- Unreasonable Knowledge.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):1-21.details
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Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology.Duncan Pritchard - 2012 - Journal of Philosophy 109 (3):247-279.details
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Safety, Sensitivity and “Distant” Epistemic Luck.Wolfgang Freitag - 2013 - Theoria 80 (1):44-61.details
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Keeping Track of the Gettier Problem.Sven Bernecker - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (2):127-152.details
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Anti-Luck Epistemologies and Necessary Truths.Jeffrey Roland & Jon Cogburn - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (3):547-561.details
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Impossible Worlds: A Modest Approach.Daniel Nolan - 1997 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38 (4):535-572.details
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Philosophical explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.details
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How to defeat opposition to Moore.Ernest Sosa - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13:137-49.details
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Closure principles.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (3):256–267.details
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Easy possibilities.R. M. Sainsbury - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (4):907-919.details
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A strategy for assessing closure.Peter Murphy - 2006 - Erkenntnis 65 (3):365 - 383.details
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Closure failures for safety.Peter Murphy - 2005 - Philosophia 33 (1-4):331-334.details
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Single premise deduction and risk.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 141 (2):157 - 173.details
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Epistemic luck and the generality problem.Kelly Becker - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (3):353 - 366.details
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Discrimination and perceptual knowledge.Alvin I. Goldman - 1976 - Journal of Philosophy 73 (November):771-791.details
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On Translating the Sensitivity Condition to the Possible Worlds Idiom in Different Ways.Bin Zhao - 2024 - American Philosophical Quarterly 61 (1):87-98.details
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On Mentioning Belief-Formation Methods in the Sensitivity Subjunctives.Bin Zhao - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.details
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Sensitivity, Safety, and Epistemic Closure.Bin Zhao - 2022 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 30 (1):56-71.details
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Knowledge from Falsehood, Ignorance of Necessary Truths, and Safety.Bin Zhao - 2022 - Philosophia 50 (2):833-845.details
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A Dilemma for Globalized Safety.Bin Zhao - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (2):249-261.details
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Sensitivity, safety, and impossible worlds.Guido Melchior - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (3):713-729.details
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Safety and Necessity.Niall J. Paterson - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (3):1081-1097.details
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Non-Reductive Safety.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2020 - Belgrade Philosophical Annual 33 (33):25-38.details
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Yes, Safety is in Danger.Tomas Bogardus & Chad Marxen - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (2):321-334.details
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Safety, domination, and differential support.Charles Neil - 2019 - Synthese 198 (2):1139-1152.details
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Modal Virtue Epistemology.Bob Beddor & Carlotta Pavese - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (1):61-79.details
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Against global method safety.Sven Bernecker - 2018 - Synthese 197 (12):5101-5116.details
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Knowledge without safety.Haicheng Zhao - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3261-3278.details
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Towards an Account of Epistemic Luck for Necessary Truths.James Henry Collin - 2018 - Acta Analytica 33 (4):483-504.details
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The internalist virtue theory of knowledge.Ralph Wedgwood - 2020 - Synthese 197 (12):5357–5378.details
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Saving safety from counterexamples.Thomas Grundmann - 2018 - Synthese 197 (12):5161-5185.details
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In defence of single-premise closure.Weng Hong Tang - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (8):1887-1900.details
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Normal Knowledge: Toward an Explanation-Based Theory of Knowledge.Andrew Peet & Eli Pitcovski - 2018 - Journal of Philosophy 115 (3):141-157.details
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Williamson on Counterpossibles.Berto Francesco, David Ripley, Graham Priest & Rohan French - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 47 (4):693-713.details
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Global safety: how to deal with necessary truths.Jaakko Hirvelä - 2019 - Synthese 196 (3):1167-1186.details
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Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.details
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Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.details
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A virtue epistemology: Apt belief and reflective knowledge, volume I * by Ernest Sosa. [REVIEW]Ernest Sosa - 2007 - Analysis 69 (2):382-385.details
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Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):353-356.details
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The modal account of luck revisited.J. Adam Carter & Martin Peterson - 2017 - Synthese 194 (6):2175-2184.details
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Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations. [REVIEW]Alvin I. Goldman - 1983 - Philosophical Review 92 (1):81-88.details
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Why Every Theory of Luck is Wrong.Steven D. Hales - 2016 - Noûs 50 (3):490-508.details
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Is it Safe to Disagree?Jaakko Hirvelä - 2017 - Ratio 30 (3):305-321.details
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Armchair luck: Apriority, intellection and epistemic luck. [REVIEW]Nenad Miščević - 2007 - Acta Analytica 22 (1):48-73.details
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Virtue epistemology and epistemic luck, revisited.Duncan Pritchard - 2008 - Metaphilosophy 39 (1):66–88.details
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Resurrecting the Moorean response to the sceptic.Duncan Pritchard - 2002 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 10 (3):283 – 307.details
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Anti-luck epistemology.Duncan Pritchard - 2007 - Synthese 158 (3):277-297.details
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Safety, content, apriority, self-knowledge.David Manley - 2007 - Journal of Philosophy 104 (8):403-423.details
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Safety and epistemic luck.Avram Hiller & Ram Neta - 2007 - Synthese 158 (3):303 - 313.details
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