- Divine Hiddenness: Defeated Evidence.Charity Anderson - 2017 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 81:119-132.details
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Cartesian Infallibilism and a Guarantee of Truth.Charity Anderson - 2023 - The Monist 106 (4):409-422.details
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Perceptual presentation and the Myth of the Given.Alfonso Anaya - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7453-7476.details
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Inquiry and Metaphysical Rationalism.Fatema Amijee - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (4):809-823.details
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Reasons for action, acting for reasons, and rationality.Maria Alvarez - 2018 - Synthese 195 (8):3293-3310.details
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Wright Back to Dretske, or Why You Might as Well Deny Knowledge Closure.Marc Alspector-Kelly - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (3):570-611.details
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Why safety doesn’t save closure.Marc Alspector-Kelly - 2011 - Synthese 183 (2):127-142.details
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La place de la critique de Hume dans la formation du réalisme à Oxford dans la première moitié du XXe siècle : quelques aspects.Christophe Alsaleh - 2003 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 2 (2):199-212.details
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What is reliance?Facundo M. Alonso - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (2):163-183.details
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The Many Faces of Closure and Introspection: An Interactive Perspective.Patrick Allo - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (1):91-124.details
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Reasoning about data and information: Abstraction between states and commodities.Patrick Allo - 2009 - Synthese 167 (2):231-249.details
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Alief or belief? A contextual approach to belief ascription.Miri Albahari - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (3):701-720.details
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Don’t Look Now.Bernhard Salow & Arif Ahmed - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (2):327-350.details
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What’s so Good about a Wise and Knowledgeable Public?Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij - 2012 - Acta Analytica 27 (2):199-216.details
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Getting it right.Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij & Stephen R. Grimm - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (2):329-347.details
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Withdrawal and contextualism.Jonathan E. Adler - 2006 - Analysis 66 (4):280–285.details
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Another argument for the knowledge Norm.Jonathan E. Adler - 2009 - Analysis 69 (3):407-411.details
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Googled Assertion.J. Adam Carter & Emma C. Gordon - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (4):490-501.details
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Extended Cognition and Propositional Memory.J. Adam Carter & Jesper Kallestrup - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (3):691-714.details
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Predicting the presuppositions of soft triggers.Márta Abrusán - 2011 - Linguistics and Philosophy 34 (6):491-535.details
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Does belief (only) aim at the truth?Daniel Whiting - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2):279-300.details
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Modal Fragmentalism.Samuele Iaquinto - 2020 - The Philosophical Quarterly 70:570-587.details
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Nonconceptual Epicycles.Sonia Sedivy - 2006 - European Review of Philosophy 6:33-66.details
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Higher-Order Evidence.Kevin Dorst - 2024 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 176-194.details
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Ur-Priors, Conditionalization, and Ur-Prior Conditionalization.Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2016 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 3.details
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Can All-Accuracy Accounts Justify Evidential Norms?Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2018 - In Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij & Jeff Dunn (eds.), Epistemic Consequentialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Knowledge is the Norm of Assertion.Matthew A. Benton - 2024 - In Blake Roeber, Ernest Sosa, Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 329-339.details
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Hume on Mental Transparency.Hsueh Qu - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (4):576-601.details
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Valuable Ignorance: Delayed Epistemic Gratification.Christopher Willard-Kyle - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (1):363–84.details
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Curiosity was Framed.Dennis Whitcomb - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):664-687.details
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Seeking confirmation: A puzzle for norms of inquiry.Jared Millson - 2020 - Analysis 80 (4):683-693.details
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Peer disagreement and higher order evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2011 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 183--217.details
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Incoherence and the balance of evidential reasons.Sebastian Schmidt - 2023 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):1-10.details
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Justification and being in a position to know.Daniel Waxman - 2022 - Analysis 82 (2):289-298.details
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Judgment's aimless heart.Matthew Vermaire - forthcoming - Noûs.details
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Gnostic Disagreement Norms.Domingos Faria - 2022 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 18 (1):(A2)5-22.details
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When warrant transmits.James Pryor - 2012 - In Annalisa Coliva (ed.), Mind, meaning, and knowledge: themes from the philosophy of Crispin Wright. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Knowledge and credit.Jennifer Lackey - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (1):27 - 42.details
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Bridge Principles and Epistemic Norms.Claire Https://Orcidorg Field & Bruno Jacinto - 2022 - Erkenntnis:1-53.details
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Superconditioning.Simon M. Huttegger - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (4):811-833.details
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How should we ascribe the third stance?Luis Rosa - forthcoming - In Alexandra Zinke & Verena Wagner (eds.), Suspension in Epistemology and Beyond. Routledge.details
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Disagreement and Intellectual Scepticism.Andrew Rotondo - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):251-271.details
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Endorsement and assertion.Will Fleisher - 2021 - Noûs 55 (2):363-384.details
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Pragmatic infallibilism.Brian Kim - 2023 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):1-22.details
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Epistemic Deontology and Voluntariness.Conor McHugh - 2012 - Erkenntnis 77 (1):65-94.details
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Epistemic Courage.Jonathan Ichikawa - 2024 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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How We Choose Our Beliefs.Gregory Salmieri & Benjamin Bayer - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (1):41–53.details
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No Justification for Smith’s Incidentally True Beliefs.Alfred Schramm - 2022 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 99 (2):273–292.details
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Introduction.Daniel Star - 2018 - In The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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Reasons and Theoretical Rationality.Clayton Littlejohn - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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