In the late 19th century, physiologists such as David Ferrier, Eduard Hitzig, and Hermann Munk argued that cerebral brain functions are localized in discrete structures. By the early 20th century, this became the dominant position. However, another prominent physiologist, Friedrich Goltz, rejected theories of cerebral localization and argued against these physiologists until his death in 1902. I argue in this paper that previous historical accounts have failed to comprehend why Goltz rejected cerebral localization. I show (...) that Goltz adhered to a falsificationist methodology, and I reconstruct how he designed his experiments and weighted different kinds of evidence. I then draw on the exploratory experimentation literature from recent philosophy of science to trace one root of the debate to differences in how the German localizers designed their experiments and reasoned about evidence. While Goltz designed his experiments to test hypotheses about the functions of predetermined cerebral structures, the localizers explored new functions and structures in the process of constructing new theories. I argue that the localizers relied on untested background conjectures to justify their inferences about functional organization. These background conjectures collapsed a distinction between phenomena they produced direct evidence for (localized symptoms) and what they reached conclusions about (localized functions). (shrink)

The German pioneer of electrophysiology, Emil du Bois-Reymond (1818–1896), is generally assumed to have remained silent on the subject of the brain. However, the archive of his papers in Berlin contains manuscript notes to a lecture on “The Seat of the Soul” that he delivered to popular audiences in 1884 and 1885. These notes demonstrate that cerebral localization and brain function in general had been concerns of his for quite some time, and that he did not shy away (...) from these subjects. (shrink)

The article proposes systematisation and development of the discourse of the East European methodological traditions regarding application of the systematic approach as a way of subject localisation in psychological research. In particular, the author’s version of systematic localisation of psychological research subjects by means of structural and ontological visualisations has been developed. The procedure proposed for systematic localisation of the researched subject includes four subsequent stages: 1) fixation of the borders and structure of the ontological field which is being studied; (...) 2) segment analysis of the obtained structure; 3) study of specifics and contents of structural and functional ties; 4) visual mapping of genesis of the core processes. The article describes specifics of application of systematic localisation of the subject of research at the example of such researched object as personal socialisation. (shrink)

This paper describes one style of functional analysis commonly used in the neurosciences called task-bound functional analysis. The concept of function invoked by this style of analysis is distinctive in virtue of the dependence relations it bears to transient environmental properties. It is argued that task-bound functional analysis cannot explain the presence of structural properties in nervous systems. An alternative concept of neural function is introduced that draws on the theoretical neuroscience literature, and an argument is given to show that (...) this alternative concept of may help to overcome the explanatory limitations of task-bound functional analysis. (shrink)

Patients with schizophrenia have a higher risk of cardiovascular diseases and higher mortality from them than does the general population; however, the underlying mechanism remains unclear. Impaired cerebral autoregulation is associated with cerebrovascular diseases and their mortality. Increased or decreased cerebral blood flow in different brain regions has been reported in patients with schizophrenia, which implies impaired cerebral autoregulation. This study investigated the cerebral autoregulation in 21 patients with schizophrenia and 23 age- and sex-matched healthy controls. (...) None of the participants had a history of cardiovascular diseases, hypertension, or diabetes. All participants underwent 10-min blood pressure and cerebral blood flow recording through finger plethysmography and Doppler ultrasonography, respectively. Cerebral autoregulation was assessed by analyzing two autoregulation indices: the mean blood pressure and cerebral blood flow correlation coefficient (Mx), and the phase shift between the waveforms of blood pressure and cerebral blood flow determined using transfer function analysis. Compared with the controls, the patients had a significantly higher Mx (0.257 vs. 0.399, p = 0.036) and lower phase shift (44.3° vs. 38.7° in the 0.07–0.20 Hz frequency band, p = 0.019), which indicated impaired maintenance of constant cerebral blood flow and a delayed cerebrovascular autoregulatory response. Impaired cerebral autoregulation may be caused by schizophrenia and may not be an artifact of coexisting medical conditions. The mechanism underlying impaired cerebral autoregulation in schizophrenia and its probable role in the development of cerebrovascular diseases require further investigation. (shrink)

What are the relationships between an entity and the space at which it is located? And between a region of space and the events that take place there? What is the metaphysical structure of localization? What its modal status? This paper addresses some of these questions in an attempt to work out at least the main coordinates of the logical structure of localization. Our task is mostly taxonomic. But we also highlight some of the underlying structural features and (...) we single out the interactions between the notion of localization and nearby notions, such as the notions of part and whole, or of necessity and possibility. A theory of localization—we argue—is needed in order to account for the basic relations between objects and space, and runs afoul a pure part-whole theory. We also provide an axiomatization of the relation of localization and examine cases of localization involving entities different from material objects. (shrink)

This research explores the effects of globalization to the Malaysian architectural practice in the current situation. The research explores three issues, firstly what are the reasons local architects are taking projects locally (localization) only, and, secondly, what are the factors which motivate local architects to venture into international projects (termed as globalization). It also explores, thirdly, what are the factors which influence foreign architects coming to Malaysia to practice. Research was qualitative in nature using semi-structured interviews. The interviews were (...) transcribed and a thematic analysis was carried out. An online survey was conducted towards the end to a different group from the architecture fraternity to supplement the research and findings. Overall, the reasons uncovered for the first issue are the total lack of opportunities and insufficient capacity due to small practices. Reasons for the second issue are due to the more lucrative fees and the experience and technology transfer which are advancements to their practices. For the third issue, the factors were found to more personal reasons based rather than solely applying to practice. In summary, to go global or stay local is actually up to the individual preference of the architect and also the capacity of their practices. The findings can be used as a resource for architects and architectural students who are still deciding whether to globalize or localize their careers. As it currently the case, many architects are practicing in other countries to replicate architectural styles which may be more conducive to sustainable tourism, for example, hotel designs. (shrink)

Traumatic brain injury is the leading cause of death in children. Children with severe TBI are in need of neurointensive care where the goal is to prevent secondary brain injury by avoiding secondary insults. Monitoring of cerebral blood flow (CBF) and autoregulation in the injured brain is crucial. However, there are limited studies performed in children to investigate this. Current studies report on age dependent increase in CBF with narrow age range. Low initial CBF following TBI has been correlated (...) to poor outcome and may be more prevalent than hyperemia as previously suggested. Impaired cerebral pressure autoregulation is also detected and correlated with poor outcome but it remains to be elucidated if there is a causal relationship. Current studies are few and mainly based on small number of patients between the age of 0–18 years. Considering the changes of CBF and cerebral pressure autoregulation with increasing age, larger studies with more narrow age ranges and multimodality monitoring are required in order to generate data that can optimize the therapy and clinical management of children suffering TBI. (shrink)

Amongst invertebrates, molluscs show great variability in their nervous system ranging from primitive arrangement in Chitons to the complex mass of fused ganglia forming the ‘brain’ of cephalopods. Most of the effector organs used for pharmacological or physiological experiments. The neurosecretory cells (NSCs) with their combination of neuronal and glandular capabilities are perfectly suited to translate a neuronal input into the hormonal output best suited to long-term process. In this capacity, the NSCs may produce hormones, which act directly upon the (...) peripheral target or it may exert its effect indirectly by influencing the activity of other non-neural, endocrine organs. Neurosecretory cells have been detected in the cerebral, pedal and visceral ganglia of Lamellidens corrianus. The distribution and biology of freshwater bivalve like Lamellidens corrianus is influenced by local ecological factors (like temperature, pH, inorganic salts, type of soil etc.), water flow system and presence of micro-organisms, teleost fishes and seasonal variations in these parameters. Nitrogenous excretory changes which include ammonia in these molluscs is also influenced by these local ecological factors in which temperature is plays very crucial role. It is well known fact that the high stress conditions during drought or severe winter conditions have been conquered by several lineage of gastropods and sand bivalves and their ability to enter the resistant or dormant stages (low food) protein catabolism increased. Present investigation deals with the oxygen consumption and ammonia excretion ratio of these freshwater pelecypode Lamellidens corrianus. Study on Lemellidens corrianus directed in understanding the different behavioral and physiological aspects after cerebral ganglia removal and injection of their extracts revealed significant changes during summer (April-May). (shrink)

The electric activities of cortical pyramidal neurons are supported by structurally stable, morphologically complex axo-dendritic trees. Anatomical differences between axons and dendrites in regard to their length or caliber reflect the underlying functional specializations, for input or output of neural information, respectively. For a proper assessment of the computational capacity of pyramidal neurons, we have analyzed an extensive dataset of three-dimensional digital reconstructions from the NeuroMorphoOrg database, and quantified basic dendritic or axonal morphometric measures in different regions and layers of (...) the mouse, rat or human cerebral cortex. Physical estimates of the total number and type of ions involved in neuronal electric spiking based on the obtained morphometric data, combined with energetics of neurotransmitter release and signaling fueled by glucose consumed by the active brain, support highly efficient cerebral computation performed at the thermodynamically allowed Landauer limit for implementation of irreversible logical operations. Individual proton tunneling events in voltage-sensing S4 protein alpha-helices of Na+, K+ or Ca2+ ion channels are ideally suited to serve as single Landauer elementary logical operations that are then amplified by selective ionic currents traversing the open channel pores. This miniaturization of computational gating allows the execution of over 1.2 zetta logical operations per second in the human cerebral cortex without combusting the brain by the released heat. (shrink)

This paper addresses a fundamental line of research in neuroscience: the identification of a putative neural processing core of the cerebral cortex, often claimed to be “canonical”. This “canonical” core would be shared by the entire cortex, and would explain why it is so powerful and diversified in tasks and functions, yet so uniform in architecture. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the search for canonical explanations over the past 40 years, discussing the theoretical frameworks informing this (...) research. It will highlight a bias that, in my opinion, has limited the success of this research project, that of overlooking the dimension of cortical development. The earliest explanation of the cerebral cortex as canonical was attempted by David Marr, deriving putative cortical circuits from general mathematical laws, loosely following a deductive-nomological account. Although Marr’s theory turned out to be incorrect, one of its merits was to have put the issue of cortical circuit development at the top of his agenda. This aspect has been largely neglected in much of the research on canonical models that has followed. Models proposed in the 1980s were conceived as mechanistic. They identified a small number of components that interacted as a basic circuit, with each component defined as a function. More recent models have been presented as idealized canonical computations, distinct from mechanistic explanations, due to the lack of identifiable cortical components. Currently, the entire enterprise of coming up with a single canonical explanation has been criticized as being misguided, and the premise of the uniformity of the cortex has been strongly challenged. This debate is analyzed here. The legacy of the canonical circuit concept is reflected in both positive and negative ways in recent large-scale brain projects, such as the Human Brain Project. One positive aspect is that these projects might achieve the aim of producing detailed simulations of cortical electrical activity, a negative one regards whether they will be able to find ways of simulating how circuits actually develop. (shrink)

While the past century of neuroscientific research has brought considerable progress in defining the boundaries of the human cerebral cortex, there are cases in which the demarcation of one area from another remains fuzzy. Despite the existence of clearly demarcated areas, examples of gradual transitions between areas are known since early cytoarchitectonic studies. Since multi-modal anatomical approaches and functional connectivity studies brought renewed attention to the topic, a better understanding of the theoretical and methodological implications of fuzzy boundaries in (...) brain science can be conceptually useful. This article provides a preliminary conceptual framework to understand this problem by applying philosophical theories of vagueness to three levels of neuroanatomical research. For the first two levels (cytoarchitectonics and fMRI studies), vagueness will be distinguished from other forms of uncertainty, such as imprecise measurement or ambiguous causal sources of activation. The article proceeds to discuss the implications of these levels for the anatomical study of connectivity between cortical areas. There, vagueness gets imported into connectivity studies since the network structure is dependent on the parcellation scheme and thresholds have to be used to delineate functional boundaries. Functional connectivity may introduce an additional form of vagueness, as it is an organizational principle of the brain. The article concludes by discussing what steps are appropriate to define areal boundaries more precisely. (shrink)

Objective: The aim of this study was to compare oral Artemether-Lumefantrine to intravenous Quinine by exploring its effectiveness in cerebral malaria in hospitalized patients. Materials and Methods: A randomized prospective study was conducted among 64 hospitalized cases of cerebral malaria. One group of patients was treated with intravenous Quinine and another group was treated with oral Artemether-Lumefantrine. Response in clinical, laboratory parameters and outcome of treatment were noted every eight hours. Results: Oral Artemether-Lumefantrine showed almost similar response in (...) clinical and laboratory parameters with median temperature (101º F), pulse rate (102 b/m), systolic BP (110mmHg), GCS (12), hemoglobin (9.8 g/dl), WBC (9000/μl), platelet (130000/μl), B. glucose (101 mg/dl), S. creatinine (1.8 mg/dl), ALT (32 U/L), mean disappearance time of parasite from blood (40 hours), and mean time for regaining full consciousness (30 hours). Final outcome was also similar in both drugs with only 1 death (3.1%) reported in each group. Conclusion: In cerebral malaria intravenous Quinine or oral Artemether-Lumefantrine therapy does not have any statistically significant difference in terms of clinical parameter, laboratory parameter and final outcome. (shrink)

It is common to distinguish between “holist” and “reductionist” views of brain function, where the former envisions the brain as functioning as an indivisible unit and the latter as a collection of distinct units that serve different functions. Opposing reductionism, a number of researchers have pointed out that cortical network architecture does not respect functional boundaries, and the neuroanatomist V. Braitenberg proposed to understand the cerebral cortex as a “great mixing machine” of neuronal activity from sensory inputs, motor commands, (...) and intrinsically generated processes. In this paper, we offer a contextualization of Braitenberg’s point, and we review evidence for the interactions of neuronal activity from multiple sensory inputs and intrinsic neuronal processes in the cerebral cortex. We focus on new insights from studies on audiovisual interactions and on the influence of respiration on brain functions, which do not seem to align well with “reductionist” views of areal functional boundaries. Instead, they indicate that functional boundaries are fuzzy and context dependent. In addition, we discuss the relevance of the influence of sensory, proprioceptive, and interoceptive signals on cortical activity for understanding brain-body interactions, highlight some of the consequences of these new insights for debates on embodied cognition, and offer some suggestions for future studies. (shrink)

In a recent case-control study by Zimny et al. (2021), the development of unruptured cerebral artery aneurysm can be reasonably traced to the combined factor of high wall shear stress and wall shear stress gradient. In addition, regions of bifurcation apices with such factor of significant wall shear stress are critical in aneurysm formation. A consideration of directional and spatial changes in opposition against the inertia and seamless hemodynamic blood flow in approaching the juncture of bifurcation apex that increase (...) interaction of contact forces between arterial walls and blood volume may aid in further discussion of causality. (shrink)

Clinical evidence has shown that physical exercise during pregnancy may alter brain devel- opment and improve cognitive function of offspring. However, the mechanisms through which maternal exercise might promote such effects are not well understood. The present study examined levels of brain-derived neurotrophic factor (BDNF) and absolute cell num- bers in the hippocampal formation and cerebral cortex of rat pups born from mothers exer- cised during pregnancy. Additionally, we evaluated the cognitive abilities of adult offspring in different behavioral paradigms (...) (exploratory activity and habituation in open field tests, spatial memory in a water maze test, and aversive memory in a step-down inhibitory avoid- ance task). Results showed that maternal exercise during pregnancy increased BDNF lev- els and absolute numbers of neuronal and non-neuronal cells in the hippocampal formation of offspring. No differences in BDNF levels or cell numbers were detected in the cerebral cortex. It was also observed that offspring from exercised mothers exhibited better cognitive performance in nonassociative (habituation) and associative (spatial learning) mnemonic tasks than did offspring from sedentary mothers. Our findings indicate that maternal exer- cise during pregnancy enhances offspring cognitive function (habituation behavior and spa- tial learning) and increases BDNF levels and cell numbers in the hippocampal formation of offspring. (shrink)

GianCarlo Ghirardi passed away on June 1st, 201. He would have turned 83 on October 28, 2018. He was without any doubt one of the most prominent theoretical physicists working on the foundation and the philosophy of quantum mechanics. In this paper I review some of his achievements and underline how his research influenced the philosophy of physics community.

Since 1968, the irreversible loss of functioning of the whole brain, called brain death, is assimilated to individual’s death. The almost universal acceptance of this neurological criterion of death had decisive consequences for the contemporary medicine, such as the withdrawal of mechanical ventilation in these patients and organ retrieval for transplantation. The new criterion was successfully accepted in part because the assimilation of brain death state to death was presented by medicine --and acritically assumed by most of societies-- as a (...) scientific and objective fact. Nevertheless, many people do not think that the patients suffering brain death are actually dead. We show here that those people are not necessarily wrong. It can be argued that, in fact, the justification of the neurological criterion is not scientific but moral. We outline the thesis that the problem surrounding the vital status of brain dead patients is due to a confusion between factual and normative questions. Furthermore, we claim that the donation of organs and the withdrawal of life-support could be ethically acceptable even if the patients suffering brain death are considered as alive. As an alternative to the dead donor rule, we propose a justification for organ donation of brain-dead patients based on the (moral) concepts of harm and consent : what truly justifies the procurement of organs on those patients is not that they are dead, but that they wish to donate their organs and that, since they have irreversibly lost their brain, they cannot be harmed. (shrink)

A topological model of elementary semiotic schemes is presented. Implications are discussed with respect to the establishment of abstract terms and the search for ultimate meaning.

Our perception of where touch occurs on our skin shapes our interactions with the world. Most accounts of cutaneous localisation emphasise spatial transformations from a skin-based reference frame into body-centred and external egocentric coordinates. We investigated another possible method of tactile localisation based on an intrinsic perception of ‘skin space’. The arrangement of cutaneous receptive fields (RFs) could allow one to track a stimulus as it moves across the skin, similarly to the way animals navigate using path integration. We applied (...) curved tactile motions to the hands of human volunteers. Participants identified the location midway between the start and end points of each motion path. Their bisection judgements were systematically biased towards the integrated motion path, consistent with the characteristic inward error that occurs in navigation by path integration. We thus showed that integration of continuous sensory inputs across several tactile RFs provides an intrinsic mechanism for spatial perception. (shrink)

L'éternalisme implique une forme exotique d'éternité : toute entité, aussi éphémère soit-elle et quelle que soit sa localisation dans le temps, existe relativement à toute autre localisation temporelle. Cet essai vise, premièrement, à défendre l'éternalisme en exhibant les difficultés rédhibitoires du présentisme et du non-futurisme, et deuxièmement à examiner de quelle manière l'éternalisme pourrait être amendé à l'aune d'une affirmation que l'on trouve sous la plume de certains physiciens, à savoir que, fondamentalement, le temps n'existe pas. La disparition du temps (...) est-elle compatible avec la thèse éternaliste ? Enfin, en guise de conclusion, nous examinerons brièvement une conséquence curieuse de l'éternalisme : bien que mortels, nous sommes des êtres éternels. (shrink)

This chapter provides a brief overview of the history of behavioral neurology, dividing it roughly into six eras. In the ancient and classical eras, emphasis is placed on two transitions: firstly, from descriptions of head trauma and attempted neurosurgical treatments to the exploratory dissections during the Hellenistic period and the replacement of cardiocentrism; and secondly, to the more systematic investigations of Galenus and the rise of pneumatic ventricular theory. In the medieval through post-Renaissance eras, the scholastic consolidation of knowledge and (...) the role of compendia are emphasized, along with the use of new methods from within a mechanistic framework. With the discovery of electrical conductance and the rise of experimentalism, we frame the modern era as period of intense debate over localization, decomposition, and other mechanistic principles, and marked by rapid discovery about the brain. The chapter ends with a discussion of the contemporary era, focusing on the establishment of behavioral neurology research on aphasia, apraxia, and neuropsychiatric conditions. (shrink)

This paper resolves a paradox concerning colour constancy. On the one hand, our intuitive, pre-theoretical concept holds that colour constancy involves invariance in the perceived colours of surfaces under changes in illumination. On the other, there is a robust scientific consensus that colour constancy can persist in cerebral achromatopsia, a profound impairment in the ability to perceive colours. The first stage of the solution advocates pluralism about our colour constancy capacities. The second details the close relationship between colour constancy (...) and contrast. The third argues that achromatopsics retain a basic type of colour constancy associated with invariants in contrast processing. The fourth suggests that one person-level, conscious upshot of such processing is the visual awareness of chromatic contrasts ‘at’ the edges of surfaces, implicating the ‘colour for form’ perceptual function. This primitive type of constancy sheds new light on our most basic perceptual capacities, which mark the lower borders of representational mind. (shrink)

If we take the indexical, “I”, to be epistemologically identical across different contexts, as in, for example, it is the same “I” that at one moment observes, “I see a puddle of water on the floor”, and then, subsequently, exclaims, “I detect a leaking tap”, and, furthermore, we attribute not only self reference but self awareness in the use of the indexical, “I”, then a question arises as to how the “I” finds itself to be in reference to the speaker (...) in one context and not another. We cannot look to the ingredients of the context that the “I” inhabits for the answer because, based upon the above assumptions, the identity, or character, of the “I” stands independently of the context of the speaker. The answer, I argue, requires both the admission of the unreality of space and time, as well as an explanation as to why we have a sense of the here and now despite space and time being unreal. To this end, I turn to the juxtaposition of Kant’s a priori forms of inner sense and outer sense to explain how the cognitive faculty arrives at a sense of time and place despite the declared unreality of time and space. To sustain this explanation in the face of the problem of localisation, I draw on the full implications of Kant’s transcendental idealism in which the properties of time and space are not only withdrawn from things as they exist externally to the mind but also from mental representations insofar as mental representations can be said to exist in themselves. (shrink)

The parallel research is contemporary to analyse processes and localisation in artificial intelligence (AI) associated with connexionism and learning algorithms. In machine learning, the perceptron (or McCulloch-Pitts neuron) is an algorithm for Boolean functions of binary classifiers. A binary classifier is a function which can decide whether or not an input, represented by a vector of numbers, belongs to some specific class. With a pattern N we use the calculator in synthesis applying polynomial advanced systems.

A broad pattern of correlations between mechanisms of brain function impairment and self-transcendence is shown. The pattern includes such mechanisms as cerebral hypoxia, physiological stress, transcranial magnetic stimulation, trance-induced physiological effects, the action of psychoactive substances and even physical trauma to the brain. In all these cases, subjects report self-transcending experiences o en described as ‘mystical’ and ‘awareness-expanding,’ as well as self-transcending skills o en described as ‘savant.’ The idea that these correlations could be rather trivially accounted for on (...) the basis of disruptions to inhibitory neural processes is reviewed and shown to be implausible. Instead, this paper suggests that an as-of-yet unrecognized causal principle underlying the entire pattern might be at work, whose further elucidation through systematic research could hold great promise. (shrink)

Le film de Tarkovsky est un « drame de douleur et de récupération partielle » axé sur la psychologie de l'équipe de la station Solaris. Tarkovsky voulait aborder plus profond émotionnellement et intellectuellement le genre scientifique-fantastique, considéré par lui comme superficiel. Il traite un phénomène central de l'analyse psycho-critique de la perception humaine de Klaus Holzkamp : les conditions de la perception du monde humain sont significatives pour l'homme. Dans la perception, les êtres humains sont orientés vers un sens objectif (...) que possèdent les objets par rapport à l'activité vitale de l'homme. En vertu de cette qualité, la localisation des sens dans les objets est exclusivement une caractéristique du monde humain. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.10967.42403. (shrink)

Growing awareness of the ethical implications of neuroscience in the early years of the 21st century led to the emergence of the new academic field of “neuroethics,” which studies the ethical implications of developments in the neurosciences. However, despite the acceleration and evolution of neuroscience research on nonhuman animals, the unique ethical issues connected with neuroscience research involving nonhuman animals remain underdiscussed. This is a significant oversight given the central place of animal models in neuroscience. To respond to these concerns, (...) the Center for Neuroscience and Society and the Center for the Interaction of Animals and Society at the University of Pennsylvania hosted a workshop on the “Neuroethics of Animal Research” in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. At the workshop, expert speakers and attendees discussed ethical issues arising from neuroscience research involving nonhuman animals, including the use of animal models in the study of pain and psychiatric conditions, animal brain-machine interfaces, animal–animal chimeras, cerebral organoids, and the relevance of neuroscience to debates about personhood. This paper highlights important emerging ethical issues based on the discussions at the workshop. This paper includes recommendations for research in the United States from the authors based on the discussions at the workshop, loosely following the format of the 2 Gray Matters reports on neuroethics published by the Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues. (shrink)

Malcolm’s English-Latin Leviathan is a marvelous technical accomplishment. My issues are with his contextualization, seeing Leviathan primarily as an advice book for Hobbes’s teenage pupil, the future Charles II. Malcolm’s localization involves minimalizing Leviathan's remoter sources, so the European Republic of Letters, for which Hobbes so painstakingly translated his works into Latin, is almost entirely missing, along with current European traditions of Hobbes scholarship. Is this very British Hobbes truly credible, or do we need a more European Hobbes to (...) account for the complexity of Leviathan? (shrink)

En la actualidad, la educación en el municipio de Teziutlán en el estado de Puebla (México) se caracteriza por desarrollar un proceso de aprendizaje para la correcta superación de los alumnos en las diferentes áreas, sin embargo, el rendimiento escolar y el índice de reprobación han puesto en marcha la búsqueda de nuevas estrategias innovadoras para el óptimo funcionamiento de los alumnos que cursan los diferentes grados de la carrera de Fisioterapia. El hecho fundamental de la permanencia escolar es el (...) resultado de la implementación de múltiples investigaciones científicas, con el propósito de rep lantear y fortalecer la metodología de enseñanza. Sin embargo, la Universidad Americana de Puebla, campus Teziutlán, en México, cuenta con 210 alumnos inscritos en los diferentes semestres. El campo de la atención a la salud de las personas con discapacida des o lesiones que provocan la pérdida de la función normal del cuerpo humano se ha incrementado. En consecuencia, aumenta la matrícula en las escuelas de fisioterapia y se incrementa la probabilidad de deserción escolar, en este sentido, la educación tiene ventajas para la investigación encaminada a mejorar los procesos de enseñanza. En el municipio de Teziutlán, Puebla, México, la demanda de la oferta académica de las instituciones educativas en el campo de las ciencias de la salud es creciente. La neurociencia en la educación es fundamental para el conocimiento de una nueva estrategia educativa que se base en la comprensión neurofisiológica del cerebro, para entender a detalle cómo influyen los mecanismos sinápticos, el comportamiento cerebral, por ejempl o, en la empatía, y utilizarlos como herramienta en la mejora del aprendizaje. Este artículo pretende aportar una nueva estrategia de aprendizaje dentro del área educativa en la Licenciatura en Terapia Física de la UAMP. Asimismo, es importante aclarar conocer los mecanismos neurofisiológicos, así como la forma en que intervienen en los procesos educativos. (shrink)

Neural structural representations are cerebral map- or model-like structures that structurally resemble what they represent. These representations are absolutely central to the “cognitive neuroscience revolution”, as they are the only type of representation compatible with the revolutionaries’ mechanistic commitments. Crucially, however, these very same commitments entail that structural representations can be observed in the swirl of neuronal activity. Here, I argue that no structural representations have been observed being present in our neuronal activity, no matter the spatiotemporal scale of (...) observation. My argument begins by introducing the “cognitive neuroscience revolution” (Sect. 1 ) and sketching a prominent, widely adopted account of structural representations (Sect. 2 ). Then, I will consult various reports that describe our neuronal activity at various spatiotemporal scales, arguing that none of them reports the presence of structural representations (Sect. 3 ). After having deflected certain intuitive objections to my analysis (Sect. 4 ), I will conclude that, in the absence of neural structural representations, representationalism and mechanism can’t go together, and so the “cognitive neuroscience revolution” is forced to abandon one of its commitments (Sect. 5 ). (shrink)

Does consciousness collapse the quantum wave function? This idea was taken seriously by John von Neumann and Eugene Wigner but is now widely dismissed. We develop the idea by combining a mathematical theory of consciousness (integrated information theory) with an account of quantum collapse dynamics (continuous spontaneous localization). Simple versions of the theory are falsified by the quantum Zeno effect, but more complex versions remain compatible with empirical evidence. In principle, versions of the theory can be tested by experiments (...) with quantum computers. The upshot is not that consciousness-collapse interpretations are clearly correct, but that there is a research program here worth exploring. (shrink)

The rare but severe cerebral venous thrombosis occurring in some AstraZeneca vaccine recipients has prompted some governments to suspend part of their COVID-19 vaccination programmes. Such suspensions have faced various challenges from both scientific and ethical angles. Most of the criticisms against such suspensions follow a consequentialist approach, arguing that the suspension will lead to more harm than benefits. In this paper, I propose a rights-based argument against the suspension of the vaccine rollouts amid this highly time-sensitive combat of (...) COVID-19. I argue that by suspending a vaccine rollout, a government infringes people's right to take the risks they deem worth taking for their health. I also consider four potential objections to my argument and explain why none of them undermines my argument. (shrink)

Our prominent definitions of cognition are too vague and lack empirical grounding. They have not kept up with recent developments, and cannot bear the weight placed on them across many different debates. I here articulate and defend a more adequate theory. On this theory, behaviors under the control of cognition tend to display a cluster of characteristic properties, a cluster which tends to be absent from behaviors produced by non-cognitive processes. This cluster is reverse-engineered from the empirical tests that comparative (...) psychologists use to determine whether a behavior was generated by a cognitive or a non-cognitive process. Cognition should be understood as the natural kind of psychological process that non-accidentally exhibits the properties assessed by these tests (as well as others we have not yet discovered). Finally, I review two plausible neural accounts of cognition's underlying mechanisms?one based in localization of function to particular brain regions and another based in the more recent distributed networks approach to neuroscience?which would explain why these properties non-accidentally cluster. While this notion of cognition may be useful for a number of debates, I here focus on its application to a recent crisis over the distinction between cognition and association in comparative psychology. (shrink)

Philosophers often state that the persistence of objects in vision is experienced differently than the persistence of sounds in audition. This difference is expressed by using metaphors from the metaphysical endurantism/perdurantism debate. For instance, it is claimed that only sounds are perceived as “temporally extended”. The paper investigates whether it is justified to characterize visually experienced objects and auditorily experienced sounds as different types of entities: endurants and perdurants respectively. This issue is analyzed from the perspective of major specifications of (...) the endurance/perdurance distinction connected, inter alia, with the notions of temporal parts and temporal localization. It is argued that it is unjustified to characterize visually experienced objects and auditorily experienced sounds as different types of entities in respect of how they persist. On the other hand, the apparent difference in the way of persisting can be explained by the presence of contingent differences between typical visual and auditory experiences. (shrink)

The gist of the many-subjects argument is that, given physicalism, it’s hard to avoid the absurd result that there are many conscious subjects in your vicinity with more-or-less the same experiences as you. The most promising ways of avoiding this result have a consequence almost as bad: that there are many things in your vicinity that are in a state only trivially different from being conscious, a state with similar normative significance. This paper clarifies and defends three versions of the (...) many-subjects argument. One version poses the threat of conscious parts. Its key premise is that if physicalism is true, then not only you, but also certain parts of your body, are conscious. These parts might include your brain, your head, all-of-you-except-your-left-pinky, all-of-your-brain-except-one-neuron, or your left cerebral hemisphere. A second version poses the threat of conscious coinciders, things that currently occupy the same spatial region as you and share all your matter. Its key premise is that if physicalism is true, then not only you, but also some things that currently coincide with you, are conscious. These might include your body or the aggregate of particles of which you are currently composed. A third version poses the threat of conscious person candidates, the many human-body-shaped material objects in your vicinity that mostly overlap one another, differing only in a few peripheral atoms. This version claims that if physicalism is true, then there are many conscious person-candidates in your vicinity. -/- . (shrink)

This study aims to determine the factors that may affect in constructing the contextualized learning activity sheets based on the learners’ results and the teachers’ self-assessment using a descriptive correlation research design. The findings of the study revealed that the teachers have varied levels of competence in terms of cultural knowledge and on average, they were at the Proficient level of competency. In addition, teachers’ self-assessments indicated that they strongly practiced the criteria in constructing contextualized IPED LAS. However, still at (...) the Advanced Beginner level based on the learners’ results. It can be concluded that teachers are competent in handling IPED based on their profile and cultural knowledge yet, Advance Beginners in terms of assessment skills. Teachers with higher educational qualifications improved their assessment skills. It is recommended that the regional and division IPED specialist should conduct quarterly training for teachers on the Indigenous Knowledge System and Practices (IKSP) and other IPED-related topics. Teachers may conduct indigenization mapping as part of the pedagogical strategy of handling IPED to encourage localization and indigenization of content. With the findings and results, the project ETASIP is made to aid teachers in planning for their assessment strategies. (shrink)

We suggest that there is confusion between why consciousness developed and what additional functions, through continued evolution, it has co-opted. Consider episodic memory. If we believe that episodic memory evolved solely to accurately represent past events, it seems like a terrible system—prone to forgetting and false memories. However, if we believe that episodic memory developed to flexibly and creatively combine and rearrange memories of prior events in order to plan for the future, then it is quite a good system. We (...) argue that consciousness originally developed as part of the episodic memory system—quite likely the part needed to accomplish that flexible recombining of information. We posit further that consciousness was subsequently co-opted to produce other functions that are not directly relevant to memory per se, such as problem-solving, abstract thinking, and language. We suggest that this theory is compatible with many phenomena, such as the slow speed and the after-the-fact order of consciousness, that cannot be explained well by other theories. We believe that our theory may have profound implications for understanding intentional action and consciousness in general. Moreover, we suggest that episodic memory and its associated memory systems of sensory, working, and semantic memory as a whole ought to be considered together as the conscious memory system in that they, together, give rise to the phenomenon of consciousness. Lastly, we suggest that the cerebral cortex is the part of the brain that makes consciousness possible, and that every cortical region contributes to this conscious memory system. (shrink)

An extended examination of Libet's works led to a comprehensive reinterpretation of his results. According to this reinterpretation, the Minimum Train Duration of electrical brain stimulation should be considered as the time needed to create a brain stimulus efficient for producing conscious sensation and not as a basis for inferring the latency for conscious sensation of peripheral origin. Latency for conscious sensation with brain stimulation may occurafterthe Minimum Train Duration. Backward masking with cortical stimuli suggests a 125-300 ms minimum value (...) for the latency for conscious sensation of threshold skin stimuli. Backward enhancement is not suitable for inferring this latency. For determining temporal relations between stimuli that correspond to subjects' reports, theendof cerebral Minimum Train Duration should be used as reference, rather than its onset. Results of coupling peripheral and cortical stimuli are explained by a latency after the cortical Minimum Train Duration, having roughly the same duration as the latency for supraliminal skin stimuli. Results of coupling peripheral stimuli and stimuli to medial lemniscus (LM) are explained by a shorter LM latency and/or a longer peripheral latency. This interpretation suggests a 230 ms minimum value for the latency for conscious sensation of somatosensory near-threshold stimuli. The backward referral hypothesis, as formulated by Libet, should not be retained. Long readiness potentials preceding spontaneous conscious or nonconscious movements suggest that both kinds of movement are nonconsciously initiated. The validity of Libet's measures of W and M moments (Libet et al., 1983a) is questionable due to problems involving latencies, training, and introspective distinction of W and M. Veto of intended actions may be initially nonconscious but dependent on conscious awareness. (shrink)

In Natural propositions (2014), Stjernfelt contends that the interpretation of a proposition or dicisign requires the joint action of two kinds of signs. A proposition must contain a sign that conveys a general quality. This function can be served by a similarity-based icon or code-based symbol. In addition, a proposition must situate or apply this general quality, so that the predication can become liable of being true or false. This function is served by an index. Stjernfelt rightly considers the co- (...) class='Hi'>localization of these two parts to be a primitive phenomenon. Although this primitive character would seem to bar any further analysis, I endeavor to clarify the degree of proximity sufficient to enable co-localization. Siding with Pietarinen (2014), who argues that the whole issue should not be construed in metric terms, I conclude that one cannot make sense of propositional co-localization without appealing to some form of first-person perspective. (shrink)

Reductive, naturalistic psychosemantic theories do not have a good track record when it comes to accommodating the representation of kinds. In this paper, I will suggest a particular teleosemantic strategy to solve this problem, grounded in the neurocomputational details of the cerebral cortex. It is a strategy with some parallels to one that Ruth Millikan has suggested, but to which insufficient attention has been paid. This lack of attention is perhaps due to a lack of appreciation for the severity (...) of the problem, so I begin by explaining why the situation is indeed a dire one. One of the main tasks for a naturalistic psychosemantic theory is to describe how the extensions of mental representations are determined. (Such a theory may also attempt to account for other aspects of the “meaning” of mental representations, if there are any.) Some mental representations, e.g. the concept of water, denote kinds (I shall be assuming this is non-negotiable). How is this possible? Unfortunately, I haven’t the space to canvass all the theories out there and show that each one fails to accommodate the representation of kinds, but I will point out the major types of problems that arise for the kinds of theories that, judging by the literature, are considered viable contenders.1 In general, the theories either attempt and fail to account for the representation of kinds, or they fall back on something like an intention to refer to a kind – not exactly the most auspicious move for a reductive theory. There are a number of problems that prevent non-teleosemantic theories from explaining how it is possible to represent kinds. A concept of a kind K must.. (shrink)

In this paper, we propose a mathematical model of subjective experience in terms of classes of hierarchical geometries of representations (“n-awareness”). We first outline a general framework by recalling concepts from higher category theory, homotopy theory, and the theory of (infinity,1)-topoi. We then state three conjectures that enrich this framework. We first propose that the (infinity,1)-category of a geometric structure known as perfectoid diamond is an (infinity,1)-topos. In order to construct a topology on the (infinity,1)-category of diamonds we then propose (...) that topological localization, in the sense of Grothendieck-Rezk-Lurie (infinity,1)-topoi, extends to the (infinity,1)-category of diamonds. We provide a small-scale model using triangulated categories. Finally, our meta-model takes the form of Efimov K-theory of the (infinity,1)-category of perfectoid diamonds, which illustrates structural equivalences between the category of diamonds and subjective experience (i.e.its privacy, self-containedness, and self-reflexivity). Based on this, we investigate implications of the model. We posit a grammar (“n-declension”) for a novel language to express n-awareness, accompanied by a new temporal scheme (“n-time”). Our framework allows us to revisit old problems in the philosophy of time: how is change possible and what do we mean by simultaneity and coincidence? We also examine the notion of “self” within our framework. A new model of personal identity is introduced which resembles a categorical version of the “bundle theory”: selves are not substances in which properties inhere but (weakly) persistent moduli spaces in the K-theory of perfectoid diamonds. (shrink)

The chief themes of this discussion are as follows. First, we need a theory of the grounds of moral status that could guide practical considerations regarding how to treat the wide range of potentially conscious entities with which we are acquainted – injured humans, cerebral organoids, chimeras, artificially intelligent machines, and non-human animals. I offer an account of phenomenal value that focuses on the structure and sophistication of phenomenally conscious states at a time and over time in the mental (...) lives of conscious subjects. Second, we need to map a theory of moral status onto practical considerations. I prefer the precautionary framework proposed by many, and fruitfully precisified recently by Birch. I have suggested that in addition to further discussion surrounding the evidential bar for attributing consciousness to different types of entities, more discussion is needed regarding how value and moral status may vary across different entity-types, and regarding the sources of value in an entity’s mental life. (shrink)

Consider a set of shuffled observations drawn from a fixed probability distribution over some instance domain. What enables learning of inductive generalizations which proceed from such a set of observations? The scenario is worthwhile because it epistemically characterizes most of machine learning. This kind of learning from observations is also inverse and ill-posed. What reduces the non-uniqueness of its result and, thus, its problematic epistemic justification, which stems from a one-to-many relation between the observations and many learnable generalizations? The paper (...) argues that this role belongs to any complexity regularization which satisfies Norton’s Material Theory of Induction (MTI) by localizing the inductive risk to facts in the given domain. A prime example of the localization is the Lottery Ticket Hypothesis (LTH) about overparameterized neural networks. The explanation of MTI’s role in complexity regularization of neural networks is provided by analyzing the stability of Empirical Risk Minimization (ERM), an inductive rule that controls the learning process and leads to an inductive generalization on the given set of observations. In cases where ERM might become asymptotically unstable, making the justification of the generalization by uniform convergence unavailable, LTH and MTI can be used to define a local stability. A priori, overparameterized neural networks are such cases and the combination of LTH and MTI can block ERM’s trivialization caused by equalizing the strengths of its inductive support for risk minimization. We bring closer the investigation of generalization in artificial neural networks and the study of inductive inference and show the division of labor between MTI and the optimality justifications (developed by Gerhard Schurz) in machine learning. (shrink)

The paper brings a challenge to Cartesian dualism, while introducing some under-explored manuscript remarks from Wittgenstein’s middle period, which are methodologically and thematically akin to some passages from Merleau-Ponty’s early period. Cartesian dualism relegates pain to mental awareness and location to bodily extension, thus rendering common localizations of pain throughout the body as unintelligible ascriptions. Wittgenstein’s and Merleau-Ponty’s attempts at doing justice to common localizations of pain are mutually illuminating. In their light, Cartesian dualism turns out to involve an objectification (...) and a deappropriation of one’s body. Moreover, Wittgenstein’s unveiling a heterogeneous multiplicity of corporeal spaces (e.g. visual-space, tactile-space, feeling-space) rehabilitates the view, reinforced by Merleau-Ponty, that corporeal pain is intimately related to corporeal localization, while corporeal space is not part of the physical space of things. (shrink)

The philosophical conception of mechanistic explanation is grounded on a limited number of canonical examples. These examples provide an overly narrow view of contemporary scientific practice, because they do not reflect the extent to which the heuristic strategies and descriptive practices that contribute to mechanistic explanation have evolved beyond the well-known methods of decomposition, localization, and pictorial representation. Recent examples from evolutionary robotics and network approaches to biology and neuroscience demonstrate the increasingly important role played by computer simulations and (...) mathematical representations in the epistemic practices of mechanism discovery and mechanism description. These examples also indicate that the scope of mechanistic explanation must be re-examined: With new and increasingly powerful methods of discovery and description comes the possibility of describing mechanisms far more complex than traditionally assumed. (shrink)

Explanations in behavioural neuroscience are often said to be mechanistic in the sense that they explain an organism’s behaviour by describing the activities and organisation of the organism’s parts that are “constitutively relevant” to organism behaviour. Much has been said about the constitutive relevance of working parts (in debates about the so-called “mutual manipulability criterion”), but relatively little has been said about the constitutive relevance of the organising relations between working parts. Some New Mechanists seem to endorse a simple causal-linking (...) account: organising relations are constitutively relevant to organism behaviour if and only if (and because) they are causal relations that link the working parts that are constitutively relevant to organism behaviour. In this paper, I argue that the causal-linking account is inadequate because it neglects the constitutive relevance of anatomical relations that organise the working parts of a behaving organism. I demonstrate this by considering a case study where the anatomical organisation of the barn owl (Tyto alba) is constitutively relevant to their mechanism for sound localization. The anatomical organisation of this mechanism is best understood as the back-and-forth flow of task information across 7 “levels of anatomy” (a notion that I distinguish from levels of mechanism). A further implication, I conclude, is that at least some of the interlevel structure of neuroscientific explanation is accounted for by levels of anatomy, not levels of mechanism. (shrink)

Much recent cognitive neuroscientific work on body knowledge is representationalist: “body schema” and “body images”, for example, are cerebral representations of the body (de Vignemont 2009). A framework assumption is that representation of the body plays an important role in cognition. The question is whether this representationalist assumption is compatible with the variety of broadly situated or embodied approaches recently popular in the cognitive neurosciences: approaches in which cognition is taken to have a ‘direct’ relation to the body and (...) to the environment. A “direct” relation is one where the boundaries between the body and the head, or between the environment and the animal are not theoretically important in the understanding of cognition. These boundaries do not play a theoretically privileged role in cognitive explanations of behavior. But representationalism appears to put a representational veil between the locus of cognition and that which is represented, making cognitive relations to the body and to the environment be indirect, with a high associated computational load. For this reason, direct approaches have tried to minimize the use of internal representations (Suchman 1987; Barwise 1987; Agre and Chapman 1987; Brooks 1992; Thelen and Smith 1994; van Gelder 1995; Port and van Gelder 1995; Clark 1997, 1999; Rupert 2009, p. 180). Does a cognitive neuroscience committed to direct relations rule out a representationalist approach to body knowledge? Or is direct representationalism possible? (shrink)

The paper identifies in Cartesian dualism a common target of the middle Wittgenstein and the early Merleau-Ponty. By relegating pain to mental awareness and location to bodily extension, Cartesian dualism renders common localizations of pain throughout the body as unintelligible ascriptions. Wittgenstein’s and Merleau-Ponty’s efforts to do justice to common localizations of pain illuminate one another. In their light, Cartesian dualism involves an objectification and a deappropriation of one’s body. Further, Wittgenstein’s acknowledgment of a heterogeneous multiplicity of corporeal spaces (e.g. (...) tactile space, feeling space) restores the view, reinforced by Merleau-Ponty, that corporeal pain is intimately related to corporeal localization, while corporeal space is not a continuation of the physical space of things. (shrink)

The paper brings a challenge to Cartesian dualism, while introducing some under-explored manuscript remarks from Wittgenstein’s middle period, which are methodologically and thematically akin to some passages from Merleau-Ponty’s early period. Cartesian dualism relegates pain to mental awareness and location to bodily extension, thus rendering common localizations of pain throughout the body as unintelligible ascriptions. Wittgenstein’s and Merleau-Ponty’s attempts at doing justice to common localizations of pain are mutually illuminating. In their light, Cartesian dualism turns out to involve an objectification (...) and a deappropriation of one’s body. Moreover, Wittgenstein’s unveiling a heterogeneous multiplicity of corporeal spaces (e.g. visual-space, tactile-space, feeling-space) rehabilitates the view, reinforced by Merleau-Ponty, that corporeal pain is intimately related to corporeal localization, while corporeal space is not part of the physical space of things. (shrink)