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The Principal Principle Implies the Principle of Indifference.Jon Williamson, Christian Wallmann, Jürgen Landes & James Hawthorne - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (1):123-131.details
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Reason and the grain of belief.Scott Sturgeon - 2008 - Noûs 42 (1):139–165.details
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Permissivism and the Value of Rationality: A Challenge to the Uniqueness Thesis.Miriam Schoenfield - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (2):286-297.details
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Conditionalization Does Not Maximize Expected Accuracy.Miriam Schoenfield - 2017 - Mind 126 (504):1155-1187.details
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Global Constraints on Imprecise Credences: Solving Reflection Violations, Belief Inertia, and Other Puzzles.Sarah Moss - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (3):620-638.details
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