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(Nonsolipsistic) conceptual role semantics.Gilbert Harman - 1987 - In Ernest LePore (ed.), New directions in semantics. Orlando: Academic Press. pp. 55–81.details
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Prediction, Authority, and Entitlement in Shared Activity.Abraham Sesshu Roth - 2013 - Noûs 48 (4):626-652.details
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Must Good Reasoning Satisfy Cumulative Transitivity?Shyam Nair - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (1):123-146.details
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Permissive Metaepistemology.David Thorstad - 2019 - Mind 128 (511):907-926.details
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On the explanatory power of truth in logic.Gila Sher - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):348-373.details
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The ontology of epistemic reasons.John Turri - 2009 - Noûs 43 (3):490-512.details
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Two Arguments for Evidentialism.Jonathan Way - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (265):805-818.details
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Reasons and Rationality.Jonathan Way - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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The Self-Effacement Gambit.Jack Woods - 2019 - Res Philosophica 96 (2):113-139.details
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Do framing effects make moral intuitions unreliable?Joanna Demaree-Cotton - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (1):1-22.details
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A Puzzle About Knowledge, Blame, and Coherence.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2019 - Acta Analytica 34 (4):493-503.details
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Books received. [REVIEW]Janusz Czelakowski - 1988 - Studia Logica 47 (1):151-161.details
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Books received. [REVIEW]Janusz Czelakowski - 1984 - Studia Logica 43 (3):151-161.details
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Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy. [REVIEW]David Christensen - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (5):754-767.details
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Epistemology in Group Agency: Six objections in search of the truth. [REVIEW]Fabrizio Cariani - 2012 - Episteme 9 (3):255-269.details
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Transparency, belief, intention.Alex Byrne - 2011 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85:201-21.details
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Semantic dispositionalism without exceptions.Arvid Båve - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (6):1751-1771.details
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Against Cognitivism about Practical Rationality.John Brunero - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 146 (3):311-325.details
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Does rationality give us reasons?John Broome - 2005 - Philosophical Issues 15 (1):321–337.details
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A Stronger Doctrine of Double Effect.Ben Bronner & Simon Goldstein - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (4):793-805.details
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Delimiting the Boundaries of Inference.Paul Boghossian - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):55-69.details
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Logic Informed.Justin Bledin - 2014 - Mind 123 (490):277-316.details
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Informal Logic’s Influence on Philosophy Instruction.J. Anthony Blair - 2006 - Informal Logic 26 (3):259-286.details
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Logical Expressivism and Carroll's Regress.Corine Besson - 2019 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 86:35-62.details
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A New Puzzle about Believed Fallibility.Yitzhak Benbaji - 2006 - Dialogue 45 (4):679-696.details
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The Abductivist Reply to Skepticism.James R. Beebe - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):605-636.details
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On Contradictory Christology: A Reply to Cotnoir’s ‘On the Role of Logic’.Jc Beall - 2019 - Journal of Analytic Theology 7 (1):529-543.details
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On Contradictory Christology: A Reply to Uckelman’s ‘Contradictions, Impossibility, and Triviality’.Jc Beall - 2019 - Journal of Analytic Theology 7 (1):560-577.details
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Inferential Justification and the Transparency of Belief.David James Barnett - 2016 - Noûs 50 (1):184-212.details
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Trying Cognitivism: A Defence of the Strong Belief Thesis.Avery Archer - 2018 - Theoria 84 (2):140-156.details
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The normativity of context.Daniel Andler - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 100 (3):273-303.details
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Beliefs do not come in degrees.Andrew Moon - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (6):760-778.details
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The Role of Intention in Intentional Action.Frederick Adams & Alfred Mele - 1989 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 19 (4):511 - 531.details
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Trying, Desire, and Desiring to Try.Frederick Adams - 1994 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 24 (4):613 - 626.details
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Conceptions of the mind... that do not loose sight of logic.Juan José Acero - 2010 - Theoria 18 (1):17-25.details
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Curiosity was Framed.Dennis Whitcomb - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):664-687.details
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Inquiry and Belief.Jane Friedman - 2017 - Noûs 53 (2):296-315.details
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Reasons for Belief and Normativity.Glüer-Pagin Kathrin & Wikforss Åsa - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press. pp. 575-599.details
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Can the lottery paradox be solved by identifying epistemic justification with epistemic permissibility?Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2019 - Episteme 16 (3):241-261.details
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The Normativity of Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Logic isn’t normative.Gillian Russell - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (3-4):371-388.details
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What is the Normative Role of Logic?Hartry Field - 2009 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):251-268.details
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Practical Knowledge and Luminosity.Juan S. Piñeros Glasscock - 2019 - Mind 129 (516):1237-1267.details
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Intentions and self-referential content.Tomis Kapitan - 1995 - Philosophical Papers 24 (3):151-166.details
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Two-state solution to the lottery paradox.Arturs Logins - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3465-3492.details
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Buddhist Philosophy of Logic.Koji Tanaka - 2013 - In Emmanuel Steven Michael (ed.), Blackwell Companion to Buddhist Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 320-330.details
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Intending, Settling, and Relying.Facundo M. Alonso - 2017 - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 4. Oxford University Press. pp. 50-74.details
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Why We Really Cannot Believe the Error Theory.Bart Streumer - 2018 - In Diego E. Machuca (ed.), Moral Skepticism: New Essays. New York: Routledge.details
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An Argument for Uniqueness About Evidential Support.Sinan Dogramaci & Sophie Horowitz - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):130-147.details
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