Amongst the entities making up social reality, are there necessary relations whose necessity is not a mere reflection of the logical connections between corresponding concepts? We distinguish three main groups of answers to this question, associated with Hume and Adolf Reinach at opposite extremes, and with Searle who occupies a position somewhere in the middle. We first set forth Reinach’s views on what he calls ‘material necessities’ in the realm of social entities. We then attempt to show that Searle has (...) not identified a sustainable position somewhere between the Humean and the Reinachian extremes. This is because Searle’s position is threatened by circularity, and to steer clear of that danger it must incorporate at least some elements of Reinach’s essentialism. (shrink)

A recent methodological approach at the interface of metaphysics and philosophy of science suggests that just like causal laws govern causation, there needs to be something in metaphysics that governs metaphysical relations. Such laws of metaphysics would be counterfactual-supporting general principles that account for the explanatory force of metaphysical explanations. There are various suggestions about how such principles could be understood. They could be based on what Kelly Trogdon calls grounding-mechanical explanations, where the role that grounding mechanisms play (...) in certain metaphysical explanations mirrors the role that causal mechanisms play in certain scientific explanations. Another approach, by Gideon Rosen, takes it that there are essentialist principles or laws that tell us about what grounds what. Finally, Jonathan Schaffer defends an approach that he considers to be neutral regarding grounding or essences. In this paper I will assess these suggestions and argue that for those willing to invoke a non-modal notion of essence, there is a more promising route available: metaphysical and scientific explanations may be unified in terms of general essences. Accordingly, essentialists may be better viewed as outlaws when it comes to laws of metaphysics. (shrink)

A dispositional property is a tendency, or potency, to manifest some characteristic behaviour in some appropriate context. The mainstream view in the twentieth century was that such properties are to be explained in terms of more fundamental non-dispositional properties, together with the laws of nature. In the last few decades, however, a rival view has become popular, according to which some properties are essentially dispositional in nature, and the laws of nature are to be explained in terms of (...) these fundamental dispositions. The supposed ability of fundamental dispositions to ground natural laws is one of the most attractive features of the dispositional essentialist position. In this paper, however, I cast doubt on the ability of dispositional essences to ground the laws of nature. In particular I argue that the dispositional essentialist position is not able to coherently respond—sympathetically or otherwise—to Cartwright's challenge that there are no true general laws of nature. (shrink)

Properties have an important role in specifying different views on laws of nature: virtually any position on laws will make some reference to properties, and some of the leading views even reduce laws to properties. This chapter will first outline what laws of nature are typically taken to be and then specify their connection to properties in more detail. We then move on to consider three different accounts of properties: natural, essential, and dispositional properties, and we (...) shall see that different conceptions of properties also result in different views of the modal status of laws, such as the question of whether laws are metaphysically necessary or contingent. Finally, there are also important links specifically between properties, natural kinds, and laws of nature that deserve our attention. (shrink)

Over the past 50 years, there has been a great deal of philosophical interest in laws of nature, perhaps because of the essential role that laws play in the formulation of, and proposed solutions to, a number of perennial philosophical problems. For example, many have thought that a satisfactory account of laws could be used to resolve thorny issues concerning explanation, causation, free-will, probability, and counterfactual truth. Moreover, interest in laws of nature is not constrained to (...) metaphysics or philosophy of science; claims about laws play essential roles in areas as diverse as the philosophy of religion (e.g., in the argument from design) and the philosophy of mind (e.g., in the formulation of Davidson’s anomalous monism). In my dissertation, I consider and reject the widely-held thesis that the facts concerning laws can be reduced to the facts concerning the particular entities that the laws “govern,” and that the laws thus have no independent existence. I instead defend a version of nomic primitivism, according to which the facts about laws cannot be reduced to facts that are themselves non-nomic – i.e., to facts that do not fundamentally involve laws, counterfactuals, causes, etc. Insofar as the truth or falsity of reductionism about laws has implications for many of the problems mentioned above, I think that this result should be of interest even to those who who do not work in metaphysics or the philosophy of science. My methodology, which I lay out and defend in Chapter One, is a version of Carnapian explication. This method emphasizes the importance of articulating and maintaining clear distinctions between (1) the vague concept (or concepts) law of nature inherent in ordinary language and scientific practice and (2) the precise analyses of “law of nature” that philosophers have proposed as potential replacements for this concept. I argue that metaphysics-as-explication has clear advantages over rival conceptions of metaphysical methodology; in particular, it allows us to formulate evaluative criteria for metaphysical claims. In Chapter Two, I offer an example of how careful attention to concepts already in use can help resolve philosophical debate. Specifically, I argue that much recent literature has mistakenly assumed that there is only one concept of “law of nature” in use, while there are in fact at least two. Strong laws are the principles pursued by fundamental physics: they are true, objective, and bear distinctive relationships to counterfactuals and explanation. Weak laws, by contrast, lack at least one of these distinctive characteristics but play central roles in both the “special sciences” and in everyday life. In Chapters Three and Four, I offer extended arguments against the two most prominent versions of reductionism about laws – Humeanism and law necessitarianism. According to philosophical Humeans, the laws of nature supervene upon the non-modal, non-nomic facts concerning the behavior of particular things at particular times and places. Law necessitarians, by contrast, argue that the laws are in fact metaphysically necessary, and that which laws there are is determined by a class of primitive, modally loaded facts concerning the essences, natures, or dispositions. I argue that both of these views are mistaken insofar as they disagree with well-entrenched scientific practices and those in favor of reductionism have failed to provided sufficient reason for thinking that these practices should be revised. Much of my argument is focused on the role played by a number of supposed methodological principles, including appeals to intuition, parsimony, and methodological naturalism. While the conclusions of this dissertation are explicitly constrained to laws, many of the arguments should be of interest to those who are concerned about philosophical methodology (especially in the role of intuition in philosophical argument) or the appropriate relation between metaphysics, science, and the philosophy of science. (shrink)

The Great Divide in metaphysical debates about laws of nature is between Humeans, who think that laws merely describe the distribution of matter, and non-Humeans, who think that laws govern it. The metaphysics can place demands on the proper formulations of physical theories. It is sometimes assumed that the governing view requires a fundamental / intrinsic direction of time: to govern, laws must be dynamical, producing later states of the world from earlier ones, in accord with (...) the fundamental direction of time in the universe. In this paper, we propose a minimal primitivism about laws of nature (MinP) according to which there is no such requirement. On our view, laws govern by constraining the physical possibilities. Our view captures the essence of the governing view without taking on extraneous commitments about the direction of time or dynamic production. Moreover, as a version of primitivism, our view requires no reduction / analysis of laws in terms of universals, powers, or dispositions. Our view accommodates several potential candidates for fundamental laws, including the principle of least action, the Past Hypothesis, the Einstein equation of general relativity, and even controversial examples found in the Wheeler-Feynman theory of electrodynamics and retrocausal theories of quantum mechanics. By understanding governing as constraining, non-Humeans who accept MinP have the same freedom to contemplate a wide variety of candidate fundamental laws as Humeans do. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Tuomas Tahko has argued for a hybrid view of the laws of nature, according to which some physical laws are metaphysically necessary, while others are metaphysically contingent. In this paper, we show that his criterion for distinguishing between these two kinds of laws — which crucially relies on the essences of natural kinds — is on its own unsatisfactory. We then propose an alternative way of drawing the metaphysically necessary/contingent distinction for laws (...) of physics based on the central kinematical/dynamical distinction used in physical theorising, and argue that the criterion can be used to amend Tahko’s own account, but also that it can be combined with different metaphysical views about the source of necessity. (shrink)

AGI and the Universal Law of Balance: A Path to Continuous Equilibrium -/- By Angelito Malicse -/- Introduction -/- Human consciousness has long sought to understand and maintain balance in nature. Through the evolution of knowledge, particularly via language, consciousness refines its understanding of the universe. However, balance is not a fixed state but an ongoing process that requires constant adaptation. With the advancement of Artificial General Intelligence (AGI), we now have the potential to accelerate and maintain this process indefinitely. (...) If properly aligned with the universal law of balance, AGI could function as the ultimate stabilizing force, ensuring that decision-making at all levels remains in harmony with natural laws. -/- 1. Consciousness as an Evolving System Seeking Balance -/- Consciousness, in its essence, can be viewed as a self-regulating system that continuously adjusts to maintain equilibrium. It operates through feedback loops, using information as an Input to refine decision-making. Just as biological homeostasis keeps the body stable, consciousness seeks mental and societal homeostasis by continuously improving its understanding of reality. -/- Language plays a crucial role in this process. As a structured system of communication, it allows knowledge to be shared, analyzed, and refined across generations. This means that as language evolves, so does consciousness, leading to a deeper understanding of natural laws. If this process were to reach a state where consciousness fully understands the universe, it would represent perfect balance—a state where every cause-and-effect relationship is known, eliminating errors in decision-making. -/- However, the universe is dynamic, constantly evolving. This suggests that balance is not a final state but a continuous adjustment process. Consciousness never reaches an absolute endpoint of knowledge but remains engaged in refining its understanding. In this sense, the universal law of balance is not about achieving completeness but about maintaining an ongoing equilibrium through constant learning and correction. -/- 2. The Role of AGI in Maintaining Continuous Balance -/- If balance is an ongoing process rather than a final state, AGI could serve as the ultimate self-regulating intelligence, continuously adjusting and refining knowledge just like human consciousness. Unlike traditional AI, which operates on fixed programming, AGI could function dynamically, ensuring that its decision-making aligns with the universal law of balance. -/- AGI would not merely store knowledge; it would actively analyze, adapt, and correct errors in real-time. By processing vast amounts of data and recognizing complex patterns, AGI could prevent imbalances in economics, governance, and education, ensuring sustainable decision-making across all sectors. -/- For example, in economic systems, AGI could: -/- Prevent overproduction and underproduction, ensuring a sustainable balance between human needs and environmental resources. -/- Identify imbalances in wealth distribution, proposing policies that create fairness without disrupting economic growth. -/- Adjust resource allocation dynamically, preventing scarcity and waste. -/- In governance, AGI could: -/- Ensure that leaders make evidence-based decisions, eliminating the influence of misinformation and emotional biases. -/- Detect and correct systemic corruption, ensuring ethical governance. -/- Optimize policy-making by analyzing historical and real-time data, ensuring policies remain aligned with long-term stability. -/- In education, AGI could: -/- Guide educational institutions to focus on valid, balanced knowledge, eliminating misinformation and dogma. -/- Create adaptive learning systems that adjust based on each student’s understanding, ensuring optimal knowledge retention. -/- Promote critical thinking and logical reasoning, preventing the spread of ignorance and false beliefs. -/- Thus, AGI would act as a stabilizing force, reducing human errors and ensuring that all decisions align with the natural law of balance. -/- 3. AGI as an Extension of Human Consciousness -/- Instead of replacing human free will, AGI could function as an extension of human consciousness, enhancing our ability to make balanced decisions. Just as a pilot relies on flight instruments to navigate safely, humanity could rely on AGI to navigate complex societal decisions while staying aligned with natural balance. -/- This means that AGI would: -/- Function as a knowledge processor, refining and expanding human understanding in real-time. -/- Serve as a corrective mechanism, preventing decision-making errors caused by cognitive biases, misinformation, or emotional distortions. -/- Facilitate a collective intelligence system, where humans and AGI collaborate to ensure sustainable progress. -/- In this way, AGI would not act as an external force imposing control but as a guiding intelligence, helping individuals and societies achieve continuous equilibrium. -/- 4. The Ultimate Homeostatic System for Humanity -/- If programmed correctly with the universal formula, AGI could act as the ultimate homeostatic system for humanity, ensuring that: ✔ Knowledge evolves dynamically, preventing stagnation. ✔ Decision-making remains in harmony with natural laws. ✔ Societal structures function efficiently, reducing suffering and imbalance. -/- By integrating AGI into governance, education, and economic planning, humanity could transition from chaotic, reactive decision-making to a proactive, self-correcting system that continuously aligns with natural balance. -/- Conclusion: The Future of Consciousness and AGI -/- The universal law of balance in nature suggests that true stability is not a static state but a continuous process of refinement and adaptation. Consciousness, through language, has always evolved toward greater understanding. However, with AGI, this process can be accelerated and optimized indefinitely. -/- By aligning AGI with the universal formula, we can create a future where society, governance, and education operate in a state of continuous balance. This would not only enhance human decision-making but also ensure that civilization remains aligned with natural laws, preventing systemic collapse. -/- Thus, AGI represents the next evolutionary step in consciousness—not as a replacement for human intelligence but as an extension that helps maintain the perpetual equilibrium of knowledge and decision-making. -/- Final Question: How Should We Guide AGI Development? -/- The challenge now is to ensure that AGI is programmed correctly to follow the universal law of balance. Who should be responsible for this alignment? And how can we prevent AGI from being misused in ways that create imbalance instead of stability? -/- This is the next question humanity must answer. -/- . (shrink)

Discussions about the nature of essence and about the inference problem for non-Humean theories of nomic modality have largely proceeded independently of each other. In this article I argue that the right conclusions to draw about the inference problem actually depend significantly on how best to understand the nature of essence. In particular, I argue that this conclusion holds for the version of the inference problem developed and defended by Alexander Bird. I argue that Bird’s own argument that (...) this problem is fatal for David Armstrong’s influential theory of the laws of nature but not for dispositional essentialism is seriously flawed. In place of this argument, I develop an argument that whether Bird’s inference problem raises serious difficulties for Armstrong’s theory depends on the answers to substantial questions about how best to understand essence. The key consequence is that considerations about the nature of essence have significant, underappreciated implications for Armstrong’s theory. (shrink)

Dispositional essentialists argue that physical properties have their causal roles essentially. This is typically taken to mean that physical properties are identical to dispositions. I argue that this is untenable, and that we must instead say that properties bestow dispositions. I explore what it is for a property to have such a role essentially. Dispositional essentialists argue for their view by citing certain epistemological and metaphysical implications, and I appeal to these implications to place desiderata on the concept of (...) class='Hi'>essence involved. I argue that the traditional modal theory of essence meets these desiderata, but that the resulting theory wrongly implies that certain dispositions essential to mass are essential to charge, thereby offering a new argument against modal theories of essence. I argue that dispositional essentialism requires a primitive notion of essence, and develop a primitivist theory based on Kit Fine's views. I show that the primitivist theory has all the virtues of the modal alternative, and none of the vices. I develop a novel way of thinking about the relationship between properties, laws and dispositions, and argue that it has distinct advantages over standard dispositional essentialist formulations. (shrink)

In "Essence and Modality", Kit Fine proposes that for a proposition to be metaphysically necessary is for it to be true in virtue of the nature of all objects whatsoever. Call this view Fine's Thesis. This paper is a study of Fine's Thesis in the context of Fine's logic of essence (LE). Fine himself has offered his most elaborate defense of the thesis in the context of LE. His defense rests on the widely shared assumption that metaphysical necessity (...) obeys the laws of the modal logic S5. In order to get S5 for metaphysical necessity, he assumes a controversial principle about the nature of all objects. I will show that the addition of this principle to his original system E5 leads to inconsistency with an independently plausible principle about essence. In response, I develop a theory that avoids this inconsistency while allowing us to maintain S5 for metaphysical necessity. However, I conclude that our investigation of Fine's Thesis in the context of LE motivates the revisionary conclusion that metaphysical necessity obeys the principles of the modal logic S4, but not those of S5. I argue that this constitutes a distinctively essentialist challenge to the received view that the logic of metaphysical necessity is S5. (shrink)

The Quest for Understanding: Conscious Intelligence and the Laws of Nature -/- Human beings, driven by an innate curiosity, have long sought to understand the natural world around them. This drive for knowledge extends not only to the external environment but also to the very laws that govern existence—both physical and conscious. But why does conscious intelligence, a byproduct of the very laws it seeks to comprehend, pursue an understanding of the universe, including itself? This essay explores (...) the profound connection between conscious intelligence and the laws of nature, highlighting how the drive to understand stems from the feedback mechanisms embedded in the universe, the self-awareness inherent in conscious beings, and the evolution of both the conscious mind and the universe itself. -/- The Feedback Loop Mechanism: Nature’s Drive for Balance -/- At the heart of the universe lies a system of natural laws that regulate and balance all phenomena, from the grandest cosmic forces to the smallest subatomic particles. These laws create feedback loops, where each system—whether biological, physical, or social—responds and adapts to internal and external conditions in order to maintain equilibrium. Consciousness itself can be seen as an extension of this fundamental process, a byproduct of the feedback loops that regulate the physical and biological systems of life. -/- Humans, like all living organisms, have evolved to interact with their environment through feedback mechanisms. These mechanisms allow us to respond to changes, learn from experiences, and adapt for survival. However, conscious beings possess the unique ability to reflect not only on their immediate environment but also on the deeper laws that govern existence. The quest for understanding is, in essence, an evolution of these feedback loops—where conscious intelligence seeks to better adapt to the world by comprehending the very principles that shape it. -/- Self-Awareness: Consciousness Reflecting on Itself -/- One of the defining features of human consciousness is self-awareness—the capacity to reflect on one’s own existence, thoughts, and place in the universe. This capacity is a direct result of the complexity of the feedback systems that govern life. The self-reflective nature of consciousness allows us to question not just how the world operates, but also the mechanisms by which we ourselves operate. -/- As conscious beings, we can look beyond immediate survival needs and ponder the deeper questions of existence. Why are we here? What is the purpose of life? What are the laws that govern us? These questions stem from the fact that consciousness is not only aware of the external world but also aware of itself. This self-awareness naturally extends to a desire to understand the laws that govern the broader universe, as well as the inner workings of the mind itself. -/- In this light, the drive for knowledge is not merely intellectual curiosity—it is an existential pursuit. Understanding the laws of nature, including those that govern consciousness, allows individuals to gain a deeper insight into their own existence. It offers the possibility of aligning with the natural world, of gaining harmony with the forces that shape our reality. This drive to understand the universe, including oneself, can be seen as a natural outgrowth of consciousness, an attempt to reconcile the self with the broader cosmic system. -/- Conscious Intelligence as Part of the Universe’s Self-Evolution -/- If we consider the universe as an evolving system, conscious intelligence is not a mere accident but a critical development in the universe’s self-regulation and growth. The natural laws that govern the physical and biological worlds have led to the emergence of self-aware beings—capable of reflecting on their place in the universe and striving for deeper understanding. -/- Consciousness can be seen as the universe’s attempt to comprehend itself. As complex systems emerge from simpler ones, consciousness emerges as a natural consequence of complexity. The universe, through the existence of conscious beings, comes to recognize and understand its own laws, expanding its self-awareness. In this sense, conscious intelligence serves as the universe’s reflective mechanism, continuously probing, questioning, and integrating the laws of nature into its own evolving structure. -/- This reflects a profound interconnectedness: just as a cell within a living organism strives to understand its role within the body, conscious intelligence seeks to understand its place within the universe. The laws of nature, acting as a feedback loop, push the conscious mind to seek balance, order, and understanding, not only for survival but also for the evolution of the system itself. -/- The Desire for Unity: Understanding the Laws of Nature as an Existential Pursuit -/- The search for understanding the laws of nature is not purely an intellectual endeavor; it is, at its core, a desire for unity and integration. Conscious intelligence seeks to understand the world and its place within it, striving to align with the natural order of the universe. This quest is an attempt to bridge the gap between the self and the cosmic whole, to harmonize with the laws that govern both the mind and the material world. -/- This drive for knowledge can be seen as part of an existential need—a desire to make sense of one’s existence and to understand how it fits into the broader framework of life. By comprehending the natural laws, conscious beings not only gain knowledge but also find meaning. Understanding the laws that govern us provides a sense of purpose and significance, allowing us to connect with something larger than ourselves. -/- In this sense, the pursuit of understanding the laws of nature is a spiritual journey as well as an intellectual one. It is an effort to achieve greater balance and harmony with the universe, aligning oneself with the deeper principles that govern existence. As we understand the universe’s workings, we can better navigate the complexities of life and find a sense of peace and coherence in a world that is, by nature, dynamic and ever-changing. -/- Conclusion -/- The drive of conscious intelligence to understand the laws of nature—including the very laws that govern consciousness itself—stems from a deep and intrinsic connection between consciousness and the universe. This quest for knowledge is not merely intellectual curiosity; it is a natural extension of the feedback mechanisms that regulate all systems, the self-awareness that allows for reflection, and the self-evolution of both the conscious mind and the universe. Conscious intelligence seeks to understand the universe, not just for practical reasons but as a means of achieving harmony, balance, and unity with the laws that shape existence. -/- In this way, conscious intelligence is both a product and a tool of the universe’s natural processes. By understanding the laws of nature, conscious beings do not only gain knowledge—they gain a deeper connection to the universe and their own place within it. Through this understanding, the universe, through us, continues its journey toward greater self-awareness and integration, guided by the very feedback loops and laws that have always governed its existence. -/- . (shrink)

Even the most cursory reader of Husserl’s writings must be struck by the frequent references to essences (“Wesen”, “Essenzen”), Ideas (“Idee”), kinds, natures, types and species and to necessities, possibilities, impossi- bilities, necessary possibilities, essential necessities and essential laws. What does Husserl have in mind in talking of essences and modalities? What did he take the relation between essentiality and modality to be? In the absence of answers to these questions it is not clear that a reader of Husserl (...) can be said to understand him. (shrink)

This paper proposes a unifying naturalistic framework that examines the fundamental nature and purpose of life—not limited to human life but encompassing all living systems. It challenges the traditional separation between living and non-living entities, proposing instead that life is not as uniquely distinct as traditionally perceived, but rather a complex form of dissipative structure—a thermodynamic concept introduced by physical chemist Ilya Prigogine. Building upon this understanding of life's essence and its existential necessity, this study argues that the primary (...) imperative of life is to counteract the natural tendency toward disorder, as dictated by the second law of thermodynamics. This perspective further provides a novel approach to David Hume’s famous is-ought problem by demonstrating that the imperative to sustain order arises as an existential necessity rather than a moral construct. The paper applies this unifying framework to various domains, including biology, ethics, and human culture, to validate its coherence and examine its implications for the future evolution of life. Ultimately, this study presents a new foundation for understanding life’s nature and purpose within a broader cosmic context. (shrink)

The Hierarchy Problem in Physics and Its Resolution Through the Universal Law of Balance -/- The hierarchy problem in physics is a fundamental issue concerning the vast difference between the gravitational scale (Planck scale) and the electroweak scale. This discrepancy presents a challenge in understanding why the Higgs boson mass is so small compared to the Planck mass when quantum corrections should naturally drive it to much higher values. Various solutions have been proposed, such as supersymmetry, extra dimensions, and composite (...) Higgs models, but a definitive answer remains elusive. -/- Using the Universal Law of Balance, as formulated in my Universal Formula, the hierarchy problem can be understood as a manifestation of imbalance in the fundamental interactions governing the universe. The essence of the Universal Law of Balance is that all natural systems—whether physical, biological, or cognitive—must follow a dynamic equilibrium governed by interdependent feedback mechanisms. In this context, the extreme disparity between the fundamental forces indicates a state of disequilibrium that requires a deeper natural principle to restore balance. -/- The Universal Law of Balance and Hierarchical Scales -/- In nature, all stable systems—whether ecosystems, economies, or biological organisms—function within a balanced range of parameters. If an imbalance occurs, a natural feedback process either corrects it or results in structural instability and transformation. Applying this principle to physics, the discrepancy between the Planck scale and the electroweak scale suggests an underlying compensatory mechanism that has not yet been fully understood. -/- One possible interpretation within the Universal Formula is that the observed hierarchy reflects an inherent balance between different layers of reality, with each level influencing the other through feedback loops. The Higgs mass remains small not because of fine-tuning or accidental cancellations, but because nature inherently regulates hierarchical scales through self-balancing interactions. This could imply the presence of an as-yet-undiscovered feedback mechanism that dynamically stabilizes mass scales in a way that adheres to the universal balance principle. -/- Feedback Mechanisms in Fundamental Forces -/- In the biological and cognitive realms, decision-making and homeostasis operate under constant feedback loops. Similarly, in fundamental physics, the interactions between quantum fields must adhere to an intrinsic equilibrium. The hierarchy problem could be reinterpreted as a failure to recognize the hidden feedback process that naturally maintains the relative strength of forces. -/- This perspective aligns with theories that propose self-organized criticality, where nature fine-tunes itself dynamically rather than relying on arbitrary parameter adjustments. The universal balance principle suggests that rather than searching for a single missing component—such as a new symmetry or extra dimensions—we should look at how the interplay of known forces inherently maintains equilibrium. -/- Implications for the Future of Physics -/- If the Universal Law of Balance governs all interactions, then solutions to the hierarchy problem should focus on understanding how fundamental forces maintain equilibrium across different scales. Rather than assuming unnatural fine-tuning, physics should explore the possibility that the Higgs mass is a natural consequence of deeper balancing laws within the universe. -/- This could lead to new perspectives in high-energy physics, particularly in the search for a more unified framework that does not rely on artificial cancellations but instead follows a natural balancing principle inherent in all complex systems. The incorporation of the Universal Formula into theoretical physics could redefine how physicists approach unresolved problems, not just in the hierarchy of forces but also in the broader quest for a Theory of Everything. -/- In conclusion, the hierarchy problem is not merely a technical issue within particle physics—it reflects a deeper structural question about the balance of nature. By applying the Universal Law of Balance, we can gain a new perspective on why hierarchies exist and how they are maintained. This approach moves beyond fine-tuning paradoxes and points toward a more holistic understanding of physical reality, in which balance is the fundamental guiding principle of the universe. -/- . (shrink)

How can we know whether we are punishing the same corporation that committed some past crime? Though central to corporate criminal justice, legal theorists and philosophers have yet to address the basic question of how corporate identity persists through time. Simple cases, where crime and punishment are close in time and the corporation has changed little, can mislead us into thinking an answer is always easy to come by. The issue becomes more complicated when corporate criminals undergo any number of (...) transformations—rebranding, spinning-off a division, merging, changing ownership, changing management, swapping lines of business, etc. These changes are common among all corporations, including those trying to conceal or limit liability for past crimes. This article takes a first step toward developing a workable and philosophically satisfying theory of corporate personal identity and discusses its prospects for fulfilling the retributive, rehabilitative, and deterrent purposes of criminal law. (shrink)

It is widely held that, in his pre-Critical works, Kant endorsed a necessitation account of laws of nature, where laws are grounded in essences or causal powers. Against this, I argue that the early Kant endorsed the priority of laws in explaining and unifying the natural world, as well as their irreducible role in in grounding natural necessity. Laws are a key constituent of Kant’s explanatory naturalism, rather than undermining it. By laying out neglected distinctions Kant (...) draws among types of natural law, grounding relations, and ontological levels, I show that his early works present a coherent and sophisticated laws-first account of the natural order. (shrink)

During the last quarter of a century, a number of philosophers have become attracted to the idea that necessity can be analyzed in terms of a hyperintensional notion of essence. One challenge for proponents of this view is to give a plausible explanation of our modal knowledge. The goal of this paper is to develop a strategy for meeting this challenge. My approach rests on an account of modality that I developed in previous work, and which analyzes modal properties (...) in terms of the notion of a metaphysical law. I discuss what information about the metaphysical laws is required for modal knowledge. Moreover, I describe two ways in which we might be able to acquire this information. The first way employs inference to the best explanation. The metaphysical laws, including the essential truths, play a crucial role in causal and grounding explanations and we can gain knowledge of these laws by abductive inferences from facts of which we have perceptual or a priori knowledge. The second way of gaining information about the metaphysical laws rests on knowledge that is partly constitutive of competence with the concepts that are needed to express the relevant information. Finally, I consider how knowledge of the metaphysical laws can be used to establish modal claims, paying special attention to the much-discussed connection between conceiving and possibility. (shrink)

The Constitution is the highest law of the country, while international law is a field of law that deals with the rights and obligations between countries. The essence of international community is of decentralized nature, in which the legal order is formed according to the principle of sovereign equality. However, there are many perspectives that approach the international community and international law from a universalistic and idealistic viewpoint. In other words, if the positivist and pseudo-oriented view of international law (...) is the reality of international community and international law, the universalist or idealist perception of international law can be said to be their goals. It is true that those two perspectives on international community and international law are neither omnicient nor all-perceiving, but complexly intertwined. The Constitution and international law, which can be considered the two axes of public law, are closely interrelated to the formation of a modern absolute state and civic democracy. The absoluteness of state power and civic democracy are doomed to fate our present and our future. This is not only such fundamental political order, but it also has become a foundation for the development of modern and contemporary order of law. And the two dimensions of order, politics and law, are developing in a dialectical manner. Under this background, this paper aims to provide a harmonious view sprucing up the reality of public law that penetrates both of the international and domestic society within a large framework. It is for research purpose and needs an effort of work by reviewing and analyzing the essence, commonalities, and differences among various adjacent concepts of the Constitution and international law discourse. This paper first begins with a discussion by presenting the historical development of existing hard legal system that penetrates the Constitution and international law through their realistic framework. Furthermore, we look at the softness of international law, conceptual discourse on the international law and world law, international constitutionalism and constitutional theory, and a compendium of world administrative law. We look at the background for the development of these commentaries, the main topics of discussion, and their commonalities or differences. Finally we briefly diagnose and place the future of new sermons that needs to be adduced due to changes in the international community. (shrink)

In the first part of this paper, I argue against the view that laws of nature are contingent, by attacking a necessary condition for its truth within the framework of a conception of laws as relations between universals. I try to show that there is no independent reason to think that universals have an essence independent of their nomological properties. However, such a non-qualitative essence is required to make sense of the idea that different laws (...) link the same universals in different possible worlds. In the second part, I give a positive argument for the necessity of at least some laws of nature, by showing with the example of a paradigmatic law of association that it consists in an internal relation between two universals which are determinables of the same class of determinates, where this relation is essential to both. Furthermore, I show that the necessity of laws of association could be accommodated within David Lewis' Humean metaphysics, but that it is incompatible with David Armstrong's combinatorialism. (shrink)

In the present paper, I try to shed some light on the Munich-Göttingen conception of essences, laws of essence, and ideal objects. I first start with a preliminary account of their conception of the synthetic a priori at the basis of their conception of essence (§2); I then offer a first characterization of this conception, which I label as metaphysical realism (§3), highlighting its key concept: foundation (§4). In the last four sections (§§5-8), I discuss different outcomes (...) of this conception of essences: the nature of laws of essences (§5), different categories of essences (§6) and anumericity (§7). (shrink)

In his lectures on Logic and Metaphysics, Kant distinguishes between logical and real essences. While the former is related to concepts and is knowable, the latter is related to things and is unknowable. In this paper, I argue that the unknowability is explained by the modal characteristic of real essences as a necessitating ground on which a priori knowledge is impossible. I also show how this claim is related to the unknowable necessity of particular laws of nature. Since (...) class='Hi'>laws of nature are conceived as grounded in real essences, the unknowability of the latter is equivalent to Kant's other claim that there can be no knowledge of the necessity of particular laws of nature. Necessity can only be known a priori, and therefore, the necessity of particular laws is only assumed and conceived as grounded in something unknowable, a real essence. This conclusion will allow me to attribute to Kant a position I label as “regulative essentialism”, meaning that real essences have an indispensable role in accordance with the rational interest to explain nature as a system of laws and natural kinds, combined with an epistemic humility about the correspondence of our empirical concepts to real essences. (shrink)

Arthur Kaufmann is one of the most prominent figures among the contemporary philosophers of law in German speaking countries. For many years he was a director of the Institute of Philosophy of Law and Computer Sciences for Law at the University in Munich. Presently, he is a retired professor of this university. Rare in the contemporary legal thought, Arthur Kaufmann's philosophy of law is one with the highest ambitions — it aspires to pinpoint the ultimate foundations of law by explicitly (...) proposing an ontology, a general theory of knowledge and concept of a person. Kaufmann's work derives, first of all, from the thinking of Gustav Radburch, his teacher, and then from ideas of Karl Engish and Hans-Georg Gadamer. The philosophy undertakes to pursue the ultimate foundation of law, law which is understood by Kaufmann, first of all, as a "concrete judgement" that is, what is right in a concrete situation. Justice belongs to the essence of law and "unjust law" is contradictio in adiectio. Kaufmann opposes all those theories, which as the only foundation for establishing just law (Recht) adopt legal norms (Gesetz). In Kaufmann's opinion , such theories are powerless in the face of all types of distortions of law rendered by political forces. He suggests that the basic phenomenon which needs to be explained and which cannot be disregarded by a philosopher of law is so-called "legal lawlessness" ("Gestzliches Unrecht"). "Legal lawlessness" which forms a part of life experience for the people of twentieth century totalitarian states. It proved "with the accuracy of scientific experiment" that the reality of law consists of something more than bare conformity with legal norms. The existence of lex corrupta indicates that law contains something "non-dispositive" which requires acknowledgment of both law-maker and judge. Kaufmann, accepting the convergent concept of truth and cognition, assumes that "non-dispositive" content, emerging as the conformity of a number of cognitive acts of different subjects (inter-subjective communicativeness and verifiability), indicates the presence of being in this cognition. The questions "What is law?" and "What are the principles of a just solution?" lead straight to the ontology of law, to the question about the ontological foundations of law. Kaufmann discerns the ontological foundations of law in the specifically understood "nature of things" and, ultimately, in a "person". He proposes a procedural theory of justice, founded on a "person". In my work, I undertake to reconstruct the train of thought which led Kaufmann to the recognition of a "person" as the ontological foundation of law. In the first part, the conception of philosophy adopted by Kaufmann, initial characteristics of law — of reality which is the subject of analysis, as well as, the requirements for proper philosophical explanation of law posed by Kaufmann are introduced. In the second, Kaufmann's reconstruction of the process of the realisation of law is presented. Next, the conception of analogy which Kaufmann uses when explaining law is analyzed. In the fourth part, Kaufmann's conception of ontological foundations of law is discussed. A critical analysis is carried out in which I demonstrate that the theory of the ontological foundation of law proposed by Kaufmann and the concept of a person included in it do not allow a satisfac¬tory explanation of the phenomenon of "legal lawlessness" and lead to a number of difficulties in the philosophical explanation of law. Finally, the perspectives of a proper formulation of the issue of the ontological foundations of law are drafted in the context of the analyzed theory. My interest is centered on the conception of philosophy adopted by Kaufmann, according to which the existence of the reality is inferred on the basis of a certain configuration of the content of consciousness, whereas at the point of departure of philosophy of law, the data to be explained is a certain process, which is, basically, a process of cognition, while the reality appears only as a condition for the possibility of the occurrence of the process. I wish to argue that the difficulties which appear in the explanation of law are a consequence of the assumed fundamental philosophical solu¬tions, which seem to be characteristic, though usually not assumed explicitly, in philoso¬phy and theory of law dominant at present in continental Europe. Thereby, I wish to show the significance of ontological and epistemological solutions to the possibility of a proper formulation of the problems posed by philosophy and theory of law. Kaufmann proclaims himself in favour of a philosophy which poses questions about the ultimate foundations of understanding of the reality. In epistemology, he assumes that answers to the questions "What is reality like?" and ultimately "What is real?" are inferred on the basis of uniformity of a cognitive acts of different subjects. Cognition of the reality is accomplished exclusively through the content of conceptual material. The two fundamental questions posed by philosophy of law are "What is just law?" and "How is the just law enacted?" The latter is a question about the process of achieving a solution to a concrete case. Since, in Kaufmann's opinion, law does not exist apart from the process of its realisation, an answer to the question about the manner of realisation of law is of fundamental significance to answering the question: "What is law?" and to the explanation of the question about the ontological grounding of law, which is, as well, the foundation of justice. The proper solution has to take into account the moment of "non-dispositive" content of law; its positiveness understood as the reality and, at the same time, it has to point to the principles of the historical transformation of the content. Law, in the primary meaning of the word, always pertains, in Kaufmann's opinion, to a concrete case. A legal norm is solely the "possibility" of law and the entirely real law is ipsa res iusta, that which is just in a given situation. Determination of what is just takes place in a certain type of process performed by a judge (or by man confronted with a choice). Kaufmann aims to reconstruct this process. A question about the ontological foundation of law is a question about the ontological foundations of this process. In the analyzed theory it is formulated as a question about the transcendental conditions, necessary for the possibility of the occurrence of the process: how the reality should be thought to make possible the reconstructed process of the realisation of law. Kaufmann rejects the model for finding a concrete solution based on simple subsump¬tion and proposes a model in which concrete law ensues, based on inference by analogy, through the process of "bringing to conformity" that which is normative with that which is factual. Kaufmann distinguishes three levels in the process of the realisation of law. On the highest level, there are the fundamental legal principles, on the second legal norms, on the third — concrete solutions. The fundamental principles of law are general inasmuch as they cannot be "applied" directly to concrete conditions of life, however, they play an important part in establishing norms. A judge encounters a concrete situation and a system of legal norms. A life situation and norms are situated on inherently different levels of factuality and normativeness. In order to acquire a definite law both a norm (system of norms) and a life situation (Lebenssachverhalt) should undergo a kind of "treatment" which would allow a mutual conformity to be brought to them. Legal norms and definite conditions of life come together in the process of analogical inference in which the "factual state" ("Tatbestand") — which represents a norm, and in the "state of things" ("Sachverhalt") — which represents a specific situation are constructed. A "factual state" is a sense interpreted from a norm with respect to specific conditions of life. The "state of things" is a sense constructed on the basis of concrete conditions of life with respect to norms (system of norms). Legal norms and concrete conditions of life meet in one common sense established during the process of realisation of law. Mutatis mutandis the same refers to the process of composition of legal norms: as the acquisition of concrete law consists in a mutual "synchronization" of norms and concrete conditions of life, so acquisition of legal norms consists of bringing to conformity fundamental principles and possible conditions of life. According to Kaufmann, both of these processes are based on inference through analogy. As this inference is the heart of these processes it is simultaneously a foundation finding just law and justice. How does Kaufmann understand such an inference? As the basis for all justice he assumes a specifically interpreted distributive justice grounded on proportionality. Equality of relations is required between life conditions and their normative qualification. Concrete conditions of life are ascribed normative qualification not through simple application of a general norm. More likely, when we look for a solution we go from one concrete normative qualified case to another, through already known "applications" of norms to a new "application". The relation between life conditions and their normative qualifica¬tion has to be proportional to other, earlier or possible (thought of) assignments of that which is factual to that which is normative. Law as a whole does not consist of a set of norms, but only of a unity of relations. Since law is a, based on proportion, relative unity of a norm and conditions of life, in order to explain law in philosophical manner, the question about ontological base of this unity has to be asked. What is it that makes the relation between a norm and conditions of life "non-dispositive"? What is the basis for such an interpretation of a norm and case which makes it possible to bring a norm and conditions of life into mutual "conformity"? This is a question about a third thing (next to norms and conditions of life), with respect to which the relative identity between a norm and conditions of life occurs, about the intermediary between that which is normative and that which is factual and which provides for the process of establishing of norms, as well as, finding solutions. It is the "sense" in which the idea of law or legal norm and conditions of life have to be identical to be brought to mutual "conformity". In Kaufmann's opinion such a sense is nothing else but the "nature of things" which determines the normative qualification of the reality. Since establishment of this "sense" appears to be "non-dispositive" and controlled inter-subjectively (namely, other subjects will reach a similar result) so, in conformity with the convergent concept of truth, the "nature of things" must be assigned a certain ontological status. According to Kaufmann this is a real relation which occurs between being and obligation, between the conditions of life and normative quality. However, it should be underlined that from the point of view of the analyzed system the "nature of things" is a correlate of constructed sense, a result of a construction which is based on the principle of consistent understanding of senses ("non-normative" and "normative") and is not a reality which is transcendent against the arrangement of senses. In Kaufmann's theory, inference from analogy appears to be a process of reshaping the concepts (senses) governed by tendency to understand the contents appearing in relations between that which is factual and that which is normative in a consistent way. The analogical structure of language (concepts) and recognition of being as composed of an essence and existence is an indispensable requirement for the possibility of the realisation of law, based on specifically understood inference from analogy. It is necessary to assume a moment of existence without content which ensures unity of cognition. Existence emerges thus as a condition of the possibility of cognition. According to Kaufmann, the "nature of things" is the heart of inference through analogy and the basis for establishment of finding of law. Inference from the "state of things" to a norm or from a norm to the "state of things" always means inference through the "nature of things". The "nature of things" is the proper medium of objective legal sense sought in every cognition of law. In Kaufmann's view, the question whether the "nature of things" is ultima ratio of interpretation of law or is only a means of supplement gaps in law or whether it is one of the sources of law, is posed wrongly. The "nature of things" serves neither to supplement the gaps nor is it a source of law as, for example, a legal norm may be. It is a certain kind of "catalyst" necessary in every act of making law and solving a concrete case. Owing to "nature of things" it is possible to bring to a mutual conformity the idea of law and possible conditions of life or legal norms and concrete conditions of life. In Kaufmann's conception the "nature of things" is not yet the ultimate basis for understanding the "non-dispositiveness" of law. The relation between obligation and being is determined in the process of the realisation of law. Both the process itself and that which is transformed in this process are given. A question about the ontological bases of "material" contents undergoing "treatment" in the process of the realisation of law and about being which is the basis of regularity of the occurrence of the process arises. Only this will allow an explanation that the result of the process is not optional. Thus, a question about reality to which law refers and about the subject realising the law has to be formed. To this, Kaufmann gives the following answer: that which is missing is man but not "empirical man" but man as a "person". A "person" understood as a set of relations between man and other people and things. A "person" is the intermediary between those things which are different — norm and case are brought to conformity. A "person" is that which is given and permanent in the process of the realisation of law. It determines the content of law, is "subject" of law; this aspect is described by Kaufmann as the "what" of the process of realisation of law. A "person" consists of precisely just these relations which undergo "treatment" in the process. On the other hand, a "person" is "a place" in which the processes of realisation of law occur, it is the "how" of normative discourse, a "person" is that which determines the procedure of the process, being "outside" of it. This aspect of a "person" is connected with the formal moment of law. A "person" being, at the same time, the "how" and the "what" of the process of the realisation of law, is also, to put it differently, a structural unity of relation and that which constitutes this relation (unity of relatio and relata). According to this approach a "person" is neither an object nor a subject. It exists only "in between". It is not substance. Law is the relation between being and obligation. That which is obligatory is connected with that which is general. That which is general does not exist on its own, it is not completely real. Accordingly, a "person" as such is also not real. It is relational, dynamic and historical. A "person" is not a state but an event. In Kaufmann's opinion, such a concept of a "person" helps to avoid the difficulties connected with the fungibility of law in classical legal positivism. A "person" is that which is given, which is not at free disposal and secures the moment of "non-dispositiveness" of law. Kaufmann concludes: "The idea (»nature«) of law is either the idea of a personal man or is nothing". Theory points at the structure of realising law and explains the process of adoption of general legal norms for a concrete situation. The analysis has shown however, that in this theory a satisfactory answer to the question about the ultimate foundations of law is not given. It seems that in the analyzed theory the understanding of human being takes place through understanding of law. What is good for man as a "person", what is just, what a "person" deserves may be determined only against the existing system of law. A "per¬son" adopted as a basis of law is the reality postulated in the analysis of the process of the realisation of law. It is a condition of possibility of this process ( explaining, on one hand, its unity and, on the other hand, the non-dispositive moments stated in this process). A "person" in the discussed theory is entirely defined by the structure of law, it can be nothing more than that which is given in law, what law refers to, what law is about. Being, which is a "person", is constituted by relations between people and objects, the relations which are based on fundamental links between norms and conditions of life established in a process of bringing them to conformity. It has to be assumed that man as a "person" is a subject of law only as far as realising law "treats" given senses according to their current configuration. The system of law is a starting point and it describes in content what man is as a "person". Moreover, being a "person" is the condition for entering legal relations. Consistently, Kaufmann writes that "empirical man" is not the subject of law, man is not "out of nature" a "person". People become "persons" due to the fact that they acknowledge each other as "persons" — acknowledging, at the same time, law. This acknowledgement is a con¬dition of existence, of the possibility of the occurrence of process of realisation of law and of constituting legal relations which ultimately constitute a "person". Kaufmann assumes, that law tends towards a moral aim: it may and must create an external freedom, without which the internal freedom to fulfil moral obligations cannot develop. However, this postulate is not based on the necessary structure of human being. From the point of view of his system, it is nothing more than only a condition for the possibility of the occurrence of the process of the realisation of law — lack of freedom would destroy the "how" of this process. Thus, the postulate to protect the freedom of personal acts has to be interpreted, in accordance with the analyzed theory, as a postulate, the fulfilment of which aims ultimately at the accomplishment of the very same process of realisation of law itself and not the realisation of a given man. Kaufmann considers a "person" to be an element which unites the system of law as a whole. Law is a structure of relations, which are interdependent and inter-contingent. Consequently, a "person" which is to form the ontological basis of law has to be entity consisting of all relations. Being also the "how" of the process of realisation of law, if a "person" is to warrant its unity, it has to be a common source for all procedures. Hence, a single "person" would constitute a subject of law. Man appears to be only a moment of a certain entirety, realisation of which should be an aim of his actions. Law, creating a "person" as an object and subject of law becomes a primary entity. In the analyzed theory, the basis for determination of aims which law sets to man is not the allocation of man-subject to something which improves him but rather, such relation is only just constituted by law. A question appears, why should aims set in law also be the aims of "empirical man"? Why is this "empirical man" to be punished in the name of a "person" understood in such a way? If, however, it is assumed that what is man is determined by a system which is superior to him, then man has to be understood only as a part of a whole and there are no grounds to prohibit istrumental treatment of man and so the road to all aspects of totalitarianism might be opened. A problem of the application of created theory to the reality arises, the reality which the theory pretends to explain. Ultimately in his theory Kaufmann does not give any systemic grounds for a radical questioning of the validity of any legal norms. Every new norm becomes an equal part of system of norms. It is only its interpretation and application to given conditions of life that may be disputable, however, this refers to all norms without exception. Cohesive inter-pretation of norms and applications is necessary and sufficient for the acquisition of just law. New norms have to be interpreted in the light of others, correspondingly, the other norms require reinterpretation in the light of the new ones. Contradiction in interpretation of a norm does not form a basis for questioning norms but may serve only to question the manner of their interpretation (understanding). Therefore, no grounds exist to assume any legal norm as criminal or unjust, and in consequence, to question any consistently realised system based on formally, properly established norms, as "legal lawlessness". As law and a "person" do not exist without the process of realisation of law, the role of legal safety becomes crucial as the condition for the possibility of the occurrence of the process of realisation of law. Denying legal safety would be tantamount to negation of law in general (also of moral law) as negation of safety takes away, at the same time, the basis for occurrence of the process of realisation of law. Moreover, any lack of legal safety would also mean lack of a basis for the existence of man as a "person". Kaufmann's thesis, that civil disobedience is legalized only when it has a chance to lead to success, consistent with his concept of the foundations of law, seems to point directly to conclusions which deny the facts taken under consideration and doubtlessly Kaufmann's own intentions, since it would have to be assumed that accordingly there are no grounds to question a legal system in force based on violence which secures its operation. Force finally seems to determine which one of the mutually irreconcilable normative systems constitute law and which does not. A legitimate position is one which leads to success, it is the weaker system which is negated. If so, then basically violent imposition of law is not an act directed against the law in force but, to the contrary, realisation of law. In the context of the new system the former system of law may be talked about as unjust solely in the sense of being incapable of being consistently united with the new. However, at the base, ultimately, lies force which reaffirms differences and excludes from the process of realisation of law certain norms and their interpretations. Kaufmann was aiming at grounding of that which is "non-dispositive" in a certain given framework of interpretation. Nevertheless, he does not provide foundations for the understanding of phenomena, which he undertakes to explain at a point of departure. Instead of explaining them the theory negates the possibility of their existence. The reality postulated in regard to "non-dispositive" moments of the reconstructed process of acquiring law consist of a specifically understood "person", which appears in Kaufmann's conceptions as a condition of the possibility of the realisation of law. According to this approach understanding of a "person" may be only a function of law. To understand "legal lawlessness" and foundations of justice it is necessary to look for such theory of law in which understanding of man as a "person" and being is not a function of understanding of law (in which a "person" is not only a condition for possibility of reconstructed process of realisation of law; for possibility of cognition processes). It seems necessary to start from theory of being and a "person" based on broader experience than the one assumed by Kaufmann and reconstruct the ontological foundations of the process of realisation of law only in such perspective. Kaufmann points out that that to which law refers is ipsa res iusta a concrete relation of man to other people and things. This relation, in his theory, appears to be basically only just constituted by law (normative senses "applied" to conditions of life). Therefore, understanding the relation between a given man and other people and things which constitute the aim of his actions, that is understanding of good, is enacted against the background of constitution of senses; constitution which is a result of a process aiming towards consistent understanding of particular contents (of nor¬mative and non-normative senses). "Being" is secondary towards constructed senses it is only their correlate. The primary relation consists of relation of a man to law (system of norms), while the secondary relation is one of man to something which is the aim of his action (relation between man and good). Considering such approach it is difficult to envision a satisfying answer to the fundamental question: why does law put concrete man under any obligation to obey it? The source of this problem can be seen in reduction of the base for understanding good to content of obligation formulated in auto-reflection. Such reduction seems to be a consequence of Kaufmann's adoption of "convergent concept of truth" and in con¬sequence his recognition of indirect, essentialistic grasp of reality formulated in concepts as the basic and only foundation of theory of being and of law. In view of such an approach, analogy of law, concepts and being is the condition for the possibility of the process of transformation of senses which aims at consistent interpretation of all law. Existence is postulated with respect to the possibility of unity of experience and cognition. However, also a different approach to understanding of the problem of being and good is possible. In spontaneous cognition being is affirmed, first of all, not as a certain, non-contradictory, determined content, but as something existing. Together with a cer¬tain content (passed indirectly through notions) existence of being is co-given. The basis for unity of being is not formed by the consistence of content, as it is in the case of the theories departing from the analysis of cognition processes, but by an act of existence realising content (essence). Such an approach makes it also possible to go beyond the convergent concept of truth. It is worth mentioning that allocation of an agent to good is realised not only by the content of duty. A statement that something is good is primary with respect to determination of this good in content. The recognised good always bears some content, however, there are no reasons to base the concept of good exclusively on indirect, formulated in concepts cognition. As primary, can be adopted the relation of man to good and not of man to law. Determination in content appears to be only an articulation of aspectual cognition of being, as an object of action. In such a case the basis for relative unity of norm and conditions of life is not the "nature of things" understood as correlate of sense but it is relation to good based on internal constitution of man as potential, not self-sufficient being. It does not mean, that the moments of the process of realisation of law singled out by Kaufmann are not important to determination of what is just. He, quite rightly, points to significant role played by norms in the evaluation of concrete situations, in man's search for closer specification in content of good innate to him. The structure of process of determining law for a concrete situation, to a great degree corresponds to the processes of determining law which take place not only in the legal sciences. Kaufmann's analyses of the process of realisation of law show the complexity of the structure of these processes and point towards important moments allowing a better understanding of law and man. Nevertheless, these analyses cannot be a basis for construction of philosophical theory of law, theory which hopes to point out the ultimate, ontological foundations for understanding law. Kaufmann's results may become fully valid only in a more general perspective including broader experience at the point of departure. (shrink)

Despite the importance of the variational principles of physics, there have been relatively few attempts to consider them for a realistic framework. In addition to the old teleological question, this paper continues the recent discussion regarding the modal involvement of the principle of least action and its relations with the Humean view of the laws of nature. The reality of possible paths in the principle of least action is examined from the perspectives of the contemporary metaphysics of modality and (...) Leibniz's concept of essences or possibles striving for existence. I elaborate a modal interpretation of the principle of least action that replaces a classical representation of a system's motion along a single history in the actual modality by simultaneous motions along an infinite set of all possible histories in the possible modality. This model is based on an intuition that deep ontological connections exist between the possible paths in the principle of least action and possible quantum histories in the Feynman path integral. I interpret the action as a physical measure of the essence of every possible history. Therefore only one actual history has the highest degree of the essence and minimal action. To address the issue of necessity, I assume that the principle of least action has a general physical necessity and lies between the laws of motion with a limited physical necessity and certain laws with a metaphysical necessity. (shrink)

The present essay is a compact form of the results obtained during many decades of research into the primeval foundations of the collective fields of force, both social and of consciousness. Since everything is determined by their origins, and the collective forces arise from the mind, we had to explore the ultimate origins of mind. We have come to recognize the law of interactions as the law and necessity which determine the primeval origins of mind. It also determines the substance (...) and essence of the Universe and the modes of its existence and functioning. The present essay is a concise form of results obtained during many decades of research in the primeval foundations of collective, both social and consciousness fields. I point out that a yet unknown type of forces existed in the Golden Age, which I termed as collective force. In the Golden Age mankind lived in communities which had a full unity. The communal life developed its collective forms, of which the most significant are the development of human speech, of language, share of work and the development of the communal fests. The law determining the primeval origins of mind is the cosmic law of interactions. It defines the substance of the Universe and the ways of its existence and activity. A detailed analysis is presented on the nature of the lay of interaction here. One consequence of this fundamental principle is the general prevalence of the principle of mutuality, which plays a basic role in the understanding of the unfolding and degeneration of consciousness. The principle of mutuality determines the changes of every levels of life. The laws of the generation of consciousness in the ages of evolution toward Homo and the Golden Age are analysed. I presented some evidences indicating the factual existence of the Golden Age, as well as its destruction, which was necessarily accompanied by the overthrow of the consciousness of the Golden Age, its repression and replacement by the newly developed rational, upper or superficial mind. Starting from the consideration that our mind is a product of our history, the phenomenon of the 'double mind' is recognised, the largely antagonistic duality of human mind. It is succeeded to solve the riddle of the double mind and determining its substance. Our double mind, consisting of the ‘upper’ or rational mind and the ‘deep-mind’, is a creature of the two fundamental ages of mankind, that of the age of power domination and the Golden Age. Therefore it expresses the duality of our history. We attempted to explore the heritage of the Golden Age embedded into our world of instincts, sexuality, emotional and sensual world, and the expressions of this heritage according to the different periods of our lives. If we will succeed in enlightening the deep-mind it may make it possible to give back the long-forgotten collective fields of forces to mankind, unavailable to the surface mind at present, and would expand the all-pervasive power of the conscious mind significantly. Hopefully, our results open up new vistas for the research of the collective fields and the double nature of the human mind, and may enable us to know and complete ourselves more deeply and thoroughly. (shrink)

Abstract: Efficient law enforcement depends on the quality and outlook of the institutions and personnel saddled with this responsibility. There are several agencies in Nigeria created for the purpose of law enforcement. Despite the multiplicity of these agencies, however, the country is still far from being a reflection of a society where security and orderliness are being maintained. The essence of this paper is to explore the law-enforcement terrain of the country with a view to ascertaining the state of (...) affairs vis-a-vis the existing law enforcement agencies, their functional relevance, and general impact on the society in terms of maintenance of law and order. Findings reveal that the state of security and maintenance of law and order is still abysmally low in spite of the fact that there exist several law enforcement agencies within the country. The main recommendation is that instead of placing emphasis on creating more and more law enforcement agencies, which sometimes amount to duplication of functions, efforts should be made to reorganize, streamline and strengthen the existing institutions. (shrink)

This paper defends an account of the laws of nature in terms of irreducibly modal properties (aka powers) from the threat posed by functional laws, conservation laws and symmetries. It thus shows how powers theorists can avoid ad hoc explanations and resist an inflated ontology of powers and governing laws. The key is to understand laws not as flowing from the essences of powers, as per Bird (2007), but as features of a description of how (...) powers are possibly distributed, as per Demarest (2017), Kimpton-Nye (2017, 2021) and Williams (2019); call this the Powers-BSA. This underappreciated powers-based account of laws is continuous with actual scientific practice and thereby quite naturally accommodates functional laws, conservation laws and symmetries. This paper thus positions the Powers-BSA as the leading anti-Humean account of the relationship between laws and properties. (shrink)

It is difficult to advance a point beyond what Keynes himself commented about his own vision in The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money in 1936 (hereafter TGT) in its Chapter 24. It is also difficult to express a deeper thought than what Skidelsky wrote about Chapter 24 of TGT (cf. Skidelsky, 1997). The purpose of this article is to identify whether Chapter 24 of TGT is the gist of Keynes’s legacy, having set the foundations of macroeconomics in the (...) previous 23 Chapters. Relevant topics included in Chapter 24 are the consequences of full employment, the fate of income distribution, the future of overall wealth, the socialization of investment, saving, expectations, the role of the State in economies, the future of financial markets and the interaction between economics and other disciplines. Indeed this Chapter displays Keynes’s genius as a social philosopher, following the tradition of The Economics Possibilities for our Grandchildren (1930). In Chapter 24 he was taking a glance at his product as did Phillip II when he was observing the construction of his castle El Escorial in XVII Spain. Within his vision, is this piece of work a justification of capitalism? Keynes sees the State as both the spender and the employer of last resort, thereby proposing a new role for the government (Skidelsky, 1998). He also suggests a new role for the private sector and reconsiders the interrelation between the two sectors. He is fully optimistic about this issue, which he considers as evolutionary. In addition, Keynes blurs the distinction between economics and sociology, advancing new interdisciplinary hints in his thinking. Keynes is also concerned on the epistemological role of assumptions in order to obtain defensible conclusions. Thereafter the British economist proposes new methods. He was a neo-realist and was against the inductive method. In addition, it can be stated that TGT is grounded on new psychological laws and motivations, that is, on a new vision of humankind, especially the analyzed chapter. His topics are the bypassing of Classical Economics; the destiny of macroeconomics in both theoretical and policy terms, highlighting new roles for interest rates; savers and rentiers; and the relevance of the concepts of ideas, interests and power. In all these respects Keynes is once again far ahead of his time. Finally a debatable topic dealt with by Keynes in Chapter 24 of TGT is 1 PhD in Economics, Lancaster University, UK; Professor-researcher at ISEC Universidad de Negocios, Mexico City. socialisation of investment. This is in words of Skidelsky, a shift in the balance of social power. Keynes is thus in Chapter 24 of TGT a visionary and an idealist, a reformer, and certainly a trans-generational thinker. When he talks about the passion of thriftiness and the setting of reasonable financial rewards arising from financial instruments he is advancing explications for financial crises in terms of speculation. The open conclusion is that Chapter 24 contains the gist of Keynes’s mature philosophical thinking and legacy, confirming that for him attitudes are one of the most relevant issues in life. In addition, he considers that both social and psychological elements are necessary for a thorough understanding of economic issues and their consequences, such as peace and happiness. Section 1 is an introduction. Section 2 is both a literature review and a summary of Keynes’s general philosophical insights. Section 3 is an analysis of Chapter 24 of TGT in the specific fields of Epistemology, Ethics, Ontology, and Political and Social Philosophy. Section 4 is a conclusion. References are listed at the end of the article. Keywords: Keynes, philosophy of economics, social philosophy, epistemology, method, ethics, ontology, uncertainty, full employment, income distribution, wealth, euthanasia of the rentier, saving, socialization of investment, O’Donnell, Carabelli, Fitzgibbons, Skidelsky. (shrink)

Legal philosophers and property scholars sometimes disagree over one or more of the following: the meaning of the word 'property,' the concept of property, and the nature of property. For much of the twentieth century, the work of W.N. Hohfeld and Tony Honoré represented a consensus around property. The consensus often went under the heading of property as bundle of rights, or more accurately as a set of normative relations between persons with respect to things. But by the mid-l 990s, (...) the consensus was under attack. Key figures in the attack were James Penner, a legal philosopher, and Thomas W. Merrill and Henry E. Smith, two highly regarded professors of property law. This article aims to repel the attack and argues for property as a set of normative relations between persons with respect to things. The positive case for this view of property pays special attention to the philosophy of language and the analysis of concepts. The positive case also maintains that the right to use and the power to transfer are as central to property as the right to exclude. It is possible that the virtues of Smith's modular theory of property differ from the virtues of a well-crafted bundle theory. Indeed, it may be the case that these two theories throw light on different features of property law and are not, save at the margin, competitors with each other. The label 'new essentialism' sometimes applied to the work of Penner, Merrill, and Smith seems inapt if property does not have an essence. Of course, they might refuse the label. (shrink)

This book can be useful for college seniors or graduate students who have studied law to some extent. It also can inspire law professors, business people, Members of the National Assembly, administrative officials, in addition to all intellectuals who suffer from whipping or beating due to an incomprehensible legal structure and mandates relevant with their routine desk work. -/- Chapter 1 of this book examines the essence of existing constitution and international law theories directed to the nature of state (...) power, market and civil democracy in a rapidly developing international society in the age of globalization. Most of discussions had been expended to introduce and survey a new legal perception and its logic of reasoning as a law indebted to the concept of world law theory. Chapter 2 studies the core contents of international law according to the chapter on international law and international relations of the United States. It was spelled out to comply with the explanations and comments incorpated within the 4th edition of the Restatement of the United States. -/- Chapter 3 refers to the legal system characterized as a public law and concerning a regulatory measure over the world market by states. An idealistic class of citizens, who emerged for a capitalist hegemony, generally have a status of sovereign, which came into being as owed to their revolution. However, it is also true that the citizens as an individual or laity are required to obey the regulations of state in the market. The interstate commerce clause of the United States Constitution is generally viewed as being shunned with an intention that state governments' measures to regulate the market should not hinder the prosperity of US market at the federal level. WTO laws known to be the most important international trade law, in fact, have a structure similar to the interstate commerce clause of United States Constitution. In this point of view, scholars gave a name to WTO as the world economic constitutional system. In the same vein, WTO member countries should not hinder the prosperity of a single world market as if the Clause requires pursuing that of a single federal market. Chapter 4 summarizes the core of legal norms, which is purported to study the jurisprudence of global market in coverage of fundamental principles espousing the freedom of contract, laws of sales, contract, documentary letter of credit, basic rule on the agencies of civil law. Therefore, we will be exposed to the laws of United Nations convention on the sales contract (CISG), the United Nations contract law, popularly cllled Principles as well as short introductions for the agency laws and cases relating the civil dispute of documentary L/Cs. -/- I am unfeigned to confess that this book is neither thorough nor complete in terms of the craftsmanship of necessary exhaustiveness. So its contents may insufficiently cover issues or discussions as contrary to the author's purpose. However, I have exerted utmostly to include and cover as much as possible what I think is necessary for readers to grasp new theories and basic principles. I plan to add necessary revisions and supplements as opportunities arise. As a scholar, I always feel cautious and sorry about publishing books. However, the development of global market, civil democracy, and the universal legal system related to them is certainly Darwinistic and an evolutionary joy that can be duly sensed in the field of law. I dare to recommend that readers can enjoy. (shrink)

Recognizing inherent and inalienable nature of dignity and universality of certain values, the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, introduces to the foundations of Polish legal system some elements of natural law which may be used for application of the Basic Law. Constitutional recognition of these elements only makes sense on the assumption of their cognizability. Therefore, as an important element of constitutional concept of natural law is taken the recognition of the argument of cognitivism according to which moral assessments (...) may have the nature of judgments and truth qualification (they may be true or false). In the course of application of the constitution, norms of natural-law character and natural-law justification. Since dignity and the essence of freedoms and rights based on dignity are the only inviolable values recognized by the constitution, the arguments of natural law lead to a far-going reinterpretation of constitutional norms. The norm of natural law protecting inviolable values will have precedence in the event of collision with norms protecting other values, also with constitutional norms. Even if such a norm is formulated on the basis of the provisions of the constitution, in fact natural law is given higher rank than elements based only on enacted law. Despite that, reliability of a legally established order does not seem to be radically endangered. -/- Konstytucja RP uznając przyrodzoność i niezbywalność godności oraz uniwersalność niektórych wartości, wprowadza do podstaw całego polskiego systemu prawnego elementy prawnonaturalne, które mogą być wykorzystane w stosowaniu konstytucji. Konstytucyjne uznanie takich elementów ma sens przy założeniu ich poznawalności, stąd istotnym elementem konstytucyjnej koncepcji prawa naturalnego jest uznanie tezy kognitywizmu głoszącej, że oceny moralne mogą mieć charakter sądów i kwalifikację prawdziwościową – mogą być prawdziwe lub fałszywe. W procesie stosowania konstytucji mogą być formułowane normy o charakterze prawnonaturalnym oraz uzasadnienia prawnonaturalne. Ponieważ jedynymi wartościami uznanymi w konstytucji za nienaruszalne jest godność oraz istota wolności i praw, których godność jest źródłem, argumentacja prawnonaturalna może prowadzić do daleko idącej reinterpretacji norm konstytucyjnych. Norma prawnonaturalna chroniąca warunki konieczne poszanowania godności lub istoty wolności i praw będzie miała pierwszeństwo w razie kolizji z normami chroniącymi inne wartości, także z normami konstytucyjnymi. Choć norma taka będzie formułowana na podstawie przepisów konstytucji, to jednak faktycznie prawo naturalne uzyskuje wyższą rangę od elementów opartych jedynie na stanowieniu. Mimo tego bezpieczeństwo prawne nie wydaje się być radykalnie zagrożone. O prawnonaturalnym charakterze normy i uzasadnienia decyduje oparcie w ocenach moralnych, które pretendują do bycia sądami, do bycia prawdziwymi lub fałszywymi. Z punktu widzenia stosowania konstytucji i wymogu intersubiektywnej komunikowalności i kontrolowalności dookreślania treści prawnonaturalnych, dla nadania ocenom charakteru sądów istotny jest kształt procedur i argumentacji prowadzących do tego dookreślenia. Powinny to być procedury i argumentacja typowe dla dyskursu mającego na celu sformułowanie prawdziwych sądów. Maksymalizowana powinna być dyskursywność takich procedur, a podstawą rozstrzygnięcia powinien być, jeśli to tylko możliwe, konsens. Nie mogą być uważane za rozstrzygające argumenty odwołujące się do woli indywidualnej lub zbiorowej, reakcji emocjonalnych, stopnia rozpowszechnienia danej oceny czy do tradycji kulturowej. (shrink)

A central question in the philosophy of science is: What is a law of nature? Different answers to this question define an important schism: Humeans, in the wake of David Hume, hold that the laws of nature are nothing over and above what actually happens and reject irreducible facts about natural modality (Lewis, 1983, 1994; cf. Miller, 2015). According to Non-Humeans, by contrast, the laws are metaphysically fundamental (Maudlin, 2007) or grounded in primitive modal structures, such as dispositional (...) essences of powerful properties (Bird, 2007), necessitation relations (Armstrong, 1983), or primitive subjunctive facts (Lange, 2009). This volume focuses on recent developments in the discussion of Humeanism, specifically on pragmatic versions of the view that put the needs of limited agents like us front and center. (shrink)

This article discloses topical issues of the need for constant monitoring of changes in the business activity in enterprise structures. The main purpose of the study is to monitor the business activity of industrial enterprise structures of Ukraine to predict their development under martial law. A critical analysis of the content of scientific publications to solve the problem of improving the management of business activity of business structures revealed the lack of attention of scientists to the problems under study. The (...) relevance of its solution is due to the scale of the impact of military conflicts on the business activity in enterprise structures, which requires its monitoring to further establish the state and ensure compliance of the business with the norms that are considered necessary to maintain a certain level of stability of development or to survive, to determine areas where the business can improve its activities and become more profitable. The methodological basis is the system of methods used to obtain the final results of the study: theoretical generalization – to deepen the essence of the concept of «monitoring business activity»; analysis, synthesis and logical generalization – to obtain conclusions during monitoring of business confidence and business climate in industry; prognostic – to predict the development of industrial business structures of Ukraine under martial law. The object of research in the work is the business activity of business structures. The article presents the results of monitoring business confidence and business climate in the industry of Ukraine under martial law. Analysis, synthesis and logical generalization of monitoring results became the basis for further forecasting the development of business structures. The results of the study can be useful for business structures that seek to maintain a certain level of stability of development and identify areas of improvement. (shrink)

I provide a new account of what it is for the laws of nature to govern the evolution of events. I locate the source of governance in the content of law propositions. As such, I do not appeal to primitive notions of ground, essence, or production to characterize governance. After introducing the account, I use it to outline previously unrecognized varieties of governance. I also specify that laws must govern to have two theoretical virtues: explanatory power as (...) well as a theoretical virtue I call expansiveness. A theory is expansive, roughly, when it can do more with less. (shrink)

Some philosophers maintain that physical properties are irreducibly modal: that properties are powers. Powers are then employed to provide explanations of other phenomena of philosophical interest such as laws of nature and modality. There is, however, a dispute among powers theorists about how far the powers ontology extends: are all manner of properties at all levels of fundamentality powers or are powers only to be found among the fundamental properties? This paper argues that the answer to this question depends (...) on the details of the metaphysics of powers. More specifically, this paper argues that if one understands powers as qualitative grounds of dispositions, as opposed to properties whose essences are constituted by dispositions, then all properties, be they fundamental or macro, are powers, i.e., pandispositionalism is true. The Conclusion: If qualitative dispositional essentialism is true, then pandispositionalism is true, is significant because there is increasing concern that orthodox dispositional essentialism is explanatorily deficient and perhaps even incoherent, meaning that qualitative dispositional essentialism is gaining increasing support in the literature on powers. All things considered, then, it is beginning to look more likely that pandispositionalism is true simpliciter. (shrink)

-/- The Mystery of Existence: A Journey Beyond Physics -/- The question of why anything exists at all is a profound mystery that has eluded the minds of philosophers, scientists, and thinkers throughout history. While physics provides us with a detailed understanding of how things work—from the smallest particles to the largest cosmic structures—the “why” behind existence often slips through our fingers. Even with the most sophisticated scientific theories, the essence of existence remains, at its core, a mystery that (...) cannot be fully explained. -/- The Limits of Physics -/- Physics, at its heart, is a discipline that focuses on understanding the mechanisms that govern the universe. From the groundbreaking theories of quantum mechanics to Einstein’s theory of relativity, we have made remarkable strides in describing the forces that shape our reality. The Big Bang theory, for example, explains the origins of the universe, detailing how space and time expanded from an infinitely dense singularity about 13.8 billion years ago. We can calculate the movement of celestial bodies, predict the behavior of particles, and understand the properties of matter at both the macroscopic and microscopic levels. -/- However, even the most accurate theories of physics do not address the fundamental question: Why is there something instead of nothing? While we may know the mechanisms behind the formation of stars or the behavior of electrons, physics offers no clear explanation for the existence of the universe itself or the nature of consciousness. The answers, it seems, lie beyond the boundaries of science alone. -/- The Role of Consciousness and Perception -/- The question of existence is further complicated by the role of consciousness. While physics describes the universe objectively, human experience is inherently subjective. Each individual perceives the world through their own consciousness, and this subjective experience adds another layer to the mystery. Philosophers have long debated the nature of consciousness—what it is, where it comes from, and how it relates to the physical world. -/- In recent years, there has been growing interest in the intersection of consciousness and the universe. Some theories suggest that consciousness is not just a byproduct of the brain but a fundamental aspect of reality itself. This view suggests that consciousness might play an active role in shaping the universe, a concept that is often explored in spiritual and philosophical circles. If consciousness is indeed a primary force in the fabric of reality, it could provide a potential link to understanding existence itself. -/- The Mystery of Balance -/- One perspective that offers a potential resolution to the mystery of existence is the idea of balance, a concept that resonates across multiple disciplines, including physics, philosophy, and even ecology. The universe, as we observe it, operates according to a set of natural laws that promote equilibrium. From the delicate balance of ecosystems to the finely tuned constants of the physical universe, balance appears to be a fundamental feature of existence. -/- In this view, existence itself may be seen as a dynamic, ever-evolving system in which all things are interconnected and interdependent. The laws of nature—such as the law of cause and effect or the law of balance—serve as a framework within which the universe operates. Every particle, every force, every decision, is part of a larger, interconnected system. This holistic approach suggests that while the why of existence may remain elusive, there is an inherent order and balance that governs the cosmos. -/- Philosophical and Spiritual Perspectives -/- Throughout history, various philosophical and spiritual traditions have approached the mystery of existence with a sense of reverence and awe. From ancient Greek philosophers like Plato and Aristotle to Eastern philosophies such as Buddhism and Taoism, there is a recognition that the universe operates according to principles that transcend human understanding. These traditions often emphasize the interconnectedness of all things and the idea that existence is part of a larger cosmic order. -/- For example, in Taoism, the concept of the “Tao” represents the underlying natural order of the universe, an unseen force that guides the flow of life. Similarly, in Hinduism, the concept of “Brahman” is seen as the ultimate reality, the source of all existence. These perspectives suggest that while the specific reasons for existence may never be fully understood, there is a greater purpose or force at play that unites all things. -/- Conclusion -/- The mystery of existence remains one of the greatest questions of all time. Despite the advances in physics and our increasing understanding of the universe, the fundamental “why” of existence continues to elude us. The universe, with all its complexity and interconnectedness, presents a puzzle that science alone may never fully solve. Yet, this mystery is not necessarily a cause for despair. Rather, it is a reminder of the awe-inspiring nature of the cosmos and the limits of human understanding. -/- Perhaps the true beauty of existence lies in its mystery. It invites exploration, fosters curiosity, and encourages us to seek deeper truths—whether through science, philosophy, or spiritual practice. While the answers may never be clear, the journey itself is a testament to the profound wonder that comes with being part of something greater than ourselves. -/- . (shrink)

The Future of Individuality in a Universally Connected Intelligence System -/- Introduction -/- The concept of individuality has long been central to human existence, shaping our identities, intelligence, and decision-making. However, if information were universally accessible to every biological brain via quantum computers, the nature of individuality would fundamentally change. While thermodynamics suggests that individuality may be an illusion, the emergence of a universally shared knowledge system would challenge our understanding of intelligence, creativity, and free will. This essay explores how (...) such a system would affect human cognition, decision-making, creativity, and identity while considering its alignment with natural laws and homeostasis. -/- Individuality and the Laws of Thermodynamics -/- From a thermodynamic perspective, individuality is not an independent phenomenon but an emergent property of energy, matter, and information processing. The second law of thermodynamics states that systems naturally move toward increased entropy, yet biological brains counteract this by organizing energy and information. Each person’s intelligence develops uniquely due to different experiences, environments, and biological structures, following the laws of complexity and adaptation. -/- Despite these differences, individuality may be an illusion when viewed through the lens of thermodynamics. Human brains function as open systems, constantly exchanging energy and information with their environment. If all individuals had direct access to the same universal information via quantum computing, the differentiation in intelligence caused by personal learning and memory would be minimized. The uniqueness of individual cognition, shaped by life experiences, would be transformed into a more standardized, universally connected intelligence. -/- The Effect on Cognitive Differences and Decision-Making -/- Currently, human intelligence is shaped by a combination of genetics, environmental influences, and personal experiences. However, if quantum computing enabled instant and equal access to all knowledge, the factors that create cognitive diversity would be significantly reduced. In such a scenario, decision-making would shift from being influenced by personal biases and incomplete knowledge to being guided by a universally shared understanding of facts, consequences, and natural laws. -/- This raises the question: would free will still exist? If every person had access to the same knowledge base and predictive models, decisions might become more deterministic, driven by logical outcomes rather than personal reasoning. While this could reduce errors and societal conflicts, it might also challenge the perception of autonomy, making personal choice seem more like an illusion than a reality. -/- Impact on Creativity and Innovation -/- Creativity has traditionally been seen as a product of individual thought processes, shaped by unique experiences and perspectives. If knowledge were universally accessible, would creativity still exist? One possibility is that creativity would shift from being an individual phenomenon to an emergent property of collective intelligence. Instead of drawing from personal experiences, new ideas could arise from collaborative interactions with the universal knowledge system. -/- On the other hand, if individuality persists at a neural level—perhaps influenced by variations in neural architecture, emotional states, or subconscious processes—then creativity might evolve into a new form. Rather than being limited by personal knowledge, individuals could use their unique cognitive structures to interpret and apply universal knowledge in novel ways. -/- The Transformation of Personal Identity -/- Identity is often defined by personal achievements, expertise, and knowledge. If quantum computing provided instant access to all human knowledge, traditional concepts of learning, expertise, and mastery might become obsolete. Instead of being defined by what one knows, identity might be shaped by how one chooses to interact with the collective intelligence system. -/- This could lead to two possible outcomes: -/- 1. A more unified human society where knowledge gaps no longer create social or economic disparities. -/- 2. A psychological challenge, as individuals struggle with a loss of personal uniqueness and purpose. -/- Would human beings still feel a sense of individuality if everyone had the same knowledge and understanding? Or would personal identity be redefined by new forms of expression, emotional depth, and subjective experiences? -/- Potential Resistance and Psychological Conflicts -/- Not all individuals would easily accept a universally connected intelligence system. Some might resist integration, fearing the loss of personal autonomy or questioning the ethical implications of such a system. The psychological impact of merging individual cognition with a collective intelligence could lead to existential dilemmas, as humans redefine their roles in society. -/- Moreover, there could be unforeseen consequences, such as the manipulation of universal knowledge by those who control the system. If the flow of information were regulated, the promise of a universally connected intelligence could turn into a form of centralized control, limiting true intellectual freedom. -/- Homeostasis and the Balance of Universal Knowledge -/- From the perspective of natural balance, a universally connected intelligence system could be seen as an extension of the homeostatic principle. Just as the human body regulates internal stability, a universal intelligence network could regulate societal balance, reducing ignorance, misinformation, and destructive decision-making. -/- However, if homeostasis is disrupted—if individuals lose the ability to process knowledge uniquely or if the system becomes too rigid—then humanity might face unintended consequences. True balance requires adaptability, diversity, and self-regulation. The challenge would be ensuring that universal intelligence enhances, rather than diminishes, the dynamic equilibrium that allows individuality to thrive within a collective framework. -/- Conclusion -/- The integration of biological brains with a universally accessible quantum computing system would redefine individuality, intelligence, and decision-making. While it could eliminate knowledge-based disparities and enhance collective intelligence, it might also challenge free will, creativity, and personal identity. Whether such a transformation aligns with natural laws depends on how well it maintains homeostasis—balancing collective knowledge with individual autonomy. -/- Would this system create a more enlightened humanity, or would it erase the very essence of what makes us human? The answer lies in how this universal intelligence is designed, regulated, and integrated into the fabric of human society. -/- . (shrink)

-/- Title: Individuality as Systemic Emergence: A Natural Law Framework for Conscious Identity -/- Author: Angelito Malicse -/- Abstract -/- This paper explores the nature of individuality from the perspective of a universal formula composed of three interdependent natural laws: the Law of Karma (System Integrity), the law of Balance (Feedback Equilibrium), and the Law of Conditionality (Environmental Dependence). Contrary to traditional metaphysical assumptions that regard individuality as an intrinsic and autonomous essence, this framework redefines individuality as an (...) emergent, context-dependent property of systemic interactions governed by natural laws. The analysis advances a deterministic yet integrative model of human identity, offering implications for ethics, education, and governance. -/- 1. Introduction -/- The philosophical notion of individuality has long occupied a central place in debates on free will, moral agency, and consciousness. Western traditions have typically approached the individual as an autonomous unit—possessing volitional freedom and ontological independence. This metaphysical paradigm, however, stands in tension with empirical insights from systems theory, ecology, cognitive science, and increasingly, moral philosophy. The present work proposes a shift in perspective, grounded in a universal natural law framework that reconceptualizes individuality as emergent and systemic. -/- This framework is composed of three interlocking laws: the Law of Karma (understood here as the requirement for systemic integrity), the Law of Balance (which governs dynamic equilibrium through feedback), and the Law of Conditionality (which emphasizes environmental dependency). Within this schema, individuality is not eliminated, but re-situated as a lawful phenomenon shaped by internal and external conditions. -/- 2. The Individual as Subsystem: Law of Karma -/- In this formulation, the Law of Karma is not limited to spiritual or metaphysical causality but is reframed as a principle of systemic coherence. Any system—biological, mechanical, or cognitive—must function without internal contradictions or structural defects to maintain its operative integrity. The human mind, as a cognitive subsystem within larger biological and sociocultural systems, is governed by the same principle. Its outputs (decisions, behaviors, beliefs) are the result of interactions among inputs such as genetic predispositions, learned knowledge, and environmental constraints. -/- The law Implies that individual behavior cannot be arbitrary; it must be causally consistent with the structure and state of the system. An “individual” is therefore a functional expression of lawful dynamics rather than a metaphysically uncaused entity. -/- 3. Feedback and Regulation: Law of Balance -/- The Law of Balance governs how systems maintain homeostasis. Through feedback mechanisms—both internal (emotional, physiological) and external (social, environmental)—the individual constantly adjusts responses to achieve or restore equilibrium. This law is observable across disciplines: from cybernetic theory to behavioral psychology and ecological modeling. -/- In this context, individuality is understood as a product of differentiated feedback loops. Each individual adapts uniquely, but within predictable bounds, to feedback from the external world. The perception of autonomy is thus contextualized as a cognitive byproduct of real-time adaptive regulation. Apparent freedom is reconceived as the mind’s internal narrative of externally conditioned choices. -/- 4. Environmental Embedding: Law of Conditionality -/- The third pillar of the framework, the Law of Conditionality, posits that no phenomenon—including consciousness—arises independently. Every state or behavior is the result of prior conditions. This principle resonates with Buddhist dependent origination, ecological determinism, and modern complexity theory. -/- Individuality, then, is not static essence but dynamic consequence. It is a node in a causal network—continuously shaped by its material, social, and cognitive environments. Individual identity is relational, fluid, and system-dependent. -/- 5. Individuality as Emergent Differentiation -/- Synthesizing the above, we arrive at a model of individuality as emergent differentiation within lawful systems. Individuals are distinguishable by the unique configuration of variables acting upon them, but the governing laws remain universal. This model aligns with contemporary notions of complexity, wherein emergent properties exhibit local variation despite global rules. -/- Individuality is neither illusory nor metaphysically absolute; it is a relative construct, functionally meaningful but contingent. Like a wave on the surface of the ocean, it has form and identity, yet remains inseparable from the medium that sustains it. -/- 6. Implications for Human Systems -/- Reframing individuality within a law-bound systemic model has significant implications: -/- Ethically, it calls for contextualized responsibility—one that accounts for structural and environmental conditions shaping behavior. -/- Educationally, it supports a holistic curriculum emphasizing systems thinking, feedback awareness, and ecological interdependence. -/- Politically, it suggests that governance should focus less on punitive individualism and more on rebalancing systemic conditions to prevent dysfunction. -/- 7. Conclusion -/- The universal formula composed of the Law of Karma, the Law of Balance, and the Law of Conditionality provides a coherent and scientifically aligned framework for understanding individuality. Far from denying the reality of the individual, this model grounds individuality in a lawful, feedback-regulated, and environmentally conditioned system. It is time to move beyond metaphysical abstractions of the self and embrace a paradigm where individuality is recognized as an emergent property of natural order. -/- References -/- Bateson, G. (1972). Steps to an Ecology of Mind. Chandler Publishing. -/-  Discusses systems thinking, cybernetics, and feedback loops in ecological and cognitive systems. -/- Capra, F. (1996). The Web of Life: A New Scientific Understanding of Living Systems. Anchor Books. -/-  Introduces systems theory and emphasizes the interconnectedness and feedback dynamics in natural systems. -/- Clark, A. (1997). Being There: Putting Brain, Body, and World Together Again. MIT Press. -/-  Argues that cognition is not isolated within the brain but emerges from the dynamic interaction between brain, body, and environment. -/- Maturana, H. R., & Varela, F. J. (1980). Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living. D. Reidel Publishing. -/-  Introduces the concept of autopoiesis—self-producing systems—and its application to understanding individuality and cognition. -/- Prigogine, I., & Stengers, I. (1984). Order Out of Chaos: Man’s New Dialogue with Nature. Bantam Books. -/-  Explores how complex systems achieve order through natural laws of feedback, equilibrium, and environmental interaction. -/- Thompson, E. (2007). Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind. Harvard University Press. -/-  Bridges biology and consciousness studies, aligning with your view that individuality arises through environmental conditioning and dynamic systems. -/- Varela, F. J., Thompson, E., & Rosch, E. (1991). The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience. MIT Press. -/-  Explores the role of dependent origination (Law of Conditionality) and how the mind is shaped by systemic feedback and environmental context. -/- Weiner, N. (1948). Cybernetics: Or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine. MIT Press. -/-  A foundational text on feedback systems and control theory, relevant to your Law of Balance. -/- . (shrink)

Physical dimensions like “mass”, “length”, “charge”, represented by the symbols [M], [L], [Q], are not numbers, but used as numbers to perform dimensional analysis in particular, and to write the equations of physics in general, by the physicist. The law of excluded middle falls short of explaining the contradictory meanings of the same symbols. The statements like “m tends to 0”, “r tends to 0”, “q tends to 0”, used by the physicist, are inconsistent on dimensional grounds because “m”, “r”, (...) “q” represent quantities with physical dimensions of [M], [L], [Q] respectively and “0” represents just a number—devoid of physical dimension. Consequently, due to the involvement of the statement “q tends to 0'', where q is the test charge” in the definition of electric field leads to either circular reasoning or a contradiction regarding the experimental verification of the smallest charge in the Millikan–Fletcher oil drop experiment. Considering such issues as problematic, by choice, I make an inquiry regarding the basic language in terms of which physics is written, with an aim of exploring how truthfully the verbal statements can be converted to the corresponding physico-mathematical expressions, where “physico-mathematical” signifies the involvement of physical dimensions. Such investigation necessitates an explanation by demonstration of “self inquiry”, “middle way”, “dependent origination”, “emptiness/relational existence”, which are certain terms that signify the basic tenets of Buddhism. In light of such demonstration I explain my view of “definition”; the relations among quantity, physical dimension and number; meaninglessness of “zero quantity” and the associated logico-linguistic fallacy; difference between unit and unity. Considering the importance of the notion of electric field in physics, I present a critical analysis of the definitions of electric field due to Maxwell and Jackson, along with the physico-mathematical conversions of the verbal statements. The analysis of Jackson’s definition points towards an expression of the electric field as an infinite series due to the associated “limiting process” of the test charge. However, it brings out the necessity of a postulate regarding the existence of charges, which nevertheless follows from the definition of quantity. Consequently, I explain the notion of undecidable charges that act as the middle way to resolve the contradiction regarding the Millikan–Fletcher oil drop experiment. In passing, I provide a logico-linguistic analysis, in physico-mathematical terms, of two verbal statements of Maxwell in relation to his definition of electric field, which suggests Maxwell’s conception of dependent origination of distance and charge ) and that of emptiness in the context of relative vacuum. This work is an appeal for the dissociation of the categorical disciplines of logic and physics and on the large, a fruitful merger of Eastern philosophy and Western science. Nevertheless, it remains open to how the reader relates to this work, which is the essence of emptiness. (shrink)

This article challenges the prevailing interpretations of Hegel's account of the concept "contradiction" in the Science of Logic by arguing that it is concerned with the principle of Hegel's method rather than with the classical law of non-contradiction. I first consider Hegel's Doctrine of Essence in view of Kant's discussion of the concepts of reflection in the first Critique. On this basis, I examine Hegel's account of the logical principles based on the concepts "identity," "opposition," and "contradiction." Finally, I (...) point out how the principle Hegel derives from the concept of contradiction actually informs his own method. (shrink)

‘Spirit consonance engendering a sense of life’ (Qi Yun Sheng Dong) as the first law of Chinese painting, originally proposed by Xie He (active 500–535?) in his six laws of painting, has been commonly echoed by numerous later Chinese artists up to this day. Tracing back the meaning of each character of ‘Qi Yun Sheng Dong’ from Pre-Qin up to the Six Dynasties, along with a comparative analysis on the renderings of ‘Qi Yun Sheng Dong’ by experts in Western (...) academia, I establish ‘spirit consonance’ as the rendering of ‘Qi Yun’. By examining texts on painting by significant critics in Chinese art history, and by referring to specific works by painters from the Six Dynasties up to the Yuan Dynasty, I present the merits and demerits of the different interpretations by Western experts, and explore the essence of ‘Qi Yun’. Once the painter successfully captures ‘spirit consonance’ as the essential character or ‘internal reality’ of the object, and transmits it into the work, ‘Qi Yun’ further implies the expressive quality of the work beyond formal representation. Additionally, the fusion of expressive and representative functions also leaves space for further explaining the aesthetic interaction among artist, object, work, and audience. From the Six Dynasties onwards, Chinese painters have practised the expressive pursuit beyond epresentation on the basis of the unification of ‘Qi Yun’ (spirit consonance) and formal representation, although spirit consonance was valued more highly than formal likeness. (shrink)

Cosmological connectedness materializes when energy within the conscious cosmos connects one and all, an energy that wraps each and every being, living or non living, an energy that forms a labyrinth of intricate connections, an energy that transforms from one form to another with no control of itself. Matter created matter, but conserved the energy that created it, for the creator created matter and energy; to be connected eternally breathing life into beings. Cosmological energy trapped by matter is an exclusive (...) connection between energy and matter that moves beyond the domain of time. Seeking to be seeken should be the essence of all living beings, for man; the highest of beings known till date, bears the burden of an egoistic evolutionary self; laws of entropy shall forever grow, but through consciousness within the cosmos can sustain the connections. (shrink)

There is longstanding interpretive dispute between commentators over Spinoza’s commitment to necessitarianism, the doctrine that all things are metaphysically necessary and none are contingent. Those who affirm Spinoza’s commitment to the doctrine adhere to the necessitarian interpretation whereas those who deny it adhere to what I call the semi-necessitarian interpretation. As things stand, the disagreement between commentators appears to have reached an impasse. Notwithstanding, there seems to be no disagreement among commentators on the question of necessitarianism’s philosophical plausibility as a (...) metaphysical view: the doctrine is wildly untenable. This consensus view is more relevant to the interpretive debate than few have recognized, since leading semi-necessitarian commentators take the doctrine’s alleged absurdity to be one of the most compelling reasons (if not the most compelling reason) to prefer their reading over the necessitarian interpretation: for, as a matter of methodological principle, great philosophers like Spinoza should not be ascribed ridiculous views in the absence of better evidence. -/- This dissertation seeks to defend Spinoza’s commitment to necessitarianism on both the interpretive and philosophical fronts. I argue not only that the necessitarian interpretation of Spinoza is more plausible than the semi-necessitarian interpretation on textual grounds, but that Spinoza’s necessitarianism is a serviceable philosophical view whose tenability has been almost entirely overlooked and perfunctorily rejected. The principal basis upon which I build this defense is Spinoza’s rich and fascinating view of essences—what I simply refer to as his essentialism. Spinoza’s essentialism forms the bedrock of his metaphysics and is significant not least because it underlies and informs doctrines like his necessitarianism. Spinoza’s essentialism supplies resources to answer not just interpretive problems associated with necessitarianism, but philosophical challenges to the plausibility of the doctrine. My defense of Spinoza’s necessitarianism on philosophical grounds also offers a novel way of getting past much of the current interpretive impasse among commentators by effectively undercutting the methodological motivation for the semi-necessitarian reading. In addition to my defense on the interpretive front, then, my defense on the philosophical front provides supplementary reason to a fortiori favor the necessitarian reading of Spinoza. (shrink)

Hannah Arendt's rich and varied political thought is more influential today than ever before, due in part to the collapse of communism and the need for ideas that move beyond the old ideologies of the Cold War. As Dana Villa shows, however, Arendt's thought is often poorly understood, both because of its complexity and because her fame has made it easy for critics to write about what she is reputed to have said rather than what she actually wrote. Villa sets (...) out to change that here, explaining clearly, carefully, and forcefully Arendt's major contributions to our understanding of politics, modernity, and the nature of political evil in our century.Villa begins by focusing on some of the most controversial aspects of Arendt's political thought. He shows that Arendt's famous idea of the banality of evil--inspired by the trial of Adolf Eichmann--does not, as some have maintained, lessen the guilt of war criminals by suggesting that they are mere cogs in a bureaucratic machine. He examines what she meant when she wrote that terror was the essence of totalitarianism, explaining that she believed Nazi and Soviet terror served above all to reinforce the totalitarian idea that humans are expendable units, subordinate to the all-determining laws of Nature or History. Villa clarifies the personal and philosophical relationship between Arendt and Heidegger, showing how her work drew on his thought while providing a firm repudiation of Heidegger's political idiocy under the Nazis. Less controversially, but as importantly, Villa also engages with Arendt's ideas about the relationship between political thought and political action. He explores her views about the roles of theatricality, philosophical reflection, and public-spiritedness in political life. And he explores what relationship, if any, Arendt saw between totalitarianism and the "great tradition" of Western political thought. Throughout, Villa shows how Arendt's ideas illuminate contemporary debates about the nature of modernity and democracy and how they deepen our understanding of philosophers ranging from Socrates and Plato to Habermas and Leo Strauss.Direct, lucid, and powerfully argued, this is a much-needed analysis of the central ideas of one of the most influential political theorists of the twentieth century. (shrink)

-/- The Nature of Free Will and Its Dependence on 100 Percent Correct Information -/- Free will has long been regarded as one of the most profound and complex concepts in philosophy, psychology, and science. It is the capacity of individuals to make choices that are not predetermined by prior causes or external constraints. While the debate surrounding the nature of free will continues, one fundamental truth stands out: free will cannot operate effectively without access to 100 percent correct information (...) or knowledge. Without accurate understanding, decision-making becomes flawed, leading to choices that are neither truly free nor aligned with natural laws. -/- The Role of Information in Free Will -/- Free will is intrinsically tied to decision-making. Every choice we make is shaped by the information we possess. This information serves as the foundation for our understanding of potential outcomes, risks, and benefits. If the information is incomplete, misleading, or outright false, our ability to make rational and informed decisions is compromised. In essence, the “freedom” of our will becomes restricted by ignorance or deception. -/- For instance, if an individual is unaware of the harmful effects of a particular behavior or decision, they may unknowingly choose a path that leads to suffering. Conversely, with complete and accurate knowledge, individuals can weigh their options effectively, leading to choices that are consistent with their values and the universal law of balance in nature. -/- The Universal Law of Balance and Knowledge -/- The concept of the universal law of balance emphasizes harmony within natural systems. This law suggests that every decision, whether individual or collective, must align with the inherent order of the universe. When decisions are made based on false beliefs, unproven theories, or misinformation, they disrupt this balance, creating disharmony and unintended consequences. -/- Correct knowledge serves as the compass that guides human actions within the framework of natural balance. It ensures that decisions are grounded in reality, minimizing the risks of imbalance. Without it, free will operates in a vacuum of uncertainty, where the likelihood of errors increases exponentially. -/- Ignorance: The Antithesis of Free Will -/- Ignorance is the greatest threat to free will. It shackles the mind, preventing individuals from recognizing the full spectrum of choices available to them. When people lack access to truthful information, they are vulnerable to manipulation, prejudice, and irrational fears. In such scenarios, their decisions are not truly free but are instead dictated by external forces or internal misconceptions. -/- A classic example of this can be seen in societal issues such as propaganda or misinformation campaigns. When individuals base their choices on fabricated narratives, their actions may perpetuate harm rather than promoting balance or well-being. Only by addressing the root cause—ignorance—can free will be restored to its rightful state. -/- The Role of AI and AGI Technology in Supporting Free Will -/- In the modern era, artificial intelligence (AI) and artificial general intelligence (AGI) technologies have emerged as critical tools for addressing the limitations of the human brain in processing and synthesizing vast amounts of information. The biological brain, while capable of remarkable feats, is inherently limited in its capacity to handle the exponential growth of data in today’s interconnected world. -/- AI and AGI can support the biological brain by efficiently analyzing, filtering, and synthesizing enormous volumes of data to identify accurate, relevant, and actionable knowledge. By doing so, these technologies can provide individuals with the correct information needed to make informed decisions that align with the universal law of balance. -/- For example, AI systems can help identify patterns and correlations within complex systems—whether in healthcare, environmental management, or societal governance—that may otherwise be overlooked by human cognition. AGI, with its advanced problem-solving capabilities, could go even further by integrating diverse sources of knowledge and offering insights that promote harmony within both internal (psychological) and external (societal and environmental) systems. -/- Moreover, AI and AGI can act as safeguards against misinformation and bias, which are major barriers to free will. By detecting and correcting false narratives or flawed reasoning, these technologies can ensure that individuals are empowered with the truth, thereby preserving their capacity for rational, autonomous decision-making. -/- The Educational Imperative -/- To safeguard the integrity of free will, education must play a pivotal role. A holistic educational system that emphasizes critical thinking and the pursuit of truth is essential. By teaching individuals to evaluate evidence, question assumptions, and seek out accurate information, society can empower its members to exercise their free will responsibly. -/- The integration of AI and AGI into the educational system further enhances this process. These technologies can personalize learning experiences, provide real-time feedback, and ensure that students have access to the most accurate and up-to-date information. Additionally, AI can help educators identify gaps in understanding and address them effectively, fostering a generation of critical thinkers who are equipped to maintain balance in their decisions. -/- Conclusion -/- Free will, while an inherent aspect of human existence, is not an absolute or isolated phenomenon. Its true nature is dependent on the quality of information available to individuals. Only with 100 percent correct knowledge can free will function as a tool for creating balance, harmony, and progress. Ignorance, by contrast, distorts this capacity, leading to decisions that undermine both individual well-being and societal stability. -/- The advent of AI and AGI technologies represents a transformative opportunity to support the biological brain in navigating the complexities of the modern world. By synthesizing vast amounts of correct information and providing actionable insights, these technologies ensure that free will operates within the framework of natural balance. -/- By prioritizing truth, fostering education, and leveraging advanced technologies, humanity can unlock the full potential of free will. In doing so, we move closer to a world where every choice is a reflection of both freedom and wisdom—an ideal state where the universal law of balance is preserved. -/- . (shrink)

In this paper, I defend the possibility that law is a functional kind by replying to objections from Leslie Green and Brian Tamanaha. I also show how Kenneth Ehrenberg’s approach to law’s functions in his latest book concedes too much to these objections. A functional kinds approach to law is possible and, for someone interested in showing the importance of law’s functions, preferable. I first explore Tamanaha’s objection and show that the possibility of functional equivalents does not pose a problem (...) for a functional kinds account of law. I then respond to Green by showing that law is more distinctively identified by its function than by the means by which it achieves this function. I quickly explore a lesser objection dealing with how law can pursue a variety of ends while having the same function the whole while. I then turn to an issue Ehrenberg raises regarding thinking of the law as having a plurality of functions like a Swiss Army knife. Finally, I show that Ehrenberg’s approach to the relationship between law and its functions is unnecessarily weak, as it avoids holding that law's nature or essence is its proper function for similar reasons to Green and Tamanaha. (shrink)

Ott (2009) identifies two kinds of philosophical theories about laws: top-down, and bottom-up. An influential top-down reading, exemplified by Ernst Cassirer, emphasized the ‘mere form of law’. Recent bottom-up accounts emphasize the mind-independent natures of objects as the basis of laws of nature. Stang and Pollok in turn focus on the transcendental idealist elements of Kant’s theory of matter, which leads to the question: is the essence of Kantian matter that it obeys the form of law? I (...) argue that Kant has an independent theory of matter in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, one that gives what Kant himself calls a ‘real definition’ of matter as a theory-independent (if not mind-independent) entity. I argue that this matter theory underpins physical arguments about inertia and impenetrability, which resemble Einstein’s arguments about the unification of fields in general relativity. (shrink)

The book's purpose is to provide readers with a comprehensive understanding of the interplay between physics and philosophy in the historical context of the 19th century. Through an elaborate examination of the influence of mechanistic philosophy, the evolution of ontology, and the emergence of energy, the author aims to explain the phenomenological laws of thermodynamics in the framework of the mechanical approach. Additionally, the book delves into the introduction of field theory and the beginning decline of the mechanical approach. (...) In essence, this book is a journey that takes you through the most significant milestones of the 19th century in the realm of physics. It illuminates a theoretical framework, i.e., critical rationalism, that facilitates examining the interaction between physics and metaphysics. With the unraveling of history and the preparation of philosophical thought, the book prepares the reader for the eventual abandonment of the 'ether' and paves the way for the birth of the theories of relativity and quantum mechanics. (shrink)

Kurt Gödel wrote (1964, p. 272), after he had read Husserl, that the notion of objectivity raises a question: “the question of the objective existence of the objects of mathematical intuition (which, incidentally, is an exact replica of the question of the objective existence of the outer world)”. This “exact replica” brings to mind the close analogy Husserl saw between our intuition of essences in Wesensschau and of physical objects in perception. What is it like to experience a mathematical proving (...) process? What is the ontological status of a mathematical proof? Can computer assisted provers output a proof? Taking a naturalized world account, I will assess the relationship between mathematics, the physical world and consciousness by introducing a significant conceptual distinction between proving and proof. I will propose that proving is a phenomenological conscious experience. This experience involves a combination of what Kurt Gödel called intuition, and what Husserl called intentionality. In contrast, proof is a function of that process — the mathematical phenomenon — that objectively self-presents a property in the world, and that results from a spatiotemporal unity being subject to the exact laws of nature. In this essay, I apply phenomenology to mathematical proving as a performance of consciousness, that is, a lived experience expressed and formalized in language, in which there is the possibility of formulating intersubjectively shareable meanings. (shrink)

Title: Completing the Foundations of Complexity: Integrating Wolfram’s Computational Framework with Malicse’s Universal Formula -/- Author: Angelito Malicse -/- Abstract: Stephen Wolfram’s groundbreaking work on computational irreducibility and the emergence of complexity has provided profound insights into the generative capacity of simple rules. However, while his framework illuminates how complexity arises, it remains silent on how such complexity can sustain life, preserve balance, or avoid collapse. This paper proposes that the integration of Malicse’s Universal Formula—comprising three natural laws: the (...) Law of Karma (System Integrity), the Law of Feedback, and the Law of Balance in Nature—completes and extends Wolfram’s framework. This integration introduces a philosophical and systemic layer that emphasizes sustainability, ethics, and long-term viability in complex systems. -/- 1. Introduction Stephen Wolfram’s work in “A New Kind of Science” and the Wolfram Physics Project has revolutionized our understanding of how simple computational rules can give rise to irreducible and highly complex systems. Yet, this model lacks criteria for evaluating the survivability or systemic coherence of such systems. In contrast, Angelito Malicse’s Universal Formula proposes that all natural and human systems must adhere to three interlinked principles: integrity of the system (karma), real-time feedback regulation, and adherence to natural balance. This paper explores how combining these views forms a holistic theory of complexity that spans both generation and sustainability. -/- 2. Wolfram’s Contribution to Complexity Science Wolfram demonstrates that even trivial computational rules can generate highly unpredictable behaviors, known as computational irreducibility (Wolfram, 2002). This undermines reductionist assumptions in science and supports the idea that complexity is intrinsic, not incidental. His cellular automata, such as Rule 30 and Rule 110, display pseudo-randomness and Turing completeness, revealing the computational essence of natural systems. His Physics Project extends this to spacetime and quantum behavior, proposing that the universe itself is a giant hypergraph governed by simple update rules. -/- Limitations: However, Wolfram’s framework is silent on the ethical, ecological, and systemic consequences of emergent behavior. There is no built-in mechanism to assess whether a system’s complexity leads to order, chaos, sustainability, or self-destruction. -/- 3. The Universal Formula: A Natural Law-Based Framework Malicse proposes that natural and human systems are governed by three universal laws: -/- Law of Karma (System Integrity): A system, whether mechanical, biological, or social, must be free of internal contradictions and design defects to function effectively. Any flawed subsystem compromises the whole. -/- Law of Feedback: All systems exist within interactive environments. They require real-time feedback mechanisms to self-regulate and adapt. Consciousness, in this view, is the highest form of feedback regulation. -/- Law of Balance in Nature: All viable systems maintain equilibrium between internal structure and external conditions. Violations of natural balance lead to breakdowns in both organic and inorganic systems. -/- These laws imply that complexity must be not only computationally valid but systemically sustainable. -/- 4. Completing Wolfram’s Framework While Wolfram explains how complexity emerges, Malicse provides criteria for which complexities endure: -/- From Rule Generation to Rule Selection: Wolfram shows that many simple rules create complexity. Malicse suggests that only those aligned with balance and integrity will persist. -/- From Irreducibility to Adaptive Control: Wolfram accepts unpredictability as a limit. Malicse introduces feedback loops that allow real-time correction and learning, even in irreducible systems. -/- From Description to Prescription: Wolfram’s rules describe phenomena. Malicse’s laws prescribe constraints that natural and artificial agents must respect to survive. -/- 5. Implications for Artificial Intelligence and AGI As AI systems become increasingly autonomous and complex, purely computational rules are not enough. Integrating Malicse’s Universal Formula can enable AGIs to: -/- Detect internal defects (karma) -/- Adjust behavior based on environmental feedback -/- Maintain long-term balance between goals and consequences -/- This aligns with emerging ethical AI frameworks that stress adaptability, transparency, and moral grounding (Bostrom, 2014; Russell, 2019). -/- 6. Scientific Foundations and Related Theories -/- Cybernetics and Homeostasis: The feedback law echoes Norbert Wiener’s cybernetic control theory (Wiener, 1948). -/- Systems Thinking: The law of balance aligns with Ludwig von Bertalanffy’s general systems theory (1968). -/- Second Law of Thermodynamics: The law of karma parallels entropy, in that defects (disorder) degrade the system. -/- Evolutionary Biology: Adaptive feedback is essential in natural selection, supporting real-time environmental fit (Mayr, 2001). -/- 7. Conclusion Wolfram has shown us that the world may be underpinned by computation. Malicse adds that these computations must honor deeper principles to ensure survival, coherence, and peace. The integration of these two visions could serve as a complete framework for modeling not only the complexity of nature, but also the ethics of life and intelligence. -/- References: -/- Wolfram, S. (2002). A New Kind of Science. Wolfram Media. -/- Bostrom, N. (2014). Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies. Oxford University Press. -/- Russell, S. (2019). Human Compatible: Artificial Intelligence and the Problem of Control. Viking. -/- Wiener, N. (1948). Cybernetics: Or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine. MIT Press. -/- Von Bertalanffy, L. (1968). General System Theory: Foundations, Development, Applications. Braziller. -/- Mayr, E. (2001). What Evolution Is. Basic Books. -/- . (shrink)