- Reflexive A priori.Vanessa Isabel Morlock - unknowndetails
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Knowledge of Validity.Sinan Dogramaci - 2010 - Noûs 44 (3):403-432.details
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What Intuitions Are Like.Elijah Chudnoff - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3):625-654.details
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Against Phenomenal Conservatism.Nathan Hanna - 2011 - Acta Analytica 26 (3):213-221.details
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(1 other version)Bursting Bealer’s Bubble: How the Starting Points Argument Begs the Question of Foundationalism Against Quine.Michael J. Shaffer & Jason A. Warnick - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (1):87-106.details
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Bealer and the autonomy of philosophy.Alexander Sarch - 2010 - Synthese 172 (3):451 - 474.details
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Taking type-b materialism seriously.Janet Levin - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (4):402-425.details
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(2 other versions)Normativity and epistemic intuitions.Jonathan M. Weinberg, Shaun Nichols & Stephen Stich - 2001 - Philosophical Topics, 29 (1-2):429-460.details
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The rise of empiricism: William James, Thomas hill green, and the struggle over psychology.Alexander Klein - 2007 - Dissertation, Indiana University, Bloomingtondetails
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Compassionate phenomenal conservatism.Michael Huemer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):30–55.details
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Thought-experiment intuitions and truth in fiction.Jonathan Ichikawa & Benjamin Jarvis - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (2):221 - 246.details
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Does Vagueness Exclude Knowledge?David Barnett - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (1):22 - 45.details
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How to challenge intuitions empirically without risking skepticism.Jonathan M. Weinberg - 2007 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):318–343.details
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Object persistence in philosophy and psychology.Brian J. Scholl - 2007 - Mind and Language 22 (5):563–591.details
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The past and future of experimental philosophy.Thomas Nadelhoffer & Eddy Nahmias - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):123 – 149.details
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Reddish Green: A Challenge for Modal Claims about Phenomenal Structure.Juan Suarez & Martine Nida-rümelin - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (2):346 - 391.details
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The origins of modal error.George Bealer - 2004 - Dialectica 58 (1):11-42.details
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Seemings and Moore’s Paradox.R. M. Farley - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-22.details
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Pricean reflection.John Bengson, Terence Cuneo & Russ Shafer-Landau - 2022 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 31 (4):744-761.details
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Anselm, Intuition and God’s Existence.Felipe G. A. Moreira - 2021 - Philosophia 50 (2):619-637.details
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Justification by acquaintance.John M. DePoe - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7555-7573.details
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Basic knowledge and the normativity of knowledge: The awareness‐first solution.Paul Silva - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (3):564-586.details
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Two morals about a modal paradox.Alexander Roberts - 2020 - Synthese 198 (10):9873-9896.details
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Intuitions Might Not Be Sui Generis: Some Criticisms of George Bealer.Marcus Hunt - 2020 - Florida Philosophical Review 19 (1):49-66.details
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El problema de la justificación del conocimiento básico.María Dolores García-Arnaldos - 2019 - Anales Del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía 36 (1):243-259.details
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Conhecimento A Priori.Célia Teixeira - 2013 - In João Branquinho & Ricardo Santos (eds.), Compêndio em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica. Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa. pp. 1-33.details
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(1 other version)Seemings as sui generis.Blake McAllister - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):3079-3096.details
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(1 other version)Pragmatic a Priori Knowledge: A Pragmatic Approach to the Nature and Object of What Can Be Known Independently of Experience.Lauri Järvilehto - 2011 - Jyväskylä University Printing House.details
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The Reality of Field’s Epistemological Challenge to Platonism.David Liggins - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (5):1027-1031.details
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Intuition Talk is Not Methodologically Cheap: Empirically Testing the “Received Wisdom” About Armchair Philosophy.Zoe Ashton & Moti Mizrahi - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (3):595-612.details
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Intuitions, Meaning, and Normativity: Why Intuition Theory Supports a Non‐Descriptivist Metaethic.Matthew S. Bedke - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (1):144-177.details
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Interpreting Intuitions.Marcus McGahhey & Neil Van Leeuwen - 2018 - In Julie Kirsch Patrizia Pedrini (ed.), Third-Person Self-Knowledge, Self-Interpretation, and Narrative. Cham: Springer Verlag. pp. 73-98.details
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Intuitions.James Andow - 2016 - Analysis 76 (2):232-246.details
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The nature of intuitions and their role in material object metaphysics.Andrew Higgins - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Illinoisdetails
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A dilemma for internalism?Thomas M. Crisp - 2010 - Synthese 174 (3):355-366.details
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The Role of Consciousness in Grasping and Understanding.David Bourget - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (2):285-318.details
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An Inferentialist Conception of the A Priori.Ralph Wedgwood - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5:295–314.details
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Doomed to fail: the sad epistemological fate.John Turri - 2012 - In Miroslaw Szatkowski (ed.), Ontological Proofs Today. Ontos Verlag. pp. 413-422.details
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Moral intuitionism and disagreement.Brian Besong - 2014 - Synthese 191 (12):2767-2789.details
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The Significance of Cognitive Phenomenology.Declan Smithies - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (8):731-743.details
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Intuitions for inferences.Sinan Dogramaci - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):371-399.details
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Against Hanna on Phenomenal Conservatism.Kevin McCain - 2012 - Acta Analytica 27 (1):45-54.details
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Intuition, Belief and Rational Criticisability.Ole Koksvik - manuscriptdetails
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Experimental philosophy and the theory of reference.Max Deutsch - 2009 - Mind and Language 24 (4):445-466.details
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Contingent A Priori Knowledge.John Turri - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):327-344.details
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(2 other versions)Variations in ethical intuitions.Jennifer L. Zamzow & Shaun Nichols - 2009 - Philosophical Issues 19 (1):368-388.details
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Self‐Knowledge, Rationality and Moore's Paradox.Jordi Fernández - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):533-556.details
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A priori knowledge: Debates and developments.C. S. Jenkins - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (3):436–450.details
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Concepts, experience and modal knowledge1.C. S. Jenkins - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):255-279.details
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Bealer on the autonomy of philosophical and scientific knowledge.Michael J. Shaffer - 2007 - Metaphilosophy 38 (1):44–54.details
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