- Knowledge, Stakes, and Mistakes.Wesley Buckwalter & Jonathan Schaffer - 2015 - Noûs 49 (2):201–234.details
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Error possibility, contextualism, and bias.Wesley Buckwalter - 2019 - Synthese 198 (3):2413-2426.details
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Subject‐Sensitive Invariantism and the Knowledge Norm for Practical Reasoning.Jessica Brown - 2008 - Noûs 42 (2):167-189.details
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Knowledge and Presuppositions.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2009 - Mind 118 (470):241 - 294.details
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Knowledge and Presuppositions.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Knowledge in and out of context.Kent Bach - 2007 - In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O.’Rourke & Harry S. Silverstein (eds.), Knowledge and Skepticism. MIT Press. pp. 105--36.details
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Applying pragmatics to epistemology.Kent Bach - 2008 - Philosophical Issues 18 (1):68-88.details
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Knowledge and practical interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment.Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):259-288.details
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Evidentialism and pragmatic constraints on outright belief.Dorit Ganson - 2018 - In Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary epistemology: an anthology. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.details
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Epistemic anxiety and adaptive invariantism.Jennifer Nagel - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):407-435.details
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On Folk Epistemology. How we think and talk about knowledge.Mikkel Gerken - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Contextualism, subject-sensitive invariantism, and knowledge of knowledge.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):213–235.details
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Can we do without pragmatic encroachment.Brian Weatherson - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):417–443.details
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Knowledge requires commitment (instead of belief).Nicholas Tebben - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (2):321-338.details
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Strict moderate invariantism and knowledge-denials.Gregory Stoutenburg - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (8):2029-2044.details
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Empirical tests of interest-relative invariantism.Chandra Sekhar Sripada & Jason Stanley - 2012 - Episteme 9 (1):3-26.details
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Time constraints and pragmatic encroachment on knowledge.Joseph Shin - 2014 - Episteme 11 (2):157-180.details
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The irrelevance of the subject: Against subject-sensitive invariantism.Jonathan Schaffer - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (1):87-107.details
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Contrastive Knowledge Surveyed.Jonathan Schaffer & Joshua Knobe - 2010 - Noûs 46 (4):675-708.details
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The context-sensitivity of knowledge attributions.Patrick Rysiew - 2001 - Noûs 35 (4):477–514.details
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Nothing at Stake in Knowledge.David Rose, Edouard Machery, Stephen Stich, Mario Alai, Adriano Angelucci, Renatas Berniūnas, Emma E. Buchtel, Amita Chatterjee, Hyundeuk Cheon, In-Rae Cho, Daniel Cohnitz, Florian Cova, Vilius Dranseika, Ángeles Eraña Lagos, Laleh Ghadakpour, Maurice Grinberg, Ivar Hannikainen, Takaaki Hashimoto, Amir Horowitz, Evgeniya Hristova, Yasmina Jraissati, Veselina Kadreva, Kaori Karasawa, Hackjin Kim, Yeonjeong Kim, Minwoo Lee, Carlos Mauro, Masaharu Mizumoto, Sebastiano Moruzzi, Christopher Y. Olivola, Jorge Ornelas, Barbara Osimani, Carlos Romero, Alejandro Rosas Lopez, Massimo Sangoi, Andrea Sereni, Sarah Songhorian, Paulo Sousa, Noel Struchiner, Vera Tripodi, Naoki Usui, Alejandro Vázquez del Mercado, Giorgio Volpe, Hrag Abraham Vosgerichian, Xueyi Zhang & Jing Zhu - 2019 - Noûs 53 (1):224-247.details
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Knowledge---by examples.Colin Radford - 1966 - Analysis 27 (1):1--11.details
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Knowledge: By Examples.Colin Radford - 1966 - Analysis 27 (1):1.details
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Unassertability And The Appearance Of Ignorance.Geoff Pynn - 2014 - Episteme 11 (2):125-143.details
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The Attitude of Knowledge. [REVIEW]Jennifer Nagel - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):678-685.details
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Knowledge ascriptions and the psychological consequences of changing stakes.Jennifer Nagel - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):279-294.details
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Knowledge ascriptions and the psychological consequences of thinking about error.Jennifer Nagel - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (239):286-306.details
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Knowing That P without Believing That P.Blake Myers-Schulz & Eric Schwitzgebel - 2013 - Noûs 47 (2):371-384.details
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Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):353-356.details
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Belief is weak.John Hawthorne, Daniel Rothschild & Levi Spectre - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1393-1404.details
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Third‐person knowledge ascriptions: A crucial experiment for contextualism.Jumbly Grindrod, James Andow & Nat Hansen - 2018 - Mind and Language (2):1-25.details
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Salient Alternatives in Perspective.Mikkel Gerken, Chad Gonnerman, Joshua Alexander & John P. Waterman - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (4):792-810.details
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Credal pragmatism.Jie Gao - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (6):1595-1617.details
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Evidentialism and pragmatic constraints on outright belief.Dorit Ganson - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (3):441 - 458.details
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Stakes, Scales, and Skepticism.Kathryn Francis, Philip Beaman & Nat Hansen - 2019 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 6:427--487.details
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Belief May Not Be a Necessary Condition for Knowledge.Katalin Farkas - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (1):185-200.details
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Knowledge in an uncertain world.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Matthew McGrath.details
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Much at stake in knowledge.Alexander Dinges & Julia Zakkou - 2020 - Mind and Language 36 (5):729-749.details
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Knowledge and availability.Alexander Dinges - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (4):554-573.details
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Anti-intellectualism, egocentrism and bank case intuitions.Alexander Dinges - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (11):2841-2857.details
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Strange-but-true: a (quick) new argument for contextualism about ‘know’.Paul Dimmock - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (8):2005-2015.details
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Knowledge, belief, and egocentric bias.Paul Dimmock - 2019 - Synthese 196 (8):3409-3432.details
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The Psychological Context of Contextualism.Jennifer Nagel & Julia Jael Smith - 2017 - In Jonathan J. Ichikawa (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism. Routledge.details
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Interest-relative invariantism.Brian James Weatherson - 2017 - In Jonathan Ichikawa (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism. Routledge.details
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Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions.Keith DeRose - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):913-929.details
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Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2006 - Critica 38 (114):98-107.details
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The Analysis of Knowledge.Jonathan Ichikawa & Matthias Steup - 2014 - Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy.details
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The Mystery of Stakes and Error in Ascriber Intuitions.Wesley Buckwalter - 2014 - In James Beebe (ed.), Advances in Experimental Epistemology. Bloomsbury Academic.details
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Are there Counterexamples to the Closure Principle.Jonathan Vogel - 1990 - In Michael David Roth & Glenn Ross (eds.), Doubting: Contemporary Perspetcives on Scepticism. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 13-29.details
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