- Scientific Disagreements, Fast Science and Higher-Order Evidence.Daniel C. Friedman & Dunja Šešelja - 2023 - Philosophy of Science 90 (4):937-957.details
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Conciliatory Reasoning, Self-Defeat, and Abstract Argumentation.Aleks Https://Orcidorg Knoks - 2023 - Review of Symbolic Logic 16 (3):740-787.details
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Evidence and facts about incoherence: Reply to Schmidt.Aleks Knoks - 2023 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):1-11.details
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Not So Phenomenal!John Hawthorne & Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2021 - Philosophical Review 130 (1):1-43.details
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You just believe that because….Roger White - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):573-615.details
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Problems for Credulism.James Pryor - 2013 - In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. New York: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 89–131.details
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Defeating looks.Kathrin Glüer - 2016 - Synthese 195 (7):2985-3012.details
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Epistemic Paradise Lost: Saving What We Can with Stable Support.Anna-Maria A. Eder - 2021 - In Nick Hughes (ed.), Epistemic Dilemmas. Oxford University Press.details
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Embracing Incoherence.Claire Field - 2021 - In Nick Hughes (ed.), Epistemic Dilemmas. Oxford University Press. pp. 1-29.details
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Peer Disagreement, Rational Requirements, and Evidence of Evidence as Evidence Against.Andrew Reisner - 2016 - In Martin Grajner & Pedro Schmechtig (eds.), Epistemic Reasons, Epistemic Norms, Epistemic Goals. De Gruyter. pp. 95-114.details
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The Psychological Dimension of the Lottery Paradox.Jennifer Nagel - 2021 - In Igor Douven (ed.), The Lottery Paradox. Cambridge University Press.details
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Suspension, Higher-Order Evidence, and Defeat.Errol Lord & Kurt Sylvan - 2021 - In Jessica Brown & Mona Simion (eds.), Reasons, Justification, and Defeat. Oxford Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Higher-Order Defeat and the Impossibility of Self-Misleading Evidence.Mattias Skipper - 2019 - In Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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Higher-Order Defeat and Doxastic Resilience.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2019 - In Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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Higher-order uncertainty.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - In Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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Evidence of Evidence as Higher Order Evidence.Anna-Maria A. Eder & Peter Brössel - 2019 - In Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 62-83.details
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Decision-making under moral-uncertainty.Andrew Sepielli - 2018 - In Aaron Zimmerman, Karen Jones & Mark Timmons (eds.), Routledge Handbook on Moral Epistemology. New York: Routledge.details
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The Perniciousness of Higher-Order Evidence on Aesthetic Appreciation.David Sackris & Rasmus Rosenberg Larsen - 2023 - Dialogue 62 (2):303-322.details
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Moral Faith and Moral Reason.Sergio Tenenbaum - 2015 - In Sophie-Grace Chappell (ed.), Intuition, Theory, Anti-Theory in Ethics. pp. 76-103.details
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Uniqueness and Metaepistemology.Daniel Greco & Brian Hedden - 2016 - Journal of Philosophy 113 (8):365-395.details
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Epistemic conflicts and the form of epistemic rules.Aleks Knoks - 2024 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.details
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Religious Disagreement.Helen De Cruz - 2019 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.details
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The Limitations of the Open Mind.Jeremy Fantl - 2018 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
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Rational Suspension.Alexandra Zinke - 2021 - Theoria 87 (5):1050-1066.details
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Philosophy Without Belief.Zach Barnett - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):109-138.details
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Higher-order defeat and intellectual responsibility.Ru Ye - 2018 - Synthese 197 (12):5435-5455.details
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Fumerton's Puzzle for Theories of Rationality.Ru Ye - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (1):93-108.details
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The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence.Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):3-44.details
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Suspiciously Convenient Beliefs and the Pathologies of (Epistemological) Ideal Theory.Alex Worsnip - 2023 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 47:237-268.details
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A puzzle about fickleness.Elise Woodard - 2020 - Noûs 56 (2):323-342.details
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Is Epistemic Permissivism a Consistent Position to Argue from?Matthew Wilson - 2017 - Southwest Philosophy Review 33 (1):43-51.details
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Higher-Order Evidence.Daniel Whiting - 2021 - Analysis 80 (4):789-807.details
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Higher-Order Evidence in Aesthetics.Daniel Whiting - 2023 - British Journal of Aesthetics 63 (2):143-155.details
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Against Second‐Order Reasons.Daniel Whiting - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):398-420.details
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Justified Inference.Ralph Wedgwood - 2012 - Synthese 189 (2):273-295.details
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A puzzle about enkratic reasoning.Jonathan Way - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3177-3196.details
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The Principal Principle and subjective Bayesianism.Christian Wallmann & Jon Williamson - 2019 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10 (1):1-14.details
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The Principal Principle and subjective Bayesianism.Christian Wallmann & Jon Williamson - 2019 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10 (1):1-14.details
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In defence of object-given reasons.Michael Vollmer - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (2):485-511.details
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Irrelevant Influences.Katia Vavova - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:134-152.details
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Peer Disagreement, Evidence, and Well-Groundedness.Han van Wietmarschen - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (3):395-425.details
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Explaining Higher-order Defeat.Marco Tiozzo - 2023 - Acta Analytica 38 (3):453-469.details
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How to respond rationally to peer disagreement: The preemption view.Thomas Grundmann - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):129-142.details
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Discordant knowing: A puzzle about insight in obsessive–compulsive disorder.Evan Taylor - 2020 - Mind and Language 37 (1):73-93.details
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Self-Intimation, Infallibility, and Higher-Order Evidence.Eyal Tal - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (3):665-672.details
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Is higher-order evidence evidence?Eyal Tal - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3157-3175.details
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Cruel Intentions and Evil Deeds.Eyal Tal & Hannah Tierney - 2022 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9.details
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Disagreement and easy bootstrapping.Eyal Tal - 2021 - Episteme 18 (1):46-65.details
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A non-probabilist principle of higher-order reasoning.William J. Talbott - 2016 - Synthese 193 (10).details
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The illusion of discretion.Kurt Sylvan - 2016 - Synthese 193 (6):1635-1665.details
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