The issue of the relation of the sacred to the secular has become paramount in virtually every country in the world. From church-state relations in the US, with the debates around abortion and same-sex marriage, to the vitriolic discussions in France over the veil (hijab) sacred-secular, faith-reason, transcendence-imminence -- impacts every aspect of personal, social, and political life. Indeed, the questions often asked are whether Huntington s, Clash of Civilizations is today s reality? Is clash and conflict inevitable? This (...) volume collects papers from scholars from all around the globe and digs into that question. Do the sacred and the secular necessarily end in conflict? Building on scholars such as Charles Taylor, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Jurgen Habermaus, and John Rawls, as well as the world s great religious traditions, the authors assembled here respond with a nuanced, but resounding, NO. A deeper read demands the possibility, indeed, necessity, of complementarity. It has become ever more urgent to discover the proper and complementary relation between the two so that both can be promoted through mutual collaboration. The deeper implications of the discussion can be perceived in many current global problems: cultural identity, multiculturalism, pluralism, nationalism, economic inequality, race, terrorism, migration, public education, and climate change. The volume unfolds in seven sections: Foundations; Sacred and Secular; Complement or Conflict; Hermeneutics; African traditions; South Asian Traditions; Chinese Traditions; and Islamic Traditions. It is fascinating to observe how the various authors grapple with unfolding the relation of sacred/secular, faith/reason, church-mosque/state, transcendence/imminence. The section on Islam illustrates this. These chapters deal with the thorny, usually misunderstood debate between the scholars and those, westerners refer to as fundamentalists or radicals. In the latter, there is no space left to reason, interpretation, or historical criticism. This ugly divide usually emerges in the hot-button issues like the treatment of women and religion-related terrorism. However, these oversimplifications betray the intellectual roots of Islamic tradition. Here the argument is advanced that there are common and multiple meanings of rationality in the Islamic primary sources and that doctrine, the Qur an, and the Sunnah, open considerable space for the rational and the secular in Islamic teachings. Unknown to most in the West, the grappling within Islam goes on. Moreover, the grappling seems to be heating up in all traditions. We are all called to the discussion. Our globe needs it! (shrink)

Philosophers often talk about the things we say, or believe, or think, or mean. The things are often called ‘propositions’. A proposition is what one believes, or thinks, or means when one believes, thinks, or means something. Talk about propositions is ubiquitous when philosophers turn their gaze to language, meaning and thought. But what are propositions? Is there a single class of things that serve as the objects of belief, the bearers of truth, and the meanings of utterances? How do (...) our utterances express propositions? Under what conditions do two speakers say the same thing, and what (if anything) does this tell us about the nature of propositions? There is no consensus on these questions—or even on whether propositions should be treated as things at all. During the second Propositions and Same-Saying workshop, which took place on July 19–21 2010 at the University of Sydney, philosophers debated these (and related) questions. The workshop covered topics in the philosophy of language, perception, and metaphysics. The present volume contains revised and expanded versions of the papers presented at the workshop. (shrink)

This paper discusses Claytons theory on Comprehensive enrolment of children by their parents. This paper supports Claytons view that we should not enrol children. However, Cameron raises objections which cause problems for the application of this framework. Namely, the cost of giving up a belief, choices made for us in childhood and the application of the PRR (Public Reason Restriction) to the way the parent-child relationship should function. Some modifications to Clayton’s framework and further debate is required to fully address (...) these issues. The conclusion is that we should be able to enrol children in activities that would be of low future cost if rejected but we should not enrol children in activities of high future rejection cost. This enrolment is tempered by the statement “the fundamental motivation of parents should be to conform with public reason i.e. to treat their children in accordance with norms that are capable of acceptance by any free and equal person”. As Clayton states: “I am not ruling out the imposition of a comprehensive doctrine on the child. I am rejecting its imposition in the absence of an argument from public reason”. The structure of this essay is as follows: In Section One I explore Clayton’s theories of end state autonomy and autonomy as a precondition, I then look at the plausible relationship between the state-citizen and child-parent relationships. The Public Reason Restriction is then examined in connection with comprehensive enrolment. In the next section, I look at objections to Clayton’s view from Cameron and any subsequent replies to this from Clayton. I then conclude by discussing the differences between the two views and add my own view to this. (shrink)

Wittgenstein responds in his Notes on Logic to a discussion of Russell's Principles of Mathematics concerning assertion. Russell writes: "It is plain that, if I may be allowed to use the word assertion in a non-psychological sense, the proposition "p implies q" asserts an implication, though it does not assert p or q. The p and the q which enter into this proposition are not strictly the same as the p or the q which are separate propositions." (PoM p35) (...) Wittgenstein replies: "Assertion is merely psychological. In not-p, p is exactly the same as if it stands alone; this point is absolutely fundamental." (NB p95) Wittgenstein's response is intriguing, not least because of the centrality to his Tractatus of the idea that a proposition says something. This paper will examine that idea, distinguishing it from 'merely psychological' assertion, and explore in this context how we should understand the occurrence of a Tractarian proposition within another. (shrink)

Tim Maudlin has influentially argued that Humeanism about laws of nature stands in conflict with quantum mechanics. Specifically Humeanism implies the principle Separability: the complete physical state of a world is determined by the intrinsic physical state of each space-time point. Maudlin argues Separability is violated by the entangled states posited by QM. We argue that Maudlin only establishes that a stronger principle, which we call Strong Separability, is in tension with QM. Separability is not in tension with QM. Moreover, (...) while the Humean requires Separability to capture the core tenets of her view, there's no Humean-specific motivation for accepting Strong Separability. We go on to give a Humean account of entangled states which satisfies Separability. The core idea is that certain quantum states depend upon the Humean mosaic in much the same way as the laws do. In fact, we offer a variant of the Best System account on which the systemization procedure that generates the laws also serves to ground these states. We show how this account works by applying it to the example of Bohmian Mechanics. The 3N-dimensional configuration space, the world particle in it and the wave function on it are part of the best system of the Humean mosaic, which consists of N particles moving in 3-dimensional space. We argue that this account is superior to the Humean account of Bohmian Mechanics defended by Loewer and Albert, which takes the 3N-dimensional space, and its inhabitants, as fundamental. (shrink)

When someone says she believes that God exists, is she expressing the same kind of mental state as when she says she thinks that a lake bigger than Lake Michigan exists⎯i.e., does she refer to the same kind of cognitive attitude in both cases? Using evidence from linguistic corpora (Study 1) and behavioral experiments (Studies 2-4), the current work provides evidence that individuals typically use the word “believe” more in conjunction with statements about religious credences and “think” more (...) in conjunction with factual statements, pointing to two different understandings of claims made with these two terms. These patterns do not appear to reflect low-level differences based on the amount of consensus surrounding a particular claim, the extent to which the truth of a particular claim is known to the participant, or linguistic differences between religious and factual statements. We discuss implications of these findings for religious cognition (e.g., as supporting the theory that religious credences are qualitatively distinct from factual beliefs) as well as cognitive processes more broadly. Finally, we relate the present findings to prior theoretical work on differences between factual belief and religious credence. (shrink)

Abstract: How exactly should the relation between a veridical perception and a corresponding hallucination be understood? I argue that the epistemic notion of ‘indiscriminability’, understood as lacking evidence for the distinctness of things, is not suitable for defining this relation. Instead, we should say that a hallucination and a veridical perception involve the same phenomenal properties. This has further consequences for attempts to give necessary and sufficient conditions for the identity of phenomenal properties in terms of indiscriminability, and for (...) considerations about the phenomenal sorites. (shrink)

The goal of this thesis is to model some of the cognitive structures and processes involve d in how people decide what to say in purposeful conversation. The main concern is to show how a speaker's knowledge of his/her hearer influences what s/he says. Utterances in such dialogues, where speakers can be presumed to be speaking for reasons, can best be viewed as the performance of "speech acts" (e.g., requesting). By modeling the process of deciding what to say as one (...) of problem-solving, we show that the same mechanisms used to plan non-linguistic actions are applicable to planning of speech acts. The methodology of this research employs a computer program that integrates beliefs, goals, problem-solving, and reasoning, with the use of language. The program does this by planning speech acts when it determines that to achieve its situational goals, it needs to influence someone else's behavior. The system is able to plan request speech actrions to influence its user's goals, and inform speech acts to influence his/her beliefs. In addition, it is shown that speech acts can be used to achieve subgoals of other such acts. For instance, in addition to requesting that the user perform some action, the system can also decide to supply him/her with information necessary to performing that action -- information that it believes s/he does not already have. Our model is extendable to the more general problem of planning multiparty speech acts -- ones where actions requested by the speaker involve acts to be performed by parties other than the hearer. [MORE]. (shrink)

Nowhere in the works of what is called Aristotle is there a discussion of anything named Natural Law. Everywhere in the works of what is called Aristotle there are discussions of principles and there are discussion of laws; separately. And for this reason: Nature abides by principles. Humans make laws. By nature, aggression is the principle. Since aggression impedes each particular person in the same way, a universal manner, this universal offense is the impetus for a prescription of any (...) law at all. Law was first prescribed to prohibit that natural aggression. Hence, there is no non-aggression principle. Aggression is the principle, non-aggression is the law. The purpose of good law is to protect and maintain this natural justice of equality before any law. Unjust laws are an attempt to establish some other sort of equality that is not universal. Seeing this distinction of principles and laws as separate makes clear what is right by nature and wrong by law. However, at some places in the works of what is called Aristotle there is a discussion of what may be named natural rights, political rights, and natural justice. The preceding paragraph is the application of Aristotle’s CATEGORIES, INTERPRETATION, ANALYTICS, TOPICS, and RHETORIC as the means of separating the true from the false. (shrink)

Aristotle’s points about sameness or identity are as follows: 1. Aristotle speaks of different senses of same (ταὐτόν) in some of his works but it seems that the most comprehensive division is found in Topics (I, 7, 103a7-25) where he mentions three kinds of sameness: numerically, specifically and generically besides a fourth kind he calls ‘in view of unity of species.’ The numerically sameness on which there is the greatest agreement (To. , I, 7, ^103a25) and is the strictest (...) sense of sameness (To., H, 1, 151b26-27) occurs when there is more than one name but only one thing. Specific sameness occurs when while there is more than one thing, they present no differences in respect of their species. Likewise, generic sameness occurs when there is more than one thing but they fall under the same genus. Aristotle also speaks of a sameness ‘in view of unity of species’ like the sameness of water from the same spring. We discussed this under the name of ‘family resemblance.’ In Metaphysics (I, 1054a32-b2) he also speaks of a sameness ‘both in formula and in number as well as a sameness in the formula of the primary substance. We also observe Aristotle distinguishing sameness from likeness because the former occurs in substance while the latter in quality. (Met., Δ, 1021a11-12) There are several other senses of sameness in book Δ of Metaphysics. One sense is accidental sameness in which two things are called the same either because they are accidents of the same thing or because one is the accident of the other. (Met., Δ, 1017b27-29) In another sense, a complex notion is considered as the same of either of the simple notions. (Met., Δ, 1017b30-33) He also speaks of a general rule of being the same: ‘Things are said to be the same by their own nature in as many ways as they are said to be one’ like being one in matter or substance. (Met., Δ, 1018a4-7) 2. ‘We know things in so far as they have the same unity and identity and in so far as some attribute belongs to them universally (ᾗ καθόλου τι ὑπάρχει).’ (Met., B, 999a28-29) 3. Herman Weidemann believes that in Met., Z, 11 (1037a33-b7) only primary substances are considered to be identical with what it is for each of them to be. This, however, is not the same as primary substance in Categories but is rather meant to cover the individualized substantial form of each thing (τὸ εἶδος τὸ ἐνον), like the soul of a man (1037a28-29). Therefore, ‘if we take substance which is ‘primary’ in this sense and ‘say just what it is,’ we must indeed be producing a statement of identity. … To say of a man that he is essentially an animal of such and such a kind is not to mean, however, that the man in question is identical with what he is said to be essentially.’ Thus, while an essential predication in which the subject is the primary substance of Metaphysics Z (i.e. substantial form) and the predicate just what it is, is ‘genuine statement of identity,’ the predication in which the subject is primary in the sense of the Categories and the predicate its secondary substance, is a predicative statement in a strict sense. (shrink)

Vere Chappell has pointed out that it is not clear whether Locke has a well-developed ontology or even whether he is entitled to have one.2 Nevertheless, it is clear that Locke believes that there are organisms, and it is clear that he thinks that there are substances. But does he believe that organisms are substances? There are certainly parts of the Essay in which Locke seems unequivocally to state that organisms are substances. For instance, in 2.23.3 Locke uses men and (...) horses as examples of substances. In Locke’s most explicit the account of abstraction, given in 3.3.7-9, organism [vivens] is treated as a sub-species of body and body as a sub-species of substance; so, by transitivity, organism is a kind of substance. Finally, in his discussion of essences in 3.6, Locke uses all of the following organisms as examples of substances: horses, mules, men, sheep, goats, plants, drills, changelings, asses, bulls, cats, and rats. This textual evidence would seem to settle the matter about the ontological status of organisms. However, there are other parts of the Essay in which the ontological status of organisms is less clear, to say the least. In fact, there are texts in which Locke seems to state (or at least to be committed to the.. (shrink)

This is part of an authors meets critics session on Daniel Star's wonderful book, Knowing Better. I discuss a potential problem with Kearns and Star's Reasons as Evidence thesis. The issue has to do with the difficulties we face is we treat normative reasons as evidence and impose no possession conditions on evidence. On such a view, it's hard to see how practical reasoning could be a non-monotonic process. One way out of the difficulty would be to allow for (potent) (...) unpossessed reasons but insist that all evidence is possessed evidence. This option, I argue, isn't open to proponents of the Reasons as Evidence thesis. Instead, it seems that they'll have to say that all normative reasons are identified with pieces of possessed evidence. This requires the proponents of the Reasons as Evidence thesis to impose epistemic constraints on norms that some of us find objectionable. (shrink)

Is there an entity such that it can be in two places at the same time ? According to one traditional view, properties can, since they are immanent universals. But what about objects such as a person or a table ? Common sense seems to say that, unlike properties, objects are not multiply locatable. In this paper, I will argue first of all that endurantism entails a consequence that is quite bizarre, namely, that objects are universals, while properties are (...) particulars. I then conclude by examining and rejecting two theories according to which objects can wholly be in two places at the same time. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Bird (in: Groff (ed.) Revitalizing causality: Realism about causality in philosophy and social science, 2007 ) has argued that some higher-order properties—which he calls “evolved emergent properties”—can be considered causally efficacious in spite of exclusion arguments. I have previously argued in favour of a similar position. The basic argument is that selection processes do not take physical categorical properties into account. Rather, selection mechanisms are only tuned to what such properties can do, i.e., to their causal (...) powers. This picture seems ultimately untenable in the light of further exclusion problems; but at the same time, it meets our explanatory demands. My purpose is therefore to show that there is a real antinomy with regard to evolved emergent properties. I develop a physicalist exclusion argument and then I go on to consider an argument that seems to establish that evolved emergent properties are causally efficacious, and propose a compatibilist solution. Finally, I very briefly consider what the proposed model may imply for the issue of mental causation. (shrink)

Hate groups are often thought to reveal a paradox in liberal thinking. On the one hand, such groups challenge the very foundations of liberal thought, including core values of equality and freedom. On the other hand, these same values underlie the rights such as freedom of expression and association that protect hate groups. Thus a liberal democratic state that extends those protections to such groups in the name of value neutrality and freedom of expression may be thought to be (...) undermining the values on which its legitimacy rests. In this paper, I suggest how this apparent paradox might be resolved. I argue that the state should protect the expression of illiberal beliefs, but that the state (along with its citizens) is also obligated to criticize publicly those beliefs. Distinguishing between two kinds of state action—coercive and expressive—I contend that such criticism should be pursued through the state’s expressive capacities in its roles as speaker, educator, and spender. Here I extend the familiar idea that law, to be legitimate, must be widely publicized; I contend that a proper theory of the freedom of expression obligates the legitimate state to publicize the reasons that underlie rights, in particular reasons that appeal to the entitlement of each citizen subject to coercion to be treated as free and equal. My theory of freedom of expression is thus “expressive” in two senses: it protects the entitlement of citizens to express any political viewpoint, and it emphasizes a role for the state in explaining these free-speech protections and persuading its citizens of the value of the entitlements that underlie them. (shrink)

This chapter explores some of the relations between Quine’s and Carnap’s metaontological stances on the one hand, and contemporary work in the metaphysics of time, on the other. Contemporary metaphysics of time, like analytic metaphysics in general, grew out of the revival of the discipline that Quine’s critique of the logical empiricists (such as Carnap) made possible. At the same time, the metaphysics of time has, in some respects, strayed far from its Quinean roots. This chapter examines some likely (...) Quinean and Carnapian reactions to elements of the contemporary scene. (shrink)

While serving as a concise introduction to the Sunnah and Quranic exegeses, the Ebook's core purpose lies in offering a comprehensive exploration of the diverse dimensions of ulum al-aqliya (rational sciences) in Islam, spanning from its inception to the contemporary era. This encompassing view incorporates perspectives from both the Sunni and Shia traditions. The Ebook is primarily designed to equip specialists with a comprehensive understanding of Islamic intellectualism, while also ensuring that individuals without specialized knowledge can readily grasp insights from (...) each academic domain. (shrink)

Punctuation has so far attracted attention within the linguistics community mostly from a syntactic perspective. In this paper, we give a preliminary account of the information-based aspects of punctuation, drawing our points from assorted, naturally occurring sentences. We present our formal models of these sentences and the semantic contributions of punctuation marks. Our formalism is a simplified analogue of an extension --- due to Nicholas Asher --- of Discourse Representation Theory.

We take em-dash as our sample punctuation mark and examine its usage from a discourse perspective, using sentences from well-known corpora. We particularly comment on how dashes can give hints on information structure, focus, and anaphora. Throughout the paper Discourse Representation Theory is used as a framework.

We offer a preliminary account of the information-based aspects of punctuation marks. We give our initial treatment within the Discourse Representation Theory and its segmented version. We hypothesize that this work will be useful in classifying the informational contributions of punctuation marks and bringing them to bear on the semantic characterization of written discourse.

Some recent studies in computational linguistics have aimed to take advantage of various cues presented by punctuation marks. This short survey is intended to summarise these research efforts and additionally, to outline a current perspective for the usage and functions of punctuation marks. We conclude by presenting an information-based framework for punctuation, influenced by treatments of several related phenomena in computational linguistics.

This paper considers the 20-year period that began with the US presence, interrogating the dynamics that helped ensure the failure of the US project – purportedly a democratic, rights-based state. It particularly examine how international actors and Afghan leaders ignored local culture and context to their ultimate detriment. The lack of attention paid to these elements helped create an opportunity for the Taliban to take power again with little opposition once the United States departed the country.

This article has begun pondering over the question of Islamic identity by narrating an ancient Muslim philosophers’ quotation. It could also be concluded with a poem from a modern Muslim philosopher Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938): “I have lived a long, long while,” said a fallen shore; “What I am know as ill as I knew of yore.” Then swiftly advanced wave from the Sea upshot; “If I roll, I am,” it said; “if I rest, I am not.” Both the first and (...) the last narration insist on a mobile and mosaic identity. Another side of Islamic Identity is related to Ummah, which is also flexible. The Quran describes immigration as an inevitable part of civilization. It was concerned with two great events during the prophet’s time – immigration to Ethiopia and emigration to Medina. It tries to connect worldly and spiritual interests in this topic where a kind of unity in plurality, the secular and sacred affairs meet. It notes that Muslims may migrate because of worldly needs but continue on with unworldly demands; and, indeed, it is possible to combine them rationally. So, focusing on story of immigration in the Quran helps one to better understand the Muslims’ mentality as well as help Muslims to deal with non-Muslims. Obviously immigration consists of some risks; sacrifices for immigrants and hospitality for hosts; but it is also full of opportunities as supported by the Quran. It is related to realizing the high capacity of humankind in facing different cultures and traditions; a mirror for self-knowing and other-knowing; the call to reform morally; to redefine and expand ethical values, to improve the social sphere and change the cultural monologue to dialogue. Finally immigration is a new way to look at God and religion; a new search for the definition of piety and reflects significant different perspectives from the light of the Quran, a misunderstood book in the West! (shrink)

We can find a common point between the Islamic peripatetic (of Al-Farabi, Ibn Sina (Avicenna), and Ibn Rushd (Averroes) (1126-98)) and Enlightenment philosophies based on their use of rationality. The overall objective of this paper is to present some of the different aspects of rationality in these two philosophies. We can find a kind of congruence between these philosophies. They commonly defend universality, unity, and permanence of reason. They do not accept a priori truths, and emphasize the limits of rationality. (...) On their respective views, rationality corrects its mistakes gradually. This suggests that we can have a dialogue between Western Enlightenment and Islamic cultures through rationality. This paper aims to reconstruct Islamic peripatetic and Enlightenment philosophies on the basis of their notion of the rationality. It tries to show this by referring to the major Muslim peripatetic philosophers and to Enlightenment philosophy as described by Ernst Cassirer (1874-1945). (shrink)

Abstract: Many scholars and practitioners are concerned with understanding how and when to motivate individuals to be more creative. We argue that the conflicting ideas may be due to differences between findings towards reward conditions and the situation in which rewards has to be offered. Hence, it is vital to portray in this study that motivating employees to be creative is important for many firms. Amount of literature shows that employee performance can be encouraged by extrinsic and intrinsic rewards in (...) their everyday tasks. This paper, therefore, investigates these kinds of rewards and shows its effectiveness in attracting creative performance. It concluded by arguing that, human behaviors are stimulated by extrinsic motivations attained from works, which are capable to fulfill innate parts of individuals. Similarly, a person is intrinsically motivated when he or she found that the work is able to fulfill his or her psychological needs for the significant experience. (shrink)

The purpose of this study is to show the competencies and skills developed for the undergraduates and postgraduates’ degrees in accounting education in the Lebanese universities. It emphasizes the role of the universities that is essential in developing the economic reforms. It seeks to address the job offers needed in the accounting departments for major employers in the public sector. The study focuses on the accounting education in the context of IPSAS adoption. The research adopted the qualitative methodology by using (...) interviews with the Lebanese higher education senior officials in universities. -/- . (shrink)

Jalal al-Din Muhammad al-Balkhi Rumi (1207-1273), often referred to as Mawlana (lord/master) or Rumi, is one of the most important figures of Islamic Sufism. Rumi’s work, I shall argue, is particularly timely today. There are tendencies among contemporary Muslim intellectuals to accept the Sufi interpretation of Islam and to present a picture of Islam as tolerant and peaceful, not only to counteract Western Islamophobia but also to counteract extremism within Islamic societies. In this paper, then, I wish to introduce some (...) aspects of Rumi’s thought and, specifically, his ideas on tolerance. The present discussion will focus on: knowledge of God and tolerance; human identity and tolerance; and spiritual journey and tolerance. My contention is that Rumi’s concept of tolerance is not only of academic and historical interest, but of particular relevance to current discussions in Islamic intellectual life. (shrink)

Bu bölüme bir bilmece ile başlayalım: Gerçekten görebildiğimiz bir şey değil. Kesinlikle dokunamaz, tadamaz, duyamaz veya koklayamayız. Yine de ne zaman baksak oradadır, dikkat çekmek için uğraştığımız her yerde onu kullanabiliriz. Onu bir kitabın sayfalarında, sabah gazetesinde veya videonun ekranının parlayan ışıklarda bulabiliriz. Bilim insanları onun genlerimizde ve yağmur ormanının yemyeşil karmaşıklığında depolandığını söylüyorlar.

This paper will attempt to determine multifaceted relationship between philosophy and technology. It explores the philosophical questions raised by technology's dominance in modern society, it examining ethical aspects and existential inquiries. The paper begins with historical relation of philosophy and technology and end with examining the ethical implications of technology. It also addresses on technology's impact on moral responsibility. Moreover, the article navigates with questioning how technology alters our perception of reality and the self. In conclusion of this paper underscores (...) importance of philosophical inquiry in technological advancements. (shrink)

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to establish how academic employees in technical, vocational education and training (TVET) College perceive the effects of psychological contract breach (PCB) in relations to job involvement and citizenship behaviour. Quantitative exploratory research design and a survey instrument were used to collect 170 samples from academic employees in a TVET College to share their perceptions of PCB. The findings confirm a significant (P-value .006) relationship between PCB and job involvement. There is a strong indication (...) that PCB has an effect on job involvement. The findings also revealed that there is a relationship between PCB and organisational citizenship behaviour. However, it is not significant since the (P-value was .119) in the regression analysis. These results are a consequence of academics not feeling a significant PCB, which might have explained better the relationship between PCB and organisational citizenship behaviour. Significantly, the paper established TVET College academics has a stable employer-employee relationship since there is minimal PCB. (shrink)

Al-Makhtoobah (The fiancé), a social-realistic drama that can be claimed as the first drama to make a mark in Indian Arabic literature published in 2009 by Syed Ehtisham Ahmad Nadvi, depicts generally a vivid picture of Indian Muslim society and some unwelcomed marital issues especially, in the form of dialogue. Al-Makhtoobah, is a tragedy in manners turning round the pertinacious attempts of a young girl to pass her life with her drunkard irresponsible husband. Before marriage, her rich parents were in (...) a promise to marry her with a meritorious madrassa student, while a fraudulent became successful to make their promise fail showing fallaciously superiority of a boy who becomes her husband later. Henceforth, the fraudulent occupies wealth of the girl and her father and finally this incident makes her father mysterious, mad and he dies. The writer Syed Ehtisham Ahmad Nadvi is a famous Indian Arabic literary critic, litterateur; an alumnus of Aligarh Muslim University, Jamia Millia Islamia and the great Islamic learning center namely Darul Uloom Nadwatul Ulama, Lucknow. He is also one of the shining figures in the history of Indian Arabic literature who wrote a good number of books and articles in Arabic as well as Urdu and retired as a professor of Arabic in the University of Calicut, Kerala in the year 2000 A.D. The present paper aims to study the themes of Al-Makhtoobah and styles that have followed the writer in making of the drama an artistic one. Further, it attempts to present writer’s academic, administrative and artistic excellence. (shrink)

Abstract: Background: Vitamin D insufficiency/deficiency prevalent in all age groups across the world is common in obesity and may play an important role in the risk factors of metabolic syndrome (MS). Objectives: This cross-sectional study is to evaluate the relationship between levels of adiponectin and circulating 25(OH)D, and its effect on metabolic biomarker among overweight/obese female students. Methods: Three hundred female students; with mean age 20.9 ± 3.2 years were attending the Aljouf University, Sakaka, Saudi Arabia. They were randomly selected (...) from university during the studying year 2015 – 2016. Anthropometric and biochemical indices were determined. Results: The study showed 19% of the female’s student were either overweight or obese (15% and 4%, respectively). The frequency of MS diagnosis among the students was 17%, with 13% and 4% had either three or four risk factors, respectively. Overweight/obese subjects had significantly worse anthropometric and biochemical characteristics, including waist/hip ratio, blood pressure (BP), fasting blood glucose (BG), insulin, insulin resistance (HOMA-IR), triglyceride levels (TG), low-density lipoprotein cholesterol levels (LDL-C), leptin, adiponectin, leptin/adiponectin ratio and high-density lipoprotein cholesterol levels (HDL-C) compared to normal weight. Of the subjects diagnosed with MS, 59% had mild and 8.6% had severe 25(OH)D deficiency. There was negative association between 25(OH)D and both FBG and HOMA-IR among young women obese/overweight. Conclusion: In our study, it suggested that low level of adiponectin was strongly correlated with low 25(OH)D levels. Also, the prevalence of MS tends to increase with high occurrence rate of low circulating 25(OH)D levels that is, known cause poor glycemic control and prediction of cardiovascular outcomes. (shrink)

Objective: Evaluating study environments, attention–motivation levels while studying, and studying methods of students is ex-tremely important for obtaining purposed results. This study aimed to determine study environments, attention–motivation levels while studying, and studying methods of medicine faculty students. -/- Methods: Gaziantep University School of Medicine students completed the questionnaire that included questions regarding study environments, attention–motivation levels, and studying methods. The students were asked 11 open-ended questions and 29 Likert-type questions. Statistical analyses of these questions were performed, and some of (...) the questions correlated among them. -/- Results: The statistically significant differences were determined between the average grade and questions: “I have difficulty in focusing on the subject before starting to study,” “I easily lose concentration while studying,” “I use some pharmaceuticals (except vitamins) for increasing my motivation while studying,” “I use some pharmaceuticals (except vitamins) for increasing my attention while study,” and “I only study during exams.” A significant association was also observed between the average grade and the accommodation of students. -/- Conclusion: Improving the physical conditions of the study environment of medicine faculty students will contribute to increas-ing their academic success. Making students aware of the components that negatively affect attention and motivation will also positively affect the academic success of students. In addition, determining studying methods of medicine faculty students will contribute to improving personal education strategies. (shrink)

Abstract: The paper presented is a work started in summer 2014 for improving surfaces of turned holes. The work was confined to two materials; aluminum alloy and brass alloy. The internal machined surfaces were burnished by ball burnishing tools. Experimental work was carried out on a lathe machine to establish the effect of the internal ball burnishing parameters; namely, burnishing feed rate, speed, force and number of tool passes on the Surface roughness and surface hardness. The operation was carried out (...) at load pushing speed 24 m/min through the hole. Turned Al-Br specimens were divided into groups, the parameters were changed with each group. The optimum values of surface roughness and surface hardness were obtained where the surface roughness improved from 3.14 µm to 0.14 µm for Al µm and from 2.25 to 0.16 for brass and the surface hardness improved from116 HV to 184 HV for Al and from 182 to 244 HV for brass. (shrink)

In this paper I examine parallels between C.S. Peirce's most mature account of signs and contemporary philosophy of language. I do this by first introducing a summary of Peirce's final account of Signs. I then use that account of signs to reconstruct Peircian answers to two puzzles of reference: The Problem of Cognitive Significance, or Frege's Puzzle; and The Same-Saying Phenomenon for Indexicals. Finally, a comparison of these Peircian answers with both Fregean and Direct Referentialist approaches to the (...) puzzles highlights interesting parallels and important differences between Peirce's final account of signs, and the concepts used in analytic philosophy of language. (shrink)

Propositions are often aligned with truth-conditions. The view is mistaken, since propositions discriminate where truth conditions do not. Propositions are hyperintensional: they are sensitive to necessarily equivalent differences. I investigate an alternative view on which propositions are truthmaker conditions, understood as sets of possible truthmakers. This requires making metaphysical sense of merely possible states of affairs. The theory that emerges illuminates the semantic phenomena of samesaying, subject matter, and aboutness.

Schiller says that “it is only through beauty that man makes his way to freedom.” Here I attempt to defend a claim in the same spirit as Schiller’s but by different means. My thesis is that a person’s autonomous agency depends on their adopting an aesthetic identity. To act, we need to don contingent features of agency, things that structure our practical thought and explain what we do in very general terms but are neither universal nor necessary features of (...) agency as such. Without these things, the question of what to do for any individual would be underdetermined. The problem is that adopting such a contingent form of agency amounts to a restriction on what we can do, and so it is a prima facie threat to our autonomy. I will argue that one way, and indeed the only way, of meeting this challenge lies in aesthetic experience. Granting our capacity for aesthetic pleasure the authority to determine the particularities of our agency is compatible with autonomy because doing so means identifying with one’s capacity for pleasure in free and creative activity. Doing this allows us to be both particular sorts of agents and creatures regulated by the universalizing demands of reason. (shrink)

Say that two goals are normatively coincident just in case one cannot aim for one goal without automatically aiming for the other. While knowledge and justification are distinct epistemic goals, with distinct achievement conditions, this paper begins from the suggestion that they are nevertheless normatively coincident—aiming for knowledge and aiming for justification are one and the same activity. A number of surprising consequences follow from this—both specific consequences about how we can ascribe knowledge and justification in lottery cases and (...) more general consequences about the nature of justification and the relationship between justification and evidential probability. Many of these consequences turn out to be at variance with conventional, prevailing views. (shrink)

Monists say that the nature of truth is invariant, whichever sentence you consider; pluralists say that the nature of truth varies between different sets of sentences. The orthodoxy is that logic and logical form favour monism: there must be a single property that is preserved in any valid inference; and any truth-functional complex must be true in the same way as its components. The orthodoxy, I argue, is mistaken. Logic and logical form impose only structural constraints on a metaphysics (...) of truth. Monistic theories are not guaranteed to satisfy these constraints, and there is a pluralistic theory that does so. (shrink)

I say: “Oh, what a beautiful surrealist picture!” With quite precise awareness: this páthos, these emotions of mine do not stem from our common sense. An aesthetic judgment is founded on an immediate subjective intuition: an emotion or a free feeling of a single subject towards an object. A universal sense, possibly. Some judgments of ours in ethics and in law are no different from our perceptions in front of art. It would be the same for a hypothetical sentence (...) of the judge that concluded with these words: “I acquit Arsenio Lupin because of his magnificent handlebar moustache like that of Guy de Maupassant”. Everyone would think intuitively that it is an unfair sentence. Is there aesthetics of terror? The case that the article intends to examine is that of the famous kidnapping and murder of the Italian statesman Aldo Moro by the “Brigate Rosse” [Red Brigades] (1978). The method used here consists in studying the image of the kidnapping as iconic documentation of reality, and, above all, as an ethical-legal judgment about the terrorist crime. Moro was photographed during his kidnapping. There are at least two pictures. Both constitute an extraordinary source for a judgment on the basis of an image. In both of them, Aldo Moro is pictured in front of a Red Brigades banner during the captivity. In what sense do these pictures document an aesthetic judgment concerning the “case Moro”? The answer can be found in a remarkable iconic coincidence of these pictures with a masterpiece by Georges Rouault (Paris 1871-1958) devoted to the theme of the “Ecce Homo”. The Gospel in the “Ecce Homo” scene (John: 19, 4-5) narrates how Pontius Pilate wanted to arouse the compassion of the people with a scourging and the exposure of Jesus to the crowd. The plate under consideration is entitled “Qui ne se grime pas?” [Who does not have a painted face?] and is a key work in Rouault’s suite of prints Miserere, dated for 1923. (shrink)

Berkeley says both that one sometimes immediately perceives the same thing by sight and touch, and that one never does. To solve the contradiction I recommend and explain a distinction Berkeley himself makes—between two uses of ‘same’. This solution unifies two seemingly inconsistent parts of Berkeley’s whole project: He argues both that what we see are bits of light and color organized into a language by which God speaks to us about tactile sensations, and yet that we directly (...) see ordinary objects. My solution explains how these can come to the same thing. (shrink)

Suppose that Ann says, “Keith knows that the bank will be open tomorrow.” Her audience may well agree. Her knowledge ascription may seem true. But now suppose that Ben—in a different context—also says “Keith knows that the bank will be open tomorrow.” His audience may well disagree. His knowledge ascription may seem false. Indeed, a number of philosophers have claimed that people’s intuitions about knowledge ascriptions are context sensitive, in the sense that the very same knowledge ascription can seem (...) true in one conversational context but false in another. This purported fact about people’s intuitions serves as one of the main pieces of evidence for epistemic contextualism. (shrink)

The first argument that Hume offers against believing in miracle stories in Part 2 of his essay on miracles relies on social context in a way that makes it difficult to follow. Hume says that there’s never been a miracle story that’s well enough attested with respect to certain criteria of testimonial strength. A little later in the essay, he cites recent miracle stories coming from that Saint Médard cemetery as meeting the criteria to an exceptionally high degree, but even (...) so, he claims that we can dismiss the stories out of hand. The hidden background assumption is that his Protestant readers wouldn’t have been tempted to believe in miracle stories coming from an oppressed Catholic sect. Other examples in Part 2 of the essay work in the same way. Hume praises to the skies the quality of the evidence for an earlier Jansenist miracle, for a miracle involving the restoration of a leg through holy water at a Catholic cathedral, and a miracle at a temple of Serapis knowing that his readers won’t be inclined to believe in any of them. The point is that these miracles are better attested than the miracle stories in the Bible, and if we shouldn’t believe in the better attested stories, then we shouldn’t believe in the worse. This can seem like an appeal to prejudice, but really Hume is doing something subtler. He knows that it’s easier to criticize the irrational beliefs of others, but sees that once we turn the same standards that we use on others on our own beliefs, epistemic progress is possible. (shrink)

In the future, when we compare the welfare of a being of one substrate (say, a human) with the welfare of another (say, an artificial intelligence system), we will be making an intersubstrate welfare comparison. In this paper, we argue that intersubstrate welfare comparisons are important, difficult, and potentially tractable. The world might soon contain a vast number of sentient or otherwise significant beings of different substrates, and moral agents will need to be able to compare their welfare levels. However, (...) this work will be difficult, because we lack the same kinds of commonalities across substrates that we have within them. Fortunately, we might be able to make at least some intersubstrate welfare comparisons responsibly in spite of these issues. We make the case for cautious optimism and call for more research. (shrink)

I formulate an account, in terms of essence and ground, that explains why atomic Russellian propositions have the truth conditions they do. The key ideas are that (i) atomic propositions are just 0-adic relations, (ii) truth is just the 1-adic version of the instantiation (or, as I will say, holding) relation (Menzel 1993: 86, note 27), and (iii) atomic propositions have the truth conditions they do for basically the same reasons that partially plugged relations, like being an x and (...) a y such that Philip gave x to y, have the holding conditions they do. The account is meant to be mainly of intrinsic interest, but I hope that it goes some distance toward answering an objection to classical theories of propositions put forward by King (2014), who writes that ‘since the classical conception of propositions as things that have truth conditions by their very natures and independently of minds and languages is incapable of explaining how or why propositions have truth conditions, it is unacceptable’ (2014: 47). Propositions do have their truth conditions ‘by their very natures’ and ‘independently of minds and languages’. But a fact about a given entity can hold by the very nature of that entity without being a fundamental fact. I argue that this is plausibly the case for atomic Russellian propositions and the facts about their truth conditions. A fact about the truth conditions of such a proposition holds by the very nature of the given proposition but is metaphysically grounded in facts about that proposition’s parts and their essences. If my account is correct, then the supposedly intractable problem of explaining why the given propositions have the truth conditions they do reduces to the problem of explaining why relations have the holding essences they do, which few seem to have found worrisome . (shrink)