Results for 'Inductive Justification inductive Rechtfertigung'

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  1. Inductive Justification and Discovery. On Hans Reichenbach’s Foundation of the Autonomy of the Philosophy of Science.Gregor Schiemann - 2002 - In Schickore J. & Steinle F. (eds.), Revisiting Discovery and Justification. Max-Planck-Institut. pp. 23-39.
    I would like to assume that Reichenbach's distinction of Justification and Discovery lives on, and to seek arguments in his texts that would justify their relevance in this field. The persuasive force of these arguments transcends the contingent circumstances apart from which their genesis and local transmission cannot be made understandable. I shall begin by characterizing the context distinction as employed by Reichenbach in "Experience and Prediction" to differentiate between epistemology and science (1). Following Thomas Nickles and Kevin T. (...)
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  2. The limits of conventional justification: inductive risk and industry bias beyond conventionalism.Miguel Ohnesorge - 2020 - Frontiers in Research Metric and Analytics 14.
    This article develops a constructive criticism of methodological conventionalism. Methodological conventionalism asserts that standards of inductive risk ought to be justified in virtue of their ability to facilitate coordination in a research community. On that view, industry bias occurs when conventional methodological standards are violated to foster industry preferences. The underlying account of scientific conventionality, however, is problematically incomplete. Conventions may be justified in virtue of their coordinative functions, but often qualify for posterior empirical criticism as research advances. Accordingly, (...)
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  3. On the justification of deduction and induction.Franz Huber - 2017 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 7 (3):507-534.
    The thesis of this paper is that we can justify induction deductively relative to one end, and deduction inductively relative to a different end. I will begin by presenting a contemporary variant of Hume ’s argument for the thesis that we cannot justify the principle of induction. Then I will criticize the responses the resulting problem of induction has received by Carnap and Goodman, as well as praise Reichenbach ’s approach. Some of these authors compare induction to deduction. Haack compares (...)
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  4. Randomness and the justification of induction.Scott Campbell & James Franklin - 2004 - Synthese 138 (1):79 - 99.
    In 1947 Donald Cary Williams claimed in The Ground of Induction to have solved the Humean problem of induction, by means of an adaptation of reasoning first advanced by Bernoulli in 1713. Later on David Stove defended and improved upon Williams’ argument in The Rational- ity of Induction (1986). We call this proposed solution of induction the ‘Williams-Stove sampling thesis’. There has been no lack of objections raised to the sampling thesis, and it has not been widely accepted. In our (...)
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  5. The" No Miracles" Justification of Induction.Mario Alai - 2009 - Epistemologia 32 (2):303.
    Il problema apparentemente insolubile di una giustificazione non circolare dell’induzione diverrebbe più abbordabile se invece di chiederci solo cosa ci assicura che un fenomeno osservato si riprodurrà in modo uguale in un numero potenzialmente infinito di casi futuri, ci chiedessimo anche come si spiega che esso si sia manifestato fin qui in modo identico e senza eccezioni in un numero di casi finito ma assai alto. E’ questa l’idea della giustificazione abduttiva dell’induzione, avanzata in forme diverse da Armstrong, Foster e (...)
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  6. Lambert on Moral Certainty and the Justification of Induction.Aaron Wells - 2024 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 2024.
    I reconstruct J. H. Lambert’s views on how practical grounds relate to epistemic features, such as certainty. I argue, first, that Lambert’s account of moral certainty does not involve any distinctively practical influence on theoretical belief. However, it does present an interesting form of fallibilism about justification as well as a denial of a tight link between knowledge and action. Second, I argue that for Lambert, the persistence principle that underwrites induction is supported by practical reasons to believe; this (...)
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  7. Logika opravdanja u Boškovićevoj indukciji [Justification Logic in Bošković's Induction].Srećko Kovač - 2014 - In Nikola Stanković, Stipe Kutleša & Ivan Šestak (eds.), Filozofija Ruđera Josipa Boškovića. Filozofsko-teološki institut Družbe Isusove. pp. 153-168.
    [English in PhilArchive, unpublished]. Ruđer Bošković's (Rogerius Joseph Boscovich, 1711-1787) induction is described as a reasoning procedure that combines abductive, generalizing and deductive forms of inference. According to Bošković, the application of inductive reasoning extends beyond natural science. Bošković's critique of the use of the principle of sufficient reason is discussed, and constructive rules of Bošković's inductive logic are proposed from the standpoint of contemporary justification logic. To that end, justification logic could be extended with Bošković's (...)
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  8. Inter-world probability and the problem of induction.Chase B. Wrenn - 2006 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (3):387–402.
    Laurence BonJour has recently proposed a novel and interesting approach to the problem of induction. He grants that it is contingent, and so not a priori, that our patterns of inductive inference are reliable. Nevertheless, he claims, it is necessary and a priori that those patterns are highly likely to be reliable, and that is enough to ground an a priori justification induction. This paper examines an important defect in BonJour's proposal. Once we make sense of the claim (...)
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  9. Induction and Natural Kinds Revisited.Howard Sankey - 2021 - In Stathis Psillos, Benjamin Hill & Henrik Lagerlund (eds.), Causal Powers in Science: Blending Historical and Conceptual Perspectives. Oxford University Press. pp. 284-299.
    In ‘Induction and Natural Kinds’, I proposed a solution to the problem of induction according to which our use of inductive inference is reliable because it is grounded in the natural kind structure of the world. When we infer that unobserved members of a kind will have the same properties as observed members of the kind, we are right because all members of the kind possess the same essential properties. The claim that the existence of natural kinds is what (...)
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  10. Induction, Experimentation and Causation in the Social Sciences.Lars-Göran Johansson - 2021 - Philosophies 6 (4):105.
    Inductive thinking is a universal human habit; we generalise from our experiences the best we can. The induction problem is to identify which observed regularities provide reasonable justification for inductive conclusions. In the natural sciences, we can often use strict laws in making successful inferences about unobserved states of affairs. In the social sciences, by contrast, we have no strict laws, only regularities which most often are conditioned on ceteris paribus clauses. This makes it much more difficult (...)
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  11. Recht und Rechtfertigung Zur rechtstheoretischen Dimension des moralischen Rechts auf Rechtfertigung.Lorenz Engi - 2016 - Archiv Fuer Rechts Und Sozialphilosphie 102 (3):353-362.
    The right to justification is the central tenet of Rainer Forst's theory of justice: every person has the moral right to receive justification for morally relevant actions. This approach is instructive also from a jurisprudential perspective. One important purpose of the law is to force state authorities to provide justifications for their actions. Therefore, based on the right to legal equality, justification must be provided for any unequal treatment. Likewise, restrictions of fundamental rights in a constitutional state (...)
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  12. How Not To Know The Principle of Induction.Howard Sankey - 2021 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 11 (3):243-254.
    In The Problems of Philosophy, Bertrand Russell presents a justification of induction based on a principle he refers to as “the principle of induction”. Owing to the ambiguity of the notion of probability, the principle of induction may be interpreted in two different ways. If interpreted in terms of the subjective interpretation of probability, the principle of induction may be known a priori to be true. But it is unclear how this should give us any confidence in our use (...)
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  13. Revisiting Inductive Confirmation in Science: A Puzzle and a Solution.Alik Pelman - 2024 - Philosophies 9 (171):1-7.
    When an empirical prediction E of hypothesis H is observed to be true, such observation is said to confirm, i.e., support (although not prove) the truth of the hypothesis. But why? What justifies the claim that such evidence supports the hypothesis? The widely accepted answer is that it is justified by induction. More specifically, it is commonly held that the following argument, (1) If H then E; (2) E; (3) Therefore, (probably) H (here referred to as ‘hypothetico-deductive confirmation argument’), is (...)
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  14. Human Induction in Machine Learning: A Survey of the Nexus.Petr Spelda & Vit Stritecky - 2021 - ACM Computing Surveys 54 (3):1-18.
    As our epistemic ambitions grow, the common and scientific endeavours are becoming increasingly dependent on Machine Learning (ML). The field rests on a single experimental paradigm, which consists of splitting the available data into a training and testing set and using the latter to measure how well the trained ML model generalises to unseen samples. If the model reaches acceptable accuracy, an a posteriori contract comes into effect between humans and the model, supposedly allowing its deployment to target environments. Yet (...)
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    Induction and Probability.Basil Evangelidis - 2025 - Humanities Bulletin 7 (2):23-38.
    The present research aims to examine the different accounts of induction given by Aristotle, Leibniz, Hume, Carnap and De Finetti, trying to support that probability calculus offers a sufficient grounding of inductive logic. The term induction had been contrasted to deduction, by Aristotle. The Neoplatonic philosopher Alcinous suggested that dialectic firstly investigates the substances and then the accidents. There are five kinds of dialectic reasoning: division, definition, analysis, induction and syllogistic. The first three concern with substances, the last two (...)
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  16. Evidence and Inductive Inference.Nevin Climenhaga - 2023 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 435-449.
    This chapter presents a typology of the different kinds of inductive inferences we can draw from our evidence, based on the explanatory relationship between evidence and conclusion. Drawing on the literature on graphical models of explanation, I divide inductive inferences into (a) downwards inferences, which proceed from cause to effect, (b) upwards inferences, which proceed from effect to cause, and (c) sideways inferences, which proceed first from effect to cause and then from that cause to an additional effect. (...)
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  17. Skepticism about Induction.Ruth Weintraub - 2008 - In John Greco (ed.), The Oxford handbook of skepticism. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 129.
    This article considers two arguments that purport to show that inductive reasoning is unjustified: the argument adduced by Sextus Empiricus and the (better known and more formidable) argument given by Hume in the Treatise. While Sextus’ argument can quite easily be rebutted, a close examination of the premises of Hume’s argument shows that they are seemingly cogent. Because the sceptical claim is very unintuitive, the sceptical argument constitutes a paradox. And since attributions of justification are theoretical, and the (...)
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  18. Demonstrative Induction and the Skeleton of Inference.P. D. Magnus - 2008 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 22 (3):303-315.
    It has been common wisdom for centuries that scientific inference cannot be deductive; if it is inference at all, it must be a distinctive kind of inductive inference. According to demonstrative theories of induction, however, important scientific inferences are not inductive in the sense of requiring ampliative inference rules at all. Rather, they are deductive inferences with sufficiently strong premises. General considerations about inferences suffice to show that there is no difference in justification between an inference construed (...)
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  19. A Justification of Empirical Thinking.Arnold Zuboff - 2014 - Philosophy Now 102:22-24.
    Imagine two urns, each with a thousand beads - in one all the beads are blue while in the other only one of the thousand is blue. If one of these urns is pushed forward (based on the toss of a fair coin) and the single bead then randomly drawn from it is blue, we must infer that it is a thousand times more probable that the urn pushed forward is the purely blue one. The hypothesis that this was instead (...)
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  20. Modes of Convergence to the Truth: Steps Toward a Better Epistemology of Induction.Hanti Lin - 2022 - Review of Symbolic Logic 15 (2):277-310.
    Evaluative studies of inductive inferences have been pursued extensively with mathematical rigor in many disciplines, such as statistics, econometrics, computer science, and formal epistemology. Attempts have been made in those disciplines to justify many different kinds of inductive inferences, to varying extents. But somehow those disciplines have said almost nothing to justify a most familiar kind of induction, an example of which is this: “We’ve seen this many ravens and they all are black, so all ravens are black.” (...)
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  21. Observation and Induction.Theodore J. Everett - 2010 - Logos and Episteme 1 (2):303-324.
    This article offers a simple technical resolution to the problem of induction, which is to say that general facts are not always inferred from observations of particular facts, but are themselves sometimes defeasibly observed. The article suggests a holistic account of observation that allows for general statements in empirical theories to be interpreted as observation reports, in place of the common but arguably obsolete idea that observations are exclusively particular. Predictions and other particular statements about unobservable facts can then appear (...)
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  22. Evolution and Epistemic Justification.Michael Vlerick & Alex Broadbent - 2015 - Dialectica 69 (2):185-203.
    According to the evolutionary sceptic, the fact that our cognitive faculties evolved radically undermines their reliability. A number of evolutionary epistemologists have sought to refute this kind of scepticism. This paper accepts the success of these attempts, yet argues that refuting the evolutionary sceptic is not enough to put any particular domain of beliefs – notably scientific beliefs, which include belief in Darwinian evolution – on a firm footing. The paper thus sets out to contribute to this positive justificatory project, (...)
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  23. Justification as a loaded notion.Yuval Avnur - 2019 - Synthese 198 (5):4897-4916.
    The problem of skepticism is often understood as a paradox: a valid argument with plausible premises whose conclusion is that we lack justification for perceptual beliefs. Typically, this conclusion is deemed unacceptable, so a theory is offered that posits conditions for justification on which some premise is false. The theory defended here is more general, and explains why the paradox arises in the first place. Like Strawson’s (Introduction to logical theory, Wiley, New York, 1952) “ordinary language” approach to (...)
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  24. Categorical harmony and path induction.Patrick Walsh - 2017 - Review of Symbolic Logic 10 (2):301-321.
    This paper responds to recent work in the philosophy of Homotopy Type Theory by James Ladyman and Stuart Presnell. They consider one of the rules for identity, path induction, and justify it along ‘pre-mathematical’ lines. I give an alternate justification based on the philosophical framework of inferentialism. Accordingly, I construct a notion of harmony that allows the inferentialist to say when a connective or concept is meaning-bearing and this conception unifies most of the prominent conceptions of harmony through category (...)
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  25. A mug's game? Solving the problem of induction with metaphysical presuppositions.Nicholas Maxwell - 2017 - In Karl Popper, Science and Enlightenment. London: UCL Press.
    This paper argues that a view of science, expounded and defended elsewhere, solves the problem of induction. The view holds that we need to see science as accepting a hierarchy of metaphysical theses concerning the comprehensibility and knowability of the universe, these theses asserting less and less as we go up the hierarchy. It may seem that this view must suffer from vicious circularity, in so far as accepting physical theories is justified by an appeal to metaphysical theses in turn (...)
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  26. Hume's Positive Argument on Induction.Hsueh Qu - 2013 - Noûs 48 (4):595-625.
    Discussion on whether Hume's treatment of induction is descriptive or normative has usually centred on Hume's negative argument, somewhat neglecting the positive argument. In this paper, I will buck this trend, focusing on the positive argument. First, I argue that Hume's positive and negative arguments should be read as addressing the same issues . I then argue that Hume's positive argument in the Enquiry is normative in nature; drawing on his discussion of scepticism in Section 12 of the Enquiry, I (...)
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  27. Can the Best-Alternative Justification Solve Hume’s Problem? On the Limits of a Promising Approach.Eckhart Arnold - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (4):584-593.
    In a recent Philosophy of Science article Gerhard Schurz proposes meta-inductivistic prediction strategies as a new approach to Hume's. This comment examines the limitations of Schurz's approach. It can be proven that the meta-inductivist approach does not work any more if the meta-inductivists have to face an infinite number of alternative predictors. With his limitation it remains doubtful whether the meta-inductivist can provide a full solution to the problem of induction.
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  28. Grounding Reichenbach’s Pragmatic Vindication of Induction.Michael J. Shaffer - 2017 - Polish Journal of Philosophy 11 (1):43-55.
    This paper has three interdependent aims. The first is to make Reichenbach’s views on induction and probabilities clearer, especially as they pertain to his pragmatic justification of induction. The second aim is to show how his view of pragmatic justification arises out of his commitment to extensional empiricism and moots the possibility of a non-pragmatic justification of induction. Finally, and most importantly, a formal decision-theoretic account of Reichenbach’s pragmatic justification is offered in terms both of the (...)
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  29. Three Ways of Getting it Wrong: Induction in Wonderland.Brendan Shea - 2009 - In William Irwin & Richard Brian Davis (eds.), Alice in Wonderland and Philosophy: Curiouser and Curiouser. Wiley. pp. 93-107.
    Alice encounters at least three distinct problems in her struggles to understand and navigate Wonderland. The first arises when she attempts to predict what will happen in Wonderland based on what she has experienced outside of Wonderland. In many cases, this proves difficult -- she fails to predict that babies might turn into pigs, that a grin could survive without a cat or that playing cards could hold criminal trials. Alice's second problem involves her efforts to figure out the basic (...)
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  30. The modifier effect in within-category induction: Default inheritance in complex noun phrases.Martin Jönsson & James Hampton - 2012 - Language and Cognitive Processes 27:90-116.
    Within-category induction is the projection of a generic property from a class to a subtype of that class. The modifier effect refers to the discovery reported by Connolly et al., that the subtype statement tends to be judged less likely to be true than the original unmodified sentence. The effect was replicated and shown to be moderated by the typicality of the modifier. Likelihood judgements were also found to correlate between modified and unmodified versions of sentences. Experiment 2 elicited justifications, (...)
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  31. Hume Is Not A Skeptic about Induction.Xinli Wang - 2001 - Diálogos. Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad de Puerto Rico 36 (78):41-54.
    On the basis of the distinction between logical and factual probability, epistemic justification is distinguished from logical justification of induction. It is argued that, contrary to the accepted interpretation of Hume, Hume believes that inductive inferences are epistemically legitimate and justifiable. Hence the beliefs arrived at via (correct) inductive inferences are rational beliefs. According to this interpretation, Hume is not a radical skeptic about induction.
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  32. Criticizing a Difference of Contexts: On Reichenbach’s Distincition Between “Context of Discovery” and “Context of Justification”.Gregor Schiemann - 2002 - In Schickore J. & Steinle F. (eds.), Revisiting Discovery and Justification. Max-Planck-Institut. pp. 237-251.
    With his distinction between the "context of discovery" and the "context of justification", Hans Reichenbach gave the traditional difference between genesis and validity a modern standard formulation. Reichenbach's distinction is one of the well-known ways in which the expression "context" is used in the theory of science. My argument is that Reichenbach's concept is unsuitable and leads to contradictions in the semantic fields of genesis and validity. I would like to demonstrate this by examining the different meanings of Reichenbach's (...)
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  33. Conceptual Spaces: A Solution to Goodman’s New Riddle of Induction?Sebastian Scholz - 2024 - Philosophia 52 (4).
    Nelson Goodman observed that we use only certain ‘good’ (viz. projectible) predicates during reasoning, with no obvious demarcation criterion in sight to distinguish them from the bad and gruesome ones. This apparent arbitrariness undermines the justifiability of our reasoning practices. Inspired by Quine’s 1969 paper on Natural Kinds, Peter Gärdenfors proposes a cognitive criterion based on his theory of Conceptual Spaces (CS). He argues the good predicates are those referring to natural concepts, and that we can capture naturalness in terms (...)
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  34. Sur le problème de l’induction : une réponse en acier (a Steel answer).Kevin Kaiser - 2018 - Ithaque 23:49-73.
    Le problème de l’induction (humien) a récemment été abordé par Steel dans son article de 2010. Celui-ci soutient que les théories d’apprentissage formelles permettent de justifier logiquement le principe de l’induction, ce dernier assurant la fiabilité logique des méthodes. Cette proposition a été critiquée par Howson en 2011, ce dernier mettant en doute la possibilité même qu’une méthode puisse être logiquement fiable. Bien que Steel ait offert une réponse à cette critique, il n’y répond pas directement. Dans le présent article, (...)
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  35. Why and how to construct an epistemic justification of machine learning?Petr Spelda & Vit Stritecky - 2024 - Synthese 204 (2):1-24.
    Consider a set of shuffled observations drawn from a fixed probability distribution over some instance domain. What enables learning of inductive generalizations which proceed from such a set of observations? The scenario is worthwhile because it epistemically characterizes most of machine learning. This kind of learning from observations is also inverse and ill-posed. What reduces the non-uniqueness of its result and, thus, its problematic epistemic justification, which stems from a one-to-many relation between the observations and many learnable generalizations? (...)
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  36. Goodman e o projeto de uma definição construtiva de “indução válida”.Eros Moreira de Carvalho - 2018 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 22 (3):439-460.
    In Fact, Fiction and Forecast, Nelson Goodman claims that the problem of justifying induction is not something over and above the problem of describing valid induction. Such claim, besides suggesting his commitment to the collapse of the distinction between the context of description and the context of justification, seems to open the possibility that the new riddle of induction could be addressed empirically. Discoveries about psychological preferences for projecting certain classes of objects could function as a criterion for determining (...)
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  37. No-Regret Learning Supports Voters’ Competence.Petr Spelda, Vit Stritecky & John Symons - 2024 - Social Epistemology 38 (5):543-559.
    Procedural justifications of democracy emphasize inclusiveness and respect and by doing so come into conflict with instrumental justifications that depend on voters’ competence. This conflict raises questions about jury theorems and makes their standing in democratic theory contested. We show that a type of no-regret learning called meta-induction can help to satisfy the competence assumption without excluding voters or diverse opinion leaders on an a priori basis. Meta-induction assigns weights to opinion leaders based on their past predictive performance to determine (...)
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  38. Проблем оправданости индуктивног закључивања.Mitar Nedeljkovic - 2021 - Zbornik Radova Filozofskog Fakulteta U Prištini 51 (2):387-408.
    In this paper, the author considers the classical strategies of defense from Hume's argument against induction, and assesses the extent to which they were found to be successful. Synthetic, linguistic, a priori, pragmatic and inductive strategies of defending induction are considered, as well as the question of the extent to which the justification of induction is a problem for grounding scientific knowledge. A new argument is introduced for the a priori justification of induction, as well as a (...)
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  39. Varying Evidential Standards as a Matter of Justice.Ahmad Elabbar - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    The setting of evidential standards is a core practice of scientific assessment for policy. Persuaded by considerations of inductive risk, philosophers generally agree that the justification of evidential standards must appeal to non-epistemic values but debate whether the balance of non-epistemic reasons favours varying evidential standards versus maintaining fixed high evidential standards in assessment, as both sets of standards promote different and important political virtues of advisory institutions. In this paper, I adjudicate the evidential standards debate by developing (...)
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  40. Logika u filozofiji Franje pl. Markovića [Logic in philosophy of Franjo pl. Marković].Srećko Kovač - 2016 - In Stipe Kutleša (ed.), Filozofijsko djelo Franje pl. Markovića: zbornik radova. Zagreb: Matica hrvatska. pp. 57-73.
    Logic has a fundamental role in the philosophy of Franjo Marković (1845-1914). His theory of concepts and reasoning is analyzed, especially with respect to the essential role of the principle of sufficient reason and in connection with the concept of causality. The interplay of various types of evidence in Marković's inductive-deductive logic is analysed by means of contemporary justification logic tools.
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  41. Against Methodological Continuity and Metaphysical Knowledge.Simon Allzén - 2023 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 13 (1):1-20.
    The main purpose of this paper is to refute the metaphysicians ‘methodological continuation’ argument supporting epistemic realism in metaphysics. This argument aims to show that scientific realists have to accept that metaphysics is as rationally justified as science given that they both employ inference to the best explanation, i.e. that metaphysics and science are methodologically continuous. I argue that the reasons given by scientific realists as to why inference to the best explanation is reliable in science do not constitute a (...)
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  42. Defusing the Common Sense Problem of Evil.Chris Tweedt - 2015 - Faith and Philosophy 32 (4):391-403.
    The inductive argument from evil to the non-existence of God contains the premise that, probably, there is gratuitous evil. Some skeptical theists object: one's justification for the premise that, probably, there is gratuitous evil involves an inference from the proposition that we don't see a good reason for some evil to the proposition that it appears that there is no good reason for that evil, and they use a principle, "CORNEA," to block that inference. The common sense problem (...)
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  43. Skeptical Symmetry: A Wittgensteinian Approach to Scientific Reasoning.Erik Nelson - 2015 - Gnosis 14 (2):14-19.
    Many philosophers have wrongly assumed that there is an asymmetry between the problem of induction and the logocentric predicament (the justification of deductive inferences). This paper will show that the demand for justification, for the very inferences that are required for justification, is deeply problematic. Using a Wittgensteinian approach, I will argue that justification has an internal relation with deductive and inductive inferences. For Wittgenstein, two concepts are internally related if my understanding of one is (...)
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  44. Understanding Creativity: Affect Decision and Inference.Avijit Lahiri - manuscript
    In this essay we collect and put together a number of ideas relevant to the under- standing of the phenomenon of creativity, confining our considerations mostly to the domain of cognitive psychology while we will, on a few occasions, hint at neuropsy- chological underpinnings as well. In this, we will mostly focus on creativity in science, since creativity in other domains of human endeavor have common links with scientific creativity while differing in numerous other specific respects. We begin by briefly (...)
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  45. Popper e o problema da predição prática.Eros Moreira De Carvalho - 2011 - Analytica (Rio) 15 (2):123-146.
    The problem of rational prediction, launched by Wesley Salmon, is without doubt the Achilles heel of the critical method defended by Popper. In this paper, I assess the response given both by Popper and by the popperian Alan Musgrave to this problem. Both responses are inadequate and thus the conclusion of Salmon is reinforced: without appeal to induction, there is no way to make of the practical prediction a rational action. Furthermore, the critical method needs to be vindicated if one (...)
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  46. The Epistemology of Debunking Argumentation.Jonathan Egeland - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (4):837-852.
    There is an ever-growing literature on what exactly the condition or criterion is that enables some (but not all) debunking arguments to undermine our beliefs. In this paper, I develop a novel schema for debunking argumentation, arguing that debunking arguments generally have a simple and valid form, but that whether or not they are sound depends on the particular aetiological explanation which the debunker provides in order to motivate acceptance of the individual premises. The schema has three unique features: (1) (...)
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  47. (1 other version)Goodman’s Paradox, Hume’s Problem, Goodman-Kripke Paradox: Three Different Issues.Beppe Brivec - manuscript
    On page 14 of "Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences" (section 4 of chapter 1) by Nelson Goodman and Catherine Z. Elgin is written: “Since ‘blue’ and ‘green’ are interdefinable with ‘grue’ and ‘bleen’, the question of which pair is basic and which pair derived is entirely a question of which pair we start with”. This paper points out that an example of interdefinability is also that one about the predicate “grueb”, which is a predicate that applies to (...)
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  48. Kants Ausweg.Charles-Philipp Beckmann - manuscript
    In der Dialektik der Kritk der reinen Vernunft entwickelt Kant eine Position, welche auf verschiedene Probleme anwendbar ist, bei denen die Vollständigkeit zu erfüllender Bedingungen wesentlicher Aspekt des Problems ist. Diese Position soll durch die hier angestellte Übertragung auf das systematische Problem der inferentiellen Rechtfertigung so klar wie möglich herausgearbeitet werden. Durch die Übertragung wird das Regressproblem und damit auch das Problem der Rechtfertigung in seiner gegenwärtigen Form aufgelöst.
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  49. Ancient Indian Logic and Analogy.J. B. Paris & A. Vencovska - 2017 - In S. Ghosh & S. Prasad (eds.), Logic and its Applications, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 10119. Springer. pp. 198-210.
    B.K.Matilal, and earlier J.F.Staal, have suggested a reading of the `Nyaya five limb schema' (also sometimes referred to as the Indian Schema or Hindu Syllogism) from Gotama's Nyaya-Sutra in terms of a binary occurrence relation. In this paper we provide a rational justification of a version of this reading as Analogical Reasoning within the framework of Polyadic Pure Inductive Logic.
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  50. Rescuing the Greater Number. A Debate about Cornerstones in Normative Ethics / Die Rettung der größeren Anzahl: Eine Debatte um Grundbausteine ethischer Normenbegründung.Annette Dufner & Bettina Schöne-Seifert - 2019 - Zeitschrift für Praktische Philosophie 6 (2):15-42.
    This paper addresses the so-called Taurek debate on whether or not to save the greater number of victims in rescue conflicts. In this controversy we take a consequentialist and aggregationist pro-numbers position and defend it against various objections. In particular, we consider it to be compatible with the principle of equal concern. Given that the pro-numbers position hinges to a significant extent on the acceptance of the person-neutral value of personal well-being, we offer a coherentist justification for this value (...)
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