In “Risk Based Passenger Screening in Aviation Security: Implications and Variants of a New Paradigm”, Sebastian Weydner-Volkmann describes the current paradigm shift from ‘traditional’ forms of screening to ‘risk based passenger screening’ (RBS) in aviation security. This paradigm shift is put in the context of the wider historical development of risk management approaches. Through a discussion of Michel Foucault, Herfried Münkler and Ulrich Beck, Weydner-Volkmann analyses the shortcomings of such approaches in public security policies, which become especially evident (...) in the aviation security context. As he shows, the turn towards methods of RBS can be seen as an attempt to address a trade-off ‘trilemma’ between the effective provision of security, the implied costs for industry and passengers, and the ethical, legal and societal implications of the screening procedures. In order to analyse foreseeable outcomes of embracing RBS, he differentiates three prototypical variants of the new paradigm on the basis of their main referent and rationale. For each variant, he then subsequently assesses the implications for the ‘trilemma’, after having unveiled the criteria of analysis that will necessarily have to be followed within a serious appraisal of RBS methods. (shrink)

To improve the street managing and passenger comfort of a vehicle, a suspension system is furnished. An active suspension device is considered to be better than the passive suspension device. In this paper, 2 degree of freedom of an active suspension system of a linear vehicle are designed, that's challenge to oneof-a-kind disturbances on the road. Since the parametric uncertainty inside the spring, the shock absorber, the mass and the actuator has been taken into consideration, robust control is used. (...) In this paper, H∞ and µ-synthesis controllers are used to enhance using consolation and the capability to force the car on the road. For the analysis of the time domain, a MATLAB script software become used and a check with 4 road disturbance inputs (bump, random, sinusoidal and harmonic) became carried out for suspension deflection, body acceleration and travel of the body for the energetic suspension with the H∞ controller and the active suspension with the µ-synthesis controller and the comparative simulation and the reference consequences display the effectiveness of the active suspension system with the µ-synthesis controller. (shrink)

Body checking, characterized by the repeated visual or physical inspection of particular parts of one’s own body (e.g. thighs, waist, or upper arms) is one of the most prominent behaviors associated with eating disorders, particularly Anorexia Nervosa (AN). In this paper, we explore the explanatory potential of the Recalcitrant Fear Model of AN (RFM) in relation to body checking. We argue that RFM, when combined with certain plausible auxiliary hypotheses about the cognitive and epistemic roles of emotions, is able to (...) explain key characteristics of body checking, including how body checking behavior becomes habitual and compulsive. (shrink)

This paper concerns model-checking of fragments and extensions of CTL* on infinite-state Presburger counter systems, where the states are vectors of integers and the transitions are determined by means of relations definable within Presburger arithmetic. In general, reachability properties of counter systems are undecidable, but we have identified a natural class of admissible counter systems (ACS) for which we show that the quantification over paths in CTL* can be simulated by quantification over tuples of natural numbers, eventually allowing translation of (...) the whole Presburger-CTL* into Presburger arithmetic, thereby enabling effective model checking. We provide evidence that our results are close to optimal with respect to the class of counter systems described above. (shrink)

Can you rationally double-check what you already know? In this paper, I argue that you can. Agents can know that something is true and rationally double-check it at the very same time. I defend my position by considering a wide variety of cases where agents double-check their beliefs to gain epistemic improvements beyond knowledge. These include certainty, epistemic resilience, and sensitivity to error. Although this phenomenon is widespread, my proposal faces two types of challenges. First, some have defended ignorance norms, (...) on which agents are only allowed to inquire about things they don’t already know. Second—motivated by strong conceptions of belief or pragmatic encroachment—some have argued that doublechecking destroys knowledge. I argue that these competing views fail to capture both the epistemic value of double-checking and the many reasons why agents might double-check. Moreover, they rely on overly strong assumptions about what inquiry, knowledge, or belief requires. Finally, I marshal linguistic data in favor of the compatibility of knowledge and doublechecking. (shrink)

This book is primarily about checking and only derivatively about knowing. Checking is a very common concept for describing a subject’s epistemic goals and actions. Surprisingly, there has been no philosophical attention paid to the notion of checking. In Part I, I develop a sensitivity account of checking. To be more explicit, I analyze the internalist and externalist components of the epistemic action of checking which include the intentions of the checking subject and the necessary externalist features of the method (...) used. Crucially, successfully checking whether p is true requires using a method that is sensitive with respect to p, i.e. a method that would not indicate that p, if p were false. In Part II, I use the distinction between knowing and checking to explain central puzzles about knowledge, particularly puzzles centering on knowledge closure, puzzles concerning bootstrapping and the skeptical puzzle. Moreover, the book clarifies a dispute about modal epistemology, concerning the application of the sensitivity principle. By arguing that sensitivity is necessary for checking but not knowing, I explain where our persisting intuitions about sensitivity have their place in epistemology. (shrink)

In his recent book, Knowing and Checking, Guido Melchior argues that, when we attempt to check whether p, we tend to think that we do not know p. Melchior then uses this assumption to explain a number of puzzles about knowledge. One outstanding question for Melchior's account, however, is why this tendency exists. After all, Melchior himself argues that checking is not necessary for knowing, so why would we think that we fail to know that p when we are in (...) the midst of checking that p? I will explore one such suggestion for why this occurs, arguing that the connection between checking and inquiry can shed light on the impact that checking has on knowing. (shrink)

In this Précis, I provide an overview of my Monograph Knowing and Checking: An Epistemological Investigation (Melchior 2019), which is subject to a book symposium organized by the University of Maribor. This volume in Acta Analytica contains contributions by Peter Baumann, Kelly Becker, Marian David, Nenad Miščević, Robert Weston Siscoe, and Danilo Šuster along with my replies.

Political fact-checkers evaluate the truthfulness of politicians’ claims. This paper contributes to an emerging scholarly debate on whether fact-checkers treat political parties differently in a systematic manner depending on their ideology (bias). We first examine the available approaches to analyze bias and then present a new approach in two steps. First, we propose a logistic regression model to analyze the outcomes of fact-checks and calculate how likely each political party will obtain a truth score. We test our model with (...) a sample of fact-checks from Newtral, a major Spanish fact-checker. Our model would signal bias under two assumptions: a) all political parties are on average equally accurate in their statements; b) the verification method gives precise instructions and is implemented systematically. We investigate this second assumption with a series of interviews with Newtral fact-checkers. We show that standard verification protocols are so loosely implemented that fact-checks reflect a set of journalistic decisions, rather than a bias in the statistical sense. We call for a more rigorous definition of verification methods as a pre-requisite for an unbiased assessment of politician’s claims. (shrink)

People who experience love often experience break-ups as well. However, philosophers of love have paid little attention to the phenomenon. Here, I address that gap by looking at the grieving process which follows unchosen relationship terminations. I ask which one is the loss that, if it were to be recovered, would stop grief or make it unwarranted. Is it the beloved, the reciprocation of love, the relationship, or all of it? By answering this question I not only provide with an (...) insight on the nature of break-ups, but also make a specific claim about the nature of love. I argue that the object that is universally lost in all break-ups is a person with certain intrinsic qualities, who is in a relationship characterised by certain shared activities and recognized as romantic. That means that, at least in romantic terminations, the beloved and the relationship are not independent objects of grief. So, plausibly, they may not independent objects of value in love. Hence, those who state otherwise should face up to this objection coming from the study of break-ups. (shrink)

The paper proposes an account of the rational response to higher-order evidence whose key claim is that whenever we acquire such evidence we ought to engage in the inquiring activity of double-checking. Combined with a principle that establishes a connection between rational inquiry and rational belief retention, the account offers a novel explanation of the alleged impermissibility of retaining one’s belief in the face of higher-order evidence. It is argued that this explanation is superior to the main competitor view which (...) appeals to the notion of defeat. (shrink)

Drawing on empirical evidence from history and anthropology, we aim to demonstrate that there is room for genealogical ideology critique within normative political theory. The test case is some libertarians’ use of folk notions of private property rights in defence of the legitimacy of capitalist states. Our genealogy of the notion of private property shows that asking whether a capitalist state can emerge without violations of self-ownership cannot help settling the question of its legitimacy, because the notion of private property (...) presupposed by that question is a product of the entity it is supposed to help legitimise: the state. We anchor our genealogical critique in recent work on ideology in epistemology and philosophy of language, and in current debates on the methodology of political theory. But, unlike more traditional approaches that aim to debunk whole concepts or even belief systems, we propose a more targeted, argument-specific form of ideology critique. (shrink)

The purpose of the study is to forecast the number of passengers transported by air in the United States for 2021-2022. The forecast is preceded by a multidimensional comparative analysis of the number of passengers transported by air in the United States from 1 January 2019 to 2 November 2021. To achieve this goal, the data were grouped as dependent variables: years, months-years. The observed similarities, the analysis and evaluation of the literature as well as the own experience made it (...) possible to forecast primary data for the future. The obtained results show a growing trend in the number of passengers transported by air in the United States. The forecast for 3 November 2021 to 31 December 2022 is 837 459 877 prospective air passengers in the United States. The standard deviation of the obtained forecast was 255 680,3, the arithmetic mean was 1 975 141 passengers and the median was 1 998 478 passengers. The observed similar trends in the identical months of July-October in 2019 and 2021 as well as the analysis of the literature and the own experience allowed for the selection of a method for the forecasting of the number of passengers transported by air in the United States for the future. The detected regularities as recurring trends in the number of air passengers transported in the United States on a dynamic basis may be used to forecast them for the future. (shrink)

There is currently a theoretical tension between young children’s failure in False Belief Tasks (FBTs) and their success in a variety of other tasks that also seem to require the ability to ascribe false beliefs to agents. We try to explain this tension by the hypothesis that in the FBT, children think they are asked what the agent should do in the circumstances and not what the agent will do. We explain why this hypothesis is plausible. We examined the hypothesis (...) in two experiments, each involving a new task. In the first task, the hypothesised misunderstanding of the question leads to failure without the need to ascribe a false belief, and we show that failure in this new task is correlated with failure in the FBT. In the second task, passing which requires ascribing a false belief to an agent, and for which we have partial yet encouraging results, the children are asked a question which is unlikely to be misunderstood. Children pass this task much more often than they do a standard FBT. The mentioned tension is thus resolved. We conclude that the so-called False Belief Task probably does not check the ability to ascribe false beliefs but rather linguistic development. (shrink)

This paper replies to the comments made in Acta Analytica by Peter Baumann, Kelly Becker, Marian David, Nenad Miščević, Wes Siscoe, and Danilo Šuster on my Knowing and Checking: An Epistemological Investigation (Routledge 2019), hereinafter abbreviated as KC. These papers resulted from a workshop organized by the department of philosophy of the University of Maribor. I am very thankful to the organizers of the workshop and to the authors for their comments.

Alongside the direct parallels and contrasts between traditional narrative fiction and games, there lie certain partial analogies that provide their own insights. This article begins by examining a direct parallel between narrative fiction and games—the role of fictional reliefs and reality checks in shaping aesthetic engagement—before arguing that from this a partial analogy can be developed stemming from a feature that distinguishes most games from most traditional fictions: the presence of rules. The relation between rules and fiction in games (...) has heretofore been acknowledged but not examined in detail, giving an impression of a tension that is constant. However, the paired concepts of formal reliefs and representation checks, once introduced, allow us to explain how rules and fiction interact to alter the ways in which players engage with games in a dynamic but limited way. (shrink)

Concerns about emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases have given a new lease of life to quarantinist measures: a series of time-honoured techniques for controlling the spread of infectious diseases through breaking the chain of human contagion. Since such measures typically infringe individual rights or privacy their use is subject to legal regulations and gives rise to ethical and political worries and suspicions. Yet in some circumstances they can be very effective. After considering some case studies that show how epidemics are (...) unique, fluid and affected by a multitude of contingent factors, it is argued that the legal and ethical guidelines may not always be the best approach to discipline the use of quarantinist measures. An alternative model based on ex-post political accountability for reasonableness is proposed. This model restores the centrality of political decision and expert judgement in situations characterized by high risk, uncertainty and contingency. It is argued that such alternative model affords quicker and more flexible responses to serious outbreaks of infections, while providing adequate protection against abuses. (shrink)

Abstract: The sinking of the RMS Titanic in 1912 remains a poignant historical event that continues to captivate our collective imagination. In this research paper, we delve into the realm of data-driven analysis by applying Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs) to predict the chances of survival for passengers aboard the Titanic. Our study leverages a comprehensive dataset encompassing passenger information, demographics, and cabin class, providing a unique opportunity to explore the complex interplay of factors influencing survival outcomes. Our ANN-based predictive (...) model achieved an accuracy rate of 78%, shedding light on the underlying patterns within the data. However, this paper underscores the multifaceted nature of survival prediction and acknowledges several challenges. These include missing data imputation, feature engineering, and the inherent noise within historical datasets. We further discuss the importance of model evaluation metrics, showcasing not only accuracy but also precision, recall, and F1-score as essential indicators of predictive performance. The research paper meticulously outlines the architecture of the ANN model, emphasizing the key hyperparameters, activation functions, and regularization techniques employed in model development. Additionally, we address ethical considerations related to data handling and potential biases within the dataset. While our achieved accuracy is a notable achievement, this study emphasizes the importance of interpreting the results with due caution. It underscores the need for a holistic perspective that considers the practical implications of false positives and false negatives, especially in the context of a disaster scenario. In conclusion, this research contributes to our understanding of survival prediction in historical events like the Titanic disaster using modern machine learning techniques. It calls for further exploration and refinement of predictive models, with a focus on enhancing the interpretability and generalizability of such models to real-world applications. (shrink)

In here, philosophical-literate thinking on the way is mainly tried. On one side, making a philosophical analysis of Heraclitus’ fragment 60 is aimed. The different views on what Heraclitus might have meant in this article which is generally translated as the way up and the way down are one and the same are examined. On the other side, with a reading of Robert Frost’s famous poem of Road Not Taken, it has been tried whether a phenomenological interpretation of the way (...) based on passenger is possible or not. It has been researched if there is a common ground or not where this fragment and poem -which exhibit two different views on the way- have met each other. This fragment and poem has been linked together on the context of essentiality of the passenger for the way. (shrink)

The proof paradox results from conflicting intuitions concerning different types of fallible evidence in a court of law. We accept fallible individual evidence but reject fallible statistical evidence even when the conditional probability that the defendant is guilty given the evidence is the same, a seeming inconsistency. This paper defends a solution to the proof paradox, building on a sensitivity account of checking and settling a question. The proposed sensitivity account of legal proof not only requires sensitivity simpliciter but sensitivity (...) of each relevant step of the proof procedure and/or sensitivity concerning all relevant alternatives. This account avoids problems that have been identified for other sensitivity views of legal proof. Moreover, it is argued that sensitivity, rather than safety, is the crucial modal condition for legal proof. It is, finally, shown that the provided account can fruitfully support very different existing views on the relationship between knowledge and legal proof. (shrink)

Abstract: There are epistemic manipulators in the world. These people are actively attempting to sacrifice epistemic goods for personal gain. In doing so, manipulators have led many competent epistemic agents into believing contrarian theories that go against well-established knowledge. In this paper, I explore one mechanism by which manipulators get epistemic agents to believe contrarian theories. I do so by looking at a prominent empirical model of trustworthiness. This model identifies three major factors that epistemic agents look for when trying (...) to determine who is trustworthy. These are (i) ability, (ii) benevolence, and (iii) moral integrity. I then show how manipulators can manufacture the illusion that they possess these factors. This leads epistemic agents to view manipulators as trustworthy sources of information. Additionally, I argue that fact-checking will be an ineffective – or even harmful – practice when correcting the beliefs of epistemic agents who have been tricked by this illusion of epistemic trustworthiness. I suggest that in such cases we should use an alternative correction, which I call trust undercutting. (shrink)

In epistemology, the concept of knowledge is of distinctive interest. This fact is also reflected in the discussion of epistemic value, which focuses to a large extend on the value problem of knowledge. This discussion suggests that knowledge has an outstanding value among epistemic standings because its value exceeds the value of its constitutive parts. I will argue that the value of knowledge is not outstanding by presenting epistemic standings of checking, transferring knowledge, and proving in court, whose values exceed (...) the value of knowledge in certain contexts. Moreover, the values of these other epistemic standings do not always rely on the value of knowledge. In terms of value, knowledge is not an outstanding epistemic concept. Hence, in terms of value we cannot find support for the privileged position that knowledge enjoys in epistemology. (shrink)

As artificial intelligence becomes more sophisticated and robots approach autonomous decision-making, debates about how to assign moral responsibility have gained importance, urgency, and sophistication. Answering Stenseke’s (2022a) call for scaffolds that can help us classify views and commitments, we think the current debate space can be represented hierarchically, as answers to key questions. We use the resulting taxonomy of five stances to differentiate—and defend—what is known as the “blank check” proposal. According to this proposal, a person activating a robot could (...) willingly make themselves answerable for whatever events ensue, even if those events stem from the robot’s autonomous decision(s). This blank check solution was originally proposed in the context of automated warfare (Champagne & Tonkens, 2015), but we extend it to cover all robots. We argue that, because moral answerability in the blank check is accepted voluntarily and before bad outcomes are known, it proves superior to alternative ways of assigning blame. We end by highlighting how, in addition to being just, this self-initiated and prospective moral answerability for robot harm provides deterrence that the four other stances cannot match. (shrink)

It is widely accepted that in fallible reasoning potential error necessarily increases with every additional step, whether inferences or premises, because it grows in the same way that the probability of a lengthening conjunction shrinks. As it stands, this is disappointing but, I will argue, not out of keeping with our experience. However, consulting an expert, proof-checking, constructing gap-free proofs, and gathering more evidence for a given conclusion also add more steps, and we think these actions have the potential to (...) improve our reliability or justifiedness. Thus, the received wisdom about the growth of error implies a skepticism about the possibility of improving our reliability and level of justification through effort. Paradoxically, and even more implausibly, taking steps to decrease your potential error necessarily increases it. I will argue that the self-help steps listed here are of a distinctive type, involving composition rather than conjunction. Error grows differently over composition than over conjunction, I argue, and this dissolves the apparent paradox. (shrink)

It can be rational to inquire into what you already know, as cases of double-checking suggest. But, I argue, this is compatible with a knowledge aim of inquiry. In general, it can be rational to pursue an aim you’ve already achieved, and inquiry is no different. In particular, I argue that to double-check what you already know is to make sure you have knowledge, and that is still to aim at knowledge.

Mathematics textbooks teach logical reasoning by example, a practice started by Euclid; while logic textbooks treat logic as a subject in its own right without practical application to mathematics. Stuck in the middle are students seeking mathematical proficiency and educators seeking to provide it. To assist them, the article explains in practical detail how to teach logic-based skills such as: making mathematical reasoning fully explicit; moving from step to step in a mathematical proof in logically correct ways; and checking to (...) make sure inferences are logically correct. The methodology can easily be extended beyond the four examples analyzed. (shrink)

Politics is full of people who don’t care about the facts. Still, while not caring about the facts, they are often concerned to present themselves as caring about them. Politics, in other words, is full of bullshitters. But why? In this paper I develop an incentives-based analysis of bullshit in politics, arguing that it is often a rational response to the incentives facing different groups of agents. In a slogan: bullshit in politics pays, sometimes literally. After first outlining an account (...) of bullshit (Section 1), I discuss the incentives driving three different groups of agents to bullshit: politicians, the media, and voters (Section 2). I then examine several existing proposals to combat bullshit in politics, arguing that each will fail because they ignore the relevant underlying incentives (Section 3). I conclude somewhat pessimistically that a certain amount of bullshit in politics is inevitable (Section 4). (shrink)

According to most accounts of trust, you can only trust other people (or groups of people). To trust is to think that another has goodwill, or something to that effect. I sketch a different form of trust: the unquestioning attitude. What it is to trust, in this sense, is to settle one’s mind about something, to stop questioning it. To trust is to rely on a resource while suspending deliberation over its reliability. Trust lowers the barrier of monitoring, challenging, checking, (...) and questioning. Trust sets up open pipelines between yourself and parts of the external world. Trust permits external resources to have a similar relationship to one as one’s internal cognitive faculties. This creates efficiency, but at the price of exquisite vulnerability. We must trust in this way because we are cognitively limited beings in a cognitively overwhelming world. Crucially, we can hold the unquestioning attitude towards objects and technologies. When I trust my climbing rope, I stop worrying about its reliability. When I trust my online calendaring system, I simply go to the events indicated, without question. But, one might worry, how could one ever hold such a normatively loaded attitude as trust towards mere objects? How could it ever make sense to feel betrayed by an object? Trust is our engine for expanding and outsourcing our agency — for binding external processes into our practical selves. Thus, we can be betrayed by our smartphones in the same way that we can be betrayed by our memory. When we trust, we try to make something a part of our agency, and we are betrayed when our part lets us down. To unquestioningly trust something is to let it in—to attempt to bring it inside one’s practical functioning. This suggests a new form of gullibility: agential gullibility, which occurs when agents too hastily and carelessly integrate external resources into their own agency. (shrink)

‘Virtue signaling’ is the practice of using moral talk in order to enhance one’s moral reputation. Many find this kind of behavior irritating. However, some philosophers have gone further, arguing that virtue signaling actively undermines the proper functioning of public moral discourse and impedes moral progress. Against this view, I argue that widespread virtue signaling is not a social ill, and that it can actually serve as an invaluable instrument for moral change, especially in cases where moral argument alone does (...) not suffice. Specifically, virtue signaling can change the broader public’s social expectations, which can in turn motivate the adoption of new, positive social norms. I also argue that the reputation-seeking motives underlying virtue signaling impose important constraints on virtue signalers’ behavior, which serve to keep the worst excesses of virtue signaling in check. (shrink)

This paper argues for the general proper functionalist view that epistemic warrant consists in the normal functioning of the belief-forming process when the process has forming true beliefs reliably as an etiological function. Such a process is reliable in normal conditions when functioning normally. This paper applies this view to so-called testimony-based beliefs. It argues that when a hearer forms a comprehension-based belief that P (a belief based on taking another to have asserted that P) through the exercise of a (...) reliable competence to comprehend and filter assertive speech acts, then the hearer's belief is prima facie warranted. The paper discusses the psychology of comprehension, the function of assertion, and the evolution of filtering mechanisms, especially coherence checking. (shrink)

Ontologies are being used increasingly to promote the reusability of scientific information by allowing heterogeneous data to be integrated under a common, normalized representation. Definitions play a central role in the use of ontologies both by humans and by computers. Textual definitions allow ontologists and data curators to understand the intended meaning of ontology terms and to use these terms in a consistent fashion across contexts. Logical definitions allow machines to check the integrity of ontologies and reason over data annotated (...) with ontology terms to make inferences that promote knowledge discovery. Therefore, it is important not only to include in ontologies multiple types of definitions in both formal and in natural languages, but also to ensure that these definitions meet good quality standards so they are useful. While tools such as Protégé can assist in creating well-formed logical definitions, producing good definitions in a natural language is still to a large extent a matter of human ingenuity supported at best by just a small number of general principles. For lack of more precise guidelines, definition authors are often left to their own personal devices. This paper aims to fill this gap by providing the ontology community with a set of principles and conventions to assist in definition writing, editing, and validation, by drawing on existing definition writing principles and guidelines in lexicography, terminology, and logic. (shrink)

There is much to admire in John Pittard’s recent book on the epistemology of disagreement. But here we develop one concern about the role that rational insight plays in his project. Pittard develops and defends a view on which a party to peer disagreement can show substantial partiality to his own view, so long as he enjoys even moderate rational insight into the truth of his view or the cogency of his reasoning for his view. Pittard argues that this may (...) happen in ordinary cases of religious disagreement—cases in which it’s a live skeptical possibility that one is misdescribing his insight, or not having insight at all—and therefore one need not be strongly conciliatory even in the face of peer disagreement. Yet Pittard agrees that one should be strongly conciliatory in cases of disagreement involving, e.g., visual perception and dim rational insight, since the sort of fallible, corrigible evidence involved in such cases may be counterbalanced by symmetrical evidence on the part of one’s disagreeing peer. We worry that there’s an inconsistency here. If it’s unreasonable to show partiality to one’s visual experience (or dim rational insight) in cases like “Horse Race” and “Restaurant Check,” it’s likewise unreasonable to show partiality in religious disagreements to one’s moderate rational insight, fallible and corrigible as it is. (shrink)

Autonomous vehicles (AVs) are expected to improve road traffic safety and save human lives. It is also expected that some AVs will encounter so-called dilemmatic situations, like choosing between saving two passengers by sacrificing one pedestrian or choosing between saving three pedestrians by sacrificing one passenger. These expectations fuel the extensive debate over the ethics settings of AVs: the way AVs should be programmed to act in dilemmatic situations and who should decide about the nature of this programming in (...) the first place. In the article, the ethics settings problem is analyzed as a trilemma between AVs with personal ethics setting (PES), AVs with mandatory ethics setting (MES) and AVs with no ethics settings (NES). It is argued that both PES and MES, by being programmed to choose one human life over the other, are bound to cause serious moral damage resulting from the violation of several principles central to deontology and utilitarianism. NES is defended as the only plausible solution to this trilemma, that is, as the solution that sufficiently minimizes the number of traffic fatalities without causing any comparable moral damage. (shrink)

Economic liberty is best understood in opposition to economic domination. This article develops a radical republican conception of such domination. In particular, I argue that radical republicanism provides a more satisfactory account of individual economic freedom than the market-friendly liberties of working, transacting, holding, and using championed by Nickel and Tomasi. So too, it avoids the pitfalls of other conceptions of economic liberty which emphasize real freedom, alternatives to immiserating work, or unalienated labor. The resulting theory holds that economic domination (...) occurs when someone’s access to civic capabilities is contingent on the arbitrary economic power of others. Socialist institutions—suitably configured—can deliver on this individual economic freedom, allowing the dominating power of proprietors, shareholders, landlords, and managers to be kept in check, and providing an unconditional minimum that allows individual citizens to be less beholden to others in meeting many of their most fundamental civic needs. Thus, I conclude that socialism can be championed as a politics of individual economic liberty. (shrink)

In this chapter I give an account of how our judgments of anger often play out in certain political instances. While contemporary philosophers of emotion have provided us with check box guides like “fittingness” and “size” for evaluating anger, I will argue that these guides do not by themselves help us escape the tendency to mark or unmark the boxes selectively, inconsistently, and erroneously. If anger—particularly anger in a political context—can provide information and spark positive change or political destruction, then (...) we have moral reasons to evaluate it properly. But can we? And what are the limitations and errors we often face when evaluating anger? -/- I will begin by laying out the ways in which we evaluate emotions and the moral and epistemic errors we attribute to the angry agent in judgments of disapproval. Then I attempt to answer the question: How do we judge political anger improperly? An improper evaluation, in my view, does not take into account relevant information that is needed to evaluate the anger. An overly generous, uninformed, biased, or selfish process of evaluation produces an improper evaluation. We see this occur when we immediately evaluate anger. I will also identify two social discursive practices of improper evaluation as well as the moral and epistemic errors committed when anger evaluators participate in these practices. (shrink)

The traditional Lewis–Stalnaker semantics treats all counterfactuals with an impossible antecedent as trivially or vacuously true. Many have regarded this as a serious defect of the semantics. For intuitively, it seems, counterfactuals with impossible antecedents—counterpossibles—can be non-trivially true and non-trivially false. Whereas the counterpossible "If Hobbes had squared the circle, then the mathematical community at the time would have been surprised" seems true, "If Hobbes had squared the circle, then sick children in the mountains of Afghanistan at the time would (...) have been thrilled" seems false. Many have proposed to extend the Lewis–Stalnaker semantics with impossible worlds to make room for a non-trivial or non-vacuous treatment of counterpossibles. Roughly, on the extended Lewis–Stalnaker semantics, we evaluate a counterfactual of the form "If A had been true, then C would have been true" by going to closest world—whether possible or impossible—in which A is true and check whether C is also true in that world. If the answer is "yes", the counterfactual is true; otherwise it is false. Since there are impossible worlds in which the mathematically impossible happens, there are impossible worlds in which Hobbes manages to square the circle. And intuitively, in the closest such impossible worlds, sick children in the mountains of Afghanistan are not thrilled—they remain sick and unmoved by the mathematical developments in Europe. If so, the counterpossible "If Hobbes had squared the circle, then sick children in the mountains of Afghanistan at the time would have been thrilled" comes out false, as desired. In this paper, I will critically investigate the extended Lewis–Stalnaker semantics for counterpossibles. I will argue that the standard version of the extended semantics, in which impossible worlds correspond to maximal, logically inconsistent entities, fails to give the correct semantic verdicts for many counterpossibles. In light of the negative arguments, I will then outline a new version of the extended Lewis–Stalnaker semantics that can avoid these problems. (shrink)

One of the moral questions concerning autonomous vehicles (henceforth AVs) is the choice between types that differ in their built-in algorithms for dealing with rare situations of unavoidable lethal collision. It does not appear to be possible to avoid questions about how these algorithms should be designed. We present the results of our study of moral preferences (N = 2769) with respect to three types of AVs: (1) selfish, which protects the lives of passenger(s) over any number of bystanders; (...) (2) altruistic, which minimizes the number of casualties, even if this leads to death of passenger(s); and (3) conservative, which abstains from interfering in such situations. We differentiate between scenarios in which participants are to make their decisions privately or publicly, and for themselves or for their offspring. We aim to answer two research questions: (1) whether the public visibility of the choice of an AV type choice make this choice more altruistic and (2) which type of situation makes it more difficult to choose altruistically: when choosing for society as a whole, when choosing only for oneself, or when choosing only for one’s offspring. Our results show that respondents exhibit a preference for an altruistic strategy for AVs and that it is reinforced when signaled to others. The altruistic preference is strongest when applies to everybody else, weaker when it reflects a solely personal choice, and weakest when choosing for one’s own child. We conclude that a public choice is considerably more likely to pressure consumers into accepting a more socially beneficial solution. (shrink)

Today, the Internet is a rich source of study materials, and Google Scholar offers free access to a large number of scientific articles. There are excellent research publications available in many more databases. Students have the option of easily copying the material. Reusing, paraphrasing, patchwriting, and ghostwriting without citing the original documents are plagiarism. Plagiarism is increasing in academics, particularly in research. This study aims to study the awareness of plagiarism and to analyze the reasons for plagiarism. The study samples (...) are the student teachers in India. For this study, we used a survey method, and the author prepared a questionnaire to collect data from the student teachers. Study respondents are the student teachers of the Regional Institute of Education Mysore; Purposive sampling was used to select samples. The total number of study respondents is 207. The findings of the study revealed that over 70 per cent of respondents mentioned reasons for plagiarism as lack of relevant literature studying, lack of preparation and time, difficulty checking every piece of work, do not know the manual citation style, lack of knowledge about bibliographic management software and also they stated that getting easily available materials on the internet is also a reason for plagiarism. The study recommends that teachers teach or conduct awareness programs on plagiarism, avoiding plagiarism, citation style, and software. (shrink)

We present a novel model of individual people, online posts, and media platforms to explain the online spread of epistemically toxic content such as fake news and suggest possible responses. We argue that a combination of technical features, such as the algorithmically curated feed structure, and social features, such as the absence of stable social-epistemic norms of posting and sharing in social media, is largely responsible for the unchecked spread of epistemically toxic content online. Sharing constitutes a distinctive communicative act, (...) governed by a dedicated norm and motivated to a large extent by social identity maintenance. But confusion about this norm and its lack of inherent epistemic checks lead readers to misunderstand posts, attribute excess or insufficient credibility to posts, and allow posters to evade epistemic accountability—all contributing to the spread of epistemically toxic content online. This spread can be effectively addressed if people and platforms add significantly more context to shared posts and platforms nudge people to develop and follow recognized epistemic norms of posting and sharing. (shrink)

Introduksiyon Sentro ng kabuoang aklat na ito ang paglalakbay –partikular na ang paglalakbay ng mga Pilipino gamit ang pananaw at wikang F/Pilipino. Sa ilang pagkakataon, isa ang paglalakbay sa hindi gaanong nabibigyan ng pansin sa pag-aaral ng lipunan, sa kabila ng pinagyayaman na itong matagal sa Kanluran at marahil isa ng ganap na diskurso. Mababakas ito sa kanilang pagpapakahulugan sa mga taong naglalakbay. Halimbawa nito ang mga Pranses na voyageur at Anglo-Amerikanong katumbas sa paglalakbay bilang trip, travel, at voyage (Almario (...) 2010, 1274-1275, 1325) at sa napakaraming kasingkahulugan gaya ng adventurer, commuter, migrant, passenger, pilgrim, sailor, tourist, drifter, excursionist, globe-trotter, itinerant, voyager, navigator, nomad, sightseer, tripper, vagabond, wanderer, expeditionist, jetsetter, at iba pa (Thesaurus 2022). Sa Pilipinas, madalas pa ngang gamitin ang mga Espanyol-Filipino na mga salita katulad ng biyahe (viaje); ekspedisyon (expedicion); nabegasyon (navigacion); at embarkasyon (embarcacion) (Almario 2010, 181, 322, 328, 806) –sa kabila ng mayaman ang mga Pilipino sa konseptong ito. (shrink)

This paper examines how Descartes’ philosophy was presented and discussed in articles and reviews published in Mind from 1900 to 1947, a period in which this most prestigious British philosophical journal was edited by George F. Stout (until 1920) and then by George E. Moore (from 1921 to 1947). The survey deals with various aspects of the reception of Cartesian philosophy in the journal: articles devoted to several topics of Cartesian thought, critical notices and reviews of the secondary literature, discussions (...) of twentieth-century English translations of Cartesian works. In line with the theoretical character of Mind, most of the interpreters discussed Cartesian philosophy with the aim either of checking its internal consistency or of proving how the Cartesian system might be rendered consistent with its own premises. In this respect, all the themes revolving around the problem of the Cartesian circle attracted the attention of commentators, and the intuitionist foundation of Cartesian theory was analyzed. Descartes’ metaphysics and natural philosophy were often evaluated from the perspective of contemporary philosophical debates, while their original historical context was neglected. Of particular relevance were issues like the mind-body problem, discussed at the beginning of the century in relation to developments in psychology, and the question of the existence of the external world, which was examined from various standpoints, metaphysically, epistemologically and from the point of view of linguistic analysis. Interest in Descartes was shown by many authors from major philosophers (such as Ward, Schiller, Taylor, Broad, Ryle) to lesser known scholars whose profiles and contributions are outlined. Through the angle of the Cartesian presence a sketch emerges of the rich and variegated philosophical scene of British culture in the first half of the twentieth century. (shrink)

"New wave" reductionism aims at advancing a kind of reduction that is stronger than unilateral dependency of the mental on the physical. It revolves around the idea that reduction between theoretical levels is a matter of degree, and can be laid out on a continuum between a "smooth" pole (theoretical identity) and a "bumpy" pole (extremely revisionary). It also entails that both higher and lower levels of the reductive relationship sustain some degree of explanatory autonomy. The new wave predicts that (...) reductions of folk psychology to neuroscience will be located in the middle of this continuum; as neuroscientific evidence about mental states checks in, theoretical folk psychology will therefore be moderately revised. However, the model has conceptual problems which preclude its success in reviving reductionism, and its commitment to a syntactic approach wrecks its attempt to rescue folk psychology. Moreover, the architecture of the continuum operates on a category mistake that sneaks in an eliminativist conclusion. I argue that new wave reductionism therefore tends to be eliminativism in disguise. (shrink)

................English....................... The purpose of this study is to reveal university students’ perceptions regarding Holy Qur’an through metaphors. The survey group of study consists of 194 participants who were studying in Theology Department and Social Service Department at Gümüşhane University in the 2014-2015 academic terms. Both quantitative and qualitative methods are used together. The study’s data was collected through a form with the phrase “The Holy Qur’an is similar/like…, because...” and some demographical variables. The Content Analysis Technique was used to interpret (...) data. Results of this study determined that 44 different metaphors regarding Holy Qur’an were given by participants. Theme of these metaphors were compiled as 9 categories consisting of directional, life source, explanatory, key, protective, curative, instructive, speech, and other categories. Top metaphors are in the directional, life source and explanatory categories. Key words are metaphor, perception, The Qur’an perception, religious concepts, and religious symbols. Getting data through comprehensive and in-dept analysis can help to have information about concepts of holy books in the human mind. The purpose of this study is to pick out perceptions of university students with regard to the Holy Qur’an through metaphors. For this reason, these questions are searched by researchers: 1) What are the metaphors which used by university students on description of perceptions regarding the Holy Qur’an? 2) How are the metaphors regarding the Holy Qur’an categorized in terms of common characteristics which produced by university students? 3) Are there any links between socio-demographic variables and composed metaphoric categories? One of the qualitative data collection technics, data collecting through metaphors method is used, and is asked open-ended question in the study. Picking up similarities and diversities under thematic topics is quite easy in the method. Therefore, this method has a functional feature in the sociology, psychology and anthropology, and it gives a wealthy and qualified image about matter, phenomenon, event and situation (Yıldırım & Şimşek 2005, 212). The target population of the study consists of students who were taking education at Gümüşhane University. Easily accessible and availability principles pursued in the sample choosing. In the distribution of participants according to the demographical features, females have 61.9 percent (n:120) and males have 38.1 percent (n:74) in terms of gender. Students who graduated from religious vocational high school is 61.3 percent (n:119), and others who from other high schools is 38.7 percent (n:75) in terms of graduated from different high schools. Students in theology department have 68.0 percent (n:132), and students who were educated in the social service department have 32.0 percent (n:62). Research data is gathered through survey form includes “The Holy Qur’an is like/similar to…, because…” sentence and demographical variabilities. Data, gathered from 194 survey forms, is transferred to the Excel and the SPSS program. In an attempt to reliability of study, gathered metaphors is examined by four area expert. Frequencies (f) and percentages (%) is taken into consideration in the process of replacing metaphors to the tables. Data analysis technique is used on the getting relationships and explaining gathered data, while content analysis technique is used on the interpreting of data. The SPSS program is used in the analysis of quantitative data. Obtained data from the surveys and composed categories is associated with descriptive statements in the verses of the Holy Qur’an. In the composed categories demonstrate distribution of produced 44 different metaphors with regard to the Holy Qur’an as 9 categories. According to this, the sample is represented in the categories as 64.4 % (f:125) is in the ‘directional’, 11.3 % (f:22) is in the ‘life source’, 7.7 % (f:15) is in the ‘explanatory’, 3.1 % (f:6) is in the ‘key’, 3.1 % (f:6) is in the ‘protective’, 2.1 % (f:4) is in the ‘curative’, 2.1 % (f:4) is in the ‘instructive’, 2.1 % (f:4) is in the ‘speech’ and 4.1 % (f:8) is in the ‘other’ categories. Distributions of composed categories are represented according to common characteristics as frequencies and percentages in the next tables. In the distribution of produced metaphors in the ‘directional’ category, university students produced 7 different metaphors (f:125). Frequencies of produced metaphors in the category are such that: guide (f:41), advisor (f:25), mentor (f:19), compass (f:16), road map (f:8), route (f:3) and other (f:13). According to the result, it is understood that aspects of guide, advisor, mentor and compass stood mostly out in the category. In the ‘life source’ category, 6 different metaphors (f:22) is developed by participants. Developed metaphors’ frequencies in the category are the following: life (f:4), lifeblood (f:4), weather (f:2), water (f:2), inheritance (f:2) and others (f:7). So, life and lifeblood aspects stood mostly out in the category. In the ‘explanatory’ category, 5 different metaphor (f:15) is developed by participants. Frequencies of produced metaphors in the category are such that: light (f:5), sun (f:3), flashlight (f:2), torch (f:2) and other (f:3). According to the result, it is understood that aspects of light and sun stood mostly out in the category In the ‘protective’ category, 5 different metaphors (f:6) is developed by participants. Frequencies of produced metaphors in the category are such that: saver (f:2), lifeguard (f:1), hereafter-saving (f:1), escapeway (f:1) and branch to catch (f:1). According to the result, it is understood that aspect of saver stood mostly out in the category. In the ‘instructive’ category, 4 different metaphors (f:6) is developed by participants. Frequencies of produced metaphors in the category are such that: reference book (f:1), dictionary (f:1), priceless book (f:1) and life encyclopedia (f:1). In the ‘speech’ category, it is seen that 4 different metaphors (f:6) is developed by participants. Frequencies of produced metaphors in the category are such that: divine message (f:1), speaking truth (f:1), Allah’s dialogue with us (f:1) and final word (f:1). In the ‘key’ category, 3 different metaphors (f:6) is developed by participants. Frequencies of produced metaphors in the category are such that: a key (f:4), the key of heaven (f:1) and the key of salvation (f:1). In the ‘curative’ category, 2 different metaphors (f:4) is developed by participants. Frequencies of produced metaphors in the category are such that: a pill (f:3) and doctor (f:1). In the ‘others’ category, 8 different metaphors (f:8) is developed by participants. Frequencies of produced metaphors in the category are such that: world (f:1), the friend of lonely passenger (f:1), the tree with fruit (f:1), hereafter (f:1), priceless treasure (f:1), miracle (f:1), philosophy (f:1) and mirror (f:1). Participants composed of 44 different metaphors regarding the Holy Qur’an. The metaphors were summed up in the 9 categories as ‘directional’, ‘life source’, ‘explanatory’, ‘key’, ‘protective’, ‘curative’, ‘instructive’, ‘speech’ and ‘other’ To results of the study; guide, advisor, mentor and compass aspects of the Qur’an came into prominence at most in the ‘directional’ category, when life and lifeblood aspects of the Qur’an came into prominence at most in the ‘life source’ category. Light and sunny aspects of the Qur’an came into prominence at most in the ‘explanatory’ category, while saver aspect of the Qur’an came into prominence at most in the ‘protective’ category. Instructive aspect of the Qur’an came into prominence at most in the ‘instructive’ category. Speech aspect of the Qur’an came into prominence at most in the ‘speech’ category, while key aspect of the Qur’an came into prominence at most in the ‘key’ category. Moreover, pill aspect of the Qur’an came into prominence at most in the ‘curative’ category. Whatsoever world, friend of single traveler, tree with fruit, hereafter, priceless treasure, miracle, philosophy and mirror aspects of the Qur’an came into prominence at most in the ‘other’ category. It is inferred that significant relationships between demographic variables and metaphor categories. In terms of major variable; theology students were composed of more metaphor in the ‘explanatory’ and ‘instructive’ categories, while social service students were composed of more metaphor in the ‘life source’ category. In terms of gender variable; females composed of more metaphor in the ‘curative’ and ‘other’ categories, while males composed of more metaphor in the ‘directional category. In terms of graduating high school variable, students who graduated from religious vocational high school composed of more metaphor in the ‘key’ and ‘speech’ categories, when students who graduated from other high school composed of more metaphor in the ‘directional’ category. Whatsoever, in terms of having the Qur’an education in their life status variable, had the Qur’an education in their life students composed of more metaphor in the ‘curative’ and ‘other’ categories, while other group composed of more metaphor in the ‘directional’. Moreover, in terms of perception of subjective religiousness, students who think themselves are ‘religious’ composed of more metaphor in the ‘key’ and ‘other’ categories, while students who think themselves are ‘less religious’ composed of more metaphor in the ‘explanatory’ category. In terms of perception of family religiousness, students who think own family ‘less religious’ composed of more metaphor in the ‘directional’ and ‘life source’ categories, when students who think own family ‘religious’ composed of more metaphor in the ‘key’ category. It can be suggested by the results of this study; perception of the Qur’an can be studied with the different study techniques, or it can be studied in the different research groups with the same technique. Muslims’ perceptions regarding the Holy Qur’an can be examined with intercultural comparative studies. Perceptions regarding the Holy Qur’an can be researched through interviews. Members’ perception regarding holy book that have different religious faith can be comparatively examined. Individuals’ perceptions regarding different religious concepts can be studied through metaphors. .................. Turkish...................Bu araştırmanın amacı üniversite öğrencilerinin Kur’an-ı Kerim’e ilişkin algılarını metaforlar aracılığıyla ortaya çıkarmaktır. Araştırmanın çalışma grubunu, 2014-2015 eğitim öğretim yılında Gümüşhane Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi ve Sosyal Hizmetler bölümünde öğrenim gören 194 katılımcı oluşturmaktadır. Araştırmada nitel ve nicel yöntemler birlikte kullanılmıştır. Araştırma verileri, “Kur’an-ı Kerim……gibidir, çünkü……” cümlesini ve demografik değişkenleri içeren bir form aracılığıyla toplanmıştır. Verilerin analizi ve yorumlanmasında içerik analizi tekniği kullanılmıştır. Araştırmada Kur’an’a ilişkin 44 farklı metafor geliştirildiği tespit edilmiştir. Bu metaforlardan ‘yönlendirici’, ‘yaşam kaynağı’, ‘açıklayıcı’, ‘anahtar’, ‘koruyucu’, ‘öğretici’, ‘derman’, ‘kelam’ ve ‘diğer’ olmak üzere 9 farklı kategori oluşturulmuştur. Üretilen metaforların ‘yönlendirici’, ‘yaşam kaynağı’ ve ‘açıklayıcı’ kategorilerinde yoğunlaştığı görülmüştür. Demografik değişkenler ile metafor kategorileri arasındaki ilişkiyi ortaya çıkarmak araştırmanın ikincil amaçlarındandır ve bu yönüyle sonuçlar değerlendirildiğinde değişkenler ile kategoriler arasında anlamlı ilişkiler olduğu tespit edilmiştir. Demografik değişkenler ile kategori ilişkisinde fakülte değişkeni açısından ilahiyat öğrencileri ‘açıklayıcı’ ve ‘öğretici’ kategorilerinde daha fazla metafor üretirken sosyal hizmet öğrencileri ‘yaşam kaynağı’ kategorisinde daha fazla metafor üretmiştir. Cinsiyet değişkeni açısından ise kız öğrenciler ‘derman’ ve ‘diğer’ kategorilerinde daha fazla metafor üretirken erkek öğrenciler ‘yönlendirici’ kategorisinde daha fazla metafor üretmiştir. Lise mezuniyeti açısından bakıldığında da İHL’den mezun olanlar ‘anahtar’ ve ‘kelam’ kategorilerinde daha fazla metafor üretirken diğer lise mezunları ‘yönlendirici’ kategorisinde daha fazla metafor üretmiştir. Kur’an Kursu eğitimi alma değişkeni açısından ise Kur’an kursu eğitimi alanlar ‘derman’ ve ‘diğer’ kategorilerinde daha fazla metafor üretirken Kur’an Kursu eğitimi almayanlar ‘yönlendirici’ kategorisinde daha fazla metafor üretmiştir. Ayrıca öznel dindarlık ve aile dindarlık algılarıyla metafor kategorileri arasında da anlamlı ilişkiler elde edilmiştir. (shrink)

The Canadian Department of Citizenship and Immigration has recently proposed to make in-person citizenship ceremonies optional. These ceremonies are oaths of allegiances: naturalizing citizens swear loyalty to King Charles and obedience to the laws of Canada. The Department of Citizenship and Immigration proposes to allow naturalizing citizens to take these oaths by checking a box online rather than by taking part in an in-person ceremony. In this commentary, I argue that Canada should go much further. It should stop forcing naturalizing (...) immigrants to swear oaths of allegiance altogether. Such oaths create an unjust inequality between naturalized and natural-born citizens: they mean the former have much weightier political obligations than the latter. (shrink)

Scientists may sometimes generalize from their samples to broader populations when they have not yet sufficiently supported this generalization. Do such hasty generalizations also occur in experimental philosophy? To check, we analyzed 171 experimental philosophy studies published between 2017 and 2023. We found that most studies tested only Western populations but generalized beyond them without justification. There was also no evidence that studies with broader conclusions had larger, more diverse samples, but they nonetheless had higher citation impact. Our analyses reveal (...) important methodological limitations of many experimental philosophy studies and suggest that philosophical training may not protect against hasty generalizations. (shrink)

The main thesis of this article is that Western societies risk becoming Balkanized if they confront the superdiversity issue without sound management of intolerance. The Balkanization process has some essential features that allow the use of this term outside the area of origin (namely the Balkan Peninsula). Thus: It always affects a diverse political unit that comprises an inextricable medley of racial, ethnocultural, religious, ideological, or gender identities. It emerges only where neither the hegemony principle nor the confederacy principle can (...) sustain a divided population’s peaceful coexistence. It entails “antagonistic and conflict-oriented relationships resistant to resolution” between the groups or classes dissociated from a diverse political unit. It increases the density of physical and psychological boundaries between the formerly associated parts. It is perpetuated by the great sponsors of the dissociated parts. Any diverse political unit can enter a process of Balkanization, regardless of its degree of culture and civilization. Balkanization does not have a fatal course. Just as there is no society immune to Balkanization, there is no diverse society doomed to Balkanization. Balkanization can be prevented, checked, stopped, or reversed, depending on society members’ individual and collective actions. To survive, the superdiverse liberal democracies from the Euro-Atlantic area need an agonistic public sphere, where actionable truths emerge from a genuine clash of educated opinions. If intolerance management is the first step in preventing the Balkanization of a superdiverse political unit, promoting social and political tolerance towards all people who express educated opinions is the best starting point to genuine tolerance. The return to Enlightenment rationalism values that underpinned our freedom of thought and expression will help us meet the challenges inherent in current and future superdiversity. By feeding enlightened conversations and debates with genuine, educated opinions, people learn to have tolerance for “unpleasant” pieces of knowledge. Then, they spread general tolerance – as a by-product – across the entire society. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: One important criticism of algorithmic systems is that they lack transparency. Such systems can be opaque because they are complex, protected by patent or trade secret, or deliberately obscure. In the EU, there is a debate about whether the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) contains a “right to explanation,” and if so what such a right entails. Our task in this chapter is to address this informational component of algorithmic systems. We argue that information access is integral for respecting (...) autonomy, and transparency policies should be tailored to advance autonomy. -/- To make this argument we distinguish two facets of agency (i.e., capacity to act). The first is practical agency, or the ability to act effectively according to one’s values. The second is what we call cognitive agency, which is the ability to exercise what Pamela Hieronymi calls “evaluative control” (i.e., the ability to control our affective states, such as beliefs, desires, and attitudes). We argue that respecting autonomy requires providing persons sufficient information to exercise evaluative control and properly interpret the world and one’s place in it. We draw this distinction out by considering algorithmic systems used in background checks, and we apply the view to key cases involving risk assessment in criminal justice decisions and K-12 teacher evaluation. -/- The link below is to an open access version of the chapter. (shrink)

In the domain of ontology design as well as in Knowledge Representation, modeling universals is a challenging problem.Most approaches that have addressed this problem rely on Description Logics (DLs) but many difficulties remain, due to under-constrained representation which reduces the inferences that can be drawn and further causes problems in expressiveness. In mathematical logic and program checking, type theories have proved to be appealing but, so far they have not been applied in the formalization of ontologies. To bridge this gap, (...) we present in this paper a theory for representing ontologies in a dependently typed framework which relies on strong formal foundations including both a constructive logic and a functional type system. The language of this theory defines in a precise way what ontological primitives such as classes, relations, properties, etc., and thereof roles, are. The first part of the paper details how these primitives are defined and used within the theory. In a second part, we focus on the formalization of the role primitive. A review of significant role properties leads to the specification of a role profile and most of the remaining work details through numerous examples, how the proposed theory is able to fully satisfy this profile. It is demonstrated that dependent types can model several non-trivial aspects of roles including a formal solution for generalization hierarchies, identity criteria for roles and other contributions. A discussion is given on how the theory is able to cope with many of the constraints inherent in a good role representation. (shrink)