
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  3. On the Cognition of States of Affairs.Barry Smith - 1987 - In Kevin Mulligan (ed.), Speech Act and Sachverhalt: Reinach and the Foundations of Realist Phenomenology. Dordrecht: M. Nijhoff. pp. 189-225.
    The theory of speech acts put forward by Adolf Reinach in his "The A Priori Foundations of the Civil Law" of 1913 rests on a systematic account of the ontological structures associated with various different sorts of language use. One of the most original features of Reinach's account lies in hIs demonstration of how the ontological structure of, say, an action of promising or of commanding, may be modified in different ways, yielding different sorts of non-standard instances of the corresponding (...)
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  4. Mental states follow quantum mechanics during perception and cognition of ambiguous figures.Elio Conte - 2009 - In Krzysztof Stefanski (ed.), Open Systems and Information Dynamics. World scientific publishing company. pp. 1-17.
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  5. Effect of cognitive restructuring on junior secondary school mathematics text anxiety in Oshimili south of L.G.A of Delta State.A. N. Anyamene & G. U. Ogugua - 2019 - Hofa: African Journal of Multidisciplinary Research 4 (1):2019.
    The study investigated the effect of cognitive restructuring on junior secondary school mathematics test anxiety in Oshimili south L.G.A of Delta State. Two research questions and two hypotheses tested at 0.05 level of significance guided the study. Quasi-experimental research design was adopted for this study. The population for this study was a total of 1224 students. These comprised of all the JSS 2 students from Oshimili South Local Government Area of Delta State. Research sample consisted of 120 JSS 2 (...)
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  6. Cognitive Penetration and the Epistemology of Perception.Nicholas Silins - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (1):24-42.
    If our experiences are cognitively penetrable, they can be influenced by our antecedent expectations, beliefs, or other cognitive states. Theorists such as Churchland, Fodor, Macpherson, and Siegel have debated whether and how our cognitive states might influence our perceptual experiences, as well as how any such influences might affect the ability of our experiences to justify our beliefs about the external world. This article surveys views about the nature of cognitive penetration, the epistemological consequences of (...)
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  7. Cognitive Penetration and the Perception of Art (Winner of 2012 Dialectica Essay Prize).Dustin Stokes - 2014 - Dialectica 68 (1):1-34.
    There are good, even if inconclusive, reasons to think that cognitive penetration of perception occurs: that cognitive states like belief causally affect, in a relatively direct way, the contents of perceptual experience. The supposed importance of – indeed as it is suggested here, what is definitive of – this possible phenomenon is that it would result in important epistemic and scientific consequences. One interesting and intuitive consequence entirely unremarked in the extant literature concerns the perception of art. (...)
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  8. Cognitive penetration and implicit cognition.Lucas Battich & Ophelia Deroy - 2023 - In J. Robert Thompson (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy and Implicit Cognition. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 144-152.
    Cognitive states, such as beliefs, desires and intentions, may influence how we perceive people and objects. If this is the case, are those influences worse when they occur implicitly rather than explicitly? Here we show that cognitive penetration in perception generally involves an implicit component. First, the process of influence is implicit, making us unaware that our perception is misrepresenting the world. This lack of awareness is the source of the epistemic threat raised by cognitive penetration. (...)
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  9. Cognitive Penetration, Imagining, and the Downgrade Thesis.Lu Teng - 2016 - Philosophical Topics 44 (2):405-426.
    We tend to think that perceptual experiences tell us about what the external world is like without being influenced by our own mind. But recent psychological and philosophical research indicates that this might not be true. Our beliefs, expectations, knowledge, and other personal-level mental states might influence what we experience. This kind of psychological phenomena is now called “cognitive penetration.” The research of cognitive penetration not only has important consequences for psychology and the philosophy of mind, but (...)
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    An Alternative Model for Direct Cognition of Third-Party Elementary Mental States.de Sá Pereira Roberto Horácio - 2021 - Revista de Filosofia Moderna E Contemporânea 9 (1):15-28.
    I aim to develop an alternative theoretical model for the direct cognition of the elementary states of others called the theory of interaction (henceforth TI), also known as the “second person” approach. The model I propose emerges from a critical reformulation of the displaced perception model proposed by FRED DRETSKE (1995) for the introspective knowledge of our own mental states. Moreover, against Dretske, I argue that no meta-representation (second-order representation of a first-order representation as a representation) is involved (...)
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  11. Cognitive Penetration: Inference or Fabrication?Lu Teng - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (3):547-563.
    ABSTRACT Cognitive penetrability refers to the possibility that perceptual experiences are influenced by our beliefs, expectations, emotions, or other personal-level mental states. In this paper, I focus on the epistemological implication of cognitive penetration, and examine how, exactly, aetiologies matter to the justificatory power of perceptual experiences. I examine a prominent theory, according to which some cognitively penetrated perceptual experiences are like conclusions of bad inferences. Whereas one version of this theory is psychologically implausible, the other version (...)
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  12. Rethinking the role of the rTPJ in attention and social cognition in light of the opposing domains hypothesis: findings from an ALE-based meta-analysis and resting-state functional connectivity.Benjamin Kubit & Anthony I. Jack - 2013 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7.
    The right temporo-parietal junction (rTPJ) has been associated with two apparently disparate functional roles: in attention and in social cognition. According to one account, the rTPJ initiates a “circuit-breaking” signal that interrupts ongoing attentional processes, effectively reorienting attention. It is argued this primary function of the rTPJ has been extended beyond attention, through a process of evolutionarily cooption, to play a role in social cognition. We propose an alternative account, according to which the capacity for social cognition depends on a (...)
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  13. Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual Justification.Susanna Siegel - 2012 - Noûs 46 (2).
    In this paper I argue that it's possible that the contents of some visual experiences are influenced by the subject's prior beliefs, hopes, suspicions, desires, fears or other mental states, and that this possibility places constraints on the theory of perceptual justification that 'dogmatism' or 'phenomenal conservativism' cannot respect.
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  14. The Cognitive Ecology of the Internet.Paul Smart, Richard Heersmink & Robert Clowes - 2017 - In Stephen Cowley & Frederic Vallée-Tourangeau (eds.), Cognition Beyond the Brain: Computation, Interactivity and Human Artifice (2nd ed.). Springer. pp. 251-282.
    In this chapter, we analyze the relationships between the Internet and its users in terms of situated cognition theory. We first argue that the Internet is a new kind of cognitive ecology, providing almost constant access to a vast amount of digital information that is increasingly more integrated into our cognitive routines. We then briefly introduce situated cognition theory and its species of embedded, embodied, extended, distributed and collective cognition. Having thus set the stage, we begin by taking (...)
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  15. Animal Cognition and Human Values.Jonathan Birch - 2018 - Philosophy of Science 85 (5):1026-1037.
    Animal welfare scientists face an acute version of the problem of inductive risk, since they must choose whether to affirm attributions of mental states to animals in advisory contexts, knowing their decisions hold consequences for animal welfare. In such contexts, the burden of proof should be sensitive to the consequences of error, but a framework for setting appropriate burdens of proof is lacking. Through reflection on two cases—pain and cognitive enrichment—I arrive at a tentative framework based on the (...)
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  16. Irreducible Cognitive Phenomenology and the AHA! Experience.John Joseph Dorsch - 2016 - Phenomenology and Mind 10:108-121.
    Elijah Chudnoff’s case for irreducible cognitive phenomenology hinges on seeming to see the truth of a mathematical proposition (Chudnoff 2015). In the following, I develop an augmented version of Chudnoff’s case, not based on seeming to see, or intuition, but based on being in a state with presentational phenomenology of high-level content. In contrast to other cases for cognitive phenomenology, those based on Strawson’s case (Strawson 2011), I argue that the case presented here is able to withstand counterarguments, (...)
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  17. Embodied Cognition and the Grip of Computational Metaphors.Kate Finley - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.
    (Penultimate draft) Embodied Cognition holds that bodily (e.g. sensorimotor) states and processes are directly involved in some higher-level cognitive functions (e.g. reasoning). This challenges traditional views of cognition according to which bodily states and processes are, at most, indirectly involved in higher-level cognition. Although some elements of Embodied Cognition have been integrated into mainstream cognitive science, others still face adamant resistance. In this paper, rather than straightforwardly defend Embodied Cognition against specific objections I will do the (...)
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  18. Cognitive penetration, hypnosis and imagination.Valtteri Arstila - 2017 - Analysis 77 (1):3-10.
    The thesis of cognitive penetrability, according to which cognitive states can affect perceptual experiences, remains the topic of intense debate among philosophers. A new candidate for a case of cognitive penetration is presented and defended. The candidate is based on studies involving suggestions that something is a certain way, which are usually given under hypnosis, rather than mere request to imagine that things are a certain way.
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  19. A Defense of Cognitive Penetration and the Face-Race Lightness Illusion.Kate Finley - 2022 - Philosophical Psychology 1:1-28.
    Cognitive Penetration holds that cognitive states and processes, specifically propositional attitudes (e.g., beliefs), sometimes directly impact features of perceptual experiences (e.g., the coloring of an object). In contrast, more traditional views hold that propositional attitudes do not directly impact perceptual experiences, but rather are only involved in interpreting or judging these experiences. Understandably, Cognitive Penetration is controversial and has been criticized on both theoretical and empirical grounds. I focus on defending it from the latter kind of (...)
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  20. Investigating Emotions as Functional States Distinct From Feelings.Ralph Adolphs & Daniel Andler - 2018 - Emotion Review 10 (3):191-201.
    We defend a functionalist approach to emotion that begins by focusing on emotions as central states with causal connections to behavior and to other cognitive states. The approach brackets the conscious experience of emotion, lists plausible features that emotions exhibit, and argues that alternative schemes are unpromising candidates. We conclude with the benefits of our approach: one can study emotions in animals; one can look in the brain for the implementation of specific features; and one ends up (...)
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  21. Extended cognition and the metaphysics of mind.Zoe Drayson - 2010 - Cognitive Systems Research 11 (4):367-377.
    This paper explores the relationship between several ideas about the mind and cognition. The hypothesis of extended cognition claims that cognitive processes can and do extend outside the head, that elements of the world around us can actually become parts of our cognitive systems. It has recently been suggested that the hypothesis of extended cognition is entailed by one of the foremost philosophical positions on the nature of the mind: functionalism, the thesis that mental states are defined (...)
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  22. Embodied cognition and temporally extended agency.Markus E. Schlosser - 2018 - Synthese 195 (5):2089-2112.
    According to radical versions of embodied cognition, human cognition and agency should be explained without the ascription of representational mental states. According to a standard reply, accounts of embodied cognition can explain only instances of cognition and agency that are not “representation-hungry”. Two main types of such representation-hungry phenomena have been discussed: cognition about “the absent” and about “the abstract”. Proponents of representationalism have maintained that a satisfactory account of such phenomena requires the ascription of mental representations. Opponents have (...)
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  23. Phenomenal Contrast Arguments for Cognitive Phenomenology.Elijah Chudnoff - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2):82-104.
    According to proponents of irreducible cognitive phenomenology some cognitive states put one in phenomenal states for which no wholly sensory states suffice. One of the main approaches to defending the view that there is irreducible cognitive phenomenology is to give a phenomenal contrast argument. In this paper I distinguish three kinds of phenomenal contrast argument: what I call pure—represented by Strawson's Jack/Jacques argument—hypothetical—represented by Kriegel's Zoe argument—and glossed—first developed here. I argue that pure and (...)
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  24. Cognitive Products and the Semantics of Attitude Verbs and Deontic Modals.Friederike Moltmann - 2017 - In Friederike Moltmann & Mark Textor (eds.), Act-Based Conceptions of Propositional Content. Contemporary and Historical Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 254-289.
    This paper outlines a semantic account of attitude reports and deontic modals based on cognitive and illocutionary products, mental states, and modal products, as opposed to the notion of an abstract proposition or a cognitive act.
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  25. A cognitive account of agentive awareness.Myrto Mylopoulos - 2017 - Mind and Language 32 (5):545-563.
    Agentive awareness is one's awareness of oneself as presently acting. Dominant accounts in cognitive science consider agentive awareness to be grounded in the states and processes underlying sensorimotor control. In this paper, I raise concerns for this approach and develop an alternative. Broadly, in the approach I defend, one is agentively aware in the virtue of intending to act. I further argue that agentive awareness is not constituted by intentions themselves but rather first-personal thoughts that are formed on (...)
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  26. What is The Reason to Use Clifford Algebra in Quantum Cognition? Part I: “It from Qubit” On The Possibility That the Amino Acids Can Discern Between Two Quantum Spin States.Elio Conte - 2012 - Neuroquantology 10 (3):561-565.
    Starting with 1985, we discovered the possible existence of electrons with net helicity in biomolecules as amino acids and their possibility to discern between the two quantum spin states. It is well known that the question of a possible fundamental role of quantum mechanics in biological matter constitutes still a long debate. In the last ten years we have given a rather complete quantum mechanical elaboration entirely based on Clifford algebra whose basic entities are isomorphic to the well known (...)
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  27. The cognitive faculties.Gary Hatfield - 1998 - In Daniel Garber & Michael Ayers (eds.), The Cambridge History of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy. Cambridge University Press. pp. 953–1002.
    During the seventeenth century the major cognitive faculties--sense, imagination, memory, and understanding or intellect--became the central focus of argument in metaphysics and epistemology to an extent not seen before. The theory of the intellect, long an important auxiliary to metaphysics, became the focus of metaphysical dispute, especially over the scope and powers of the intellect and the existence of a `pure' intellect. Rationalist metaphysicians such as Descartes, Spinoza, and Malebranche claimed that intellectual knowledge, gained independently of the senses, provides (...)
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  28. Inferentialism and cognitive penetration of perception.Jack C. Lyons - 2016 - Episteme 13 (1):1-28.
    Cognitive penetration of perception is the idea that what we see is influenced by such states as beliefs, expectations, and so on. A perceptual belief that results from cognitive penetration may be less justified than a nonpenetrated one. Inferentialism is a kind of internalist view that tries to account for this by claiming that some experiences are epistemically evaluable, on the basis of why the perceiver has that experience, and the familiar canons of good inference provide the (...)
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  29. ELEMENTS OF COGNITIVE SCIENCES AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN GAYATRI MANTRA.Varanasi Ramabrahmam - 2006 - In Proceedings of National seminar on Bharatiya Heritage in Engineering and Technology, May 11-13, 2006, at Department of Metallurgy and Inorganic Chemistry, I.I.Sc., Bangalore, India. pp. 249-254.
    The syllables and series of sounds composing Gayatri Mantra, and the sense and meaning attached to them are analyzed using Upanishadic Wisdom, Advaitha Philosophy and Sabdabrahma Siddhanta. The physical structure of mind as revealed by this analysis is presented. An insight of various phases of mind, their rise and set, their significance and implications to cognitive sciences and natural language comprehension branch of artificial intelligence are discussed. The possible applications of such an insight in the fields of cognitive (...)
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  30. Cognitive Neuroscience and Animal Consciousness.Matteo Grasso - 2014 - In Sofia Bonicalzi, Leonardo Caffo & Mattia Sorgon (eds.), Naturalism and Constructivism in Metaethics. Newcastle Upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Press. pp. 182-203.
    The problem of animal consciousness has profound implications on our concept of nature and of our place in the natural world. In philosophy of mind and cognitive neuroscience the problem of animal consciousness raises two main questions (Velmans, 2007): the distribution question (“are there conscious animals beside humans?”) and the phenomenological question (“what is it like to be a non-human animal?”). In order to answer these questions, many approaches take into account similarities and dissimilarities in animal and human behavior, (...)
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  31. Innate cognitive capacities.Muhammad ali KhAlidi - 2007 - Mind and Language 22 (1):92-115.
    This paper attempts to articulate a dispositional account of innateness that applies to cognitive capacities. After criticizing an alternative account of innateness proposed by Cowie (1999) and Samuels (2002), the dispositional account of innateness is explicated and defended against a number of objections. The dispositional account states that an innate cognitive capacity (output) is one that has a tendency to be triggered as a result of impoverished environmental conditions (input). Hence, the challenge is to demonstrate how the (...)
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  32. Perceptual Experience and Cognitive Penetrability.Somogy Varga - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (2):376-397.
    This paper starts by distinguishing three views about the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. ‘Low-level theorists’ argue that perceptual experience is reducible to the experience of low-level properties, ‘high-level theorists’ argue that we have perceptual experiences of high-level properties, while ‘disunified view theorists’ argue that perceptual seemings can present high-level properties. The paper explores how cognitive states can penetrate perceptual experience and provides an interpretation of cognitive penetration that offers some support for the high-level view.
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  33. Scripts and Social Cognition.Gen Eickers - 2024 - Ergo 10 (54):1565-1587.
    To explain how social cognition normally serves us in real life, we need to ask which factors contribute to specific social interactions. Recent accounts, and mostly pluralistic models, have started incorporating contextual and social factors in explanations of social cognition. In this paper, I further motivate the importance of contextual and identity factors for social cognition. This paper presents scripts as an alternative resource in social cognition that can account for contextual and identity factors. Scripts are normative and context-sensitive knowledge (...)
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  34. Nonconscious Cognitive Suffering: Considering Suffering Risks of Embodied Artificial Intelligence.Steven Umbrello & Stefan Lorenz Sorgner - 2019 - Philosophies 4 (2):24.
    Strong arguments have been formulated that the computational limits of disembodied artificial intelligence (AI) will, sooner or later, be a problem that needs to be addressed. Similarly, convincing cases for how embodied forms of AI can exceed these limits makes for worthwhile research avenues. This paper discusses how embodied cognition brings with it other forms of information integration and decision-making consequences that typically involve discussions of machine cognition and similarly, machine consciousness. N. Katherine Hayles’s novel conception of nonconscious cognition in (...)
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  35. Cognitive Neuroscience and the Hard Problems.Jan Faye - 2019 - Axiomathes 29 (6):561-575.
    This paper argues that the fundamental problem of cognitive neuroscience arises from the neuronal description of the brain and the phenomenal description of the conscious mind. In general philosophers agree that no functional approach can explain phenomenal consciousness; some even think that science is forever unable to explain the qualitative character of our experiences. In order to overcome these challenges, I propose a distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties of the brain according to which brain states are characterized (...)
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  36. The Mental States of Persons and their Brains.Tim Crane - 2015 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 76:253-270.
    Cognitive neuroscientists frequently talk about the brain representing the world. Some philosophers claim that this is a confusion. This paper argues that there is no confusion, and outlines one thing that might mean, using the notion of a model derived from the philosophy of science. This description is then extended to make apply to propositional attitude attributions. A number of problems about propositional attitude attributions can be solved or dissolved by treating propositional attitudes as models.
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  37. Does Intraindividual Variability of Personality States Improve Perspective Taking? An Ecological Approach Integrating Personality and Social Cognition. [REVIEW]Richard Wundrack, Julia Prager, Eva Asselmann, Garret O'Connell & Jule Specht - 2018 - Journal of Intelligence 6:18.
    Research integrating cognitive abilities and personality has focused on the role of personality traits. We propose a theory on the role of intraindividual variability of personality states (hereafter state variability) on perspective taking, in particular, the ability to infer other peoples’ mental states. First, we review the relevant research on personality psychology and social cognition. Second, we propose two complementary routes by which state variability relates to anchoring and adjustment in perspective taking. The first route, termed ego-dispersion, (...)
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  38. Evaluative Discourse and Affective States of Mind.Nils Franzén - 2020 - Mind 129 (516):1095-1126.
    It is widely held within contemporary metaethics that there is a lack of linguistic support for evaluative expressivism. On the contrary, it seems that the predictions that expressivists make about evaluative discourse are not borne out. An instance of this is the so-called problem of missing Moorean infelicity. Expressivists maintain that evaluative statements express non-cognitive states of mind in a similar manner to how ordinary descriptive language expresses beliefs. Conjoining an ordinary assertion that p with the denial of (...)
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  39. Cognitive Empathy.Spaulding Shannon - 2017 - In Heidi L. Maibom (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Empathy. Routledge Press. pp. 13-21.
    We have various strategies available to us for understanding another person’s state of mind. Cognitive empathy may be achieved by mental simulation, i.e. by imagining yourself in another’s situation and figuring out what you would think and feel in that situation. Alternatively, you could consider all the relevant information about the person’s situation and folk psychology and draw a sophisticated inference to the best explanation of that person’s perspective. In this chapter, I examine the conditions under which we are (...)
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  40. Are visuomotor representations cognitively penetrable? Biasing action-guiding vision.Josefa Toribio - 2018 - Synthese (Suppl 17):1-19.
    Is action-guiding vision cognitively penetrable? More specifically, is the visual processing that guides our goal-directed actions sensitive to semantic information from cognitive states? This paper critically examines a recent family of arguments whose aim is to challenge a widespread and influential view in philosophy and cognitive science: the view that action-guiding vision is cognitively impenetrable. I argue, in response, that while there may very well be top–down causal influences on action-guiding vision, they should not be taken to (...)
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  41. Discrete thoughts: Why cognition must use discrete representations.Eric Dietrich & Arthur B. Markman - 2003 - Mind and Language 18 (1):95-119.
    Advocates of dynamic systems have suggested that higher mental processes are based on continuous representations. In order to evaluate this claim, we first define the concept of representation, and rigorously distinguish between discrete representations and continuous representations. We also explore two important bases of representational content. Then, we present seven arguments that discrete representations are necessary for any system that must discriminate between two or more states. It follows that higher mental processes require discrete representations. We also argue that (...)
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  42. Rejecting the extended cognition moral narrative: a critique of two normative arguments for extended cognition.Guido Cassinadri & Marco Fasoli - 2023 - Synthese 202 (155):1-24.
    Given the explanatory stalemate between ‘embedded’ (EMB) and ‘extended’ (EXT) cognition, various authors have proposed normative and moral arguments in favour of EXT. According to what we call the “extended cognition moral narrative” (EXT-MN) (Cassinadri, 2022), we should embrace EXT and dismiss EMB, because the former leads to morally preferable consequences with respect to the latter. In this article we argue that two arguments following the EXT moral narrative are flawed. In Sect. 2.1 and 2.2, we present respectively King (2016) (...)
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  43. HUMAN COGNITIVE PROCESS – AN ANCIENT INDIAN MODEL.Varanasi Ramabrahmam - 2005 - In In the Proceedings of International Vedic Conference on Contribution of the Vedas to the world, 27-30 January, 2005 at Department of Ved, Gurukul Kangri Viswavidyalaya Haridwar, Uttaranchal, India.
    Human cognitive process as a combination of the triad Knower - Knowing - Known and the language learning process as a combination of the triad Subject -Verb - Object will be understood in the light of ancient Indian wisdom as revealed in the Upanishads and will be presented. -/- A physics awareness of Advaita (No Two) concept will be used to model human mental processes such as – Knowing / Learning, Perception / Thinking / Logic, Understanding / Experiencing / (...)
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  44. Cognition according to Quantum Information: Three Epistemological Puzzles Solved.Vasil Penchev - 2020 - Epistemology eJournal (Elsevier: SSRN) 13 (20):1-15.
    The cognition of quantum processes raises a series of questions about ordering and information connecting the states of one and the same system before and after measurement: Quantum measurement, quantum in-variance and the non-locality of quantum information are considered in the paper from an epistemological viewpoint. The adequate generalization of ‘measurement’ is discussed to involve the discrepancy, due to the fundamental Planck constant, between any quantum coherent state and its statistical representation as a statistical ensemble after measurement. Quantum in-variance (...)
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  45. State of the Art of Audio- and Video-Based Solutions for AAL.Slavisa Aleksic, Michael Atanasov, Jean Calleja Agius, Kenneth Camilleri, Anto Cartolovni, Pau Climent-Perez, Sara Colantonio, Stefania Cristina, Vladimir Despotovic, Hazim Kemal Ekenel, Ekrem Erakin, Francisco Florez-Revuelta, Danila Germanese, Nicole Grech, Steinunn Gróa Sigurđardóttir, Murat Emirzeoglu, Ivo Iliev, Mladjan Jovanovic, Martin Kampel, William Kearns, Andrzej Klimczuk, Lambros Lambrinos, Jennifer Lumetzberger, Wiktor Mucha, Sophie Noiret, Zada Pajalic, Rodrigo Rodriguez Perez, Galidiya Petrova, Sintija Petrovica, Peter Pocta, Angelica Poli, Mara Pudane, Susanna Spinsante, Albert Ali Salah, Maria Jose Santofimia, Anna Sigríđur Islind, Lacramioara Stoicu-Tivadar, Hilda Tellioglu & Andrej Zgank - 2022 - Alicante: University of Alicante.
    It is a matter of fact that Europe is facing more and more crucial challenges regarding health and social care due to the demographic change and the current economic context. The recent COVID-19 pandemic has stressed this situation even further, thus highlighting the need for taking action. Active and Assisted Living technologies come as a viable approach to help facing these challenges, thanks to the high potential they have in enabling remote care and support. Broadly speaking, AAL can be referred (...)
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  46. Naïve Realism and the Cognitive Penetrability of Perception.Dan Cavedon-Taylor - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (3):391-412.
    Perceptual experience has representational content. My argument for this claim is an inference to the best explanation. The explanandum is cognitive penetration. In cognitive penetration, perceptual experiences are either causally influenced, or else are partially constituted, by mental states that are representational, including: mental imagery, beliefs, concepts and memories. If perceptual experiences have representational content, then there is a background condition for cognitive penetration that renders the phenomenon prima facie intelligible. Naïve realist or purely relational accounts (...)
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  47. The Cognitive Significance of Kant's Third Critique.Michael Joseph Fletcher - 2011 - Dissertation, University of California, Santa Barbara
    This dissertation aims at forging an archetectonic link between Kant's first and third Critiques within a cognitive-semantic framework. My aim is to show how the major conceptual innovations of Kant’s third Critique can be plausibly understood in terms of the theoretical aims of the first, (Critique of Pure Reason). However, unlike other cognition-oriented approaches to Kant's third Critique, which take the point of contact between the first and third Critique's to be the first Critique's Transcendental Analytic, I link these (...)
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  48. Varieties of cognitive achievement.J. Adam Carter, Benjamin W. Jarvis & Katherine Rubin - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (6):1603-1623.
    According to robust virtue epistemology , knowledge is type-identical with a particular species of cognitive achievement. The identification itself is subject to some criticism on the grounds that it fails to account for the anti-luck features of knowledge. Although critics have largely focused on environmental luck, the fundamental philosophical problem facing RVE is that it is not clear why it should be a distinctive feature of cognitive abilities that they ordinarily produce beliefs in a way that is safe. (...)
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  49. Euphoria versus dysphoria: differential cognitive roles in religion?Yvan I. Russell, Robin I. M. Dunbar & Fernand Gobet - 2011 - In Slim Masmoudi, Abdelmajid Naceur & David Y. Dai (eds.), Attention, Representation & Performance. Psychology Press. pp. 147-165.
    The original book chapter does not have an abstract. However, I have written an abstract for this repository: Religious life encompasses a wide diversity of situations for which the emotional tone is on a continuum from extreme euphoria to extreme dysphoria. In this book chapter, we propose the novel hypothesis that euphoria and dysphoria have distinctly separate functional consequences for religious evolution and survivability. This is due to the differential cognitive states that are created in euphoric and dysphoric (...)
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  50. Radically enactive high cognition.Giovanni Rolla - 2018 - Dissertatio 47:26-41.
    I advance the Radically Enactive Cognition (REC) program by developing Hutto & Satne’s (2015) and Hutto & Myin’s (2017) idea that contentful cognition emerges through sociocultural activities, which require a contentless form of intentionality. Proponents of REC then face a functional challenge: what is the function of higher cognitive skills, given the empirical findings that engaging in higher-cognitive activities is not correlated with cognitive amelioration (Kornblith, 2012)? I answer that functional challenge by arguing that higher cognition is (...)
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