We should not be creating conscious, humanoid agents but an entirely new sort of entity, rather like oracles, with no conscience, no fear of death, no distracting loves and hates.

While we agree in broad strokes with the characterisation of rationalization as a “useful fiction,” we think that Fiery Cushman's claim remains ambiguous in two crucial respects: the reality of beliefs and desires, that is, the fictional status of folk-psychological entities and the degree to which they should be understood as useful. Our aim is to clarify both points and explicate the rationale of rationalization.

ABSTRACT This paper compares Spinoza with Daniel Dennett and uncovers a number of striking parallels. Genevieve Lloyd’s recent work on Spinoza reveals a picture of a philosopher that anticipated many of Dennett’s later ideas. Both share a fervent opposition to Descartes’ conception of mind and body and endorse a strikingly similar naturalist philosophy. It is the goal of this paper to tease out these connections and once again highlight the richness of a Spinozist lens of the world.

This paper seeks to explain and evaluate, by an analytic method, the conflict between determinism and free will from the viewpoint of two physicalist reductionist philosophers, namely, Daniel Dennett and Sam Harris. Dennett is a compatibilist philosopher who tries to show compatibility between determinism and free will, while Sam Harris is a non-compatibilist philosopher who turns to determinism with the thesis that our thoughts and actions have been pre-determined by the neurobiological events associated with them, and thus, considers (...) free will to be an illusion. Therefore according to him, we are not the authors of our thoughts and actions. However, Dennett tries to establish the existence of free will through the use of concepts like control and deliberation and defends ‘free will worth wanting’. Therefore, if we take the agency of the agent and the absence of determinism as two criteria for free will, Dennett accepts both and Harris denies them; since there is neurobiological determinism, and all of Dennett’s deliberations, etc. are also determined neurobiologically. Between the two conditions of free will, Dennett accepts that the origin of action must be in the agent; however, he refutes the condition of alternate possibilities, establishing his view based on a causal theory. As a Neo-Darwinist, he explains human beings’ physical and mental phenomena based on evolution theory and despite accepting causal determinism, he shows how the agent can still have agency in decisions and actions. As a result, he does not consider determinism to requisite compulsion. In his philosophical system, one can change the future that has not yet taken place. This decision-making regarding the future takes place through the process of deliberation, which has a special place in Dennett’s view. On the other hand, by adhering to Libet’s neurological experiments, Harris refutes both conditions of free will and considers the cause of all human being actions to arise from activities of the brain and concludes that one cannot have any conscious control over one’s actions. As a result, he emerges as a non-compatibilist determinist. In both his works, The Moral Landscape and Free Will, Harris addresses the topic of free will. In Free Will, he criticizes the view of compatibilists like Dennett, who responds to those criticisms in his article, ‘Reflections on Free Will, Review of Sam Harris’ Free Will’. Like Harris, Dennett too addresses free will in his two important books, Elbow Room and Freedom Evolves. Following an analysis of the views of Dennett and Harris and explaining the criticisms of the two regarding each other, the present article will show that neither Dennett, considering the rest of the elements of his philosophical views in philosophy of mind and philosophy of action can well justify compatibilism, nor can Harris, considering his neurological approach defend his determinist idea. The conflict that is present in Dennett’s views causes his explanation of the agent being the origin of his action to also be indefensible. Furthermore, due to the incompatibility of the different elements of his view and the vagueness of his idea regarding the effect of unconscious intentions on action, Harris too is placed in a weak position. In contrast to Harris’ supposition, a human is not “a puppet [who] is free as long as he loves his strings”; rather, a human chooses, makes decisions and acts according to his own will. As a result, despite the objections that apply to both philosophers, Dennett’s view is more acceptable than Harris’ in terms of the effort to justify free will; even though neither have been apparently successful in defending their own ideas. (shrink)

The Consequence Argument is the classic argument for the incompatibility of determinism and our ability to do otherwise. Daniel C. Dennett objects that the Consequence Argument suffers from the same error as a clearly unconvincing argument that there are no mammals. In this paper, I argue that these arguments do not suffer from the same error. The argument that there are no mammals is unconvincing as it takes the form of a sorites, whereas the Consequence Argument does not. Accordingly, (...) Dennett's objection misses its mark. (shrink)

In this paper I compare two different approaches to the supposed distinction between the mental and the physical: 1. Brentano's theory of `Intentionality', which, in its early formulation, proposes a true distinction between physical objects and the objects of thought; and 2. Dennett's `Intentional Systems Theory', which is an attempt to naturalise the mind and to reduce mental phenomena such as beliefs and desires to simple physical systems.

Over 35 years, Daniel Dennett has articulated a rich and expansive philosophical outlook. There have been elaborations, refinements, and changes of mind, exposi- tory and substantive. This makes him hard to pin down. Does he, for example, think intentional states are real? In places, he sounds distinctly instrumentalist; elsewhere, he avows realism, ‘sort of’. What is needed is a map, charting developments and tracing dialectical threads through his extensive writings and the different regions of his thought. This is what (...) Matthew Elton’s impressive book supplies. Accessibly written, with a useful glossary and detailed guides to the literature, it will be ex- tremely helpful to students and professionals alike. (shrink)

A review of Daniel Dennett's Intuition Pumps (W.V. Norton: 2013).

[लोग बार बार कहते हैं कि दर्शन वास्तव में प्रगति नहीं करता है, कि हम अभी भी एक ही दार्शनिक समस्याओं के साथ कब्जा कर रहे हैं के रूप में यूनानियों थे. लेकिन जो लोग यह कहते हैं, वे समझ नहीं पा रहे हैं कि ऐसा क्यों होना चाहिए। ऐसा इसलिए है क्योंकि हमारी भाषा वही रही है और हमें एक ही सवाल पूछने में seducing रहता है. जब तक कोई क्रिया होती रहती है, तब तक ऐसा प्रतीत होता है (...) जैसे कि वह उसी तरह कार्य करता है जैसे कि वह खाने और पीने के लिए उसी तरह कार्य करता है, जब तक कि हमारे पास अभी भी विशेषण [अद्वितीय] है, [गलत] , [गलत] , जब तक हम समय की नदी की बात करना जारी रखते हैं, तब तक हम समय की एक नदी की बात करते रहते हैं , अंतरिक्ष के विस्तार, आदि, लोगों को एक ही puzzling कठिनाइयों पर ठोकर रखने के लिए और खुद को कुछ है जो कोई स्पष्टीकरण को साफ करने में सक्षम लगता है घूर पाते हैं. और क्या अधिक है, यह उत्कृष्ट के लिए एक लालसा को संपीड़ित करता है, क्योंकि, जहाँ तक लोग सोचते हैं कि वे 'मानव समझ की सीमाओं को देख सकते हैं], वे निश्चित रूपसे था टी वे इन से परे देख सकते हैं पर विश्वास करतेहैं. यह बोली लुडविग Wittgenstein से है जो दर्शन को कुछ 70 साल पहले फिर से परिभाषित किया है (लेकिन ज्यादातर लोगों को अभी तक यह पता लगाना है). Dennett, हालांकि वह कुछ 40 साल के लिए एक दार्शनिक किया गया है, उनमें से एक है. यह भी उत्सुक है कि दोनों वह और उनके प्रधानमंत्री विरोधी, जॉन Searle, प्रसिद्ध Wittgensteinians के तहत अध्ययन किया (जॉन ऑस्टिन के साथ Searle, गिल्बर्ट Ryle के साथ Dennett) लेकिन Searle अधिक या कम बात है और Dennett नहीं किया था, (हालांकि यह बातें खींच रहा है Searle या Ryle Wittgensteinians फोन करने के लिए). Dennett एक कठिन determinist है (हालांकि वह पिछले दरवाजे में वास्तविकता चुपके की कोशिश करता है), और शायद यह Ryle, जिसकी प्रसिद्ध पुस्तक के कारण है - मन की अवधारणा (1949) के लिए reprinted जारी है. उस किताब ने भूत को भगाने का बहुत अच्छा कामकिया, लेकिन उसने मशीन छोड़ दी। Dennett गलतियों Wittgenstein बनाने आनंद मिलता है, Ryle (और कई अन्य लोगों के बाद से) विस्तार से उजागर किया है. शब्द चेतना, पसंद, स्वतंत्रता, इरादा, कण, सोच, निर्धारित करता है, लहर, कारण, हुआ, घटना (और इतने पर अंतहीन) का हमारा उपयोग शायद ही कभी भ्रम का एक स्रोत हैं, लेकिन जैसे ही हम सामान्य जीवन छोड़ और दर्शन में प्रवेश (और किसी भी चर्चा उस वातावरण से अलगहो गई जिसमें भाषा विकसित हुई थी ,अर्थात्, जिस संदर्भ में शब्दों का अर्थ था) अराजकता राज करतीहै। सबसे अधिक कीतरह, Dennett एक सुसंगत ढांचे का अभाव है - जो Searle तर्कसंगतता की तार्किक संरचना कहा जाता है. मैं इस पर काफी विस्तार किया है जब से मैं इस समीक्षा लिखा था और मेरे हाल के लेख विस्तार से क्या दर्शन के लिए Dennett दृष्टिकोण के साथ गलत है दिखानेके लिए , जो एकस्टेरॉयड पर वैज्ञानिकता कह सकते हैं. मुझे Wittgenstein से एक और उद्धरण के साथ समाप्त करते हैं - महत्वाकांक्षा सोचा की मौत है. आधुनिक दो systems दृश्यसे मानव व्यवहार के लिए एक व्यापक अप करने के लिए तारीख रूपरेखा इच्छुक लोगों को मेरी पुस्तक 'दर्शन, मनोविज्ञान, मिनडी और लुडविगमें भाषा की तार्किक संरचना से परामर्श कर सकते हैं Wittgenstein और जॉन Searle '2 एड (2019). मेरे लेखन के अधिक में रुचि रखने वालों को देख सकते हैं 'बात कर रहेबंदर- दर्शन, मनोविज्ञान, विज्ञान, धर्म और राजनीति पर एक बर्बाद ग्रह --लेख और समीक्षा 2006-2019 3 एड (2019) और आत्मघाती यूटोपियान भ्रम 21st मेंसदी 4वें एड (2019). (shrink)

Most of the free will debate operates under the assumption that classic determinism and indeterminism are the only metaphysical options available. Through an analysis of Dennett’s view of free will as gradually evolving this article attempts to point to emergentist, interactivist and temporal metaphysical options, which have been left largely unexplored by contemporary theorists. Whereas, Dennett himself holds that “the kind of free will worth wanting” is compatible with classic determinism, I propose that his models of determinism fit (...) poorly with his evolutionary theory and naturalist commitments. In particular, his so-called “intuition pumps” seem to rely on the assumption that reality will have a compositional bottom layer where appearance and reality coincide. I argue that instead of positing this and other “unexplained explainers” we should allow for the heretical possibility that there might not be any absolute bottom, smallest substances or universal laws, but relational interactions all the way down. Through the details of Dennett’s own account of the importance of horizontal transmission in evolution and the causal efficacy of epistemically limited but complex layered “selves,” it is argued that our autonomy is linked to the ability to affect reality by controlling appearances. (shrink)

This article was primarily a reaction to Dennett's Sweet Dreams (2005). In it Dennett pretends to renounce zombies. But what he means is that consciousness is nothing beyond that which can be tested behaviorally and objectively, so since zombies pass these tests, they can't be said to be unconscious – yet that is part of their definition. So they are a contradiction. In other words, zombies are inconceivable because a being that is "behaviorally, objectively indistinguishable from a conscious (...) person" just doesn't deserve in Dennett's eyes to be called unconscious. I argue, to the contrary, that zombies must lack brains since it is perfectly clear that in our universe having a brain (normally) entails having consciousness. I argue also that brain states are about people and things in the world, meaning for example that for some brain state S, necessarily if one is in brain state S, one is thinking about external object A. The brain "comes with" a world. The brain, therefore, transcends the boundaries of the skull. Science (and Dennett) cannot reduce the brain to something that doesn't pull off this most astonishing of feats. (shrink)

Adopting a materialist approach to the mind has far reaching implications for many presuppositions regarding the properties of the brain, including those that have traditionally been consigned to “the mental” aspect of human being. One such presupposition is the conception of the disembodied self. In this article we aim to account for the self as a material entity, in that it is wholly the result of the physiological functioning of the embodied brain. Furthermore, we attempt to account for the structure (...) of the self by invoking the logic of the narrative. While our conception of narrative selfhood incorporates the work of both Freud and Dennett, we offer a critique of these two theorists and then proceed to amend their theories by means of complexity theory. We argue that the self can be characterised as a complex system, which allows us to account for the structure of the wholly material self. (shrink)

Dennett elabora una concepción del “yo” entendido como un centro de gravedad narrativo. Uno de los obstáculos principales para valorar esta propuesta radica en que resulta dificultoso entender cuál es la naturaleza del concepto dennettiano de “yo”: concretamente, cuáles son los compromisos ontológicos y epistemológicos que cabe atribuir al fenómeno en cuestión. En este artículo defendemos que el mejor modo de realizar una reconstrucción interpretativa de su noción de “yo” es apelando a la distinción elaborada por Reichenbach entre tres (...) clases de entidades, Concreta,a e Illata, y entendiendo a los centros de gravedad narrativos como un caso de Abstracta reichenbachiano. Sostenemos que resulta pertinente e iluminador entender los centros de gravedad narrativos como Abstracta en el sentido de Reichenbach, apoyándonos en que: i) aunque no la aplica directamente al problema de la naturaleza del “yo”, Dennett sí emplea la distinción de Reichenbach en otras partes de su obra; ii) Dennett traza explícitamente una analogía del “yo” con los centros de gravedad que son, justamente, uno de sus ejemplos de Abstracta; iii) este modo de entender al “yo” permite dar sentido y entender mejor ciertos aspectos de la teoría narrativista dennettiana. Además de permitirnos clarificar las metáforas empleadas por Dennett en la elaboración de su teoría narrativa, dicha elucidación conceptual permite comprender mejor la distinción entre las tres clases de psicología intencional trazada por Dennett y es útil para sugerir a cuál de estos tres tipos pertenece el concepto de “yo”. Dennett's theory of personal identity argues that the “self” is no more than a center of narrative gravity. One of the main hurdles to assessing this proposal lies in the fact that it is difficult to understand what the nature of Dennett's concept of "self" is; specifically, what are the ontological and epistemological commitments that can be attributed to the phenomenon in question. In this article, we claim that the best way to make an interpretative reconstruction of his notion of "self" is appealing to the distinction elaborated by Reichenbach between three classes of entities, Concreta, Abstracta, and Illata, and understanding the narrative centers of gravity as a case of Reichenbachian Abstracta. We defend that understanding the narrative centers of gravity as Abstracta in the sense of Reichenbach is pertinent and illuminating given that: i) although he does not apply it directly to the problem of the nature of the "self", Dennett does use Reichenbach's distinction in other parts of his work; ii) Dennett explicitly draws an analogy of the "self" with the centers of gravity that are, precisely, one of his examples of Abstracta; iii) this way of understanding the "self" allows us to give sense and better understand certain aspects of Dennett’s narrative theory. Besides allowing us to clarify the metaphors used by Dennett in the elaboration of his narrative theory, such conceptual elucidation allows us to better understand the distinction between the three classes of intentional psychology drawn by Dennett (1987) and is useful in suggesting to which of these three types the concept of "self" belongs. (shrink)

One of the most influential arguments against the claim that computers can think is that while our intentionality is intrinsic, that of computers is derived: it is parasitic on the intentionality of the programmer who designed the computer-program. Daniel Dennett chose a surprising strategy for arguing against this asymmetry: instead of denying that the intentionality of computers is derived, he endeavours to argue that human intentionality is derived too. I intend to examine that biological plausibility of Dennett’s suggestion (...) and show that Dennett’s argument for the claim that human intentionality is derived because it was designed by natural selection is based on the misunderstanding of how natural selection works. (shrink)

사람들은 철학이 실제로 진보하지 않는다고 거듭 말하며, 우리는 여전히 그리스인과 같은 철학적 문제에 몰두하고 있습니다. 그러나 이 말을 하는 사람들은 왜 그렇게 해야 하는지 이해하지 못합니다. 그것은 우리의 언어가 동일하게 유지되고 같은 질문을 우리에게 유혹 유지하기 때문이다. 'to'라는 동사가 계속 있는 한, '먹고 마시는 것과 같은 방식으로 기능하는 것처럼 보이는', 우리가 여전히 형용사를 가지고 있는 한, ', ', ', 'false', ́', '가능한', 우리가 시간의 강, 넓은 공간 등에 대해 계속 이야기하는 한, 사람들은 똑같은 수수께끼의 어려움을 계속 발견하고 설명이 없는 무언가를 (...) 쳐다보고 있을 것입니다. 그리고 더 많은 것은, 사람들이'인간의 이해의 한계'를볼 수 있다고 생각하는 한, ‘그들은 물론이것들을 넘어서볼 수 있다고 믿기 때문에 초월에 대한 갈망을 만져봅습니다. 이 인용문은 약 70년 전에 철학을 재정의한 루드비히 비트겐슈타인(Ludwig Wittgenstein)의 인용문입니다(그러나 대부분의 사람들은 아직 이 것을 발견하지 못했습니다). 데넷은 40년 동안 철학자였지만 그 중 한 명입니다. 그것은 또한 그와 그의 주요 길항제, 존 Searle, 유명한 비트 겐슈타인에서 공부 (존 오스틴과 시얼, 길버트 라일과 덴넷) 하지만 Searle 다소 포인트를 가지고 덴넷하지 않았다, (그것은 Searle 또는 라일 비트 겐슈타인을 호출하는 것들을 스트레칭하지만). Dennett는 어려운 결정주의자이며 (비록 그는 뒷문에서 현실을 몰래 하려고 하지만), 아마도 이것은 그의 유명한 책 '마음의 개념'(1949)이 계속 재인쇄되는 라일 때문일 것입니다. 그 책은 유령을 추방하는 훌륭한, 일을했지만, 그것은 기계를 떠났다. 데넷은 비트겐슈타인, 라일(그리고 그 이후로 많은 다른 사람들이) 실수를 자세하게 드러내는 것을 즐긴다. 의식, 선택, 자유, 의도, 입자, 사고, 결정, 파도, 원인, 일어난, 사건 (등끝없이) 혼란의 근원은 드물지만, 우리가 정상적인 삶을 떠나 철학에 들어가자마자 (그리고 언어가 진화한 환경과는 모든 토론이 -, 즉, 단어가 의미를 가진 정확한맥락)이 혼돈으로 지배합니다. 대부분의 경우와마찬가지로, Dennett는 일관된 프레임워크가 부족합니다 - Searle은 합리성의 논리적 구조라고 불렀습니다. 나는이 리뷰를 작성하고 내 최근 기사는 철학에 Dennett의 접근 방식에 무엇이 잘못되었는지 자세히 보여 이후이 상당히 확장했다,하나는 스테로이드에 Scientism을 호출 할 수 있습니다. 비트겐슈타인의 또 다른 인용문으로 끝내자- '야망은 생각의 죽음'이다. 현대 의 두 systems보기에서인간의 행동에 대한 포괄적 인 최신 프레임 워크를 원하는 사람들은 내 책을 참조 할 수 있습니다'철학의 논리적 구조, 심리학, 민d와 루드비히 비트겐슈타인과 존 Searle의언어' 2nd ed (2019). 내 글의 더 많은 관심있는 사람들은 '이야기 원숭이를 볼 수 있습니다-철학, 심리학, 과학, 종교와 운명 행성에 정치 - 기사 및 리뷰 2006-2019 3 rd 에드 (2019) 및 21st 세기 4번째 에드 (2019) 및 기타에서 자살 유토피아 망상. 사람들은 철학이 실제로 진보하지 않는다고 거듭 말하며, 우리는 여전히 그리스인과 같은 철학적 문제에 몰두하고 있습니다. 그러나 이 말을 하는 사람들은 왜 그렇게 해야 하는지 이해하지 못합니다. 그것은 우리의 언어가 동일하게 유지되고 같은 질문을 우리에게 유혹 유지하기 때문이다. 'to 먹기'와 ''음료를 마시는 것과 같은 방식으로 작동하는 것처럼 보이는 동사'가 계속 되는 한, 우리가 여전히 형용사를 가지고 있는 한, ''false', ́ ́, '가능' 최대. 그리고 더 구체적으로, 이것은 초월에 대한 갈망을 만지며, 왜냐하면 사람들이 '인간의 이해의 한계'를 볼 수 있다고 생각하는 한, 그들은 물론 이 것들을 넘어서볼 수 있다고 믿기 때문입니다. (shrink)

This is a review of Daniel Dennett and Gregg D. Caruso's Just Deserts: Debating Free Will.

「人々は、哲学は本当に進歩していない、私たちはまだギリシャ人と同じ哲学的問題に占領されていると何度も何度も言います。しかし、これを言う人々は、なぜそうでなければならないのか理解していません。それは、私 たちの言語が変わらず、同じ質問をするように誘惑し続けているからです。食べたり飲んだりするのと同じように機能しているかのように見える動詞が続いている限り、 私たちがまだ形容詞を持っている限り、時間の川、空間の広がりなどについて話し続ける限り、人々は同じ不可解な困難につまずき続け、説明が晴れることができないものを見つめています。さらに、人々が「人間の理解の 限界」を見ることができると考える限り、彼らはもちろんこれらを超えて見ることができないと信じているので、これは超越への憧れを満たしています。 この引用は、約70年前に哲学を再定義したルートヴィヒ・ヴィトゲンシュタインからのものです(しかし、ほとんどの人はまだこれを見つけていません)。デネットは、彼が約40年間哲学者であったが、そのうちの一つ です。また、彼と彼の主要なアンタゴニスト、ジョン・サールの両方が有名なヴィトゲンシュタイニアン(ジョン・オースティンとサール、ギルバート・ライルとデネット)の下で学んだが、サールは多かれ少なかれポイン トを得て、デネットはしなかった(しかし、それはサールやライル・ヴィトゲンシュテニアンと呼ぶものを伸ばしているが)。デネットは難しい決定論者であり(裏口で現実をこっそり見ようとしますが)、おそらくこれは 有名な本「心の概念」(1949年)が転載され続けているライルによるものです。その本は幽霊を追い出すのに大いに役,立ったが、機械を置き去りにした。 デネットは、ヴィトゲンシュタイン、ライル(およびそれ以来)が詳細に暴露したミスを作ることを楽しんでいます。私たちの言葉の意識、選択、自由、意図、粒子、思考、決定、波、原因、起こった出来事(そして無限に )の使用はめったに混乱の原因ではありませんが、,通常の生活を離れて哲学に入るとすぐに(そして言語が進化した環境から切り離された議論、すなわち言葉が意味を持っていた正確な文脈)カオスが支配します。ほとん どの場合と同様に、デネットは一貫した枠組みを欠いており、サールは合理性の論理的構造と呼ばれています。私はこのレビューを書いて以来、私はこれにかなり拡大しており、私の最近の記事は、ステロイドのScien tism (（説明としての科学の不適切な使用）を呼び出すかもしれない哲学へのデネットのアプローチの何が間違っているかを詳細に示しています。ヴィトゲンシュタインからの別の引用で終わらせましょう - '野心は思考の死です。 現代の2つのシス・エムスの見解から人間の行動のための包括的な最新の枠組みを望む人は、私の著書「ルートヴィヒ・ヴィトゲンシュタインとジョン・サールの第2回(2019)における哲学、心理学、ミンと言語の論 理的構造」を参照することができます。私の著作の多くにご興味がある人は、運命の惑星における「話す猿--哲学、心理学、科学、宗教、政治―記事とレビュー2006-2019 第3回(2019)」と21世紀4日(2019年)の自殺ユートピア妄想st Century 4th ed (2019)などを見ることができます。 .

This research will argue about which theory of mind between Searle’s and Dennett’s can better explain human consciousness. Initially, distinctions between dualism and materialism will be discussed ranging from substance dualism, property dualism, physicalism, and functionalism. In this part, the main issue that is tackled in various theories of mind is revealed. It is the missing connection between input stimulus (neuronal reactions) and behavioral disposition: consciousness. Then, the discussion will be more specific on Searle’s biological naturalism and Dennett’s (...) multiple drafts model as the two attempted to answer the issue. The differences between them will be highlighted and will be analyzed according to their relation to their roots: dualism and materialism. The two theories will be examined on how each answer the questions on consciousness. (shrink)

Although Symons' recent book, On Dennett (Wadsworth, 2002), provides scientists with ahelpful, general introduction to Dennett'sthought, it presents a skewed version of the history of the philosophy of mind. In particular, the continental tradition is almost entirely ignored, if not glibly dismissed. As aresult, the unwary reader of this book wouldnever realize that Dilthey, Sartre and Husserl,like Dennett, offer a ``middle ground'' between naturalistic realism and naturalistic eliminativism. However, unlike Dennett, the respective positions of Dilthey, Sartre (...) and Husserl are not ontologically indifferent, but instead, present a non-naturalistic form of realism that does not simultaneously invoke Cartesian dualism. (shrink)

As art produced by autonomous machines becomes increasingly common, and as such machines grow increasingly sophisticated, we risk a confusion between art produced by a person but mediated by a machine, and art produced by what might be legitimately considered a machine artist. This distinction will be examined here. In particular, my argument seeks to close a gap between, on one hand, a philosophically grounded theory of art and, on the other hand, theories concerned with behavior, intentionality, expression, and creativity (...) in natural and artificial agents. This latter set of theories in some cases addresses creative behavior in relation to visual art, music, and literature, in the frequently overlapping contexts of philosophy of mind, artificial intelligence, and cognitive science. However, research in these areas does not typically address problems in the philosophy of art as a central line of inquiry. Similarly, the philosophy of art does not typically address issues pertaining to artificial agents. (shrink)

人们一再说,哲学并没有真正进步,我们仍然被和希腊人一样的哲学问题所占据。但是说这一点的人不明白为什么会这样。因为我们的语言保持不变,并不断引诱我们问同样的问题。只要继续有一个动词,看起来好像它的作用与 吃和喝一样,只要我们仍然有形容词[相同],[真],[false],只要我们继续谈论时间的河流,在广阔的空间,等等,人们会不断绊倒同样的令人费解的困难,发现自己盯着的东西,似乎无法解释,无法清除。更重要 的是,这满足了对超然的渴望,因为只要人们认为他们能看到"人类理解的极限",他们当然相信他们能看到超越这些。 这句话出自路德维希·维特根斯坦,他在大约70年前重新定义了哲学(但大多数人还没有发现这一点)。德内特,虽然他已经作为一个哲学家约40年,是其中之一。也奇怪的是,他和他的主要对手,约翰·西尔,在著名的维 特根斯坦人(西尔与约翰·奥斯汀,德内特与吉尔伯特·莱尔)下学习,但西尔或多或少得到了这一点,而德内特没有,(虽然它正在拉伸的东西打电话给西尔或莱尔·维特根斯坦人)。丹内特是一个强硬的威慑者(尽管他试图 在后门偷偷摸摸现实),也许这是由于莱尔,他的名著 《心灵的概念》(1949年)继续被重印。那本书在驱除鬼魂方面做得非常好,但它离开了机器。 德内特喜欢犯维特根斯坦、莱尔(以及许多其他人)已经详细揭露的错误。我们使用词的意识,选择,自由,意图,粒子,思维,决定,波,因,发生,事件(等等无休止)很少是混乱的来源,但只要我们离开正常生活,进入哲 学(和任何讨论脱离了语言演变的环境——即,单词含义的确切背景)混乱。和大多数人一样,德内特缺乏一个连贯的框架——西尔称之为理性的逻辑结构。我已经大大扩展了这一点,因为我写了这个评论,我最近的文章详细显 示了什么与Dennett的哲学方法是错误的,这可能称为类固醇的山达主义。让我以维特根斯坦的另一句话结束——野心是思想的死亡。 那些希望从现代两个系统的观点来看为人类行为建立一个全面的最新框架的人,可以查阅我的书《路德维希的哲学、心理学、Min d和语言的逻辑结构》维特根斯坦和约翰·西尔的《第二部》(2019年)。那些对我更多的作品感兴趣的人可能会看到《会说话的猴子——一个末日星球上的哲学、心理学、科学、宗教和政治——文章和评论2006-20 19年第3次(2019年)和自杀乌托邦幻想21篇世纪4日(2019年)。.

Purpose – Neuroscientists act as proxies for implied anthropomorphic signal- processing beings within the brain, Homunculi. The latter examine the arriving neuronal spike-trains to infer internal and external states. But a Homunculus needs a brain of its own, to coordinate its capabilities – a brain that necessarily contains a Homunculus and so on indefinitely. Such infinity is impossible – and in well-cited papers, Attneave and later Dennett claim to eliminate it. How do their approaches differ and do they (in (...) fact) obviate the Homunculi? Design/methodology/approach – The Attneave and Dennett approaches are carefully scrutinized. To Attneave, Homunculi are effectively “decision-making” neurons that control behaviors. Attneave presumes that Homunculi, when successively nested, become successively “stupider”, limiting their numbers by diminishing their responsibilities. Dennett likewise postulates neuronal Homunculi that become “stupider” – but brain-wards, where greater sophistication might have been expected. Findings – Attneave’s argument is Reductionist and it simply assumes-away the Homuncular infinity. Dennett’s scheme, which evidently derives from Attneave’s, ultimately involves the same mistakes. Attneave and Dennett fail, because they attempt to reduce intentionality to non-intentionality. Research limitations/implications – Homunculus has been successively recognized over the centuries by philosophers, psychologists and (some) neuroscientists as a crucial conundrum of cognitive science. It still is. Practical implications – Cognitive-science researchers need to recognize that Reductionist explanations of cognition may actually devolve to Homunculi, rather than eliminating them. Originality/value – Two notable Reductionist arguments against the infinity of Homunculi are proven wrong. In their place, a non-Reductionist treatment of the mind, “Emergence”, is discussed as a means of rendering Homunculi irrelevant. (shrink)

La actitud del diseño es una estrategia interpretativa propuesta por Dennett, que consiste en tratar al sistema, cuyo “comportamiento” se quiere predecir, bajo el supuesto de que sus partes cumplen funciones que obedecen a un diseño satisfactorio. Sin embargo, estudios recientes sobre atribución funcional en artefactos técnicos consideran que la actitud del diseño supone una estrategia inadecuada para entender qué hace un artefacto técnico. En particular, dos críticas han ganado visibilidad. Por una parte, Vermaas et al. (2013) señalan una (...) inconsistencia en la propuesta dennettiana de la actitud del diseño: las intenciones del diseñador a veces desempeñan un papel en la interpretación de los artefactos y a veces no lo hacen, sin tener finalmente una intuición clara sobre su rol. Por otra parte, Vaesen y Van Amerongen (2008) sostienen que la actitud del diseño admite dos interpretaciones, una descriptiva y una normativa, y que ambas son implausibles. No obstante, en este trabajo argumentamos que estas críticas son rebatibles y que el problema reside en que ambas acusaciones, i.e. inconsistencia e implausibilidad, suponen una interpretación incorrecta de la posición de Dennett. The design attitude is an interpretive strategy proposed by Dennett, which consists of treating the system, whose “behavior” is to be predicted, under the assumption that its parts fulfill functions that accomplish a satisfactory design. Recent studies on technical artifacts' functional attribution claim that the design attitude is an inadequate strategy to elicit what a technical artifact does. In particular, two criticisms have gained visibility. On the one hand, Vermas et al (2013) remark an inconsistency in Dennett’s design stance. The very designer's intentions sometimes play a role in the interpretation of artifacts and sometimes they don´t, without finally having a clear intuition about their role. On the other hand, Vaesen and Van Amerongen (2008) argue that the design stance admits two interpretations, a descriptive and a normative one and that both are implausible. However, we argue that these criticisms miss the point given that both accusations, i.e. of inconsistency and of implausibility, result from a wrong interpretation of Dennett's position. (shrink)

In this paper I introduce some of the key elements of Daniel Dennett’s theory of intentional attribution and their relation with his notion of rationality. While doing so I will show that Dennett’s approach implies a circularity in the process of attribution of rationality, and that his resource to evolutionary arguments for trying to avoid an infinite regress does not help him to avoid the problem. My presentation will include a revision of Dennett’s arguments for epistemic intentional (...) ascription and rationality attribution as well as some criticisms developed against his proposal. At the end of the article I will extend the criticisms and present my view about his proposal for ideal rationality attribution. (shrink)

«Les gens disent encore et encore que la philosophie ne progresse pas vraiment, que nous sommes toujours occupés avec les mêmes problèmes philosophiques que les Grecs. Mais les gens qui disent cela ne comprennent pas pourquoi il doit en être ainsi. C’est parce que notre langue est restée la même et continue de nous séduire à poser les mêmes questions. Tant qu’il continue à y avoir un verbe qui ressemble à s’il fonctionne de la même manière que de manger et (...) de boire, tant que nous avons encore les adjectifs 'identiques', 'faux', 'false', 'possible', tant que nous continuons à parler d’une rivière du temps, d’une étendue d’espace, etc., etc., les gens continueront à trébucher sur les mêmes difficultés déroutantes et se retrouveront à regarder quelque chose qui ne semble pas capable de se dégager. Et qui plus est, cela satisfait un désir pour le transcendant, parce que, dans la mesure où les gens pensent qu’ils peuvent voir les ‘«limites de la compréhension humaine », ils croient bien sûr ce ils peuvent voir au-delà de ceux-ci. Cette citation est de Ludwig Wittgenstein qui a redéfini la philosophie il ya 70 ans (mais la plupart des gens n’ont pas encore de le savoir). Dennett, bien qu’il ait été un philosophe pendant une quarantaine d’années, est l’un d’entre eux. Il est également curieux que lui et son antagoniste principal, John Searle, étudié sous les célèbres Wittgensteiniens (Searle avec John Austin, Dennett avec Gilbert Ryle) mais Searle plus ou moins obtenu le point et Dennett n’a pas, (bien qu’il est étirer les choses à appeler Searle ou Ryle Wittgensteinians). Dennett est un déterministe difficile (bien qu’il essaie de se faufiler la réalité dans la porte arrière), et peut-être cela est dû à Ryle, dont le célèbre livre "Le concept de l’esprit" (The Concept of Mind) (1949) continue d’être réimprimé. Ce livre a fait un excellent travail d’exorciser le fantôme, mais il a quitté la machine. Dennett aime faire les erreurs Wittgenstein, Ryle (et beaucoup d’autres depuis) ont exposé en détail. Notre utilisation des mots conscience, choix, liberté, intention, particule, pensée, détermine, vague, cause, arrivé, événement (et ainsi de suite sans fin) sont rarement une source de confusion, mais dès que nous quittons la vie normale et entrer dans la philosophie (et toute discussion détachée de l’environnement dans lequel la langue a évolué-c’est-à-dire le contexte exact dans lequel les mots avaient un sens) chaos règne. Comme la plupart, Dennett n’a pas un cadre cohérent - que Searle a appelé la structure logique de la rationalité. J’ai développé sur ce considérablement depuis que j’ai écrit cette revue et mes articles récents montrent en détail ce qui ne va pas avec l’approche de Dennett à la philosophie, que l’on pourrait appeler Scientism sur les stéroïdes. Permettez-moi de terminer par une autre citation de Wittgenstein-- «L’ambition est la mort de la pensée. Ceux qui souhaitent un cadre complet à jour pour le comportement humain de la vue moderne de deux systèmes peuvent consulter mon livre 'The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle' 2nd ed (2019). Ceux qui s’intéressent à plus de mes écrits peuvent voir «Talking Monkeys --Philosophie, Psychologie, Science, Religion et Politique sur une planète condamnée --Articles et revues 2006-2019 3e ed (2019) et Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2020) et autres. (shrink)

"Die Leute sagen immer wieder, dass die Philosophie nicht wirklich vorankommt, dass wir immer noch mit den gleichen philosophischen Problemen beschäftigt sind wie die Griechen. Aber die Leute, die das sagen, verstehen nicht, warum es so sein muss. Weil unsere Sprache gleich geblieben ist und uns immer wieder dazu verführt, dieselben Fragen zu stellen. Solange es weiterhin ein Verb "zu sein" gibt, das so aussieht, als ob es genauso funktioniert wie "essen und trinken" Solange wir noch die Adjektive "identisch", "wahr", (...) "falsch", "möglich" haben, solange wir weiterhin von einem Fluss der Zeit, von einer Weite des Raumes usw. sprechen, werden die Menschen immer wieder über dieselben rätselhaften Schwierigkeiten stolpern und auf etwas starren, was keine Erklärung zu klären scheint. Und darüber hinaus erfüllt dies eine Sehnsucht nach dem Transzendenten, denn insofern die Menschen denken, sie können die "Grenzendes menschlichen Verständnisses" erkennen, glauben sie natürlich,dass sie darüber hinaus sehenkönnen." Dieses Zitat stammt von Ludwig Wittgenstein, der vor etwa 70 Jahren die Philosophie neu definierte (aber die meisten Leute haben das noch nicht herausgefunden). Dennett ist einer von ihnen, obwohl er seit etwa 40 Jahren Philosoph ist. Es ist auch merkwürdig, dass sowohl er als auch sein Hauptgegner, John Searle, unter berühmten Wittgensteinianern studierten (Searle mit John Austin, Dennett mit Gilbert Ryle), aber Searle mehr oder weniger den Punkt bekam und Dennett nicht, (obwohl es die Dinge dehnt, Searle oder Ryle Wittgensteinians zu nennen). Dennett ist ein harter Determinist (obwohl er versucht, die Realität in die Hintertür zu schleichen), und vielleicht liegt das an Ryle, dessen berühmtes Buch "The Concept of Mind" (1949) immer wieder nachgedruckt wird. Dieses Buch hat einen großartigen Job gemacht, den Geist zu exorzisieren,, aber es verließ die Maschine. Dennett macht gerne die Fehler, die Wittgenstein, Ryle (und viele andere seither) im Detail aufgedeckt haben. Unsere Verwendung der Worte Bewusstsein, Wahl, Freiheit, Absicht, Teilchen, Denken, bestimmt, Welle, Ursache, Geschehen, Ereignis (und so weiter endlos) sind selten eine Quelle derVerwirrung, aber sobald wir das normale Leben verlassen und in die Philosophie eintreten (und jede Diskussion losgelöst von der Umgebung, in der sich die Sprache entwickelthat –d.h. der genaue Kontext, in dem die Worte Bedeutung hatten)herrscht Chaos. Wie die meisten, fehlt Dennett ein kohärenter Rahmen - den Searle die logische Struktur der Rationalität genannt hat. Ich habe auf diese erheblich erweitert, da ich diese Rezension geschrieben und meine jüngsten Artikel zeigen im Detail, was falsch mit Dennettansatz zur Philosophie,die man Scientismus auf Steroiden nennen könnte. Lassen Sie mich mit einem weiteren Zitat aus Wittgenstein enden - "Ambition ist der Tod des Denkens". Wer aus der modernen zweisystems-Sichteinen umfassenden, aktuellen Rahmen für menschliches Verhalten wünscht, kann mein Buch "The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mindand Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle' 2nd ed (2019) konsultieren. Diejenigen,die sich für mehr meiner Schriften interessieren, können 'Talking Monkeys--Philosophie, Psychologie, Wissenschaft, Religion und Politik auf einem verdammten Planeten --Artikel und Rezensionen 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) und Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) und andere sehen. (shrink)

Richard Dawkin’s The God Delusion, Daniel Dennett’s Breaking the Spell, Christopher Hitchens’ God is not Great, and Sam Harris’ The End of Faith were published from 2004 to 2007. The new atheism was widely spread by these books. Compared to other atheisms, the particularity of this movement is rooted in its motivations, which are in a sense mostly cultural and political, rather than strictly circumscribed to philosophical issues. The goal of this note is to characterize the new atheism through (...) the arguments given by the four referred books. (shrink)

"La gente dice una y otra vez que la filosofía no progresa realmente, que todavía estamos ocupados con los mismos problemas filosóficos que los griegos. Pero la gente que dice esto no entiende por qué tiene que ser así. Es porque nuestro lenguaje ha permanecido igual y nos sigue seduciendo para que hagan las mismas preguntas. Mientras siga habiendo un verbo "ser" que parezca como si funciona de la misma manera que "comer y beber", siempre y cuando todavía tengamos los (...) adjetivos "idénticos", "verdaderos", "falsos", "posibles", siempre y cuando sigamos hablando de un río de tiempo, , de una extensión de espacio, etc., etc., la gente seguirá tropezando con las mismas dificultades desconcertante y se encontrará mirando a algo que ninguna explicación parece capaz de aclarar. Y lo que es más, esto satisface un anhelo de lo trascendente, porque, en la medida en que la gente cree que puede ver el ‘límites de la comprensión humana ́, creen, por supuesto, que pueden ver más allá de estos. ' ' Esta cita es de Ludwig Wittgenstein que redefinió la filosofía hace unos 70 años (pero la mayoría de la gente todavía tiene que averiguarlo). Dennett, aunque ha sido un filósofo desde hace unos 40 años, es uno de ellos. También es curioso que tanto él como su antagonista principal, John Searle, estudiaron bajo los famosos Wittgensteinianos (Searle con John Austin, Dennett con Gilbert Ryle) pero Searle Más o menos consiguió el punto y Dennett no, (aunque se está estirando cosas para llamar Searle o Ryle Wittgensteinianos). Dennett es un determinista duro (aunque intenta escabullirse de la realidad en la puerta trasera), y tal vez esto se deba a Ryle, cuyo famoso libro ́el concepto de la mente ́ (1949) continúa siendo reimpreso. Ese libro hizo un gran trabajo de exorcizar al fantasma, pero dejó la máquina. A Dennett le gusta cometer los errores que Wittgenstein, Ryle (y muchos otros desde entonces) han expuesto en detalle. Nuestro uso de las palabras consciencia, elección, libertad, intención, partícula, pensamiento, determina, oleada, causa, ocurrió, evento (y así sucesivamente) raramente son una fuente de confusión, pero tan pronto como dejamos la vida normal y entramos en la filosofía (y cualquier discusión separada del entorno en el que el lenguaje evolucionó— es decir, el contexto exacto en el que las palabras tenían sentido) reina el caos. Como la mayoría, Dennett carece de un marco coherente - que Searle ha llamado la estructura lógica de la racionalidad. Me he expandido en este considerablemente desde que escribí esta reseña y mis artículos recientes muestran en detalle lo que está mal con el enfoque de Dennett a la filosofía, que uno podría llamar scientismo en esteroides. Permítanme terminar con otra cita de Wittgenstein--́la ambición es la muerte del pensamiento ́. Aquellos que deseen un marco completo hasta la fecha para el comportamiento humano de la moderna Doe Sistemas Punto de Vista puede consultar mi libro 'La estructura lógica de la filosofía, la psicología, la mente y lenguaje en Ludwig Wittgenstein y John Searle ' 2nd ED (2019). Los interesados en más de mis escritos pueden ver 'Monos parlantes--filosofía, psicología, ciencia, religión y política en un planeta condenado--artículos y reseñas 2006-2019 3rd ED (2019) y delirios utópicos suicidas en el siglo 21 4a Ed (2019) y otras. (shrink)

"La gente ripete più e più volte che la filosofia non progredisce davvero, che siamo ancora occupati con gli stessi problemi filosofici come erano i greci. Ma le persone che dicono questo non capiscono perché deve essere così. È perché il nostro linguaggio è rimasto lo stesso e continua a sedurrci a fare le stesse domande. Finché continua ad essere un verbo - per essere - che sembra come se funziona allo stesso modo come "mangiare e bere", fintanto che abbiamo (...) ancora gli aggettivi , identici , , , , , false , , possibile , fino a quando continuiamo a parlare di un fiume di tempo, di una distesa di spazio, ecc. , ecc, la gente continuerà a inciampare sulle stesse difficoltà sconcertanti e si troverà a fissare qualcosa che nessuna spiegazione sembra in grado di chiarire. E per di più, questo soddisfa il desiderio del trascendente, perché, nella misura in cui la gente pensa di poter vedere i limitidella comprensione umana, credono ovviamente chepossano vedere al di là di questi.` ' Questa citazione è di Ludwig Wittgenstein che ha ridefinito la filosofia circa 70 anni fa (ma la maggior parte delle persone deve ancora scoprirlo). Dennett, anche se è stato un filosofo per circa 40 anni, è uno di loro. È anche curioso che sia lui che il suo primo antagonista, John Searle, abbiano studiato sotto famosi Wittgensteinians (Searle con John Austin, Dennett con Gilbert Ryle) ma Searle ha più o meno ottenuto il punto e Dennett no, (anche se si sta ccmute cose per chiamare Searle o Ryle Wittgensteinians). Dennett è un duro determinista (anche se cerca di intrufolarsi nella porta sul retro), e forse questo è dovuto a Ryle, il cui famoso libro - Il concetto di mente (1949) continua ad essere ristampato. Quel libro ha fatto un ottimo lavoro di esorciscazione del fantasma,, ma ha lasciato la macchina. Dennett si diverte a commettere gli errori che Wittgenstein, Ryle (e molti altri da allora) hanno esposto in dettaglio. Il nostro uso delle parole coscienza, scelta, libertà, intenzione, particella, pensiero, determina, onda, causa, accaduto, evento (e così via all'infinito) sono raramente fonte diconfusione, ma non appena lasciamo la vita normale ed entriamo nella filosofia (e qualsiasi discussione staccata dall'ambiente in cui il linguaggio si è evoluto,cioè, regna il contesto esatto in cui le parole avevano significatoilcaos). Come la maggior parte, Dennett manca di un quadro coerente - che Searle ha chiamato la struttura logica della razionalità. Ho ampliato su questo considerevolmente da quando ho scritto questa recensione e i miei articoli recenti mostrano in dettaglio cosa c'è di sbagliato con l'approccio di Dennett alla filosofia, che si potrebbe chiamare Scientismo sugli steroidi. Permettetemi di concludere con un'altra citazione di Wittgenstein-- l'ambizione è la morte del pensiero. Coloro che desiderano un quadro aggiornato completo per il comportamento umano dalla moderna vista a due systems possono consultare il mio libro 'La struttura logica dellafilosofia, psicologia, Mind e il linguaggio in Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle' 2nd ed (2019). Coloro che sono interessati a più dei miei scritti possono vedere 'Talking Monkeys--Filosofia, Psicologia, Scienza, Religione e Politica su un Pianeta Condannato--Articoli e Recensioni 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) e Suicidal Utopian Delusions nel 21st Century 4th ed (2019). (shrink)

' ' As pessoas dizem repetidas vezes que a filosofia não progride realmente, que ainda estamos ocupados com os mesmos problemas filosóficos que os gregos. Mas as pessoas que dizem isso não entendem por que tem que ser assim. É porque a nossa língua permaneceu a mesma e continua a seduzir-nos a fazer as mesmas perguntas. Contanto que continue a ser um verbo ́para ser ́ que pareça como se ele funciona da mesma forma como ́para comer e beber ́, (...) contanto que ainda tenhamos os adjetivos ́idênticos ́, ́verdadeiro ́, ́falso ́, ́possível ́, contanto que continuemos a falar de um rio de tempo , de uma extensão do espaço, etc., etc., os povos manter-se-ão tropeçando sobre as mesmas dificuldades intrigantes e encontram-se olhar fixamente em algo que nenhuma explanação parece capaz de esclarecer. E o que é mais, isso satisfaz um anseio pelo transcendente, porque, na medida em que as pessoas pensam que podem ver os "limites da compreensão humana", eles acreditam, naturalmente, que eles podem ver além destes. ' ' Esta citação é de Ludwig Wittgenstein que redefiniu a filosofia de cerca de 70 anos atrás (mas a maioria das pessoas ainda têm de descobrir isso). Dennett, embora ele tenha sido um filósofo por cerca de 40 anos, é um deles. Também é curioso que tanto ele e seu antagonista principal, John Searle, estudou famoso Wittgensteinians (Searle com John Austin, Dennett com Gilbert Ryle), mas Searle mais ou menos tem o ponto e Dennett não fez, (embora ele está esticando as coisas para chamar Searle ou Ryle Wittgensteinians). Dennett é um determinista difícil (embora ele tenta esgueirar a realidade na porta dos fundos), e talvez isso seja devido a Ryle, cujo famoso livro ́O conceito de mente ́ (1949) continua a ser reimpresso. Esse livro fez um grande trabalho de exorcizando o fantasma, mas deixou a máquina. Dennett gosta de fazer os erros Wittgenstein, Ryle (e muitos outros desde) ter exposto em detalhes. Nosso uso das palavras consciência, escolha, liberdade, intenção, partícula, pensamento, determina, onda, causa, aconteceu, evento (e assim por diante infinitamente) raramente são uma fonte de confusão, Mas assim que deixamos a vida normal e entrar filosofia (e qualquer discussão separada do ambiente em que a linguagem evoluiu— ou seja, o contexto exato em que as palavras tinham significado) reina o caos. Como a maioria, Dennett carece de um quadro coerente-que Searle chamou a estrutura lógica da racionalidade. Eu expandi neste consideravelmente desde que eu escrevi esta revisão e meus artigos recentes mostram em detalhe o que está errado com a aproximação de Dennett à filosofia, que uma pôde chamar o scientism em esteróides. Deixe-me terminar com outra citação de Wittgenstein--́ambição é a morte do pensamento ́. Aqueles que desejam um quadro até à data detalhado para o comportamento humano da opinião moderna dos dois sistemas consultar meu livros Falando Macacos 3ª Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica da Filosofia, Psicologia, Mente e Linguagem em Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle 2a Ed (2019), Suicídio Pela Democracia,4aEd(2019), Entendendo as Conexões entre Ciência, Filosofia, Psicologia, Religião, Política e Economia Artigos e Análises 2006-2019 (2019), Ilusões Utópicas Suicidas no 21St século 5a Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica do Comportamento Humano (2019), e A Estrutura Lógica da Consciência (2019) y outras. (shrink)

Self-consciousness relates to important themes, such as sentience and personhood, and is often the cornerstone of moral theories (Warren, 1997). However, not much attention is given to future moral creatures of the earth: robots. This may be due to the unsettled status of their experience, which is why I have chosen to find the necessary features of self-consciousness in them. Philosophy of mind is also my interest which I have developed since I rejected the idea of souls and could not (...) account for my own phenomenal experiences. Among the current answers to the hard problem of consciousness (Chalmers, 1995) one stood out to me – Daniel Dennett’s multiple drafts model of consciousness presented in “Consciousness Explained” (Dennett, 1991) and his other works. Daniel Dennett is a self-described illusionist (Dennett, 2016) and a functionalist. His position is synonymous to holding self-conscious experiences, such as deliberating over one’s pain or reflecting over one’s actions insufficient to postulate existence of a metaphysical self. He believes instead that experiences are functional realizations which do not require any self, and the feeling of being conscious or self-conscious is actually a ”user-illusion” (Dennett, 1991), a term describing the unjustified belief of being in control of one’s actions. In his views, a selfhood as it is popularly conceived is contradictory. Therefore, he rejects realism about mental events, a position also called naïve realism (Siegel, 2011), on the basis that it is unverifiable and there are insufficient grounds to accept mental events (Dennett, 1988). He adopts a similar scepticism towards other theories of minds, hence nearing eliminative materialism in self-consciousness and related theme of pain (Dennett, 1978). His multiple drafts model of consciousness seeks to ground our beliefs about self-consciousness in the specific architecture of mind, which is particular to every species and kind of being. As such it is a particularly flexible theory that examines experiences of non-humans without falling into binary thinking – believing that a being has as rich inner life as humans do or none. This is why it is a great starting point for establishing necessary conditions for consciousness in robots. In this essay, I will often use words computer, programme, robot interchangeably for the purpose of clarity and take as the working definition “autonomous machines capable of sensing their environment, making decision and performing tasks similar to human actions”. I chose to explore self-consciousness instead of committing to the issue of consciousness, because consciousness can be defined in a weak sense, in which even a thermostat is “conscious” of the temperature, and consciousness in a strong sense, which invokes the internalism and externalism debate that is less connected to the nature of experiences than self-consciousness. My exploration pertains first and foremost to the philosophy of mind, of which I will examine the most relevant positions and decide to commit to functionalism (Block, 1980). Then I will advocate for explaining away of some of phenomena of self-consciousness and believing self-consciousness to be a sort of illusion. From there I will conclude that robots could fall for the same illusion of self-consciousness and therefore become self-conscious. I will argue, that self-consciousness can be established using a modified Turing Test, which would determine if a robot believed in a meaningful narrative about itself (Ricoeur, 1991) and hence be self-conscious. This will lead to answering the question of this essay: what are the features necessary for a self-conscious robot in the light of “Consciousness Explained” by Daniel Dennett? (shrink)

A note summarizing a workshop dedicated to the discussion of Dennett's book Darwin's Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life (1995). It includes a reflection on the basic tenets of Darwin's theory of evolution and natural selection.

"Люди говорят снова и снова, что философия на самом деле не прогресс, что мы по-прежнему заняты теми же философскими проблемами, что и греки. Но люди, которые говорят это, не понимают, почему это должно быть так. Это потому, что наш язык остался прежним и продолжает соблазнять нас задавать те же вопросы. До тех пор, пока по-прежнему существует глагол, который выглядит так, как будто он функционирует так же, как «есть и пить», до тех пор, пока у нас есть прилагательные «идентично», «правда» ( (...) « » » » » » » » » » возможно, до тех пор, как мы продолжаем говорить о реке времени, просторы пространства и т.д., и т.д., люди будут держать спотыкаясь над темже загадочные трудности и найти себя глядя на то, что никакое объяснение, кажется, способны очистки. И более того, это удовлетворяет стремление к трансцендентной, потому что, поскольку люди думают, что они могут видеть ‘"пределы человеческого понимания", они считают, конечно, тони могут видеть за этим. Эта цитата из Людвиг Витгенштейн, который пересмотрел философию около 70 лет назад (но большинство людей до сих пор не выяснить это). Деннетт, хотя он был философом в течение 40 лет, является одним из них. Любопытно также, что и он, и его главный антагонист Джон Сирл учились у знаменитых Витгенштейнов (Сирл с Джоном Остином, Деннет с Гилбертом Райлом), но Сирл более или менее получил точку, а Деннет т , (хотя это растяжение вещей, чтобы назвать Сирл или Райл Витгенштейнов). Деннетт является жесткий детерминант (хотя он пытается проникнуть реальность в задней двери), и, возможно, это связано с Райл, чья знаменитая книга "Концепция разума" (1949) продолжает быть перепечатаны. Эта книга проделала большую работу по изгнанию призрака, но он покинул машину. Деннетт любит делать ошибки Витгенштейна, Райл (и многие другие с тех пор) разоблачили в деталях. Наше использование слов сознание, выбор, свобода, намерение, частицы, мышление, определяет, волна, причина, произошло, событие (и так далее бесконечно) редко источником путаницы, но как только мы оставляем нормальную жизнь и введите философию (и любое обсуждение отделены от среды, в которой язык развивался-т.е., точный контекст, в котором слова имели смысл)хаос царит. Как и большинству,, Деннетне не хватает когерентной структуры - которую Сирл назвал логической структурой рациональности. Я расширил на этом значительно, так как я написал этот обзор, и мои последние статьи показывают подробно, что случилось с подходом Деннетк к философии, который можно было бы назвать Scientism на стероидах. Позвольте мне закончить с другой цитатой из Витгенштейна - "Амбиции является смерть мысли. Те, кто желает всеобъемлющего до современных рамок для человеческого поведения из современных двух systEms зрения могут проконсультироваться с моей книгой"Логическая структура философии, психологии, Минd иязык в Людвиг Витгенштейн и Джон Сирл" второй ред (2019). Те, кто заинтересован в более моих сочинений могут увидеть "Говоря обезьян - Философия, психология, наука, религия и политика на обреченной планете - Статьи и обзоры 2006-2019 3-й ed (2019) и suicidal утопических заблуждений в 21-мst веке 4-й ed (2019) th и другие. (shrink)

This paper deals with Daniel Dennett’s well-known charges against phenomenological philosophy as an endevour to restore the rights of introspection: that is, the attempt, albeit doomed to failure, to contribute to the science of the mind from a purported incorrigible, ineffable and ‘subjective’ (interpreted as ‘private’) first-person perspective. According to Dennett’s heterophenomenology, only a strict third-person method is possible when it comes to the scientific study of the mind. I will dispute Dennett’s method in order to do (...) both: correct Dennett’s caricaturization of phenomenological philosophy as naïve introspection and offer not only a clarification of phenomenology’s true aims and scope, but also a case in which phenomenology will stand as a crucial option in the new studies of the mind, under the sigh of fresh air that can be found in the new approaches to cognitive science (the so-called 4EA approaches: embodied, embedded, extended, enacted, affective). By way of introducing the concept of ‘phenomenological skillful-coping,’ an affirmative respond to Dennett’s own question shall be given: “Is there anything about experience that is not explorable by heterophenomenology? I’d like to know what.” The answer to Dennett should be firm: Yes there is! No less than the most basic non-theoretical, non-representational, embodied and embedded, human experience or coping. (shrink)

``People say again and again that philosophy doesn´t really progress, that we are still occupied with the same philosophical problems as were the Greeks. But the people who say this don´t understand why is has to be so. It is because our language has remained the same and keeps seducing us into asking the same questions. As long as there continues to be a verb´to be´that looks as if it functions in the same way as´to eatánd´to drink´, as long as (...) we still have the adjectives´identical´,´true´,´false´,´possible´, as long as we continue to talk of a river of time, of an expanse of space, etc., etc., people will keep stumbling over the same puzzling difficulties and find themselves staring at something which no explanation seems capable of clearing up. And what´s more, this satisfies a longing for the transcendent, because, insofar as people think they can seèthe limits of human understanding´, they believe of course that they can see beyond these.`` ´ This quote is from Ludwig Wittgenstein who redefined philosophy some 70 years ago (but most people have yet to find this out). Dennett, though he has been a philosopher for some 40 years, is one them. It is also curious that both he and his prime antagonist, John Searle, studied under famous Wittgensteinians (Searle with John Austin, Dennett with Gilbert Ryle) but Searle got the point and Dennett did not. Dennett is a hard determinist (though he trys to sneak reality in the back door), and perhaps this is due to Ryle, whose famous book´The Concept of Mind´(1949) continues to be reprinted. That book did a great job of exorcising the ghost but it left the machine. Dennett enjoys making the mistakes Wittgenstein, Ryle (and many others since) have exposed in detail. Our use of the words consciousness, choice, freedom, intention, particle, thinking, determines, wave, cause, happened, event(and so on endlessly) are rarely a source of confusion but as soon as we leave normal life and enter philosophy(and any discussion detached from the environment in which language evolved) chaos reigns. Like most Dennet lacks a coherent framework-which Searle has called the logical structure of rationality. I have expanded on this considerably since I wrote this review and my recent articles show in detail what is wrong with Dennet's approach to philosophy. Let me end with another quote from Wittgenstein--´Ambition is the death of thought´. -/- Those wishing a comprehensive up to date account of Wittgenstein, Searle and their analysis of behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my article The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in Wittgenstein and Searle (2016). Those interested in all my writings in their most recent versions may download from this site my e-book ‘Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization Michael Starks (2016)- Articles and Reviews 2006-2016’ by Michael Starks First Ed. 662p (2016). -/- All of my papers and books have now been published in revised versions both in ebooks and in printed books. -/- Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet - Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 (2017) https://www.amazon.com/dp/B071HVC7YP. -/- The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle--Articles and Reviews 2006-2016 (2017) https://www.amazon.com/dp/B071P1RP1B. -/- Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st century: Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization - Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 (2017) https://www.amazon.com/dp/B0711R5LGX . (shrink)

``People say again and again that philosophy doesn´t really progress, that we are still occupied with the same philosophical problems as were the Greeks. But the people who say this don´t understand why it has to be so. It is because our language has remained the same and keeps seducing us into asking the same questions. As long as there continues to be a verb ´to be´ that looks as if it functions in the same way as ´to eat and (...) to drink´, as long as we still have the adjectives ´identical´, ´true´, ´false´, ´possible´, as long as we continue to talk of a river of time, of an expanse of space, etc., etc., people will keep stumbling over the same puzzling difficulties and find themselves staring at something which no explanation seems capable of clearing up. And what´s more, this satisfies a longing for the transcendent, because, insofar as people think they can see the ‘limits of human understanding´, they believe of course that they can see beyond these.`` -/- This quote is from Ludwig Wittgenstein who redefined philosophy some 70 years ago (but most people have yet to find this out). Dennett, though he has been a philosopher for some 40 years, is one of them. It is also curious that both he and his prime antagonist, John Searle, studied under famous Wittgensteinians (Searle with John Austin, Dennett with Gilbert Ryle) but Searle more or less got the point and Dennett did not, (though it is stretching things to call Searle or Ryle Wittgensteinians). Dennett is a hard determinist (though he tries to sneak reality in the back door), and perhaps this is due to Ryle, whose famous book ´The Concept of Mind´(1949) continues to be reprinted. That book did a great job of exorcising the ghost, but it left the machine. -/- Dennett enjoys making the mistakes Wittgenstein, Ryle (and many others since) have exposed in detail. Our use of the words consciousness, choice, freedom, intention, particle, thinking, determines, wave, cause, happened, event (and so on endlessly) are rarely a source of confusion, but as soon as we leave normal life and enter philosophy (and any discussion detached from the environment in which language evolved—i.e., the exact context in which the words had meaning) chaos reigns. Like most, Dennett lacks a coherent framework - which Searle has called the logical structure of rationality. I have expanded on this considerably since I wrote this review and my recent articles show in detail what is wrong with Dennett's approach to philosophy, which one might call Scientism on steroids. Let me end with another quote from Wittgenstein--´Ambition is the death of thought´. -/- Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) . (shrink)

Una bolsa mixta dominada por las tonterías reduccionistas de H & D. Este es un seguimiento del famoso Hofstadter (o infame como diría ahora, teniendo en cuenta sus incesantes tonterías) Godel, Escher, Bach (1980). Al igual que su predecesor, se ocupa en gran medida de los fundamentos de la inteligencia artificial, pero se compone principalmente de historias, ensayos y extractos de una amplia gama de personas, con algunos ensayos de DH y DD y comentarios a todas las contribuciones de uno (...) u otro de ellos. Para mis puntos de vista sobre los intentos de D y H para entender el comportamiento ver mi revisión de Hofstadter 'Soy un bucle extraño' y otros escritos. Gran parte de ella es muy reduccionista en tono (es decir, " explica "todo en términos de física / matemáticas y niega " realidad " de la psicología) pero como Hofstadter señala, las ecuaciones de campo cuántico de una molécula de agua son demasiado complejas de resolver (y también es un vacío) y nadie tiene una pista sobre cómo explicar la forma en que surgen las propiedades (por ejemplo, las propiedades del agua de H2 y 02) a medida que sube la escala del vacío al cerebro, por lo que el reduccionismo, como el holismo, requiere una gran cantidad de fe y de hecho es incoherente ya que ni siquiera se puede enmarcar sus argumentos t presuponiendo la coherencia del pensamiento de orden superior. Otros problemas para el reduccionismo son el principio de incertidumbre, el caos (por ejemplo, no hay manera de predecir cómo caerá una pila de arena), la incompleta lógicamente necesaria de las matemáticas (y todo el pensamiento) y la imposibilidad de igualar comportamientos de orden superior (por ejemplo, lenguaje) con fenómenos de orden inferior (por ejemplo, bioquímica), es decir, la explosión combinatoria o subdeterminación. En resumen, aunque hay muchos comentarios interesantes, como casi toda la escritura sobre el comportamiento, este trabajo carece de un relato coherente de la estructura lógica de la racionalidad, que trato de dar en mis escritos. Aquellos que deseen un marco completo hasta la fecha para el comportamiento humano de la moderna dos sistemas punto de vista puede consultar mi libros Talking Monkeys 3ª ed (2019), Estructura Logica de Filosofia, Psicología, Mente y Lenguaje en Ludwig Wittgenstein y John Searle 2a ed (2019), Suicidio pela Democracia 4ª ed (2019), La Estructura Logica del Comportamiento Humano (2019), The Logical Structure de la Conciencia (2019, Comprender las Conexiones entre Ciencia, Filosofía, Psicología, Religión, Política y Economía, Historia y Literatura (2020), Delirios Utópicos Suicidas en el Siglo 21 5ª ed (2019), y Observaciones sobre Imposibilidad, Incompletitud, Paraconsistencia, Indecidibilidad, Aleatoriedad, Computabilidad, Paradoja e Incertidumbre en Chaitin, Wittgenstein, Hofstadter, Wolpert, Doria, da Costa, Godel, Searle, Rodych Berto, Floyd, Moyal-Sharrock y Yanofsky (2019) y otras. (shrink)

A mixed bag dominated by H & D's reductionist nonsense. This is a follow-up to Hofstadter´s famous (or infamous as I would now say, considering its unrelenting nonsense) Godel, Escher, Bach (1980). Like its predecessor, it is concerned largely with the foundations of artificial intelligence, but it is composed mostly of stories, essays and extracts from a wide range of people, with a few essays by DH and DD and comments to all of the contributions by one or the other (...) of them. For my views on the attempts of D and H to understand behavior see my review of Hofstadter's ‘I am a Strange Loop’ and other writings. -/- Much of it is very reductionistic in tone (i.e., " explains " everything in terms of physics/math and denies " reality " of psychology) but as Hofstadter notes, the quantum field equations of a water molecule are too complex to solve (and so is a vacuum)and nobody has a clue about how to explain the way properties emerge (e.g., water properties from H2 and 02) as you go up the scale from the vacuum to the brain, so reductionism, like holism, requires a great deal of faith and in fact is incoherent as one cannot even frame it's arguments without presupposing the coherence of higher order thought. Additional problems for reductionism are the uncertainty principle, chaos (e.g., no way to predict how a pile of sand will fall), the logically necessary incompleteness of math (and all thought) and the impossibility of matching higher order behaviors (e.g., language) with lower order phenomena (e.g., biochemistry), i.e., the combinatorial explosion or underdetermination. In sum, though there are many interesting comments, like nearly all writing on behavior, this work lacks any coherent account of the logical structure of rationality, which I try to give in my writings. -/- Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) . (shrink)

Um saco misto dominado pelo absurdo reducionista da H & D. Esta é uma continuação do famoso (ou infame como eu diria agora, considerando seu absurdo implacável) Godel, Escher, Bach (1980). Assim como seu antecessor, preocupa-se em grande parte com os fundamentos da inteligência artificial, mas é composto principalmente por histórias, ensaios e extratos de uma ampla gama de pessoas, com alguns ensaios de DH e DD e comentários para todas as contribuições de um ou outro deles. Para minhas opiniões (...) sobre as tentativas de D e H para entender o comportamento, consulte minha revisão de "Eu sou um Ciclo Estranho" de Hofstadter e outros escritos. Muito disso é muito reducionista no tom (ou seja, " explica " tudo em termos de física/matemática e nega " realidade " da psicologia), mas como Hofstadter observa, as equações de campo quântico de uma molécula de água são muito complexas para resolver (e assim é um vácuo)e ninguém tem uma pista sobre como explicar a forma como as propriedades emergem (por exemplo, propriedades de água de H2 e 02) à medida que você sobe a escala do vácuo para o cérebro, então o reducionismo, como o holismo, requer muita fé e, de fato, é incoerente, pois não se pode sequer enquadrar seus argumentos sem pressupor da coerência do pensamento de ordem superior. Problemas adicionais para o reducionismo são o princípio da incerteza, o caos (por exemplo, não há como prever como uma pilha de areia cairá), a incompletude logicamente necessária da matemática (e todo o pensamento) e a impossibilidade de combinar comportamentos de ordem superior (por exemplo, linguagem) com fenômenos de ordem inferior (por exemplo, bioquímica), ou seja, a explosão combinatória ou subdeterminação. Em suma, embora existam muitos comentários interessantes, como quase todos escrever sobre comportamento, este trabalho não tem qualquer relato coerente da estrutura lógica da racionalidade, que eu tento dar em meus escritos. Aqueles que desejam um quadro até à data detalhado para o comportamento humano da opinião moderna dos dois sistemas consultar meu livros Falando Macacos 3ª Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica da Filosofia, Psicologia, Mente e Linguagem em Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle 2a Ed (2019), Suicídio Pela Democracia,4aEd(2019), Entendendo as Conexões entre Ciência, Filosofia, Psicologia, Religião, Política e Economia Artigos e Análises 2006-2019 (2020), Ilusões Utópicas Suicidas no Século 21 6a Ed (2020), A Estrutura Lógica do Comportamento Humano (2019), e A Estrutura Lógica da Consciência (2019) y outras. (shrink)

From Bacteria To Bach and Back is an ambitious book that attempts to integrate a theory about the evolution of the human mind with another theory about the evolution of human culture. It is advertised as a defense of memes, but conceptualizes memes more liberally than has been done before. It is also advertised as a defense of the proposal that natural selection operates on culture, but conceptualizes natural selection as a process in which nearly all interesting parameters are free (...) to vary. This liberal conception of key concepts creates space for philosophical innovation, but occasionally makes the empirical content of the theory difficult to pin down. Nevertheless, the book is full of scientific insight, wit, and humor. It will undoubtedly become a cause of both controversy and inspiration for those interested in naturalistic theories of human culture. (shrink)

' ' Orang mengatakan lagi dan lagi bahwa filosofi tidak benar-benar maju, bahwa kita masih sibuk dengan masalah filosofis yang sama seperti orang Yunani. Tapi orang yang mengatakan ini tidak mengerti mengapa hal itu harus begitu. Hal ini karena bahasa kita tetap sama dan terus merayu kita untuk mengajukan pertanyaan yang sama. Selama masih ada kata kerja ' ' yang terlihat seolah-olah berfungsi dengan cara yang sama seperti untuk makan dan minum ', selama kita tetap memiliki kata sifat yang sama (...) ', ' benar ', ' palsu ', selama kita terus berbicara tentang Sungai waktu, dari keluasan ruang, dll, dll, orang akan terus tersandung kesulitan membingungkan yang sama dan menemukan diri mereka menatap sesuatu yang tidak ada penjelasan yang tampaknya mampu membersihkan. Dan apa lagi, ini memuaskan kerinduan untuk transenden, karena, sejauh orang berpikir bahwa mereka dapat melihat 'batas pemahaman manusia, mereka percaya tentu saja That mereka dapat melihat di luar ini. '' -/- Kutipan ini dari Ludwig Wittgenstein yang didefinisikan ulang filsafat beberapa 70 tahun yang lalu (tapi kebanyakan orang belum menemukan ini). Dennett, meskipun ia telah menjadi seorang filsuf untuk beberapa 40 tahun, adalah salah satu dari mereka. Hal ini juga ingin tahu bahwa baik dia dan antagonis utamanya, John Searle, belajar di bawah Wittgensteinians terkenal (Searle dengan John Austin, Dennett dengan Gilbert Ryle) tapi Searle lebih atau kurang mendapat titik dan Dennett tidak, (meskipun hal ini peregangan untuk memanggil Searle atau Ryle Wittgensteinians). Dennett adalah penentu yang keras (meskipun ia mencoba menyelinap realitas di pintu belakang), dan mungkin ini karena Ryle, yang bukunya yang terkenal ́The Concept of Mind ́ (1949) terus dicetak ulang. Buku itu melakukan pekerjaan yang besar mengusir hantu, tapi itu meninggalkan mesin. -/- Dennett menikmati membuat kesalahan Wittgenstein, Ryle (dan banyak lainnya sejak) telah terkena secara rinci. Kami menggunakan kata kesadaran, pilihan, kebebasan, niat, partikel, berpikir, menentukan, gelombang, sebab, terjadi, peristiwa (dan seterusnya tanpa henti) jarang menjadi sumber kebingungan, tetapi segera setelah kita meninggalkan kehidupan normal dan memasuki filsafat (dan setiap diskusi terlepas dari lingkungan di mana bahasa berevolusi— yaitu, konteks yang tepat di mana kata yang berarti) kekacauan memerintah. Seperti kebanyakan, Dennett tidak memiliki kerangka yang koheren-yang Searle telah disebut struktur Logis rasionalitas. Saya telah memperluas ini cukup sejak saya menulis review ini dan artikel saya baru-baru ini menunjukkan secara rinci apa yang salah dengan pendekatan Dennett filsafat, yang satu mungkin menyebut saintisme on steroid. Mari saya Akhiri dengan kutipan lain dari Wittgenstein--' ambisi adalah kematian pemikiran ́. -/- Mereka yang ingin komprehensif up to date kerangka perilaku manusia dari dua systEMS tampilan modern dapat berkonsultasi buku saya 'struktur Logis filsafat, psikologi, mind dan bahasa dalam Ludwig wittgenstein dan John Searle ' 2nd Ed (2019). Mereka yang tertarik pada tulisan saya lebih mungkin melihat 'berbicara monyet--filsafat, psikologi, ilmu pengetahuan, agama dan politik di planet yang ditakdirkan--artikel dan review 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) dan bunuh diri utopian delusi di 21st Century 4th Ed (2019). (shrink)

In the writings of Daniel Dennett and Donald Davidson we find something like the following bold conjecture: it is an a priori truth that there is no gap between our best judgements of a subject's beliefs and desires and the truth about the subject's beliefs and desires. Under ideal conditions a subject's belief-box and desire-box become transparent.

Four philosophers, Husserl, Wittgenstein, Dennett, and Hegel, who hold for the most part radically different philosophies, all agree on rejecting the notion of atomic entities, of “things-in-themselves,” and insist that objects only make sense – can only be what they are -- in a context.