An action-oriented perspective changes the role of an individual from a passive observer to an actively engaged agent interacting in a closed loop with the world as well as with others. Cognition exists to serve action within a landscape that contains both. This chapter surveys this landscape and addresses the status of the pragmatic turn. Its potential influence on science and the study of cognition are considered (including perception, social cognition, social interaction, sensorimotor entrainment, and language acquisition) and its impact (...) on how neuroscience is studied is also investigated (with the notion that brains do not passively build models, but instead support the guidance of action). A review of its implications in robotics and engineering includes a discussion of the application of enactive control principles to couple action and perception in robotics as well as the conceptualization of system design in a more holistic, less modular manner. Practical applications that can impact the human condition are reviewed (e.g., educational applications, treatment possibilities for developmental and psychopathological disorders, the development of neural prostheses). All of this foreshadows the potential societal implications of the pragmatic turn. The chapter concludes that an action-oriented approach emphasizes a continuum of interaction between technical aspects of cognitive systems and robotics, biology, psychology, the social sciences, and the humanities, where the individual is part of a grounded cultural system. (shrink)

While several tests and strategies are recommended for colorectal cancer (CRC) screening, studies suggest that primary care providers often recommend colonoscopy without providing information about its risks or alternatives. These observations raise concerns about the quality of informed consent for screening colonoscopy.

Throughout the biological and biomedical sciences there is a growing need for, prescriptive ‘minimum information’ (MI) checklists specifying the key information to include when reporting experimental results are beginning to find favor with experimentalists, analysts, publishers and funders alike. Such checklists aim to ensure that methods, data, analyses and results are described to a level sufficient to support the unambiguous interpretation, sophisticated search, reanalysis and experimental corroboration and reuse of data sets, facilitating the extraction of maximum value from data sets (...) them. However, such ‘minimum information’ MI checklists are usually developed independently by groups working within representatives of particular biologically- or technologically-delineated domains. Consequently, an overview of the full range of checklists can be difficult to establish without intensive searching, and even tracking thetheir individual evolution of single checklists may be a non-trivial exercise. Checklists are also inevitably partially redundant when measured one against another, and where they overlap is far from straightforward. Furthermore, conflicts in scope and arbitrary decisions on wording and sub-structuring make integration difficult. This presents inhibit their use in combination. Overall, these issues present significant difficulties for the users of checklists, especially those in areas such as systems biology, who routinely combine information from multiple biological domains and technology platforms. To address all of the above, we present MIBBI (Minimum Information for Biological and Biomedical Investigations); a web-based communal resource for such checklists, designed to act as a ‘one-stop shop’ for those exploring the range of extant checklist projects, and to foster collaborative, integrative development and ultimately promote gradual integration of checklists. (shrink)

Dretske has provided very influential arguments that there is a difference between our sensory awareness of objects and our awareness of facts about these objects—that there is a difference, for example, between seeing x and seeing that x is F. This distinction between simple and epistemic seeing is a staple of the philosophy of perception. Memory is often usefully compared to perception, and in this spirit I argue for the conditional claim that if Dretske’s arguments succeed in motivating the posit (...) of simple seeing, then parallel arguments should equally motivate a posit I call simple remembering. Simple remembering would be a conscious form of memory about an object or event which is prior to and independent of any beliefs the subject may or may not form about the object or event simply remembered. (shrink)

"Modern History" versions of the etiological theory claim that in order for a trait X to have the proper function F, individuals with X must have been recently favored by natural selection for doing F (Godfrey-Smith 1994; Griffiths 1992, 1993). For many traits with prototypical proper functions, however, such recent selection may not have occurred: traits may have been maintained due to lack of variation or due to selection for other effects. I examine this flaw in Modern History accounts and (...) offer an alternative etiological theory, the Continuing Usefulness account, which appears to avoid such problems. (shrink)

Pace Perry, wondering whether perceived things are identical is thinking about them, for Hume, with no thought of perceptions of them. Hume is not a proto-Fregean; Hume's Difficulty is not a version of Frege's Puzzle. Pace Falkenstein, wondering about an identity is not wondering whether clearly distinct things--stages, surfaces, names--are connected in some way. Pace Garrett, wondering about the identity of an observed object is wondering whether it is really one or two things, not whether there is one F or (...) two Fs. Second, Humean consciousness is apperception, not immediate awareness. Third, Hume finds nothing with epistemic merit. (shrink)

Mystical Theology and Platonism in the Time of Cusanus engages with the history of mystical theology and Neoplatonic philosophy through the lens of the 15th century philosopher and theologian, Nicholas of Cusa. The volume comprises nineteen essays that break down the barriers between medieval and Renaissance studies, reinterpreting Cusanus’ place in the history of thought by exploring the archive that informed his thinking, while also interrogating his works by exploring them from the standpoint of their later reception by modern philosophers (...) and theologians. The volume also offers tribute to the career of Donald F. Duclow, a leading scholar in the field of Cusanus studies in particular and of the history of mystical theology and Neoplatonic philosophy more generally. (shrink)

Donald Davidson and John Searle famously differ, among other things, on the issue of animal thoughts. Davidson seems to be a latter-day Cartesian, denying any propositional thought to subhuman animals, while Searle seems to follow Hume in claiming that if we have thoughts, then animals do, too. Davidson’s argument centers on the idea that language is necessary for thought, which Searle rejects. The paper argues two things. Firstly, Searle eventually argues that much of a more complex thought does depend (...) on language, which reduces a distance between himself and Davidson. Secondly, some of Davidson’s suggestions are promising – in particular the idea that we may lack a vocabulary to capture the contents of animal thoughts. Based on this insight, one might, pace Davidson, grant thoughts to animals. However, this does not mean, pace Searle, that it should be possible to construe even the simplest of such thoughts as propositional. Perhaps we need to move beyond Davidson and Searle by developing a theory of nonpropositional thought for animals. (shrink)

In contemporary mathematics, a Colombeau algebra of Colombeau generalized functions is an algebra of a certain kind containing the space of Schwartz distributions. While in classical distribution theory a general multiplication of distributions is not possible, Colombeau algebras provide a rigorous framework for this. Remark 1.1.1.Such a multiplication of distributions has been a long time mistakenly believed to be impossible because of Schwartz’ impossibility result, which basically states that there cannot be a differential algebra containing the space of (...) distributions and preserving the product of continuous functions. However, if one only wants to preserve the product of smooth functions instead such a construction becomes possible, as demonstrated first by J.F.Colombeau [1],[2]. As a mathematical tool, Colombeau algebras can be said to combine a treatment of singularities, differentiation and nonlinear operations in one framework, lifting the limitations of distribution theory. These algebras have found numerous applications in the fields of partial differential equations, geophysics, microlocal analysis and general relativity so far. (shrink)

Providing the most thorough coverage available in one volume, this comprehensive, broadly based collection offers a wide variety of selections in four major genres, and also includes a section on film. Each of the five sections contains a detailed critical introduction to each form, brief biographies of the authors, and a clear, concise editorial apparatus. Updated and revised throughout, the new Fourth Edition adds essays by Margaret Mead, Russell Baker, Joan Didion, Annie Dillard, and Alice Walker; fiction by Nathaniel Hawthorne, (...) Ursula K. LeGuin, Anton Chekov, James Joyce, Katherine Mansfield, F. Scott Fitzgerald, William Faulkner, Alice Walker, Louise Erdrich, Donald Barthelme, and James McPherson; poems by John Donne, Robert Browning, Walt Whitman, Edwin Arlington Robinson, e.e. cummings, Langston Hughes, W.H. Auden, Philip Levine, and Louise Gluck; and plays by August Wilson, Marsha Norman, Wendy Wasserstein, and Vaclav Havel. The chapter devoted to film examines the relation of film to literature and gives the complete screenplay for Citizen Kane plus close analysis of a scene from the film. With its innovative structure, comprehensive coverage, and insightful and stimulating presentation of all kinds of literature, this is an anthology readers will turn to again and again. (shrink)

What happens to the inner light of consciousness with the death of the individual body and brain? Reductive materialism assumes it simply fades to black. Others think of consciousness as indicating a continuation of self, a transformation, an awakening or even alternatives based on the quality of life experience. In this issue, speculation drawn from theoretic research are presented. -/- Table of Contents Epigraph: From “The Immortal”, Jorge Luis Borges iii Editor’s Introduction: I Killed a Squirrel the Other Day, Gregory (...) M. Nixon iv-xi Research Essays The Tilde Fallacy and Reincarnation: Variations on a "Skeptical" Argument Teed Rockwell 862-881 Death, Consciousness, and Phenomenology, Steve Bindeman 882-899 The Idealist View of Consciousness After Death, Bernardo Kastrup 900-909 Consciousness, a Cosmic Phenomenon—A Hypothesis, Eva Déli 910-930 The Theory of a Natural Afterlife: A Newfound, Real Possibility for What Awaits Us at Death, Bryon K. Ehlmann 931-950 Near-Death Cases Desegregating Non-Locality/Disembodiment via Quantum Mediated Consciousness: An Extended Version of the Cell-Soul Pathway, Contzen Pereira & J Shashi Kiran Reddy 951-968 On the Possible Existence of Quantum Consciousness After Brain Death, Massimo Pregnolato & Alfredo Pereira Jr. 969-991 Science and Postmortem Survival, Edward F. Kelly 992-1011 Explorations ISS Theory: Cosmic Consciousness, Self, and Life Beyond Death in a Hyperdimensional Physics, Chris H. Hardy 1012-1035 Does the Consciousness End, Remain Awake, or Transform After Death? Radivoj Stankovich (with Micho Durdevich) 1036-1050 Big Bang Spirituality, Life, and Death, Ken Bausch 1051-1063 Death, Consciousness and the Quantum Paradigm, Ronald Peter Glasberg 1064-1077 Living With Limits: The Continuum of Consciousness, Donald Brackett 1078-1098 Mysticism, Consciousness, Death, Mike Sosteric 1099-1118 What Dies? Eternalism and the Afterlife in William James, Jonathan Bricklin 1119-1140 Theories of Consciousness and Death: Does Consciousness End, Continue, Awaken, or Transform When the Body Dies? Roger Cook 1141-1153 It’s the Other Way Around: Matter is a Form of Consciousness and Death is the End of the Illusion of Life in the World, James P. Kowall & Pradeep B. Deshpande 1154-1208 Statements A Feminine Vision for the World Consciousness, & a New Outrageous Ontology, Lorna Green 1209-1217 The Mask of Eternity: The Quest for Immortality and the Afterlife, Iona Miller 1218-1228 Are We Really “such stuff as dreams are made on”? Chris Nunn 1229-1225 Is the Afterlife a Non-Question? (Let's Hope Not), Deepak Chopra 1226-1230 Life After Death? An Improbable Essay, Stuart Kauffman 1231-1236. (shrink)

INTRODUÇÃO O ovo da galinha consiste em uma célula reprodutiva bastante comparável às encontrada nos mamíferos. Todavia, no caso da galinha, essa célula reprodutiva localiza- se na superfície da gema, sendo preenchida por albumens, membranas de casca, casca e cutícula. O ovário é responsável pela formação da gema; as porções restantes do ovo originam-se no canal do oviduto. • OVÁRIO No momento do desenvolvimento precoce do embrião, existem dois ovários e dois ovidutos, entretanto o conjunto ovário-oviduto direito atrofia-se, deixando apenas (...) o ovário e o oviduto esquerdo funcional para a realização dos processos embrionários e de formação do ovo (feto). Antes da produção de óvulos, o ovário consiste em uma massa inerte de pequenos folículos que contém os óvulos. Alguns óvulos possuem estatura suficiente para serem vistos visualmente; outros requerem ampliação para serem detectados. A galinha possui inúmeros folículos presentes no ovário, que são capazes de suprir toda a produção de gemas da vida da ave. FORMAÇÃO DA GEMA A gema (figura 1) não é a verdadeira célula reprodutiva, mas como uma fonte de material alimentar a partir do qual a célula blastoderma e seu embrião resultante irão se sustentar durante o desenvolvimento. Quando uma franga atinge a maturidade sexual, o ovário e o oviduto sofrem algumas alterações. Cerca de 11 dias antes da fêmea colocar seu primeiro ovo, uma sequência de alterações hormonais ocorrem em seu organismo. O hormônio FSH (folículo estimulante) produzido pela glândula pituitária (hipófise) anterior faz com que os folículos ovarianos aumentem de tamanho, mas para que isso aconteça a fêmea deve ser exposta à luz, já que é o segundo fator relevante depois da nutrição adequada para a formação do ovo, uma vez que através do olho os estímulos da luz que entram no olho atingem as células nervosas até a hipófise que libera o FSH. Em suma, o ovário ativado começa a gerar hormônios como o estrogênio, progesterona e testosterona (esteroides sexuais). Os níveis plasmáticos mais elevados de estrogênio iniciam o desenvolvimento do osso medular, bem como estimula a produção de proteína albumina e a formação de lipídios (gordura) pelo fígado, além de aumentar o tamanho do oviduto, o que permite a produção de proteínas de albumina, membranas da casca, carbonato de cálcio para a formação da casca, e cutícula. A primeira gema (óvulo) que começa a amadurecer capta as grandes quantidades do material produzido pelo fígado e transportado pelo sistema circulatório diretamente para o ovário em desenvolvimento. Um ou dois dias depois da primeira, a segunda gema começa a se desenvolver, e assim por diante, até que no momento em que é posto o primeiro ovo, cerca de cinco a dez gemas já estão no processo de crescimento. É necessário em torno de 10 dias para que uma gema cresça e siga o caminho para se transformar num ovo posto. Depósitos de material de gema são lentos no início e possuem coloração clara. Eventualmente, o óvulo atinge um diâmetro de 6 mm, valor que cresce a uma taxa muito expressiva diária de até 4 mm. Um número maior de gemas encontram- se em desenvolvimento ao mesmo tempo em matrizes (galinhas reprodutoras) do que em poedeiras, no entanto a matriz não possui a capacidade de produzir uma taxa grande de ovos completos. A coloração presente na gema é xantofila, um pigmento carotenoides derivado da dieta do animal. O pigmento é transferido primeiro para a corrente sanguínea em função do processo de digestão e absorção, em seguida, rapidamente para a gema, bem como para outras partes do corpo como as penas. Consequentemente, em função da dieta, um teor mais elevado de xantofilas é depositado na gema durante as horas em que a galinha está comendo. Isso dá origem a depósitos de camadas escuras e claras no material da gema, dependendo do pigmento dietético disponível. Cerca de 7 a 11 anéis concêntricos são encontrados em cada gema. A formação de gemas é uniforme e a espessura total de depósitos de coloração clara e escura durante 24 horas é de cerca de 1,5 a 2,0 mm. A gema de ovo é composta basicamente de gorduras (lipídios) e proteínas, que combinam-se para a formação das lipoproteínas, das quais 60% do peso da gema é de lipoproteínas de baixa densidade (LDL), e são conhecidas por serem sintetizado pelo fígado através da ação do estrogênio. Na galinha poedeira, o LDL é removido do plasma sanguíneo como partículas intactas para a deposição do mesmo diretamente nos óvulos em desenvolvimento. Fatores que influenciam o crescimento da gema As gemas variam de tamanho entre as aves individuais de um aviário da mesma idade e são, geralmente, associados com as diferenças no peso corporal. O tamanho da gema não está associado a taxa de postura da ave, mas provavelmente com o tempo necessário para que os óvulos atinjam a maturidade e se desprendam. As gemas de uma galinha aumentam de tamanho ao longo do ciclo de produção. Além disso, o primeiro ovo posto em uma ninhada geralmente conterá uma gema maior do que os restantes. Os ovos colocados durante o final do dia são cerca de 0,5 gramas mais leves para cada hora adicional do dia; isso também está associado com gemas menores. A inclusão de gordura e proteína na dieta também demonstram um aumento significativo no tamanho da gema em desenvolvimento. Localização do disco germinativo O material da gema é colocado adjacente ao disco germinal (figura 1) que permanece na superfície da massa da gema globular. Uma vez que o ovo é posto, a gema gira para que o disco germinal permaneça na extremidade do ovo. OVULAÇÃO Quando a franga entra na maturidade, os óvulos são liberados do ovário para que possam entrar no canal do oviduto por um processo conhecido como ovulação. Cada óvulo encontra-se pendurado no ovário por uma haste estreita que contém as artérias que fornecem o sangue para a gema em desenvolvimento. As artérias sofrem diversas ramificações nas membranas superficiais da gema e o folículo têm um aspecto altamente vascular (figura 2), exceto pelo estigma, uma faixa estreita no entorno da gema que é quase desprovido de vasos sanguíneos. Figura 2: ovário com os folículos pequenos e prontos para se desprenderem. Fonte: IPA. Quando um óvulo está maduro, o hormônio progesterona, produzido pelo ovário, estimula o hipotálamo para causar a liberação do hormônio luteinizante (LH) da hipófise anterior que, por sua vez, faz com que o folículo maduro se rompa no local do estigma liberando o óvulo do ovário. A gema é então cercada apenas pela membrana vitelina (membrana da gema). Atraso da primeira ovulação A maturidade sexual, visualizada através da primeira ovulação da ave, pode ser acelerada ou retardada. Restringir a alimentação ou diminuir a duração do dia durante o período de crescimento da franga são os dois procedimentos principais para a agilizar o processo na galinha. O que inicia a ovulação? Não se sabe ao certo os parâmetros que definem a hora da primeira ovulação da ave, porém tanto o sistema nervoso quanto as secreções hormonais são de essencial importância na manifestação da mesma. A segunda ovulação é regulada mediante a oviposição (postura) do primeiro ovo cerca de 15 a 40 minutos após o primeiro ovo passar pelo canal da cloaca. As ovulações posteriores ocorrem com a mesma frequência em função dos ovos subsequentes serem postos. Ovos postos em ninhadas As galinhas põem ovos em dias sucessivos conhecidos como ninhadas, do qual nenhum é posto por um ou mais dias. O corrimento do ciclo da ninhada pode várias de 2 dias a mais de 200 antes de um dia é perdido, mas a maioria das poedeiras comerciais pode produzir mais de 50 ovos sucessivos, sem uma pausa durante as fases iniciais de produção no primeiro ciclo da ninhada. O comprimento da ninhada é bastante consistente nos indivíduos; as poedeiras com taxas de produção menores possuem um ciclo mais curto, enquanto que as grandes produtoras possuem ciclos mais longos. Uma vez que o comprimir do ciclo ninhada é estabelecido, a galinha não irá ovular por um ou mais dias e, em seguida, irá produzir outra ninhada. As poedeiras menos produtivas possuem um período de descanso mais longo entre as ninhadas do que as boas produtoras. Tempo necessário para produzir um ovo O tempo necessário para que um ovo atravesse o oviduto varia de acordo com os indivíduos. A maioria das galinhas põe ovos sucessivos com intervalos de tempo entre 23 a 26 horas. Se o tempo for maior que 24 horas, cada ovo será posto no final do dia. Os ovos postos à tarde passaram mais horas no oviduto do que os postos pela manhã. Eventualmente, os ovos são colocados tão tarde que o ritmo é quebrado e uma ovulação é pulada. Teoricamente, alguns autores dizem que o tempo ideal para uma boa formação de um ovo é de 25 horas. O óvulo se desprende do ovário entrando no canal do oviduto, permanece por 15 minutos no infundíbulo que é a primeira região do oviduto, em seguida o óvulo vai para o magno a segunda região do oviduto e permanece nessa região entre 2 a 3 horas. Em seguida, vai para o istmo, ficando nessa região entre 1 a 1,5 horas. Por último, vai para o útero permanecendo nessa região entre 18 a 20 horas. Por fim, vai para a vagina onde recebe um óleo, indo para a cloaca onde é posto. Tempo de ovulação As galinhas que produzem ninhadas mais longas colocam seu primeiro ovo no início do dia, uma ou duas horas após o nascer do Sol ou as luzes artificiais são ligadas. A ovulação da próxima gema acontece rapidamente após o primeiro ovo ser posto, com apenas um pequeno intervalo de tempo. As poedeiras com comprimentos mais curtos da ninhada colocam seu primeiro ovo mais tarde do dia, a ovulação da gema seguinte é mais lenta, e a defasagem de tempo para a postura é maior. A maioria das ovulações ocorre durante as primeiras horas da manhã, já que não é natural que a ovulação ocorra em meados do final da tarde. Produção de ovos no início da postura Durante a primeira semana de postura, a ovulação é bastante irregular, uma vez que o mecanismo hormonal da galinha não está em equilíbrio. Na maioria das vezes, apenas dois a quatro ovos são produzidos na primeira ninhada. Entretanto, na segunda ou terceira semana, a ovulação irá progredindo gradativamente em sua taxa de pico até cair lentamente a cada semana durante o restante do ciclo de postura. Luz e ovulação A luz, seja natural ou artificial, possui um efeito direto sobre a glândula pituitária, estimulando-a a segregar uma quantidade maior do hormônio FSH que, por sua vez, ativa a região ovariana. A duração e a intensidade da luz são fatores importantes no processo de planejamento de uma granja, bem como durante a fase de postura. O procedimento para iluminar corretamente um galpão de galinhas poedeiras não é uma tarefa fácil e será discutido trabalhos posteriores. Nidificação como indicação de ovulação Na maioria das vezes, a galinha procura um ninho cerca de 24 horas após a ovulação, levando aos pesquisadores a teorizar que a nidificação pode ser usada como um fator de indicação da ovulação. Evidentemente, a presença de um ovo totalmente formado na cloaca não tem nada a ver com o desejo da galinha de procurar um ninho. Por exemplo, algumas galinhas irão ovular, todavia por causa de um imprevisto, o óvulo não chega ao oviduto, essas mesmas galinhas ainda irão procurar um ninho no dia seguinte. Ovulação dupla Normalmente, apenas uma gema é ovulada por dia, entretanto, ocasionalmente duas gemas podem ser liberadas e, em raras ocasiões até três gemas podem ser liberadas. Se duas gemas serão ovuladas ao mesmo tempo, normalmente apenas uma entra no canal do oviduto, mas se ambas são apanhadas simultaneamente pelo oviduto, resultará em um ovo de gema dupla (figura 3). Cerca de dois terços dos ovos de gema dupla são resultantes de ovulações dentro de 3 horas de um para o outro. Se houver uma grande diferença de tempo de ovulação, dois ovos poderão ser produzidos no mesmo dia, porém na maioria das vezes o segundo ovo possui casca mole ou apenas é revestido por uma membrana (figura 4). Geralmente, os ovos de gema dupla são mais comuns durante a primeira parte do período de produção do ovo causados por um ovário hiperativo e, frequentemente, são associados com frangos de corte do que com galinhas poedeiras. A incidência é um traço herdado, uma vez que algumas aves mais velhas produzem um percentual maior de ovos com gema dupla do que outras, sendo assim, a característica pode ser hereditária. As aves criadas na estação da Primavera e no Verão também produzem um número maior de ovos de gema dupla do que as galinhas criadas no Outono e no Inverno. Figura 3: ovo de gema dupla. Fonte: IPA. Figura 4: ovo com casca mole. Fonte: IFPE. CASCA DE OVOS DEFEITUOSAS Quando o intervalo normal de 23 a 26 horas entre as ovulações é quebrado, mais ovos são produzidos com casca defeituosas (figuras 4 e 5), incluindo aqueles com textura de lixa, bandas brancas, salpicos de cálcio e depósitos de calcário. A ocorrência é maior em ovos de matrizes do que em poedeiras. Cerca de 5 a 7% dos ovos produzidos por uma matriz poderá apresentar alguma forma de deformações na casca. Esses defeitos estão associados principalmente com a idade do lote e com as raças mais propensas ao problema do que outras. Figura 5: deformações na casca do ovo. Fonte: internet. TAMANHO DA GEMA AFETA O TAMANHO DO OVO O tamanho do ovo normal está associado mais com o tamanho da gema do que com qualquer outros fator relevante, embora as variações nas secreções de albumina no oviduto possam ter alguma influência. A relação gema-albumina muda ao longo do ciclo de postura. Os ovos que são produzidos no início do período de postura possuem gemas que representam em torno de 25% do peso total do ovo, enquanto que as gemas compõem cerca de 30% do peso do ovo quando as galinhas estão perto do final do período de postura. Em outras palavras, à medida em que o tamanho do ovo aumenta, o peso da gema aumenta mais rapidamente do que o peso do albúmen. Em lotes de frangas, quando o tamanho do ovo é pequeno, o aumento de proteína na dieta pode aumentar o peso total até 3,5 g/cada. MANCHAS DE SANGUE E DE CARNE Muitas vezes, quando o saco vitelino se rompe ao longo do estigma, pequenos vasos sanguíneos perto da área da ruptura são quebrados, formando um coágulo de sangue ligado à gema. A frequência de hemorragias pode estar relacionada com uma série de fatores, como a genética, alimentação, idade da galinha etc. As manchas de sangue são de duas a três vezes mais comuns em galinhas que produzem ovos de casca marrom do que em galinhas poedeiras de casca branca. Qualquer tecido deslocado do saco folicular ou do oviduto poderá ser incluído ao ovo em desenvolvimento à medida que passa pelo oviduto. Esses pedaços de tecido escurecem com a idade e são conhecidos como manchas de carne. Muitas manchas de sangue escurecem também, e muitas vezes são classificadas de forma incorreta como manchas de carne. Este problema é especialmente prevalente em ovos de casca marrom, onde 15% ou mais dos ovos podem ser afetados, em comparação com menos de 1% em ovos de casca branca. Figura 6: ovo com mancha de carne e com mancha de sangue. Fonte: internet. • PARTES DO OVIDUTO O oviduto é um tubo lindo através do qual a gema passa e onde os componentes restantes do ovo como a clara e a casca são incorporados. Normalmente, o oviduto é relativamente pequeno em diâmetro, mas com a aproximação da primeira ovulação seutamanho e espessura se expandem de forma significativa para que possa favorecer a passagem e o desenvolvimento do ovo. Os segmentos do oviduto e sua finalidade serão resumidos no texto abaixo e ilustrados na figura 7 e 8. INFUNDÍBULO A porção superior do oviduto que possui uma formato de funil é denominada infundíbulo. Quando encontra-se funcional, seu comprimento é de aproximadamente 9 cm. Normalmente é inerte, exceto quando ocorre a ovulação, seu objetivo é captar a gema ou óvulo que se desprende do ovário para que a mesma entre no oviduto, por isso a forma de funil. Após a ovulação, a gema entra na bolsa ovariana ou na cavidade do corpo, a partir da qual é capturada pelo infundíbulo. A gema permanece nessa secção por apenas um curto período de cerca de 15 minutos, depois é forçada ao longo do oviduto através das várias contrações ou movimentos peristálticos. Mau funcionamento do infundíbulo Para que o infundíbulo seja completamente funcional, ele deve capturar todas as gemas que se desprendem do ovário e caiu na cavidade do corpo. No entanto, verificou- se que uma média de 4% das gemas não são atraídas para o segmento, porém permanecem na cavidade do corpo onde são reabsorvidas dentro de um dia. A porcentagem de gemas retidas varia entre as várias linhagens de galinhas, algumas podem reter até 10% de suas gemas na cavidade corporal. As matrizes são as mais afetadas do que as poedeiras. Camadas internas Às vezes, o infundíbulo perde a sua capacidade de captação de uma alta proporção de gemas, e acabam acumulando-se na cavidade do corpo mais rápido do que possam ser reabsorvidas. Tal problema é definido por “camadas internas”, embora o termo não defina de forma clara a condição. O abdômen em tais camadas torna-se distendido, e a galinha fica em uma posição ereta. MAGNO O magno é a porção secretória de albúmen do oviduto, possui cerca de 33 cm de comprimento nas poedeiras em média. Demora aproximadamente cerca de 2 a 3 horas para passagem do ovo em desenvolvimento passar pelo magno. Albúmen O albúmen em um ovo é composto por quatro camadas, sendo elas: Chalaza ou calaza 2,7% Líquido branco exterior 16,8% Densidade branca 57,3% Branco fino exterior 23,2% Fonte: BELL. Enquanto todos os quatro são produzidos no magno, o branco fino exterior não é concluído até que a água seja adicionada no útero. Chalaza ou calaza Ao quebrar um ovo, percebe-se duas partes torcidas conhecidas como calaza, estendendo-se de polos opostos da gema através do albúmen. L albúmen calcífero é produzido quando a gema entra pela primeira vez no magno, mas a torção para formação dos dois calazas acontece mais tardiamente, como o ovo gira na extremidade inferior do oviduto. Torcidas em direções opostas, a calaza tende a manter a gema no centro do ovo depois que ele é posto. Líquido interior branco À medida que o ovo em desenvolvimento passa pelo magno, apenas um tipo de albúmen é produzido, porém a adição de água juntamente com a rotação do ovo dão origem a várias outras camadas, uma delas e a expressiva é o líquido interno de coloração branca. Densidade branca O branco denso constitui a maior parte do ovo. Contém muco que tente a mantê- lo juntos. A quantidade de branco espesso gerada no magno é grande, mas a degradação da mucina e a adição de água, já que o ovo move-se através do oviduto, tendem a reduzir a quantidade desse líquido denso e grosso, aumentando a quantidade do branco fino. No momento em que o ovo é posto, ele possui cerca de um terço do seu conteúdo original de clara, porém o restante ainda compreende mais da metade do albúmen no ovo. Deterioração da qualidade dos ovos Após a postura dos ovos, há uma mudança constante no conteúdo interno do ovo. A clara é a primeira que começa a perder gradualmente a sua composição viscosa e o seu volume diminui, enquanto que o branco fino fica mais aguado e sua quantidade aumenta. Essas condições são afetadas pela temperatura de retenção, umidade relativa, tempo e certas doenças. A quantidade crescente de branco fino é um dos melhores indicadores das condições de idade (frescura) dos ovos. ISTMO Depois da passagem pelo magno, o ovo em desenvolvimento é forçado para o istmo, uma secção relativamente curta de aproximadamente 10 cm de comprimento, onde permanece entre 1 a 1,5 horas (média geral de 75 minutos). Aqui, as membranas da casca interna e externa são formadas de modo a representar a dona final do ovo. O conteúdo presente nesse momento não é suficiente para preencher completamente as membranas da casca, e o ovo assemelha-se a um saco parcialmente preenchido. As membranas da casca são um material parecido com um papel composto de fibras proteicas. A membrana interna estabelece-se primeiro, seguida pela membrana externa, que é três vezes mais grossa que a membrana interna. As duas membranas são mantidas juntas até que o ovo seja posto; em seguida, na extremidade do ovo, as duas membranas se separam para formar a célula de ar, essencial para a respiração do feto no caso de ovos de matrizes. Em uma pequena porcentagem dos ovos, a célula de ar se formará na extremidade pequena ou nas laterais. Importância da célula ou câmara de ar Quando o ovo é posto pela primeira vez não há célula de ar. Ela é estabelecida através da redução de temperatura e aumenta de diâmetro para cerca de 1,8 cm conforme a perda de água do ovo por evaporação. À medida em que o ovo envelhece, a umidade ou presença d água dentro do mesmo evapora através dos poros presentes na casca e a câmara de ar aumenta em diâmetro e profundidade. O tamanho da célula de ar pode ser afetado por várias condições de armazenamento. A alta temperatura circundante e/ou a baixa umidade aumentam o tamanho da câmara de ar. O tamanho da célula, conforme determinado pela ovoscopia, é usado em programas de classificação de julgamento da idade do ovo. As células de ar maiores são prerrogativas de pior qualidade interior. Membranas da casca atuam como barreiras As membranas da casca atuam como uma barreira à penetração de organismos microscópios tais como as bactérias que podem afetar diretamente a qualidade do mesmo para consumo ou o embrião em desenvolvimento. Os ovos postos por frangas possuem membranas de casca mais espessas do que os ovos postos por galinhas mais velhas, o que se determina que conforme a idade da ave, as membranas protetoras vão ficando mais finas o que pode levar a penetração de microrganismos que afetam a qualidade do ovo. ÚTERO (GLÂNDULA DA CASCA) O útero é o penúltimo caminho do ovo em desenvolvimento, possui cerca de 10 a 12 cm de comprimento nas galinhas poedeiras. O ovo em desenvolvimento normalmente permanece no útero de 18 a 20 horas, muito mais do que em qualquer outra seção do oviduto. Exterior fino branco depositado após as membranas da casca Quando o ovo entra pela primeira vez no útero, a água e os sais minerais são depositados através das membranas da casca pelo processo de osmose de dentro para fora das membranas da casca de forma gradativa e aderindo para liquefazer alguns dos albumens finos que formam a quarta camada, o branco fino exterior. A casca A calcificação da casca do ovo começa antes do mesmo entrar no útero. Pequenas quantidades de Ca aparecem na membrana externa da casca pouco antes do ovo deixar o istmo. Esses são os locais de iniciação para a deposição de cálcio no útero. A quantidade de Ca provavelmente herdada desempenha um papel primordial na deposição de Ca mais tarde no ovo. Eles desaparecem pouco tempo depois que o ovo entra na glândula da casca ou útero. A primeira camada da casca é depositada sobre os locais de iniciação (istmo) que forma a casca interna, uma camada composta de cristais de calcita que é um material com característica esponjosa. Essa camada é seguida pela adição da camada externa, que é composta por uma camada de cristais de calcita que são os calcários, camada que possui cerca de duas vezes mais espessura que a superfície interna da casca. Quanto mais longas forem as colunas de calcita, mais forte será a casca. A casca do ovo quando completa, é composta quase inteiramente de carbonato de cálcio (CaCO3), com pequenas quantidades de sódio, potássio e magnésio. Figura 9: carbonato e fórmula do cálcio presente no útero e istmo. Fonte: internet. Fontes de cálcio para a casca de ovo Existem apenas duas fontes de cálcio para a produção da casca, a alimentação e os ossos que atuam como locais de armazenamento de cálcio no corpo. Normalmente, a maioria do Ca para a formação dos ovos vem diretamente da ração que a ave come, com alguns derivados do osso medular que serve como reservatório de Ca. O reservatório é particularmente importante à noite, quando a ave não está comendo e a casca do ovo está em processo de desenvolvimento. Formação do carbonato de cálcio O carbonato de cálcio (figura 9) é formado quando os íons de Ca presentes no sangue e os íons carbonatos do sangue e da glândula da casca ou útero se combinam no útero. Qualquer fator que reduza o fornecimento de qualquer um desses íons interfere com a formação de CaCO3 e o desenvolvimento da casca do ovo, muitas vezes resultando em baixa qualidade da casca, que será discutida em outros trabalhos. Acredita-se que as altas temperaturas ambientais também podem contribuir para este problema, uma vez que as cascas de ovos são mais finas durante o tempo quente. Qualidade da casca Muitos fatores podem causar uma deterioração na qualidade da casca do ovo, e a influência desse má qualidade pode não ser em função do fornecimento inadequado de íons de cálcio ou carbonato. A qualidade da casca é, geralmente, definida como a capacidade da casca de suportar o choque, sua aparência geral e suavidade. A resistência da casca pode ser medida mediante várias técnicas, incluindo a resistência à quebra, gravidade específica, deformações e espessura da mesma. Vários fatores podem reduzir a qualidade da casca, por exemplo: 1. A qualidade é reduzida à medida que a ave envelhece e continua a postura, uma vez que a galinha não pode produzir de forma eficiente a quantidade adequada de carbonato de cálcio para cobrir os ovos maiores produzidos durante a última parte do ciclo de postura, mesmo com o Ca presente na ração de consumo. 2. Aumento das temperaturas ambientais. 3. Ovos postos de manhã possuem uma qualidade da casca inferior à dos ovos postos pela tarde. 4. Estresse experimentado pelas aves que receberam chuva ou que foram, de alguma forma, submetidas à água. 5. Praticamente todos os ovos deformados e os ovos submetidos a controles corporais são postos entre às 6 e 8 horas da manhã, complemento do item 3. 6. Certas doenças como a bronquite infecciosa e a doença de Newcastle. 7. Determinados antibióticos ou outros fármacos. Necessidades de cálcio durante a produção A demanda da poedeira por Cá é extremamente alta. As aves poedeiras requerem mais Ca para a produção de ovos para consumo do que as matrizes reprodutoras que produzem pintainhos. Uma galinha de 2 kg produzindo 250 ovos de 56,7 gramas em média por ano requer cerca de 560 gramas de Ca. Uma vez que essa quantidade é 25 vezes maior que a quantidade de Ca presente no esqueleto da ave, é evidente que a necessidade alimentar de Ca seja grande. A maioria das rações de postura contém de 3 a 4% de Ca para atender as necessidades e permitir as ineficiências de absorção do Ca para o corpo e sim para o ovo. Figura 10: estrutura do ovo e da casca. Fonte: Adaptação da internet. Poros da casca do ovo As duas camadas da casca do ovo interna e externa possuem pequenas aberturas chamadas poros. Em um ovo pode haver até 8000 poros. Através dessas pequenas aberturas, o ar consegue passar para o ovo e fornece oxigênio para o embrião em desenvolvimento. Além disso, o dióxido de carbono e a umidade são removidos do ovo passando por esses mesmos poros. No ovo recém-posto, os poros presentes são quase completamente fechados, porém à medida que o ovo envelhece ou é lavado, o número de poros abertos aumenta. Cor da casca A casca do ovo é predominantemente branca ou marrons. No entanto, uma raça sul-americana, a Araucana, produz ovos de casca verde ou azul. Os pigmentos produzidos no útero no momento em que a casca é produzida são os responsáveis pela coloração. O tom de coloração é bastante consistente de acordo com cada ave, com a intensidade da cor sendo uma derivação da composição genética do indivíduo. Algumas linhagens de aves põem ovos com cascas castanhas mais escuras, enquanto que outras podem variar até ao branco. O pigmento marrom nas cascas de ovos é a porfirina, uniformemente distribuída por toda a casca. A cutícula A cutícula é colocada na parte externa da casca no útero e representa a última das camadas de formação dos ovos. É composta principalmente de material orgânico. Contém uma alta porcentagem de água e atua como lubrificante natural durante o processo de postura. Todavia, uma vez que o ovo é posto, o material da cutícula seca rapidamente, selando os poros da casca o que ajuda a evitar uma troca rápida de ar e umidade entre o interior do ovo e o ambiente externo, além de vedar a passagem de bactérias e outros microrganismos que podem afetar a qualidade ou o embrião. Vários processos de limpeza da casca (lavagem e desinfecção) reduzem a eficácia da cutícula. Para evitar esse problema, os processadores de ovos comumente aplicam um revestimento de óleo mineral na superfície da casca durante o processamento. Tal óleo ajuda a diminuir a perda de umidade e mantém a qualidade interna do ovo. REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS ALBINO, L. F. T. et al. Galinhas poedeiras: Criação e alimentação. Viçosa: Aprenda Fácil, 2014. Anotações de aulas. Disciplina: Avicultura. Prof. Me. Cléber Rondinelli Gomes de Freitas. IFPE Campus Belo Jardim, 2017. BELL, Donald D. Formation of the egg. In: Commercial chicken meat and egg production. Springer, Boston, MA, 2002. p. 59-69. COTTA, Tadeu. Galinha: produção de ovos. Viçosa: Aprenda Fácil Editora, 2002. COTTA, T. Reprodução da galinha e produção de ovos. Lavras: UFLA-Faepe, p. 81- 92, 1997. DE MORAES, Ismar Araujo. Fisiologia da reprodução das aves domésticas. Fisiovet, 2006. FLORIANO, Luciane Sperandio. Anatomia e fisiologia das aves domésticas. Ururaí: rede E-tec, 2018. GRAU, C. R. Egg formation. In: Seabird energetics. Springer, Boston, MA, 1984. p. 33- 57. LANA, Geraldo Roberto Quintão. Avicultura. Recife: Livraria e Editora Rural Ltda, 2000 PERRINS, C. M. Eggs, egg formation and the timing of breeding. Ibis, v. 138, n. 1, p. 2- 15, 1996. STURKIE, Paul D. Fisiología aviar. Zaragoza: Acribia, 1967. (shrink)

This volume presents discussions on a wide range of topics focused on eco-phenomenology and the interdisciplinary investigation of contemporary environmental thought. Starting out with a Tymieniecka Memorial chapter, the book continues with papers on the foundations, theories, readings and philosophical sources of eco-phenomenology. In addition, it examines issues of phenomenological anthropology, ecological perspectives of the human relationship to nature, and phenomenology of the living body and the virtual body. Furthermore, the volume engages in a dialogue with contemporary behavioral sciences on (...) topics such as eco-alienation, sustainability, and the human relationship to the earth in the context of the cosmos. (shrink)

The Gathas, a corpus of seventeen poems in Old Avestan composed by the ancient Iranian poet-priest Zarathushtra (Zoroaster) ca. 1200 B.C.E., is the foundation document of Zoroastrian religion. Even though the dualistic axiology of the Gathas has been widely noted, it has proved very difficult to understand the meaning and genre of the corpus or the position of Zarathushtra’s ideas with regard to other religious philosophies. Relying on recent advances in translation and decryptions of Gathic poetry, I shall here develop (...) a philosophical interpretation of the Gathas, including, as shall be discussed here in detail, explication of the revelation he reports in the poem known as Yasna 30. I argue that, similarly to Marx, Henry, and Schutz, Zarathushtra connects social criticism with an original philosophy of (inter)subjectivity and existential reflection, placing his account in the context of a fully developed metaphysics which includes the human-divine sharing of mental properties. I show that in order to accommodate this complicated problematic, Zarathushtra uses the vehicle of multiple realities. Reflecting the spontaneity of life, the dynamics of various ontological modes in the text create a reference to subjectivity. A description of the dream in Yasna 30 is sufficiently within the limits of possibility for a dream experience, and thereby delivers three original phenomenological reductions. The reductions initiate a genetic account of the phenomenalization of invisible impulses which give rise to moral choices, and define the human-divine relationship. The opposing moral choices open into a reverse axiological intentionality in the sphere of intersubjectivity, and are said to plot life for the rightful and lifelessness for the wrongful. It can be concluded that Zarathushtra’s theism and views of the social world are “the first philosophy”, with a unique and original phenomenological ontology of intersubjectivity at its core. (shrink)

In Book I of his Nicomachean Ethics (NE), Aristotle defines happiness, or eudaimonia, in accordance with an argument he makes regarding the distinctive function of human beings. In this paper, I argue that, despite this argument, there are moments in the NE where Aristotle appeals to elements of happiness that don’t follow from the function argument itself. The place of these elements in Aristotle’s account of happiness should, therefore, be a matter of perplexity. For, how can Aristotle appeal to elements (...) of happiness not entailed by his argument for what happiness involves? I will examine two instances that exemplify the sort of appeal to outside elements that I have in mind. The first deals with Aristotle’s reference, in NE, I, 8, to certain goods—ancestry, children, beauty—goods unrelated to man’s function or his fulfillment of it, but nevertheless required for his happiness. The second instance involves pleasure. Aristotle makes various arguments, both in Books I and X of the NE, that tie pleasure to the activity of the soul, and the function argument in turn. However, none of these arguments succeeds in demonstrating that pleasure would necessarily follow from this activity. Taken together then, these two examples demonstrate the extent to which Aristotle’s definition of happiness is more inclusive than his function argument permits. (shrink)

Two brief Late Antique religious texts, respectively by the monk Theophanis and by Monoimus the Arab, present an interesting problem of whether they embody the authors’ experience, or whether they are merely literary constructs. Rather than approaching this issue through the lens of theory, the article shows how phenomenological analysis and studies of living subjectivity can be engaged with the text in order to clarify the contents of introspective experience and the genesis of its religious connotations. The analysis uncovers a (...) previously unnoticed form of embodied introspective religious experience which is structured as a ladder with a distinct internal structure with the high degree of synchronic and diachronic stability. This approach also helps one identify the specific introspective techniques in the canonical and non-canonical literature of early Christian tradition, as related to the concepts of “ theosis ” and “ kenosys ”, as well as to suggest some neurological correspondents of religious cognition. (shrink)

This article presents phenomenological meta-analysis of Tymieniecka's phenomenology of life with regard to its strategies of knowledge. The novelty of phenomenology of life consists in special orientation of direct intuition of Tymieniecka's insight. The analysis suggests that the positioning of the direct intuition differes from philosopher to philosopher. Even though this perspective pays attention to individual differences in philosophical thinking, this view has to be distinguished froll1 psychologism as criticized by Husser!. and rather, seen as a development of Husserl 's (...) lheory of direct intuition. A framework for such analysis can be also found in Islamic philosophies of Suhrawardi and Ibn 'Arabi, who introduced the concepts of individual predisposition, modes of knowledge, and self-knowledge mediated by knowledge by presence. These concepts can be applied to understanding of the origins of philosophical insight. The paper examines in depth the workings of direct, or presentive, intuition in Tymieniecka's descriptions of the phenomenal field of life, and of life per se as a dynamic object. It demonstrates the dialogical nature of interrogation, and the sentience of logos as a horizon of philosophical inquiry. Finally, the paper introduces the concept of process phenomenology, and suggests directions of future research with regard to phenomenology of imagination. (shrink)

Applying Michel Henry’s philosophical framework to the phenomenological analysis of religious experience, the author introduces a concept of material introspection and a new theory of the constitution of religious experience in phenomenologically material interiority. As opposed to ordinary mental self-scrutiny, material introspection happens when the usual outgoing attention is reverted onto embodied self-awareness in search of mystical self-knowledge or union with God. Such reversal posits the internal field of consciousness with the self-disclosure of phenomenological materiality. As shown by the example (...) of Vedantic self-inquiry, material introspection is conditioned on the attitude ‘I “see” myself’ and employs reductions which relieve phenomenological materiality from the structuring influence of intentionality; the telos of material introspection is expressed by the inward self-transcendence of intentional consciousness into purified phenomenological materiality. Experience in material introspection is constituted by the self-affection and self-luminosity of phenomenological materiality; experience is recognized as religious due to such essential properties as the capacity of being selffulfilled, and specific qualitative “what it’s like”(s). Drawing on more than 5000 live accounts of internal religious experience, it is shown that introspective attention can have different trajectories, producing, within a temporal extension of material introspection, different spatial modifications of embodied selfawareness and a variety of corresponding religious experiences. (shrink)

This paper argues that the Islamic metaphysical vision finds its Western philosophical counterpart in Anna-Teresa Tymienecka's Phenomenology of Life. Comparative analysis of the main categories and strategies of knowledge in Islamic metaphysics and the Phenomenology of Life demonstrates obvious similarities, but also significant distinctions whereby the systems can be viewed as complementary. Tymieniecka’s philosophy begins with epoché on preceding philosophical knowledge, while Islamic philosophy begins with revelation. Tymieniecka uses presuppositionless phenomenological direct intuition combined with reflective analysis, while Sufi metaphysics combines (...) logic, intuitio,n and reliance on the experience attained in states of mystical perception. Unification of Reality and realization of truth in the Phenomenology of Life is attained via phenomenological intuition of life in all forms of experience, and in Islam, via certainty attained in religious experiences of unveiling. Due to its refocusing on the dynamic moments of the ontopoiesis of life, Tymieniecka’s ontology serves as a possible solution to the problems incurred by the more static metaphysical vision of Reality in Sufism. (shrink)

The concept of metaphor as primarily a vehicle for conveying ideas, even if unusual ones, seems to me as wrong as the parent idea that a metaphor has a special meaning. I agree with the view that metaphors cannot be paraphrased, but I think this is not because metaphors say something too novel for literal expression but because there is nothing there to paraphrase. Paraphrase, whether possible or not, inappropriate to what is said: we try, in paraphrase, to say it (...) another way. But if I am right, a metaphor doesn't say anything beyond its literal meaning. This is not, of course, to deny that a metaphor has a point, nor that that point can be brought out by using further words.... My disagreement is with the explanation of how metaphor works its wonders. To anticipate: I depend on the distinction between what words mean and what they are used to do. I think metaphor belongs exclusively to the domain of use. It is something brought off by the imaginative employment of words and sentences and depends entirely on the ordinary meanings of those words and hence on the ordinary meanings of the sentences they comprise. Donald Davidson is University Professor of philosophy at the University of Chicago. He is the author of many important essays, including "Actions, Reasons and Causes," "Causal Relations," and "Truth and Meaning," coauthor of Decision-Making: An Experimental Approach, and coeditor of Words and Objections, Semantics of Natural Language, and The Logic of Grammar. (shrink)

THIS PAPER IS THE CO-WINNER OF THE FRED BERGER PRIZE IN PHILOSOPHY OF LAW FOR THE 1999 AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE BEST PUBLISHED PAPER IN THE PREVIOUS TWO YEARS. -/- The conflict between liberal legal theory and critical legal studies (CLS) is often framed as a matter of whether there is a theory of justice that the law should embody which all rational people could or must accept. In a divided society, the CLS critique of this view is overwhelming: (...) there is no such justice that can command universal assent. But the liberal critique of CLS, that it degenerates into an unpalatable moral relativism on which there is no non-arbitrary basis between a justice that underwrites forms of domination such as slavery and a justice that condemns such forms of domination is equally powerful and compelling. I show that there is a way to harmonize both views that is subject to empirical test. -/- First I show that the most widely accepted and influential formulation of liberal justice, John Rawls' Justice as Fairness, in. e.g, A Theory of Justice, cannot avoid the relativistic challenge because it would not be accepted, as a matter of sociological fact, by real people in a divided society once the "veil of Ignorance" is removed and real people step out from the Original Position. To put it differently, different reflective equilibria are inevitable in a divided society. Given the weight that Rawls properly puts on the realizability of a conception of justice and its stability in practice, this is a fatal objection. There can be no divided society that is "well ordered" in Rawls' sense, governed by a shared conception of justice and known to be so governed. -/- I then turn to the most powerful statement of the CLS view, Milton's Fisk's relativistic account in The State and Justice. For Fisk, justice is a compromise between what the dominant groups can compel and what the the subordinate groups will acquiesce to., There is no one such compromise in any given situation, so the account is in that sense relativistic, but more deeply, it is relativistic in that it offers no non-arbitrary, non-question begging way to choose between the official justice of, e.g., a slaveholding society and and the radical justice of the slaves, which has no place for slaveholders as a group or slavery as an institution.All that Fisk can offer is an arbitrary existential choice: I'm with the slaves. (Or the slaveowners.) Most of us would find this disconcerting or even unacceptable. -/- I show that Fisk's general sort of account can be modified to allow for an non-arbitrary choice. Given general facts about human nature, societies based on domination will produce resistance that over the long run will diminish or eliminate various forms of domination. Through a sort of ratchet effect, rights won will be hard if not impossible to reverse. Societies embodying forms of domination can therefore be compared on dimensions of stability: the more domination, the more resistance, and the less stability. Such societies are inferior on the dimension of justice to more emancipatory society on the terms of both kinds of justice, official and radical. -/- This is not question begging because regimes of domination incorporate stability no less than more emancipatory social orders. The choice between official justice embodying domination and radical justice that does not is not arbitrary because it is based on a shared commitment to long term stability. This offers an empirical test of which social orders are more justice, and a prediction that over time, domination will tend to decrease. (shrink)

In this Article, I propose a novel law and economics explanation of a deeply puzzling aspect of business organization in market economies. Why are virtually all firms organized as capital-managed and -owned (capitalist) enterprises rather than as labor-managed and -owned cooperatives? Over 150 years ago, J.S. Mill predicted that efficiency and other advantages would eventually make worker cooperatives predominant over capitalist firms. Mill was right about the advantages but wrong about the results. The standard explanation is that capitalist enterprise is (...) more efficient. Empirical research, however, overwhelmingly contradicts this. But employees almost never even attempt to organize worker cooperatives. I critique the explanations of the three leading analysts of the subject (N. Scott Arnold, Henry Hansmann, and Gregory Dow), all of whom offer are different transactions cost accounts, as logically defective and empirically inadequate. I then propose an explanation that has been oddly neglected in the literature, that the rarity of cooperatives is explained by the collective action problem identified by writers such as Mancur Olson. Labor management is a public good that generates the n-person prisoner’s dilemma which gives rational actors the incentive to create it in suboptimal (or no) amounts. I support this by reference to the empirical facts about the origin of existing cooperatives and show that this explanation requires no strong version of a questionable rational choice theory. This explanation is supplemented by the mere exposure or familiarity effect derived from social and cognitive psychology, which turns on the fact that labor managed firms are rare, in part because of the public goods problem, thus unfamiliar, which makes them less attractive and thus more likely to be rare. My account points advocates of labor management towards solutions such as institutional changes in incentives, which, however, themselves involve public goods issues. (shrink)

Debate about legal and policy reform has been haunted by a pernicious confusion about human nature, the idea that it is a set of rigid dispositions, today generally conceived as genetic, that is manifested the same way in all circumstances. Opponents of egalitarian alternatives argue that we cannot depart far from the status quo because human nature stands in the way. Advocates of such reforms too often deny the existence of human nature because, sharing this conception, they think it would (...) prevent changes they deem desirable. Both views rest on deep errors about what it is to have a nature and how genetics works. Human nature, like the nature of anything else, is a set of potentials to behave certain ways in given environments, not a nonsocial genetic something that inevitably produces the same result in any environment. To say that existing inequalities, are due to our genes, inalterable because heritable, ignores that genetic propensities may be differently manifested in different environments. Heritability has meaning only relative to an environment and a population and implies nothing about inevitability. A better sort of inegalitarian argument is that a proposed reform, given our nature, would be too costly even if possible. However, this sort of argument is too rarely supported by evidence and generally ignores the costs of existing inequalities. But egalitarians err in supposing that, if behavior is unconstrained by biology, the status quo is easily alterable. The environment may be extremely hard to change. Legal and policy debate should adopt a correct understanding of human nature as a set of propensities and ask of any proposed reform agreed to be otherwise desirable what and how alterable are its causes, genetic, environmental, or more accurately both. (shrink)

Accounts of the concepts of function and dysfunction have not adequately explained what factors determine the line between low‐normal function and dysfunction. I call the challenge of doing so the line‐drawing problem. Previous approaches emphasize facts involving the action of natural selection (Wakefield 1992a, 1999a, 1999b) or the statistical distribution of levels of functioning in the current population (Boorse 1977, 1997). I point out limitations of these two approaches and present a solution to the line‐drawing problem that builds on the (...) second one. (shrink)

The work argues that engaging Africa's cultural and epistemic resources as social imaginaries, and not as metaphysical or ontological “essences,” could help practitioners of African philosophy overcome the cluster of shortcomings and undesirable features associated with “ethnophilosophy.” A number of points are outlined to buttress this claim. First, the framework of social imaginaries does not operate with the false assumption that Africa's cultural forms and epistemic resources are static and immutable. Second, this framework does not lend itself to sweeping generalizations (...) about Africa or large swathes of it. Third, the framework of social imaginaries remedies ethnophilosophy's problem of collectivism. Fourth, unlike ethnophilosophy, it does not romanticize and canonize a supposedly “idyllic” African past, which militates against a realistic and forward‐looking philosophizing. Finally, with the framework of social imaginaries, Africa's indigenous cultural and epistemic resources become amenable to being engaged with critical philosophical rigor. This not only enhances their potential for cross‐cultural philosophical conversation but also enhances their usefulness for addressing current sociopolitical issues affecting Africa. The discussion in this paper somewhat touches upon the question of method in African philosophy, using the ethnophilosophy problem to navigate the vast gamut of issues involved. (shrink)

Similarly to other accounts of disease, Christopher Boorse’s Biostatistical Theory (BST) is generally presented and considered as conceptual analysis, that is, as making claims about the meaning of currently used concepts. But conceptual analysis has been convincingly critiqued as relying on problematic assumptions about the existence, meaning, and use of concepts. Because of these problems, accounts of disease and health should be evaluated not as claims about current meaning, I argue, but instead as proposals about how to define and use (...) these terms in the future, a methodology suggested by Quine and Carnap. I begin this article by describing problems with conceptual analysis and advantages of “philosophical explication,” my favored approach. I then describe two attacks on the BST that also question the entire project of defining “disease.” Finally, I defend the BST as a philosophical explication by showing how it could define useful terms for medical science and ethics. (shrink)

This essay interprets Butler’s distinction between identity in the loose and popular sense and in the strict and philosophical sense. Suppose there are different standards for counting the same things. Then what are two distinct things counting strictly may be one and the same thing counting loosely. Within a given standard identity is one-one. But across standards it is many-one. An alternative interpretation using the parts-whole relation fails, because that relation should be understood as many-one identity. Another alternative making identity (...) relative to sort fails, because whole and parts can be of the same sort. (shrink)

According to simulationism, the function of episodic memory is not to remember the past, but to help construct representations of possible future episodes, by drawing together features from different experiential sources. This article suggests that the relationship between the traditional storehouse view, on which the function of memory is remembering, and the simulationist approach is more complicated than has been typically acknowledged. This is attributed, in part, to incorrect interpretations of what remembering on the storehouse view requires. Further, by appeal (...) to function pluralism, the article questions both the assumption that the traditional view and simulationism are inconsistent, and the simulationist’s inference to the best explanation strategy that is based upon this assumption. The article then provides an evaluation of the simulationist argument against the traditional view, and finds it in need of further support. (shrink)

According to the Weak Supplementation Principle (WSP)—a widely received principle of mereology—an object with a proper part, p , has another distinct proper part that doesn't overlap p . In a recent article in this journal, Nikk Effingham and Jon Robson employ WSP in an objection to endurantism. I defend endurantism in a way that bears on mereology in general. First, I argue that denying WSP can be motivated apart from the truth of endurantism. I then go on to offer (...) an explanation of WSP's initial appeal, argue that denying WSP fails to have untoward consequences for the rest of mereology, and show that the falsity of WSP is consistent with a primary guiding thought behind it. (shrink)

Hume’s critique of traditional abstraction entails a result that undercuts his account of the idea of identity. To save his account of identity, Hume would have to accept abstraction as well. What links these two discussions is (1) Hume’s widely shared assumption that traditional abstraction is separating in the mind what are inseparable in reality, (2) his principle that what are different are mentally separable, and (3) his principle that we cannot conceive of the impossible. Given these, it will turn (...) out that abstraction is mentally separating something from itself, which will entail that abstraction is conceiving of something as distinct from itself. But it is impossible for something to be distinct from itself, and so it is inconceivable. Therefore abstraction is impossible. Yet consider Hume’s account of the idea of identity. On that account, to conceive of an identity is to conceive of something as one single thing viewed one way and as two distinct things viewed another. How we can take these opposing views of the same thing is a problem that I’ve termed Hume’s Difficulty concerning Identity. It will turn out that we can take the opposing views only if we can conceive of the single thing viewed one way as somehow distinct from itself when viewed the other way. That is, we must be able to conceive of something as distinct from itself. However, if we cannot conceive of something as distinct from itself when abstracting, then we cannot do it when conceiving of an identity. So traditional abstraction and Hume’s account of the idea of identity stand or fall together. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to consider whether critical rationalism has any ideas which could usefully be applied to the internet. Today we tend to take the internet for granted and it is easy to forget that it was only about two decades ago that it began to be used to any significant extent. Accordingly in section 1 of the paper, there is a brief consideration of the history of the internet. At first sight this makes it looks implausible (...) that any of Popper’s ideas could be applicable to the internet, since Popper died before the internet came into general use. However, section 2 argues that Popper’s theory of World 3 does apply very well to the internet. This application is significant because, as shown in section 3, it leads to the problem of misinformation, which is one of the most significant problems generated by the internet. In section 4 there is an attempt to solve this problem using ideas taken from Popper’s epistemology. It is argued that there should be changes in education designed to prepare students for the internet age. Teaching in the internet age should focus on presenting to the students not just the accepted theories but also the evidence on which they are based. An illustration of how this might be done is given by considering an example from science teaching, namely the teaching of Newtonian mechanics in the last years of school or first years of university. (shrink)

How is it possible for David Hume to be both withering skeptic and constructive theorist? I recommend an answer like the Pyrrhonian answer to the question how it is possible to suspend all judgment yet engage in active daily life. Sextus Empiricus distinguishes two kinds of assent: one suspended across the board and one involved with daily living. The first is an act of will based on appreciation of reasons; the second is a causal effect of appearances. Hume makes the (...) same distinction, only he extends the sort of assent involved in daily life to theoretical matters as well. He is a skeptic both in finding no reason to grant the first sort of assent and in being subject to the second. (shrink)

Intellectualism is the claim that practical knowledge or ‘know-how’ is a kind of propositional knowledge. The debate over Intellectualism has appealed to two different kinds of evidence, semantic and scientific. This paper concerns the relationship between Intellectualist arguments based on truth-conditional semantics of practical knowledge ascriptions, and anti-Intellectualist arguments based on cognitive science and propositional representation. The first half of the paper argues that the anti-Intellectualist argument from cognitive science rests on a naturalistic approach to metaphysics: its proponents assume that (...) findings from cognitive science provide evidence about the nature of mental states. We demonstrate that this fact has been overlooked in the ensuing debate, resulting in inconsistency and confusion. Defenders of the semantic approach to Intellectualism engage with the argument from cognitive science in a way that implicitly endorses this naturalistic metaphysics, and even rely on it to claim that cognitive science support Intellectualism. In the course of their arguments, however, they also reject that scientific findings can have metaphysical import. We argue that this situation is preventing productive debate about Intellectualism, which would benefit from both sides being more transparent about their metaphilosophical assumptions. (shrink)

Two things become one thing, something having parts, and something becoming something else, are cases of many things being identical with one thing. This apparent contradiction introduces others concerning transitivity of identity, discernibility of identicals, existence, and vague existence. I resolve the contradictions with a theory that identity, number, and existence are relative to standards for counting. What are many on some standard are one and the same on another. The theory gives an account of the discernibility of identicals using (...) phrases like “insofar as”. And it holds that standards for counting remain or shift depending on our purposes. (shrink)

I argue that an individual has aspects numerically identical with it and each other that nonetheless qualitatively differ from it and each other. This discernibility of identicals does not violate Leibniz's Law, however, which concerns only individuals and is silent about their aspects. They are not in its domain of quantification. To argue that there are aspects I will appeal to the internal conflicts of conscious beings. I do not mean to imply that aspects are confined to such cases, but (...) the best way to start is to recognize them experientially. We can feel the conflicts within ourselves. In doing so we can feel some of our aspects. I will try to enhance our understanding of the concept of aspect by listing and formalizing some principles for its use. After that I will argue that all sorts of individual things have aspects, not just people who are conflicted. (shrink)

Construing the instantiation of a universal by a particular in terms of my theory of aspects resolves the basic mystery of this "non-relational tie", and gives theoretical unity to the four characteristics of instantiation discerned by Armstrong. Taking aspects as distinct in a way akin to Scotus's formal distinction, I suggest that instantiation is the sharing of an aspect by a universal and a particular--a kind of partial identity. This approach allows me to address Plato's multiple location and One over (...) Many problems, Bradley's problem concerning the instantiation of relations, and the problem of change. (shrink)

There is more than one way to say that composition is identity. Yi has distinguished the Weak Composition thesis from the Strong Composition thesis and attributed the former to David Lewis while noting that Lewis associates something like the latter with me. Weak Composition is the thesis that the relation between the parts collectively and their whole is closely analogous to identity. Strong Composition is the thesis that the relation between the parts collectively and their whole is identity. Yi is (...) right that Strong Composition does not fully reflect my view. We must recognize further what, borrowing Lewis's characterization, could be called the "stronger, and stranger" Composition thesis, or what I'll call the Stronger Composition thesis for short. On Strong Composition, it is only collectively that the parts are identical with the whole. On Stronger Composition, they are individually identical with it as well. I will explain and motivate this thesis. (shrink)

The Negation Problem states that expressivism has insufficient structure to account for the various ways in which a moral sentence can be negated. We argue that the Negation Problem does not arise for expressivist accounts of all normative language but arises only for the specific examples on which expressivists usually focus. In support of this claim, we argue for the following three theses: 1) a problem that is structurally identical to the Negation Problem arises in non-normative cases, and this problem (...) is solved once the hidden quantificational structure involved in such cases is uncovered; 2) the terms ‘required’, ‘permissible’, and ‘forbidden’ can also be analyzed in terms of hidden quantificational structure, and the Negation Problem disappears once this hidden structure is uncovered; 3) the Negation Problem does not arise for normative language that has no hidden quantificational structure. We conclude that the Negation Problem is not really a problem about expressivism at all but is rather a feature of the quantificational structure of the required, permitted, and forbidden. (shrink)

This paper examines the practice of using predictive systems to lengthen the prison sentences of convicted persons when the systems forecast a higher likelihood of re-offense or re-arrest. There has been much critical discussion of technologies used for sentencing, including questions of bias and opacity. However, there hasn’t been a discussion of whether this use of predictive systems makes sense in the first place. We argue that it does not by showing that there is no plausible theory of punishment that (...) supports it. (shrink)

Questions about the morality of lying tend to be decided in a distinctive way early in discussions of Kant’s view on the basis of readings of the false promising example in his Groundwork of The metaphysics of morals. The standard deception-as-interference model that emerges typically yields a very general and strong presumption against deception associated with a narrow and rigorous model subject to a range of problems. In this paper, I suggest an alternative account based on Kant’s discussion of self-deception (...) in the Metaphysics of Morals. I argue that we make the concern with respect for our capacity for inner freedom seen in the case of self-deception the model for deception in general. Focusing on the case of paternalistic lying, I claim that this approach yields a subtle and integrated account that promises the kind of resources we need if we are to be able to make headway with hard cases where deception may seem permissible. (shrink)

In this paper, I critically discuss one of the more influential arguments for mereological universalism, what I will call ‘the Vagueness Argument’. I argue that a premise of the Vagueness Argument is not well supported and that there are at least two good reasons for thinking that the premise in question is false.

I argue that ductal carcinoma in situ (DCIS), the tumor most commonly diagnosed by breast mammography, cannot be confidently classified as cancer, that is, as pathological. This is because there may not be dysfunction present in DCIS—as I argue based on its high prevalence and the small amount of risk it conveys—and thus DCIS may not count as a disease by dysfunction-requiring approaches, such as Boorse’s biostatistical theory and Wakefield’s harmful dysfunction account. Patients should decide about treatment for DCIS based (...) on the risks it poses and the risks and benefits of treatment, not on its disease status. (shrink)

Given the technological constraints of long-duration space travel and planetary settlement, off-Earth humans will likely need to employ food systems very different from their terrestrial counterparts, and newly emerging food technologies are being developed that will shape novel food systems in these off-Earth contexts. Projected off-Earth food systems may therefore potentially “alienate” their users in new ways compared to Earth-based food systems. They will be susceptible to alienation in ways that are similar to such potential on Earth, where there are (...) points of overlap between off-Earth food systems and any of the multitudes of ways in which food systems on Earth are structured. They will also be susceptible to new forms of alienation, as we encounter scenarios that are genuinely structurally novel to humanity. These are especially important to consider since there are comparatively fewer analyses of these food systems where they differ from existing ones. We propose five non-exhaustive sources of value beyond nutrition our individual relationships with a food may possess: gustatory, social, cultural, epistemic, and authorial value. Using these, we offer examples of ways in which an off-Earth food system may exacerbate or alleviate alienation for humans in long-term off-Earth food systems. (shrink)

An essay on the compatibility of Jewish and Muslim aspirations for the Land that argues that a vision of peaceful coexistence to provide a spur to the settling of grievances, but that this vision must respect the deeply felt aspirations of both communities, including in particular those underpinned by religious lore. Existing formulations of the aims of each community are blatantly inconsistent; it is time to attempt to characterise the just and religiously authentic goals of each community in ways that (...) are compatible. I argue that there religious and personal dimensions of the conflict that have been displaced by less deep-seated political goals, but which can be addressed more readily. I outline a tiered constitutional settlement that could address legitimate aspirations by avoiding the anathema of partition. (shrink)

Patients should not always receive hard data about the risks and benefits of a medical intervention. That information should always be available to patients who expressly ask for it, but it should be part of standard disclosure only sometimes, and only for some patients. And even then, we need to think about how to offer it.

Terraforming is a process of planetary engineering by which the extant environment of a planetary body is transformed into an environment capable of supporting human inhabitants. The question I would like to consider in this paper is whether there is any reason to believe that the terraforming of another planet—for instance, the terraforming of Mars—is morally problematic. Topics related to the human exploration of space are not often discussed in philosophical circles. Nevertheless, there exists a growing body of philosophical literature (...) dedicated to sorting out the moral implications of the use of resources from (and in) space. Most of this literature is produced as environmental philosophy. Questions of .. (shrink)