- Are There Counterexamples to the Consistency Principle?Clayton Littlejohn - 2023 - Episteme 20 (4):852-869.details
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Structural Rationality and the Property of Coherence.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2023 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 104 (1):170-194.details
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Epistemic Akrasia and Epistemic Reasons.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2019 - Episteme 16 (3):282-302.details
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False Beliefs and Misleading Evidence.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2021 - Theoria 87 (3):520-541.details
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Involuntarism impugned?E. J. Coffman - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-11.details
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Truth, knowledge, and the standard of proof in criminal law.Clayton Littlejohn - 2020 - Synthese 197 (12):5253-5286.details
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A New Problem for Internalism.Chad Carmichael - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13187-13199.details
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Recent Work on Internal and External Reasons.John Brunero - 2017 - American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (2):99-118.details
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Ought-contextualism and reasoning.Darren Bradley - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2977-2999.details
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Knowledge and Attributability.Cameron Boult - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):329-350.details
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An explanatory challenge for epistemological disjunctivism.Cameron Boult - 2017 - Episteme 15 (2):141-153.details
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Dissonance and Doxastic Resistance.Cristina Borgoni - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (5):957-974.details
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The Epistemic Norm of Inference and Non-Epistemic Reasons for Belief.Patrick Bondy - 2019 - Synthese (2):1-21.details
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The epistemic norm of inference and non-epistemic reasons for belief.Patrick Bondy - 2021 - Synthese 198 (2):1761-1781.details
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Epistemic justification and the ignorance excuse.Nathan Biebel - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (12):3005-3028.details
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Paternalism.Jessica Begon - 2016 - Analysis 76 (3):355-373.details
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Minimal disturbance: in defence of pragmatic reasons of the right kind.Lisa Bastian - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (12):3615-3636.details
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Self-Knowledge Requirements and Moore's Paradox.David James Barnett - 2021 - Philosophical Review 130 (2):227-262.details
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Cogito and Moore.David James Barnett - 2023 - Synthese 202 (1):1-27.details
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Gnostic Disagreement Norms.Domingos Faria - 2022 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 18 (1):(A2)5-22.details
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Welfarist Pluralism: Pluralistic Reasons for Belief and the Value of Truth.Andrew Reisner - forthcoming - Philosophical Topics.details
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Reasons and Theoretical Rationality.Clayton Littlejohn - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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Are epistemic reasons normative?Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2021 - Noûs 56 (3):670-695.details
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The Normativity of Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Grenzen und Möglichkeiten argumentativer Auseinandersetzungen und die unterrichtliche Ausbildung argumentativer Metakompetenzen.Dominik Balg - 2023 - In David Löwenstein, Donata Romizi & Jonas Pfister (eds.), Argumentieren im Philosophie- und Ethikunterricht. Grundfragen, Anwendungen, Grenzen. Göttingen: V&R Unipress. pp. 229-243.details
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Argumentieren im Philosophie- und Ethikunterricht. Grundfragen, Anwendungen, Grenzen.David Löwenstein, Donata Romizi & Jonas Pfister (eds.) - 2023 - Göttingen: V&R Unipress.details
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Epistemic Dilemmas: A Guide.Nick Hughes - forthcoming - In Essays on Epistemic Dilemmas. Oxford University Press.details
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Externalism Explained.Clayton Littlejohn - 2023 - In Luis R. G. Oliveira (ed.), Externalism about Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Standing in a Garden of Forking Paths.Clayton Littlejohn - 2018 - In McCain Kevin (ed.), Believing in Accordance with the Evidence: New Essays on Evidentialism. Cham: Springer Verlag.details
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Embracing Incoherence.Claire Field - 2021 - In Nick Hughes (ed.), Epistemic Dilemmas. Oxford University Press. pp. 1-29.details
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Epistemic Dilemmas Defended.Nick Hughes - 2021 - In Epistemic Dilemmas. Oxford University Press.details
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Suspension, Higher-Order Evidence, and Defeat.Errol Lord & Kurt Sylvan - 2021 - In Jessica Brown & Mona Simion (eds.), Reasons, Justification, and Defeat. Oxford Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Knowledge and normativity.Clayton Littlejohn - 2018 - In Markos Valaris & Stephen Hetherington (eds.), Knowledge in Contemporary Philosophy. London, UK: Bloomsbury Publishing.details
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Hyperintensionality and Normativity.Federico L. G. Faroldi - 2019 - Cham, Switzerland: Springer Verlag.details
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True lies and Moorean redundancy.Alex Wiegmann & Emanuel Viebahn - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13053-13066.details
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Higher-Order Evidence.Daniel Whiting - 2021 - Analysis 80 (4):789-807.details
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Against Second‐Order Reasons.Daniel Whiting - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):398-420.details
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Aesthetic Reasons and the Demands They (Do Not) Make.Daniel Whiting - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 71 (2):407-427.details
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Perspectivism and the Argument from Guidance.Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (2):361-374.details
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If you justifiably believe that you ought to Φ, you ought to Φ.Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1873-1895.details
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Knowledge first, stability and value.Barnaby Walker - 2019 - Synthese 198 (4):3833-3854.details
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What The Tortoise Has To Say About Diachronic Rationality.Markos Valaris - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):293-307.details
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How Norms (Might) Guide Belief.Teemu Toppinen - 2015 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (3):396-409.details
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An Epistemic Non-Consequentialism.Kurt L. Sylvan - 2020 - The Philosophical Review 129 (1):1-51.details
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The epistemic normativity of conjecture.Mona Simion - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (11):3447-3471.details
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Way and Whiting on Elusive Reasons.Benjamin Cohen Rossi - 2021 - Analytic Philosophy 63 (2):131-136.details
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Suspending is Believing.Thomas Raleigh - 2019 - Synthese (3):1-26.details
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Another Argument Against Uniqueness.Thomas Raleigh - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (267):327-346.details
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Epistemically flawless false beliefs.Kate Nolfi - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11291-11309.details
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Epistemic norms, all things considered.Kate Nolfi - 2019 - Synthese 198 (7):6717-6737.details
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