- (1 other version)The Desire‐Belief Account of Intention Explains Everything.Neil Sinhababu - 2012 - Noûs 47 (4):680-696.details
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(1 other version)Intention and Motivational Strength.Hugh McCann - 1995 - Journal of Philosophical Research 20:571-583.details
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The Epistemology of Belief and the Epistemology of Degrees of Belief.Richard Foley - 1992 - American Philosophical Quarterly 29 (2):111 - 124.details
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A defense of imprecise credences in inference and decision making1.James M. Joyce - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):281-323.details
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(1 other version)``The Paradox of the Preface".D. C. Makinson - 1964 - Analysis 25 (6):205-207.details
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(1 other version)Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief.Henry Ely Kyburg - 1961 - Middletown, CT, USA: Wesleyan University Press.details
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(1 other version)Probability and the logic of rational belief.Henry Ely Kyburg - 1961 - Middletown, Conn.,: Wesleyan University Press.details
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Putting logic in its place: formal constraints on rational belief.David Phiroze Christensen - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Intention, plans, and practical reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.details
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Settled objectives and rational constraints.Hugh J. McCann - 1991 - American Philosophical Quarterly 28 (1):25-36.details
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Partial belief, partial intention.Richard Holton - 2008 - Mind 117 (465):27-58.details
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The will as reason.Pamela Hieronymi - 2009 - Philosophical Perspectives 23 (1):201-220.details
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(1 other version)The Wrong Kind of Reason.Pamela Hieronymi - 2005 - Journal of Philosophy 102 (9):437 - 457.details
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Reason and the grain of belief.Scott Sturgeon - 2008 - Noûs 42 (1):139–165.details
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Can we do without pragmatic encroachment.Brian Weatherson - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):417–443.details
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(1 other version)How truth governs belief.Nishi Shah - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.details
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How Action Governs Intention.Nishi Shah - 2008 - Philosophers' Imprint 8:1-19.details
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(1 other version)On indeterminate probabilities.Isaac Levi - 1974 - Journal of Philosophy 71 (13):391-418.details
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Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief. Henry E. Kyburg, Jr.Wesley C. Salmon - 1967 - Philosophy of Science 34 (3):283-285.details
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A Preface Paradox for Intention.Simon Goldstein - 2016 - Philosophers' Imprint 16.details
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Credal Dilemmas.Sarah Moss - 2014 - Noûs 48 (3):665-683.details
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The Use of Reasons in Thought (and the Use of Earmarks in Arguments).Pamela Hieronymi - 2013 - Ethics 124 (1):114-127.details
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Rational 'ought' implies 'can'.Ralph Wedgwood - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):70-92.details
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Non-Intentional Actions.David K. Chan - 1995 - American Philosophical Quarterly 32 (2):139 - 151.details
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Dracula Meets Wolfman: Acceptance vs. Partial Belief.Richard Jeffrey - 1970 - In Marshall Swain (ed.), Induction, acceptance, and rational belief. Dordrecht,: Reidel. pp. 157-185.details
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(1 other version)The paradox of the preface.David C. Makinson - 1965 - Analysis 25 (6):205-207.details
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(1 other version)Intention and Motivational Strength.Hugh McCann - 1995 - Journal of Philosophical Research 20:571-583.details
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Dilemmas: Dithering, Plumping, and Grief.Simon Blackburn - 1996 - In H. E. Mason (ed.), Moral dilemmas and moral theory. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 127.details
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What can we Learn from Buridan's Ass?Ruth Weintraub - 2012 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 42 (3):281-301.details
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Take the sugar.Caspar Hare - 2010 - Analysis 70 (2):237-247.details
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(2 other versions)Induction, Acceptance and Rational belief.Ian Hacking - 1970 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 39 (1):166-168.details
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The Calendar Paradox.Sam Shpall - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (3):801-825.details
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(1 other version)On Indeterminate Probabilities.Isaac Levi - 1978 - Journal of Philosophy 71 (13):233--261.details
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Reasoning, meaning, and mind.Gilbert Harman - 1999 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)The Desire-Belief Account of Intention Explains Everything.Neil Sinhababu - 2012 - Noûs 47 (4):680-696.details
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Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. [REVIEW]J. David Velleman - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (2):277-284.details
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(3 other versions)Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief.Peter Krauss - 1961 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 35 (1):127.details
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(1 other version)Evidentialism and pragmatic constraints on outright belief.Dorit Ganson - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (3):441 - 458.details
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(1 other version)Two faces of intention.Michael Bratman - 1984 - Philosophical Review 93 (3):375-405.details
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(1 other version)Putting Logic in Its Place. Formal Constraints on Rational Belief.David Christensen - 2007 - Erkenntnis 67 (1):143-146.details
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(1 other version)How Truth Governs Belief.Nishi Shah - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.details
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(1 other version)Evidentialism and pragmatic constraints on outright belief.Dorit Ganson - 2018 - In Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary epistemology: an anthology. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.details
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(1 other version)Two faces of intention.Michael Bratman - 1997 - In Alfred R. Mele (ed.), The philosophy of action. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Figures in a Probability Landscape.Bas van Fraassen - 1990 - In J. Dunn & A. Gupta (eds.), Truth or Consequences: Essays in Honor of Nuel Belnap. Boston, MA, USA: Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 345-356.details
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