Results for 'truth-functionality'

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  1. On Truth-Functionality.Daniel J. Hill & Stephen K. Mcleod - 2010 - Review of Symbolic Logic 3 (4):628-632.
    Benjamin Schnieder has argued that several traditional definitions of truth-functionality fail to capture a central intuition informal characterizations of the notion often capture. The intuition is that the truth-value of a sentence that employs a truth-functional operator depends upon the truth-values of the sentences upon which the operator operates. Schnieder proposes an alternative definition of truth-functionality that is designed to accommodate this intuition. We argue that one traditional definition of ‘truth-functionality’ is (...)
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    Truth-Functional Logic and the Form of a Tractarian Proposition.Oliver Thomas Spinney - 2022 - Public Reason 13 (2):101-105.
    In this paper I argue against Michael Morris’ claim, that the Tractatus view involves holding that the possibility of truth-functional combination is prior to the possibility for sentential constituents to combine with one another. I provide an alternative interpretation in which I deny the presence of any distinction in the Tractatus between these two possibilities. I then turn to Adrian Moore’s ‘disjunctivist’ account of sentencehood, itself inspired by the Tractatus view. I argue that Moore’s account need not involve a (...)
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  3. Conditionals and Truth Functionality.Rani Lill Anjum - manuscript
    The material interpretation of conditionals is commonly recognized as involving some paradoxical results. I here argue that the truth functional approach to natural language is the reason for the inadequacy of this material interpretation, since the truth or falsity of some pair of statements ‘p’ and ‘q’ cannot per se be decisive for the truth or falsity of a conditional relation ‘if p then q’. This inadequacy also affects the ability of the overall formal system to establish (...)
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  4. The truth functional hypothesis does not imply the liars paradox.M. Martins Silva - 2017 - Unisinos Journal of Philosophy 17 (3):1-2.
    The truth-functional hypothesis states that indicative conditional sentences and the material implication have the same truth conditions. Haze (2011) has rejected this hypothesis. He claims that a self-referential conditional, coupled with a plausible assumption about its truth-values and the assumption that the truth-functional hypothesis is true, lead to a liar’s paradox. Given that neither the self-referential conditional nor the assumption about its truth-values are problematic, the culprit of the paradox must be the truth-functional hypothesis. (...)
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  5. Teaching Truth-Functional Conditionals.James Cain - 1999 - APA Newsletter on Teaching Philosophy 98 (2):160-162.
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  6. Extensional and non-truth-functional contexts.Adam Morton - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (6):159-164.
    I discuss Frege's argument - later called the slingshot - that if a construction is extensional and preserves logical equivalence then it is truth-functional. I consider some simple apparent counterexamples and conclude that they are not sentence-embedding in the required way.
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  7. Natural Deduction for the Sheffer Stroke and Peirce’s Arrow (and any Other Truth-Functional Connective).Richard Zach - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 45 (2):183-197.
    Methods available for the axiomatization of arbitrary finite-valued logics can be applied to obtain sound and complete intelim rules for all truth-functional connectives of classical logic including the Sheffer stroke and Peirce’s arrow. The restriction to a single conclusion in standard systems of natural deduction requires the introduction of additional rules to make the resulting systems complete; these rules are nevertheless still simple and correspond straightforwardly to the classical absurdity rule. Omitting these rules results in systems for intuitionistic versions (...)
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  8. Quine and his Critics on Truth-Functionality and Extensionality.Charles Sayward - 2007 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 16 (1):45-63.
    Quine argues that if sentences that are set theoretically equivalent are interchangeable salva veritate, then all transparent operators are truth-functional. Criticisms of this argument fail to take into account the conditional character of the conclusion. Quine also argues that, for any person P with minimal logical acuity, if ‘belief’ has a sense in which it is a transparent operator, then, in that sense of the word, P believes everything if P believes anything. The suggestion is made that he intends (...)
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  9. Deflationism and the Function of Truth.Lavinia Picollo & Thomas Schindler - 2018 - Philosophical Perspectives 32 (1):326-351.
    Deflationists claim that the truth predicate was introduced into our language merely to full a certain logico-linguistic function. Oddly enough, the question what this function exactly consists in has received little attention. We argue that the best way of understanding the function of the truth predicate is as enabling us to mimic higher-order quantification in a first-order framework. Indeed, one can show that the full simple theory of types is reducible to disquotational principles of truth. Our analysis (...)
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  10. Facts and the function of truth.Huw Price - 1988 - New York, NY, USA: Blackwell.
    Many areas of philosophy employ a distinction between factual and non-factual (descriptive/non-descriptive, cognitive/non-cognitive, etc) uses of language. This book examines the various ways in which this distinction is normally drawn, argues that all are unsatisfactory, and suggests that the search for a sharp distinction is misconceived. The book develops an alternative approach, based on a novel theory of the function and origins of the concept of truth. The central hypothesis is that the main role of the normative notion of (...)
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  11. On the functionalization of pluralist approaches to truth.Cory Wright - 2005 - Synthese 145 (1):1–28.
    Traditional inflationary approaches that specify the nature of truth are attractive in certain ways; yet, while many of these theories successfully explain why propositions in certain domains of discourse are true, they fail to adequately specify the nature of truth because they run up against counterexamples when attempting to generalize across all domains. One popular consequence is skepticism about the efficaciousness of inflationary approaches altogether. Yet, by recognizing that the failure to explain the truth of disparate propositions (...)
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  12. Facts and the Function of Truth, Extended Edition (draft).Huw Price - manuscript
    This is a draft of a new extended edition of Facts and the Function of Truth (Blackwell, 1988), forthcoming from Oxford University Press. If you wish to cite it before the final version appears, please refer to it as ‘Facts and the Function of Truth, Extended Edition (draft)’, including the URL at PhilPapers, and date of access.
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  13. Semidisquotation and the infinitary function of truth.Camillo Fiore - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (2):851-866.
    The infinitary function of the truth predicate consists in its ability to express infinite conjunctions and disjunctions. A transparency principle for truth states the equivalence between a sentence and its truth predication; it requires an introduction principle—which allows the inference from “snow is white” to “the sentence ‘snow is white’ is true”—and an elimination principle—which allows the inference from “the sentence ‘snow is white’ is true” to “snow is white”. It is commonly assumed that a theory of (...)
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  14. Truth About Artifacts.Howard Sankey - 2023 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 10 (1):149-152.
    Truth in a correspondence sense is objective in two ways. It is objective because the relation of correspondence is objective and because the facts to which truths correspond are objective. Truth about artifacts is problematic because artifacts are intentionally designed to perform certain functions, and so are not entirely mind independent. Against this, it is argued in this paper that truth about artifacts is perfectly objective despite the role played by intention and purpose in the production of (...)
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  15. The Function of Assertion and Social Norms.Peter Graham - 2018 - In Sanford C. Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford University Press. pp. 727-748.
    A proper function of an entity is a beneficial effect that helps explain the persistence of the entity. Proper functions thereby arise through feedback mechanisms with beneficial effects as inputs and persistence as outputs. We continue to make assertions because they benefit speakers by benefiting speakers. Hearers benefit from true information. Speakers benefit by influencing hearer belief. If hearers do not benefit, they will not form beliefs in response to assertions. Speakers can then only maintain influence by providing true information, (...)
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  16. Truth and Existence.Jan Heylen & Leon Horsten - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (1):106-114.
    Halbach has argued that Tarski biconditionals are not ontologically conservative over classical logic, but his argument is undermined by the fact that he cannot include a theory of arithmetic, which functions as a theory of syntax. This article is an improvement on Halbach's argument. By adding the Tarski biconditionals to inclusive negative free logic and the universal closure of minimal arithmetic, which is by itself an ontologically neutral combination, one can prove that at least one thing exists. The result can (...)
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  17. Logic, Logical Form, and the Disunity of Truth.Will Gamester - 2019 - Analysis 79 (1):34-43.
    Monists say that the nature of truth is invariant, whichever sentence you consider; pluralists say that the nature of truth varies between different sets of sentences. The orthodoxy is that logic and logical form favour monism: there must be a single property that is preserved in any valid inference; and any truth-functional complex must be true in the same way as its components. The orthodoxy, I argue, is mistaken. Logic and logical form impose only structural constraints on (...)
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  18. Language, Truth and The Just Society.Charles Justice - manuscript
    All that philosophical “theories” of truth do is to demonstrate what is entailed by assuming our common uses and common understandings of the concept of truth. But our common understanding of what truth is is only a part of how truth functions. If we only look at that, we are missing the rest of the picture, namely how truth functions as the foundation for all human communication. I propose that truth functions a lot like (...)
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  19. On Truth and Instrumentalisation.Chris Henry - 2016 - London Journal in Critical Thought 1 (1):5-15.
    This paper makes two claims. Firstly, it shows that thinking the truth of any particular concept (such as politics) is founded upon an instrumental logic that betrays the truth of a situation. Truth cannot be thought ‘of something’, for this would fall back into a theory of correspondence. Instead, truth is a function of thought. In order to make this move to a functional concept of truth, I outline Dewey’s criticism, and two important repercussions, of (...)
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  20. The Truthful Portrait: Can Posing Be a Tool for Authenticity in Portraiture?Aurélie J. Debaene - 2021 - The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 79 (4):440-451.
    This article explores the compatibility of posing and authenticity in portraiture. Often understood as a source of inauthenticity, I propose that posing in fact functions as an artistic tool that can support a truthful portrayal. My argument first discusses authenticity in relation to portraiture through the lens of Bernard Williams’s idea of “truthfulness,” which relies on his notions of “accuracy” and “sincerity.” Second, I introduce a phenomenology of posing. I identify two aspects of posing that can be present in the (...)
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  21. Williams’s Pragmatic Genealogy and Self-Effacing Functionality.Matthieu Queloz - 2018 - Philosophers' Imprint 18:1-20.
    In Truth and Truthfulness, Bernard Williams sought to defend the value of truth by giving a vindicatory genealogy revealing its instrumental value. But what separates Williams’s instrumental vindication from the indirect utilitarianism of which he was a critic? And how can genealogy vindicate anything, let alone something which, as Williams says of the concept of truth, does not have a history? In this paper, I propose to resolve these puzzles by reading Williams as a type of pragmatist (...)
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  22. What's wrong with logic?Rani Lill Anjum - 2012 - Argumentos 4 (8).
    The truth functional account of conditional statements ‘if A then B’ is not only inadequate; it eliminates the very conditionality expressed by ‘if’. Focusing only on the truth-values of the statements ‘A’ and ‘B’ and different combinations of these, one is bound to miss out on the conditional relation expressed between them. All approaches that treat conditionals as functions of their antecedents and consequents will end up in some sort of logical atomism where causal matters simply are reduced (...)
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  23. The Truth Assignments That Differentiate Human Reasoning From Mechanistic Reasoning: The Evidence-Based Argument for Lucas' Goedelian Thesis.Bhupinder Singh Anand - 2016 - Cognitive Systems Research 40:35-45.
    We consider the argument that Tarski's classic definitions permit an intelligence---whether human or mechanistic---to admit finitary evidence-based definitions of the satisfaction and truth of the atomic formulas of the first-order Peano Arithmetic PA over the domain N of the natural numbers in two, hitherto unsuspected and essentially different, ways: (1) in terms of classical algorithmic verifiabilty; and (2) in terms of finitary algorithmic computability. We then show that the two definitions correspond to two distinctly different assignments of satisfaction and (...)
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  24. Models and truth.Uskali Mäki - 2010 - In M. Dorato M. Suàrez (ed.), Epsa Epistemology and Methodology of Science. Springer. pp. 177--187.
    In what follows, I will give examples of the sorts of step that can be taken towards spelling out the intuition that, after all, good models might be true. Along the way, I provide an outline of my account of models as ontologically and pragmatically constrained representations. And I emphasize the importance of examining models as functionally composed systems in which different components play different roles and only some components serve as relevant truth bearers. This disputes the standard approach (...)
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  25. Truth-Value Gaps, Ontological Commitments, and Incommensurability (doctoral dissertation).Xinli Wang - 1998 - Dissertation, The University of Connecticut
    According to the accepted translation-failure interpretation, the problem of incommensurability involves the nature of the meaning-referential relation between scientific languages. The incommensurability thesis is that some competing scientific languages are mutually untranslatable due to the radical variance of meaning or/and reference of the terms they employ. I argue that this interpretation faces many difficulties and cannot give us a tenable, coherent, and integrated notion of incommensurability. It has to be rejected. ;On the basis of two case studies, I find that (...)
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  26. Minimalism, fiction and ethical truth.Graham Oppy - manuscript
    Consider truth predicates. Minimalist analyses of truth predicates may involve commitment to some of the following claims: (i) truth “predicates” are not genuine predicates -- either because the truth “predicate” disappears under paraphrase or translation into deep structure, or because the truth “predicate” is shown to have a non-predicative function by performative or expressivist analysis, or because truth “predicates” must be traded in for predicates of the form “true-in-L”; (ii) truth predicates express ineligible, (...)
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  27. Putting form before function: Logical grammar in Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein.Kevin C. Klement - 2004 - Philosophers' Imprint 4:1-47.
    The positions of Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein on the priority of complexes over (propositional) functions are sketched, challenging those who take the "judgment centered" aspects of the Tractatus to be inherited from Frege not Russell. Frege's views on the priority of judgments are problematic, and unlike Wittgenstein's. Russell's views on these matters, and their development, are discussed in detail, and shown to be more sophisticated than usually supposed. Certain misreadings of Russell, including those regarding the relationship between propositional functions and (...)
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  28. A tableau calculus for partial functions.Manfred Kerber Michael Kohlhase - unknown
    Even though it is not very often admitted, partial functions do play a significant role in many practical applications of deduction systems. Kleene has already given a semantic account of partial functions using a three-valued logic decades ago, but there has not been a satisfactory mechanization. Recent years have seen a thorough investigation of the framework of many-valued truth-functional logics. However, strong Kleene logic, where quantification is restricted and therefore not truthfunctional, does not fit the framework directly. We solve (...)
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  29. Necessary truths, evidence, and knowledge.Arturs Https://Orcidorg Logins - 2016 - Filosofia Unisinos 17 (3):302-307.
    According to the knowledge view of evidence notoriously defended by Timothy Williamson (2000), for any subject, her evidence consists of all and only her propositional knowledge (E=K). Many have found (E=K) implausible. However, few have offered arguments against Williamson’s positive case for (E=K). In this paper, I propose an argument against Williamson’s positive case in favour of (E=K). Central to my argument is the possibility of the knowledge of necessary truths. I also draw some more general conclusions concerning theorizing about (...)
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  30. The Weight of Truth: Lessons for Minimalists from Russell's Gray's Elegy Argument.Tim Button - 2014 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114 (3pt3):261-289.
    Minimalists, such as Paul Horwich, claim that the notions of truth, reference and satisfaction are exhausted by some very simple schemes. Unfortunately, there are subtle difficulties with treating these as schemes, in the ordinary sense. So instead, minimalists regard them as illustrating one-place functions, into which we can input propositions (when considering truth) or propositional constituents (when considering reference and satisfaction). However, Bertrand Russell's Gray's Elegy argument teaches us some important lessons about propositions and propositional constituents. When applied (...)
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  31. The concept of truth.Boris Čulina - 2001 - Synthese 126 (1-2):339 - 360.
    On the basis of elementary thinking about language functioning, a solution of truth paradoxes is given and a corresponding semantics of a truth predicate is founded. It is shown that it is precisely the two-valued description of the maximal intrinsic fixed point of the strong Kleene three-valued semantics.
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  32. How objective are biological functions?Marcel Weber - 2017 - Synthese 194 (12):4741-4755.
    John Searle has argued that functions owe their existence to the value that we put into life and survival. In this paper, I will provide a critique of Searle’s argument concerning the ontology of functions. I rely on a standard analysis of functional predicates as relating not only a biological entity, an activity that constitutes the function of this entity and a type of system but also a goal state. A functional attribution without specification of such a goal state has (...)
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  33. Truth in memory: the humanities and the cognitive sciences.John Sutton - 2003 - In Iain McCalman & Ann McGrath (eds.), Proof and Truth: the humanist as expert. Australian Academy of the Humanities. pp. 145-163.
    Mistakes can be made in both personal and official accounts of past events: lies can be told. Stories about the past have many functions besides truth-telling: but we still care deeply that our sense of what happened should be accurate. The possibility of error in memory and in history implies a commonsense realism about the past. Truth in memory is a problem because, coupled with our desires to find out what really happened, we recognize that our individual and (...)
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  34. Outline for a Truth-Conditional Semantics for Tense.Ernest Lepore & Kirk Ludwig - 2003 - In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Tense, Time and Reference. MIT Press. pp. 49-105.
    Our aim in the present paper is to investigate, from the standpoint of truth-theoretic semantics, English tense, temporal designators and quantifiers, and other expressions we use to relate ourselves and other things to the temporal order. Truth-theoretic semantics provides a particularly illuminating standpoint from which to discuss issues about the semantics of tense, and their relation to thoughts at, and about, times. Tense, and temporal modifiers, contribute systematically to conditions under which sentences we utter are true or false. (...)
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  35. The Post of Post-Truth in Post-Media. About Socio-Situational Dynamic Information.Adrian Mróz - 2017 - Kultura I Historia 32 (2):23-37.
    Regarding the place of humans in a time of post-media I take into consideration the function of new technology and fictional information on human, embodied, and consequentially emotive forms of evaluating truth and messages conveyed, especially ones sent via the Internet. The main aim of this essay is to argue for the critical role played by post-media understood as digital technology in disseminating and co-creating post-truth conditions mediating human relationships horizontally (peer-to-peer, rather than vertically or from older generations (...)
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  36. Logic and Truth in Religious Belief.Srećko Kovač - 2015 - In Mirosław Szatkowski (ed.), God, Truth, and Other Enigmas. Berlin: De Gruyter. pp. 119-132.
    Logical reasoning is not only a component of religious faith (cf., for instance, the "Golden rule"), but, in addition, the religious faith itself can be conceived as a logical pragmatic function applied to sentences and their meanings. Pragmatic role of religious faith is shown on the examples of the analogy of seed and spoken word (e.g., Mt 13:3-23) and on the degrees of faith described in the episode about Nicodemus (John 3). Pragmatics adds (different grades of) perseverance to the correctness (...)
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  37. The Proper Formulation of the Minimalist Theory of Truth.Thomas Schindler & Julian J. Schlöder - forthcoming - The Philosophical Quarterly.
    Minimalism about truth is one of the main contenders for our best theory of truth, but minimalists face the charge of being unable to properly state their theory. Donald Davidson incisively pointed out that minimalists must generalize over occurrences of the same expression placed in two different contexts, which is futile. In order to meet the challenge, Paul Horwich argues that one can nevertheless characterize the axioms of the minimalist theory. Sten Lindström and Tim Button have independently argued (...)
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  38. Constituting assertion: a pragmatist critique of Horwich’s ‘Truth’.Andrew W. Howat - 2018 - Synthese 195 (3):935-954.
    In his influential book Truth, Paul Horwich deploys a philosophical method focused on linguistic usage, that is, on the function(s) the concept of truth serves in actual discourse. In doing so Horwich eschews abstract metaphysics, arguing that metaphysical or ontological conceptions of truth rest on basic misconceptions. From this description, one might reasonably expect Horwich's book to have drawn inspiration from, or even embodied philosophical pragmatism of some kind. Unfortunately Horwich relies upon Russell's tired caricature of pragmatism (...)
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  39. Is Liberalism Disingenuous? Truth and Lies in Political Liberalism.Emily McGill - 2018 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 5 (2):113-134.
    Rawlsian political liberalism famously requires a prohibition on truth. This has led to the charge that liberalism embraces non-cognitivism, according to which political claims have the moral status of emotions or expressions of preference. This result would render liberalism a non-starter for liberatory politics, a conclusion that political liberals themselves disavow. This conflict between what liberalism claims and what liberalism does has led critics to charge that the theory is disingenuous and functions as political ideology. In this paper, I (...)
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  40. What is Truth?Ruel F. Pepa - manuscript
    On this particular issue about ¨truth¨, I´d rather focus more on the specific problematization of ¨sentential truth¨. In other words, I will not be concerned with the truth of an event or an experience per se in the objective, intersubjective or subjective sense. In the present consideration, I´d be more concentrated on the truth of beliefs uttered in meaningful statements. This distinctively philosophical approach—in the linguistic-analytic tradition—is supportive of the intent to determine whether certain beliefs are (...)
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  41. From Bi-facial Truth to Bi-facial Proofs.Stefan Wintein & Reinhard A. Muskens - 2015 - Studia Logica 103 (3):545-558.
    In their recent paper Bi-facial truth: a case for generalized truth values Zaitsev and Shramko [7] distinguish between an ontological and an epistemic interpretation of classical truth values. By taking the Cartesian product of the two disjoint sets of values thus obtained, they arrive at four generalized truth values and consider two “semi-classical negations” on them. The resulting semantics is used to define three novel logics which are closely related to Belnap’s well-known four valued logic. A (...)
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  42. Democracy is not a truth machine.Thomas Wells - 2013 - Think 12 (33):75-88.
    ExtractIn a democracy people are free to express their opinions and question those of others. This is an important personal freedom, and also essential to the very idea of government by discussion. But it has also been held to be instrumentally important because in open public debate true ideas will conquer false ones by their merit, and the people will see the truth for themselves. In other words, democracy has an epistemic function as a kind of truth machine. (...)
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  43. On the explanatory power of truth in logic.Gila Sher - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):348-373.
    Philosophers are divided on whether the proof- or truth-theoretic approach to logic is more fruitful. The paper demonstrates the considerable explanatory power of a truth-based approach to logic by showing that and how it can provide (i) an explanatory characterization —both semantic and proof-theoretical—of logical inference, (ii) an explanatory criterion for logical constants and operators, (iii) an explanatory account of logic’s role (function) in knowledge, as well as explanations of (iv) the characteristic features of logic —formality, strong modal (...)
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  44. Three dogmas of 'if'.Rani Lill Anjum - 2008 - In A. Leirfall & T. Sandmel (eds.), Enhet i Mangfold. Unipub.
    In this paper I argue that a truth functional account of conditional statements ‘if A then B’ not only is inadequate, but that it eliminates the very conditionality expressed by ‘if’. Focusing only on the truth-values of the statements ‘A’ and ‘B’ and different combinations of these, one is bound to miss out on the conditional relation expressed between them. But this is not a flaw only of truth functionality and the material conditional. All approaches that (...)
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  45. The semiotic functioning of synthetic media.Auli Viidalepp - 2022 - Információs Társadalom 4:109-118.
    The interpretation of many texts in the everyday world is concerned with their truth value in relation to the reality around us. The recent publication experiments with computer-generated texts have shown that the distinction between true and false, or reality and fiction, is not always clear from the text itself. Essentially, in today’s media space, one may encounter texts, videos or images that deceive the reader by displaying nonsensical content or nonexistent events, while nevertheless appearing as genuine human-produced messages. (...)
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  46. Disagreement and the Normativity of Truth beneath Cognitive Command.Filippo Ferrari - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Aberdeen
    This thesis engages with three topics and the relationships between them: (i) the phenomenon of disagreement (paradigmatically, where one person makes a claim and another denies it); (ii) the normative character of disagreements (the issue of whether, and in what sense, one of the parties is “at fault” for believing something that’s untrue); (iii) the issue of which theory of what truth is can best accommodate the norms relating belief and truth. People disagree about all sorts of things: (...)
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  47. Talking about trees and truth-conditions.Reinhard Muskens - 2001 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 10 (4):417-455.
    We present Logical Description Grammar (LDG), a model ofgrammar and the syntax-semantics interface based on descriptions inelementary logic. A description may simultaneously describe the syntacticstructure and the semantics of a natural language expression, i.e., thedescribing logic talks about the trees and about the truth-conditionsof the language described. Logical Description Grammars offer a naturalway of dealing with underspecification in natural language syntax andsemantics. If a logical description (up to isomorphism) has exactly onetree plus truth-conditions as a model, it completely (...)
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  48. FUNCTIONALIST ACCOUNT OF TRUTH WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO MIXED CONJUNCTION.Sabeena P. Shereef - manuscript
    A theory of truth is an explanation of the nature of truth and set of rules that true things obey. A theory of truth is basically an attempt to enlighten on the nature of truth and formulate a set of laws that ‘true’ things follow. When we recall a memory, or analyze a statement, or appeal to evaluate within our brain, in fact, we are in quest for truth. Different theories of truth try to (...)
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  49. On the weak Kleene scheme in Kripke's theory of truth.James Cain & Zlatan Damnjanovic - 1991 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 56 (4):1452-1468.
    It is well known that the following features hold of AR + T under the strong Kleene scheme, regardless of the way the language is Gödel numbered: 1. There exist sentences that are neither paradoxical nor grounded. 2. There are 2ℵ0 fixed points. 3. In the minimal fixed point the weakly definable sets (i.e., sets definable as {n∣ A(n) is true in the minimal fixed point where A(x) is a formula of AR + T) are precisely the Π1 1 sets. (...)
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  50. The inherent risks in using a name-forming function at object language level.Ferenc András - 2015 - The Reasoner 5 (3):36 - 37.
    The Truth problem is one of the central problems of philosophy. Nowadays, every major theory of truth that applies to formal languages utilizes devices referring to formulae. Such devices include name-forming functions. The theory of truth discussed in this paper applies to strict formal logic languages, the critique of which must, therefore, also obey mathematical rigour. This is why I have used formal logic derivations below rather than the argumentation of ordinary language.
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