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Exceeding Expectations: Stochastic Dominance as a General Decision Theory.Christian Tarsney - manuscriptdetails
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Infinite Prospects.Jeffrey Sanford Russell & Yoaav Isaacs - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (1):178-198.details
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Non-Archimedean Preferences Over Countable Lotteries.Jeffrey Sanford Russell - 2020 - Journal of Mathematical Economics 88 (May 2020):180-186.details
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Expected Comparative Utility Theory: A New Theory of Rational Choice.David Robert - 2018 - Philosophical Forum 49 (1):19-37.details
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Expected comparative utility theory: A new theory of instrumental rationality.David Robert - manuscriptdetails
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A restatement of expected comparative utility theory: A new theory of rational choice under risk.David Robert - 2021 - Philosophical Forum 52 (3):221-243.details
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Decision Theory.Katie Steele & H. Orri Stefánsson - 2012 - In Peter Adamson (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Abstracta and Possibilia: Hyperintensional Foundations of Mathematical Platonism.David Elohim - manuscriptdetails
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Epistemic Modality and Hyperintensionality in Mathematics.David Elohim - 2017 - Dissertation, Arché, University of St Andrewsdetails
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Forms of Luminosity: Epistemic Modality and Hyperintensionality in Mathematics.David Elohim - 2017details
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Risk, Non-Identity, and Extinction.Kacper Kowalczyk & Nikhil Venkatesh - 2024 - The Monist 107 (2):146–156.details
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Pascalian Expectations and Explorations.Alan Hajek & Elizabeth Jackson - forthcoming - In Roger Ariew & Yuval Avnur (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Pascal. Wiley-Blackwell.details
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Epistemic Modality and Hyperintensionality in Mathematics.David Elohim - unknowndetails
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Expected Choiceworthiness and Fanaticism.Calvin Baker - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.details
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Intention: Hyperintensional Semantics and Decision Theory.David Elohim - manuscriptdetails
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Counterfactual Desirability.Richard Bradley & H. Orri Stefansson - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (2):485-533.details
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What Is Risk Aversion?H. Orri Stefansson & Richard Bradley - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (1):77-102.details
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How Valuable Are Chances?H. Orri Stefansson & Richard Bradley - 2015 - Philosophy of Science 82 (4):602-625.details
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Hope: A Solution to the Puzzle of Difficult Action.Catherine Rioux - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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Computational Goals, Values and Decision-Making.Louise A. Dennis - 2020 - Science and Engineering Ethics 26 (5):2487-2495.details
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Externalism and exploitability.Nilanjan Das - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (1):101-128.details
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The explanatory role of consistency requirements.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2020 - Synthese 197 (10):4551-4569.details
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Neophobia.John Collins - 2015 - Res Philosophica 92 (2):283-300.details
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Attitudes toward risk are complicated: experimental evidence for the re-individuation approach to risk-attitudes.Haim Cohen, Anat Maril, Sun Bleicher & Ittay Nissan-Rozen - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (8):2553-2577.details
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Surreal Decisions.Eddy Keming Chen & Daniel Rubio - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (1):54-74.details
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Pandemic Ethics and Status Quo Risk.Richard Yetter Chappell - 2022 - Public Health Ethics 15 (1):64-73.details
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Grading Modal Judgement.Nate Charlow - 2020 - Mind 129 (515):769-807.details
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Decision-theoretic relativity in deontic modality.Nate Charlow - 2018 - Linguistics and Philosophy 41 (3):251-287.details
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Normative Uncertainty without Theories.Jennifer Rose Carr - 2020 - Tandf: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (4):747-762.details
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Chance, Credence and Circles.Fabrizio Cariani - 2017 - Episteme 14 (1):49-58.details
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Attitudes, Deontics and Semantic Neutrality.Fabrizio Cariani - 2014 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (4):491-511.details
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Avoiding Risk and Avoiding Evidence.Catrin Campbell-Moore & Bernhard Salow - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (3):495-515.details
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Predicting Divine Action.Hugh Burling - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (4):785-801.details
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Weighing the Risks of Climate Change.Lara Buchak - 2019 - The Monist 102 (1):66-83.details
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Replies to Commentators.Lara Buchak - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (9):2397-2414.details
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Relative priority.Lara Buchak - 2023 - Economics and Philosophy 39 (2):199-229.details
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Revisiting Risk and Rationality: a reply to Pettigrew and Briggs.Lara Buchak - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5):841-862.details
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Risk and Tradeoffs.Lara Buchak - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S6):1091-1117.details
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Precis of Risk and Rationality.Lara Buchak - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (9):2363-2368.details
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Philosophical foundations for worst-case arguments.Lara Buchak - 2023 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 22 (3):215-242.details
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Instrumental rationality, epistemic rationality, and evidence-gathering.Lara Buchak - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):85-120.details
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Faith and steadfastness in the face of counter-evidence.Lara Buchak - 2017 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 81 (1-2):113-133.details
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A Faithful Response to Disagreement.Lara Buchak - 2021 - The Philosophical Review 130 (2):191-226.details
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Costs of abandoning the Sure-Thing Principle.Rachael Briggs - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5):827-840.details
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Learning by Ignoring the Most Wrong.Seamus Bradley - 2022 - Kriterion – Journal of Philosophy 36 (1):9-31.details
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Fairness and risk attitudes.Richard Bradley & Stefánsson H. Orri - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (10-11):3179-3204.details
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Aggregating Causal Judgments.Richard Bradley, Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (4):491-515.details
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Selection under Uncertainty: Affirmative Action at Shortlisting Stage.Luc Bovens - 2016 - Mind 125 (498):421-437.details
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Wanting what’s not best.Kyle Blumberg & John Hawthorne - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (4):1275-1296.details
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