To most of us – believers and non-believers alike – the possibility of a perfect God co-existing with the kinds of evil that we see calls out for explanation. It is unsurprising, therefore, that the belief that God must have justifying reasons for allowing all the evil that we see has been a perennial feature of theistic thought. Recently, however, a growing number of authors have argued that the existence of a perfect God is compatible with the existence of gratuitous (...) evil. Given powerful, millenia-long sensibilities about power and love and justice, it isn’t hard to find that suggestion simply incredible. Nonetheless, in this paper I will argue that the most prominent theistic alternatives to what has seemed incredible to most of us throughout most of history are themselves patently unacceptable for the theist as well. On any of the most widely accepted accounts of how God could have justifying reasons for permitting some evils, God’s existence means that we have justifying reasons for perpetrating and allowing every evil that we see. That's hard to swallow too. If I’m right about all of this, then two competing outcomes seem to present themselves as a possible result. On the one hand, for the theist, the apparently outrageous suggestion that the existence of a perfect God is compatible with gratuitous evil no longer looks like it faces a formidable, hard-to-resist alternative. On the other hand, some like me might think that my arguments go no distance at all towards dispelling the incredibility of the gratuitous evil nouvelle vague. On this line, theism may seem now to be between the rock and the hard place: it seems hard to make sense of the existence of a perfect God whether or not He has justifying reasons for allowing all the evil that we see. (shrink)

Paul Silva has recently argued that doxastic justification does not have a basing requirement. An important part of his argument depends on the assumption that doxastic and moral permissibility have a parallel structure. I here reply to Silva's argument by challenging this assumption. I claim that moral permissibility is an agential notion, while doxastic permissibility is not. I then briefly explore the nature of these notions and briefly consider their implications for praise and blame.

Given plausible assumptions about the nature of evidence and undercutting defeat, many believe that the force of the evidential problem of evil depends on sceptical theism’s being false: if evil is...

One of the few points of agreement between most theists and non-theists working on the problem of evil is that the existence of a perfect God is incompatible with the existence of pointless evil. In a series of influential papers, however, Peter van Inwagen has argued that careful attention to the reasoning behind this claim reveals fatal difficulties related to the Sorites Paradox. In this paper, I explain van Inwagen’s appeal to sorites reasoning, distinguish between two different arguments in his (...) work, and argue that they both commit the same so-far-unnoticed mistake. (shrink)

This paper defends a novel account of how to determine the intrinsic value of possible worlds. Section 1 argues that a highly intuitive and widely accepted account leads to undesirable consequences. Section 2 takes the first of two steps towards a novel account by clarifying and defending a view about value-contribution that is based on some of W. D. Ross’ claims about the value of pleasure. Section 3 takes the second step by clarifying and defending a view about value-suppression that (...) is based on Ross’ claims about the interplay between prima-facie duties. Section 4 states and defends the account that I call Rossian Totalism. According to this account, the atoms of intrinsic value within a world only sometimes contribute their intrinsic value to the value of that world. (shrink)

Deontological evidentialism is the claim that we ought to form and maintain our beliefs in accordance with our evidence. In this paper, I criticize two arguments in its defense. I begin by discussing Berit Broogard’s use of the distinction between narrow-scope and wide-scope requirements against W.K. Clifford’s moral defense of. I then use this very distinction against a defense of inspired by Stephen Grimm’s more recent claims about the moral source of epistemic normativity. I use this distinction once again to (...) argue that Hilary Kornblith’s criticism of Richard Feldman’s defense of is incomplete. Finally, I argue that Feldman’s defense is insensitive to the relation between normative requirements and privileged values: values that have normative authority over us. (shrink)

Aesthetic subjectivism takes the truth of aesthetic judgments to be relative to the individual making that judgment. Despite widespread suspicion, however, this does not mean that one cannot be wrong about such judgments. Accordingly, this does not mean that one cannot gain higher-order evidence of error and fallibility that bears on the rationality of the aesthetic judgment in question. In this paper, we explain and explore these issues in some detail.

James Sterba has recently argued that the free will defense fails to explain the compossibility of a perfect God and the amount and degree of moral evil that we see. I think he is mistaken about this. I thus find myself in the awkward and unexpected position, as a non-theist myself, of defending the free will defense. In this paper, I will try to show that once we take care to focus on what the free will defense is trying to (...) accomplish, and by what means it tries to do so, we will see that Sterba’s criticism of it misses the mark. (shrink)

This is not a guide for your writing process. You should write in whatever way expressing and making sense of your ideas feels most natural and most productive to you. This is a guide for organizing your ideas, after you have captured some of them in fits and starts of prose, into a particular kind of final product: the basic philosophy paper.

Skeptical theism, broadly construed, is an attempt to leverage our limited cognitive powers, in some specified sense, against “evidential” and “explanatory” arguments from evil. Since there are different versions of these kinds of arguments, there are correspondingly different versions of skeptical theism. In this paper, I briefly explain three versions of these arguments from evil (two from William Rowe and one from Paul Draper) and the three versions of skeptical theism tailor-made to block them (from Stephen Wykstra, Michael Bergmann, and (...) Peter van Inwagen). (shrink)

Skeptical theism, broadly construed, is an attempt to leverage our limited cognitive powers, in some specified sense, against “evidential” and “explanatory” arguments from evil. Since there are different versions of these kinds of arguments, there are correspondingly different versions of skeptical theism. In this paper, I consider four challenges to three central versions of skeptical theism: (a) the problem of generalized skepticism, (b) the problem of moral skepticism, (c) the problem of unqualified modal skepticism, and (d) the challenge from Bayesian (...) epistemology. (shrink)

Deontological evidentialism is the claim that S ought to form or maintain S’s beliefs in accordance with S’s evidence. A promising argument for this view turns on the premise that consideration c is a normative reason for S to form or maintain a belief that p only if c is evidence that p is true. In this paper, I discuss the surprising relation between a recently influential argument for this key premise and the principle that ought implies can. I argue (...) that anyone who antecedently accepts or rejects this principle already has a reason to resist either this argument’s premises or its role in support of deontological evidentialism. (shrink)

Deontological internalism is the family of views where justification is a positive deontological appraisal of someone's epistemic agency: S is justified, that is, when S is blameless, praiseworthy, or responsible in believing that p. Brian Weatherson discusses very briefly how a plausible principle of ampliative transmission reveals a worry for versions of deontological internalism formulated in terms of epistemic blame. Weatherson denies, however, that similar principles reveal similar worries for other versions. I disagree. In this article, I argue that plausible (...) principles of ampliative transmission reveal a worry for deontological internalism in general. (shrink)

My starting point is what I call the Normative Authority Conception of justification, where S is justified in their belief that p at t (to some degree n) if and only if their believing that p at t is not ruled out by epistemic norms that have normative authority over S at t. With this in mind, this paper develops an account of doxastic justification by first developing an account of the normative authority of epistemic norms. Drawing from work in (...) political philosophy, I argue that (a) the cognitive and evaluative commitments and concerns behind our actual practices of holding each other and ourselves accountable for our beliefs reveal which epistemic norms we have consented to be under, and that (b) it is because we have consented to be under the authority of these norms – by actually holding ourselves and others accountable to them – that they in turn have normative authority over us. By connecting the authority of epistemic norms to the authority we have over ourselves in this way, the resulting account of doxastic justification (i) explains why it can be appropriate to criticize, resent, or sanction someone for having unjustified beliefs, (ii) avoids the phenomena of normative alienation and normative parochialism, and (iii) respects the social and collective nature of epistemic justification. (shrink)

What I call the Doxastic Puzzle, is the impression that while each of these claims seems true, at least one of them must be false: (a) Claims of the form ‘S ought to have doxastic attitude D towards p at t’ are sometimes true at t, (b) If Φ-ing at t is not within S’s effective control at t, then it is false, at t, that ‘S ought to Φ at t’, (c) For all S, p, and t, having doxastic (...) attitude D towards p at t is not within S’s effective control at t. All three natural replies to the puzzle have been pursued. Some have claimed that doxastic attitudes like believing that p are, in fact, within our effective control, or sufficiently so. Others have claimed that doxastic ought-claims, strictly speaking, are always false. And some have denied that effective control is required for the adequacy of doxastic ought-claims in general. I here pursue and examine a different strategy. In the first part of this paper, I argue that these claims are not only each true but actually not in tension with each other in the first place. Instead of attempting to dispel the puzzle, this solution proposes to evade it instead: to solve it by properly understanding, and by thereby accepting without contradiction, all of its constitutive claims. In the second part of the paper, I argue that the evasive strategy forces us to re-think our understanding of the place of normative reasons in epistemology. More exactly, it seems to come at the cost of one central way of thinking about our reasons for having doxastic attitudes, one where such reasons are good-standing exemplars of normative reasons in general. The evasive strategy, that is, threatens to lead us very quickly to a deflationary picture of epistemic normativity: it rescues normative talk, but sacrifices normative substance. I conclude by explaining why I think this is more consequential than some have made it out to be, and by suggesting that these consequences are welcome nonetheless. (shrink)

W.K. Clifford’s famous 1876 essay The Ethics of Belief contains one of the most memorable lines in the history of philosophy: "it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence." The challenge to religious belief stemming from this moralized version of evidentialism is still widely discussed today.

The claim that ordinary ethical discourse is typically true and that ethical facts are typically knowable seems in tension with the claim that ordinary ethical discourse is about features of reality friendly to a scientific worldview. Cornell Realism attempts to dispel this tension by claiming that ordinary ethical discourse is, in fact, discourse about the same kinds of things that scientific discourse is about: natural properties. We offer two novel arguments in reply. First, we identify a key assumption that we (...) find unlikely to be true. Second, we identify two features of typical natural properties that ethical properties lack. We conclude that Cornell Realism falls short of dispelling the tension between ethical conservativism and ethical naturalism. (shrink)

Abstracting away from its various particular versions, contemporary externalism about knowledge can be broadly characterized as the rejection of two central ideas: that knowledge is incompatible with reflective awareness of the possibility of error, and that knowledge is necessarily tied to the resources that are available from within the first-person perspective. In this brief introduction, I outline five distinctly externalist accounts of knowledge, and two distinctly externalist methodological approaches to knowledge, all fitting this general description.

Hermeneutical injustices, according to Miranda Fricker, are injustices that occur “when a gap in collective interpretive resources puts someone at an unfair disadvantage when it comes to making sense of their social experiences” (Fricker 2007, 1). For Fricker, the relevant injustice in these cases is the very lack of knowledge and understanding experienced by the subject. In this way, hermeneutical injustices are instances of epistemic injustices, the kind of injustice that “wrongs someone in their capacity as a subject of knowledge” (...) (Fricker 2007, 5). In this paper, however, I identify different means by which our hermeneutic activities lead to social injustices, of both a practical and epistemic kind, and I identify different ways in which those injustices manifest themselves. Since Fricker’s use of the notion of “hermeneutical injustices” to denote a well-defined kind of injustice is rightfully well-established, I here refer to the more general kinds of injustices I have in mind as “hermeneutic injustices” instead. (shrink)

Um alinhamento responsável à alguma versão do naturalismo filosófico requer a articulação explicita e cuidadosa de um argumento em sua defesa. Em quatro passos, o texto que segue abaixo expande e examina a validade de um argumento que é frequentemente rascunhado em favor do naturalismo. Como veremos, contudo, a versão do naturalismo que esse argumento nos permite é um pouco diferente dos naturalismos filosóficos mais populares.

O ceticismo é por vezes descartado como uma doutrina absurda e merecedora do seu lugar distante na antiguidade. Nada poderia ser menos correto. O ceticismo continua extremamente relevante para o pensamento filosófico e científico de hoje, servindo como um lembrete de que a sabedoria não é barata nem segura. Nesse texto, o meu objetivo principal é reproduzir o raciocínio das discussões clássicas sobre o ceticismo, mas de uma maneira coloquial e contemporânea. Após seguir as linhas de pensamento de Sexto Empírico, (...) René Descartes, e David Hume, eu vou extrair e identificar claramente as teses centrais que marcam as suas ideias. A minha intenção, porém, não é a de sugerir que as suas teses são auto-evidentes, ou incontestáveis, ou até hoje ainda incontestadas. Muito pelo contrário. A minha intenção é produzir um aperitivo ao debate e um convite a discussão. (shrink)

Ever since John Locke, philosophers have discussed the possibility of a normative epistemology: are there epistemic obligations binding the cognitive economy of belief and disbelief? Locke's influential answer was evidentialist: we have an epistemic obligation to believe in accordance with our evidence. In this dissertation, I place the contemporary literature on agency and reasons at the service of some such normative epistemology. I discuss the semantics of obligations, the connection between obligations and reasons to believe, the implausibility of Lockean evidentialism, (...) and some of the alleged connections between agency and justification. (shrink)

RESUMO A Transferência de Embrião (TE) em bovinos se trata de uma técnica mundialmente disseminada com objetivo de aumentar a capacidade reprodutiva da fêmea. Mantém vínculo direto com outras técnicas das biotecnologias da reprodução, como, a Ovum Pick-Up (OPU), Produção In Vitro e In Vivo de embriões (PIVE) e Transferência de Embrião em Tempo Fixo (TETF), sendo estas, técnicas que fazem parte de um processo, que vai desde a seleção de doadoras, passando pelo preparo dos embriões até sua inovulação em (...) receptoras criteriosamente selecionadas. Com seu avanço, várias tecnologias de manejo vêm sendo implantadas: formas no transporte de embriões, protocolos de sincronização de doadoras e receptoras, e protocolos de recuperação de oócitos para produção de embriões. Isto infundiu a tecnologia, porém, os investimentos previstos para a produção de um animal de alto mérito genético limita sua utilização. Contudo, esta análise abordou avanços tecnológicos essenciais para o sucesso da TE, incluindo novos protocolos, sexagem de embriões, além do uso de embriões congelados Direct Transfer (DT) e vitrificados. No entanto, é claro que o sucesso do procedimento está no processo como um todo, em destaque ressalta-se que é de grande valia que o profissional apto a executar a técnica esteja sempre preparado e atualizado garantindo qualidade, eficiência e sustentabilidade na pecuária. Esta revisão foi desenvolvida com o propósito de adquirir conhecimento teórico, de forma detalhada e crítica, nas técnicas e procedimentos de Transferência de Embriões em bovinos, incluindo a colheita, manipulação e implantação de embriões. Palavras-chaves: Bovino, doadora, embrião, receptora. ABSTRACT Embryo Transfer (ET) in cattle is a globally widespread technique aimed at enhancing the reproductive capacity of females. It is closely linked to other techniques in reproductive biotechnologies, such as Ovum Pick-Up (OPU), In Vitro and In Vivo Embryo Production (PIVE), and Timed Embryo Transfer (TET), all of which are part of a process that ranges from donor selection, through embryo preparation, to their inoculation into carefully chosen recipients. With its advancement, various management technologies have been implemented: including methods for embryo transport, synchronization protocols for donors and recipients, and oocyte recovery protocols for embryo production. Although technology has been infused, the anticipated investments for producing animals of high genetic merit limit its widespread use. However, this analysis addressed essential technological advances for the success of ET, including new protocols, embryo sexing, as well as the use of frozen-thawed (DT) and vitrified embryos. Nevertheless, it is clear that the success of the procedure lies in the entire process. Notably, it emphasizes the significant value of having a qualified professional who is always prepared and updated to ensure quality, efficiency, and sustainability in livestock farming. This literary review was developed with the purpose of acquiring theoretical knowledge, in a detailed and critical way, on the techniques and procedures of Embryo Transfer in cattle, including the collection, manipulation and implantation of embryos. Keywords: Bovine, donor, embryo, recipient. -/- REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS BARUSELLI, P.S; MADUREIRA, E.H. Controle farmacológico do ciclo estral em ruminantes. 2000, Anais.. São Paulo: Fundação da Faculdade de Medicina Veterinária e Zootecnia, USP, 2000. BARUSSELI, P.S. et al. Importância do emprego da eCG em protocolos de sincronização para IA, TE e SOV em tempo fixo. Biotecnologia de reprodução em bovinos (3° Simpósio Internacional de Reprodução Animal Aplicada). 2008. BRANDÃO, G.V.R. Revisão de Literatura: Transferência de Embrião em Bovinos. Curitibanos-SC, 2019. BUENO, A.P.; BELTRAN, M.P.; Produção in vitro de embriões bovinos. Revista Científica Eletrônica De Medicina Veterinária. ISSN 1679-7353, ano VI, n.11, Julho, 2008. CAETANO, S.G; SILVA, N.V.S. Inseminação artificial de bovnos em tempo fixo (IATF) – Revisão de literatura. UNIFUCAMP, Monte Carmelo- M.G, Junho, 2023. CARVALHO, V.H.S. et al. Impactos das biotécnicas da reprodução animal e o melhoramento genético na pecuária de corte. PUBVET, São Luis De Montes Belos, v.17, n.8, p.1-10, 2023 DANTAS, K.S.A.; NUNES, C. C. C.; FERREIRA, J.; DANTAS, R. A. A. Seleção de receptoras em um programa de transferência de embriões (PIVE) em bovinos no Nordeste do Brasil. Ciência Animal, Fortaleza, v. 28, p. 1-14, 2018. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Fisiologia Clínica do Ciclo Estral de Vacas Leiteiras: Desenvolvimento Folicular, Corpo Lúteo e Etapas do Estro. 2020. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Fisiologia da Reprodução de Bovinos Leiteiros: Aspectos Básicos e Clínicos. Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva, 2022. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Fisiologia do ciclo estral dos animais domésticos. Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva, 2021. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Transferência de Embriões nos Animais e a Indústria de Embriões no Brasil. DIAS, L.R.O. Fatores que afetam a produção de embriões pela Transferência Intrafolicular de Ovócitos Imaturos (TIFOI) em bovinos. 2021. 85 f. Tese (Doutorado em [nome do programa]) - Faculdade de Agronomia e Medicina Veterinária, Universidade de Brasília, Brasília, 2021. DOMINGUES, P.F.; LANGONI, H. Manejo Sanitário Animal. Editora de Publicações Biomédicas Ltda - EPUB, Rio de Janeiro, 2001. 209 p. EMBRAPA. MINERAIS NA EFICIÊNCIA REPRODUTIVA DE BOVINOS. SÃO CARLOS- SÃO PAULO 2008. FIDELIS, C.A.S. Inseminação artificial em tempo fixo intracornual profunda em bovinos. Dissertação (mestrado acadêmico). Araguaína - TO, 2019. GONÇALVES, R.L.R.; VIANA, J.H.M. Situação atual da produção de embriões bovinos no Brasil e no mundo. In: Anais do XXIII Congresso Brasileiro de Reprodução Animal, 2019, Gramado, RS, 2019, p. 156-159. GOUVEIA, F.F. A Produção in vitro de embriões Bovinos. Monografia (Conclusão do curso de Medicina Veterinária) – Faculdade de Agronomia e Medicina Veterinária, Universidade de Brasília, Brasília, DF, 2011. GREGIANINI, J.T.F. et al. Avaliação de embriões bovinos utilizando sêmen sexado e convencional. In: SEMINÁRIO DA EMBRAPA ACRE DE INICIAÇÃO CIENTÍFICA E PÓS-GRADUAÇÃO, 4., 2021, Rio Branco, AC. Atividades agropecuárias e florestais para o desenvolvimento sustentável da Amazônia: Anais... Rio Branco, AC: Embrapa Acre, 2022. Pôster. GUARDA, A.C.A. Biotecnologia na reprodução animal: Uma visão teórico/prática de produção in vitro de embriões bovino. 2023. 28p. Trabalho de Conclusão de curso (Bacharelado de Zootecnia). Instituto Federal de Educação, Ciência e Tecnologia Goiano – Câmpus Rio Verde, Rio Verde, GO, 2023. HAFEZ, E.S.E.; HAFEZ. Reprodução animal / [coordenador de tradução da 7. ed. original Renato Campanarut Barnabe]. – Barueri, SP : Manole, 2004, il.; HONORATO, M.T. et al. Importância da escolha de receptoras em um programa de transferência de embriões em bovinos. PUBVET, Londrina, V. 7, N. 19, Ed. 242, Art. 1601, Outubro, 2013. HOPPER, R.M. Bovine Reproduction. Wiley Blackwell, Capítulo 78, p. 723-733, 2015. LIMA, Fabio Junior Arruda. Transferência de embriãos em tempo fixo em bovinos: Relato de Caso. Trabalho de Conclusão de Curso (graduação em medicina veterinária)- Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina-Campus Curitibanos. Curitibanos, 2018. MACHADO, R. et al. Metodologia para obtenção de concepto bovino. Embrapa Pecuária Sudeste, ISSN 1981-2078, São Carlos-SP, 2009. Disponível em:. Acessado em 11 de outubro, 2023 BASTOS, M.R. et al. Criopreservação de embriões bovinos produzidos in vitro. In: MENDONÇA, P. P. et al. (Org.). Tópicos Especiais em Ciência Animal XI. 1. ed. Alegre: CAUFES, 2022. Capítulo 13. MELO, R. et al. Utilização de ECG e FSH em protocolos de superovulação em bovinos. Manejo, Nutrição e Produção Animal: Tópicos Atuais em Pesquisa, v. 1, n. 1, p. 110-116, 2023. OLIVEIRA, C.S. et al. Biotécnicas da Reprodução em Bovinos. EMBRAPA, 2014. PASA, C. Transferência de embriões em bovinos. Biodiversidade, v. 7, n. 1, 2008. PAZZIM, L.V.L. Transferencia de embriões em bovinos: Revisão de literatura. Monografia (Trabalho conclusão de curso) - Universidade federal de Santa Catarina. Curitibanos, 2021. PENITENTE FILHO, J.M. et al. Produção de embriões bovinos in vivo e in vitro. Revista CFMV, Ano XX, p. 73-82, 2014. PENITENTE FILHO, J.M. Produção de Embriões Bovinos In Vivo e In Vitro. 2011. 22 f. Monografia (Especialização) - Curso de Medicina Veterinária, UFV, Viçosa, 2011. PILLA, L.F.C. Congelamento ultra-rapido de embriões bovinos com etilenoglicol associado ou não a trealose. 2005. 37f. Dissertação (Mestrado em Area de concentração em Fisiopatologia da Reprodução), Universidade Federal de Santa Maria, Santa Maria. RIBEIRO, L.V.P.; RIGOLON, L.P.; CAVALIERI, F.L.B.; SEKO, M.B.; MARTINEZ, A.C.; RIBEIRO, M.G.; MARTINS, R.R.; ÁVILA, M.R.; DE CONTI, J.B. Recuperação de oócitos e recuperação in vitro de embriões de vacas estimuladas com FSH ou eCG. Archivos de zootecnia. v. 60, n. 232, p. 1021-1029, 2011. ROCHA, J.R.; SANTOS, L.M. As vantagens da sexagen de embriões em bovinos. Revista científica eletrônica de medicina veterinária, ano IV, n.8, janeiro de 2007. RUBIN, M.I.B; Histórico dos 20 anos da Sociedade Brasileira de Tecnologia de Embriões, 2005. SANTOS, P.H. Impactos da superestimulação ovariana sore a diferenciação das celulas da grranulosa bovina. Dissertação de Mestrado em Farmacologia e Biotecnologia - UNESP. 2017. SEIDEL, G.E.J.; SEIDEL, S. M. Training manual for embryo transfer in cattle 2005. SENEDA, M.M.; ESPER, C.R.; GARCIA, J.M.; ANDRADE, E.R. Aspecto técnicos e biológicos da obtenção de oócitos bovinos: Revisão de Literatura. Ciências agrárias, Londrina, v. 23, n. 1, p. 101-110, 2002. SILVA, D.P.; TOLEDO, H.R.P.; SILVA, R.A.B.; CARVALHO, G.F.; MELO, A.F.; GARCIA, M.S.; et al. Transferência Intrafolicular de Ovócitos Imaturos (TIFOI): revisão de literatura. Zootecnia: Pesquisa e práticas contemporâneas - volume 2, 255-266, 2021. SPELL, A.R.; BEAL, W.E.; CORAH, L.R.; LAMB, G.C. Evaluating recipient and embryo factors that affect pregnancy rates of embryo transfer in beef cattle. Theriogenology, v. 56, p. 287-297, 2001. SPRÍCIGO, J.F.W.; DODE, M.A.N. Transferência Intrafolicular de Ovócitos Imaturos (TIFOI): uma Alternativa para Produção de Embriões Bovinos. Embrapa Recursos Genéticos e Biotecnologia, Brasília, 2016. VALLE, E.R. O ciclo estral de bovinos e os métodos de controle. EMBRAPA, 1991. VIANA, J.H.M. Classificação de embriões bovinos produzidos in vivo. Comunicado Técnico (EMBRAPA). ISSN 1678-3131, Juiz De Fora-MG, Novembro, 2009. VIANA, J.H.M. 2017 Statistics of embryo production and transfer in domestic farm animals: Is it a turning point? In 2017 more in vitro-produced than in vivo-derived embryos were transferred worldwide. Embryo Transfer Newsl, v.36(4), p.8-25, 2018. VIANA, J.H.M.; SIQUEIRA, L.G.; PALHAO, M.P.; CAMARGO, L.S.A.; Features and perspectives of the Brazilian in vitro embryo industry. Anim Reprod, v.9, p.12-18, 2012. WÜNSCHE JÚNIOR, A.G et al. Avaliação de uma segunda lavagem uterina sobre a recuperacão de embriões em vacas Nelore. Semina: Ciências Agrárias, Londrina, v. 29, n.3, p. 677-684, jul./set. 2008. (shrink)

Kant’s dualism in anthropology and morality is said to be bridged only by means of a teleology that seems to betray the historical constitution of its subjectivity. And yet the Kantianarticulation of problems of theoretical and practical reason can be explored only insofar as they help us understand the correlated issues of the unity of reason, the relation of aesthetics and ethics in the light of the three Critiques, and the teleological conception of history. In this paper, I argue for (...) a teleological reading of the systematic architectonic so as to make sense of the concept of purposiveness as the a priori principle of judgment in its logical, aesthetic, and teleological reflection and of the unifying, a priori principles of each faculty–namely, conformity to law, final purpose, and conformity to purpose or purposiveness – respectively dealt with in the three Critiques. (shrink)

Debate about cognitive science explanations has been formulated in terms of identifying the proper level(s) of explanation. Views range from reductionist, favoring only neuroscience explanations, to mechanist, favoring the integration of multiple levels, to pluralist, favoring the preservation of even the most general, high-level explanations, such as those provided by embodied or dynamical approaches. In this paper, we challenge this framing. We suggest that these are not different levels of explanation at all but, rather, different styles of explanation that capture (...) different, cross-cutting patterns in cognitive phenomena. Which pattern is explanatory depends on both the cognitive phenomenon under investigation and the research interests occasioning the explanation. This reframing changes how we should answer the basic questions of which cognitive science approaches explain and how these explanations relate to one another. On this view, we should expect different approaches to offer independent explanations in terms of their different focal patterns and the value of those explanations to partly derive from the broad patterns they feature. (shrink)

In the visual representation of ontologies, in particular of part-whole relationships, it is customary to use graph theory as the representational background. We claim here that the standard graph-based approach has a number of limitations, and we propose instead a new representation of part-whole structures for ontologies, and describe the results of experiments designed to show the effectiveness of this new proposal especially as concerns reduction of visual complexity. The proposal is developed to serve visualization of ontologies conformant to the (...) Basic Formal Ontology. But it can be used also for more general applications, particularly in the biomedical domain. (shrink)

In the graphical representation of ontologies, it is customary to use graph theory as the representational background. We claim here that the standard graph-based approach has a number of limitations. We focus here on a problem in the graph-based representation of ontologies in complex domains such as biomedical, engineering and manufacturing: lack of mereotopological representation. Based on such limitation, we proposed a diagrammatic way to represent an entity’s structure and various forms of mereotopological relationships between the entities.

Science, technology, and professions form a system with strong interactions. Yet, these activities attack different kinds of problems which require different kinds of solutions. The problems that trigger scientific and technological research remain insufficiently solved or unsolved, therefore their possible solutions must be invented (i. e. they are partially or totally original) and, consequently, they should be tested against reality by researchers before considering them as true or useful. On the contrary, the problems that trigger professional inquiry are already solved, (...) or have at least some partial solution at hand that is available in the form of a technical protocol. This solution is applied with caution but without testing (i. e. the professional assumes that the solution works because it was already challenged by researchers). Moreover, science and technology tackle unsolved inverse problems, which allow the radical advancement of knowledge, and genuine innovation. A science policy based on a clear distinction between creative and routine activities (i. e. a cre- atively friendly policy) offers an opportunity for societies to reach value-added innovative economic and integral development. (shrink)

Contemporary political philosophy is, to a certain degree, dominated by a family of theories that invoke hypothetical procedures as a method of normative justification. This article intends to analyze Axel Honneth’s critique of the so-called “proceduralism” in theories of justice, as well as to examine the author’s alternative proposal for a justification method, what he calls “normative reconstruction”. Honneth’s complaints are divided in three parts: critiques of the understanding of justice, the method of justification, and the scope of proceduralist theories (...) of justice are raised, each one receiving an alternative formulation by the author. After reading texts by Axel Honneth, John Rawls — author of "A theory of justice", in which he presents one of the most well-known proceduralist arguments — Jürgen Habermas and Nancy Fraser, who raise problems for Honneth’s normative reconstruction, we suspect that even though Honneth’s critique of proceduralism and his proposal of normative reconstruction seem initially plausible, they are only possible if we abandon the framework of political philosophy to do what is usually called “social philosophy”. (shrink)

Trata-se de revisitar o debate Rawls-Habermas,em particular, o problema da autonomia política à luz da apropriação que estes autores nos oferecem do procedimentalismo kantiano.Tanto John Rawls quanto Jürgen Habermas, em suas respectivas concepções de "cultura política" e "esfera pública," partem de uma equivocada atribuição de um fundacionalismo moral em Kant de forma a preservar o princípio normativo de universalizabilidade capaz de assegurar a estabilidade de uma "sociedade bem ordenada" e balizar o procedimentalismo democrático enquanto alternativa para os modelos liberais e (...) republicanos. (shrink)

Foundational ontologies, central constructs in ontological investigations and engineering alike, are based on ontological categories. Firstly proposed by Aristotle as the very ur- elements from which the whole of reality can be derived, they are not easy to identify, let alone partition and/or hierarchize; in particular, the question of their number poses serious challenges. The late medieval philosopher Dietrich of Freiberg wrote around 1286 a tutorial that can help us today with this exceedingly difficult task. In this paper, I discuss (...) ontological categories and their importance for foundational ontologies from both the contemporary perspective and the original Aristotelian viewpoint, I provide the translation from the Latin into English of Dietrich's De origine II with an introductory elaboration, and I extract a foundational ontology–that is in fact a single-category one–from this text rooted in Dietrich's specification of types of subjecthood and his conception of intentionality as causal operation. (shrink)

It is recognized that Buddhadharma schools are markedly ontologically, epistemologically, and semantically nominalist. Regardless of that, when it comes to the use of the term “consciousness”, there is still a tendency in some Western circles to understand Buddhism in a solipsist or monist way. To this purpose, I argue that the general expression “consciousness” from Buddhadharma texts must be understood according to traditional nominalist Buddhist semantics and theory of entities. In the end, I briefly mention some arguments and viewpoints – (...) defending the plurality/diversity of consciousness – of some Buddhist Dzogchen scholars and masters. (shrink)

Ontologies are some of the most central constructs in today's large plethora of knowledge technologies, namely in the context of the semantic web. As their coinage indicates, they are direct heirs to the ontological investigations in the long Western philosophical tradition, but it is not easy to make bridges between them. Contemporary ontological commitments often take causality as a central aspect for the ur-segregation of entities, especially in scientific upper ontologies; theories of causality and philosophical ontological investigations often go hand-in-hand, (...) and were essentially inseparable in medieval thought. This constitutes the foundation for a bridge, and this article analyzes the causality-based ontology of the late medieval philosopher Dietrich of Freiberg from the viewpoint of today's upper-ontology engineering. In this bridging attempt, it offers a translation into English of the first part of Dietrich's De origine (abbreviated title) that is a compromise between traditional scholarly translations of medieval Latin philosophical texts and contemporary ontology. (shrink)

Neste artigo discutimos alguns aspectos da lógica nos dias atuais. O propósito central é mostrar a evolução dessa disciplina. Começamos com uma breve introdução onde especificamos o que queremos dizer com o termo “lógica”. A seguir, exporemos e discutiremos o que consideramos ser algumas das principais áreas de investigação da lógica atual. Concluímos o artigo com algumas observações sobre lógicas não clássicas e seus impactos sobre a filosofia. Ao final do texto se encontram mais detalhes que apontam para um aprofundamento (...) e uma ampliação das questões aqui tratadas. (shrink)

Trata-se de mostrar em que sentido a concepção normativa de pessoa em John Rawls pressupõe uma transformação semântica da concepção kantiana de subjetividade transcendental, em particular do seu ideal de personalidade. Uma reinterpretação kantiana da concepção normativa de pessoa logra explicar o dispositivo procedimental do equilíbrio reflexivopara responder a críticas comunitaristas em defesa do individualismo inerente ao liberalismo político, concebido não mais como uma doutrina abrangente da auto-identidade mas como um construtivismo, num modelo coerentista dejustificativa epistêmico-moral.The article seeks to show (...) in which sense Rawls’s normative conception of the person does presuppose a semantic transformation of the Kantian conception of transcendental subjectivity, particularly of his ideal of personhood . A Kantian reinterpretation of the normative conception of the person succeeds in accounting for the procedural device of reflective equilibrium so as to address communitarian criticisms in defense of the individualism inherent in political liberalism, conceived no longer as a comprehensive doctrine of self-identity but as a constructivism, within a coherentist model of moral epistemology. (shrink)

The van Wijngaarden grammars are two-level grammars that present many interesting properties. In the present article I elaborate on six of these properties, to wit, (i) their being constituted by two grammars, (ii) their ability to generate (possibly infinitely many) strict languages and their own metalanguage, (iii) their context-sensitivity, (iv) their high descriptive power, (v) their productivity, or the ability to generate an infinite number of production rules, and (vi) their equivalence with the unrestricted, or Type-0, Chomsky grammars.

Experts in Artificial Intelligence (AI) development predict that advances in the dvelopment of intelligent systems and agents will reshape vital areas in our society. Nevertheless, if such an advance isn't done with prudence, it can result in negative outcomes for humanity. For this reason, several researchers in the area are trying to develop a robust, beneficial, and safe concept of artificial intelligence. Currently, several of the open problems in the field of AI research arise from the difficulty of avoiding unwanted (...) behaviors of intelligent agents, and at the same time specifying what we want such systems to do. It is of utmost importance that artificial intelligent agents have their values aligned with human values, given the fact that we cannot expect an AI to develop our moral preferences simply because of its intelligence, as discussed in the Orthogonality Thesis. Perhaps this difficulty comes from the way we are addressing the problem of expressing objectives, values, and ends, using representational cognitive methods. A solution to this problem would be the dynamic cognitive approach proposed by Dreyfus, whose phenomenological philosophy defends that the human experience of being-in-the-world cannot be represented by the symbolic or connectionist cognitive methods. A possible approach to this problem would be to use theoretical models such as SED (situated embodied dynamics) to address the values learning problem in AI. (shrink)

A impossibilidade de se fundamentar os direitos humanos hoje de maneira satisfatória, sem recorrer a modelos essencialistas ou metafísicos, parece correlata à universalidade de sua defesa e promoção. Uma abordagem fenomenológica favorece uma leitura perspectivista da alteridade, tornando altamente defensável e razoável que se aplique uma semântica transcendental ao problema da fundamentação dos direitos humanos. The impossibility of satisfactorily grounding human rights today, without resorting to essentialist or metaphysical models, seems correlated to the universality of their defense and promotion. A (...) phenomenological approach favors a perspectivist reading of alterity, making it highly defensible and reasonable that transcendental semantics be applied to the problem of the foundations of human rights. (shrink)

3rd ed, 2021. A circumscription of the classical theory of computation building up from the Chomsky hierarchy. With the usual topics in formal language and automata theory.

For millennia, knowledge has eluded a precise definition. The industrialization of knowledge (IoK) and the associated proliferation of the so-called knowledge communities in the last few decades caused this state of affairs to deteriorate, namely by creating a trio composed of data, knowledge, and information (DIK) that is not unlike the aporia of the trinity in philosophy. This calls for a general theory of knowledge (ToK) that can work as a foundation for a science of knowledge (SoK) and additionally distinguishes (...) knowledge from both data and information. In this paper, I attempt to sketch this generality via the establishing of both knowledge structures and knowledge systems that can then be adopted/adapted by the diverse communities for the respective knowledge technologies and practices. This is achieved by means of a formal–indeed, mathematical–approach to epistemological matters a.k.a. formal epistemology. The corresponding application focus is on knowledge systems implementable as computer programs. (shrink)

In this paper I present reasons for us to accept the hypothesis that suspended judgment has correctness conditions, just like beliefs do. Roughly put, the idea is that suspended judgment about p is correct when both p and ¬p might be true in view of certain facts that characterize the subject’s situation. The reasons to accept that hypothesis are broadly theoretical ones: it adds unifying power to our epistemological theories, it delivers good and conservative consequences, and it allows us to (...) assess processes of reasoning involving attitudes of suspended judgment. (shrink)

Not focusing on the history of classical logic, this book provides discussions and quotes central passages on its origins and development, namely from a philosophical perspective. Not being a book in mathematical logic, it takes formal logic from an essentially mathematical perspective. Biased towards a computational approach, with SAT and VAL as its backbone, this is an introduction to logic that covers essential aspects of the three branches of logic, to wit, philosophical, mathematical, and computational.

Why should we avoid incoherence? An influential view tells us that incoherent combinations of attitudes are such that it is impossible for all of those attitudes to be simultaneously vindicated by the evidence. But it is not clear whether this view successfully explains what is wrong with certain akratic doxastic states. In this paper I flesh out an alternative response to that question, one according to which the problem with incoherent combinations of attitudes is that it is impossible for all (...) of those attitudes to be simultaneously knowledgeable. This alternative response explains what is wrong with akratic combinations of attitudes using commonly accepted epistemological theses. The paper still shows how this proposal is able to explain the badness of incoherent combinations involving the absence of attitudes, suspended judgment and credence. These explanations deploy the notions of knowledge and being in a position to know, instead of the notion of responding properly to the evidence. Finally, I suggest that this picture can be generalized to the realm of practical rationality as well. (shrink)

A. Newell and H. A. Simon were two of the most influential scientists in the emerging field of artificial intelligence (AI) in the late 1950s through to the early 1990s. This paper reviews their crucial contribution to this field, namely to symbolic AI. This contribution was constituted mostly by their quest for the implementation of general intelligence and (commonsense) knowledge in artificial thinking or reasoning artifacts, a project they shared with many other scientists but that in their case was theoretically (...) based on the idiosyncratic notions of symbol systems and the representational abilities they give rise to, in particular with respect to knowledge. While focusing on the period 1956-1982, this review cites both earlier and later literature and it attempts to make visible their potential relevance to today's greatest unifying AI challenge, to wit, the design of wholly autonomous artificial agents (a.k.a. robots) that are not only rational and ethical, but also self-conscious. (shrink)

Genera, typically hand-in-hand with their branching species, are essential elements of vocabulary-based information constructs, in particular scientific taxonomies. Should they also feature in formal ontologies, the highest of such constructs? I argue in this article that the answer is “Yes” and that the question posed in its title also has a Yes-answer: The way medieval ontologists sliced up the world into genera does matter to formal ontology. More specifically, the way Dietrich of Freiberg, a Latin scholastic, conceived and applied strictly (...) generic criteria to slice up the world into its entities can provide some guidelines to the field of formal ontology with respect to not only its contents, but also its scope. In particular, Dietrich's information criterion plays here a central role. (shrink)

The gulf between philosophical and formal ontology can and should be bridged. In this Editorial, I elaborate briefly on this subject.

An analysis of--yet another--case of academic failure in multi- and interdisciplinarity. An editorial of the Journal of Knowledge Structures & Systems.

In this paper, I offer two counterexamples to the so-called ‘Uniqueness Thesis.’ As one of these examples rely on the thesis that it is possible for a justified belief to be based on an inconsistent body of evidence, I also offer reasons for this further thesis. On the assumption that doxastic justification entails propositional justification, the counterexamples seem to work.