This study was intended to determine the level of factors affecting the decision of 4th year BS Accountancy students from College of Maasin to work after graduation or to take the 2022 CPALE. In order to determine the factors affecting the decision of the graduating Accountancy students, the researchers adopted the descriptive survey design. Descriptive survey is a sort of descriptive study that uses surveys to collect data on a variety of issues. The goal of this information is to see (...) how different circumstances can be obtained among the respondents. The following results were derived in the course of the conduct of this study; There is bigger percentage of female than of male where 26 out of 27 belongs to the age group of 20 to 22. Majority of the student’s parent’s occupation status is working. Conversely, most of them only earns P2,000 to P5,000 per month even though the household member earning for a living is 1 to 4 members, the first 3 factors namely financial status, peer pressure and parent’s influence were found to slightly affect the decision of the student with regards to taking the CPALE or to work after graduation. The last factor, school’s teaching influence turned out that it somewhat affects the decision of the students, there is a significant difference between the teaching influence factor and the demographic profile of gender while on the age and parent’s occupation status, it has a significance difference with financial status factor. As BSA students taking a course where a licensure examination awaits after graduation, it is necessary to take some factors into consideration before coming up into a decision regarding taking the CPALE or to work after graduation. Based on the results of the study, the level of factors to affect the decision of the students was determined. It has been shown in the results that the three factors namely financial status, peer pressure and parent’s influence can slightly affect the student’s decision. However, among three, peer pressure has the highest weighted mean rating of 2.86. On the other hand, the school’s teaching influence has the lowest weighted mean rating of 2.29 which means it can somewhat affect the decision of the student. (shrink)

Dating and hookup apps (DHAs) are now widely used and may be transforming our intimate relationships. The apps are beneficial in fostering intimate connections among those who are lonely, who are members of minority or marginalized groups, or who live nomadic lifestyles because of work or recreational travel. However, the wider social and relational changes that DHAs portend are merely beginning to be seriously discussed by academics (Arias et al., 2017). In this chapter, we employ concepts from the philosophy of (...) technology that inform our analysis of these changes. We also collate some of the morally significant impacts of DHAs and present some of the elements of the architecture of DHAs that facilitate them. Although there are many reasons to be concerned about DHAs, we argue that there is room for cautious optimism that DHAs may be vehicles of positive social and moral change. (shrink)

A wide variety of ontologies relevant to the biological and medical domains are available through the OBO Foundry portal, and their number is growing rapidly. Integration of these ontologies, while requiring considerable effort, is extremely desirable. However, heterogeneities in format and style pose serious obstacles to such integration. In particular, inconsistencies in naming conventions can impair the readability and navigability of ontology class hierarchies, and hinder their alignment and integration. While other sources of diversity are tremendously complex and challenging, agreeing (...) a set of common naming conventions is an achievable goal, particularly if those conventions are based on lessons drawn from pooled practical experience and surveys of community opinion. We summarize a review of existing naming conventions and highlight certain disadvantages with respect to general applicability in the biological domain. We also present the results of a survey carried out to establish which naming conventions are currently employed by OBO Foundry ontologies and to determine what their special requirements regarding the naming of entities might be. Lastly, we propose an initial set of typographic, syntactic and semantic conventions for labelling classes in OBO Foundry ontologies. Adherence to common naming conventions is more than just a matter of aesthetics. Such conventions provide guidance to ontology creators, help developers avoid flaws and inaccuracies when editing, and especially when interlinking, ontologies. Common naming conventions will also assist consumers of ontologies to more readily understand what meanings were intended by the authors of ontologies used in annotating bodies of data. (shrink)

We discuss recent progress in the development of cognitive ontologies and summarize three challenges in the coordinated development and application of these resources. Challenge 1 is to adopt a standardized definition for cognitive processes. We describe three possibilities and recommend one that is consistent with the standard view in cognitive and biomedical sciences. Challenge 2 is harmonization. Gaps and conflicts in representation must be resolved so that these resources can be combined for mark-up and interpretation of multi-modal data. Finally, Challenge (...) 3 is to test the utility of these resources for large-scale annotation of data, search and query, and knowledge discovery and integration. As term definitions are tested and revised, harmonization should enable coordinated updates across ontologies. However, the true test of these definitions will be in their community-wide adoption which will test whether they support valid inferences about psychological and neuroscientific data. (shrink)

We discuss recent progress in the development of cognitive ontologies and summarize three challenges in the coordinated development and application of these resources. Challenge 1 is to adopt a standardized definition for cognitive processes. We describe three possibilities and recommend one that is consistent with the standard view in cognitive and biomedical sciences. Challenge 2 is harmonization. Gaps and conflicts in representation must be resolved so that these resources can be combined for mark-up and interpretation of multi-modal data. Finally, Challenge (...) 3 is to test the utility of these resources for large-scale annotation of data, search and query, and knowledge discovery and integration. As term definitions are tested and revised, harmonization should enable coordinated updates across ontologies. However, the true test of these definitions will be in their community-wide adoption which will test whether they support valid inferences about psychological and neuroscientific data. (shrink)

As part of a trend in modern cognitive science, cognitive linguist, George Lakoff, and philosopher, Mark Johnson claim to provide a biologically-based account of subsymbolic meaningful experiences. They argue that human beings understand objects by extrapolating from their sensory motor activities and primary perceptions. Lakoff and Johnson’s writings have generated a good deal of interest among scholars of Early China because they maintain that “our common embodiment allows for common stable truths.” Although there are many grounds on which Lakoff and (...) Johnson’s theories have been criticized, this essay focuses in particular on problems related to their schema of Self as Container. Lakoff and Johnson contend that there are no pure experiences outside of culture, while nevertheless arguing that the experience of being a closed-off container is “direct.” “The concepts OBJECT, SUBSTANCE and CONTAINER emerge directly,” they write. “We experience ourselves as entities, separate from the rest of the world—as containers with an inside and an outside.” By “emerge directly,” they do not mean emerging free of culture, but rather that some experiences within culture, specifically physical experiences, are more directly given than others. My study explores the pitfalls of presuming the “direct” experience of containment makes good sense of texts from Early China (ca. 500–100 B.C.E). (shrink)

This paper offers a general theory of privacy, a theory that takes privacy to consist in being free from certain kinds of intrusions. On this understanding, privacy interests are distinct and distinguishable from those in solitude, anonymity, and property, for example, or from the fact that others possess, with neither consent nor permission, personal information about oneself. Privacy intrusions have both epistemic and psychological components, and can range in value from relatively trivial considerations to those of profound consequence for an (...) individual’s dignity, integrity, and autonomy. Thus while the focus of this theory is privacy per se— privacy as being free from certain kinds of intrusions—it has significant implications, discussed briefly, for what properly counts as the content of moral or legal rights to privacy. (shrink)

Review of All Things Wise and Wonderful by E. Janet Warren.

In the contemporary debate on moral status, it is not uncommon to find philosophers who embrace the the Principle of Full Moral Status, according to which the degree to which an entity E possesses moral status is proportional to the degree to which E possesses morally relevant properties until a threshold degree of morally relevant properties possession is reached, whereupon the degree to which E possesses morally relevant properties may continue to increase, but the degree to which E possesses moral (...) status remains the same. One philosopher who has contributed significantly to the contemporary debate on moral status and embraces the Principle of Full Moral Status is Mary Anne Warren. Warren holds not only that it is possible for some entities to possess full moral status, but that some entities actually do, e.g., normal adult human beings. I argue that two of Warren’s primary arguments for the Principle of Full Moral Status—the Argument from Pragmatism and the Argument from Explanatory Power—are significantly flawed. (shrink)

Over the last few decades, virtue has become increasingly important in philosophy, psychology, cognitive science, and education. However, as each of these disciplines approaches virtue from a decidedly different perspective, it has proven difficult to come up with an understanding of virtue that satisfies the standards of all four disciplines. In their book, Jennifer Wright, Michael Warren, and Nancy Snow attempt to put forward such an understanding.

Proza e shkurtër në këtë vëllim, e ribashkuar nën titullin „Me duar në xhepa të qepur”, tërheq konflikte midis ekzistencës dhe thelbit, duke projektuar ngërçe, aporie identitare dhe shëmbëlltyra komunikimi. 1-0 (?) është një satirë për futbollin dhe aranzhimet - në favor të skuadrave apo lojtarëve të caktuar - që u prodhuan intensivisht gjatë periudhës socialiste, të dominuara nga gënjeshtra, mistifikimi dhe faji. GIONÍ diskuton për komplekset adoleshente-adoleshente të disa krijesave me status të pasigurt, të përhumbur nga dështimi dhe dështimi, (...) të cilat autori, në frymën amerikane, i shpëton në fund, duke i dërguar në punë (pa na shpjeguar sesi do të ishte i mundur shpëtimi ontologjik). Mekanizmi epik në XHAMANTANI BOJËALLI duket i huazuar nga Mircea Eliade, i zbatuar vetëm në dimensione deterministe, ndër të cilat zbulimi I paautenticitetit të një martese është më pak problematik. Tek KU ISHA NË VEND, strategjitë e fiksionit autobiografik funksionojnë me mjeshtëri, autori rikujtues na çon nëpër labirintin e fatit drejt arratisjes në brendësi. Katër tekstet e fundit (në anglisht) janë drafte për më vonë. Një sërë ilustrimeve mbështesin tekstet dhe, në tensionin e ideve, gjarpërimet e rrëfimit të Florentin Smarandache befasojnë këndshëm, duke shkaktuar keqardhje që autori, shumë më i tërhequr nga shkenca, por edhe nga avangarda, nuk kërkonte një konservator fati letrar në prozë. Kam bindjen se do të jetë një sukses. (shrink)

_La Peste_, originally published in 1947 by the Nobel Prize-winning writer Albert Camus, chronicles the progression of deadly bubonic plague as it spreads through the quarantined Algerian city of Oran. While most discussions of fictional examples within aesthetics are either historical or hypothetical, Camus offers an example of "pestilence fiction." Camus chose fiction to convey facts--about plagues in the past, his own bout with tuberculosis at age seventeen, living under quarantine away from home for several years, and forced separation from (...) his wife who remained in Algiers while he was abroad in Nazi-occupied France. His own lived experiences undergird an imaginative account of shared human realities with which we can identify: vulnerability to the disease, isolation, fear, and finally humanitarianism. _The Plague_ teaches us to neither covet nor expect what we so casually took for granted. This collection of original essays on philosophical themes in _The Plague_ is of special relevance during and in the aftermath of Covid-19 but also provides reflections that will be of lasting value to those interested in this classic work of literature. The novel explores questions of enduring importance. Do we collectively meet the threshold of ethical behavior posed by Camus who wrote, "What's true of all the evils in the world is true of plague as well. It helps men to rise above themselves"? Or does the absurd undermine the compassionate? Do "heroes" dutifully fight a plague with "common decency," or does human nature resign itself to the normalization of uncontrollable suffering and death? There are myriad ways to approach the novel and this volume encourages readers to ponder human dilemmas in fictional Oran informed by our current pandemic. Series editor forward by Richard Eldridge. List of Contributors includes Steven G. Kellman, Jane E. Schultz, Andrew Edgar, Kathleen Higgins, Edward B. Weiser, Cynthia A. Freeland, and Margaret E. Gray; see "Introduction" by Peg Brand Weiser below. (shrink)

Can new technology enhance purpose-driven, democratic dialogue in groups, governments, and societies? Online Deliberation: Design, Research, and Practice is the first book that attempts to sample the full range of work on online deliberation, forging new connections between academic research, technology designers, and practitioners. Since some of the most exciting innovations have occurred outside of traditional institutions, and those involved have often worked in relative isolation from each other, work in this growing field has often failed to reflect the full (...) set of perspectives on online deliberation. This volume is aimed at those working at the crossroads of information/communication technology and social science, and documents early findings in, and perspectives on, this new field by many of its pioneers. -/- CONTENTS: -/- Introduction: The Blossoming Field of Online Deliberation (Todd Davies, pp. 1-19) -/- Part I - Prospects for Online Civic Engagement -/- Chapter 1: Virtual Public Consultation: Prospects for Internet Deliberative Democracy (James S. Fishkin, pp. 23-35) -/- Chapter 2: Citizens Deliberating Online: Theory and Some Evidence (Vincent Price, pp. 37-58) -/- Chapter 3: Can Online Deliberation Improve Politics? Scientific Foundations for Success (Arthur Lupia, pp. 59-69) -/- Chapter 4: Deliberative Democracy, Online Discussion, and Project PICOLA (Public Informed Citizen Online Assembly) (Robert Cavalier with Miso Kim and Zachary Sam Zaiss, pp. 71-79) -/- Part II - Online Dialogue in the Wild -/- Chapter 5: Friends, Foes, and Fringe: Norms and Structure in Political Discussion Networks (John Kelly, Danyel Fisher, and Marc Smith, pp. 83-93) -/- Chapter 6: Searching the Net for Differences of Opinion (Warren Sack, John Kelly, and Michael Dale, pp. 95-104) -/- Chapter 7: Happy Accidents: Deliberation and Online Exposure to Opposing Views (Azi Lev-On and Bernard Manin, pp. 105-122) -/- Chapter 8: Rethinking Local Conversations on the Web (Sameer Ahuja, Manuel Pérez-Quiñones, and Andrea Kavanaugh, pp. 123-129) -/- Part III - Online Public Consultation -/- Chapter 9: Deliberation in E-Rulemaking? The Problem of Mass Participation (David Schlosberg, Steve Zavestoski, and Stuart Shulman, pp. 133-148) -/- Chapter 10: Turning GOLD into EPG: Lessons from Low-Tech Democratic Experimentalism for Electronic Rulemaking and Other Ventures in Cyberdemocracy (Peter M. Shane, pp. 149-162) -/- Chapter 11: Baudrillard and the Virtual Cow: Simulation Games and Citizen Participation (Hélène Michel and Dominique Kreziak, pp. 163-166) -/- Chapter 12: Using Web-Based Group Support Systems to Enhance Procedural Fairness in Administrative Decision Making in South Africa (Hossana Twinomurinzi and Jackie Phahlamohlaka, pp. 167-169) -/- Chapter 13: Citizen Participation Is Critical: An Example from Sweden (Tomas Ohlin, pp. 171-173) -/- Part IV - Online Deliberation in Organizations -/- Chapter 14: Online Deliberation in the Government of Canada: Organizing the Back Office (Elisabeth Richard, pp. 177-191) -/- Chapter 15: Political Action and Organization Building: An Internet-Based Engagement Model (Mark Cooper, pp. 193-202) -/- Chapter 16: Wiki Collaboration Within Political Parties: Benefits and Challenges (Kate Raynes-Goldie and David Fono, pp. 203-205) -/- Chapter 17: Debian’s Democracy (Gunnar Ristroph, pp. 207-211) -/- Chapter 18: Software Support for Face-to-Face Parliamentary Procedure (Dana Dahlstrom and Bayle Shanks, pp. 213-220) -/- Part V - Online Facilitation -/- Chapter 19: Deliberation on the Net: Lessons from a Field Experiment (June Woong Rhee and Eun-mee Kim, pp. 223-232) -/- Chapter 20: The Role of the Moderator: Problems and Possibilities for Government-Run Online Discussion Forums (Scott Wright, pp. 233-242) -/- Chapter 21: Silencing the Clatter: Removing Anonymity from a Corporate Online Community (Gilly Leshed, pp. 243-251) -/- Chapter 22: Facilitation and Inclusive Deliberation (Matthias Trénel, pp. 253-257) -/- Chapter 23: Rethinking the ‘Informed’ Participant: Precautions and Recommendations for the Design of Online Deliberation (Kevin S. Ramsey and Matthew W. Wilson, pp. 259-267) -/- Chapter 24: PerlNomic: Rule Making and Enforcement in Digital Shared Spaces (Mark E. Phair and Adam Bliss, pp. 269-271) -/- Part VI - Design of Deliberation Tools -/- Chapter 25: An Online Environment for Democratic Deliberation: Motivations, Principles, and Design (Todd Davies, Brendan O’Connor, Alex Cochran, Jonathan J. Effrat, Andrew Parker, Benjamin Newman, and Aaron Tam, pp. 275-292) -/- Chapter 26: Online Civic Deliberation with E-Liberate (Douglas Schuler, pp. 293-302) -/- Chapter 27: Parliament: A Module for Parliamentary Procedure Software (Bayle Shanks and Dana Dahlstrom, pp. 303-307) -/- Chapter 28: Decision Structure: A New Approach to Three Problems in Deliberation (Raymond J. Pingree, pp. 309-316) -/- Chapter 29: Design Requirements of Argument Mapping Software for Teaching Deliberation (Matthew W. Easterday, Jordan S. Kanarek, and Maralee Harrell, pp. 317-323) -/- Chapter 30: Email-Embedded Voting with eVote/Clerk (Marilyn Davis, pp. 325-327) -/- Epilogue: Understanding Diversity in the Field of Online Deliberation (Seeta Peña Gangadharan, pp. 329-358). -/- For individual chapter downloads, go to odbook.stanford.edu. (shrink)

Epistemologists often claim that in addition to belief and disbelief there is a third, neutral, doxastic attitude. Various terms are used: ‘suspending judgment’, ‘withholding’, ‘agnosticism’. It is also common to claim that the factors relevant to the justification of these attitudes are epistemic in the narrow sense of being factors that bear on the strength or weakness of one’s epistemic position with respect to the target proposition. This paper addresses two challenges to such traditionalism about doxastic attitudes. The first concerns (...) the relevance of non-epistemic factors we might call "future-comparative" – e.g., that you’ll have more decisive evidence on whether p tomorrow – to the justification of suspending judgment. The second, from Jane Friedman, is to explain the point of the neutral attitude without appealing to inquiry and thus taking goal-related factors, which are not epistemic, such as the value of the goal or the prospects for finding means to achieve it, to bear on the justification of the neutral attitude. My defense of traditionalism relies on distinguishing three ways of being neutral on a question: agnosticism, inquiry and suspension of judgment. Traditionalism is saved because, of these, agnosticism alone is a genuine doxastic attitude. (shrink)

Due to Gӧdel’s incompleteness results, the categoricity of a sufficiently rich mathematical theory and the semantic completeness of its underlying logic are two mutually exclusive ideals. For first- and second-order logics we obtain one of them with the cost of losing the other. In addition, in both these logics the rules of deduction for their quantifiers are non-categorical. In this paper I examine two recent arguments –Warren (2020), Murzi and Topey (2021)– for the idea that the natural deduction rules (...) for the first-order universal quantifier are categorical, i.e., they uniquely determine its semantic intended meaning. Both of them make use of McGee’s open-endedness requirement and the second one uses in addition Garson’s (2013) local models for defining the validity of these rules. I argue that the success of both these arguments is relative to their semantic or infinitary assumptions, which could be easily discharged if the introduction rule for the universal quantifier is taken to be an infinitary rule, i.e. non-compact. Consequently, I reconsider the use of the ω-rule and I show that the addition of the ω-rule to the standard formalizations of first-order logic is categorical. In addition, I argue that the open-endedness requirement does not make the first-order Peano Arithmetic categorical and I advance an argument for its categoricity based on the inferential conservativity requirement. (shrink)

Readers assume that commonplace properties of the real world also hold in realistic fiction. They believe, for example, that the usual physical laws continue to apply. But controversy exists in theories of fiction about whether real individuals exist in the story’s world. Does Queen Victoria exist in the world of Jane Eyre, even though Victoria is not mentioned in it? The experiments we report here find that when participants are prompted to consider the world of a fictional individual (“Consider (...) the world of Jane Eyre…”), they are willing to say that a real individual (e.g., Queen Victoria) can exist in the same world. But when participants are prompted to consider the world of a real individual, they are less willing to say that a fictional individual can exist in that world. The asymmetry occurs when we ask participants both if a real person is in the character’s world and if the person would appear there. However, the effect is subject to spatial and temporal constraints. When the person and the character share spatial and temporal settings, interchange is more likely to occur. These results shed light on the author’s implicit contract with the reader, which can license the reader to augment a fictional world with features that the author only implicates as part of the work’s background. (shrink)

Intuitively, it seems that certain basic desires, or urges, are rationally impotent, i.e., that they provide no reasons for action (a famous example is Warren Quinn's story of a man who has a brute urge to turn on every radio he sees). This intuition seems to conflict with the internalist, or Humean subjectivist, claim that our desires give us reasons. But Harry Frankfurt's well-known subjectivist account, with its distinction between first- order and higher-order desires and its concepts of identification (...) and commitment, may be able to accommodate this intuition. Regan Lance Reitsma has argued that to do so, it needs to be supplemented with a concept of "personal ideals", which demand that we give no normative weight to certain inclinations. I argue that Reitsma's account depends on the unexplained assumption that some kinds of desire have special standing, and thus cannot improve on the explanation of the rational impotence of urges already available to Frankfurt. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.3 (2003) 417-418 [Access article in PDF] Heidi M. Ravven and Lenn E. Goodman, editors. Jewish Themes in Spinoza's Philosophy. Albany: The State University of New York Press, 2002. Pp. ix + 290. Cloth, $78.50. Paper, $26.95.The current anthology presents an important contribution to the study of Spinoza's relation to Jewish philosophy as well as to contemporary scholarship of Spinoza's metaphysics and political (...) theory.In the opening essay, Lenn Goodman takes upon himself the ambitious task of evaluating Spinoza's positions as to several central disputes throughout the history of philosophy. In this rich and extensive essay Goodman argues that Spinoza's radical rationalism makes him pursue syntheses between traditionally opposed poles. Lee Rice's article, "Love of God in Spinoza," carefully analyzes Spinoza's concept of love and suggests the existence of three kinds of love parallel to the three kinds of knowledge. Warren Montag addresses the unresolved issue of Spinoza's relation to the Kabbalah. Montag sides with Deleuze against the association of Spinozism with the Neo-Platonic theory of emanation, arguing that unlike the Neo-Platonists and Kabbalists, Spinoza's view of God rules out any hierarchy, and does not assume a descent from primal simplicity into complexity. Edwin Curley contributes a beautiful reading of the story of Job and of Maimonides' interpretation of the story. Curley follows Maimonides' discussion of the various positions regarding the question of divine providence and his attempt to identify the speeches of the characters of the book of Job with each of these positions. Following a sensitive consideration of various attempts to [End Page 417] recover Maimonides' own rather concealed view about providence, Curley concludes that "[W]hatever you think Maimonides' final word on Job is, our examination of him certainly supports [Spinoza's] claim that [Maimonides] reads Scripture in terms of Platonic or Aristotelian speculations" (170).Warren Zev Harvey's essay addresses Spinoza's most neglected work, the Compendium of the Grammar of the Hebrew Language. Apart from providing an outline of Spinoza's work as a Hebrew grammarian ("a noun-intoxicated grammarian") and pointing out some of Spinoza's more eccentric views about the nature of the Hebrew language, Harvey makes a compelling case for the importance of the book for the study of Spinoza's metaphysics. He points out a fascinating analogy which Spinoza draws between the parts of speech: (proper) noun, adjectives, and participles, and Spinoza's key metaphysical terms: substance, attributes, and modes. (Think about the weighty implications of this analogy for Curley's interpretation of the substance-mode relation.) According to Harvey, Spinoza's claim that all Hebrew words are derived from nouns is a linguistic parallel to Spinoza's pivotal metaphysical doctrine which makes all things be in the substance (or God). Kenneth Seeskin's article discusses the views of Maimonides and Spinoza on the question of creation and God's relation to the world. Seeskin reconstructs an interesting critical dialogue between these two philosophers. According to Seeskin, both philosophers held that an effect must be similar to its cause. Maimonides' commitment to Negative Theology and to the denial of any common measure between God and finite things forced him to deny causal or explanatory relation between God and the world. What Maimonides can suggest instead is rather to prove that the emergence of the world ex nihilo and according to the divine will, is possible, and even likely given certain astronomical facts of medieval science. Thus, Maimonides would hold that "although we have grounds for believing that creation occurred, we will never be in a position to say how" (120). For Spinoza, such a view constitutes nothing but a "sanctuary of ignorance." Thus, according to Seeskin, Spinoza affirms a clear causal relation between God and the world of finite things insofar as God is said to explain the world. While I tend to agree with most aspects of this analysis, it is important to note that Spinoza also claims that "between the finite and infinite there is no relation" (Letter 54). This... (shrink)

This paper focuses on two questions: (I) why do the Cyrenaics deny that we can gain knowledge concerning "external things," and (II) how wide-ranging is this denial? On the first question, I argue that the Cyrenaics are skeptical because of their contrast between the indubitable grasp we have of own affections, versus the inaccessibility of external things that cause these affections. Furthermore, this inaccessibility is due to our cognitive and perceptual limitations--it is an epistemological doctrine rooted in their psychology--and not (...) (pace Zilioli) due to any metaphysical theses regarding the external world. On the second question, I argue (pace Tsouna and Warren) that the scope of the Cyrenaics' skepticism is quite wide. Our reports on the Cyrenaics are inconsistent, but the most charitable and plausible reading results in attributing to the Cyrenaics skepticism not merely about the properties of external things (e.g., that the fire that warms me is really hot) of also of their nature and identity (e.g., that the object that warms me is a fire). However, it does not extend to skepticism regarding the existence of an external world. (shrink)

(CONTENIDO: LA FILOSOFÍA DE ALTHUSSER A 50 AÑOS DE LIRE LE CAPITAL Pedro Karczmarczyk, 3; DISCURSO Y DECRETO: SPINOZA ALTHUSSER Y PÊCHEUX Warren Montag 11; ALTHUSSER LECTOR DE GRAMSCI Vittorio Morfino 43 LAS ABSTRACCIONES, ENTRE LA IDEOLOGÍA Y LA CIENCIA João Quartim de Moraes 67 ELOGIO DEL TEORICISMO. PRÁCTICA TEÓRICA E INCONSCIENTE FILOSÓFICO EN LA PROBLEMÁTICA ALTHUSSERIANA, Natalia Romé 85 MARXISMO Y FEMINISMO: EL RECOMIENZO DE UNA PROBLEMÁTICA1 115 Luisina Bolla* / Pedro Karczmarczyk* 115 RRESEÑAS El materialismo de Althusser. (...) Más allá del telos y del Eschaton de Vittorio Morfino, por Valentín Huarte 153; El sujeto en cuestión, Pedro Karczmarczyk (ed.) por Constanza Storani; 159 La posición materialista. El pensamiento de L. Althusser entre la práctica teórica y la práctica política, de Natalia Romé, por Ingrid Sarchman y Carolina Collazo 164. (shrink)

In philosophical aesthetics, discussions on design objects place the notion of Functional Beauty at the fore. Such a philosophical approach can be found in Jane Forsey’s book The Aesthetics of Design that focuses on the notion of function to promote the aesthetic value of design and develops an interpretation of Kantian Dependent Beauty around it. Lucía Jiménez Sánchez has recently put forward several flaws of Functional Beauty accounts. She presented several practical cases as evidence for the narrowness of Functional (...) Beauty accounts. Two cases are presented against Jane Forsey’s theory of Dependent Beauty, holding that it excludes other properties from appreciation that are not necessarily related to functionality, i.e., expres- sive properties. The purpose of this article is to show that these criticisms leveled at Jane Forsey’s proposal for an aesthetic theory of design are unfounded and are based on a misun- derstanding of the structure of judgments of beauty in her system. Despite this, these criticisms highlight the need to clarify the purpose of the aesthetics of design. (shrink)

O renascimento do pragmatismo foi acompanhado por uma série de filósofas feministas que se esforçaram para resgatar do esquecimento as pensadoras que fizeram parte do movimento pragmatista clássico do final do século XIX e primeira metade do século XX. O presente trabalho visa introduzir aos leitores de língua portuguesa esse trabalho a partir de uma breve exposição das pensadoras Jane Addams, Mary Parker Follet, Charlotte Perkins Gilman, Mary Whiton Calkins e Ella Flagg Young.

Wir wissen, dass eine Transformation von globalem Ausmaß bereits begonnen hat, und wir wissen, dass ihre Entfaltung nicht vorhersehbar ist. Wir können sicher sein, dass es eine Herausforderung sein wird: Wir werden inmitten tiefgreifender Veränderungen leben, unser Überleben wird ständig auf dem Spiel stehen. Werden wir das Verständnis, die Weisheit erreichen, um diese Herausforderung zu bestehen? Hier sind einige Gedanken und Überlegungen, die uns helfen, den Zustand zu erreichen, in dem wir eine positive Antwort geben können. -/- Zurückblicken, um nach (...) vorne zu sehen -/- Dies wird nicht das erste Mal in der Geschichte sein, dass für die Menschheit eine Periode der Transformation auf globaler Ebene angebrochen ist. Der Wissenschaftsphilosoph Holmes Rolston wies darauf hin, dass unsere „große Geschichte“ drei solcher Transformationen umfasst – wahre „Urknalle“.1 Die erste war der physische Urknall, der vermutlich vor etwa 13,8 Milliarden Jahren stattfand. Es gebar das manifeste Universum mit seinen Quantenteilchen, vielfältigen Arten von Energien und Milliarden von Galaxien. Es führte zur Bildung von Sonnensystemen mit Sonnen und Planeten und Energieflüssen, die die Entwicklung von lebenden (glücklich gelegenen) Planeten ermöglichen, die aktive Sonnen umkreisen. Eine weitere grundlegende Transformation – ein „zweiter Urknall“ – war die Entstehung lebender Organismen in den komplexen Systemen, die sich auf der Erde und vermutlich auch auf anderen Planeten entwickelt haben. Es wird angenommen, dass diese Transformation vor etwa 3,8 Milliarden Jahren stattgefunden hat. Es begann mit der Entstehung einzelliger Prokaryoten in der Ursuppe, die die Oberfläche des Planeten bedeckte. Der „dritte Urknall“ soll vor etwa 120.000 Jahren stattgefunden haben. Es hat das Bewusstsein unserer Spezies grundlegend verändert – „entwickelt“. Homo soll sapiens geworden sein. Zu den evolutionären Vorteilen des weiterentwickelten Bewusstseins gehörte eine flexiblere und schnellere Form der Kommunikation. Die Kommunikation war nicht mehr auf halbautomatische Reaktionen beschränkt, die durch wiederkehrende Bedingungen und Ereignisse ausgelöst wurden; Anstatt sich auf Zeichen zu beschränken, basierte die menschliche Kommunikation auf einvernehmlich entwickelten Symbolen. -/- Die Entwicklung der Symbolsprache war ein großer Sprung. Einerseits brachte es soziale Strukturen hervor, die auf kollektiv erworbener Bedeutung beruhten, und andererseits produzierte es verbesserte manipulative Fähigkeiten. Gesellschaften könnten sich auf der Grundlage gemeinsamer Kulturen entwickeln, die mächtige Technologien einsetzen. Homo sapiens begann andere Arten zu dominieren und wurde zu einem Schlüsselfaktor in der Evolution des Lebens in der Biosphäre. Der dritte Urknall erzeugte eine Explosion der menschlichen Bevölkerung, aber er brachte nicht die Weisheit hervor, die sicherstellen würde, dass die erweiterte Bevölkerung das Gleichgewicht aufrechterhalten könnte, das für das Gedeihen des Lebens auf diesem Planeten unerlässlich ist. Diese Gleichgewichte wurden immer mehr beeinträchtigt. Der kurzsichtige Einsatz von Technologie und die Missachtung natürlicher Kontrollmechanismen brachten die Menschheit dorthin, wo sie heute ist: an einen „Chaos-Punkt“, an dem die Wahl klar ist: zwischen Zusammenbruch und Durchbruch.2 Eine weitere globale Transformation ist unvermeidlich geworden und ist es noch tatsächlich im Gange: ein vierter Urknall. Es ist an der Zeit, die Lehren aus der Geschichte zu ziehen. Der Aufbau unserer Herrschaft auf dem Planeten hängt davon ab, ob wir die Herausforderung dieser Transformation meistern. -/- Die erste und grundlegende Lektion ist einfach und offensichtlich. Wir haben uns von der natürlichen Welt getrennt und müssen zurückkommen – nicht um Wilde und „Primitive“ zu werden, sondern Wesen, die auf die Welt um sie herum eingestimmt sind, die im Einklang mit den Rhythmen und Gleichgewichten der Natur leben und kompatibel erschaffen und nachhaltige eigene Rhythmen und Balancen. Wir sind nicht mehr auf die Rhythmen und Balancen der Natur ausgerichtet. Obwohl wir durch unsere biologische Evolution in diese Rhythmen und Balancen „eingebaut“ sind, haben wir unsere eigenen künstlichen Rhythmen und gefährlichen Balancen geschaffen, die die natürlichen Rhythmen ignorieren und oft mit ihnen in Konflikt stehen. Mit der Sonne aufzugehen und sich mit der Sonne zurückzuziehen bedeutet, sich an den zirkadianen 24-Stunden-Rhythmus anzupassen, der durch die Bewegung der Erde um die Sonne geschaffen wurde, und die sogenannten primitiven Menschen leben immer noch in Harmonie damit, und das tun die meisten auch die restlichen indigenen und traditionellen Kulturen. Aber moderne Menschen missachten die Rhythmen und Gleichgewichte der Natur und glauben, dass sie sie ersetzen können, indem sie Lichter und andere künstliche Annehmlichkeiten mit dem Umlegen eines Schalters ein- und ausschalten. Doch der menschliche Körper passt sich nicht den künstlichen Rhythmen an, und wir leiden unter den Folgen. -/- 3Die Wirksamkeit des Immunsystems ist beeinträchtigt, und trotz einer Flut von biochemischen Medikamenten breiten sich Krankheiten aus. Moderne Bevölkerungen sind Stadtbewohner und haben nur begrenzten Kontakt mit der Natur. Sie leben in einer künstlichen Welt und denken, dass es die reale Welt ist. Sie halten sich anderen Lebensformen überlegen und glauben, die Natur nach Belieben beherrschen zu können. Noch vor fünfzig Jahren musste die Tierintelligenzforscherin Jane Goodall gegen die damals noch vorherrschende Überzeugung ankämpfen, dass ChiMenschen sind biochemische Reiz-Reaktions-Mechanismen, keine lebenden und fühlenden Wesen. Heute erkennen wir, dass nicht nur höhere Säugetiere, alle lebenden Organismen und sogar Bäume und Pflanzen sensible Lebewesen sind und sich in dieser Hinsicht nicht grundlegend von uns unterscheiden. Es liegt im besten Interesse unseres körperlichen und geistigen Wohlbefindens, dass wir diese Missverständnisse und fehlerhaften Verhaltensweisen korrigieren. Wenn wir dies tun, gewinnen wir unsere natürliche Gesundheit und Vitalität zurück. Die heilende Wirkung natürlicher Substanzen und Lebensweisen war schon in der Antike Heilern und Weisen bekannt. Seit Hippokrates, der als Vater der modernen Medizin gilt, suchen Mediziner nach Substanzen und Methoden, die das Gleichgewicht und die Verbindung zwischen Mensch und Natur wiederherstellen. Heute wird dieser Anspruch überschattet von einer oft kommerziell motivierten Abhängigkeit von synthetischen Substanzen und naturverachtenden Praktiken. Die Szene ist nicht nur negativ: Wie wir sehen werden, gibt es positive Entwicklungen in allen Bereichen des menschlichen Strebens, einschließlich Heilung und Medizin. Die Verbindung mit der Natur ist ein Hauptziel der alternativen Heilmethoden, die als Informations- und Energiemedizin bekannt sind. Diese Form der Heilung erlebt in verschiedenen Teilen der Welt, vor allem im Orient, eine Renaissance. Shirin yoku, die japanische Kunst des Waldbadens, ist ein Paradebeispiel. Um es zu praktizieren, müssen wir in einen Wald gehen und uns auf seine Rhythmen und Energien eingestimmt fühlen – den Wind durch die Blätter rauschen hören, das Lichtspiel auf der Oberfläche eines Teichs spüren, mit den Wolken schweben, wenn sie sich durch den Himmel bewegen. Psychotherapeuten finden, dass sogar die Geräusche der Natur, das Zwitschern der Vögel, das Rauschen der Bäche heilend wirken. Einfach in einem Wald zu sein oder neben einem Baum zu stehen, beruhigt und heilt das Nervensystem. Eine weitere wesentliche Aufgabe ist es, positive Entwicklungen in der Gesellschaft zu erkennen und daran anzuknüpfen. -/- Es gibt positive Entwicklungen in der Gesellschaft, und es gibt gesunde, lebensspendende und erhaltende Prozesse in der Natur. Wir könnten wieder in die Natur eintauchen und an positiven Entwicklungen in der Gesellschaft teilhaben. Und doch gelingt uns das nicht. Wir beschreiten einen Weg, der eher zum Zusammenbruch als zum Durchbruch führt. Wir müssen überdenken, wie wir gehen, und vor allem, wohin wir gehen. Wir sind eine von mehr als hundert Millionen Arten in der Biosphäre, wobei jede Art Millionen und in einigen Fällen Milliarden von Individuen umfasst. Unter all diesen Arten und Individuen befinden wir uns in einer privilegierten Position: Wir haben ein hoch entwickeltes Gehirn und Bewusstsein. Dies ermöglicht uns zu fragen, wer wir sind, was die Welt ist und wie wir in der Welt leben können und sollen. Ein fortgeschrittenes Bewusstsein ist eine einzigartige Ressource, und wir machen keinen guten Gebrauch davon. Wir stellen nicht die richtigen Fragen und suchen nicht nach den richtigen Antworten, sondern gehen einfach vorwärts und vertrauen auf das Glück. Wir haben unsere Zahl erhöht, aber nicht die Vorteile, die unser Bewusstsein denen verleihen könnte, die wir in die Welt bringen. Wir haben ausgeklügelte Technologien entwickelt und angewendet, um unseren Bedürfnissen und Wünschen gerecht zu werden, haben aber die Mehrheit der fortgeschrittenen Arten beschädigt oder zum Aussterben gebracht. Fünfzig Prozent aller Wildtiere auf dem Planeten sind verschwunden, und jeden Tag verschwinden vierundvierzigtausend Populationen lebender Arten. Wir sind zu einer Gefahr für das Leben in der Biosphäre geworden. Die Geschichte lehrt uns, dass Urknalle, globale Transformationen, nicht unbedingt eine gerechte und blühende Welt hervorbringen; sie können zu einem Zusammenbruch führen. Wir haben die Schwelle eines vierten Urknalls erreicht, und wir tun nicht, was wir können, um einen Zusammenbruch abzuwenden. Der Großteil der heutigen Bevölkerung ist frustriert und depressiv und wird gewalttätig. Menschen leiden unter einer veränderten -/- über Klima, Umweltverschmutzung und unzählige Formen der Umweltzerstörung. Millionen durchstreifen den Planeten auf der Suche nach einem Ort, an dem sie nur überleben können. Die Lehren der Geschichte liegen vor uns, und wir ignorieren sie. Dennoch könnten wir die Lektionen lernen und unsere Wege korrigieren. Wir sind durchaus in der Lage, auf diesem Planeten zu leben, ohne das Gleichgewicht und die Ressourcen zu zerstören, die für ein gesundes Leben für uns und andere Arten erforderlich sind. Keine Spezies müsste dezimiert, unterworfen oder zum Aussterben getrieben werden, um uns am Leben zu erhalten. Wir könnten nachhaltig leben, mit anderen Arten koexistieren und die Grenzen des Lebens auf dem Planeten respektieren. Wir könnten die Verfügbarkeit lebenswichtiger Ressourcen für alle Menschen und Bevölkerungsgruppen sicherstellen. Dennoch treiben wir unzählige Arten zum Aussterben und schädigen die gemeinsame Umwelt. Die bloße Tatsache, dass wir es geschafft haben, als biologische Spezies fünf Millionen Jahre und als bewusste Spezies fünfzigtausend Jahre zu überleben, ist ein Beweis dafür, dass unsere grundlegende Natur nicht das Problem ist. Es ist nicht die Masse der menschlichen Bevölkerung, die dafür verantwortlich ist, zu einer Geißel des Lebens auf dem Planeten zu werden, sondern nur ein Teil. Die Frage ist, warum dieses Segment unhaltbare und jetzt kritische Bedingungen für geschaffen hat die höheren Formen des Lebens auf der Erde? Und kann es sich rechtzeitig ändern und transformieren, um eine große Katastrophe zu vermeiden? Theologische und mystische Annahmen wurden manchmal als Grund dafür angeführt, dass wir zu dem wurden, was wir sind, aber unser Verhalten göttlichen oder anderen transzendenten Ursachen zuzuschreiben, ist nicht die Antwort. Wir sind weder Engel noch Teufel. Wir wurden zur Geißel, zu der wir unbeabsichtigt geworden sind. Zu Beginn des Neolithikums begann ein Teil der Menschheit, die Ressourcen des Planeten ohne Rücksicht auf irgendetwas und irgendjemanden zu nutzen und sich nur darauf zu konzentrieren, seinen eigenen Komfort und seine eigene Macht zu verbessern. Auf einem endlichen und voneinander abhängigen Planeten führte dies zu unausgewogenen und unhaltbaren Bedingungen. Der egozentrische Umgang mit Ressourcen hat das Netz des Lebens beschädigt. Die menschliche Spezies wurde zu einer Bedrohung für alles Leben auf dem Planeten und auch für sich selbst: Die Gesundheit des Netzes des Lebens ist eine Vorbedingung für die Gesundheit der dort lebenden Spezies. Dies ist eine relativ junge Erkenntnis. Jahrtausendelang gingen die Menschen ihren Daseinsaufgaben nach, ohne sich bewusst zu sein, dass die unreflektierte Verfolgung ihrer eigenen Interessen um sie herum zum Fluch des Lebens wird. -/- Wir sind zu einem Fluch für das Leben auf diesem Planeten geworden; Wir haben die Welt zu einem Spielzeugladen gemacht, in dem wir die leistungsstarken Spielzeuge bauen, die unseren wahrgenommenen Interessen dienen. Wir spielen mit unseren Spielsachen unabhängig davon, ob sie wirklich unseren Bedürfnissen dienen, und ohne Rücksicht auf die Bedürfnisse anderer. Wir setzen die Energie des Atoms frei und nutzen sie, um Systeme anzutreiben, die unsere Bedürfnisse befriedigen. Wir leiten Elektronenströme in integrierte Schaltkreise und verwenden die Schaltkreise, um die Technologien zu beherrschen, die unseren Anforderungen an Kommunikation und Information dienen. Wir spielen im globalen Spielzeugladen ohne Rücksicht auf die Folgen für andere und für den gesamten Laden. Dies ist ein kurzsichtiges und gefährliches Verhalten. Wir greifen auf Energie auf eine Weise zu, die nicht unseren wirklichen Bedürfnissen dient, sondern nur unseren kurzfristigen, egozentrischen Bedürfnissen. Ähnlich kurzsichtig manipulieren wir Informationen. Beispiele dafür sind die Atombombe und das Atomkraftwerk auf der einen Seite und der Computer mit seinem Netzwerk aus globalem Geschwätz auf der anderen Seite. Atomkraft, selbst für friedliche Zwecke, und künstliche Intelligenz, selbst wenn sie gut gemeint ist, sind gefährliche Spielzeuge. Sie können zu technologischen Überschreitungen werden, die am Ende unser Leben und das gesamte Lebensnetz in der Biosphäre schädigen. Wir sind an sich gut, aber egozentrisch und kurzsichtig. Aber das kann nicht unwidersprochen bleiben. Die Zeit, in der wir naiv mit mächtigen Spielzeugen spielen konnten, ist vorbei. Ihre unvorhergesehenen „Nebenwirkungen“ sind zu einer Bedrohung für alles Leben auf dem Planeten geworden, einschließlich unseres eigenen. -/- Vorwärts gehen. -/- Wir sind an der Schwelle des vierten Urknalls angekommen. Was machen wir jetzt? Wenn wir gedeihen oder auch nur überleben wollen, muss sich unser Bewusstsein ändern. Gelingt dies nicht, wird der nächste Urknall unser letzter sein. Eine globale Transformation ist ein riskanter Prozess: Soll sie nicht zum Zusammenbruch, sondern zum Durchbruch führen, muss sie gesteuert werden. Wir können mit der bewussten Führung unserer Evolution beginnen, indem wir Gandhis Rat folgen: Sag anderen nicht, was sie tun sollen; Werde du selbst zu dem, was sie und die Welt werden sollen. Unsere wesentliche Aufgabe ist es, die Transformation der Welt zu werden. Wir müssen Ausdruck eines reifen und gesunden Lebens in der Biosphäre sein. Wenn diese kritische Masse erreicht wird, wird der „vierte Urknall“ nicht das Ende des Lebens auf dem Planeten markieren. Es wird eine disruptive globale Transformation sein, aber keine destruktive. Es wird eine neue Phase in der Amtszeit der Menschheit auf dem Planeten auslösen und nicht das Ende dieser Amtszeit. Es ist an der Zeit, die Lehren aus der Geschichte zu ziehen – zurückzublicken, um nach vorne zu sehen. Das Überleben einer fortgeschrittenen Spezies und die Zukunft des Lebensnetzes auf diesem Planeten liegt in unseren Händen. Noch nie waren so viele von der Weisheit so weniger abhängig. Wir müssen erwachen – um erwachsen zu werden. Die Kraft des Bewusstseins zu nutzen, die in unseren Händen liegt. Es ist nicht an der Zeit zu fragen, ob wir den vierten Urknall, die bereits begonnene globale Transformation, überstehen werden. Es ist an der Zeit, sich daran zu machen, es zu schaffen. (shrink)

Quietist Moral Realists accept that there are moral facts and properties, while aiming to avoid many of the explanatory burdens thought to fall on traditional moral realists. This chapter examines the forms that Quietist Moral Realism has taken and the challenges it has faced, in order to better assess its prospects. The best hope, this chapter argues, lies in a pragmatist approach that distinguishes the different functions of diverse areas of discourse. This paves the way for a form of Quietism (...) that does not simply remain quiet about the explanatory demands of metaethics, but rather is able to diagnose where they go wrong. By combining a neopragmatic analysis of the discourse with an easy approach to ontology, , we can develop a form of Quietist Moral Realism that is far stronger than critics of quietism have appreciated. (shrink)

In this paper two concepts of populism are identified, explicated, and critically discussed. Their links with underlying views of democracy are emphasized. It is argued that the second concept, but not the first concept, is both consistent with the values of pluralism and inclusion and also expresses a normatively defensible aspiration for greater economic democracy.

Two major lines of argument support the notion that Hildegard of Bingen’s metaphysics is peculiarly gynocentric. Contra the standard commentary on her work, the focus is not on the notion of viriditas; rather, the first line of argument presents a specific delineation of her ontology, demonstrating that it is a graded hierarchy of beings, many of which present feminine aspects of the divine, and all of which establish the metaphysical notion of interpenetrability. The second line of argument specifically contrasts her (...) thought to that of Aquinas and Meister Eckhart, noting areas of similarity and difference. It is concluded that the visionary origins of Hildegard’s work may have to some extent precluded our understanding of it, and that her work merits consideration not only philosophically and theologically but from the standpoint of its early presentation of a gynocentric worldview. (shrink)

Despite its many advantages as a metaethical theory, moral expressivism faces difficulties as a semantic theory of the meaning of moral claims, an issue underscored by the notorious Frege-Geach problem. I consider a distinct metaethical view, inferentialism, which like expressivism rejects a representational account of meaning, but unlike expressivism explains meaning in terms of inferential role instead of expressive function. Drawing on Michael Williams’ recent work on inferential theories of meaning, I argue that an appropriate understanding of the pragmatic role (...) of moral discourse—the facilitation of coordinated social behavior—suggests the kind of inferences we should expect terms with this function to license. I offer a sketch of the inferential roles the moral ‘ought’ plays, and argue that if we accept that the relevant inferential roles are meaning-constitutive, we will be in a position to solve the Frege-Geach problem. Such an inferentialist solution has advantages over those forwarded by expressivists such as Blackburn and Gibbard. First, it offers a more straightforward explanation of the meaning of moral terms. It also gives simple answers to at least two semantic worries that have vexed contemporary expressivists—the “problem of permissions” and the commitment to “mentalism”, both of which I argue are problems that don’t get traction with an inferentialist approach. I conclude by considering ways in which this approach can be expanded into a more robust semantic account. (shrink)

Plato claimed that morality exits to control conflict. Business people increasingly are called upon to resolve moral conflicts between various stakeholders who maintain opposing ethical positions or principles. Attempts to resolve these moral conflicts within business discussions may be exacerbated if disputants have different communicative styles. To better understand the communication process involved in attempts to resolve a moral dilemma, we investigate the "discourse ethics" procedure of Jürgen Habermas. Habermas claims that an individual's level of moral reasoning parallels the type (...) of communication which that individual typically uses in attempts to resolve conflict. Our research focuses upon the relationship between the communicative style used by participants attempting to resolve a particular moral dilemma involving workplace safety and the level of moral reasoning possessed by those participants. The results of our study suggest that, contrary to Habermas' views, participants with "higher" levels of moral reasoning do not use "discursive" communicative tactics more frequently than participants that possessed "lower" moral reasoning. (shrink)

Michelle’s thesis explores the extent to which a researcher could contribute to change by engaging leaders in conversations that might intensify commitment to or the direction of their actions around socio-environmental decline in Bermuda as a country historically organised in the tradition of an entrepreneurial for-profit enterprise. The framing of a space to reflect on highlighted the significance of time that led to the bricolage design of a heuristic device called a moon gate. Time, the keystone of the moon gate, (...) created a prism lighting up the twists and turns of kaleidoscopic images of the chaos of the markets and the creative diversity of human and nonhuman participants. She undertook a philosophical approach with her study of the contested space of time around sensitivity to maintaining a fulcrum point based on the wellbeing of people and planet. (shrink)

Three professors reflect on the experience of creating a learning community of 22 students by linking courses in Literature and Ethics. The project demonstrates practical strategies for incorporating feminist scholarship and pedagogy into the core curriculum and for integrating core courses from diverse disciplines.

Recent work in the philosophy of biology argues that we must rethink the biological individual beyond the boundary of the species, given that a key part of our essential functioning is carried out by the bacteria in our intestines in a way that challenges any strictly genetic account of what is involved for the biological human. The gut is a kind of ambiguous other within our understanding of ourselves, particularly when we also consider the status of gastro-intestinal disorders. Hegel offers (...) us theoretical tools to describe and understand our relationship to our gut. His description of our selves as continually mediated through otherness is strikingly compatible with the kind of structure contemporary biology presents us with. His accounts of digestion and habit, contextualized by his logic, help point toward an understanding of selfhood as porous and yet still capable of being sufficiently unified for us to make sense of ourselves, one which allows us to acknowledge otherness within us while still having enough unity for agency. (shrink)

What role should religion play in public discourse? Not long ago Richard Rorty argued, in more than one place, that religion is a "conversation stopper" which polite people refer to only in private conversations. Religious believers complain, however, that this practice renders it impossible for them to participate in public discourse. They ask whether a democratic community is worthy of the name if it effectively forbids (by custom or legislation) a significant segment of its citizens from acknowledging and drawing upon (...) their own traditions to help justify their moral and political claims? This paper draws upon the work of Jeffrey Stout, Robert Brandom, and importantly a Confucian understanding of ritual to argue that Rorty goes too far in arguing that religious assumptions have no place in public discourse. (shrink)

Explaining genuine moral disagreement is a challenge for metaethical theories. For expressivists, this challenge comes from the plausibility of agents making seemingly univocal claims while expressing incongruent conative attitudes. I argue that metaethical inferentialism – a deflationary cousin to expressivism, which locates meaning in the inferential import of our moral assertions rather than the attitudes they express – offers a unique solution to this problem. Because inferentialism doesn’t locate the source of moral disagreements in a clash between attitudes, but instead (...) in conflicts between the inferential import of ethical assertions, the traditional problem for expressivism can be avoided. After considering two forms of inferentialism that lead to revenge versions of the problem, I conclude by recommending that we understand the semantics of moral disagreements pragmatically: the source of univocity does not come from moral or semantic facts waiting to be described, but instead from the needs that ethical and semantic discourses answer – a solution to the problems of what we are to do and how we are to talk about it. (shrink)

A discussion of L.A. Paul's 'Transformative Experience' from an Author Meets Critics session at the 2015 Pacific APA.

Wittgenstein’s concepts shed light on the phenomenon of schizophrenia in at least three different ways: with a view to empathy, scientific explanation, or philosophical clarification. I consider two different “positive” wittgensteinian accounts―Campbell’s idea that delusions involve a mechanism of which different framework propositions are parts, Sass’ proposal that the schizophrenic patient can be described as a solipsist, and a Rhodes’ and Gipp’s account, where epistemic aspects of schizophrenia are explained as failures in the ordinary background of certainties. I argue that (...) none of them amounts to empathic-phenomenological understanding, but they provide examples of how philosophical concepts can contribute to scientific explanation, and to philosophical clarification respectively. (shrink)

In his arguments that science itself can answer moral questions, Sam Harris often appeals to our intuitions about the badness of suffering. If we share these intuitions, Harris argues, we’ve taken a significant step in conceding to a basically utilitarian worldview. In this chapter, I critically assess Harris’ arguments and find them deeply wanting.

Translation of "Von der Armut am Geiste; ein Dialog des jungen Lukács," by Ágnes Heller. This translation originally appeared in The Philosophical Forum, Spring-Summer 1972.

Once upon a time, logical conventionalism was the most popular philosophical theory of logic. It was heavily favored by empiricists, logical positivists, and naturalists. According to logical conventionalism, linguistic conventions explain logical truth, validity, and modality. And conventions themselves are merely syntactic rules of language use, including inference rules. Logical conventionalism promised to eliminate mystery from the philosophy of logic by showing that both the metaphysics and epistemology of logic fit into a scientific picture of reality. For naturalists of all (...) stripes, this was paradise. Alas, paradise was lost. By the end of the twentieth century, logical conventionalism had been almost universally abandoned. But more recently, it has been revitalized. This chapter provides an overview of logical conventionalism and its history, clears away misunderstandings, and briefly responds to both the canonical objections to conventionalism (from Quine, Dummett, Boghossian, and many others) as well as new objections (from Field and Golan). From paradise lost, to paradise regained: logical conventionalism is back. (shrink)

In the remainder of this article, we will disarm an important motivation for epistemic contextualism and interest-relative invariantism. We will accomplish this by presenting a stringent test of whether there is a stakes effect on ordinary knowledge ascription. Having shown that, even on a stringent way of testing, stakes fail to impact ordinary knowledge ascription, we will conclude that we should take another look at classical invariantism. Here is how we will proceed. Section 1 lays out some limitations of previous (...) research on stakes. Section 2 presents our study and concludes that there is little evidence for a substantial stakes effect. Section 3 responds to objections. The conclusion clears the way for classical invariantism. (shrink)

When discussing the problem of evil, philosophers often distinguish between physical evil (harm caused within the natural world such as natural disasters, disease, and the like), and moral evil (harm caused by human agency). Mapping this traditional distinction is mapped onto the third section of Fichte’s The Vocation of Man would at first seem fairly straightforward: for Fichte, evil arising from nature occurs through “blind mechanism” and is unfree; in contrast, evil done by human beings arises out of free agency. (...) The answer may be more complicated, however, in two different ways. First, Fichte holds that nature is to be cultivated and controlled by human beings so that it is no longer a source of harm; this may imply that the continuing harm done by nature is the result of humans’ failure to have sufficiently tamed nature. In that case, some of the harm caused by nature may be attributable to free human causality and thus no longer be a clearcut instance of natural evil. Second, Fichte repeatedly states that those who fail to act morally and who fail to conform their wills to the moral law are still be in the power of the mechanisms of nature. Even though we must think of them as free, Fichte compares their actions to the operation of nature and its mechanism of necessity. By presenting a careful and nuanced Fichtean account of the traditional distinction between physical and moral evil, we can better appreciate how Fichte understood the meaning and scope of human responsibility. (shrink)

We face reality presented with the data of conscious experience and nothing else. The project of early modern philosophy was to build a complete theory of the world from this starting point, with no cheating. Crucial to this starting point is the data of conscious sensory experience – sense data. Attempts to avoid this project often argue that the very idea of sense data is confused. But the sense-data way of talking, the sense-data language, can be freed from every blemish (...) using ideas from contemporary metaontology. We can adopt a sense-data framework that vindicates the traditional claims of sense-data theories and leads to plausible theories of perception and color. We can, we should, and in a sense, we must. Yet when we do, we face the traditional problem of external world skepticism, head-on. The real challenge of skepticism is forced upon us; it cannot honestly be avoided using externalist tricks, burden of proof shifting, or other razzle dazzle. But the challenge can be met: we are rational to posit the external world as the best explanation of the many synchronic and diachronic patterns over our sense-data. This paper argues for all of these points and ends with a plea for analytic empiricism – a traditional sense-data version of empiricism that uses all of the tools of analytic philosophy while avoiding the more questionable doctrines of the Vienna Circle (phenomenalism, verificationism). Analytic empiricism is our last best hope for completing the great philosophical project of early modern philosophy. (shrink)

Quantifier variance is a well-known view in contemporary metaontology, but it remains very widely misunderstood by critics. Here we briefly and clearly explain the metasemantics of quantifier variance and distinguish between modest and strong forms of variance (Section I), explain some key applications (Section II), clear up some misunderstandings and address objections (Section III), and point the way toward future directions of quantifier-variance-related research (Section IV).

Bibliography of South African literary works and literary criticism published in 2019.

A short paper discussing and critiquing common claims that "truth is relative.".

We argue that generic generalizations about racial groups are pernicious in what they communicate (both to members of that racial group and to members of other racial groups), and may be central to the construction of social categories like racial groups. We then consider how we should change and challenge uses of generic generalizations about racial groups.

Resumo: A crise na União Europeia e os programas de austeridade subsequentes fizeram emergir uma miríade de movimentos sociais, diversos na sua natureza e nos seus propósitos. O que se pretende aferir neste artigo é a relação e a conexão existentes entre o Estado, o poder económico, a sociedade civil e os movimentos sociais neste contexto específico de crise. Procuraremos, nesta breve abordagem, explanar alguns elementos de originalidade intrínsecos aos movimentos sociais hodiernos, patentes na sua forma de participação e organização, (...) assim como aplicar estas questões teóricas relevantes ao contexto português. A parte empírica, dada a escassez de estudos de caso existentes, será apoiada no último inquérito do European Social Survey, de 2012. Analisando um conjunto de perguntas aí explícitas, podemos compreender, de forma indirecta, algumas das dinâmicas que caracterizam estes movimentos. Abstract: The crisis in the European Union and the subsequent austerity programs have unleashed a myriad of social movements, diverse in its nature and purpose. The purpose of this paper is to assess the relationship and connection between the State, economic power, civil society and social movements in this specific context of crisis. We will try, in this brief approach, to explain some elements of originality intrinsic to modern social movements, evident in their form of participation and organization, as well as to apply these theoretical questions relevant to the Portuguese context. The empirical part, given the paucity of existing case studies, will be supported in the last survey of the European Social Survey of 2012. By analyzing a set of questions explicit there, we can, indirectly, understand some of the dynamics that characterize these movements. (shrink)

This paper focuses on stakeholder identification as per the value sensitive design (VSD) approach applied to the context of quantum technologies (QT). We provide two comprehensive lists of stakeholders as starting points for VSD researchers and practitioners. These lists encompass a diverse range of organizations, including private companies, government agencies, NGOs, partnerships, and professional/trade organizations. Our aim is to facilitate the recognition, legitimation, and understanding of stakeholder interactions in the development of QT. These stakeholder lists can serve as a foundation (...) for designing and implementing policies and strategies that promote the ethical and responsible development of QT, considering the values and interests of various stakeholders. Furthermore, these lists can enable empirical and technical studies on specific QT innovations using an ethics-by-design approach like VSD. Overall, this paper contributes to a better understanding of the complex and dynamic nature of the QT landscape and highlights the importance of stakeholder engagement and collaboration in shaping its future. (shrink)

This paper explores the role of generics in social cognition. First, we explore the nature and effects of the most common form of generics about social kinds. Second, we discuss the nature and effects of a less common but equally important form of generics about social kinds. Finally, we consider the implications of this discussion for how we ought to use language about the social world.

The theoretical underpinnings and practical worth of content-based, intentional, or "folk" psychology have been challenged by three distinct groups of philosophical critics in the past 15 years or so. The first group, comprised by Hilary Putnam, Tyler Burge, and other advocates of "wide" or "externalist" theories of meaning, claims that traditional psychologists have been mistaken in assuming that our beliefs, desires, and other content-laden states supervene on or inhere in our individual minds or brains. The other two groups are both (...) "eliminative materialists," who charge that the intentional approach is inadequate and that it can or will be replaced by a completely non-interpretive discipline: either neuropsychology, in the view of Patricia and Paul Churchland, or a strictly syntactic computational psychology, according to Stephen Stich. ;This dissertation defends "notional world" or narrow intentional psychology against these charges, primarily on the strength of its practical merits, in contrast to the limitations and adverse effects of the proposed alternatives. Psychology is at least partly an applied science with a mandate to help understand and treat concrete psychological problems such as Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and depression, I argue, so any theorist who proposes to reconfigure or phase out existing approaches must be prepared to take over these duties with at least equal facility. However, whereas various "narrow" schools of psychotherapy such as Cognitive Therapy are fairly successful in this regard and show every indication of continuing to be needed for the foreseeable future, the Syntactic Theory seems to show very poor promise of being able to help relieve the distress of people with psychological disturbances, while a purely neurobiological approach is inappropriate in many cases, and tends to cause a variety of untoward and dangerous side-effects. As for the "wide" theorists with their emphasis upon the social and environmental contributions to meaning: they must acknowledge that a good deal of content is in the head; and, more importantly, by focusing on the role of the "experts" in a society's language-game, they miss the whole point of a psychological attribution, which is to understand an individual's reasons--however idiosyncratic--for acting as he or she does. (shrink)