- The Total Artificial Heart and the Dilemma of Deactivation.Ben Bronner - 2016 - Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 26 (4):347-367.details
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Reductive Views of Shared Intention.Facundo M. Alonso - 2016 - In Kirk Ludwig & Marija Jankovic (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality. New York: Routledge.details
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Intending, Settling, and Relying.Facundo M. Alonso - 2017 - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 4. Oxford University Press. pp. 50-74.details
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The Property of Rationality: A Guide to What Rationality Requires?Julian Fink - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (1):117-140.details
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The Argument from Slips.Santiago Amaya - 2015 - In Andrei Buckareff, Carlos Moya & Sergi Rosell (eds.), Agency, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 13-29.details
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Slip-Proof Actions.Santiago Amaya - 2015 - In Roman Altshuler Michael J. Sigrist (ed.), Time and the Philosophy of Action. New York: Routledge. pp. 21-36.details
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Free Will as a Psychological Accomplishment.Eddy Nahmias - 2016 - In David Schmidtz & Carmen Pavel (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Freedom. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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A Dual Aspect Theory of Shared Intention.Facundo M. Alonso - 2016 - Journal of Social Ontology 2 (2):271–302.details
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Experts and Deviants: The Story of Agentive Control.Wayne Wu - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (1):101-26.details
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In the beginning was the doing: the premises of the practical syllogism.Eric Wiland - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (3):303-321.details
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Using gaze patterns to predict task intent in collaboration.Chien-Ming Huang, Sean Andrist, Allison Sauppé & Bilge Mutlu - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6:144956.details
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The Essential Indexicality of Intentional Action.Matthew Babb - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (264):439-457.details
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Consent ain’t anything: dissent, access and the conditions for consent.Ezio Di Nucci - 2016 - Monash Bioethics Review 34 (1):3-22.details
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The Oxford Handbook of Causal Reasoning.Michael Waldmann (ed.) - 2017 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.details
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Action without attention.Carolyn Dicey Jennings & Bence Nanay - 2016 - Analysis 76 (1):29-36.details
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A Case for Epistemic Agency.Dustin Olson - 2015 - Logos and Episteme 6 (4):449-474.details
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Is A Purely First Person Account Of Human Action Defensible?Christopher Tollefsen - 2006 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (4):441-460.details
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Intention, intentional action and moral considerations.J. Knobe - 2004 - Analysis 64 (2):181-187.details
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Modest sociality and the distinctiveness of intention.Michael E. Bratman - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (1):149-165.details
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Against Cognitivism about Practical Rationality.John Brunero - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 146 (3):311-325.details
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What good is a diachronic will?Luca Ferrero - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (3):403-430.details
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The Analogy Argument for Doxastic Voluntarism.Nikolaj Nottelmann - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (3):559-582.details
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Two Cheers for “Closeness”: Terror, Targeting and Double Effect.Neil Francis Delaney - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 137 (3):335-367.details
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The role of beliefs in goal dynamics: prolegomena to a constructive theory of intentions.Cristiano Castelfranchi & Fabio Paglieri - 2007 - Synthese 155 (2):237-263.details
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Intentions are Optimality Beliefs – But Optimizing What?Christoph Lumer - 2005 - Erkenntnis 62 (2):235-262.details
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Can I Only Intend My Own Actions?Luca Ferrero - 2013 - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford studies in agency and responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. (1) 70-94.details
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The Omissions Account of the Knobe Effect and the Asymmetry Challenge.Katarzyna Paprzycka - 2015 - Mind and Language 30 (5):550-571.details
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(1 other version)Giving up on convergence and autonomy: Why the theories of psychology and neuroscience are codependent as well as irreconcilable.Eric Hochstein - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A:1-19.details
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Faith in Kant.Guy Longworth - 2017 - In Paul Faulkner & Thomas Simpson (eds.), The Philosophy of Trust. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Internalism without Luminosity.Miriam Schoenfield - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):252-272.details
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Corporate Crocodile Tears? On the Reactive Attitudes of Corporate Agents.Gunnar Björnsson & Kendy Hess - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (2):273–298.details
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Is Collective Agency a Coherent Idea? Considerations from the Enactive Theory of Agency.Mog Stapleton & Tom Froese - 1st ed. 2015 - In Catrin Misselhorn (ed.), Collective Agency and Cooperation in Natural and Artificial Systems. Springer Verlag. pp. 219-236.details
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Social norms and unthinkable options.Ulf Hlobil - 2016 - Synthese 193 (8):2519–2537.details
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Retracted article: Strategic bombing, causal beliefs, and double effect.Ezio Di Nucci - 2016 - Journal of Value Inquiry 50 (2):385-394.details
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Imperative Statics and Dynamics.Nate Charlow - manuscriptdetails
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Desires without Guises: Why We Need Not Value What We Want.Sabine Döring & Bahadir Eker - 2017 - In Federico Lauria & Julien Deonna (eds.), The Nature of Desire. New York, USA: Oxford University Press.details
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Agency.Markus Schlosser - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Review of Michael Bratman's Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together. [REVIEW]Olle Blomberg - 2015 - Analysis 75 (2):346-348.details
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Non-Consequentialism Demystified.John Ku, Howard Nye & David Plunkett - 2015 - Philosophers' Imprint 15 (4):1-28.details
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Attitudinal control.Conor McHugh - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2745-2762.details
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Indispensability, the Discursive Dilemma, and Groups with Minds of Their Own.Abraham Sesshu Roth - 2014 - In Gerhard Preyer, Frank Hindriks & Sara Rachel Chant (eds.), From Individual to Collective Intentionality: New Essays. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 137-162.details
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Instrumental Normativity: In Defense of the Transmission Principle.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2015 - Ethics 125 (4):921-946.details
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The Bootstrapping Objection.Christian Piller - 2013 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 20 (4):612-631.details
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A problem for the unity of normativity.Nicholas Shackel - 2014 - Analysis 74 (3):404-411.details
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Phronesis in Aristotle: Reconciling Deliberation with Spontaneity.Bronwyn Finnigan - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (3):674-697.details
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The Formula of Universal Law: A Reconstruction.Matthew Braham & Martin van Hees - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (2):243-260.details
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Towards a convincing account of intention.Niel Henk Conradie - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Stellenboschdetails
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The Transparency of Mind.Sarah K. Paul - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (5):295-303.details
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(1 other version)The Trouble with Tracing.Manuel Vargas - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):269-291.details
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Temptation and the Agent’s Standpoint.Michael E. Bratman - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (3):293-310.details
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