Results for 'Hume and personal identity'

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  1. Hume’s Positive Theory of Personal Identity.Bradley M. Porath - 1989 - Auslegung 15:147-163.
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  2. Consciousness and Personal Identity.Owen Ware & Donald C. Ainslie - 2014 - In Aaron Garrett (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Eighteenth Century Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 245-264.
    This paper offers an overview of consciousness and personal identity in eighteenth-century philosophy. Locke introduces the concept of persons as subjects of consciousness who also simultaneously recognize themselves as such subjects. Hume, however, argues that minds are nothing but bundles of perceptions, lacking intrinsic unity at a time or across time. Yet Hume thinks our emotional responses to one another mean that persons in everyday life are defined by their virtues, vices, bodily qualities, property, riches, and (...)
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  3. Hume’s Recantation of His Theory of Personal Identity.David Pears - 2004 - Hume Studies 30 (2):257-264.
    I am going to defend a diagnosis of Hume’s recantation that I have already defended—rather unsuccessfully—in more than one publication. My excuse for trying again is that I shall now offer a more carefully qualified defense. My diagnosis was, and still is, that in the Appendix to the Treatise Hume came to see that he could not account for the necessary ownership of perceptions —i.e., for the fact that this very perception could not have occurred in a different (...)
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  4. O QUE D. W. WINNICOTT DIRIA A D. HUME? SOBRE A IDENTIDADE PESSOAL/ WHAT WOULD D. W. WINNICOTT SAY TO D. HUME? AN ANALYSIS OF PERSONAL IDENTITY.Motta Carlos J. & Piza Suze - 2014 - Natureza Humana 16 (1):79-95.
    Apresentaremos neste texto a tese de David Hume sobre a identidade pessoal tal como é apresentada no Tratado da natureza humana, de sua autoria. No apêndice da obra, Hume apresenta dúvidas sobre a tese que defendeu, apontando uma série de problemas que não se resolvem em sua teoria. Mas o tratamento desses problemas e uma possível resposta a Hume podem ser encontrados em D. W. Winnicott.
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  5.  91
    Imagined Causes: Hume’s Conception of Objects.Stefanie Rocknak - 2012 - Springer.
    This book provides the first comprehensive account of Hume’s conception of objects in Book I of the Treatise. What, according to Hume, are objects? Ideas? Impressions? Mind-independent objects? All three? None of the above? Through a close textual analysis, I show that Hume thought that objects are imagined ideas. However, I argue that he struggled with two accounts of how and when we imagine such ideas. On the one hand, Hume believed that we always and universally (...)
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  6. Minds, Composition, and Hume's Skepticism in the Appendix.Jonathan Cottrell - 2015 - Philosophical Review 124 (4):533-569.
    This essay gives a new interpretation of Hume's second thoughts about minds in the Appendix, based on a new interpretation of his view of composition. In Book 1 of the Treatise, Hume argued that, as far as we can conceive it, a mind is a whole composed by all its perceptions. But—this essay argues—he also held that several perceptions form a whole only if the mind to which they belong supplies a “connexion” among them. In order to do (...)
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  7. Personal Identity.David Shoemaker & Kevin P. Tobia - forthcoming - In Oxford Handbook of Moral Psychology. Oxford:
    Our aim in this entry is to articulate the state of the art in the moral psychology of personal identity. We begin by discussing the major philosophical theories of personal identity, including their shortcomings. We then turn to recent psychological work on personal identity and the self, investigations that often illuminate our person-related normative concerns. We conclude by discussing the implications of this psychological work for some contemporary philosophical theories and suggesting fruitful areas for (...)
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  8.  40
    História natural da religião, de David Hume.David Hume & Jaimir Conte - 2005 - São Paulo, SP, Brasil: Editora da Unesp.
    Tradução para o português da obra "História natural da religião", de David Hume.Tradução, apresentação e notas: Jaimir Conte. Editora da UNESP: São Paulo, 1ª ed. 2005. ISBN: 8571396043.
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  9. Locke on Personal Identity.Shelley Weinberg - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (6):398-407.
    Locke’s account of personal identity has been highly influential because of its emphasis on a psychological criterion. The same consciousness is required for being the same person. It is not so clear, however, exactly what Locke meant by ‘consciousness’ or by ‘having the same consciousness’. Interpretations vary: consciousness is seen as identical to memory, as identical to a first personal appropriation of mental states, and as identical to a first personal distinctive experience of the qualitative features (...)
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  10. Memory and the Sense of Personal Identity.Stan Klein & Shaun Nichols - 2012 - Mind 121 (483):677-702.
    Memory of past episodes provides a sense of personal identity — the sense that I am the same person as someone in the past. We present a neurological case study of a patient who has accurate memories of scenes from his past, but for whom the memories lack the sense of mineness. On the basis of this case study, we propose that the sense of identity derives from two components, one delivering the content of the memory and (...)
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  11. Distributed Selves: Personal Identity and Extended Memory Systems.Richard Heersmink - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):3135–3151.
    This paper explores the implications of extended and distributed cognition theory for our notions of personal identity. On an extended and distributed approach to cognition, external information is under certain conditions constitutive of memory. On a narrative approach to personal identity, autobiographical memory is constitutive of our diachronic self. In this paper, I bring these two approaches together and argue that external information can be constitutive of one’s autobiographical memory and thus also of one’s diachronic self. (...)
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  12. Personal Identity, Direction of Change, and Neuroethics.Kevin Patrick Tobia - 2016 - Neuroethics 9 (1):37-43.
    The personal identity relation is of great interest to philosophers, who often consider fictional scenarios to test what features seem to make persons persist through time. But often real examples of neuroscientific interest also provide important tests of personal identity. One such example is the case of Phineas Gage – or at least the story often told about Phineas Gage. Many cite Gage’s story as example of severed personal identity; Phineas underwent such a tremendous (...)
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  13. Personal Identity and the Phineas Gage Effect.Kevin P. Tobia - 2015 - Analysis 75 (3):396-405.
    Phineas Gage’s story is typically offered as a paradigm example supporting the view that part of what matters for personal identity is a certain magnitude of similarity between earlier and later individuals. Yet, reconsidering a slight variant of Phineas Gage’s story indicates that it is not just magnitude of similarity, but also the direction of change that affects personal identity judgments; in some cases, changes for the worse are more seen as identity-severing than changes for (...)
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  14. The Metaphysical Fact of Consciousness in Locke's Theory of Personal Identity.Shelley Weinberg - 2012 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 50 (3):387-415.
    Locke’s theory of personal identity was philosophically groundbreaking for its attempt to establish a non-substantial identity condition. Locke states, “For the same consciousness being preserv’d, whether in the same or different Substances, the personal Identity is preserv’d” (II.xxvii.13). Many have interpreted Locke to think that consciousness identifies a self both synchronically and diachronically by attributing thoughts and actions to a self. Thus, many have attributed to Locke either a memory theory or an appropriation theory of (...)
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  15. Memory and Personal Identity in Spinoza.Martin Lin - 2005 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35 (2):243-268.
    Locke is often thought to have introduced the topic of personal identity into philosophy when, in the second edition of the Essay, he distinguished the person from both the human being and the soul. Each of these entities differs from the others with respect to their identity conditions, and so they must be ontologically distinct. In particular, Locke claimed, a person cannot survive total memory loss, although a human being or a soul can.
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  16.  67
    The Simplicity of the Simple Approach to Personal Identity.Andrea Sauchelli - 2019 - In Luca Bellotti, Luca Gili, Giacomo Turbanti & Enrico Moriconi (eds.), Third Pisa Colloquium in Logic, Language and Epistemology. Pisa, Province of Pisa, Italy: pp. 347-358.
    I provide a simple solution to the problem of determining the characterising feature(s) of the simple approach to personal identity, sometimes also called the simple view: instead of focusing on claims regarding the analysability, reducibility, or triviality of the concepts used in simple theories of personal identity, I propose instead a metaphysical criterion to define this approach. In particular, I claim that the simple approach is (best seen as) that family of theories according to which (...) identity is a relation that essentially depends on a mereologically simple (or impartite) entity the existence and features of which may be known directly (e.g., by introspection) or indirectly (e.g., by deduction from a series of other premises). (shrink)
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  17.  60
    Conativism About Personal Identity.David Braddon-Mitchell & Kristie Miller - forthcoming - In Andrea Sauchelli (ed.), Derek Parfit's Reasons and Persons: An Introduction and Critical Inquiry. Routledge.
    This paper aims to provide an overview of the conceptual terrain of what we call conative accounts of personal identity. These are views according to which the same-person relation in some sense depends on a range of broadly conative phenomena, especially desires, behaviours and conventions. We distinguish views along three dimensions: what role the conations play, what kinds of conations play that role, and whether the conations that play that role are public or private. We then offer a (...)
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  18. 'He Only Comes Out When I Drink My Gin’: DID, Personal Identity, and Moral Responsibility.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2016 - In Rocco J. Gennaro & Casey Harison (eds.), The Who and Philosophy. Rowman & Littlefield: Lexington Press. pp. 121-134.
    This essay explores the topic of Dissociative Identity Disorder (formerly called “Multiple Personality Disorder”) with special attention to such Quadrophenia masterpieces as “Dr. Jimmy” and “The Real Me.” A number of major philosophical questions arise: Can two or more “persons” really inhabit the same body? How can we hold Dr. Jimmy morally responsible for the reprehensible actions of Mr. Jim? Wouldn’t it be wrong to do so if they are really different people? What is it to be the “same” (...)
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  19. Reductionism in Personal Identity and the Phenomenological Sense of Being a Temporally Extended Self.Robert Schroer - 2013 - American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (4):339-356.
    The special and unique attitudes that we take towards events in our futures/pasts—e.g., attitudes like the dread of an impeding pain—create a challenge for “Reductionist” accounts that reduce persons to aggregates of interconnected person stages: if the person stage currently dreading tomorrow’s pain is numerically distinct from the person stage that will actually suffer the pain, what reason could the current person stage have for thinking of that future pain as being his? One reason everyday subjects believe they have a (...)
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  20. Getting the Story Right: A Reductionist Narrative Account of Personal Identity.Jeanine Weekes Schroer & Robert Schroer - 2014 - Philosophical Studies (3):1-25.
    A popular “Reductionist” account of personal identity unifies person stages into persons in virtue of their psychological continuity with one another. One objection to psychological continuity accounts is that there is more to our personal identity than just mere psychological continuity: there is also an active process of self-interpretation and self-creation. This criticism can be used to motivate a rival account of personal identity that appeals to the notion of a narrative. To the extent (...)
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  21. Personal Identity.Jacqueline Mariña - 2008 - In Transformation of the Self in the thought of Schleiermacher. Oxford University Press.
    This is the third chapter of my book Transformation of the self, which covers Schleiermacher's reception of Kant on the problem of personal identity.
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  22. The Extended Self, Functional Constancy, and Personal Identity.Joshua Fost - 2013 - Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations 12:47-66.
    Personal indexicals are often taken to refer to the agent of an expression’s context, but deviant uses (e.g. ‘I’m parked out back’) complicate matters. I argue that personal indexicals refer to the extended self of the agent, where the extended self is a mereological chimera incorporating whatever determines our behavioral capacities. To ascertain the persistence conditions of personal identity, I propose a method for selecting a level of description and a set of functional properties at that (...)
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  23.  80
    Delayed Fission and the Standard Psychological View of Personal Identity.Huiyuhl Yi - 2013 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 20 (2):173-191.
    Consider a specific type of fission where psychological continuity takes a branching form, and one of the offshoots comes into being later than the other offshoot. Let us say that the earlier offshoot comes into being in the left branch at t, and the later offshoot comes into being in the right branch at t+1. With regard to the question how many persons are involved in this case, three answers are worth considering: (i) The original subject persists up to t; (...)
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  24. Facial Allograft Transplantation, Personal Identity, and Subjectivity.J. S. Swindell Blumenthal-Barby - 2007 - Journal of Medical Ethics 33 (8):449-453.
    An analysis of the identity issues involved in facial allograft transplantation is provided in this paper. The identity issues involved in organ transplantation in general, under both theoretical accounts of personal identity and subjective accounts provided by organ recipients, are examined. It is argued that the identity issues involved in facial allograft transplantation are similar to those involved in organ transplantation in general, but much stronger because the face is so closely linked with personal (...)
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  25. Personal Identity in Multicultural Constitutional Democracies.H. P. P. Lotter - 1998 - South African Journal of Philosophy 17 (3):179-198.
    Awareness of, and respect for differences of gender, race, religion, language, and culture have liberated many oppressed groups from the hegemony of white, Western males. However, respect for previously denigrated collective identities should not be allowed to confine individuals to identities constructed around one main component used for political mobilisation, or to identities that depend on a priority of properties that are not optional, like race, gender, and language. In this article I want to sketch an approach for accommodating different (...)
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  26. Personal Identity and Patient-Centered Medical Decision Making.Lucie White - 2017 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 8 (3):194-195.
    Nancy Jecker and Andrew Ko (2017) wish to present an account of personal identity which captures what matters to the patient and places the patient at the center of medical decisions. They focus particularly on medical interventions in the brain that can cause drastic changes in personality; under what circumstances should we say the patient has 'survived' these changes? More specifically, how can we best understand the notion of survival in a way that captures what is of concern (...)
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  27.  72
    Introduction: Personal Identity: Complex or Simple?Georg Gasser & Matthias Stefan - 2012 - In Personal Identity: Complex or Simple? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 1-17.
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  28.  99
    Morality Grounds Personal Identity.Bradley Monton - 2014 - Philosophical Analysis 31:1-26.
    There is a connection between moral facts and personal identity facts: morality grounds personal identity. If, for example, old Sally enters a teletransporter, and new Sally emerges, the fundamental question to ask is: is new Sally morally responsible for actions (and omissions) of old Sally? If the moral facts are such that she is morally responsible, then Sally persisted through the teletransporter event, and if not, Sally ceased to exist.
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  29. Fetuses, Corpses and the Psychological Approach to Personal Identity.Robert Francescotti - 2005 - Philosophical Explorations 8 (1):69-81.
    Olson (1997a) tries to refute the Psychological Approach to personal identity with his Fetus Argument, and Mackie (1999) aims to do the same with the Death Argument. With the help of a suggestion made by Baker (1999), the following discussion shows that these arguments fail. In the process of defending the Psychological Approach, it is made clear exactly what one is and is not committed to as a proponent of the theory.
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  30.  98
    Personal Identity Without Persons.Jens David Ohlin - 2002 - Dissertation, Columbia University
    The project takes as its starting point our conflicting intuitions about personal identity exposed by Bernard Williams' thought experiment involving the switching of bodies in "The Self and the Future." The conflicted intuitions are identified as animalist and psychologist and correspond roughly with the two major approaches to personal identity. The traditional strategy to resolve the conflict---thought experiments---is critically examined and the project concludes that proper thought experiments will reveal the conflict but are unlikely to resolve (...)
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  31. Language and Hume's Search for a Theory of the Self.Alan Schwerin - 2015 - Metaphysica: Internationale Fachzeitschrift Für Ontologie Und Metaphysik (Issue 2):139 - 158.
    In his Treatise Hume makes a profound suggestion: philosophical problems, especially problems in metaphysics, are verbal. This view is most vigorously articulated and defended in the course of his investigation of the problem of the self, in the section “Of personal identity.” My paper is a critical exploration of Hume's arguments for this influential thesis and an analysis of the context that informs this 1739 version of the nature of philosophical problems that anticipates the linguistic turn (...)
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  32. Personal Identity and Practical Reason: The Failure of Kantian Replies to Parfit.Jonny Anomaly - 2008 - Dialogue 47 (2):331-350.
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  33. Moment Universals and Personal Identity.Arnold Zuboff - 1978 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 52:141-55.
    This paper could be thought of as divided into two parts. In the first I show through a series of thought experiments that it is a mistake to think of one’s individual experience as necessarily belonging to only one particular place, time and organism. In repetitions across a universe large enough to host them, the particular experience that one finds oneself in, which can be individuated only by the detailed type that is the entirety of its momentary subjective content, would (...)
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  34. Personal Identity and Brain Identity.Nils-Frederic Wagner & Georg Northoff - 2017 - In L. Syd M. Johnson & Karen Rommelfanger (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Neuroethics. Routledge. pp. 335-351.
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  35. The Role of Appropriation in Locke's Account of Persons and Personal Identity.Ruth Boeker - 2016 - Locke Studies 16:3–39.
    According to Locke, appropriation is a precondition for moral responsibility and thus we can expect that it plays a distinctive role in his theory. Yet it is rare to find an interpretation of Locke’s account of appropriation that does not associate it with serious problems. To make room for a more satisfying understanding of Locke’s account of appropriation we have to analyse why it was so widely misunderstood. The aim of this paper is fourfold: First, I will show that Mackie’s (...)
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  36.  44
    Do eu como feixe de percepções ao eu das paixões: Hume e a identidade pessoal no Tratado.Susie Kovalczyk - 2016 - In Jaimir Conte, Marília Côrtes de Ferraz & Flávio Zimmermann (eds.), Ensaios sobre a filosofia de Hume. Florianópolis, Santa Catarina, Brésil: pp. 311-329.
    No Tratado da Natureza Humana David Hume (2009, p. 285-6 / T 1.4.6 (§5)) prescreve que “devemos distinguir a identidade pessoal enquanto diz respeito a nosso pensamento e imaginação, e enquanto diz respeito a nossas paixões ou ao interesse que temos por nós mesmos”. Enquanto o primeiro escopo é por ele abordado em seção específica no Livro I da obra em questão e pode ser sintetizado através da tese de que a atribuição de identidade sincrônica e diacrônica ao eu (...)
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  37. DBS, Personal Identity, and Diachronic Value.Doug McConnell - 2013 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 4 (2):47-49.
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  38. Transformation and Personal Identity In Kant.Jacqueline Marina - 2000 - Faith and Philosophy 17 (4):479-497.
    In this paper I explore how Kant’s development of the idea of the disposition in the Religion copes with problems implied by Kant’s idea of transcendental freedom. Since transcendental freedom implies the power of absolutely beginning a state, and therefore of absolutely beginning a series of the consequences of that state, a transcendentally free act is divorced from the preceding state of an agent, and would thus seem to be divorced from the agent’s character as well. The paper is divided (...)
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  39.  71
    John Locke and Personal Identity: Immortality and Bodily Resurrection in 17th-Century Philosophy. [REVIEW]Lloyd Strickland - 2011 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 19 (4):826 - 830.
    British Journal for the History of Philosophy, Volume 19, Issue 4, Page 826-830, July 2011.
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  40. The Dynamic Process of Being : Two ProcessOntological Theories of Personal Identity.Daniel Robert Siakel - 2014 - Process Studies 43 (2):4-28.
    The purpose of this article is to introduce, interpret, and develop two incompatible process -ontological theories of personal identity that have received little attention in analytic metaphysics. The first theory derives from the notion of personal identity proposed in Alfred North Whitehead’s philosophy, but I interpret this notion differently from previous commentators. The Whiteheadian theory may appeal to those who believe that personal identity involves an entity or entities that are essentially dynamic, but has (...)
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  41. The Sense of Diachronic Personal Identity.Stan Klein - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):791-811.
    In this paper, I first consider a famous objection that the standard interpretation of the Lockean account of diachronicity (i.e., one’s sense of personal identity over time) via psychological connectedness falls prey to breaks in one’s personal narrative. I argue that recent case studies show that while this critique may hold with regard to some long-term autobiographical self-knowledge (e.g., episodic memory), it carries less warrant with respect to accounts based on trait-relevant, semantic self-knowledge. The second issue I (...)
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  42. The Primacy of Space in Heidegger and Taylor: Towards a Unified Account of Personal Identity.Ignacio Moya Arriagada - 2009 - Appraisal 7 (4):17-24.
    My aim is to explore how the notion of personhood is tied to the notion of space--both physical and moral space. In particular, I argue against the Cartesian view of the disengaged/disembodied self and in favour of Charles Taylor's and Martin Heidegger's view of the engaged and embedded self. I contend that space, as the transcendental condition for the possibility of human agency, is the place where questions of identity are possible and answers, if any, are to be found. (...)
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  43. Sharing the Blame: Implications of the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition for Personal Identity and Ethics.Jessica Swallow - 2013 - Dissertation, University of Exeter
    The hypothesis of extended cognition supposes that internal and external vehicles of cognition should be understood as being on a cognitive par; I propose that this requires that these vehicles should be treated as being on an ethical par. Further, I propose that the hypothesis entails extended personal identity, which enables us to make claims about the possibility of distributed and extended moral responsibility.
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  44. "Hume and Kant on Identity and Substance".Mark Pickering - 2017 - In Elizabeth Robinson & Chris W. Surprenant (eds.), Kant and the Scottish Enlightenment. New York: Routledge. pp. 230-244.
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  45. Identifying the Problem of Personal Identity.Ned Markosian - 2010 - In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & Harry Silverstein (eds.), Time and Identity. MIT Press. pp. 129.
    This paper has two main aims. The first is to propose a new way of characterizing the problem of personal identity. The second is to show that the metaphysical picture that underlies my proposal has important implications for the 3D/4D debate. I start by spelling out several of the old ways of characterizing the problem of personal identity and saying what I think is wrong with each of them. Next I present and motivate some metaphysical principles (...)
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  46. Personal Identity and Resurrection: How Do We Survive Our Death? Edited by Georg Gasser . Pp. Xvi, 277, Farnham, Ashgate, 2010, £55.00/$99.95. [REVIEW]Derek Michaud - 2013 - Heythrop Journal 54 (2):330-331.
    Book review of Georg Gasser, ed. “Personal Identity: How do we Survive Our Death?” (Ashgate, 2010).
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  47. Strong Evaluations and Personal Identity.Arto Laitinen - 2002 - In Christian Kanzian & et al (eds.), Persons: An Interdisciplinary Approach. ALWS Society. pp. 127-9.
    This paper examines Charles Taylor’s claim that personal identity is a matter of strong evaluations. Strong evaluations are in this paper analyzed as stable preferences, which are strongly identified with and which are based on qualitative distinctions concerning the non-instrumental value of options. In discussing the role of strong evaluations in personal identity, the focus is on "self-identity", not on the criteria of personhood or on the logical relation of identity. Two senses of self- (...) can be distinguished: identity as practical orientation and identity as self-definition in a more encompassing sense. The former consists of one’s strong evaluations only, the latter is a more comprehensive notion, in which strong evaluations have a double role. Strong evaluations are first of all directly a constituent of self-definitions, and secondly, self-definition with respect to other features proceeds in the light of the strong evaluations. (shrink)
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  48. Transcendental Arguments for Personal Identity in Kant’s Transcendental Deduction.Jacqueline Mariña - 2011 - Philo 14 (2):109-136.
    One of the principle aims of the B version of Kant’s transcendental deduction is to show how it is possible that the same “I think” can accompany all of my representations, which is a transcendental condition of the possibility of judgment. Contra interpreters such as A. Brook, I show that this “I think” is an a priori (reflected) self-consciousness; contra P. Keller, I show that this a priori self-consciousness is first and foremost a consciousness of one’s personal identity (...)
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  49. Personal Identity and Subjective Time: Readings in From Brain to Cosmos.Mark F. Sharlow - manuscript
    This document consists primarily of an excerpt (chapter 5) from the author’s book From Brain to Cosmos. That excerpt presents an analysis of personal identity through time, using the concept of subjective fact that the author developed earlier in the book. (Readers unfamiliar with that concept are strongly advised to read chapters 2 and 3 of From Brain to Cosmos first. See the last page of this document for details on how to obtain those chapters.).
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  50.  41
    The Discovery of Individuality. A Short History of Human Personal Identity.Wolfgang Sohst - 2015 - In Collected Lectures of MoMo Berlin. Berlin, Germany: xenomoi Verlag. pp. 2015-11-16.
    Human individuality is something that is taken for granted in our time. In fact, it has arisen anthropologically over long periods of time. Man is originally a collective being who has no identity outside of his collective - not least because nobody asks him about it. The text provides a) a psychoanalytically inspired hypothesis as to how an idea of the ego as an individual could actually come about and b) a subsequent, further hypothesis that this idea of the (...)
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