Results for 'Graham Hendry'

444 found
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  1. The Phenomenal Evidence Argument.Peter Graham & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen - forthcoming - Synthese.
    Do perceptual states necessarily constitute evidence epistemically supporting corresponding perceptual beliefs? Susanna Schellenberg thinks so. She argues that perceptual states, veridical or not, necessarily provide (or constitute) a kind of evidence (for the existence of the truth-maker) supporting corresponding perceptual beliefs. She uses “phenomenal evidence” as a label for this kind of evidence and calls her argument “The Phenomenal Evidence Argument.” Having introduced her project, we offer a reconstruction of Schellenberg’s argument. A key premise has it that, necessarily, for items (...)
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  2. Ateizm için Bir Argüman.Graham Oppy & Musa Yanık - 2024 - Öncül Analitik Felsefe Dergisi. Translated by Musa Yanık.
    Bu [makalede], nihai olarak kesin bir sonucu olduğunu iddia etmemekle birlikte, ateizm için geliştirebileceğim en iyi argümanı öne sürmeye çalışacağım ve ortaya koyacağım şeyin, Tanrı’nın varlığına dair yürütülen tartışmaların herhangi bir kısmındaki, en iyi argüman olduğunu iddia edeceğim.
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  3. Proper Functionalism and the Organizational Theory of Functions.Peter J. Graham - 2023 - In Luis R. G. Oliveira (ed.), Externalism about Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 249-276.
    Proper functionalism explicates epistemic warrant in terms of the function and normal functioning of the belief-forming process. There are two standard substantive views of the sources of functions in the literature in epistemology: God (intelligent design) or Mother Nature (evolution by natural selection). Both appear to confront the Swampman objection: couldn’t there be a mind with warranted beliefs neither designed by God nor the product of evolution by natural selection? Is there another substantive view that avoids the Swampman objection? There (...)
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  4. Counterexamples to Testimonial Transmission.Peter Graham & Zachary Bachman - 2019 - In Miranda Fricker, Peter Graham, David Henderson & Nikolaj Jang Pedersen (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 61-77.
    Commonsense holds that testimony transfers knowledge from a speaker to the hearer. If the speaker has knowledge, then the hearer acquires it. Call that sufficiency. And a hearer acquires knowledge only if the speaker has it to transfer. Call that necessity. This article reviews counterexamples--and some replies to those counterexamples--to both claims.
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  5. The Contours of Locke’s General Substance Dualism.Graham Clay - 2022 - Journal of Modern Philosophy 4 (1):1-20.
    In this paper, I will argue that Locke is a substance dualist in the general sense, in that he holds that there are, independent of our classificatory schema, two distinct kinds of substances: wholly material ones and wholly immaterial ones. On Locke’s view, the difference between the two lies in whether they are solid or not, thereby differentiating him from Descartes. My way of establishing Locke as a general substance dualist is to be as minimally committal as possible at the (...)
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  6. Hume's Incredible Demonstrations.Graham Clay - 2022 - Hume Studies 47 (1):55-77.
    Commentators have rightly focused on the reasons why Hume maintains that the conclusions of skeptical arguments cannot be believed, as well as on the role these arguments play in Hume’s justification of his account of the mind. Nevertheless, Hume’s interpreters should take more seriously the question of whether Hume holds that these arguments are demonstrations. Only if the arguments are demonstrations do they have the requisite status to prove Hume’s point—and justify his confidence—about the nature of the mind’s belief-generating faculties. (...)
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  7. What I Believe.Graham Oppy - 2009 - In Russell Blackford & Udo Schüklenk (eds.), 50 Voices of Disbelief. Wiley‐Blackwell. pp. 50–56.
    This is my first attempt at briefly sketching my worldview. There is a much expanded version of this sketch in my contributions to *Is There A God?* (Routledge, 2021), coauthored with Kenny Pearce.
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  8. Agnosticism.Graham Oppy - forthcoming - KİLİKYA JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY.
    I endorse the following claims in this paper. (1) Agnosticism is suspension of judgment on existence claims concerning gods and God. (2) Historical agnostics accepted (1) but unwisely insisted on further conditions best set aside. (3) Particular case agnosticism is less problematic than general principle-based agnosticism. (4) Agnostics should suspend judgment on—or, on occasion, reject—atomic claims of the form ‘God is F’.
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  9. Conceptions of Supreme Deity.Graham Oppy - 2024 - Sophia 63 (3):389-399.
    This paper attempts to provide a high-level comparison of Eastern and Western conceptions of deity. It finds some significant similarities—involving worshipworthiness and the ideal shape of human lives—and some important differences—concerning the ultimate nature of reality, the relation of supreme deity to the rest of reality, and the relative frequency of divine incarnation.
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  10. In Defense of Natural Religion.Graham Renz & William Bell - forthcoming - Religious Studies.
    The dominance of the Abrahamic tradition in contemporary analytic philosophy of religion has led some to call for greater exploration of alternatives to the traditional conception of God, such as Pantheism, Ultimism, and Axiarchism. While we think this call for alternatives is important, we go in a different direction. Rather than explore and defend alternative conceptions of God, we defend a range of fairly traditional but non-religious conceptions of God. This range of views, from deism to philosophical theism, enjoys a (...)
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  11. The new evil demon problem at 40.Peter J. Graham - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 109 (2):478-504.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
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  12. Assertions, Handicaps, and Social Norms.Peter J. Graham - 2020 - Episteme 17 (3):349-363.
    How should we undertand the role of norms—especially epistemic norms—governing assertive speech acts? Mitchell Green (2009) has argued that these norms play the role of handicaps in the technical sense from the animal signals literature. As handicaps, they then play a large role in explaining the reliability—and so the stability (the continued prevalence)—of assertive speech acts. But though norms of assertion conceived of as social norms do indeed play this stabilizing role, these norms are best understood as deterrents and not (...)
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  13. Deception Detection Research: Some Lessons for Epistemology.Peter Graham - 2024 - In Waldomiro J. Silva-Filho (ed.), Epistemology of Conversation: First essays. Cham: Springer.
    According to our folk theory of lying, liars leak observable cues of their insincerity, observable cues that make it easy to catch a liar in real time. Various prominent social epistemologists rely on the correctness of our folk theory as empirically well-confirmed when building their normative accounts of the epistemology of testimony. Deception detection research in communication studies, however, has shown that our folk-theory is mistaken. It is not empirically well-confirmed but empirically refuted. Michaelian (2010) and Shieber (2012) have already (...)
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  14. The Structure of Defeat: Pollock's Evidentialism, Lackey's Framework, and Prospects for Reliabilism.Peter J. Graham & Jack C. Lyons - 2021 - In Jessica Brown & Mona Simion (eds.), Reasons, Justification, and Defeat. Oxford Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Epistemic defeat is standardly understood in either evidentialist or responsibilist terms. The seminal treatment of defeat is an evidentialist one, due to John Pollock, who famously distinguishes between undercutting and rebutting defeaters. More recently, an orthogonal distinction due to Jennifer Lackey has become widely endorsed, between so-called doxastic (or psychological) and normative defeaters. We think that neither doxastic nor normative defeaters, as Lackey understands them, exist. Both of Lackey’s categories of defeat derive from implausible assumptions about epistemic responsibility. Although Pollock’s (...)
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  15. The Function of Assertion and Social Norms.Peter Graham - 2018 - In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford University Press. pp. 727-748.
    A proper function of an entity is a beneficial effect that helps explain the persistence of the entity. Proper functions thereby arise through feedback mechanisms with beneficial effects as inputs and persistence as outputs. We continue to make assertions because they benefit speakers by benefiting speakers. Hearers benefit from true information. Speakers benefit by influencing hearer belief. If hearers do not benefit, they will not form beliefs in response to assertions. Speakers can then only maintain influence by providing true information, (...)
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  16. Epistemic Normativity and Social Norms.Peter J. Graham - 2015 - In David K. Henderson & John Greco (eds.), Epistemic Evaluation: Purposeful Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 247-273.
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  17. What's Wrong With Testimony? Defending the Epistemic Analogy between Testimony and Perception.Peter Graham - 2025 - In Jennifer Lackey & Aidan McGlynn (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.
    This chapter states the contrast between presumptivism about testimonial warrant (often called anti-reductionism) and strict reductionism (associated with Hume) about testimonial warrant. Presumptivism sees an analogy with modest foundationalism about perceptual warrant. Strict reductionism denies this analogy. Two theoretical frameworks for these positions are introduced to better formulate the most popular version of persumptivism, a competence reliabilist account. Seven arguments against presumptivism are then stated and critiqued: (1) The argument from reliability; (2) The argument from reasons; (3) the argument from (...)
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  18. Transparency, Corruption, and Democratic Institutions.Graham Hubbs - 2014 - Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 9 (1):65-83.
    This essay examines some of the institutional arrangements that underlie corruption in democracy. It begins with a discussion of institutions as such, elaborating and extending some of John Searle’s remarks on the topic. It then turns to an examination of specifically democratic institutions; it draws here on Joshua Cohen’s recent Rousseau: A Free Community of Equals. One of the central concerns of Cohen’s Rousseau is how to arrange civic institutions so that they are able to perform their public functions without (...)
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  19. Can Testimony Generate Knowledge?Peter J. Graham - 2006 - Philosophica 78 (2):105-127.
    Jennifer Lackey ('Testimonial Knowledge and Transmission' The Philosophical Quarterly 1999) and Peter Graham ('Conveying Information, Synthese 2000, 'Transferring Knowledge' Nous 2000) offered counterexamples to show that a hearer can acquire knowledge that P from a speaker who asserts that P, but the speaker does not know that P. These examples suggest testimony can generate knowledge. The showpiece of Lackey's examples is the Schoolteacher case. This paper shows that Lackey's case does not undermine the orthodox view that testimony cannot generate (...)
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  20. Dretske & McDowell on perceptual knowledge, conclusive reasons, and epistemological disjunctivism.Peter J. Graham & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):148-166.
    If you want to understand McDowell's spatial metaphors when he talks about perceptual knowledge, place him side-by-side with Dretske on perceptual knowledge. Though McDowell shows no evidence of reading Dretske's writings on knowledge from the late 1960s onwards (McDowell mentions "Epistemic Operators" once in passing), McDowell gives the same four arguments as Dretske for the conclusion that knowledge requires "conclusive" reasons that rule of the possibility of mistake. Despite various differences, we think it is best to read McDowell as re-discovering (...)
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  21. Matter and Society. Response to Orensanz.Graham Harman - 2024 - Mεtascience: Scientific General Discourse 3:288-299.
    This article is a response to Martin Orensanz’s argument that object-oriented ontology ought to accept the existence of matter as both a sensual and a real object. That matter can exist as a sensual object is a point immediately granted, since “sensual object” is such a broad term that nothing could be excluded from this designation. Yet I argue that this is not the case with respect to real objects, which must exist independently of any other entity that might encounter (...)
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  22. Anti-Naturalistic Arguments From Reason.Graham Oppy - 2022 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 70 (1):15-35.
    This paper discusses a wide range of anti-naturalistic argument from reason due to Balfour, Haldane, Joad, Lewis, Taylor, Moreland, Plantinga, Reppert, and Hasker. I argue that none of these arguments poses a serious challenge to naturalists who are identity theorists. Further, I argue that some of these arguments do not even pose prima facie plausible challenges to naturalism. In the concluding part of my discussion, I draw attention to some distinctive differences between Hasker’s anti-naturalistic arguments and the other anti-naturalistic arguments (...)
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  23. Knowledge is Not Our Norm of Assertion.Peter J. Graham & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen - 2024 - In Blake Roeber, Ernest Sosa, Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley-Blackwell.
    The norm of assertion, to be in force, is a social norm. What is the content of our social norm of assertion? Various linguistic arguments purport to show that to assert is to represent oneself as knowing. But to represent oneself as knowing does not entail that assertion is governed by a knowledge norm. At best these linguistic arguments provide indirect support for a knowledge norm. Furthermore, there are alternative, non-normative explanations for the linguistic data (as in recent work from (...)
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  24. Why Should Warrant Persist in Demon Worlds?Peter J. Graham - 2020 - In Peter Graham & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (eds.), Epistemic Entitlement. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 179-202.
    In 'Perceptual Entitlement' (PPR 2003), Tyler Burge argues that on his teleological reliabilist account of perceptual warrant, warrant will persist in non-normal conditions, even radical skeptical scenarios like demon worlds. This paper explains why Burge's explanation falls short. But if we distinguish two grades of warrant, we can explain, in proper functionalist, teleological reliabilist terms, why warrant should persist in demon worlds. A normally functioning belief-forming process confers warrant in all worlds, provided it is reliable in normal conditions when functioning (...)
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  25. Naturalism.Graham Oppy - 2020 - Think 19 (56):7-20.
    I offer a minimal characterization of naturalism, with ontological, epistemological, psychological and evaluative dimensions. I explain why naturalism is attractive. I note that naturalists disagree among themselves about, among other things, the nature of values, beliefs, and abstractions. I close by responding to some standard objections to naturalism.
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  26. Recent Work on Epistemic Entitlement.Peter Graham & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen - 2020 - American Philosophical Quarterly 57 (2):193-214.
    We review the "Entitlement" projects of Tyler Burge and Crispin Wright in light of recent work from and surrounding both philosophers. Our review dispels three misunderstandings. First, Burge and Wright are not involved in a common “entitlement” project. Second, though for both Wright and Burge entitlement is the new notion, “entitlement” is not some altogether third topic not clearly connected to the nature of knowledge or the encounter with skepticism. Third, entitlement vs. justification does not align with the externalism vs. (...)
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  27. Testimony as Speech Act, Testimony as Source.Peter J. Graham - 2015 - In Mi Chienkuo, Michael Slote & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Moral and Intellectual Virtues in Western and Chinese Philosophy: The Turn Toward Virtue. New York: Routledge. pp. 121-144.
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  28. What I believe.Graham Oppy - 2009 - In Russell Blackford & Udo Schüklenk (eds.), 50 Voices of Disbelief: Why We Are Atheists. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 50-56.
    This article gives a brief sketch of the naturalistic beliefs that I hold. It is not intended as a *defence* of those beliefs; the aim of the paper is simply to get the beliefs out onto the table.
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  29. Does Knowledge Entail Justification?Peter J. Graham - 2023 - Journal of Philosophical Research 48:201-211.
    Robert Audi’s Seeing, Knowing, and Doing argues that knowledge does not entail justification, given a broadly externalist conception of knowledge and an access internalist conception of justification, where justification requires the ability to cite one’s grounds or reasons. On this view, animals and small children can have knowledge while lacking justification. About cases like these and others, Audi concludes that knowledge does not entail justification. But the access internalist sense of “justification” is but one of at least two ordinary senses (...)
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  30. Kant on 'the cosmological argument'.Graham Oppy - 2023 - In Ina Goy (ed.), Kant on Proofs for God's Existence. Boston: De Gruyter.
    In this paper, I examine Kant’s discussion of ‘the cosmological argument’ in The Critique of Pure Reason, Transcendental Doctrine of Elements, Second Part, Second Division, Book 2, Chapter Three, Section Five (‘The Impossibility of a Cosmological Proof of the Existence of God’). While there are other places where Kant provides related discussions of ‘the cosmological argument’—e.g. in The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God, Lectures on Philosophical Theology, and Religion within the Limits of (...)
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  31. Mathematics, isomorphism, and the identity of objects.Graham White - 2021 - Journal of Knowledge Structures and Systems 2 (2):56-58.
    We compare the medieval projects of commentaries and disputations with the modern projects of formal ontology and of mathematics.
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  32. Religious Language Games.Graham Oppy & Nick Trakakis - 2007 - In Andrew Moore & Michael Scott (eds.), Realism and Religion: Philosophical and Theological Perspectives. Ashgate. pp. 103-29.
    This paper is a critique of Witgensteinian approaches to philosophy of religion. In particular, it provides a close critique of the views of D. Z. Phillips.
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  33. The Future of Value Sensitive Design.Batya Friedman, David Hendry, Steven Umbrello, Jeroen Van Den Hoven & Daisy Yoo - 2020 - Paradigm Shifts in ICT Ethics: Proceedings of the 18th International Conference ETHICOMP 2020.
    In this panel, we explore the future of value sensitive design (VSD). The stakes are high. Many in public and private sectors and in civil society are gradually realizing that taking our values seriously implies that we have to ensure that values effectively inform the design of technology which, in turn, shapes people’s lives. Value sensitive design offers a highly developed set of theory, tools, and methods to systematically do so.
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  34. Intelligent Design and Selective History: Two Sources of Purpose and Plan.Peter J. Graham - 2011 - In Jonathan L. Kvanvig (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion Volume 3. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 67-88.
    Alvin Plantinga argues by counterexample that no naturalistic account of functions is possible--God is then the only source for natural functions. This paper replies to Plantinga's examples and arguments. Plantinga misunderstands naturalistic accounts. Plantinga's mistakes flow from his assimilation of functional notions in general to functions from intentional design in particular.
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  35. Testimonial Entitlement and the Function of Comprehension.Peter J. Graham - 2008 - In Duncan Pritchard, Alan Millar & Adrian Haddock (eds.), Social Epistemology. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 148--174.
    This paper argues for the general proper functionalist view that epistemic warrant consists in the normal functioning of the belief-forming process when the process has forming true beliefs reliably as an etiological function. Such a process is reliable in normal conditions when functioning normally. This paper applies this view to so-called testimony-based beliefs. It argues that when a hearer forms a comprehension-based belief that P (a belief based on taking another to have asserted that P) through the exercise of a (...)
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  36. Philosophy.Graham Oppy - 2012 - In Mark Cobb, Christina Puchalski & Bruce Rumbold (eds.), The Textbook of Spirituality in Healthcare. Oxford University Press. pp. 77-82.
    This paper provides a discussion of philosophy as it bears on spirituality and healthcase. Topics take up include: flourishing; health; disease; spirituality; adversity, virtue; and religion.
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  37. On Stage One of Feser's 'Aristotelian Proof'.Graham Oppy - 2021 - Religious Studies 57:491-502.
    Feser (2017) presents and defends five proofs of the existence of God. Each proof is in two stages: the first stage proves the existence of something which, in the second stage, is shown to possess an appropriate range of divine attributes. Each proof is given two presentations, one informal and one formal. In this paper, I critically examine two premises from one of Feser's five first stage proofs. I provide reasons for thinking that naturalists reject both of these premises. In (...)
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  38. On an argument about reference to future individuals.Graham Oppy - 1995 - Philosophical Quarterly 45 (178):84-87.
    This paper critically examines Roger Teichmann's defence of the claim that it is impossible to refer to future individuals. (Bibliographical details are provided in the article.).
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  39. Forms Are Not Emergent Powers.Graham Renz - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Hylomorphism is the Aristotelian theory according to which substances are composites of matter and form. If my house is a substance, then its matter would be a collection of bricks and timbers and its form something like a structure that unites those bricks and timbers into a single substance. Contemporary hylomorphists are divided on how to understand forms best, but a prominent group of theorists argue that forms are emergent powers. According to such views, when material components are arranged appropriately, (...)
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  40. Liberal Fundamentalism and Its Rivals.Peter Graham - 2006 - In Jennifer Lackey & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The epistemology of testimony. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 93-115.
    When is a testimony-based belief justified? According to so-called "Anti-Reductionism," the principle that a hearer is prima facie justified to take what another tells them at face value is true. I call this position "Liberal Foundationalism." I call it "liberal" for it is more liberal than "Moderate Foundationalism" that holds that perception-based beliefs are prima facie justified but testimony-based beliefs are not. Liberal Foundationalism has two interpretations: the principle is a contingent empirical truth, or an a priori necessary truth. I (...)
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  41. Epistemic Evaluations: Consequences, Costs and Benefits.Peter J. Graham, Megan Stotts, Zachary Bachman & Meredith McFadden - 2015 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 4 (4):7-13.
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  42. Do substances have formal parts?Graham Renz - 2023 - Analytic Philosophy 65 (4):561-572.
    Hylomorphism is the Aristotelian theory according to which substances are composed of matter and form. If a house is a substance, then its matter would be a collection of bricks and timbers, and its form is something like the structure of those bricks and timbers. It is widely agreed that matter bears a mereological relationship to substance; the bricks and timbers are parts of the house. But with form things are more controversial. Is the structure of the bricks and timbers (...)
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  43. Defining ‘Religion’ and ‘Atheism’.Graham Oppy - 2021 - Sophia 60 (3):517-529.
    There are various background issues that need to be discussed whenever the topic of conversation turns to religion and atheism. In particular, there are questions about how these terms are to be used in the course of the conversation. While it is sometimes the case that all parties to a conversation about religion and atheism have agreed what they mean by ‘religion’ and ‘atheism’, it is often enough the case that such conversations go poorly because the parties mean different things (...)
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  44. Why semantic innocence?Graham Oppy - 1992 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (4):445 – 454.
    This paper rejects the imposition of "semantic innocence" as a constraint on semantic theories. In particular, it argues that recent attempts to justify the imposition of "semantic innocence" as a constraint on semantic theories fail.
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  45. Warrant, Functions, History.Peter J. Graham - 2014 - In Abrol Fairweather & Owen Flanagan (eds.), Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 15-35.
    Epistemic warrant consists in the normal functioning of the belief-forming process when the process has forming true beliefs reliably as an etiological function. Evolution by natural selection is the most familiar source of etiological functions. . What then of learning? What then of Swampman? Though functions require history, natural selection is not the only source. Self-repair and trial-and-error learning are both sources. Warrant requires history, but not necessarily that much.
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  46. Infinity in Pascal's Wager.Graham Oppy - 2018 - In Paul Bartha & Lawrence Pasternack (eds.), Pascal’s Wager. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 260-77.
    Bartha (2012) conjectures that, if we meet all of the other objections to Pascal’s wager, then the many-Gods objection is already met. Moreover, he shows that, if all other objections to Pascal’s wager are already met, then, in a choice between a Jealous God, an Indifferent God, a Very Nice God, a Very Perverse God, the full range of Nice Gods, the full range of Perverse Gods, and no God, you should wager on the Jealous God. I argue that his (...)
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  47. Rationality and Worldview.Graham Oppy - 2017 - In Paul Draper & J. L. Schellenberg (eds.), Renewing Philosophy of Religion: Exploratory Essays. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 174-86.
    In this paper, I aim to bring out the implausibility of the claim that there is a class of philosophers of religion—holders of a particular constellation of beliefs about religion—whose religious beliefs are either uniquely rational or uniquely supported by a stock of cogent arguments. My initial focus will be on models of parties to religious disagreements. These models may be simple, but I believe that there is much to be learned from them.
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  48. Frege's Puzzle and the Meaning of Words.Graham Seth Moore - 2020 - 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology.
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  49. Against Idealism.Graham Oppy - 2017 - In K. Pearce & T. Goldschmidt (eds.), Idealism: New Essays in Metaphysics. Oxford University Press. pp. 50-65.
    It is a very curious thing that proponents of Idealism have considered it to be a satisfactory counter to ‘scepticism’, ‘nihilism’, and the like. On the contrary, it seems to me that Idealism is a very close cousin to ‘brain-in-a-vat’ scepticism and other anti-naturalistic fantasies. Moreover, it seems to me that Idealism is inferior to Naturalism for much the same kinds of reasons that ‘brain-in-a-vat’ scepticism and other anti-naturalistic fantasies are inferior to Naturalism: a proper weighing of theoretical virtues discloses (...)
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  50. Whither New Atheism?Graham Oppy - 2017 - In Christopher R. Cotter, Philip Andrew Quadrio & Jonathan Tuckett (eds.), New Atheism: Critical Perspectives and Contemporary Debates. Cham: Springer. pp. 15-31.
    In order to give a proper estimation of the place of the New Atheism in history, we shall need to have before us an overview of that history. So I shall begin with an appropriate sketch. Then I will try to give an account of the current global state of play, and to indicate some reasons why it seems reasonable to think that the worldview of the New Atheists is currently gaining ground, at least in certain quarters. After examining—and rejecting—some (...)
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