- Logical Akrasia.Frederik J. Andersen - forthcoming - Episteme.details
|
|
Extremists are more confident.Nora Heinzelmann & Viet Tran - 2022 - Erkenntnis (5).details
|
|
Epistemic ownership and the practical/epistemic parallelism.Jesús Navarro - 2024 - Synthese 203 (5):163.details
|
|
Consistent desires and climate change.Daniel Coren - 2024 - Analytic Philosophy 65 (2):241-255.details
|
|
Evidence-Coherence Conflicts Revisited.Alex Worsnip - 2021 - In Nick Hughes (ed.), Epistemic Dilemmas. Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Dynamic Introspection.Michael Cohen - 2021 - Dissertation, Stanford Universitydetails
|
|
Epistemic Defeaters.Tommaso Piazza - 2021 - Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
Rational epistemic akrasia for the ambivalent pragmatist.Neil Sinhababu - 2021 - In Berit Brogaard & Dimitria Electra Gatzia (eds.), The Philosophy and Psychology of Ambivalence: Being of Two Minds. New York: Routledge.details
|
|
The Archimedean Urge.Amia Srinivasan - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):325-362.details
|
|
The Unity of Evidence and Coherence.Declan Smithies - forthcoming - In Nick Hughes (ed.), Essays on Epistemic Dilemmas. Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Being Rational and Being Wrong.Kevin Dorst - 2023 - Philosophers' Imprint 23 (1).details
|
|
Rational Polarization.Kevin Dorst - 2023 - Philosophical Review 132 (3):355-458.details
|
|
"I'm, Like, a Very Smart Person" On Self-Licensing and Perils of Reflection.Joshua DiPaolo - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Epistemology.details
|
|
Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence.Yan Chen & Alex Worsnip - forthcoming - In Maria Baghramian, J. Adam Carter & Rach Cosker-Rowland (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Disagreement. Routledge.details
|
|
Positive illusion and the normativity of substantive and structural rationality.Tsung-Hsing Ho - 2022 - Philosophical Explorations 26 (3).details
|
|
Consistency, Obligations, and Accuracy-Dominance Vindications.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2020 - Dialectica 74 (1):139-156.details
|
|
Moral error theory, explanatory dispensability and the limits of guilt.Silvan Wittwer - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (10):2969-2983.details
|
|
The Epistemic Function of Higher-Order Evidence.Declan Smithies - 2022 - In Paul Silva & Luis R. G. Oliveira (eds.), Propositional and Doxastic Justification: New Essays on their Nature and Significance. New York: Routledge. pp. 97-120.details
|
|
Surprising Suspensions: The Epistemic Value of Being Ignorant.Christopher Willard-Kyle - 2021 - Dissertation, Rutgers University - New Brunswickdetails
|
|
Logical Disagreement.Frederik J. Andersen - 2024 - Dissertation, University of St. Andrewsdetails
|
|
Higher-Order Defeat and the Impossibility of Self-Misleading Evidence.Mattias Skipper - 2019 - In Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Is higher-order evidence evidence?Eyal Tal - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3157-3175.details
|
|
Permissivism and the Arbitrariness Objection.Robert Mark Simpson - 2017 - Episteme 14 (4):519-538.details
|
|
Embracing Epistemic Dilemmas.David Christensen - 2021 - In Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles.details
|
|
Normative Indeterminacy in the Epistemic Domain.Nicholas Leonard & Fabrizio Cariani - forthcoming - In Kevin McCain, Scott Stapleford & Matthias Steup (eds.), Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles. K. McCain, S. Stapleford & M. Steup.details
|
|
Higher-Order Evidence and the Normativity of Logic.Mattias Skipper - forthcoming - In Scott Stapleford, Kevin McCain & Matthias Steup (eds.), Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles. Routledge.details
|
|
What Is Wrong With Agnostic Belief?Yuval Avnur - 2020 - In Agnosticism: Explorations in Philosophy and Religious Thought. pp. Ch 2.details
|
|
Group belief reconceived.Jeroen de Ridder - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-21.details
|
|
Should agents be immodest?Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2020 - Analytic Philosophy 62 (3):235-251.details
|
|
Structural Rationality and the Property of Coherence.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2023 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 104 (1):170-194.details
|
|
The explanatory role of consistency requirements.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2020 - Synthese 197 (10):4551-4569.details
|
|
Epistemic Akrasia and Epistemic Reasons.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2019 - Episteme 16 (3):282-302.details
|
|
Inexact knowledge and dynamic introspection.Michael Cohen - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):5509-5531.details
|
|
Epistemic Akrasia: No Apology Required.David Christensen - 2022 - Noûs 1 (online first):1-22.details
|
|
Epistemic akrasia: No apology required.David Christensen - 2024 - Noûs 58 (1):54-76.details
|
|
Disagreement, Drugs, etc.: from Accuracy to Akrasia.David Christensen - 2016 - Episteme 13 (4):397-422.details
|
|
Akratic (epistemic) modesty.David Christensen - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (7):2191-2214.details
|
|
Moore's Paradox and Akratic Belief.Eugene Chislenko - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (3):669-690.details
|
|
How can belief be akratic?Eugene Chislenko - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13925-13948.details
|
|
A New Problem for Internalism.Chad Carmichael - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13187-13199.details
|
|
A modesty proposal.Jennifer Rose Carr - 2019 - Synthese 198 (4):3581-3601.details
|
|
A Faithful Response to Disagreement.Lara Buchak - 2021 - The Philosophical Review 130 (2):191-226.details
|
|
Ought-contextualism and reasoning.Darren Bradley - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2977-2999.details
|
|
Epistemic akrasia and the fallibility of critical reasoning.Cristina Borgoni & Yannig Luthra - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (4):877-886.details
|
|
When propriety is improper.Kevin Blackwell & Daniel Drucker - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (2):367-386.details
|
|
Evidential Preemption.Endre Begby - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (3):515-530.details
|
|
Self-Knowledge Requirements and Moore's Paradox.David James Barnett - 2021 - Philosophical Review 130 (2):227-262.details
|
|
Rational Moral Ignorance.Zach Barnett - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (3):645-664.details
|
|
Unicorn agnosticism.Yuval Avnur - 2021 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 64 (8):818-829.details
|
|
How irrelevant influences bias belief.Yuval Avnur & Dion Scott-Kakures - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):7-39.details
|
|