- Moderatism and Truth.Santiago Echeverri - forthcoming - Canadian Journal of Philosophy.details
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Truthmaking. Are Facts Still Really Indispensable?Błażej Mzyk - 2024 - Metaphysica 25 (1):119-144.details
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Truth and knowledge in the community of inquiry.Luca Zanetti & Sebastiano Moruzzi - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophy of Education.details
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The evidence in perception.Ali Hasan - 2024 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. New York, NY: Routledge.details
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Grounding and the Epistemic Regress Problem.Robert Weston Siscoe - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (3):875-896.details
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The significance of high-level content.Nicholas Silins - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (1):13-33.details
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Seemings and Justification: An Introduction.Chris Tucker - 2013 - In Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. New York: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 1-29.details
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Contingent A Priori Knowledge.John Turri - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):327-344.details
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Inferential seemings and the problem of reflective awareness.Luca Moretti - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (2):253-271.details
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Intuition.Ole Koksvik - 2011 - Dissertation, Australian National Universitydetails
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Movin' on up: higher-level requirements and inferential justification.Chris Tucker - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (3):323-340.details
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Phenomenal Conservatism and the Internalist Intuition.Michael Huemer - 2006 - American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (2):147-158.details
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On Metaepistemological Scepticism.Duncan Pritchard & Chris Ranalli - 2016 - In Brett Coppenger & Michael Bergmann (eds.), Intellectual Assurance: Essays on Traditional Epistemic Internalism. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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Intuitions for inferences.Sinan Dogramaci - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):371-399.details
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The virtues of epistemic conservatism.Kevin McCain - 2008 - Synthese 164 (2):185–200.details
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Phenomenal conservatism and self-defeat: a reply to DePoe.Michael Huemer - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 156 (1):1-13.details
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Internalist Foundationalism and the Sellarsian Dilemma.Ali Hasan - 2013 - Res Philosophica 90 (2):171-184.details
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Moderate realist ideology critique.Rebecca L. Clark - 2024 - European Journal of Philosophy 32 (1):260-273.details
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Moderate realist ideology critique.Rebecca L. Clark - 2024 - European Journal of Philosophy (1):260-273.details
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Idealism and the Best of All (Subjectively Indistinguishable) Possible Worlds.Helen Yetter-Chappell - 2024 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind Vol 4. Oxford University Press.details
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Knowledge and normativity.Clayton Littlejohn - 2018 - In Markos Valaris & Stephen Hetherington (eds.), Knowledge in Contemporary Philosophy. London, UK: Bloomsbury Publishing.details
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Conciliatory Views of Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence.Jonathan Matheson - 2009 - Episteme 6 (3):269-279.details
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Explanationist aid for the theory of inductive logic.Michael Huemer - 2009 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (2):345-375.details
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Phenomenal conservatism and the problem of reflective awareness.Luca Moretti - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (3):267-280.details
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Two notions of epistemic normativity.Søren Harnow Klausen - 2009 - Theoria 75 (3):161-178.details
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Philosophical Investigation Series: Selected Texts in Epistemology and Philosophy of Science / Série Investigação Filosófica: Textos Selecionados de Epistemologia e Filosofia da Ciência.Rodrigo Reis Lastra Cid & Luiz Helvécio Marques Segundo (eds.) - 2020 - Pelotas: Editora da UFPel / NEPFIL Online.details
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The gradation puzzle of intellectual assurance.Xiaoxing Zhang - 2021 - Analysis 81 (3):488-496.details
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Objective Bayesianism and the Abductivist Response to Scepticism.Darren Bradley - 2021 - Episteme 1:1-15.details
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Can Infinitists Handle the Finite Mind Objection and the Distinction Objection?Bin Zhao - 2021 - Philosophia 49 (5):2275-2291.details
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The Quest for Certainty.Luca Zanetti - 2021 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 35 (1):71-95.details
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Consciousness and Hegel's Solution to the Problem of the Criterion.Peter Yong - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (1):283-307.details
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Does Klein’s infinitism offer a response to Agrippa’s trilemma?Stephen Wright - 2013 - Synthese 190 (6):1113-1130.details
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Comments on “What the internalist should say to the tortoise".Sarah Wright - 2015 - Episteme 12 (2):219-223.details
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Moore's paradoxes, Evans's principle and self-knowledge.John N. Williams - 2004 - Analysis 64 (4):348-353.details
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The problem of the problem of induction.Roger White - 2015 - Episteme 12 (2):275-290.details
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The Bootstrapping Problem.Jonathan Weisberg - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (9):597-610.details
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Skeptical arguments.Jonathan Vogel - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):426–455.details
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Dismissing skeptical possibilities.Jonathan Vogel - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 70 (3):235 - 250.details
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The ‘Conditional Position Problem’ for epistemic externalism.Miguel Ángel Fernández Vargas - 2018 - Synthese 197 (12):5203-5224.details
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What reasoning might be.Markos Valaris - 2017 - Synthese 194 (6).details
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Varieties of easy knowledge inference: A resolution. [REVIEW]Hamid Vahid - 2007 - Acta Analytica 22 (3):223-237.details
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The ontology of epistemic reasons.John Turri - 2009 - Noûs 43 (3):490-512.details
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Knowledge of language in action.Cheng-Hung Tsai - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (1):68-89.details
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Being Familiar with What One Wants.Uku Tooming - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (4):690-710.details
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Tell me you love me: bootstrapping, externalism, and no-lose epistemology.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (1):119-134.details
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What seemings seem to be.Samuel A. Taylor - 2015 - Episteme 12 (3):363-384.details
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Acquaintance, Attention, and Introspective Justification.Samuel A. Taylor - forthcoming - Acta Analytica:1-22.details
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Non‐epistemic perception as technology.Kurt Sylvan - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):324-345.details
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Epistemic Reasons I: Normativity.Kurt Sylvan - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (7):364-376.details
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Epistemic Reasons II: Basing.Kurt Sylvan - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (7):377-389.details
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