Emphasizing the importance of language is a key characteristic of philosophical reflection in general and of bioethics in particular. Rather than trying to eliminate the historicity and ambiguity of language, a continental approach to bioethics will make conscious use of it, for instance by closely studying the history of the key terms we employ in bioethical debates. Continental bioethics entails a focus on the historical vicissitudes of the key signifiers of the bioethical vocabulary, urging us to study the history of (...) terms such as “bioethics,” “autonomy,” “privacy,” and “consensus.” Instead of trying to define such terms as clearly and unequivocally as possible, a continental approach rather requires us to take a step backwards, tracing the historical backdrop of the words currently in vogue. By comparing the original meanings of terms with their current meanings, and by considering important moments of transition in their history, obfuscated dimensions of meaning can be retrieved. Thus, notwithstanding a number of methodological challenges involved in etymological exercises, they may foster moral articulacy and enhance our ability to come to terms with moral dilemmas we are facing. (shrink)

This article is about an etymological study of the concept "Woman" and leads towards Feminism. Written in Marathi for the first time ever. Published in a Rationalist Journal from Maharashtra. This is first part of the three parts.

Are the long, wildly inventive etymologies in Plato’s Cratylus just some kind of joke, or does Plato himself accept them? This standard question misses the most important feature of the etymologies: they are a competitive performance, an agôn by Socrates in which he shows that he can play the game of etymologists like Cratylus better than they can themselves. Such show-off performances are a recurrent feature of Platonic dialogue: they include Socrates’ speeches on eros in the Phaedrus, his rhetorical discourse (...) in the Menexenus, and his literary interpretation in the Protagoras. The paper compares these cases to work out the ground rules, purposes and implications of the Platonic agôn, and the Cratylus etymologies in particular. (shrink)

The article reviews the category of ‘happiness’ along three lines: etymological discourse, ‘objective’ indicators and elements of happiness as a social/cultural phenomenon, as well as the author's proposed formula for happiness. The relevance of this study is determined by the fact that human resource is the main resource of the State, and the future of the country depends on the well-being of each individual. As a result of the etymological discourse, the following conclusions have been drawn: 1, the category of (...) ‘happiness’ is a more recent entity; 2, the ancient Greek categories of ‘good’ and ‘the highest good’ are its progenitors; 3, in the West European philosophy, good is understood inconsistently and includes the range from its utilitarian meaning to its connection with the notion of ‘value’; 4, the category of ‘happiness’ includes two aspects: one under the control of a man and another determined by external factors. Thus, in understanding happiness, most studies focus on either social/biological or social/economic components. The author proposes an integrative formula for happiness, which has the following elements: 1, ‘why’/belief system: life according to one’s own convictions; 2, ‘what’/abilities: their fulfilment in a professional/cognitive activity, i.e. the implementation of cognitive interest; 3, ‘where’/the place for fulfilling one’s life, understood as a geographical and climatic space; 4, ‘with whom’/ communication with people the person truly likes and who like him/her, while keeping a socially acceptable distance of a detached polite interaction with the rest of the social space. Therefore, happiness is the harmony of triune: the person with the Self, the Self with the world and the world with the Self. (shrink)

Focusing on sin as a historical-cultural and socio-religious construction in a process that encompasses its mythical-religious aspects, the article points out that the concept that expresses its notion is rooted in the borders involving human failure to correspond to the paradigmatic framework and its system of taboos, laws and moral codes. Thus, converging on the etymological-literary and biblical-religious aspects of sin, the article emphasizes that, by ending the meaning of missing the mark, the translation of the aforementioned term as “sin” (...) corresponds to the textual transposition established by the Septuagintversion in a movement of abstraction from the notion of moral guilt. Based on Ricoeur's reading of the philosophical-theological aspects of sin, the article that points out that sin is not a term capable of exhausting the meaning of reality that it implies as a symbol of the rupture between essence and existence, converging to its characterization as a symbol of eviland “mythical grandeur” through a construction that marks sin as an intersection involving evil and the world and attributes its emergence tothe act and determines its identification as a product and simultaneously a cause. Thus, focusing on the biblical-theological aspects of sin in Tillich and on the construction of the concept as an alienation between “non-faith” and “non-love”, the articleemphasizes the irreducible character of the conception that, according to the Apostle Paul, encloses the condition of an almost personal powerthat controls this world, which implies the superposition of a state of affairs characterized by objectivity and the configuration of the event now designated as a rupture involving essence and existence in a movement that may represent the human separation from the “Being-in-itself” and expressing the element of personal responsibility imbricated in its existential dynamics. (shrink)

In this paper we give some suggestions from etymology on the contrast between Kaplan’s direct reference theory and a neo-Fregean view on indexicals. After a short summary of the philosophical debate on indexicals (§1), we use some remarks about the hidden presence of a demonstrative root in all indexicals to derive some provisional doubts concerning Kaplan’s criticism of what he calls “sloppy thinker” (§2). To support those doubts, we will summarise some etymological data on the derivation of the so-called (...) “pure indexicals” from an original demonstrative root (§ 3). The aim of the paper is to consider etymological data as providing evidence for alternative theories of language and fostering new directions in linguistic and philosophical research on specific topics. (shrink)

Against the background of a conventionalist theory, and staged as a defense of a naturalistic notion of names and naming, the critique of language developed in Plato’s Cratylus does not only propose that human language, in contrast to the language of the gods, is bound to the realm of myth and lie. The dialogue also concludes by offering a set of reasons to think that knowledge of reality is not within the reach of our words. Interpretations of the dialogue’s long (...) etymological sections often neglect this critique and tend to end up with an overly optimistic assessment of the theory of language on offer. In the light of one of the dialogue’s central etymological accounts, Socrates’ etymology of the name Hermes, this paper discusses two recent and influential versions of such a view: David Sedley’s theory of onomatopoetic encapsulation and Franco Trivigno’s qualified referentialism. It argues that the complex relation between language and reality expressed in the Cratylus cannot be exhaustively captured by either of these theories because Plato considers all names to be semantically underdetermined until they are put to use. It suggests that Plato rather works with a functionalistic notion of names and naming, and that the dialogue’s account of natural and correct naming is to be understood in these terms. (shrink)

Geometry, etymologically the “science of measuring the Earth”, is a mathematical formalization of space. Just as formal concepts of number may be rooted in an evolutionary ancient system for perceiving numerical quantity, the fathers of geometry may have been inspired by their perception of space. Is the spatial content of formal Euclidean geometry universally present in the way humans perceive space, or is Euclidean geometry a mental construction, specific to those who have received appropriate instruction? The spatial content of the (...) formal theories of geometry may depart from spatial perception for two reasons: first, because in geometry, only some of the features of spatial figures are theoretically relevant; and second, because some geometric concepts go beyond any possible perceptual experience. Focusing in turn on these two aspects of geometry, we will present several lines of research on US adults and children from the age of three years, and participants from an Amazonian culture, the Mundurucu. Almost all the aspects of geometry tested proved to be shared between these two cultures. Nevertheless, some aspects involve a process of mental construction where explicit instruction seem to play a role in the US, but that can still take place in the absence of instruction in geometry. (shrink)

This is an etymological, Biblical and philosophical scrutiny of Milton's Satan. While Satan is a metaphor in Paradise Lost, he is very much real within Christian Studies. This essay revisits the reality of Satan.

English Abstract: The manuscript describes a new scientific discipline called Octology, which should unify morphogenetic linguistics and neurobiology to investigate the development of the words, cognition and behavior. -/- Russian Abstract: В книге даётся описание научной дисциплины Октологии, призванной объединять морфогенетическую лингвистику и нейробиологию для исследования словообразования, понимания и поведения. -/- German Abstract: Der Begriff Oktologie (Engl. octology) wurde von Dr. Andrej Poleev in seinem gleichnamigen Aufsatz, der am 8. März 2010 erschienen ist, im Umlauf gebracht, und bezeichnet eine wissenschaftliche (...) Disziplin, welche die morphogenetische Linguistk und Neurobiologie vereint, um die Zusammenhänge zwischen Wahrnehmung, Verhalten und Wortbildung zu erforschen. Die Sprache ist das Mittel zwischenmenschlicher Verständigung, und der Sprache ist dieses Buch gewidmet. Wie entsteht Sprache? Welche sprachliche Formen gab es, gibt es heute, und wird es noch geben? In welchem Verhältnis steht Kultur zur Sprache? Was sind neurobiologische Grundlagen des Denkens und der Verbalisierung mentaler Inhalte? Mit diesen und anderen Fragen befasst sich neue Wissenschaft, die im Jahr 2010 gegründet wurde, um interdisziplinär die Zusammenhänge zwischen Wahrnehmung, Wortbildung und Verhalten zu erforschen. (shrink)

In this article, I discuss prospects for democracy in the Middle East. I argue, first, that some democratic experiments—for instance, Egypt under Mohammed Morsi—are not in keeping with etymological and historical meanings of democracy; and second, that efforts to promote democracy, especially as exemplified in U.N. documents emphasizing universal rights grounded in Western traditions, are possibly totalitarian and also colonialist and hence counter to democratic ideals insofar as they impart one set of values as the only morally acceptable ones. A (...) respectful dialogue in which people from both regions strive to understand conditions giving rise to certain social practices would be more productive than morally superior attitudes, and help all to see areas where their respective cultures could be improved. I conclude by discussing concepts of democratic and pragmatic faith articulated by John Dewey and William James, arguing that democracy will continue to flounder in the Middle East so long as the basic trust implied in these concepts is lacking; and how Westerners might consider this a cautionary tale regarding social attitudes and public policies contrary to democratic life in their own countries. (shrink)

Darshana, in the sense of true philosophical knowledge, Darshana is first quoted in the Vaiśesika Sūtra (first century CE) to mean the perfect vision of everything. Etymologically, Darshana evolves from the Sanskr̥ti term Drś, that is, vision. The contemporary use of the term Darshana finds its new dimension in the writings of Haribhardra (eighteenth century CE), who considers different philosophical schools in the cord of Darshana in his text Ṣad-darśana-samuccaya. Later, eminent Vedāntin Mādhava in fourteenth century CE popularized and expatiated (...) the meaning of Darshana in Sarvadarśana Saṅgraha. The purport of the term Darshana is embedded in the notion of Indianness that caters to an influential uniqueness in Hinduism, Jainism (Samyak Darshana or liberation consists in right vision) and Mahayana Buddhism (Nagarjuna’s dictum tattva-darśana, i.e., the true reality, and Vasubandhu’s use of Darshana marga, i.e., the conduit of seeing). -/- The conception of the word guru in Indian cultures goes back to the Upanishadic era, especially in the Mundakopanishad, where Brahma (the creator of the world) taught the Brahma Vidya (the foundation of all knowledge or the speculative discussion about ultimate reality) to his eldest son, Atharvan. Later, Artharvan transmitted the Brahma Vidya to Angiras, who shared the absolute knowledge with Satyavaha, a successor of Sage Bharadwaja. Satyavaha narrated to Bharadwaja, who finally imparted the knowledge (both the higher and lower levels) to Angiras. One could find a significance herein using the Upanishadic term paraparam (Mundakopanishad, 1.2). The term not only indicates that the foundation of all knowledge has two different folds – para (transcendent) and apar (mundane) – but also that the term paraparam tinges on the transmission progression of the knowledge from guru (enlightened master) to his shisya (dedicated disciple). The proper way of learning Brahma Vidya depends on the gurupasadana; the only guru can condescend to expose wisdom to the devoted disciples. (shrink)

It is often thought that consciousness has a qualitative dimension that cannot be tracked by science. Recently, however, some philosophers have argued that this worry stems not from an elusive feature of the mind, but from the special nature of the concepts used to describe conscious states. Marc Champagne draws on the neglected branch of philosophy of signs or semiotics to develop a new take on this strategy. The term “semiotics” was introduced by John Locke in the modern period – (...) its etymology is ancient Greek, and its theoretical underpinnings are medieval. Charles Sanders Peirce made major advances in semiotics, so he can act as a pipeline for these forgotten ideas. Most philosophers know Peirce as the founder of American pragmatism, but few know that he also coined the term “qualia,” which is meant to capture the intrinsic feel of an experience. Since pragmatic verification and qualia are now seen as conflicting commitments, Champagne endeavors to understand how Peirce could (or thought he could) have it both ways. The key, he suggests, is to understand how humans can insert distinctions between features that are always bound. Recent attempts to take qualities seriously have resulted in versions of panpsychism, but Champagne outlines a more plausible way to achieve this. So, while semiotics has until now been the least known branch of philosophy ending in –ics, his book shows how a better understanding of that branch can move one of the liveliest debates in philosophy forward. (shrink)

This is a personal and philosophical reflection on the theme of acceptance as it relates to my grief journey following the deaths of my son and father (among others) in recent years. Its main premise is that acceptance is a state of being given, and, as such, we would do well to stop not accepting. To learn how to do this, I draw on a wide range of sources, from Christian and Persian mystics (Marguerite Porete, Simone Weil, Rumi, Hāfez), to (...) rock singers (Jeremy Enigk, Eddie Vedder, Chris Cornell, Kurt Cobain, Maynard James Keenan), to architects (Rem Koolhaas). I also dive into the Ancient Greek etymology of the word “acceptance.” The overall result is a philosophical guide into acceptance. (shrink)

In its etymology and in popular discourse, the term ‘avant-garde’ is commonly associated with a future temporality, while in art-historical discourse, it represents a tradition of modernist innovation, periodised as ‘historical avant-garde’ and ‘neo-avant-garde’. Since this historical periodisation was first established in the 1950s, the avant-garde’s futurity has been repeatedly disputed, bringing the very notion of an avant-garde into question. This thesis takes as its starting point the predicament of ‘an avant-garde after the avant-garde’ as a means to investigate (...) the philosophico-political implications of a historical temporality marked by ‘afterness’. Writing in critical dialogue with scholarship that has articulated the avant-garde as a notion of historical time, the thesis modifies the parameters of this scholarship by foregrounding the category of historicism, and by reformulating the avant-garde as a notion that both resists and inhabits historical periodisation. As a study at the disciplinary intersection of comparative literature and critical theory, 'Ahead of its Time' proceeds via close readings of selected theories of the avant-garde (German literary scholar Peter Bürger’s foundational Theory of the Avant-Garde in the 1970s; British art theorist John Roberts’ formulation of a ‘suspensive avant-garde’ in the twenty-first century; and the intellectual debates of the Italian circle Neoavanguardia in the 1960s), while also mobilising the critical resources available in the thought of Walter Benjamin. Through a non-linear, comparativist critical analysis that discusses these theories in, and as, a Benjaminian constellation, the thesis proposes the avant-garde as a relational, indexical category that is constitutively split between historical continuity and historical rupture. In this manner, 'Ahead of its Time' revisits the broader question of mediation between universality and particularity, and by recasting it in temporal terms, it advocates a chronopolitics of singularity, whereby the avant-garde’s split between continuity and rupture also reveals the ethically-necessary relationship between self-determination and contingency. (shrink)

The article proposes to model the phenomenon of the cell phone as a wall-window. This model aims at explicating some of the perceptions and experiences associated with cellular technology. The wall-window model means that the cell phone simultaneously separates the user from the physical surroundings (the wall), and connects the user to a remote space (the window). The remote space may be where the interlocutor resides or where information is stored (e.g. the Internet). Most cell phone usage patterns are modeled (...) as a single dimension according to the level of distraction or attention of the user. In order to accommodate nuanced situations such as augmented reality, I suggest a two-dimensional layout: the wall-window. The wall represents the attention to the immediate physical environment, while the window represents the attention to a remote space. The wall-window model further evolves once a screen is woven into this layout. This addition is easily understood due to the screen’s etymology, which is associated with the concepts of shield or barrier. From a technical perspective, the screen has become an integral part of the cell phone. Furthermore, a screen itself is both a wall and a window. Lastly, once a cell phone is supplemented with a screen, it is easier to refer to it as media. And again, media fits into the wall-window model. (shrink)

The graph tong同and its associated concepts, such as da-tong (Great tong大同) and xuan-tong (mystic or dark tong玄同), have played important roles in the development of Chinese philosophy. Yet tong has received scant attention from either western or eastern scholarships. This paper is a first attempt to remedy such regret. Unlike usual understandings of tong as sameness or unity, this paper presents a nuanced account from early China, that is, ‘difference to one,’ a definition from the Mozi墨子. This definition can be (...) supported from etymological, textual, and lexical evidence. ‘Difference to one’ should not be solely attributed to a Mohist understanding; it in fact represents a common understanding of tong across philosophical streams in early China. This nuanced account provides new insights into the concept of tong in early philosophical texts, and furthermore breaks solid grounds for further studies of tong and its associated concepts. (shrink)

Holism is the notion that all the elements in a system, whether physical, biological, social or political, are interconnected and therefore should be appreciated as a whole. Consequently, the meaning or function of the total system is irreducible to the meaning or function of one or more of the system’s constituent elements. The whole is, on the holist’s account, prior to its parts. In the Metaphysics, Aristotle captures the idea of holism in his statement that “the whole is more than (...) the sum of the parts.” The term holism was coined by South African statesman and scholar Jan Smuts. Etymologically, it comes from a Greek root meaning total, whole, entire or everything. In political thought, the idea is commonly associated with organicism, the view that the state is a living whole (the so-called “body politic”) and therefore studies of the how it functions should be treated systematically rather than piecemeal (cf. Plato, G.W.F. Hegel and Henry Maine). (shrink)

The opening words of the second book of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics are as familiar as any in his corpus: Excellence of character results from habituation [ethos]—which is in fact the source of the name it has acquired [êthikê], the word for ‘character-trait’ [êthos] being a slight variation of that for ‘habituation’ [ethos]. This makes it quite clear that none of the excellences of character [êthikê aretê] comes about in us by nature; for no natural way of being is changed through (...) habituation [ethizetai]. Equally familiar, unfortunately, is the characterization of Aristotle’s notion of character formation as a form of habituation by means of the repetition of actions which results in a “habit” in the same way that a weight lifter produces muscles through the repetition of exertions. As a 19th century commentator remarked on the passage above, “[insert Grant].” From a Socratic perspective, such a view of becoming good seems hopelessly rigid and unconnected to the intellectual development which knowledge of the good requires. Habit and habituation in Aristotle seem eminently familiar and eminently unphilosophical. Such a view would be mistaken on at least three counts. First, the notion of character formation (to use the broadest possible term for the phenomenon of habituation) in Aristotle is significantly more complicated than the notion that through habituation one develops good habits which are what we mean by ethical virtue. Although character formation includes the development of proper emotional responses, such as taking pleasure in what is fine and being repulsed by what is shameful, it is equally concerned with cognitive development independent of the intellectual virtues. Second, although Aristotle’s terms for “ethics” (êthica), character-trait (êthos), and habituation (ethos, ethismos, or ethizetai) are linguistically and conceptually interrelated, his notion of “ethical state” (hexis) is both linguistically and conceptually quite distinct from the notion of “habit,” at least as we use that term today. As one Aristotle translator has put it, “A hexis is not only not the same thing as a habit, but is almost exactly its opposite.” For Aristotle, a hexis is a dynamic equilibrium which, although always productive of virtuous actions, is nonetheless the basis for being virtuous in varied circumstances. Thirdly, once Aristotle’s notion of a character state is retrieved from its false association with “habit” and repetitive habituation, one sees that its apparent divorce from practical reason is more a fixture of Aristotle’s analytical method and its connotations of inflexibility or fixedness are in fact antithetical to Aristotle’s description of ethical virtue. Rather than view ethical “character” in its Greek etymological sense as an indelibly fixed or engraved mark or stamp (charactêr) upon one’s soul, Aristotle’s notion of ethical character (êthos) or virtue (aretê) captures the notion of a virtuoso who is responsive in an excellent fashion to what reason perceives in particular and changing circumstances. (shrink)

Understanding Hegel's account of particularity has proven to be anything but straightforward. Two main accounts of particularity have been advanced: the particular as an example or instance and the particular as a subjective perspective on a universal concept. The problem with these accounts is that they reduce particularity either to singularity or to universality. As Derrida's analyses make apparent, the ‘structure of exemplarity’ in Hegel is quite intricate. Hegel uses ‘example’ in three senses: it means (1) ‘instance’, ‘illustration’, or (2) (...) ‘model’, ‘exemplary individual’, ‘paradigm’, or (3) a by-play (a meaning derived from Hegel's neologismbeiherspielen, in whichBeispielis understood quasi-etymologically as a ‘by-play’ of accidental moments). ABeispielin the first sense can be replaced by another instance in a free play (by-play). This play of accidental moments, however, is not entirely free; it generates a series (of replacements) that ultimately leads to an example in the second sense, to an exemplary individual. I argue that particularity can be taken as exemplarity of this kind, oscillating between a singular example and a universal paradigm. Within this by-play, the universal concept, its law, is supposed to be mediated and determined. However, out of the differences between the examples the by-play induces another law, the law of non-mediation, which may, in Derrida's view, actually negate the dialectical movement towards universality. I argue, utilizing Malabou's concept of plasticity, that this disruption may be recovered. This implies that each individual example within a series is a particular determination of the universal. Hence, we can take literally Hegel's claim that the movement of the concept is play. (shrink)

In this study, after a short introductory information on the etymology, origin, and transition of botanical knowledge in Medieval Islamic Civilisation, we made a comparison of illustrated botanical works in Maghreb and Masriq through two illustrated books. We studied on randomly selected illustrations from Kitab al- Hashaish at-Tibb li-Diskuridus al-Aynzarbi translated by Istefan ibn Basil & Hunayn ibn Ishaq from Dioscorides’ Materia Medica, and Kitab al-Adwiyat al-Mufradat of Abu Ja’far Ahmad al-Ghafiqi, the Andalusian physician, pharmacist, and herbalist. We made (...) comparisons on the illustrations of nine plants and one lichen, chosen from Codex Osler of al-Ghafiqi, and Codices Ayasofya of Istefan-Hunayn, with real photos of plants and lichen, via the methods used currently in the science-art of botanical illustration. With this «botanical illustrative method», we conclude that in the same century, the work of al-Ghafiqi has been copied in a more accurate way than that of Istefan-Hunayn translation. -/- تخصص هذه الدراسة - بعد تقديم معلومات تمهيدية موجزة عن علم أصل الكلمات، وأصول وتطور المعرفة النباتية في الحضارة الإسلامية في العصور الوسطى - للتحليل المقارن للمؤلفات في علم النبات المصور في المغرب والمشرق، من خلال كتابين مصورين. و لهذه الغاية، قمنا بتحليل سلسلة من الرسوم، إختيرت بشكل تلقائي، أُخذت من كتاب النباتات الطبية لصاحبه دِيُسوفُورِيدس، و من ترجمة ابن استيفان ابن باسل و حنين ابن إسحاق لدراسة المادة الطبية لديسوفوريدس، و من كتاب الأدوية البسيطة لأبو جعفر أحمد الغافقي، و هو طبيب و صيدلي و عشاب أندلسي. لقد أجرينا مقارنات لرسوم تسعة نباتات و أشنة وقع الإختيار عليها من كتاب أوسلر للغافقي و من كتب أياصوفيا لإستيفان و حنين، مع صور حقيقية لعينات من هذه الأنواع، باستخدام الطرق المطبقة في وقتنا الراهن في فن وعلم الرسوم النباتية. و بعد تطبيق هذا المنهج التصويري النباتي، نستطيع أن نخلص إلى أنه، و على الرغم من إنتاجها في نفس القرن، فإن نسخ رسوم الغافقي النباتية كانت أكثر دقة من تلك الموجودة في ترجمة استيفان - حنين. الكلمات المفتاحية دِيُسوفُورِيدس، الغافقي، تاريخ علم النبات، الأندلس -/- Este estudio –tras una breve información introductoria sobre etimología, orígenes y evolución del conocimiento botánico en la civilización islámica medieval– está dedicado a un análisis comparativo de los tratados botánicos ilustrados en el Magreb y en el Máshreq, a través de dos libros ilustrados. Para ello, hemos analizado una serie de ilustraciones, elegidas al azar, extraídas del Libro de plantas medicinales de Dioscórides por Anazarba, traducción de Istefan ibn Basil y Hunayn ibn Ishaq del tratado De materia medica de Dioscórides, y del Libro de los medicamentos simples de Abu Ya'far Ahmad al-Gafiqi, médico, farmacéutico y herbolario andalusí. Hemos llevado a cabo comparaciones de las ilustraciones de nueve plantas y un liquen, escogidos del códice Osler de al-Gafiqi y de los códices Ayasofya de Istefan-Hunayn, con fotografías reales de especímenes de dichas especies, acudiendo a los métodos aplicados actualmente en el arte y ciencia de la ilustración botánica. Tras este «método ilustrativo botánico», podemos concluir que, aunque llevadas a cabo en el mismo siglo, las copias de ilustraciones de al-Gafiqi han resultado más precisas que las de la traducción de Istefan-Hunayn. (shrink)

Suicide or self-destruction means in ordinary language “the act of killing oneself deliberately” (intentionally or on purpose). Indeed, that’s what we read in the Oxford dictionary and the Oxford dictionary of philosophy , which seems to be confirmed by the etymology of the term “suicide”, a term introduced around mid-17th century deduced from the modern Latin suicidium, ‘act of suicide’. Traditionally, suicide was regarded as immoral, irreligious and illegal in Western culture. However, during the 17th century this Christian view (...) started to change as a consequence of the rise of modern science . Generally speaking, Spinoza does not write much on death. His name does even not occur in the Oxford Philosophy of Death, although he had had very particular ideas on the nature of death. However, he even had much more particular ideas on suicide. Moreover, he states in the fourth proposition of the third part of his masterpiece, the Ethics, that self-destruction is simply impossible: Nulla res, nisi à causâ externâ, potest destrui. (shrink)

When faced with a rule that they take to be true, and a recalcitrant example, people are apt to say: “The exception proves the rule”. When pressed on what they mean by this though, things are often less than clear. A common response is to dredge up some once-heard etymology: ‘proves’ here, it is often said, means ‘tests’. But this response—its frequent appearance even in some reference works notwithstanding1—makes no sense of the way in which the expression is used. (...) To insist that the exception proves the rule is to insist that whilst this is an exception, the rule still stands; and furthermore, that, rather than undermining the rule, the exception serves to confirm it. This second claim may seem paradoxical, but it should not, once it is realized that what does the confirming is not the exception itself, but rather the fact that we judge it to be an exception; and that what is confirmed is not the rule itself, but rather the fact that we judge it to be a rule. To treat something as an exception is not to treat it as a counterexample that refutes the existence of the rule. Rather it is to treat it as special, and so to concede the rule from which it is excepted. The point comes clearly in the original (probably 17th Century) Latin form: Exceptio probat (figit2) regulam in casibus non exceptis. Exception (i.e. the act of excepting) proves (establishes) the rule in the cases not excepted. Clearly this form of reasoning cannot apply when the rule that we are considering has the form of a simple universal generalization. Here there can be no exceptions, only counterexamples. So what we need, and what will be developed.. (shrink)

Part of a larger project of constructing a new, historically informed philosophy of dance, built on four phenomenological constructs that I call “Moves,” this essay concerns the third Move, “grace.” The etymology of the word “grace” reveals the entwined meanings of pleasing quality and authoritative power, which may be combined as “beautiful force.” I examine the treatments of grace in German philosopher Friedrich Schiller, who understands it as playful, naive transformation of matter; and in American philosopher John Dewey, for (...) whom it represents rhythmic organism/environment reversal. I conclude by showing how “grace” can be used in analyzing various types of dance, which in turn suggests transformational potential for philosophy, dance, and society as a whole. (shrink)

In the major French and German etymological dictionaries of Latin, there is some puzzlement over the semantics of exāmen: how can one word refer to a measurement or examination, but also to a swarm of bees? Walde and Hofmann suggest these two dis-parate meanings stem from the diverse meanings of the verb exigō (<*ex-agō, ‘to drive out’), from which exāmen derives. They claim these two senses of exāmen become two words in the Latin Sprachgefühl. Ernout and Meillet agree: there is (...) more than one exāmen in the Latins’ sentiment linguistique. I, too, agree. But this approach does not tell us why these terms derive from exigō, nor does it give any hint of an underlying concept which measurements and swarms of bees share, which makes a derivation from exigō appropriate to both. The present paper addresses this puzzle by reducing the two meanings of exāmen to one meaning of the parent term *ex-agō: ‘to drive out.’ In sum: a swarm of bees is a ‘driving out’ or outpouring, and a measurement or examination is a ‘driving out’ or setting out for scrutiny. This interpretation is moreover supported by semantically parallel uses of cognate terms in other Indo-European languages, notably Greek and Old Irish, and by semantic parallels in English and in the Slavic language family. Along the way, I touch upon a philosophical puzzle: at what point do evolving linguistic items with a common source become distinct from one another? (shrink)

This essay is part of a larger project in which I construct a new, historically-informed, social justice-centered philosophy of dance, centered on four central phenomenological constructs, or “Moves.” This essay in particular is about the fourth Move, “resilience.” More specifically, I explore how Judith Butler engages with the etymological aspects of this word, suggesting that resilience involves a productive form of madness and a healthy form of compulsion, respectively. I then conclude by showing how “resilience” can be used in the (...) analysis of various Wittgensteinian “families” of dance, which in turn could facilitate positive educational changes in philosophy, dance and society, with particular efficacy on the axis of gender. In brief, by teaching a conception of strength as vulnerability (instead of machismo’s view of strength as apathetic “toughness”), a pedagogy of dancing resilience provides additional support for feminists (including Anzaldúa, Haraway, Butler and Concepción) who advocate a cautious openness toward seemingly-unlikely resources and allies (including analytic methodologies, Machiavellian politics, and the discourses of the natural sciences). (shrink)

Our article deals with Aristotle’s account of the sphere of temperance in the Nicomachean Ethics. The goal is to provide a detailed analysis of NE III.10 in order to identify the difficulties this chapter presents us with and to introduce and discuss the interpretations set forth by the secondary literature. Of special interest to us are Aristotle’s intense dialogue with Plato; the difficulty in understanding touch as the most common of the senses and Aristotle’s severe judgment of the pleasures of (...) the sphere of temperance. In short, Aristotle seems to set out from platonic thesis and notions only to distance himself from them by introducing his own, associating temperance with the most common of the senses, namely, the sense of touch. This association is not based, as it could seem primafacie, on a merely empirical observation but on the assumption that touch is the most fundamental and necessary sense for humans and animals alike. Temperance, therefore, as the excellence in the relation with the most fundamental and necessary of the senses, seems to be a pre-condition for rational action. From this Aristotle derives the etymology of the term, as the one who preserves practical reason. This hypothesis would explain why Aristotle seems to engage in apotreptic language to characterize the lack of temperance, that is, the vice of intemperance – something we do not find the in the account of any other virtue and vice. (shrink)

Aristotle regarded highly the concept of friendship. For him, friendship—being one of the virtues just like truth, justice, courage, etc.—is something that affects not just human behavior but even the state’s as well . However, the English language has set a limit to its use and thus diminished its meaning. While the Greek for friendship, which is φιλια can be translated as love, when using the English language one cannot say that as A and B are friends, it must be (...) that A and B are lovers. But for the Greeks, A and B are friends, if and only if, A and B are lovers. In fact, φιλια is where half of the word philosophy comes from. Why is it that even when tracing the etymology of philosophy, one uses “love of wisdom” instead of “friend of wisdom?” This is not the case for Aristotle. Aside from just regarding highly friendship by considering it as affecting the individual and the collective’s behavior toward others, Aristotle goes further by claiming that friendship is a necessary ingredient, not just to have an orderly life and state, but in order to have a eudaimon life, i.e., a happy life. Thus, for Aristotle, without friendship, a person cannot be happy. (shrink)

The word pro-tasis is etymologically a near equivalent of pre-mise, pro-position, and ante-cedent—all having positional, relational connotations now totally absent in contemporary use of proposition. Taking protasis for premise, Aristotle’s statement (24a16) -/- A protasis is a sentence affirming or denying something of something…. -/- is not a definition of premise—intensionally: the relational feature is absent. Likewise, it is not a general definition of proposition—extensionally: it is too narrow. This paper explores recent literature on these issues.

The paper deals with concept of theft in general with a few selected verses in Sanskrit Literature, from its etymological meaning and the idea behind. It deals with the concept of plagiarism in particular with special reference to some thoughts on plagiarism and credential stealing in ancient Indian scriptures and Vaarakari Sampraday in Maharashtra. The research article is devided in thre parts: first deals with the etymology – in englsih and Sanskrit; second deasl with the considerable scope of the (...) concept of plagiarism and the last part deals with the ancient and medival references plagiarism in Sanskrit literature. चोरी ही जागतिक समस्या आहे. वस्तूंची साधी गरज अथवा तिची तीव्रतेने गरजेची असताना तिचा तुटवडा असणे, तिचा अभाव असणे, किंवा ती आजूबाजूला असणे पण आपल्याला उपलब्ध न होणे, ती अप्राप्य होणे, इत्यादी कारणांमुळे (तिच्या) चोरीची घटना घडते.चोरवाङमय आणि वाङमयचौर्य या दोन संकल्पनांमध्ये फरक आहे. चोरवाङमय म्हणजे चोरीविषयीचे वाङमय. वाङमयचौर्य म्हणजे वाङमयाची, ज्ञानाची चोरी. प्रस्तुत संशोधन लेखात ज्ञानाची चोरी म्हणजे वाङमयचौर्य आणि श्रेयचौर्य या संकल्पनांचा संस्कृत वाङमयाच्या संदर्भात घेतलेला शोध, तिचे प्राचीन, मध्ययुगीन भारतीय संदर्भ, यांचा धांडोळा घेतला आहे. (shrink)

A belief in a firm correspondence between objects, ideas, and their representation in language pervaded the works of Anne Robert Jacques Turgot

(1727–1781) in 1750. This conviction is particularly manifest in Turgot’s sharp critique of Berkeley’s philosophical system and his remarks on Maupertuis’s reconstruction of the origin of language. During the 1750s Turgot’s epistemological views underwent a change, apparent in two of his contributions to the Encyclopédie: the entries Existence and Étymologie (1756). These articles included a reassessment of Berkeleyan immaterialism, facing (...) an ultimate crisis of definition and representation. A similar development may be traced in contemporary works by Condillac and Diderot. Turgot’s Encyclopédie entries also envisaged a new science, an archeology of the human mind aided by the examination of linguistic development and change. This entailed the scientific verification of conjectures in any historical account of ideas, turning etymological

and psychological inquiries into what Turgot termed ‘experimental metaphysics’. (shrink)

By rethinking the meaning of a central idiom in the Great Learning, this essay intends to open up a new horizon for the hermeneutics of early Confucian thinking, which has little to do with metaphysics. Through a careful etymological study of ge wu and a dialogue between the Great Learning and Heidegger's phenomenology of human affection, I demonstrate the critical position of the human heart in early Chinese thinking. This new interpretation of early Confucian moral teachings also recovers an invigorating (...) possibility for contemporary discourse on the question of ethics. (shrink)

The overarching thesis of this essay is that despite the etymological relationship between the word ‘philosophy’ and wisdom—the word ‘philosophos’, in Greek, means ‘lover of wisdom’—and irrespective of the longstanding tradition of identifying philosophers with ‘wise men’—mainline philosophy, historically, has had little interest in wisdom and has been preoccupied primarily with knowledge. Philosophy, if we are speaking of the mainline tradition, has had and continues to have more in common with the natural and social sciences than it does with the (...) humanities and liberal arts. In advancing this thesis, I divide the history of philosophy into three competing traditions: the mainline tradition of philosophy and two philosophical ‘countercultures,’ one conservative the other radical. At issue between these rival traditions is precisely the relative significance of knowledge and wisdom and their respective places in inquiry. I also provide an account of the distinction between knowledge and wisdom—which I argue is greater than has perhaps been appreciated—and between the natural and applied sciences, on the one hand, and the humanities and liberal arts on the other. (Published Online February 27 2006). (shrink)

The question addressed in this article is to what extent a destructed concept of religion can be said to characterize the philosophical method of Martin Heidegger. In order to approach this question, we first characterize his method as “Vollzug der Fraglichkeit”: philosophy in its deepest sense does not mean to give answers to questions but to ask questions. According to Heidegger, the execution of questioning consists in the “transforming repetition” of the leading question of philosophy in order to ask the (...) basic question of philosophy. In the second part of the article, we reflect on the “religious” character of Heidegger’s method of questioning. The reflection makes use of different etymological derivations of the word ‘Religion’: relegere, re-eligere, religare, relinquere. In the third part of the article, we discuss what Heidegger’s “religious” method of philosophy means for present questions concerning religion. To that end, we finish with a confrontation between Heidegger and Derrida with respect to the “religious” method of philosophy. (shrink)

本文通过对德国著名汉学家、翻译家卫礼贤的最后一部哲学论著《中国哲学导 论》(1929)的翻译和研究,整理归纳了卫礼贤对中国哲学的核心词“道”的五种不同译法, 深入剖析了他如何用“一词多译”的方法,对中国哲学史上不同文本、不同哲学家、不同时代 及不同思想维度中的“道”进行诠释。同时,本文以术语学(Terminologie)为研究方法,聚焦 于卫礼贤用来翻译“道”的几个德语哲学术语,并对这些词汇进行溯源。以此为切入点, 本文 分析了卫礼贤作为对中国哲学与德国哲学均有深刻理解的汉学家,有意识地从跨文化比较哲学 的角度出发,将“道”转换为德国哲学中与之相匹配的哲学概念,并将其介绍给德国思想界的 路径。重新审视卫礼贤对“道”的“一词多译”,在加强当今中外文化互鉴和中文著作外译方面 具有积极且重要的作用。[This contribution is based on the translation and study of the book Chinesische Philosophie: Eine Einführung (Chinese Philosophy: An Introduction, 1929). It is the last philosophy-related work by the famous German sinologist and translator Richard Wilhelm. The article provides a compilation, summary, and in-depth analysis concerning Wilhelm's handling of the translation of "Dao", the "Urwort" (Heidegger) of Chinese philosophy. The study provides insight into how Wilhelm has used a poly-perspective method to (...) interpret the word “Dao" by using five different translation terms in relation to divergent texts, various philosophers, and different periods in the history of Chinese philosophy. Some of the German philosophical terms that were applied in these translations are investigated by tracing their etymological origins and general semantics. Richard Wilhelm was a sinologist with a deep understanding of both Chinese and German philosophical traditions. He deliberately imparted the different philosophical meanings of "Dao" in a way that was compatible with the context of the contemporary German intellectual community. In parts, he presented this semantic field from the perspective of transcultural philosophy. We believe that a re-examination of Richard Wilhelm's variational approaches to translate the term "Dao" can provide important methodological inspirations for the translation of complex Chinese texts as well as concerning the improvement of mutual cultural understanding between Chinese and other cultures.]. (shrink)

The article starts with two uses presented by Plato concerning the etymology of Hades' name. In the Phaedo, he follows the tradition and interprets the name as the 'in-visible'. In the Cratylus, on the other hand, he proposes a new reading of Hades as the 'all-knowing'. Despite this inconsistency, there is an anterior coherence in regard to the project of extinguishing the fear of death in the tradition. To understand these differences and similarities we recur to the Republic. In (...) this dialogue, there is a political motivation to extinguish the fear of death amongst citizens. Fearing death would be prejudicial for their brave behaviour in battles. We also found a concession to the manipulative use of the etymologies in order to correct illusory beliefs of the people. These are taken as evidence that the superficial variation on the use of the etymologies of Hades is consistent if read under the framework of a political project. Nevertheless, this is not exempt from moral questions. One may ask if this kind of manipulation remains to be seen as wrong, who would be allowed to do it and in which cases. It follows an attempt to find Plato's answer to these questions and a discussion with the contemporary literature on the subject. (shrink)

In this paper, I try to show how Japanese practices of self-cultivation found in the so-called “ways” can be interpreted as embodied forms of “caring for oneself ” and, therefore, as part of a philosophical Lebenskunst or art of living. To this end, I refer to phenomenological accounts of the body as well as to a unique notion of practice found in the writings of Dōgen Kigen, a thirteenth-century Japanese Zen master. Central to this essay is a concern with embodying (...) kata or pre-defined patterns of movement and posture used in nearly all practices of self-cultivation in Japan. To approach this question, I look at the etymological roots of the term kata and its use in the writings of Zeami, the foremost representative of classical Noh theater, both as author and as actor. This is followed by an analysis of certain aspects of the embodiment of kata and the way it is described in Japanese literature. (shrink)

Philosophy is a subject which does not concerned only to an expert or specialist. It appears that there is probably no human being who does not philosophise. Good philosophy expands one’s imagination as some philosophy is close to us, whoever we are. Then of course some is further away, and some is further still, and some is very alien indeed. We raise questions about the assumptions, presuppositions, or definitions upon which a field of inquiry is based, and these questions can (...) be concerned with the meaning, significance, or integration of the results discovered or proposed by a field of inquiry. We find Karmic, Bhaktic and Jnanic interpretations of an ancient text in Indian philosophy because of different approaches adopted to inquire the text. This paper is an attempt to draw an outline of Upanishadic methods of inquiry in Indian philosophical tradition. Several methods like Enigmatic, Aphoristic, Etymological, Mythical, Analogical, Dialectical, Synthetic, Monologic, Temporising and Regressive methods etc. we can find in Upanishads. (shrink)

Aristotle’s analysis of language is, firstly, on the basis of co-positing and positing away: this is the starting point of analysis: what is asserted in language either involves a co-positing or does not (Cat. , 2, 1a16-17). Although he does not explain what he means by co-positing, we can see that he considers something like a sentence (his examples: man runs, man wins) and not merely a co-positing of two words like not-man, which he calls an indefinite noun (OI., 2, (...) 16a30-32). Aristotle and his contemporaries had no word for ‘word.’ The closest words for ‘word’ are ὄνομα and λόγος. ὄνομα is distinguished from ῥῆμα (verb) and, thus, cannot mean word. λόγος means a sentence or statement. Daniel W. Graham (Aristotle’s Two Systems, 1987, Oxford University Press, 38, fn.27) renders λεγομενον as ‘word.’ The problem with this suggestion is that, as Aristotle asserts in Categories, it is used both for single words and the composition of several words and even sentences. Aristotle distinguishes a noun from all the followings: a) A co-positing of words: noun is a word that is said without co-positing. (Cat., 2, 1a16-19) b) Inarticulate sounds: the sounds like those that brutes produce are not considered as nouns, though Aristotle believes that they are significant. (OI., 2, 16a28-29) c) Verbs: words that carry with them the notion of time. (OI., 2, 16b6-8) So far, a noun is a word said without co-positing, without the notion of time and distinguished from inarticulate sounds. What remains in language, however, is not necessarily a proper noun, though it is related with noun. What remain are different kinds of names: 1) Noun (ὄνομα) or definite noun: a sound that is significant by convention and of which no part is significant from the rest (OI., I, 1, 16a19-20) unless not having an independent meaning, the parts contribute to the meaning of the whole (OI., I, 1, 16a22-27). This latter condition is indeed a division made by Aristotle between two kinds of nouns: a. Simple nouns: a word in which the part is in no way significant. b. Composite nouns: a word in which though the part may be significant, i) it contribute to the meaning of the whole and ii) it does not have an independent meaning. 2) Indefinite noun: expressions like ‘not-man’ that i) have no recognized term by which denote the expression and ii) are not a sentence or denial by themselves (OI, 2, 16a28-29; 10, 19b8-10). 3) Cases of a noun. This is what used in languages like Greek language that have different cases. They show the senses that are asserted by other elements like prepositions in languages like English in a form or case of the name. Thus, e.g. Φίλωνος means ‘of Philo’ while Φίλωνι means ‘to Philo’. The cases of a noun have the same definition as the noun itself. However, they are not able to combine with any of the different tenses of the verb ‘is’ so that a true or false preposition results. (OI., 2, 16ab4-5). Aristotle thinks convention (συνθήκην) is the basis of the formation of nouns: ‘The limitation ‘by convention’ was introduced because nothing is by nature a noun- it is only so when it becomes a symbol.’ (OI., I, 1, 16a27-28) In Greek language, Francesco Ademollo notes (B508, 34), onoma has a close etymological connection with any transitive verb. Thus, it seems that an onoma is essentially ‘an expression that names or refers to something. It is strange that Aristotle does not distinguish proper from improper noun. We find no text in which Aristotle made such a distinction. In fact, it seems nouns are essentially improper for him: ‘A name, e.g. ‘round,’ means vaguely a sort of whole: its definition analyses this into its particular senses. Similarly, a child begins by calling all men ‘father’ and all women ‘mother’ but later on distinguishing each of them.’ (Phy., A, 1) Nouns necessarily are applicable to others: ‘If one were defining you, he would say ‘an animal which is lean’ or ‘white’ or something else which will apply to someone other than you.’ (Met., Z, 1040a12-14) -/- . (shrink)

Many different meanings are attributed to the term Sufi. From the philosophical standpoint the sufi sect leans towards the mystic tradition, while taken etymologically the word implies anything which is extracted from wool. Sufi was the term applied to those individuals who went through life wearing a woolen gown, spending their life in mediation and prayer. Other scholars are of the opinion that the terms sufi is derived from the root “Suffa” which is applicable to the platform built by Mohammad (...) in the mosque at Madina. Hence the term sufi applied to those benevolent and pure but homeless people who spent their time sitting on this platform and meditating upon this life and the hereafter. According to Gazzzali , the term sufi implies a man’s remaining at peace with the world, in mediation upon God. We can say that the Sufis are example of pure spiritual discipline which require a sense of dedication and humanity to get the ultimate goal of life i.e. self-realisation. (shrink)

Understood in its widest sense, the term “hermeneutics” can be taken to refer to the theory and/or practice of any interpretation aimed at uncovering the meaning of any expression, regardless of whether such expression was produced by a human or non-human source. Understood in a narrower sense, the term “hermeneutics” can be taken to refer to a particular stream of thought regarding the theory and/or practice of interpretation, developed mainly by German-speaking theorists from the late eighteenth through to the late (...) twentieth century. “Hermeneutics” in its broadest sense dates at least as far back as the ancient Greeks and is linked etymologically to the ancient Greeks’ mythological deity Hermes, who was said to deliver and interpret messages from the gods to mortals. “Hermeneutics” in its narrower sense emerged in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, initially for the purpose of addressing problems in the interpretation of classical and biblical tests and then later for the purpose of articulating a more “universalized” theory of interpretation of general. This chapter traces the development of hermeneutics in its narrow sense through the work of Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher (1768-1834), Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911), Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) and Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900-2002), and then concludes with some observations about what Hegel’s own hermeneutical thought might mean against the backdrop of this development. (shrink)

Corcoran, J. 2007. Psychologism. American Philosophy: an Encyclopedia. Eds. John Lachs and Robert Talisse. New York: Routledge. Pages 628-9. -/- Psychologism with respect to a given branch of knowledge, in the broadest neutral sense, is the view that the branch is ultimately reducible to, or at least is essentially dependent on, psychology. The parallel with logicism is incomplete. Logicism with respect to a given branch of knowledge is the view that the branch is ultimately reducible to logic. Every branch of (...) knowledge depends on logic. Psychologism is found in several fields including history, political science, economics, ethics, epistemology, linguistics, aesthetics, mathematics, and logic. Logicism is found mainly in branches of mathematics: number theory, analysis, and, more rarely, geometry. Although the ambiguous term ‘psychologism’ has senses with entirely descriptive connotations, it is widely used in senses that are derogatory. No writers with any appreciation of this point will label their own views as psychologistic. It is usually used pejoratively by people who disapprove of psychologism. The term ‘scientism’ is similar in that it too has both pejorative and descriptive senses but its descriptive senses are rarely used any more. It is almost a law of linguistics that the negative connotations tend to drive out the neutral and the positive. Dictionaries sometimes mark both words with a usage label such as “Usually disparaging”. In this article, the word is used descriptively mainly because there are many psychologistic views that are perfectly respectable and even endorsed by people who would be offended to have their views labeled psychologism. A person who subscribes to logicism is called a logicist, but there is no standard word for a person who subscribes to psychologism. ‘Psychologist’, which is not suitable, occurs in this sense. ‘Psychologician’, with stress on the second syllable as in ‘psychologist’, has been proposed. In the last century, some of the most prominent forms of psychologism pertained to logic; the rest of this article treats only such forms. Psychologism in logic is very “natural”. After all, logic studies reasoning, which is done by the mind, whose nature and functioning is studied in psychology—using the word ‘psychology’ in its broadest etymological sense. (shrink)

In this article, on the basis of analysis of the classical definition of a miracle (from D.Hume to C.S.Lewis and R. Swinburne) and the nonclassical one (J.L. Marion and J.P.Manussakis), the phenomenological and the etymological aspects of a miracle are examined.Taking into consideration the historical development of the concept of a miracle, the author proves the connections between contemplation, miracle and novelty. They are necessary for the constituting of religious experience. Faith itself, in theological sense, is not determinative for religious (...) experience.It has sense only when it is integrated into contemplation. True religious experience is based on the art of contemplation which helps a human being to look with astonishment. The author argues that phenomenological approach to a miracle combined with the etymological analysis is a valuable method for the study of a miracle in the context of the history of philosophy. (shrink)

This article is bout the history of Masters Degree. It elaborates from the etymology of meaning of 'Master' to the honor of being the Degree.

In this academic article, we articulate the relation between hermeneutics as a method and History of Religion as a study filed. In introduction, the word hermeneutics is explained both from an etymological point of view and from a mythological one. Throughout history, theologians and historians used this concept in their research. In special, the author Mircea Eliade, as an historian, used in his studies about religion the method of hermeneutics. We present in a creative way the most important critics on (...) this system of analysis and complete with an open conclusion about using or not hermeneutics as a method in the study of religion history. (shrink)

The book explores the themes of a) “radical concepts” in politics (inspired by François Laruelle’s “non-Marxism” and “non-philosophy,” developed in accordance with Badiouan and Žižekian “realism”); b) politically relevant and applicable epistemologies of “Thought’s Correlating with the Real” (Laruelle), inspired by Laruelle, Badiou and Žižek and c) the possibility of hybridization of the epistemic stance of “radical concept” with the politics of grief and “identification with the suffering itself” proposed by Judith Butler. Radical concepts, the political vision and the theory (...) based on them, are always already succumbing to the “Lived” (Laruelle), to the singularity of the Event (Badiou), to the encounter with the “kernel of the Real” (Žižek) conditioning a political horizon and the grand and small political narratives taking place within it. The thesis of the book is that the instances of the “lived,” the “event” or the “Real” can be inherently inter-connected by virtue of the category of the “experience” which is an instance of the sheer lived, the bare being subjected to an occurrence which is always already an instance of trauma. The mere subjection to certain” taking place,” the passion (in the etymological sense derived from the Latin verb pati or in the Spinozian sense) which is category beyond the psychological notions of feeling, rational (or irrational) thought, i.e., an ontological category referring to our relation with the “Out-There” which always already happens to us, is that to which the radical (political) concept succumbs to as the ultimate authority rather than to a doctrine, a system of thought, to the “philosophy’s auto-mirroring” (Laruelle). Political revolt or the revolutionary stance stems from precisely this bare experiential, the sheer lived and thus, from the Real of the conatus of staying-in-life. Paradoxically the survivalist stance, the principle of self-preservation is also the revolutionary stance which is by definition destabilizing and destructive. Bodily resistance to subjection (i.e., to discipline) and the continuity of the Self in-the-Real is the source of resistance. The Real of grief and mourning, the identification with the purely experiential stance of the suffering itself is the foundation of a “radical concept” of political solidarity, which by virtue of its being grounded in the Real, i.e., in the Lived, provides the possibility of acting in a revolutionary way. But it is also a form of human universality or political universality, which yet again is not historic universality but rather purely categorical. Other concepts that can be called radical, concepts which are minimally transcendental (Laruelle) and are, therefore, of revolutionary potential are also violence, mourning, labor (work) and gender (the trauma introduced by the linguistic determination as a “he” or a “she”), life, death, animal. Yet, the main focus of the book is the exploration of the lived of vulnerability, trauma and the conatus of life as the determination in the last instance of the revolutionary (political) stance. Clearly, the revolutions and the revolutionary stance this book advocates, or rather, whose potentiality it explores, are not necessarily historical revolutions produced by the intentionality to create politico-historic change. They are not this necessarily. Yet again they are such possibly. Still all purely (on the formal level) revolutionary stance tends to introduce universal change, radically change the political horizon and to reverse the politically unthinkable into a thinkable by elevating it to the level of a universal political truth. (shrink)

This essay—part of a larger project of constructing a new, historically informed philosophy of dance, built on four phenomenological constructs that I call “Moves”—concerns the second Move, “gesture,” the etymology of which reveals its close connection to the Greek word “metaphor.” More specifically, I examine the treatments of gesture by the philosophers George Herbert Mead and Etienne Bonnot de Condillac, both of whom view it as the foundation of language. I conclude by showing how gesture can be used in (...) analyzing various types of dance, which in turn suggests transformational potential for philosophy, dance, and society as a whole. (shrink)

This article investigates a central yet perplexing term yiming in the ‘Qiwulun’ chapter of the Zhuangzi. Yiming describes a crucial way to detach from epistemic distinctions and debates. This term is often explained as ‘using ming’ or contradictorily as ‘stopping ming’. Yet neither of the two explanations can provide a full understanding of how yiming is adopted. I take three steps to explain yiming. First, taking an etymological approach, I argue that ming can be formulated as ‘X shining on Y’. (...) Second, I use the formula of ‘X shining on Y’ to account for yiming and argue that this term refers specifically to ‘using tian to shine on everything’. Third, I unpack a cluster of tian-associated metaphors, which provides a deep understanding of yiming as an ideal way to mental tranquility. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to show in what terms reality can be considered as a stratification of surfaces by developing Mario Perniola's philosophy of transit. The first part will deal with the etymology of the word transit, in order to explain its meanings and uses. As it will be clarified, the development of the notion of transit goes together with the conception of reality as deep in the sense of full, available, rich, as the realm of "difference" (...) and "enigmas". The second part will explain the particular conception of temporality implied in the transit. Together with Perniola's analysis, Nietzschean and Deleuzian reflections about "amor fati" and "eternal return" will be further explored. This concept is crucial to understand not only Perniola's overall philosophy by clarifying his position against postmodern thinkers; it also provides a theoretical framework from which the task and the challenge of the philosopher in the contemporary world emerge. (shrink)

En la Carta a Voetius, Descartes escribe que su enemigo es el diablo, el enemigo. La acusación es etimológicamente coherente e introduce una excepción a la metafísica, una voluntad de mal. Finalmente, la malignidad odia la verdad : es deliberadamente irracional. Examinamos aquí la oratoria del mal: primero, sus recursos retóricos ; segundo, las pasiones que excita y su combinación en una pasión particular, la cólera piadosa; tercero, sus efectos: la disolución del vínculo civil entre ciudadanos y amistoso entre familiares. (...) -/- ABSTRACT In his Letter to Voetius, Descartes writes that his enemy is the devil, the enemy. The accusation is etymologically coherent (Voetius is the libeler, whose word divides men) and introduces an exception to metaphysics, a will to evil. Finally, malignity hates truth (absurditas): it is deliberately irrational. The article examines the oratory of evil: first, its rhetorical devices (in contrast with the rhetoric of Guez de Balzac); second, the passions it elicits (in contrast with Passions of the Soul) and their combination with a specific passion, pious rage; and third, its effects: the dissolution of the civil bond among citizens and the friendship bond family members. Keywords: R. Descartes, evil, oratory, passions, rhetoric. (shrink)