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Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and other Indexicals.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563.details
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(2 other versions)In Defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy1.Katalin Balog - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):1-23.details
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Themes From Kaplan.Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.) - 1989 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Frege on demonstratives.John Perry - 1977 - Philosophical Review 86 (4):474-497.details
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(1 other version)Epiphenomenal qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.details
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(1 other version)There is No Question of Physicalism.Tim Crane & D. H. Mellor - 1990 - Mind 99 (394):185-206.details
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Demonstrative thought.Joseph Levine - 2010 - Mind and Language 25 (2):169-195.details
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(1 other version)Acquaintance and the Mind-Body Problem.Katalin Balog - 2012 - In Simone Gozzano & Christopher S. Hill (eds.), New Perspectives on Type Identity: The Mental and the Physical. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 16-43.details
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Introspecting phenomenal states.Brie Gertler - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):305-28.details
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Physicalism and phenomenal concepts.Daniel Stoljar - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (2):296-302.details
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Phenomenal concepts and the materialist constraint.Joseph Levine - 2006 - In Torin Andrew Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. New York, US: Oxford University Press.details
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The indexical nature of sensory concepts.John O'Dea - 2002 - Philosophical Papers 32 (2):169-181.details
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What is a phenomenal concept?Janet Levin - 2006 - In Torin Andrew Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. New York, US: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Phenomenal concepts and the explanatory gap.David J. Chalmers - 2006 - In Torin Andrew Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. New York, US: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)The content and epistemology of phenomenal belief.David Chalmers - 2002 - In Aleksandar Jokic & Quentin Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 220--72.details
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(1 other version)Materialism without reductionism: What physicalism does not entail.Richard Boyd - 1980 - In Ned Joel Block (ed.), Readings in Philosophy of Psychology: 1. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. pp. 1--67.details
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Conceivability and the metaphysics of mind.Joseph Levine - 1998 - Noûs 32 (4):449-480.details
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(2 other versions)Phenomenal states.Brian Loar - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:81-108.details
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From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis.Frank Jackson - 1998 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Materialism and qualia: The explanatory gap.Joseph Levine - 1983 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64 (October):354-61.details
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(5 other versions)What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (4):435-50.details
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Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness.John Perry - 2001 - MIT Press.details
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Consciousness and Experience.William G. Lycan - 1996 - Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.details
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(1 other version)The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory (2nd edition).David J. Chalmers - 1996 - Oxford University Press.details
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(5 other versions)What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 2014 - In Josh Weisberg (ed.), Consciousness (Key Concepts in Philosophy). Cambridge, UK: Polity.details
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(5 other versions)What is it Like to be a Bat?Thomas Nagel - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(5 other versions)What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 2004 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics: a guide and anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Epiphenomenal Qualia.Frank Jackson - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Consciousness and Experience.William G. Lycan - 1996 - Philosophy 72 (282):602-604.details
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(1 other version)Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness.John Perry - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (213):616-618.details
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(1 other version)Thinking about Consciousness.David Papineau - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (215):333-335.details
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(1 other version)From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis.Frank Jackson - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (197):539-542.details
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Phenomenal Consciousness.Peter Carruthers - 2001 - Mind 110 (440):1057-1062.details
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Two Conceptions of the Physical.Daniel Stoljar - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):253-281.details
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Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism.Christopher S. Hill - 1991 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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(1 other version)The Harder Problem of Consciousness.Ned Block - 2002 - Journal of Philosophy 99 (8):391.details
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(1 other version)A Materialist Theory of the Mind.D. M. Armstrong - 1968 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Ted Honderich.details
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Thinking About Consciousness.David Papineau - 2002 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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A Materialist Theory of the Mind.D. Armstrong - 1968 - Philosophical Quarterly 19 (74):73-79.details
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(1 other version)There is no Question of Physicalism.Tim Crane & D. H. Mellor - 1995 - In Paul K. Moser & J. D. Trout (eds.), Contemporary Materialism: A Reader. New York: Routledge. pp. 65.details
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Deconstructing new wave materialism.Terence Horgan & John Tienson - 2001 - In Carl Gillett & Barry Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 307--318.details
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(1 other version)How not to solve the mind-body problem.Colin McGinn - 2001 - In Carl Gillett & Barry Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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There Are Fewer Things in Reality Than Are Dreamt of in Chalmers’s Philosophy. [REVIEW]Christopher S. Hill & Brian P. McLaughlin - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):445-454.details
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(1 other version)Précis of Thinking about Consciousness.David Papineau - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):143-143.details
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(1 other version)Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness.John Perry - 2001 - Philosophy 77 (301):457-461.details
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In defense of new wave materialism: A response to Horgan and Tienson.Brian P. McLaughlin - 2001 - In Carl Gillett & Barry Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Materialism without reductionism: What physicalism does not entail.Robert Boyd - 1980 - In Ned Joel Block (ed.), Readings in Philosophy of Psychology: 1. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.details
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(1 other version)The Harder Problem of Consciousness.Ned Block - 2003 - Disputatio 1 (15):5-49.details
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Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism. [REVIEW]Frank Jackson - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (4):614.details
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