In On the Plurality of Worlds (Lewis 1986), David Lewis imposes a condition on realist theories of modality which he calls ‘plenitude’. Lewis apparently assigns this condition considerable importance, and uses it to motivate his Humean principle of recombination, but he never says exactly what plenitude amounts to. This chapter first sets aside some obvious ways of reconstructing the plenitude criterion which do not fit with the textual evidence. An objection to modal realism due to John Divers and Joseph Melia (...) (Divers and Melia 2002) is diagnosed as equivocating between an overly-demanding plenitude constraint and a weaker constraint which fails to establish their conclusion. An alternative deflationary interpretation of the plenitude condition has it following from an application of standard theoretical virtues to a modal realist’s total theory; Lewis’ correspondence provides new evidence in support of this interpretation. The deflationary plenitude criterion also has broader application, beyond Lewisian modal realism. (shrink)

Plenitude, roughly, the thesis that for any non-empty region of spacetime there is a material object that is exactly located at that region, is often thought to be part and parcel of the standard Lewisian package in the metaphysics of persistence. While the wedding of plentitude and Lewisian four-dimensionalism is a natural one indeed, there are a hand-full of dissenters who argue against the notion that Lewisian four-dimensionalism has exclusive rights to plentitude. These ‘promiscuous’ three-dimensionalists argue that a temporalized version (...) of plenitude is entirely compatible with a three-dimensional ontology of enduring entities. While few would deny the coherence of such a position, and much work has been done by its proponents to appease critics, there has been surprisingly little by way of exploring the various forms such an ontology might take as well as the potential advantages of one plenitudinous three-dimensional ontology over another. Here I develop a novel form of plenitudinous three-dimensionalism, what John Hawthorne (Metaphysical essays, 2006a, b) has called “Neo-Aristotelian Plenitude,” and argue that if one is inclined to endorse an abundant three-dimensional ontology, one is wise to opt for a plenitude of accidental unities. (shrink)

Dispositionalism about modality is the view that metaphysical modality is a matter of the dispositions possessed by actual objects. In a recent paper, David Yates has raised an important worry about the formal adequacy of dispositionalism. This paper responds to Yates’s worry by developing a reply that Yates discusses briefly but dismisses as ad hoc: an appeal to a ’plenitude of powers’ including such powers as the necessarily always manifested power for 2+2\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} (...) \begin{document}$$2+2$$\end{document} to be 4. I argue that the reply is not ad hoc at all, by defending the metaphysics of dispositions that should underly it. I then argue, first, that a proper understanding of dispositions’ degrees provides us with an argument for such necessarily always manifested dispositions; second, that all the natural attempts to block that argument can be resisted without being ad hoc; and third, that pragmatic considerations explain our intuitive resistance to the ascription of necessarily always manifested dispositions. Dispositionalism can be formally adequate after all. (shrink)

A number of prominent metaphysicians have recently defended the idea of material plenitude: wherever there is one material object, there is in fact a great multitude of them, all coincident and sharing many properties, but differing in which of these properties they have essentially and which accidentally. The main goal of this paper is to put on the agenda an important theoretical decision that plenitudinists face, regarding whether their plenitude is egalitarian or elitist, depending on whether or not they take (...) all objects that coincide at a certain location to be in some sense ontologically on a par. Many current proponents of plenitude tend toward egalitarianism. But current proponents often also point to an Aristotelian tradition they claim to carry on; indeed, the view is sometimes referred to as “neo-Aristotelian plenitude.” By examining some of the historical protagonists of Aristotelian plenitude, however, I show that they defended rather an elitist form of plenitude, wherein a single coincident is ontologically privileged in every occupied region. In the final section of the paper, I also try to articulate the basic motivation for each outlook, by way of initiating discussion of which view plenitudinists should believe. (shrink)

One of the salient developments in recent metaphysics is the increasing popularity of _material plenitude_: roughly, the thesis that wherever there is one material object there is in fact a great multitude of co-located but numerically distinct objects that differ principally in which of their properties they have essentially and which accidentally. Here I argue that we have at least as much reason to look favorably on _event plenitude_: wherever one event occurs there occur a great multitude of co-located but (...) numerically distinct events that differ principally in which of their properties they have essentially and which accidentally. I argue, first, that the standard reasons to adopt material plenitude extend fairly straightforwardly to events, and secondly, that only event plenitude can protect the plausible idea that causality is an extensional relation. (shrink)

Fairchild (2019) advertised the humility of material plenitude, arguing that despite the profligate ontology of coincident objects it entails, the best version of plenitude is one that takes no stand on a range of nearby questions about modality and coincidence. Roughly, the thought is that plenitude says only that there are coincident objects corresponding to every consistent pattern of essential and accidental properties. Plenitude says (or should say) nothing about which patterns those might be, and so should be compatible with (...) any reasonable hypothesis about which combinations of properties it is possible for something to have. I argued in the earlier paper that a particular formulation of the target view (Global Plenitude) has exactly that virtue. But, unfortunately, Global Plenitude turns out not to be very humble at all. Global Plenitude is incompatible with an exceptionally compelling hypothesis about coincidence: that there are some things which coincide, but might not have. Scandal ensues. (shrink)

Neo‐Aristotelian Plenitude is the thesis that, necessarily, any property that could be had essentially by something or other is had essentially by something or other if and only if and because it is instantiated; any essentializable property is essentialized iff and because it is instantiated. In this paper, I develop a partial nonmodal characterization of ‘essentializable' and show it cannot be transformed into a full characterization. There are several seemingly insurmountable obstacles that any full characterization of essentializability must overcome. Moreover, (...) these obstacles threaten other views in the conceptual neighborhood such as Counterpart Theoretic Plenitude and Conceptualist Plenitude. (shrink)

The idea of “material plenitude” has been gaining traction in recent discussions of the metaphysics of material objects. My main goal here is to show that this idea may have important dialectical implications for the metaphysics of properties – more specifically, that it provides nominalists with new resources in their attempt to reject an ontology of universals. I will recapitulate one of the main arguments against nominalism – due to David Armstrong – and show how plenitude helps the nominalist overcome (...) the argument. (shrink)

I examine what the mathematical theory of random structures can teach us about the probability of Plenitude, a thesis closely related to David Lewis's modal realism. Given some natural assumptions, Plenitude is reasonably probable a priori, but in principle it can be (and plausibly it has been) empirically disconfirmed—not by any general qualitative evidence, but rather by our de re evidence.

The paper discusses the arguments for and against animalism and concludes that a pluralist position which rejects animalism and embraces a multiplicity of thinkers is the best option.

Non-well-founded set theories allow set-theoretic exotica that standard ZFC will not allow, such as a set that has itself as its sole member. We can distinguish plenitudinous non-well-founded set theories, such as Boffa set theory, that allow infinitely many such sets, from restrictive theories, such as Finsler-Aczel or AFA, that allow exactly one. Plenitudinous non-well-founded set theories face a puzzle: nothing seems to explain the identity or distinctness of various of the sets they countenance. In this paper I aim to (...) sharpen this puzzle, make clear who it does and does not apply to and, ultimately, to argue in favor of a plenitudinous theory like Boffa. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that from the point of view of a theist, inclusivism with respect to the issue whether adherents of different religious traditions can have veridical experience of God (or Ultimate Reality) now, is more plausible than the Alstonian exclusivism. I suggest that mystical inclusivism of the kind I imply in this paper may contribute to the development of cross-cultural philosophy of religion, as well as to the theoretical framework for inter-religious dialogue, because (1) it allows for (...) the possibility of veridical experience of God in a variety of religious traditions, but (2) it avoids the radical revisionist postulates of Hickian pluralism and (3) it leaves open the question whether the creed of any specific tradition is a better approximation to the truth about God than the creeds of other traditions. (edited). (shrink)

In his metaphysical summa of 1986, The Plurality of Worlds, David Lewis famously defends a doctrine he calls ‘modal realism’, the idea that to account for the fact that some things are possible and some things are necessary we must postulate an infinity possible worlds, concrete entities like our own universe, but cut off from us in space and time. Possible worlds are required to account for the facts of modality without assuming that modality is primitive – that there are (...) irreducibly modal facts. We argue that on one reading, Lewis’s theory licenses us to assume maverick possible worlds which spread through logical space gobbling up all the rest. Because they exclude alternatives, these worlds result in contradictions, since different spread worlds are incompatible with one another. Plainly Lewis’s theory must be amended to exclude these excluders. But, we maintain, this cannot be done without bringing in modal primitives. And once we admit modal primitives, bang goes the rationale for Lewis’s modal realism. (shrink)

This work studies some problems connected to the role of negation in logic, treating the positive fragments of propositional calculus in order to deal with two main questions: the proof of the completeness theorems in systems lacking negation, and the puzzle raised by positive paradoxes like the well-known argument of Haskel Curry. We study the constructive com- pleteness method proposed by Leon Henkin for classical fragments endowed with implication, and advance some reasons explaining what makes difficult to extend this constructive (...) method to non-classical fragments equipped with weaker implications (that avoid Curry's objection). This is the case, for example, of Jan Lukasiewicz's n-valued logics and Wilhelm Ackermann's logic of restricted implication. Besides such problems, both Henkin's method and the triviality phenomenon enable us to propose a new positive tableau proof system which uses only positive meta-linguistic resources, and to mo- tivate a new discussion concerning the role of negation in logic proposing the concept of paratriviality. In this way, some relations between positive reasoning and infinity, the possibilities to obtain a ¯first-order positive logic as well as the philosophical connection between truth and meaning are dis- cussed from a conceptual point of view. (shrink)

La dicha y la auto-realización del hombre.

‘Ahab is a whaler’ and ‘Holmes is a whaler’ express different propositions, even though neither ‘Ahab’ nor ‘Holmes’ has a referent. This seems to constitute a theoretical puzzle for the Russellian view of propositions. In this paper, I develop a variant of the Russellian view, Plenitudinous Russellianism. I claim that ‘Ahab is a whaler’ and ‘Holmes is a whaler’ express distinct gappy propositions. I discuss key metaphysical and semantic differences between Plenitudinous Russellianism and Traditional Russellianism and respond to objections that (...) stem from those differences. (shrink)

The Forrest-Armstrong argument, as reconfigured by David Lewis, is a reductio against an unrestricted principle of recombination. There is a gap in the argument which Lewis thought could be bridged by an appeal to recombination. After presenting the argument, I show that no plausible principle of recombination can bridge the gap. But other plausible principles of plenitude can bridge the gap, both principles of plenitude for world contents and principles of plenitude for world structures. I conclude that the Forrest-Armstrong argument, (...) when fortified in one of these ways, demands that unrestricted recombination be rejected. The appropriate restriction comes from a consideration of what world structures are possible. I argue that, although there are too many worlds to form a set, for any world, the individuals at that world do form a set. To defend it I invoke a principle of Limitation of Size together with an iterative conception of structure. (shrink)

ABSTRACTMost of Spinoza’s arguments for God’s existence do not rely on any special feature of God, but instead on merely general features of substance. This raises the following worry: those arguments prove the existence of non-divine substances just as much as they prove God’s existence, and yet there is not enough room in Spinoza’s system for all these substances. I argue that Spinoza attempts to solve this problem by using a principle of plenitude to rule out the existence of other (...) substances and that the principle cannot be derived from the PSR, as many claim.Abbreviation: PSR: Principle of Sufficient Reason. (shrink)

On Jaakko Hintikka’s understanding of Aristotle’s modal thought, Aristotle is committed to a version of the Principle of Plenitude, which is the thesis that no genuine possibility will go unactualized in an infinity of time. If in fact Aristotle endorses the Principle of Plenitude, everything becomes necessary. Despite the strong evidence that Aristotle indeed accepts that Principle of Plenitude, there are key texts in which Aristotle seems to contradict it. On Hintikka’s final word on the matter, Aristotle either endorses the (...) Principle of Plenitude or Aristotle is simply inconsistent. Without challenging Hintikka’s interpretation of the relevant texts, I show how Aristotle may accept a form of the Principle of Plenitude that allows for genuine unactualized possibilities in the world. What allows me to reconcile the seemingly inconsistent data is to show how Aristotle is only committed to a de re version of the Principle of Plenitude. After I lay out my proposal, I show how it opens up new ways in which we might understand Aristotle’s attempt to reject fatalism in his De interpretatione 9. (shrink)

According to dispositionalism about modality, a proposition <p> is possible just in case something has, or some things have, a power or disposition for its truth; and <p> is necessary just in case nothing has a power for its falsity. But are there enough powers to go around? In Yates (2015) I argued that in the case of mathematical truths such as <2+2=4>, nothing has the power to bring about their falsity or their truth, which means they come out both (...) necessary and not possible. Combining this with axiom (T), it is easy to derive a contradiction. I suggested that dispositionalists ought to retreat a little and say that <p> is possible just in case either p, or there is a power to bring it about that p, grounding the possibility of mathematical propositions in their truth rather than in powers. Vetter’s (2015) has the resources to provide a response to my argument, and in her (2018) she explicitly addresses it by arguing for a plenitude of powers, based on the idea that dispositions come in degrees, with necessary properties a limiting case of dispositionality. On this view there is a power for <2+2=4>, without there being a power to bring about its truth. In this paper I argue that Vetter’s case for plenitude does not work. However, I suggest, if we are prepared to accept metaphysical causation, a case can be made that there is indeed a power for <2+2=4>. (shrink)

Unlike identity physicalism, ground physicalism does not achieve the physicalist dream. It faces the T-shirt problem for ground physicalism (Pautz 2014; Schaffer this volume; Rubenstein ms). In the case of insentient nature, it may be able to get by with small handful of very general ground laws to explain the emergence of nonfundamental objects and properties – for example, a few “principle of plenitude”. But I argue that for the case consciousness it will require a separate huge raft of special, (...) anomalous psychophysical ground laws. So it is just as complex and nonuniform as dualism. (shrink)

Several philosophers have embraced the view that high-level events—events like Zimbabwe's monetary policy and its hyper-inflation—are causally related if their corresponding low-level, fundamental physical events are causally related. I dub the view which denies this without denying that high-level events are ever causally related causal emergentism. Several extant philosophical theories of causality entail causal emergentism, while others are inconsistent with the thesis. I illustrate this with David Lewis's two theories of causation, one of which entails causal emergentism, the other of (...) which entails its negation. I then argue for causal emergentism on the grounds that it provides the only adequate means of squaring the apparent plenitude of causal relations between low-level events with the apparent scarcity of causal relations between high-level events. This tension between the apparent abundance of low-level causation and the apparent scarcity of high-level causation has been noted before. However, it has been thought that various theses about the semantics or the pragmatics of causal claims could be used to ameliorate the tension without going in for causal emergentism. I argue that none of the suggested semantic or pragmatic strategies meet with success, and recommend emergentist theories of causality in their stead. As Lewis's 1973 account illustrates, causal emergentism is consistent with the thesis that all facts reduce to microphysical facts. (shrink)

According to cognitive science of religion (CSR) people naturally veer toward beliefs that are quite divergent from Anselmian monotheism or Christian theism. Some authors have taken this view as a starting point for a debunking argument against religion, while others have tried to vindicate Christian theism by appeal to the noetic effects of sin or the Fall. In this paper, we ask what theologians can learn from CSR about the nature of the divine, by looking at the CSR literature and (...) what it identifies as commonalities across religions. We use a pluralist, non-confessional approach to outline properties of the divine. We connect our approach to Hick’s religious pluralism, Ramakrishna’s realization of God through multiple spiritual paths, and Gellman’s inexhaustible plenitude. (shrink)

Unlike identity physicalism, ground physicalism does not achieve the physicalist dream. It faces the T-shirt problem for ground physicalism (Pautz 2014; Schaffer this volume; Rubenstein ms). In the case of insentient nature, it may be able to get by with small handful of very general ground laws to explain the emergence of nonfundamental objects and properties – for example, a few “principle of plenitude”. But I argue that for the case consciousness it will require a separate huge raft of special, (...) anomalous psychophysical ground laws. So it is just as complex and nonuniform as dualism. (shrink)

Mereological universalists, according to whom every plurality of entities has a fusion, usually claim that most quantifications are restricted to ordinary entities. However, there is no evidence that our usual quantifications over ordinary objects are restricted. In this article I explore an alternative way of reconciling Mereological Universalism with our usual quantifications. I resort to a modest form of ontological expansionism and to the so-called interpretational modalities. Quantifications over ordinary objects are the initial stages of the expansion. From these initial (...) stages, expansions can proceed upwards (fusions of entities in the domain of quantification are added), downwards (parts of entities in the domain are added), and sidewards (entities which are mereologically disjoint from the entities in the domain are added). These expansions are driven by a variety of epistemic and pragmatic reasons and raise different kinds of problems. At each stage, a modalized version of Mereological Universalism is true. By contrast, only at some especially rich stages, standard, non-modalized Mereological Universalism is true as well. Among these especially rich stages, there is a final, metaphysically pre-eminent stage of mereological plenitude. In the last part of the article I discuss some problems and limitations of expansionism. (shrink)

While there is considerable disagreement on the precise nature of material objecthood, it is standardly assumed that material objects must be spatial. In this paper, I provide two arguments against this assumption. The first argument is made from largely a priori considerations about modal plenitude. The possibility of non-spatial material objects follows from commitment to certain plausible principles governing material objecthood and plausible principles regarding modal plenitude. The second argument draws from current philosophical discussions regarding theories of quantum gravity and (...) the emergence of spacetime. When it is appreciated what possible worlds these current theories commit us to, the possibility of non-spatial material objects will follow. Thus, either route will lead us to the possibility of non-spatial material objects. The significance of this result is that we need to revise our accounts of material objecthood to both accommodate these possibilities and the theories that lead to them. (shrink)

A "good" arguer is like an architect with a penchant for civil and civic engineering. Such an arguer can design and present their reasons artfully about a variety of topics, as good architects do with a plenitude of structures and in various environments. Failures in this are rarely hidden for long, as poor constructions reveal themselves, often spectacularly, so collaboration among civical engineers can be seen as a virtue. Our logical virtues should be analogous. When our arguments fail due to (...) being uncivil and demagogic, since we inhabit the arguments we build, we are all crushed beneath our flawed reasoning. This mixed metaphor takes us to a self-referential analysis of argumentation, analogy, and humor. I argue that good argumentation strives to collaboratively convince rather than belligerently persuade. A convincing means toward this end is through humorous analogical arguments, whether the matter at hand is ethical, logical, theological, phenomenological, epistemological, metaphysical, political, or about baseball. (shrink)

Leibniz was a philosopher of principles: the principles of Contradiction, of Sufficient Reason, of Identity of Indiscernibles, of Plenitude, of the Best, and of Continuity are among the most famous Leibnizian principles. In this article I shall focus on the first three principles; I shall discuss various formulations of the principles (sect. 1), what it means for these theses to have the status of principles or axioms in Leibniz’s philosophy (sect. 2), the fundamental character of the Principles of Contradiction and (...) Sufficient Reason (sect. 3), some attempts to demonstrate the Principles of Contradiction and Sufficient Reason (sect. 4), and one attempt to demonstrate the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles (sect. 5). The main results of the chapter are summarized in a short conclusion (sect. 6). (shrink)

Thus Spoke Zarathustra expresses a revolt against the quest for “afterworlds.” Nietzsche is seen transferring rationality to the body, welcoming the many in akingdom of the un-unified multiple, with a burst of enthusiasm at the figure of recurrence. At first, he values an acceptation of suffering through reconciliation with time, and puts the onus on the divine to refute the dismembering of the oneness of meaning and unity of the soul’s quest for joy in eternity. Then confrontingChristianity, he sees its (...) refusal to sacrifice anyone, at the cost of making all sick with a unique healer, and rejects it as incompatible with his ideal of plenitude. Inthe absence of an ontology of the person, the affirmation of the individual and his value, opposed to the antagonistic affirmation of the many put in front of theone God and destroyed by him, ends up dislocating the reality of the self. The Nietzschean option resisted any leveling down—this is its merit—yet the mysteryof the Trinity needs to be brought into the reflection to respect Nietzsche’s own terms in defining the final problem which is also the one option: Dionysus orthe Crucified? (shrink)

La educación es siempre, por su misma naturaleza, transformadora. Transforma vidas, transforma realidades, transforma culturas y civilizaciones y todo ello a partir del hecho básico inicial de que dicha transformación comienza por ser la de sus propios actores: educadores y educandos. Es válida, en relación con ello, la afirmación del filósofo Gadamer (2000) acerca de que “educar es educarse”, pues en la educación “de lo que se trata –dice el autor, parafraseando a Hegel-- es de que el hombre acceda él (...) mismo a su morada”: acceder a la morada en el mundo es para la persona abrir el camino a ese espacio en el que se siente bien, donde es feliz. Desde esta perspectiva, el ejercicio de educarse es, para educadores y estudiantes en primer término pero con proyección a la sociedad entera, un ejercicio compartido de diálogo, involucramiento y enriquecimiento mutuo mediante el cual asumen el desafío de impulsar sus vidas hacia la plenitud personal, en armonía con la construcción de felicidad social. En tiempos en los que predominan formas de educación orientadas al éxito, a ser competitivo y poseer habilidades avanzadas para interactuar con las máquinas, o bien –en algunas perspectivas psicológicas-- solamente para adaptarse y no sufrir, según Gadamer (2000) “si lo que uno quiere es educarse y formarse, es de fuerzas humanas de lo que se trata y sólo si lo conseguimos sobreviviremos indemnes a la tecnología y al ser de la máquina” (p. 48) o, agregaríamos, a la ilusión de refugiarnos en islas de bienestar individual que nos aíslan de la comunidad y del entorno. Esas fuerzas humanas de las que habla el filósofo son las que pueden impulsar una educación basada en la capacidad de aprender a ser felices a lo largo de toda la vida. (shrink)

Peter Van Inwagen argues that The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) either leads to contradiction or it leads to necessitarianism. Although I agree with Van Inwagen that the relationship between the PSR and necessitarianism is close, I argue that the PSR is compatible with innocent versions of necessitarianism. In this project my main argument is that modal realism can account for the PSR and integrate it within an innocent version of necessitarianism. My main claim will be that each fact in (...) each possible world is grounded in the principle of plenitude. Also, while each fact is grounded in plenitude, it avoids rigid necessitarianism because (i) actuality is not captured by the PSR, (ii) things could be otherwise because there are other worlds, and due to the principle of recombination (iii) cardinality of possible worlds is maximized and (iv) there are no necessary connections between distinct individuals. As a result, the relationship between modal realism and the PSR is symbiotic. Through modal realism, the PSR also results as: having its scope extended to the realm of all possibilia rather than being confined to mere actuality; it solves indeterminacy problems like Leibniz’s problem of space or the hard problem of consciousness; it accounts for facts in lawless worlds etc. On the other hand, through the PSR, modal realism gets one more benefit in its inventory because it accounts for the PSR. Thus, modal realism still continues on Lewis’ paradoxical path of proving to be highly pragmatic but counterintuitive at the same time. If added benefits are worth the costs for modal realism is still an open question. (shrink)

Se presentan las concepciones sobre el argumento ontológico en Paul Tillich y en Jean-Luc Marion. Paul Tillich no ha creado una propia escuela de pensamiento, pero ha influido sobre muchos pensadores. Abre el camino a posteriores reflexiones, desde diversos puntos metodológicos, sobre el problema ontológico, sobre la realidad de Dios y sobre la relación del Ser con la cultura. Se puede decir que, a partir de él, se abren caminos para pensar el papel de la mística en el conocimiento del (...) Being itself (el ser mismo), la relación dinámica en la vida del hombre, el darse del Ser como ágape, la correlación entre mística y cultura. Y Jean-Luc Marion lleva a su plenitud las ideas de Anselmo y Tillich: Dios no se piensa sino que se da. (shrink)

O objetivo desta obra é elucidar qual seja a noção de liberdade (libertas) desenvolvida por Guilherme de Ockham (1284?-1347?) em sua Opera Politica; tendo como locus de pesquisa, especificamente, o Livro I do Tratado I, intitulado Sobre o poder do papa e do clero, da Terceira Parte do Diálogo. Trata-se, com efeito, da liberdade cristã (ou evangélica); a qual é entendida, nesse contexto, como um princípio filosófico-teológico: lex christiana est lex libertatis (a lei cristã é uma lei de liberdade). Através (...) dessa argumentação, o Venerabilis Inceptor empreende sua incisiva crítica à doutrina da plenitudo potestatis papalis (plenitude do poder papal); mediante a qual os pontífices romanos buscavam legitimar sua pretensa plenitude de poder espiritual e temporal. De fato, se os cristãos são livres, por força da lei evangélico-cristã, então o papa não pode possuir regularmente tal plenitude de poder; pois se a possuísse, os fiéis seriam privados de sua liberdade religiosa e política; e o pontífice, consequentemente, se tornaria um herege. Assim sendo, essa liberdade evangélico-cristã deve ser caracterizada como liberdade religiosa e também política. (shrink)

My task in this paper is to study Sartre’s ontology as a godless theology. The urgency of defending freedom and responsibility in the face of determinism called for an overarching first principle, a role that God used to play. I first show why such a principle is important and how Sartre filled the void that God had left with a solipsist consciousness. Then I characterize Sartre’s ontology of this consciousness as a “dualist monism”, explaining how it supports his radical conception (...) of freedom. Then, by assessing Sartre’s dualist monism through a theological lens, I disclose an inconsistency in his thought concerning the idea that the in-itself is a deterministic plenitude, which presumes a theos different from consciousness and hence threatens monism. Finally I argue that his inconsistency originates from the finitude of Sartre’s first principle and analyze this finitude by examining the modes of temporality it implies. The entire trajectory problematizes the practice of theo-logy, the idea that a theos stands at the origin of the “logic” (organization or intelligibility) of everything such that all must be conceived under the logos of the theos. While Sartre forcefully criticized the theology of the infinite, his was nonetheless a theology of finitude. (shrink)

The Intelligible Living Thing, posited as the model of our visible and tangible universe in Plato’s Timaeus, is often taken for a richly structured whole, which is not a simple sum of its four major parts. This assumption seems unwarranted – most specifically, the dialogue contains no hint at any complex intelligible blue print of the world as a teleologically arranged whole, whose goodness is irreducible to the well-being and individual perfection of its parts. To construe the rich structure of (...) the world is necessary insofar as the Demiurge creates material likenesses of the austere immaterial species. While the life forms included in our universe conform to their intelligible paradigms, this is not, strictly speaking, true about the considerations guiding the Demiurgic activity which gives rise to the universe itself, whose goodness is also to be measured by comparing it to the disordered pre-cosmic matter. The paper discusses several implications of this austere interpretation of the model and its role in creation. It suggests that the Forms that compose the model should be understood as abstract particulars rather than universals, and critically discusses the relation of Timaeus’ account to the so-called Principle of Plenitude. (shrink)

The well-known Principle of Plenitude has it that everything that exists in some possible world exists in the actual world. I argue for an amended version of this principle: If there’s a possible world in which something lacks some positive property, then there’s an object in the actual world that lacks that property. That is, all positive universally held properties in the actual world are necessarily universally held. This rules out that for some positive property, everything in the actual world (...) merely happens to have it. After having presented and defended the argument, I show that it has a wide range of corollaries, such as that there are mereologically simple and composite things, physical and non-physical things, caused and uncaused things, and contingent and necessarily existing things. The argument has three premises. The first premise is the thesis that there are no things that do not exist. The second premise is a Fregean theory of linguistic meaning. According to the third premise, two meanings coincide if and only if their reference sets coincide. The notion of a reference set is defined in the paper. (shrink)

Missing Links, A Book in Ten Sessions received the Award from the Association of Moving Image Researchers [AIM] for Best Monograph released in 2023. -/- Missing Links, A Book in Ten Sessions is Lucas Ferraço Nassif's elaboration on the work of art in Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari through description, time, cosmology, and desire production. The films of Chantal Akerman, alongside Anne Carson and Ludwig Wittgenstein, are his main objects of study. -/- //The book is available, open access.// -/- //In (...) Missing Links, Lucas Ferraço Nassif instructs that “cinema exists in the tension of desires, from everything that is in the game”. And “what is in the game vibrates”, or becomes perceptible in the tempo of film and filmic thought that somehow promises to reveal the nature of this world (maybe, a world that’s about to end). To approach such perception is to submit to description, says Nassif, and then proceeds to investigate the act of describing in all its perilous demand and exhausting impossibility. What can we know, after all, of Chantal Akerman’s Jeanne Dielman, at whom we look and look? Or of any seemingly-unified object that, in being worthy of our attention, must be recognized most fundamentally for the way it slips and blurs? I’m dazzled by this writer’s courage to “work on the void”, to tilt, heart in mouth, at ghosts and ruins. This is the drama I came for. — Matt Longabucco// -/- //Inside the cracks in Lucas Ferraço Nassif’s cinecriticism is an elegy for Chantal Akerman, born the same year as me and Anne Carson too, both here hailed. This elegy is composed as a montage that tells the tale of the Jewish filmmaker as desperado fleeing Sherriff Jean-Luc Godard on a runaway midnight train to Rio, which makes an unscheduled stop in Wittgenstein, Montana. What with all the humming, you just can’t see it. Or if you can, you can’t describe it. “We have nowhere else to start.” — Charles Bernstein// -/- //Lucas Ferraço Nassif’s expansive, rhizomatic project is “full” of missing links in the sense of plenitude: a surfeit of references, genres, affects, and paths for the reader to follow, the listener to harken, the viewer to watch. In the process of tracing affinities between the cast of characters in the intellectual drama staged here — from Jean-Luc Godard to Ludwig Wittgenstein, Anne Carson to Chantal Akerman, Gilles Deleuze to Jacques Lacan, and beyond — we have the chance to reconsider the articulations and boundaries, the flows and stoppages, between film and writing, autobiography and criticism, theory and practice. Missing Links is a ciné-poème of flickering, delicate attention that compels our immersion in turn. — Craig Dworkin//. (shrink)

Se ha dicho que tenemos inteligencia y personalidad, pero en realidad son dos dimensiones de una misma unidad que nos hace tender a la plenitud. Esto es la Inteligencia Sensible y su maduración es la misión fundamental de la educación. Con la Inteligencia Sensible gestionamos el amor y el miedo, y cuando un niño tiene una Inteligencia Sensible muy alta es posible que se vea envuelto en una vida de amores y temores muy desordenados. Tener alta Inteligencia Sensible no (...) es un trastorno sino una dotación. El niño presenta una sensibilidad muy alta, vive con mucha intensidad, es intuitivo, sus pensamientos son profundos, tiene mucha empatía, una fuerte emotividad, alta creatividad, bondad, ternura, energía y todo con una apariencia de normalidad que hace pensar: este niño tiene algo especial. (shrink)

Is consistency the sort of thing that could provide a guide to mathematical ontology? If so, which notion of consistency suits this purpose? Mark Balaguer holds such a view in the context of platonism, the view that mathematical objects are non-causal, non-spatiotemporal, and non-mental. For the purposes of this paper, we will examine several notions of consistency with respect to how they can provide a platon-ist epistemology of mathematics. Only a Gödelian notion, we suggest, can provide a satisfactory guide to (...) a platonist ontology. Is consistency the sort of thing that could provide a guide to mathematical ontology? If so, which notion of consistency suits this purpose? Mark Bala-guer holds such a view in the context of platonism, the view that mathematical objects are non-causal, non-spatiotemporal, and non-mental. Balaguer's version of Platonism, Full-Blooded Platonism (FBP), is the view that "there are as many abstract mathematical objects as there could be-i.e., there actually exist abstract mathematical objects of all possible kinds" (Balaguer, 2017, p. 381). He continues: Since FBP says that there are abstract mathematical objects of all possible kinds, it follows that if FBP is true, then every purely mathematical theory that could be true-i.e., that is internally consistent-accurately describes some collection of actually existing abstract objects. Thus it follows from FBP that in order to acquire knowledge of abstract objects, all we have to do is come up with an internally consistent purely mathematical theory (and know that it is internally consistent). (Balaguer, 2017, p. 381) * To be published in 43rd International Wittgenstein Symposium proceedings. (shrink)

The first two thirds or so of this book is a thorough, severe, and at times somewhat difficult, philosophical analysis and critique of atheistic naturalistic answers to “What caused the Big Bang?” Most contemporary astrophysicists accept one of the following non-theistic accounts of the origin of the Big Bang: Steady State, Plasma, Oscillationist, Big Fizz, Big Divide, Quantum Observership, Big Accident, Atheistic Anthropic, and Plenitude cosmologies. The last third or so of the book develops a highly plausible theistic process cosmology (...) which includes creation ex nihilo. This book critically explores answers to the big question, What produced our universe around fifteen billion years ago in a Big Bang? It defends and revises Process Theology and develops contemporary arguments for God's existence based on the universe's life-supporting order and contingent existence. (shrink)

En los albores de la tercera del siglo XXI, la existencia de la humanidad se ha vuelto sumamente peligrosa. Estamos talando nuestros bosques, agotando nuestros acuíferos de agua dulce y perdendo nuestros suelos superiores vitais. Estamos eliminando a vida de nuestros oceanos e reemplazándola com cientos de milhões de toneladas de desechos plásticos. Estamos inundando nosso ambiente com produtos químicos industriais tóxicos. Nuestra contaminação está impulsando a mudança climática que provoca olas de calor, sequías e incêndios florestais que destrozan o (...) tejido de la vida en los continentes. Y estamos trazendo novas gerações no mundo, milhões que requerem acesso aos recursos de uma existência digna. El alcance y la amplitud de las amenazas a la vida aumentarn día tras día. Este não é um modo sustentável de desarrollo. A causa raíz de nuestros machos fornece uma forma de pensar equivocada. ¿Que significa exatamente? significa que hemos estado pensando em nosotros mismos principalmente como seres materiais, mientras negamos nuestra naturaleza espiritual. Debido a que pensamos que existimos como seres materiais e nada mais, damos prioridade a proteger nuestros cuerpos del daño y prolongar nuestra existencia material. Nuestra naturaleza espiritual, si é que se considera em absoluto, se trata como um aspecto secundário de nuestro ser físico, algo que não deve ser tomado em serio. Para nós, as únicas cosas que importam são os fenômenos que aparecem no mundo material, como se pueden ver, oír, tocar o mediterrâneo, por saber que nuestros sentidos nos engañan, los sentidos son una construção del cerebro. Lo que consideramos um mundo real é uma ilusão. A dominação do pensamento positivista e materialista conduz à irracionalidade e à destruição. Pero, ¿adónde nos ha llevado este enfoque? ¿Nos ha traído una sensación de felicidad y plenitud? No lugar de viver cada dia com um espírito de cooperação alegre, con nuestros corazones llenos de brillante esperanza y feliz antecipación, nos hemos aislado Diferenos de los demás y verlos como rivales o inemigos. Nuestros pensamientos estão inundados de sospecha, miedo y codicia, lo que lleva a un ciclo interminável de guerra, pobreza, hambruna y destruição ambiental. A menos que despertemos pronto e prestemos atenção a nossa naturaleza espiritual, não há futuro para a humanidade na Terra. Las palabras son vida. As palavras da luz. Las palabras son poder. Las palavras son energía. Las palabras son verdad. Las palabras pueden animar y las palabras también pueden matar. Las palabras pueden dar esperanza ou hundirnos en la desesperación. La gente usa palabras para construir la paz y usa palabras para hacer la guerra. Las palabras pueden crear muros entre culturas, religiões e nações. Y las palabras también pueden construir puentes. La existencia de un individuo, una familia, una comunidad, un país y nuestro planeta está conduzindo al been ou al mal a través del poder de las palabras que hablamos. Las palabras que hablamos son responsables de todo lo que sucede neste mundo. Nosotros, por lo tanto, debemos ser responsables de las palabras que hablamos. Em nome das gerações futuras, espero que cada um de nosotros haga todo o possível para hablar solo palabras brilhantes y llenas de luz, para que um dia, nuestros descendentes nazcan en un mundo lleno de luz. No hay tiempo que perder. A partir deste momento, espero que todos echemos uma vista de cerca das palavras que hemos estado usando e hagamos esfuerzos constantes para llenarlas de brillo. Nadie va a cambiar nuestra vida por nosotros. Nadie va a cambiar el mundo por nosotros. É hora de cada um de nós reconhecer o prodigioso poder criativo que se desata em cada palavra que pronuncia, e de maneira consciente pronunciemos apenas palavras de gratidão, alienação e boa intenção. A partir deste momento, elijamos palabras que resuenen con amor y perdón para nosotros mismos y para los demás. Ciertamente podemos fazer se damos um passo solo adelante. Un paso a la vez, uma palavra a la vez, podemos arrancar de raíz os gérmenes de tragédia e aislamiento de nossa consciência e conversão em ondas de felicidade e conciliação. Por nosostros mismos, por la Madre Tierra y por el bien de las generaciones futuras, usemos palavras que contribuem para a evolução positiva de la humanidad en la Tierra. (shrink)

En los albores de la tercera década del siglo XXI, la existencia de la humanidad se ha vuelto sumamente peligrosa. Estamos talando nuestros bosques, agotando nuestros acuíferos de agua dulce y perdiendo nuestros suelos superiores vitales. Estamos eliminando la vida de nuestros océanos y reemplazándola con cientos de millones de toneladas de desechos plásticos. Estamos inundando nuestro medio ambiente con productos químicos industriales tóxicos. Nuestra contaminación está impulsando el cambio climático que provoca olas de calor, sequías e incendios forestales que (...) destrozan el tejido de la vida en los continentes. Y estamos trayendo nuevas generaciones al mundo, millones que requieren acceso a los recursos de una existencia digna. El alcance y la amplitud de las amenazas a la vida aumentan día tras día. Este no es un modo sostenible de desarrollo. La causa raíz de nuestros males proviene de una forma de pensar equivocada. ¿Qué significa esto exactamente? significa que hemos estado pensando en nosotros mismos principalmente como seres materiales, mientras negamos nuestra naturaleza espiritual. Debido a que pensamos que existimos como seres materiales y nada más, damos prioridad a proteger nuestros cuerpos del daño y prolongar nuestra existencia material. Nuestra naturaleza espiritual, si es que se la considera en absoluto, se trata como un aspecto secundario de nuestro ser físico, algo que no debe tomarse en serio. Para nosotros, las únicas cosas que importan son los fenómenos que aparecen en el mundo material, cosas que se pueden ver, oír, tocar o medir, pero sabemos que nuestros sentidos nos engañan, los sentidos son una construcción del cerebro. Lo que consideramos un mundo real es una ilusión. La dominación del pensamiento positivista y materialista conduce a la irracionalidad y la destrucción. Pero, ¿adónde nos ha llevado este enfoque? ¿Nos ha traído una sensación de felicidad y plenitud? En lugar de vivir cada día con un espíritu de alegre cooperación, con nuestros corazones llenos de brillante esperanza y feliz anticipación, nos hemos aislado Preimpresión de Academia Letters.©2021 por el autor – Acceso abierto – Distribuido bajo CC BY 4.0 1 diferenciarnos de los demás y verlos como rivales o enemigos. Nuestros pensamientos están inundados de sospecha, miedo y codicia, lo que lleva a un ciclo interminable de guerra, pobreza, hambruna y destrucción ambiental. A menos que despertemos pronto y prestemos atención a nuestra naturaleza espiritual, no habrá futuro para la humanidad en la Tierra. Las palabras son vida. Las palabras son luz. Las palabras son poder. Las palabras son energía. Las palabras son verdad. Las palabras pueden animar y las palabras también pueden matar. Las palabras pueden dar esperanza o hundirnos en la desesperación. La gente usa palabras para construir la paz y usa palabras para hacer la guerra. Las palabras pueden crear muros entre culturas, religiones y naciones. Y las palabras también pueden construir puentes. La existencia de un individuo, una familia, una comunidad, un país y nuestro planeta está siendo conducida al bien o al mal a través del poder de las palabras que hablamos. Las palabras que hablamos son responsables de todo lo que sucede en este mundo. Nosotros, por lo tanto, debemos ser responsables de las palabras que hablamos. En nombre de las generaciones futuras, espero que cada uno de nosotros haga todo lo posible para hablar solo palabras brillantes y llenas de luz, para que un día, nuestros descendientes nazcan en un mundo lleno de luz. No hay tiempo que perder. A partir de este mismo momento, espero que todos echemos un vistazo de cerca a las palabras que hemos estado usando y hagamos esfuerzos constantes para llenarlas de brillo. Nadie va a cambiar nuestra vida por nosotros. Nadie va a cambiar el mundo por nosotros. Es hora de que cada uno de nosotros reconozca el prodigioso poder creativo que se desata en cada palabra que pronunciamos, y de manera consciente pronunciemos sólo palabras llenas de gratitud, aliento y buena intención. A partir de este momento, elijamos palabras que resuenen con amor y perdón para nosotros mismos y para los demás. Ciertamente podemos hacerlo si damos un solo paso adelante. Un paso a la vez, una palabra a la vez, podemos arrancar de raíz los gérmenes de tragedia y aislamiento de nuestra conciencia y convertirlos en ondas de felicidad y conciliación. Por nosotros mismos, por la Madre Tierra y por el bien de de las generaciones futuras, usemos palabras que contribuyan a la evolución positiva de la humanidad en la Tierra . (shrink)

Produção de conhecimento: uma característica fundamental das sociedades humanas -/- 1. As diferentes formas de conhecimento A espécie humana não se limita a sobreviver no mundo. Ela também procura entendê-lo e modificá-lo de acordo com as diferentes formas como percebe a realidade. Essa busca, que articula a realidade objetiva e a subjetiva, é a matriz sobre a qual se constrói o que convencionamos chamar de conhecimento. Podemos definir o conhecimento como toda compreensão e prática adquiridas, cuja memória e transmissão permitem (...) lidar com as tarefas do dia a dia. Quando uma pessoa age de acordo com sua experiência de vida, expressa uma forma de conhecimento do mundo. Correr a favor do vento e segurar um martelo pelo cabo são habilidades adquiridas com a experiência, um tipo de conhecimento construído na vida comum. Do mesmo modo, quando um cientista anuncia uma descoberta, também apresenta um tipo de conhecimento sobre a realidade. Portanto, podemos afirmar que somos todos capazes de produzir conhecimento, mas existem diferenças de acordo com a forma como esse conhecimento é produzido. Orientado pela experiência e transmitido por gerações, o conhecimento produzido nas sociedades adquire formas tão diversas quanto as próprias sociedades. Pode-se, por exemplo, resolver um problema imediato (como atravessar um rio sem se afogar), responder uma questão transcendental, isto é, que vai além da nossa existência material (como o sentido da vida e da morte), resolver uma pendência social (como determinar o justo proprietário de uma terra) ou desvendar as estruturas do Universo (de que forma definir a menor partícula que compõe a matéria). É possível tentar explicar as mais diversas questões com base na experiência ou mediante o que se aprende com os pais, na crença em Deus ou em seu livro sagrado, em sistemas lógicos de pensamento ou, ainda, em regras e critérios sistemáticos de investigação e de verificação. As explicações obtidas com regras e critérios sistemáticos de investigação e de verificação constituem a forma de conhecimento que chamamos de ciência. Pela possibilidade de ser criticada e corrigida, pela flexibilidade para absorver inovações e expandir sua área de atuação, pela eficiência na forma como orienta a intervenção no mundo, pelo caráter plural que permite sua prática em diferentes culturas, a ciência é hoje o modo mais aceito de produção de conhecimento. No entanto, ainda que ela seja importante para a produção material da sociedade, outros conhecimentos produzidos dia a dia, baseados na prática e na experiência, estão presentes na vida social. As conquistas das lutas políticas e a eficácia dos saberes tradicionais dos povos, assim como diferentes produtos da inteligência coletiva (desenvolvida por meio do trabalho colaborativo e disponibilizada para a sociedade especialmente por meio das novas tecnologias informacionais, como a internet), são exemplos disso. -/- 1.1 Conhecimento religioso O fato de a ciência ser o meio de produção de conhecimento mais amplamente aceito nas sociedades industrializadas, não significa que outros meios tenham desaparecido. Quando o conhecimento sobre o sentido da vida ou sobre como proceder diante da inevitabilidade da morte é fundamentado na crença em Deus ou em um livro sagrado, ele é chamado conhecimento teológico ou religioso. Diferentemente da ciência, a religião é um conhecimento sustentado pela crença na existência de uma realidade exterior ao mundo que influencia a percepção e a explicação da realidade social. Seus ensinamentos orientam uma compreensão e uma prática da vida fundamentadas nos princípios religiosos. 1.2 Conhecimento filosófico A Filosofia também procura explicar a realidade. Mas, diferentemente da fundamentação religiosa, que tem como princípio a fé em uma verdade revelada, amparada em um ou mais deuses ou profetas, a Filosofia empreende um esforço para dar sentido racional aos mistérios do mundo com base no questionamento e na reflexão. Ainda que seus resultados não precisem ser comprovados em testes de verificação, eles não podem deixar de obedecer aos princípios da razão. Ao procurar responder a questões como “o que é?”, “como é?” e “por que é?” , em outras palavras, ao buscar a essência, a significação e a origem das coisas, a Filosofia se vale do pensamento racional e da lógica para justificar e sistematizar o conhecimento que produz. -/- 1.3 Conhecimento do senso comum Desde que nascemos, apreendemos continuamente informações sobre o mundo. A convivência em sociedade nos transmite o que é essencial para sobrevivermos. Esse conhecimento fundamentado na experiência, ou na experiência que nos é transmitida, é chamado senso comum. É como se a experiência fosse um conjunto de fenômenos sobre os quais não cabe questionamento e que, por esse motivo, se impõe como a base das opiniões, ideias e concepções que acabam por prevalecer em determinado contexto social. Segundo o sociólogo português Boaventura de Sousa Santos, o senso comum é o conhecimento vulgar e prático que orienta nossas ações no cotidianos lhes dá sentido. De fato, na maior parte do tempo, ao tomarmos decisões, não realizamos reflexões elaboradas nem experimentos em laboratório. Apenas agimos de acordo com o que consideramos adequado, com base em nossa experiência no mundo. Quando o céu fica carregando de nuvens negras, não é preciso ser cientista para saber que logo virá uma tempestade. Sabemos disso porque, todas as vezes em que choveu, o céu tinha sido tomado por nuvens escuras. 1.4 Conhecimento científico O escurecer o céu e a tempestade que o sucede podem ser analisados mediante a aplicação de um método rigoroso de investigação que explicaria as causas e consequências desse fenômeno, as condições em que ele acontece ou sua periodicidade. Ao seguir esse método, o investigador não apenas produzirá um conhecimento válido, com também poderá promover sua aplicação útil. No século XX, o conhecimento formal fundamentado na observação e na experimentação, aliado a sua aplicação útil, tornou-se a principal característica do que chamamos ciência. O conhecimento científico também é resultado da busca constante por explicações sobre os diferentes eventos que acontecem em nosso mundo. No entanto, essas explicações precisam ser construídas mediante rigorosa execução de um método organizado, com base em teorias coerentes e socialmente aceitas. -/- 2. Ciência e senso comum: opostos ou complementares Desde que a ciência se estabeleceu como o principal meio de conhecimento dos fenômenos naturais e sociais, sua relação com o senso comum tornou-se objeto de debates. De um lado, estão aqueles que a consideram um conhecimento hierarquicamente superior ao senso comum; de outro, os que consideram complementares os dois tipos de conhecimento. O sociólogo Pedro Demo defende que a pesquisa é o modo pelo qual se conhece a realidade. A investigação é uma característica fundamental da ciência. Ao comparar o senso comum com a ciência, ele afirma que o primeiro aceita a realidade sem questionamentos nem pesquisas. Isso equivale a afirmar que o Sol se movimenta em torno da Terra porque o vemos nascer no leste e se pôr no oeste. Ao contrário, a ciência é construída com base em pesquisas metodologicamente fundamentadas. Os defensores da oposição entre ciência e senso comum destacam a ciência como conhecimento imparcial e racional, enquanto o senso comum é visto como um olhar parcial e irracional sobre a realidade. Essa concepção tem origem no Iluminismo, movimento intelectual e político que, ao longo do século XVIII, defendeu a ciência como o caminho para a superação do chamado Antigo Regime. A defesa da ciência como único conhecimento válido e aceito e a crítica aos outros meios de explicação do mundo, principalmente o religioso, serviram de fundamento para que, no século XIX, se desenvolvesse uma corrente de pensamento conhecida como Positivismo. Nela, a ciência é o único conhecimento útil a ser perseguido pela humanidade, a única maneira de investigar e conhecer a realidade e a única forma legítima de resolver os problemas que a impediriam de atingir sua plenitude. Em uma segunda vertente, estão aqueles que consideram a ciência e o senso comum conhecimentos complementares. O sociólogo Boaventura de Sousa Santos afirma que a oposição entre ciência e senso comum se justificou nos séculos XVIII e XIX, principalmente nas Ciências Naturais, para promover a ciência como o principal meio de conhecimento do mundo. Na atualidade, tal posição não se justifica e deve ser substituída por uma aproximação que transforme tanto o senso comum quanto a ciência. Assim, o senso comum se tornaria menos supersticioso e restrito à tradição, enquanto a ciência ficaria mais acessível e inteligível a todos, mediante o surgimento de novos veículos de divulgação científica e a universalização da educação. Essa percepção de ciência e senso comum como formas complementares de conhecimento também pode ser encontrada na obra de Paulo Freire . Segundo ele, não há produção de conhecimento sem que haja conexão entre o sujeito que o produz e sua realidade social. Isso significa que o senso comum determina o alcance e o tipo de conhecimento produzido. Contrapondo-se ao Positivismo, Freire defende que o conhecimento a realidade acontece com base no modo como os indivíduos explicam o mundo em seu cotidiano e na valorização do saber popular – uma das modalidades do senso comum. Segundo essa visão, todo conhecimento científico teria por objetivo converter-se em senso comum. Assim, em um tempo no qual a ciência se tornasse popular, o senso comum também passaria a adquirir novo caráter, mais crítico e menos receptivo a verdades prontas que não apresentassem fundamentos racionais e objetivos para serem validados. Nesse sentido, ciência e senso comum seriam percebidos como complementares. Por exemplo, a classe burguesa que liderou a Revolução Francesa para repor o rei absolutista e proclamar uma república não aceitou a premissa religiosa que orientava o senso comum, segundo a qual os reis governam por direito divino. Ao argumentar que os homens eram todos iguais e que seria impossível provar que Deus escolhera um em detrimento dos demais para governar, o pensamento liberal burguês proclamava que os próprios cidadãos deveriam decidir, por critérios definidos por eles mesmos, quem seria o governante. Antes, o senso comum aceitava que os reis fossem coroados por ordem divina; hoje ele rejeita essa hipótese, que durante séculos teve valor de verdade. Nas sociedades democráticas ocidentais, acredita-se que o voto confere legitimidade ao governante pelo período estipulado para seu mandato. A difusão dessa concepção pelo mundo tem sido a base para questionar governos ditatoriais em diferentes épocas e lugares. Mas recentemente, eventos ligados à chamada Primavera Árabe – um conjunto de movimentos sociais que atingiu vários países árabes a partir de 2011 – serviram para questionar um poder solidamente estabelecido e que até então não se mostrava passível de ser questionado. Embora na maior parte dos casos não se tenha alcançado um estado de liberdades democráticas nesses países, houve o questionamento efetivo da situação, com consequências que impossibilitaram o retorno completo ao estado de coisas anterior à eclosão desses protestos. -/- . (shrink)

Dans ses Confessions, long discours qu’il adresse directement à Dieu, Augustin explique comment l’homme, inquiet de s’être détourné de Dieu par insouciance, aspire intérieurement à retourner à son créateur, et à vivre l’expérience de plénitude associée à ce retour. Mais cette quête est d’abord celle d’Augustin lui-même qui, au IV e siècle, se rappelant les étapes de sa propre conversion au christianisme, évoque deux expériences d’extase qu’il a faites de Dieu, pendant lesquelles il entre en relation directe et charnelle avec (...) la réalité divine. Mais comment de telles expériences mystiques peuvent-elles avoir un caractère aussi sensuel, alors que, selon Augustin, l’ascension vers Dieu suppose justement de l’homme qu’il réussisse à élever son esprit au-delà des tentations charnelles? Le présent article vise à comprendre un peu mieux ce paradoxe. (shrink)

Le cycle du renseignement est un ensemble de processus utilisés pour fournir des informations utiles à la prise de décision. Le cycle comprend plusieurs processus. Le domaine connexe de la contre-information est chargé d'empêcher les efforts du renseignement de tiers. Un modèle de base du processus de collecte et d'analyse du renseignement est appelé « cycle du renseignement ». Ce modèle peut être appliqué et, comme tous les modèles de base, ne reflète pas la plénitude des opérations dans le monde (...) réel. Au cours des activités du cycle du renseignement, les informations sont collectées et assemblées, les informations brutes sont transformées en informations traitées, analysées et mises à la disposition des utilisateurs. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.11282.81607 . (shrink)

Es un lugar común afirmar que Hannah Arendt es una filósofa difı́cilmente encasillable en una sola tradición polı́tica. Menos arduo es advertir la gran influencia que ha ejercido el mundo grecolatino a lo largo de su filosofı́a. La polis griega y la república romana son imágenes recurrentes para ilustrar instancias donde se ha ejercido con plenitud la polı́tica. Aunque es patente la influencia de los clásicos en su filosofı́a, existe un elemento ausente que es, no obstante, ampliamente trabajado por (...) los antiguos: la virtud. Por lo anterior el presente trabajo se propone explorar los vı́nculos que existen entre una doctrina de la virtud y la filosofı́a polı́tica de Arendt, tratando de responder la siguiente pregunta: ¿cómo se relaciona la virtud con el ejercicio de la libertad? Se concluye que, si bien Arendt no trabaja un concepto de virtud, esta puede asimilarse al concepto de principio, tal como lo expone en su ensayo Revisión de la Tradición por Montesquieu. Además, el ejercicio de virtudes polı́ticas particulares, como la valentı́a y la prudencia, son prácticas que protegen la libertad. (shrink)

Si se identifica libertad con voluntad, se corre el riesgo de tomar a la primera como el único aspecto en que la voluntad se desenvuelve, es decir, considerar el querer como mera actualización de la libertad. Pero la libertad no es más que un aspecto parcial de la voluntad, un aspecto cualitativo del querer, pues el dinamismo de la voluntad procede de su naturaleza y no del hecho de la libertad del acto del querer. La relación entre la inteligencia y (...) la voluntad es lo que caracteriza al acto específicamente humano. Por ello, se impone el análisis de la reciprocidad de influencia de las dos facultades espirituales en su propia unidad viva y funcional, pues si bien el libre albedrío se identifica con el momento de la elección, la libertad recorre todo el acto humano. Puesto que la voluntad tiende naturalmente a lo que supone perfeccionamiento del hombre, la libertad debe fomentar en el caso concreto esa orientación natural de la voluntad, es decir, elevarla a la práctica en la realidad concreta. Que la libertad disponga de la posibilidad de obrar en contra o al margen de ella, es decir, de romper de alguna forma la orientación natural de la voluntad, violentándola y torciéndola, es un defecto y también una forma de esclavitud, pues el hombre cuando obra el mal peca actúa al margen de la razón, conduciéndose como si fuese movido por otro distinto de él mismo. La posibilidad de apartarse del bien no pertenece a la esencia y a la perfección de la libertad, pues ésta consiste en obrar según la razón, impulso propio de acuerdo con su naturaleza. Los dos planos o motivaciones determinantes en que se articula la voluntad, como son el querer natural y necesario y, además, el querer deliberado y libre, son imprescindibles para dar un enfoque correcto al problema de la libertad: pues lo importante es apreciar en la acción libre la parte que se debe a la naturaleza de la voluntad, dándose la libertad únicamente como posibilidad de poner por obra un acto volitivo de acuerdo o no con la orientación natural de aquélla. El interés de esta indagación se centra especialmente en la voluntad deliberada o amor electivo del Bien. Podrá comprobarse la armonía constitutiva que reina entre la intención del fin y la elección de los medios, tema central cuando se estudia la psicología y la filosofía moral de Santo Tomás de Aquino. Las siguientes páginas se deciden a favor de la distinción entre intención del fin -intentio finis- y elección de los medios -electio mediorum-, haciendo partícipe a la voluntad deliberada del último fin en concreto, es decir, de Dios, a través de la intención, salvando así el poder de autodeterminación de la voluntad hacia el fin último en concreto, con lo que se abren las puertas a la conducta moral del hombre. Santo Tomás enfoca el problema de la libertad sin excluir ninguno de los tres planos en los que se articula, como son el plano ontológico, el plano psicológico y el plano moral, ya que el hombre tiene el deber de realizar en cada momento el máximo de su libertad en orden al perfeccionamiento de su ser, en una costosa labor de autocreación y no de caprichosa elección. Así, pues, el mayor ejercicio de libertad humana está en decidirse por su último fin en concreto, es decir, por Dios, a través de una adecuada elección de medios y de una recta intención, pues el hombre, en tanto que criatura, procede de Dios, y en tanto que hombre, tiene su fin último en la glorificación de Dios, en un doble ritmo de procesión y de retorno, poniéndose así de manifiesto el carácter religioso de la moral. Es por ello que el problema de la libertad es, en último término, un problema metafísico, que consiste en el movimiento natural y deliberado de la persona humana hacia su plenitud. (shrink)

The consensus among spacetime substantivalists is to respond to Leibniz's classic shift arguments, and their contemporary incarnation in the form of the hole argument, by pruning the allegedly problematic metaphysical possibilities that generate these arguments. Some substantivalists do so by directly appealing to a modal doctrine akin to anti-haecceitism. Other substantivalists do so by appealing to an underlying hyperintensional doctrine that implies some such modal doctrine. My first aim in this paper is to pose a challenge for all extant forms (...) of this consensus position. My second aim is to show what form substantivalism must take in order to uphold the consensus while addressing this challenge. The result is a novel "plenitudinous" substantivalist view, which predicts that certain modal facts about spacetime are vague or indeterminate. I then argue against this view on independent grounds, concluding that substantivalists should reject the consensus position. The paper also discusses the way forward for substantivalists in light of this conclusion. (shrink)

The problem of the many seems to problematize the platitude that we can think about particular things in the world. How is it that, given how very many cat-like candidates there are, we often manage to think and talk about a particular cat? I argue that this challenge stems from an under-examined assumption about the relationship between metaphysics and intentionality. I explore and develop a way of characterizing what it is to think and talk about the world, according to which (...) an abundant ontology poses no obstacle to our ability to think and talk about particular things. (shrink)