El Libro de Arena, de J. L. Borges imagina un libro poblado de infinitas páginas. Esta infinidad se manifiesta de varias formas, cada una de las cuales puede ser asimilada con alguna propiedad de los conjuntos numéricos. Exploraremos dicha similitud y veremos emerger el Libro de Arena como un símbolo complejo, pero no autónomo. En efecto, no sólo el libro y sus páginas, sino asimismo los personajes y cada elemento puesto en escena se articulan en el desarrollo del relato y (...) allí pierden su apariencia de objetos para revelarse como funciones en la producción del sentido final. (shrink)

This monography provides an overview of the conceptual developments that leads from the traditional views of infinite (and their paradoxes) to the contemporary view in which those old paradoxes are solved but new problems arise. Also a particular insight in the problem of continuity is given, followed by applications in theory of computability.

By the beginning of the 19th century Hegel's dialectic turned contradiction (conceived as unity of a concept with its determined negation) into distinguished inference. In the course of 20th century a family of systems known as "paraconsistent" formalized dialectical logic according to the contemporary paradigm of inference, oriented to truth-preserving, and not powered anymore solely by contradiction. In this way, nevertheless, Hegel's idea of logic as unfolding of concepts ordered by degree of "determination" reached at every step of the process, (...) was put aside. We attempt to recover the importance of that idea for the hegelian concept of "logical necessity", pointing out in addition that it may well play the role of an order relation for dialectical inference. (shrink)

This work-in-progress aims to explain as accurately as possible the philosophical meaning given by Wittgenstein to the silence in both of his major books, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, and the Philosophical Investigations. REMARKS ARE WELL RECEIVED.

In ‘Excusing Mistakes of Law’, Gideon Yaffe sets out to ‘vindicate’ the claim ‘that mistakes of law never excuse’ by ‘identifying the truth that is groped for but not grasped by those who assert that ignorance of law is no excuse’. Yaffe does not offer a defence of the claim that mistakes of law never excuse. That claim, Yaffe argues, is false. Yaffe’s article is, rather, an effort to assess what plausible thought might be behind the idea that mistakes of (...) law often should not excuse. (Yaffe is interested in more than just the descriptive claim that in Anglo-American legal jurisdictions mistakes of law routinely do not, in fact, excuse.) More particularly, Yaffe is interested in what plausible normative justification there might be for this asymmetric pattern: -/- Asymmetry: False beliefs about non-legal facts often excuse, but false beliefs about the law rarely excuse. -/- Yaffe offers a complex argument in support of Asymmetry. This paper is organised around my reconstruction of Yaffe’s argument. I argue that Yaffe’s argument does not succeed, but that his argument provides a template for an argument that could succeed. (shrink)

Regarding the linguistic turn in History of Ideas, there are logical topics to be considered in order to increase the accuracy of reconstruccions oriented to describe and explain conceptual formations of the past. This paper propose an overview of these topics and a methodological approach to deal with its difficulties.

Las «metáforas», «analogías» o «alegorías» tienen un lugar bien ganado en la tradición filosófica. Han sido atacadas por dar lugar a una interpretación poco rigurosa de las nociones que describen, pues permite asociarles propiedades que originalmente no se había pensado (ni resulta deseable) que formen parte de su concepto. Sin embargo, a pesar del reclamo en favor de procedimientos estrictos de definición, el uso de una imagen apropiada suele ser el mejor modo de explicar esas cuestiones que cada siglo escapan (...) a la disección que el filo de las mejores definiciones pretendía darle. Tal es el caso de las ilustraciones usadas por Charles S. Peirce en sus artículos "Algunas consecuencias de cuatro incapacidades" y "Cómo esclarecer nuestras ideas" para dar cuenta del pensamiento. Primero veremos el papel que juegan estas imágenes en la argumentación conque Peirce establece dos principios importantes de su filosofía: el de que toda cognición se encuentra determinada por otras cogniciones previas, y el de que no tenemos ningún poder de introspección. Luego hallaremos que dos de las imágenes presentan cierta incompatibilidad en un aspecto especialmente relevante desde el punto de vista de lo que tratan de ilustrar. Para finalizar, consideraremos una explicación que sea consistente con los textos y que permita resolver la discrepancia, brindando una mejor comprensión conjunta de ambas ilustraciones . (shrink)

En este trabajo nos enfocamos fundamentalmente en responder dos interrogantes: (a) ¿Pueden las mujeres ser sujetos ilustrados desde la perspectiva de Hume? y en caso de responder afirmativamente, (b) ¿resulta esta ilustración emancipatoria en términos feministas? En primer lugar, reconstruimos las principales líneas de interpretación feministas de la obra de Hume para ubicar nuestra propuesta dentro de una corriente interpretativa poco explorada aún. En segundo lugar, precisamos el sentido que puede adoptar la noción de “ilustración” en la filosofía de Hume, (...) en discusión con debates de la literatura secundaria contemporánea. En tercer lugar, orientamos nuestra reflexión a responder el primero de los interrogantes e indagamos si las mujeres están incluidas dentro de los rasgos ilustrados que podemos reconocer en el pensamiento de Hume y en qué condiciones. En cuarto y último lugar, ensayamos una respuesta al segundo interrogante: si aquello que podemos interpretar como ilustración femenina en clave humeana constituye una vía para la emancipación de la dominación patriarcal o si, por el contrario, refuerza el sometimiento de las mujeres. (shrink)

Una idea casi universalmente aceptada es que es que la filosofía y la ciencia por naturaleza buscan la verdad. No obstante, para que alcancen la Verdad requieren a fortiori de la fe. A partir de estas ideas, nuestra reflexión está organizada en tres apartados: en el primero abordamos la necesidad de la metafísica como disciplina que encuentra los principios en la naturaleza. Así como, la ciencia gracias a la metafísica encuentra las leyes de esta, pero sólo con ayuda de la (...) fe; en la segunda idea nos centramos en explicar el método de la ciencia y nos preguntamos sí sus formas y metodologías van de acuerdo con la fe. La última idea, trata la dimensión de las ciencias sociales cara al Desarrollo Humano (DH). El argumento que se desarrolla en este apartado sostiene que, el motivo por el cual el hombre, con su razón, busca la verdad; es para dar sentido a su existencia. No obstante, hay que reflexionar sobre el devenir de las Ciencias Sociales puesto que ante el establecimiento de linderos, la inflexión de métodos y metodologías se ha desdibujado e incomprendido de los hechos presentes en la realidad y no se ha tendido a la búsqueda de la verdad. Finalmente, se presentan nuestras conclusiones que ahondan en la propuesta del DH y la bibliografía utilizada para elaborar este trabajo. (shrink)

The concept of psychological trauma is polysemous and remains a subject of ongoing debate among scholars and researchers. One of the most significant discussions surrounding the definition of trauma is the relationship between traumatic events (TE), traumatic memory (TM) and trauma response (TR). Several definitions of trauma provided by world-renowned organizations present the TE as the primary element, suggesting a necessary causal relationship in which the TE is antecedent, and the TM and TR are consequent. I call this the _strong (...) causal view_. In this article, I argue that the strong causal view is problematic as it does not sufficiently account for important trauma-related effects that pose anomalies for the causal position. I argue in favor of two claims. First, in defining psychological trauma, we must move beyond the need for a strong TE-dependent causal relationship and instead adopt a _weak causal view_. To support this, I review the discussion of causation in philosophy of memory that pits causal theories against postcausal theories, and propose two principles that can aid this transition. Second, I propose that among the three elements, TR should be the most critical in defining trauma. My aim is to support those definitions of psychological trauma that focus on TR, as I believe they offer greater explanatory power —especially regarding anomalies that challenge the strong causal view— and are more centered on the survivors' experience than those focused on TE. (shrink)

Para comprender la visión peirceana acerca de la subjetividad semiótica es necesario establecer antes tres referentes. Cada uno de estos referentes tiene un constructo teórico efectuado por otra serie de nociones, que en este momento no me detendré a explicar, sin embargo, será necesario más adelante acudir a varias de estas nociones para intentar exponer mi tema de investigación. La filosofía peirceana es un sistema amplio y complejo, va madurando en el tiempo. Peirce va definiendo y redefiniendo sus conceptos, hasta (...) cierto punto lo realiza de una manera imbricada, este es su método. Se presenta la dificultad de que la construcción teórica peirceana depende de conceptos que se explican entre sí, lo que hace la labor de investigación y exposición difícil, pues para fin de exponer una idea se requiere acceder a diferentes referentes conceptuales simultáneamente hasta llegar a una noción central. (shrink)

Desde ines del siglo XX, el Desarrollo Humano (DH) ha planteado la necesidad de un cambio de paradigma que centre su atención en la mejora de la condición de vida de las personas —no únicamente desde la perspectiva de un aumento de ingreso— sino en torno al desarrollo de las capacidades fundamentales o esenciales pertenecientes al ser humano. Esta postura parte de la crítica al utilitarismo y sostiene que el DH tiene que partir de una comprensión profunda del ser humano. (...) Hasta entonces, la pregunta central del desarrollo había sido sobre la capacidad de producción de una nación. Pero, el nuevo planteamiento se preocupa por el estatus de las personas no en cuanto a la felicidad entendida como el poder de generar bienestar en función de obtener placer y evitar el dolor, sino cómo está la gente en sí misma. Entonces, el DH se reiere a un proceso y a un in en sí mismo, mediante el cual la gente accede a oportunidades para ampliar sus capacidades y funcionamientos, puesto que el sujeto de éstas es el hombre mismo. El DH como paradigma tiene que desarrollar un cuerpo teórico de carácter interdisciplinar y, en este punto, la incorporación de la ilosofía se hace urgente. Es necesario incorporar la metafísica del hombre dentro de la antropología social (AS) a la metodología de investigación del DH, a in de responder ¿Cuáles son las capacidades esenciales que le competen a los seres humanos? (shrink)

Supra-Bayesianism is the Bayesian response to learning the opinions of others. Probability pooling constitutes an alternative response. One natural question is whether there are cases where probability pooling gives the supra-Bayesian result. This has been called the problem of Bayes-compatibility for pooling functions. It is known that in a common prior setting, under standard assumptions, linear pooling cannot be nontrivially Bayes-compatible. We show by contrast that geometric pooling can be nontrivially Bayes-compatible. Indeed, we show that, under certain assumptions, geometric and (...) Bayes-compatible pooling are equivalent. Granting supra-Bayesianism its usual normative status, one upshot of our study is thus that, in a certain class of epistemic contexts, geometric pooling enjoys a normative advantage over linear pooling as a social learning mechanism. We discuss the philosophical ramifications of this advantage, which we show to be robust to variations in our statement of the Bayes-compatibility problem. (shrink)

En Argentina existió una poderosa influencia de origen francés que modificó profundamente las tácticas militares y la ideología del Ejército entre 1957 y 1963. Estas teorías extranjeras importadas al Cono Sur, tuvieron como origen los aprendizajes obtenidos por el Ejército francés en las guerras de Argelia e Indochina. A partir de tales experiencias, los oficiales franceses desarrollaron técnicas de combate contra la entonces novedosa ‘guerra de guerrillas’ de los grupos rebeldes, que fueron enseñadas posteriormente a los militares argentinos. Esta enseñanza (...) incluía importantes elementos de carácter doctrinario, como la idea de la guerra global contra el comunismo, la noción de enemigo interno, y la convicción de que sus acciones, incluido el uso de tortura como técnica de obtención de información, estaban justificadas por la búsqueda del bien mayor de la nación. Esta ideología influyó profundamente en el Ejército argentino y es posible notar su rastro en el radical proceder que tuvieron los cuerpos militares durante el Proceso de Reorganización Nacional. (shrink)

En su ópera prima, antes de concebir la filosofía crítica, Kant manifestó su entusiasmo por una geometría de todos los tipos posibles de espacio, y no sólo del espacio conocido. Como el filósofo atribuye cada espacio a un mundo posible distinto, la "geometría suprema", como la denominó, en realidad sería el nombre genérico para un conjunto de geometrías diversas que describen espacios igualmente diversos. En ese conjunto genérico se encuentra la geometría de Euclides, y cabe preguntarse si acaso entre las (...) otras especies no podrían hallarse las geometrías que hoy conocemos como no-euclídeas. Creemos que no es así, y es lo que nos proponemos mostrar en este trabajo. Sostendremos, por lo tanto, la distinción entre las denominaciones "otras geometrías" y "geometrías no-euclídeas" y desarrollaremos la incompatibilidad entre ambas tal como ésta se sigue de los textos de Kant. Intentaremos asimismo caracterizar las "otras geometrías" según la noción de "espacio habitado", por nosotros o por los eventuales habitantes de otros universos posibles. Así, las "otras geometrías" quizá podrían ser comprendidas mejor como geometrías de los otros (de la alteridad), que como anticipación de las geometrías no-euclídeas. (shrink)

Las generaciones que hemos vivido los últimos años del siglo XX y los comienzos de esta nueva centuria solemos pensar que cuando este mundo sea realmente perfecto, entonces nadie tendrá que trabajar, pues es común creer que el trabajo es una de las múltiples imperfecciones de esta existencia. Ahora bien, como se sabe el hombre se encuentra arrojado al trabajo, y al ser éste un quehacer de desdicha y cansancio para él, se toman entonces dos posturas ante su “reivindicación”: la (...) primera apunta a la obtención en mayor grado de beneficios externos y riquezas y, la segunda se encamina por la trasmutación del hombre a la máquina. De manera que, la búsqueda de la retribución y la abolición del esfuerzo marcan las pautas del entendimiento sobre el trabajo en este principio del siglo XXI. La retribución es el fin del trabajo y para generar la mayor posible, no se ve como necesario el sudor de la frente. (shrink)

Se analiza la apertura del hombre a partir de su naturaleza legalizada. Ante el conflicto entre ley, physis y libertad, nos preguntamos: ¿por qué se considera la naturaleza incompatible con la libertad?, ¿por qué la legalidad parece contradecir a la apertura?, ¿ser libre significa estar lejos de cualquier atadura a la ley y a la naturaleza? El texto inicia con una exposición de las nociones de naturaleza y legalidad y de su relación con la libertad, ofrece una definición de la (...) persona basada en su comprensión yoica y su dignidad y una explicación del sentido de la apertura en la dimensión social del ser humano. (shrink)

This paper aims to explore and offer different hypotheses that could account for an adequate understanding of the duty to die and its relation to biopolitics from two neglected approaches. First, death will be analysed from a biopolitical perspective to understand the crucial role it has in biopower. Second, the focus lies on the two-folded implication that death has in biopower, for it could be either a defiance of it or the final sublimation of its control. Similarly, the next section (...) addresses the relations between death and neoliberalism from a biopolitical perspective, exploring the possibility of understanding the duty to die as resistance to economic mandates or, on the contrary, as the fulfilment of neoliberal interests. Finally, as a continuation of the relations between the duty to die and neo-liberalism, the paper analyses a similar two-folded view of the former from a psychopolitical perspective. (shrink)

This paper straightforwardly addresses one of the strongest, from an ethical perspective, objections presented to the duty to die, the one concerned with the lack of a normative theory to support it, offered by Seay in his paper Can there be a “duty to die” without a normative theory? The aim of the paper is to provide strong metaethical grounds to support the duty to die without the need of a moral normative theory. First, the definition and main argument for (...) the duty to die will be presented. Second, Seay’s objection will be described and clearly explained. Third, our metaphysical assumptions and a preliminary metaethical discussion will be offered to situate and understand the context. Finally, we will show how the duty to die can be integrated within the metaethical approach previously presented, defending that there is no need of a normative theory to provide good justification and strong ethical grounds for the duty to die, because they will have already been provided by our metaethical argument. (shrink)

Euthanasia and the duty to die have both been thoroughly discussed in the field of bioethics as morally justifiable practices within medical healthcare contexts. The existence of a narrow connection between both could also be established, for people having a duty to die should be allowed to actively hasten their death by the active means offered by euthanasia. Choosing the right time to end one’s own life is a decisive factor to retain autonomy at the end of our lives. However, (...) there is no definitive consensus on why physicians should be the ones performing the medical procedure to end a person’s life. The moral problems arising from such assertion are not to be taken lightly, for medical tradition has long regarded the duty not to kill, not to actively end a patient’s life, as the core moral obligation that gives meaning to the medical profession. Our concern is to question the moral justifiability of the arguments offered by physicians not to actively help patients die. (shrink)

(English below) -/- Normalmente se piensa en la percepción y la memoria como dos capacidades independientes, creyendo que la primera solo tiene influencia sobre la segunda durante la codificación. En las entrevistas autobiográficas de historia oral y memoria histórica, los entrevistados seleccionan, adaptan y completan sus recuerdos para crear diferentes versiones de ellos. En este artículo se argumenta que lo anterior es consecuencia de la naturaleza simulativa de la memoria episódica, y del empleo por los entrevistados de información perceptiva para (...) generar y adaptar sus recuerdos a un discurso autobiográfico, buscando satisfacer un propósito comunicativo. Para ilustrar esto, se analizan tres factores contextuales que influyen sobre la construcción del recuerdo en una entrevista autobiográfica (objetivo comunicativo, idioma de comunicación e interacción emocional), mostrando que, en este tipo de recuperación, memoria y percepción contribuyen simultáneamente a construir simulaciones de eventos que se adaptan en tiempo real al contexto donde ocurre la evocación. /////////////Abstract/////////////// Perception and memory are usually thought to be two independent faculties, where the former is believed to only have an influence on the latter at encoding. In autobiographical interviews of oral history and historical memory, interviewees select, adapt, and complete their memories to create different versions. This paper argues that this process is a consequence of the simulative nature of episodic memory and the interviewees’ use of perceptual information to generate and adapt their memories to an autobiographical discourse with the goal of satisfying a communicative purpose. To illustrate this, three contextual factors that influence the construction of a memory in an autobiographical interview are analyzed, showing that, in this type of recall, memory and perception simultaneously contribute to constructing episodic simulations of events, which adapt in real-time to the context in which recall happens. (shrink)

This summary is not exactly the way I would have done it myself but I must admit that my writing is sometimes a challenge to read. So I asked an AI to do this summary expecting that it will give an easily understandable although not totally accurate view on Ontology of Knowledge and from this general understanding help the reader to read the original papers. Jean-Louis Boucon’s works, "Introduction to the Ontology of Knowledge" and "Time, Space, and World as (...) Knowledge," delve into the intricate nature of reality, meaning, and the process of knowing. Boucon challenges traditional dichotomies in philosophy and science, presenting a cohesive framework where the knowing subject and the world are intertwined aspects of a single dynamic reality. His ideas provide a robust foundation for exploring ontological and epistemological questions, including the interpretation of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

Many current problems surrounding science revolve around the complex epistemological framework that shapes a new vision of knowledge about reality. The traditional epistemological positions are characterized by the explanation of nature by means of concatenated facts; that is, as bricks attached to each other giving shape to the edifice of science. A conception of this nature showed that the idea of certainty was nothing more than a mere illusion, opening the way, on the contrary, to the idea of the uncertainty (...) of knowledge based on the descriptions of quantum physics, also a product of the non-reductionist conception of reality, thus criticizing the specular representation. This article addresses the main problems surrounding the critical conceptions that the emerging epistemology reveals about knowledge, pointing towards a much more complex vision of reality. (shrink)

Est-il possible de parler de ce qui n’est pas ou d’y penser sans présupposer une forme d’être pour cela même que nous pensons ne pas exister? La vieille énigme parménidienne, qui hante toujours la philosophie contemporaine, est au cœur non seulement de la philosophie médiévale mais aussi des études médiévales, comme en témoigne le récent ouvrage d’Alain de Libera sur la référence vide. L’objet de cette étude est en comparaison beaucoup plus...

According to a well-known view in the philosophy of mind, intentional attitudes by their very nature satisfy requirements of rationality (e.g. Davidson 1980; Dennett 1987; Millar 2004). This view (which I shall call Constitutivism) features prominently as the ‘principle of minimal rationality’ in de Sousa’s monograph The Rationality of Emotion (1987). By explicating this principle in terms of the notion of the formal object of an attitude, de Sousa articulates an interesting and original version of Constitutivism, which differs in important (...) respects from other extant versions. In this paper, I explore this version of Constitutivism against the background of recent developments in the theory of rationality and make explicit its ramifications for the long-standing dispute over whether the mind is essentially normative. My focus will be on how to conceive of the form of the rationality requirements that attitudes as such must satisfy according to this principle. I argue that, although de Sousa seems officially to endorse a structuralist conception of rationality, according to which these requirements are requirements of coherence, his considerations on formal objects suggest that they are more aptly conceived in terms of a reasons-responsive conception of rationality. I further argue that which of these two readings we choose makes a significant difference to the prospect of vindicating the essential normativity of mind by invoking the principle of minimal rationality. (shrink)

It is popular to hold that emotions are evaluative. On the standard account, the evaluative character of emotion is understood in epistemic terms: emotions apprehend or make us aware of value properties. As this account is commonly elaborated, emotions are experiences with evaluative intentional content. In this paper, I am concerned with a recent alternative proposal on how emotions afford awareness of value. This proposal does not ascribe evaluative content to emotions, but instead conceives of them as evaluative at the (...) level of intentional mode or attitude. I first argue that this proposal fails to make emotions intelligible as value apprehensions. There are reasons to suppose that emotions do not apprehend value to begin with, but are related to values in a different, non-epistemic sense. I then go on to show that the notion of an evaluative intentional mode can still help elucidate the evaluative character of emotion. I argue that there is a plausible non-epistemic understanding of the view that emotions are evaluative modes. On this account, emotions are not ways of apprehending values, but ways of acknowledging values. (shrink)

Original title : 「ドガの『舞姫』」『深田康算全集』[Œuvres complètes de Fukada Yasukazu]. Machida, Tamagawa Daigaku Shuppanbu, 1972–1973, 3 : 9–15.

A prominent version of emotional cognitivism is the view that emotions are preceded by awareness of value. In a recent paper, Jonathan Mitchell (2019) has attacked this view (which he calls the content-priority view). According to him, extant suggestions for the relevant type of pre-emotional evaluative awareness are all problematic. Unless these problems can be overcome, he argues, the view does not represent a plausible competitor to rivaling cognitivist views. As Mitchell supposes, the view is not mandatory since its core (...) motivations can be accommodated by competing views, too. I argue that Mitchell's case against the content-priority view is unconvincing as it misconceives the principal motivation for the view. As I show, properly reconstructed, this motivation provides a strong case for the indispensability of the view to any adequate cognitivist treatment of emotion. Moreover, Mitchell's survey of candidates for pre-emotional value awareness can be seen to rest on problematic phenomenological assumptions. (shrink)

A study is reported testing two hypotheses about a close parallel relation between indicative conditionals, if A then B , and conditional bets, I bet you that if A then B . The first is that both the indicative conditional and the conditional bet are related to the conditional probability, P(B|A). The second is that de Finetti's three-valued truth table has psychological reality for both types of conditional— true , false , or void for indicative conditionals and win , lose (...) , or void for conditional bets. The participants were presented with an array of chips in two different colours and two different shapes, and an indicative conditional or a conditional bet about a random chip. They had to make judgements in two conditions: either about the chances of making the indicative conditional true or false or about the chances of winning or losing the conditional bet. The observed distributions of responses in the two conditions were generally related to the conditional probability, supporting the first hypothesis. In addition, a majority of participants in further conditions chose the third option, “void”, when the antecedent of the conditional was false, supporting the second hypothesis. (shrink)

The paper challenges the assumption, common amongst philosophers, that the reality described in the fundamental theories of microphysics is all the reality we have. It will be argued that this assumption is in fact incompatible with the nature of such theories. It will be shown further that the macro-world of three-dimensional bodies and of such qualitative structures as colour and sound can be treated scientifically on its own terms, which is to say not only from the perspective of psychology but (...) also ontologically. A new sort of emergentist position will be defended, one which yields the basis of a method for describing the perceptually salient macroscopic world in mathematical terms. Broadly, it will be argued that the macroscopic world exists in virtue of certain specific sorts of boundary-patterns in the field of what is captured by the theories of microphysics. (shrink)

El síndrome de Herlyn-Werner es una patología rara que afecta a las mujeres entre 0,1 a 3,8% de la población general, su etiología es desconocida pero existe una malformación congénita del útero y la vagina, el diagnóstico es tardío lo que genera consecuencias graves como la infertilidad, endometriosis secundaria, adherencias pélvicas, piosalpinx e incluso piocolpos. El tratamiento es principalmente mediante cirugía y dependiendo de la anomalía, será la intervención quirúrgica. A partir de la problemática antes descrita la presente investigación tiene (...) como objetivo desarrollar un método neutrosófico para la evaluación del Síndrome Herlyn-Werner. Es un síndrome raro que presenta complicaciones al momento de diagnosticar. Es importante la clínica y el seguimiento una vez diagnosticado. Sin embargo, la falta de estudios de este síndrome hace que no se conozca la etiología y por ende haya limitados tratamientos en estas pacientes, además de que un diagnóstico tardío aumenta la probabilidad de endometriosis e infertilidad. (shrink)

It is a popular thought that emotions play an important epistemic role. Thus, a considerable number of philosophers find it compelling to suppose that emotions apprehend the value of objects and events in our surroundings. I refer to this view as the Epistemic View of emotion. In this paper, my concern is with a rivaling picture of emotion, which has so far received much less attention. On this account, emotions do not constitute a form of epistemic access to specific axiological (...) aspects of their objects. Instead it proposes that they are ways of taking a stand or position on the world. I refer to this as the Position-Taking View of emotion. Whilst some authors seem sympathetic to this view, this it has so far not been systematically motivated and elaborated. In this paper, I fill this gap and propose a more adequate account of our emotional engagement with the world than the predominant epistemic paradigm. I start by highlighting the specific way in which emotions are directed at something, which I contrast with the intentionality of perception and other forms of apprehension. I then go on to offer a specific account of the valence of emotion and show how this account and the directedness of emotions makes them intelligible as a way of taking a position on something. (shrink)

How does microbiota research impact our understanding of biological individuality? We summarize the interdisciplinary summer school on "Microbiota, Symbiosis and Individuality: Conceptual and Philosophical Issues" (July 2019), which was supported by a European Research Council starting grant project "Immunity, DEvelopment, and the Microbiota" (IDEM). The summer school centered around interdisciplinary group work on four facets of microbiota research: holobionts, individuality, causation, and human health. The conceptual discussion of cutting-edge empirical research provided new insights into microbiota and highlights the value of (...) incorporating into meetings experts from other disciplines, such as philosophy and history of science. (shrink)

El presente artículo analiza el fenómeno del mestizaje cultural que se da alrededor de la creación de la Virgen de Guadalupe. Se propone que la resignificación que se dio en torno al cerro del Tepeyac, donde originalmente se adoraba a Tonantzin, constituye un evento de creación de sentidos que se da en el contexto del mestizaje, y que incorpora la construcción discursiva de la hierofanía en torno a tres elementos: el objeto sagrado, el lugar del culto y el ritual de (...) adoración. Este evento tuvo una gran importancia, pues el guadalupanismo generó consigo una serie de sentimientos de pertenencia entre los criollos e indígenas, quienes encontraron en él una forma de entenderse como distintos al imperio español, lo que para muchos autores significó una de las primeras semillas de los ideales independentistas y la superación de la época colonial. (shrink)

Physical reality is all the reality we have, and so physical theory in the standard sense is all the ontology we need. This, at least, was an assumption taken almost universally for granted by the advocates of exact philosophy for much of the present century. Every event, it was held, is a physical event, and all structure in reality is physical structure. The grip of this assumption has perhaps been gradually weakened in recent years as far as the sciences of (...) mind are concerned. When it comes to the sciences of external reality, however, it continues to hold sway, so that contemporary philosophers B even while devoting vast amounts of attention to the language we use in describing the world of everyday experience B still refuse to see this world as being itself a proper object of theoretical concern. Here, however, we shall argue that the usual conception of physical reality as constituting a unique bedrock of objectivity reflects a rather archaic view as to the nature of physics itself and is in fact incompatible with the development of the discipline since Newton. More specifically, we shall seek to show that the world of qualitative structures, for example of colour and sound, or the commonsense world of coloured and sounding things, can be treated scientifically (ontologically) on its own terms, and that such a treatment can help us better to understand the structures both of physical reality and of cognition. (shrink)

El alcance de la epojé y la posterior reducción ha sido siempre uno de los mayores terrenos de disputa de la fenomenologı́a. Este ensayo tiene la pretensión de reflexionar en torno a este elemento metodológico esencial a la luz del problema del acceso al mundo. ¿Se ha perdido algo, una vez llevada a cabo la reducción? La respuesta será negativa. Para ello, en la primera sección se presentará cómo más bien hay una reapropiación originaria del mundo a través de la (...) reducción. En la segunda sección se revisará la noción de Jan Patočka de mundo como totalidad pre-dada. En efecto, ambas permiten acercarse a la conclusión de que la reducción encamina hacia un renovado acceso al mundo sin dejar nada de este fuera, permitiendo ası́ que el mundo aparezca qua fenómeno. Esto significa, finalmente, que la reducción permite reconocer de modo originario la relación de nosotros con el mundo, sin entenderla como una mera relación entre dos cosas. (shrink)

El síndrome de Smith-Lemli-Opitz (SLOS) es un síndrome congénito de anomalía múltiple y deterioro cognitivo, causado por una deficiencia en la enzima 7-DHC reductasa. El grado de cumplimiento de un indicador congénito se expresa mediante una relación directa del desempeño de neutralidad representando un dominio de valores neutrosóficos para modelar la incertidumbre. La presente investigación describe una solución a la problemática planteada mediante el desarrollo de un método para la evaluación del Síndrome de Smith-Lemli-Opitz. El SLOS, causado por mutaciones en (...) el gen DHCR7, presenta variabilidad fenotípica, malformaciones múltiples y discapacidad intelectual. No tiene cura, y la suplementación con colesterol es de eficacia limitada. La revisión destaca la necesidad de diagnóstico prenatal preciso y nuevas intervenciones terapéuticas, como estatinas y antioxidantes, para mejorar la calidad de vida de los pacientes. (shrink)

It is popular to hold that our primary epistemic access to specific response-dependent properties like the fearsome or admirable (or so-called ‘affective properties’) is constituted by the corresponding emotion. I argue that this view is incompatible with a widely held meta-ethical view, according to which affective properties have deontic force. More specifically, I argue that this view cannot accommodate for the requirement that deontic entities provide guidance. If affective properties are to guide the formation of the corresponding emotion, our primary (...) access to them cannot be provided by that same emotion. (shrink)

The Sure-Thing Principle famously appears in Savage’s axiomatization of Subjective Expected Utility. Yet Savage introduces it only as an informal, overarching dominance condition motivating his separability postulate P2 and his state-independence postulate P3. Once these axioms are introduced, by and large, he does not discuss the principle any more. In this note, we pick up the analysis of the Sure-Thing Principle where Savage left it. In particular, we show that each of P2 and P3 is equivalent to a dominance condition; (...) that they strengthen in different directions a common, basic dominance axiom; and that they can be explicitly combined in a unified dominance condition that is a candidate formal statement for the Sure-Thing Principle. Based on elementary proofs, our results shed light on some of the most fundamental properties of rational choice under uncertainty. In particular they imply, as corollaries, potential simplifications for Savage’s and the Anscombe- Aumann axiomatizations of Subjective Expected Utility. Most surprisingly perhaps, they reveal that in Savage’s axiomatization, P3 can be weakened to a natural strengthening of so-called Obvious Dominance. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to clarify the role of category theory in the foundations of mathematics. There is a good deal of confusion surrounding this issue. A standard philosophical strategy in the face of a situation of this kind is to draw various distinctions and in this way show that the confusion rests on divergent conceptions of what the foundations of mathematics ought to be. This is the strategy adopted in the present paper. It is divided into 5 (...) sections. We first show that already in the set theoretical framework, there are different dimensions to the expression foundations of. We then explore these dimensions more thoroughly. After a very short discussion of the links between these dimensions, we move to some of the arguments presented for and against category theory in the foundational landscape. We end up on a more speculative note by examining the relationships between category theory and set theory. (shrink)

The representational theory of measurement has long been the central paradigm in the philosophy of measurement. Such is not the case anymore, partly under the influence of the critique according to which RTM offers too poor descriptions of the measurement procedures actually followed in science. This can be called the metrological critique of RTM. I claim that the critique is partly irrelevant. This is because, in general, RTM is not in the business of describing measurement procedures, be it in idealized (...) form. To support this claim, I present various cases where RTM can be said to investigate measurement without providing any measurement procedure. Such limit cases lead to a better understanding of the RTM project. They also illustrate some of the questions which the philosophy of measurement can explore, when it is ready to go beyond the metrological viewpoint. (shrink)

Chapitre méthodologique d'un livre co-écrit par Éliane Pons et J.-J. Pinto. Ce dernier, pour raisons professionnelles, n'avait indiqué son nom que dans cette partie intitulée "Esquisse d'une psychanalyse scientifique" (allusion respectueuse au titre de Freud "Esquisse d'une psychologie scientifique"), où se trouve expliquée en détail la méthode originale d'analyse de discours inventée et enseignée par lui : l'Analyse des Logiques Subjectives© (A.L.S.©).

It is widely assumed that emotions are evaluative. Moreover, many authors suppose that emotions are important or valuable as evaluations. According to the currently dominant version of cognitivism, emotions are evaluative insofar as they make us aware of value properties of their intentional objects. In attributing to emotions an epistemic role, this view conceives of them as epistemically valuable. In this paper, I argue that proponents of this account mischaracterize the evaluative character of emotions and, a fortiori, their value. Moreover, (...) I propose an alternative view of emotional evaluation, according to which emotions are practically rather than epistemically important. As I argue, emotions are ways of acknowledging their intentional objects as (dis)valuable. As such, they do not apprehend values but make them count. I elaborate this idea by drawing an analogy with legal and political sanctions. The resulting view has it that emotions are practically important in that they affirm the cares and concerns which serve as standards of emotional evaluation. (shrink)