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Is irrationality systematic?Robyn M. Dawes - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):491.details
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The plasticity of human rationality.Norman Daniels & George E. Smith - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):490.details
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Truthlikeness and the Lottery Paradox via the Preface Paradox.Simon D'Alfonso - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (2):391-397.details
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A normatively adequate credal reductivism.Justin M. Dallmann - 2014 - Synthese 191 (10):2301-2313.details
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Information and cognitive agents.Robert Cummins - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):68-69.details
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Rationality and Value: The Epistemological Role of Indeterminate and Agent-dependent Values.Horacio Arló Costa - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 128 (1):7-48.details
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Non-adjunctive inference and classical modalities.Horacio Arló Costa - 2005 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 34 (5/6):581 - 605.details
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What lottery problem for reliabilism?Juan Comesaña - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (1):1-20.details
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The controversy about irrationality.L. Jonathan Cohen - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):510.details
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Belief, acceptance, and probability.L. Jonathan Cohen - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):248-249.details
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Minimalism and the generalisation problem: on Horwich’s second solution.Cezary Cieśliński - 2018 - Synthese 195 (3):1077-1101.details
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Content: Semantic and information-theoretic.Paul M. Churchland & Patricia S. Churchland - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):67-68.details
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The epistemological status of lay intuition.Christopher Cherniak - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):489.details
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Probability, Approximate Truth, and Truthlikeness: More Ways out of the Preface Paradox.Gustavo Cevolani & Gerhard Schurz - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (2):209-225.details
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The normality of error.Sam Carter & Simon Goldstein - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (8):2509-2533.details
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Degrees of Assertability.Sam Carter - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (1):19-49.details
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Resolving conflicting information.John Cantwell - 1998 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 7 (2):191-220.details
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Probability, coherent belief and coherent belief changes.John Cantwell & Hans Rott - 2019 - Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence 87 (3):259-291.details
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String Theory, Non-Empirical Theory Assessment, and the Context of Pursuit.Frank Cabrera - 2021 - Synthese 198:3671–3699.details
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Can there be a Bayesian explanationism? On the prospects of a productive partnership.Frank Cabrera - 2017 - Synthese 194 (4):1245–1272.details
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Belief, credence, and norms.Lara Buchak - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):1-27.details
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Discrepancies between human behavior and formal theories of rationality: The incompleteness of Bayesian probability logic.Lea Brilmayer - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):488.details
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Ought-contextualism and reasoning.Darren Bradley - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2977-2999.details
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Aggregating Causal Judgments.Richard Bradley, Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (4):491-515.details
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How to Believe Long Conjunctions of Beliefs: Probability, Quasi-Dogmatism and Contextualism.Stefano Bonzio, Gustavo Cevolani & Tommaso Flaminio - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (3):965-990.details
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Determining what is perceived.Radu J. Bogdan - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):66-67.details
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Infinitism and probabilistic justification.Benjamin Bewersdorf - 2014 - Synthese 191 (4):691-699.details
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Indicative Conditionals: Probabilities and Relevance.Franz Berto & Aybüke Özgün - 2021 - Philosophical Studies (11):3697-3730.details
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Knowledge and Evidence You Should Have Had.Matthew A. Benton - 2016 - Episteme 13 (4):471-479.details
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The rational dimension of understanding.Miloud Belkoniene - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-16.details
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Justification as faultlessness.Bob Beddor - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (4):901-926.details
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Believing epistemic contradictions.Beddor Bob & Simon Goldstein - 2018 - Review of Symbolic Logic (1):87-114.details
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Lotteries And Contexts.Peter Baumann - 2004 - Erkenntnis 61 (2):415-428.details
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DeRose on Lotteries.Peter Baumann - 2020 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 10 (1):44-67.details
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To err is human.Maya Bar-Hillel & Avishai Margalit - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):246-248.details
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Self-Knowledge Requirements and Moore's Paradox.David James Barnett - 2021 - Philosophical Review 130 (2):227-262.details
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Information and semantics.Jon Barwise - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):65-65.details
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Clarity and the grammar of skepticism.Chris Barker - 2009 - Mind and Language 24 (3):253-273.details
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A Bitter Pill for Closure.Marvin Backes - 2019 - Synthese 196:3773-3787.details
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Indeterminism, proximal stimuli, and perception.D. M. Armstrong - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):64-65.details
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Iterative probability kinematics.Horacio Arló-Costa & Richmond Thomason - 2001 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 30 (5):479-524.details
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Knowledge is mutable.Michael A. Arbib - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):64-64.details
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Dretske on knowledge.William P. Alston - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):63-64.details
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The rationality of the scientist: Toward reconciliation.Jonathan E. Adler - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):487.details
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Human rationality: Essential conflicts, multiple ideals.Jonathan E. Adler - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):245-246.details
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Rationality: Constraints and Contexts.Timothy Joseph Lane & Tzu-Wei Hung (eds.) - 2016 - London, U.K.: Elsevier Academic Press.details
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Epistemic Risk and the Demands of Rationality.Richard Pettigrew - 2022 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
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Winners and Losers in the Folk Epistemology of Lotteries.John Turri & Ori Friedman - forthcoming - In James Beebe (ed.), Advances in Experimental Epistemology. London, United Kingdom: pp. 45-69.details
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Against Belief Closure.Lina M. Lissia - manuscriptdetails
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