The recent global surge in large-scale foreign land acquisitions marks a radical transformation of the global economic and political landscape. Since land that attracts capital often becomes the site of expulsions and displacement, it also leads to new forms of migration. In this paper, I explore this connection from the perspective of a political philosopher. I argue that changes in global land governance unsettle the congruence of political community and bounded territory that we often take for granted. As a case (...) study, I discuss the European Union’s Renewable Energy Directive as a significant driver of foreign land acquisitions. Using its global power, the European Union (EU) is effectively governing land far outside of its international borders and with it the people who live on this land or are expelled from it. As a result, EU citizens ought to consider such people fellow members of their political community. This has implications for normative debates about immigration and, in particular, for arguments that appeal to collective self-determination to justify a right of political communities to exclude newcomers. The political community to which EU citizens belong reaches far beyond the EU’s official borders. (shrink)

The Top-Down Argument for the ability to do otherwise aims at establishing that humans can do otherwise in the sense that is relevant for debates about free will. It consists of two premises: first, we always need to answer the question of whether some phenomenon (such as the ability to do otherwise) exists by consulting our best scientific theories of the domain at issue. Second, our best scientific theories of human action presuppose that humans can do otherwise. This paper argues (...) that this is not enough to establish the conclusion. The Top-Down Argument supports that humans can do otherwise _in some sense_. But it does not show that humans can do otherwise _in the sense that is relevant for debates about free will_. The paper then shows that the apparently best way to make the argument valid does not work. (shrink)

In the last two decades, blame has become a core topic in ethics, philosophical moral psychology and, more recently, epistemology. This chapter aims at clarifying the complex state of the debate and at making a suggestion for how we should proceed from here. The core idea is that accounts of blame are often motivated by very different background goals. One standard goal is to provide a unifying account of our everyday blame practices. The chapter argues that there is reason to (...) think that this goal is not achievable. Another goal is to provide the tools for solving or clarifying important social or philosophical problems. The chapter suggests that this is what theories of blame should focus on. (shrink)

For a long time the dominant view on the nature of blame was that to blame someone is to have an emotion toward her, such as anger, resentment or indignation in the case of blaming someone else and guilt in the case of self-blame. Even though this view is still widely held, it has recently come under heavy attack. The aim of this paper is to elaborate the idea that to blame is to have an emotion and to defend the (...) resulting emotion account of blame. (shrink)

Even though the idea that privacy is some kind of control is often presented as the standard view on privacy, there are powerful objections against it. The aim of this paper is to defend the control account of privacy against some particularly pressing challenges by proposing a new way to understand the relevant kind of control. The main thesis is that privacy should be analyzed in terms of source control, a notion that is adopted from discussions about moral responsibility.

Many philosophers characterize a particularly important sense of free will and responsibility by referring to basically deserved blame. But what is basically deserved blame? The aim of this paper is to identify the appraisal entailed by basic desert claims. It presents three desiderata for an account of desert appraisals and it argues that important recent theories fail to meet them. Then, the paper presents and defends a promising alternative. The basic idea is that claims about basically deserved blame entail that (...) the targets have forfeited their claims that others not blame them and that there is positive reason to blame them. The paper shows how this view frames the discussion about skepticism about free will and responsibility. (shrink)

Blame skeptics argue that we have strong reason to revise our blame practices because humans do not fulfill all the conditions for it being appropriate to blame them. This paper presents a new challenge for this view. Many have objected that blame plays valuable roles such that we have strong reason to hold on to our blame practices. Skeptics typically reply that non-blaming responses to objectionable conduct, like forms of disappointment, can serve the positive functions of blame. The new challenge (...) is that skeptics need to show that it can be appropriate (or less inappropriate) to respond with this kind of disappointment to people’s conduct if it is inappropriate to respond with blame. The paper argues that current blame-skeptical views fail to meet this challenge. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Recently, many authors have argued that claims about determinism and free will are situated on different levels of description and that determinism on one level does not rule out free will on another. This paper focuses on Christian List’s version of this basic idea. It will be argued for the negative thesis that List’s account does not rule out the most plausible version of incompatibilism about free will and determinism and, more constructively, that a level-based approach to free will (...) has better chances to meet skeptical challenges if it is guided by reasoning at the moral level – a level that has not been seriously considered so far by proponents of this approach. (shrink)

Skepticism about blameworthiness says that there is good reason to doubt that, in our world, humans are ever blameworthy for their deeds. A significant problem for the discussion of this view is that it is unclear how to understand the kind of blame that should be at issue. This paper makes a new proposal. The basic idea is that the kind of blame skeptics should be skeptical about is constituted by responses that can violate the targets’ claims and by the (...) responders’ thought that the targets have forfeited this claim because of their morally objectionable actions and because of how they were when they performed them. This view identifies an important part of our everyday lives and frames discussions about skepticism about blameworthiness in a new way. (shrink)

A standard account of privacy says that it is essentially a kind of control over personal information. Many privacy scholars have argued against this claim by relying on so-called threatened loss cases. In these cases, personal information about an agent is easily available to another person, but not accessed. Critics contend that control accounts have the implausible implication that the privacy of the relevant agent is diminished in threatened loss cases. Recently, threatened loss cases have become important because Edward Snowden’s (...) revelation of how the NSA and GCHQ collected Internet and mobile phone data presents us with a gigantic, real-life threatened loss case. In this paper, I will defend the control account of privacy against the argument that is based on threatened loss cases. I will do so by developing a new version of the control account that implies that the agents’ privacy is not diminished in threatened loss cases. (shrink)

The issue of political violence is mostly absent from current debates about power. Many conceptions of power treat violence as wholly distinct from or even antithetical to power, or see it as a mere instrument whose effects are obvious and not in need of political analysis. In this paper, I explore what kind of ontology of power is necessary to properly take account of the various roles that violence can play in creating and maintaining power structures. I pursue this question (...) by contrasting the views of Hannah Arendt and Michel Foucault. For Arendt, power is generated and maintained by communicative practices. She argues that power and violence are ‘opposites’ because violence can only destroy but not create these practices. In contrast, Foucault’s conception explicitly allows violence to play a constitutive role in generating power. I argue that while Arendt is right to insist that power and violence are not identical, it does not follow that violence cannot play any role in constituting power. Guided by Foucault’s approach, I formulate a non-dualist account of the relationship between power and violence that takes seriously the role that bodies, material things, and built infrastructures play in making social relations ‘more durable’ and constituting power. (shrink)

This paper discusses the idea that the concept of privacy should be understood in terms of control. Three different attempts to spell out this idea will be critically discussed. The conclusion will be that the Source Control View on privacy is the most promising version of the idea that privacy is to be understood in terms of control.

How do the fact that an agent is morally responsible for a certain morally objectionable action and the fact that she is an appropriate target of blame for it relate to each other? Many authors inspired by Peter Strawson say that they necessarily co‐occur. Standard answers to the question of why they co‐occur say that the occurrence of one of the facts explains that the other obtains. This article presents a third option: that they are one and the same fact. (...) There is no difference between the fact that a person is an appropriate target of blame for an objectionable action and the fact that she is morally responsible for it. This view has the advantage of being metaphysically more parsimonious and of answering, in an elegant and plausible way, an interesting question about which many standard theories of responsibility keep silent: what is it to be morally responsible simpliciter? (shrink)

Power is often taken to be a central concept in social and political thought that can contribute to the explanation of many different social phenomena. This article argues that in order to play this role, a general theory of power is required to identify a stable causal capacity, one that does not depend on idiosyncratic social conditions and can thus exert its characteristic influence in a wide range of cases. It considers three promising strategies for such a theory, which ground (...) power in (1) the ability to use force, (2) access to resources, or (3) collective acceptance. It shows that these strategies fail to identify a stable causal capacity. The lack of an adequate general theory of power suggests that the concept lacks the necessary unity to play the broad explanatory role it is often accorded. (shrink)

This paper presents an account of the right to privacy that is inspired by classic control views on this right and recent developments in moral psychology. The core idea is that the right to privacy is the right that others not make personal information about us flow unless this flow is an expression of and does not conflict with our deep self. The nature of the deep self will be spelled out in terms of stable intrinsic desires. The paper argues (...) that this view has advantages over alternative accounts of the right to privacy, that it is extensionally adequate in interesting test cases, that there is a good reason to think that the right to privacy, thus understood, can be justified, and that this view helps identify what kind of information is protected by the right to privacy. (shrink)

When confronted with the question of why it is appropriate to morally blame a person for some bad action, it may seem plausible to reply that she is morally responsible for it. Some authors, inspired by Peter Strawson's "Freedom and Resentment," argue, however, that thinking this way is backwards. They believe that a person is morally responsible for some bad action because it would be appropriate to blame her for it. The aims of this paper are to present this account, (...) to highlight some of its important but often overlooked features, and to defend it against pressing objections. (shrink)

What kind of thing, as it were, is power and how does it fit into our understanding of the social world? I approach this question by exploring the pragmatic character of power ascriptions, arguing that they involve fictional expectations directed at an open future. When we take an agent to be powerful, we act as if that agent had a robust capacity to make a difference to the actions of others. While this pretense can never fully live up to a (...) social reality whose future is open, acting on such expectations helps constitute social order. Fictional expectations are thus built into the material practices that constitute power. This account, I argue, helps us make sense of some of the deep disagreements about the nature of power. I develop the account by drawing on Thomas Hobbes’s myth of an original institution of sovereign power before expanding it to other forms of power. (shrink)

AI systems, like self-driving cars, healthcare robots, or Autonomous Weapon Systems, already play an increasingly important role in our lives and will do so to an even greater extent in the near future. This raises a fundamental philosophical question: who is morally responsible when such systems cause unjustified harm? In the paper, we argue for the admittedly surprising claim that some of these systems can themselves be morally responsible for their conduct in an important and everyday sense of the term—the (...) attributability sense. More specifically, relying on work by Nomy Arpaly and Timothy Schroeder (In Praise of Desire, OUP 2014), we propose that the behavior of these systems can manifest their ‘quality of will’ and thus be regarded as something they can be blameworthy for. We develop this position in detail, justify some of its crucial presuppositions, and defend it against potential objections. (shrink)

Collective self-determination is considered to be an important political value. Many liberal political philosophers appeal to it to defend the right of states to exclude would-be newcomers. In this paper, I challenge the value of collective self-determination in the case of countries like the US, former colonial powers with a history of white supremacist immigration and citizenship policies. I argue for my claim by way of an analogy: There is no value to white neighborhoods in the US, which are the (...) result of racist attitudes and state policies, determining autonomously who should become a neighbor. In light of this commitment, defenders of the US's right to exclude would need to explain why it should be of moral value that a community whose character and composition has been shaped by white supremacy be able to determine its membership on its own terms. (shrink)

As Christian List (2021) has recently argued, the increasing arrival of powerful AI systems that operate autonomously in high-stakes contexts creates a need for “future-proofing” our regulatory frameworks, i.e., for reassessing them in the face of these developments. One core part of our regulatory frameworks that dominates our everyday moral interactions is blame. Therefore, “future-proofing” our extant regulatory frameworks in the face of the increasing arrival of powerful AI systems requires, among others things, that we ask whether it makes sense (...) to extend our blaming practices to these systems. In the paper, we argue for the admittedly surprising thesis that this question should be answered in the affirmative: contrary to what one might initially think, it can make a lot of sense to blame AI systems, since, as we furthermore argue, many of the important functions that are fulfilled by blaming humans can also be served by blaming AI systems. The paper concludes that this result gives us a good pro tanto reason to extend our blame practices to AI systems. (shrink)

My paper analyses the analogy between Computers and the Thomistic separate substances, and argues that Aquinas' account of angels as cognitively intuitive and non-discursive makes the analogical gap between these impossible to bridge. From there, I point the direction away from computers as the way for us to move up the order of cognitive excellence. Instead, the gifts of the Holy Spirit are the way to go, since by them we participate in this intuitivity. I then lay out the ascetical (...) presuppositions for the successful participation of this gifts, in particular the necessity for the passive purgations, according to the division of the ascetical life into three stages by Garrigou-Lagrange OP. (shrink)

In Being Realistic About Reasons,T.M. Scanlon develops a non-naturalistic realist account of normative reasons. A crucial part of that account is Scanlon’s contention that there is no deep epistemological problem for non-naturalistic realists, and that the method of reflective equilibrium suffices to explain the possibility of normative knowledge. In this critical notice we argue that this is not so: on a realist picture, normative knowledge presupposes a significant correlation between distinct entities, namely between normative beliefs and normative facts. This correlation (...) calls for an explanation. We show that Scanlon does not have the resources to offer such an explanation. (shrink)

1. Biomedical sciences are fast-growing fields with unprecedented speed of research outputs, especially in the quantities of papers. Philosophers aiming to study ongoing biomedical changes face cha...

Recent psychological research shown that the places where we live are linked to our personality traits. Geographical aggregation of personalities has been observed in many individualistic nations; notably, the mountainousness is an essential component in understanding regional variances in personality. Could mountainousness therefore also explain the clustering of personality-types in collectivist countries like China? Using a nationwide survey (29,838 participants) in Mainland China, we investigated the relationship between the Big Five personality traits and mountainousness indicators at the provincial level. Multilevel (...) modelling showed significant negative associations between the elevation coefficient of variation (Elevation CV) and the Big Five personality traits, whereas mean elevation (Elevation Mean) and the standard deviation in elevation (Elevation STD) were positively associated with human personalities. Subsequent machine learning analyses showed that, for example, Elevation Mean outperformed other mountainousness indicators regarding correlations with neuroticism, while Elevation CV performed best relative to openness models. Our results mirror some previous findings, such as the positive association between openness and Elevation STD, while also revealing cultural differences, such as the social desirability of people living in China’s mountainous areas. (shrink)

examines Hegel’s analysis of honor and recognition in the chivalric culture, and contrasts that to the xia tradition’s engagement with Buddhism, Daoism, Confucianism, and Chinese Legalism.

This essay is based on the talk that I gave at the 2nd International Conference and the 4th National Conference for Cognitive Poetics at Guandong University of Foreign Studies in Guangzhou in the fall 2015. When inviting me to participate in that scholarly meeting, Professor Xiong Muqing suggested that I start by discussing the relationship between cognitive approaches to literature (a field that I represent) and cognitive poetics. So here, too, I will begin by considering the issue of this relationship (...) before turning to one particular area of research within cognitive literary studies and the possible application of that research to Cao Xueqin's Honglou Meng (《红楼梦》). (shrink)

Menges (2022) seeks to identify the kind of blame that should be at issue in debates between skeptics and anti-skeptics about responsibility. Menges argues that such blame is constituted by responses that the target has a claim against, and by the blamer’s thought that they have forfeited this claim due to their bad action and state while engaged in that action. I identify a class of blame responses that Menges mistakenly excludes and offer an alternative, more general, account in which (...) the distinctive feature of controversial blame isn’t claim forfeiture, but the defeat of reasons grounded in the target’s interests. (shrink)

Die Frage, was eine wissenschaftliche Erklärung ist, stellt seit mehr als einem halben Jahrhundert ein zentrales Thema der Wissenschaftsphilosophie dar. Die heutige Diskussion begann mit einer richtungsweisenden Arbeit von Carl Hempel im Jahre 1942 über den Erklärungsbegriff in der Geschichtswissenschaft. In dieser Arbeit gab Hempel, frühere Überlegungen von John Stuart Mill, Karl Popper und anderen präzisierend, eine formale Definition der Erklärung eines singulären Faktums.1 Mit seiner dem zugrunde liegenden Auffassung, dass die Wissenschaften sehr wohl in der Lage sind, Erklärungen zu (...) liefern, setzt sich Hempel ab von den zur damaligen Zeit vorherrschenden antimetaphysisch gestimmten Erklärungsskeptikern wie Pierre Duhem. Es ist jedoch wichtig zu betonen, dass Hempels Definition des Konzeptes der wissenschaftlichen Erklärung nicht wesentlich über das Deskriptive hinaus geht und damit auch und gerade von Empiristen akzeptiert werden kann. Bekanntlich versteht man unter einer Erklärung in Hempels Deduktiv-Nomologischen (D-N) Modell ein deduktiv gültiges Argument, zu dessen Prämisse (dem sog. Explanans) mindestens ein universelles Gesetz und eine Menge von singulären Sätzen gehört und dessen Konklusion das zu erklärende Faktum (das sog. Explanandum) ist. (shrink)

The theory of lower previsions is designed around the principles of coherence and sure-loss avoidance, thus steers clear of all the updating anomalies highlighted in Gong and Meng's "Judicious Judgment Meets Unsettling Updating: Dilation, Sure Loss, and Simpson's Paradox" except dilation. In fact, the traditional problem with the theory of imprecise probability is that coherent inference is too complicated rather than unsettling. Progress has been made simplifying coherent inference by demoting sets of probabilities from fundamental building blocks to secondary (...) representations that are derived or discarded as needed. (shrink)

The three great sovereigns of ancient Chinese history, which have subsumed almost nine centuries before Common Era, referred to Xia (2070-1600 BC), Shang (1600-1046 BC) and Zhou (1046- 256 BC) dynasties. The people of Shang, who represented the transition from a primitive to a civilized continuum with the invention of writing, were exposed to social stratification due to the self-interests of courtiers indulging in superstitions, relying on prophecy and necromancy. As a result of this stratification, the first examples of class (...) discrimination and hierarchical organization that divided national subjects into ranks, bestowing a privilege on the noble class, occurred. The Shang period has been implied as a process that, on one hand, continued the tradition of ancestral cults initiated by the Xia family, who founded the first official dynasty, but, on the other hand, humiliated the people in terms of status since the rulers who ascended the throne equated themselves with a divine power. The fact that the Shang rulers appropriated the rituals which took place under the name of deference during the Xia period escalated the belief of ancestral spirits’ belonging to heaven into another belief. Thus, the enslavement of those who did not belong to noble blood by forcing them into obedience to the dynasty has revealed an issue that should not be ignored. The Shang rulers, who divided the national subjects outside the noble class considering their mission, position, profession, and demotion, also classified the slaves in the service of the dynasty considering punishments, rules, and sanctions that they determined. Despite this truth, divergences among Chinese researchers underlie the dichotomy whether slavery existed in China. But if the classical texts are examined in detail, it can be sort out that slavery became prevalent in the Shang period and the dynasty was destroyed owing to the tyrannical governance policy of the rulers. In this study, it will be argued that slavery was experienced in early China society based on the idea of private property by discussing class discrimination and hierarchical organization leading Chinese bureaucracy. (shrink)

In der heutigen Welt der Informations- und Kommunikationstechnologie hat sich die Generation Z, die Digital Natives, wiedergefunden. Im Jahr 2021 nutzten 95% der jungen Menschen in der EU täglich das Internet (Eurostat, 2022). Um in der überwältigenden Menge an Informationen navigieren zu können, müssen Jugendliche Medienkompetenz beweisen. Der Fortschritt der Medien und Technologien erfordert eine zunehmende Anzahl an digitalen Fähigkeiten, wobei die Medienkompetenz in den letzten Jahren viele Formen und Gestalten gekannt hat. In diesem Zusammenhang befasst sich die vorliegende Literaturübersicht (...) mit dem Übergang von der Medienkompetenz der 90er Jahre (Aufderheide, 1993) zur neuen, digitalen Medienkompetenz. Unsere primären Ergebnisse deuten darauf hin, dass die neue Medienkompetenz ein Grundstein in der fortlaufenden Entwicklung und in der Bildungsphase der Jugendlichen ist. (shrink)

Wie wäre es mit einer anderen Ausg. der Reichen und Berühmten? Zuerst das Offensichtliche – die Harry-Potter-Romane sind primitiver Aberglaube, der Kinder dazu ermutigt, an Fantasie zu glauben, anstatt Verantwortung für die Welt zu übernehmen – natürlich die Norm. JKR ist genauso ahnungslos über sich und die Welt wie die meisten Menschen,aber etwa 200 Mal so destruktiv wie der durchschnittliche Amerikaner und etwa 800 Mal mehr als der durchschnittliche Chinese. Sie war verantwortlich für die Zerstörung von vielleicht 30.000 Hektar Wald, (...) um diese Müllromane zu produzieren, und die ganze Erosion, die sich daraus ergibt (nicht trivial, da esmindestens 6 und vielleicht 12 Tonnen/Jahr Boden in den Ozean für alle auf der Erde oder vielleicht 100 Tonnen pro Amerikaner ist, und so etwa 5000 Tonnen/Jahr für Rowlings Bücher und Bewegungenundihre 3 Kinder). Die Erde verliert jedes Jahr mindestens 1% ihres Oberbodens, so dass der größte Teil ihrer Nahrungsmittelanbaukapazität weg sein wird, wenn sie sich dem Jahr 2100 nähert. Dann gibt es die riesige Menge an verbranntem Brennstoff und Abfall, die gemacht werden, um die Bücher und Filme, Plastikpuppen usw. herzustellen und zu vertreiben. Sie zeigt ihren Mangel an sozialer Verantwortung, indem sie Kinder hervorbringt, anstatt ihre Millionen zu verwenden, um familienplanerisch zu sein oder den Regenwald aufzukaufen, und indem sie die konventionelle liberale Dummheit der Vorherrschaft der Dritten Welt fördert, die Großbritannien, Amerika, die Welt und die Zukunft ihres Nachkommen zerstört. Natürlich unterscheidet sie sich nicht so sehr von den anderen 7. 8 Milliarden ahnungslos - nur noiser und zerstörerischer.. Es ist das keine kostenlose Mittagessen Problem schreiben groß. Der Mob kann einfach nicht sehen, dass es nichts gibt, wie einer Person zu helfen, ohne anderen zu schaden. Rechte oder Privilegien, die Neuankömmlingen in einer überfüllten Welt gewährt werden, können die Rechte anderer nurvereist enden. Trotz der massiven ökologischen Katastrophen, die sich jeden Tag überall vor ihnen abspielen, können sie sie nicht an die hemmungslose Mutterschaft der "Vielfalt" heften, die für den größten Teil des Bevölkerungszuwachses des letzten Jahrhunderts und all das in diesem jahr erklärt. Ihnen fehlt eine Kombination aus Intelligenz, Bildung, Erfahrung und Gesunden, die erforderlich sind, um die täglichen Angriffe auf die Ressourcen und das Funktionieren der Gesellschaft auf den letztendlichen Zusammenbruch der industriellen Zivilisation zu extrapolieren. Jede Mahlzeit, jede Fahrt mit dem Auto oder Bus, jedes Paar Schuhe ist ein weiterer Nagel im Sarg der Erde. Es ist ihr wahrscheinlich nie in den Sinn gekommen, dass ein Sitz in einem Flugzeug von London nach San Francisco etwa eine Tonne Kohlenstoff produziert, der etwa 3 Quadratmeter Meereis schmilzt, und als eine der Überprivilegierten hat sie wahrscheinlich Hunderte solcher Flüge geflogen. Nicht nur die Reichen und Berühmten, sondern fast jede öffentliche Persönlichkeit überhaupt, einschließlich praktisch aller Lehrer, werden unter Druck gesetzt, politisch korrekt zu sein, was in den westlichen Demokratien heute sozialdemokratisch(neomarxistisch – d.h. verwässerte Kommunisten) bedeutet, dass die Supremacisten der Dritten Welt für die Zerstörung ihrer eigenen Gesellschaften und ihrer eigenen Nachkommen arbeiten. Diejenigen also, deren Bildung,Erfahrung, Intelligenz (und der grundlegende gesunde Menschenverstand), die ihnen verbieten sollten, überhaupt öffentliche Erklärungen abzugeben, völlig alle Medien beherrschen und den Eindruck erwecken, dass die Intelligenten und Zivilisierten Demokratie, Vielfalt und Gleichheit begünstigen müssen, während die Wahrheit ist, dass dies die Probleme und nicht die Lösungen sind und dass sie selbst die Hauptfeinde der Zivilisation sind. Siehe my Suicide by Democracy 2nd ed (2019) und andere. (shrink)

This thirteenth volume of Collected Papers is an eclectic tome of 88 papers in various fields of sciences, such as astronomy, biology, calculus, economics, education and administration, game theory, geometry, graph theory, information fusion, decision making, instantaneous physics, quantum physics, neutrosophic logic and set, non-Euclidean geometry, number theory, paradoxes, philosophy of science, scientific research methods, statistics, and others, structured in 17 chapters (Neutrosophic Theory and Applications; Neutrosophic Algebra; Fuzzy Soft Sets; Neutrosophic Sets; Hypersoft Sets; Neutrosophic Semigroups; Neutrosophic Graphs; Superhypergraphs; Plithogeny; (...) Information Fusion; Statistics; Decision Making; Extenics; Instantaneous Physics; Paradoxism; Mathematica; Miscellanea), comprising 965 pages, published between 2005-2022 in different scientific journals, by the author alone or in collaboration with the following 110 co-authors (alphabetically ordered) from 26 countries: Abduallah Gamal, Sania Afzal, Firoz Ahmad, Muhammad Akram, Sheriful Alam, Ali Hamza, Ali H. M. Al-Obaidi, Madeleine Al-Tahan, Assia Bakali, Atiqe Ur Rahman, Sukanto Bhattacharya, Bilal Hadjadji, Robert N. Boyd, Willem K.M. Brauers, Umit Cali, Youcef Chibani, Victor Christianto, Chunxin Bo, Shyamal Dalapati, Mario Dalcín, Arup Kumar Das, Elham Davneshvar, Bijan Davvaz, Irfan Deli, Muhammet Deveci, Mamouni Dhar, R. Dhavaseelan, Balasubramanian Elavarasan, Sara Farooq, Haipeng Wang, Ugur Halden, Le Hoang Son, Hongnian Yu, Qays Hatem Imran, Mayas Ismail, Saeid Jafari, Jun Ye, Ilanthenral Kandasamy, W.B. Vasantha Kandasamy, Darjan Karabašević, Abdullah Kargın, Vasilios N. Katsikis, Nour Eldeen M. Khalifa, Madad Khan, M. Khoshnevisan, Tapan Kumar Roy, Pinaki Majumdar, Sreepurna Malakar, Masoud Ghods, Minghao Hu, Mingming Chen, Mohamed Abdel-Basset, Mohamed Talea, Mohammad Hamidi, Mohamed Loey, Mihnea Alexandru Moisescu, Muhammad Ihsan, Muhammad Saeed, Muhammad Shabir, Mumtaz Ali, Muzzamal Sitara, Nassim Abbas, Munazza Naz, Giorgio Nordo, Mani Parimala, Ion Pătrașcu, Gabrijela Popović, K. Porselvi, Surapati Pramanik, D. Preethi, Qiang Guo, Riad K. Al-Hamido, Zahra Rostami, Said Broumi, Saima Anis, Muzafer Saračević, Ganeshsree Selvachandran, Selvaraj Ganesan, Shammya Shananda Saha, Marayanagaraj Shanmugapriya, Songtao Shao, Sori Tjandrah Simbolon, Florentin Smarandache, Predrag S. Stanimirović, Dragiša Stanujkić, Raman Sundareswaran, Mehmet Șahin, Ovidiu-Ilie Șandru, Abdulkadir Șengür, Mohamed Talea, Ferhat Taș, Selçuk Topal, Alptekin Ulutaș, Ramalingam Udhayakumar, Yunita Umniyati, J. Vimala, Luige Vlădăreanu, Ştefan Vlăduţescu, Yaman Akbulut, Yanhui Guo, Yong Deng, You He, Young Bae Jun, Wangtao Yuan, Rong Xia, Xiaohong Zhang, Edmundas Kazimieras Zavadskas, Zayen Azzouz Omar, Xiaohong Zhang, Zhirou Ma.‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬. (shrink)

Üblicherweise sind die Dinge kompliziert. Dies führt dazu, dass es eine Menge (unvereinbarer) Theorien gibt, die sich diesen Dingen widmen. Manche sind recht einfach gestrickt, andere sind komplexer. Die Existenz dieser unterschiedlichen Ideen sind ein Indiz dafür, dass die Dinge bisher letztlich unerklärt sind. Und sie sind eine Aufforderung, weiter zu denken. Manchmal sind sie aber auch eine Aufforderung, einmal aufzuräumen. Diese Aufgabe habe ich mir zu Herzen genommen und will deswegen in dieser Arbeit (sozusagen als kleiner Reiseführer) einige Theorien (...) zu Handlungsgründen beleuchten. (shrink)

In der modernen Physik spielen Symmetrien eine herausragende Rolle zur Identifikation und Klassifizierung der fundamentalen Theorien und Entitäten. Symmetrien dienen der Darstellung invarianter Strukturen, das geeignete mathematische Werkzeug hierfür ist die Gruppentheorie. Eine Struktur lässt sich als eine Menge von Relationen verstehen, die einer Menge von Objekten aufgeprägt sind. Strukturell charakterisierte Objekte sind daher wesentlich über ihre relationalen Eigenschaften charakterisiert. Sieht man die theoretischen Entitäten wissenschaftlicher Theorien vornehmlich in dieser strukturellen Weise an, vertritt man eine moderate Variante eines wissenschaftlichen Realismus, (...) die als Strukturenrealismus bekannt ist. Im Umfeld dieser drei Konzepte – Symmetrien, Strukturen, Realismus – bewegt sich der folgende Aufsatz. (shrink)

This paper tries to summarize the main lines of discussion at the conference "Compatibilist Libertarianism: Advantages and Challenges" (October 29, 2021). This conference, organised by Alexander Gebharter and Maria Sekatskaya, served the discussion of Christian List's account of compatibilist libertarianism. Speakers were Taylor W. Cyr, Nadine Elzein, Alexander Gebharter, Christian List, Alfred R. Mele, Leonhard Menges, Tuomas K. Pernu, and Maria Sekatskaya.

Die aktuellen Erfolge von Künstlicher Intelligenz beruhen nicht nur auf technologischen Fortschritten, sondern auch auf einem grundlegenden soziotechnischen Strukturwandel. Denn maschinelle Lernverfahren wie Deep Learning benötigen eine große Menge Trainingsdaten, die nur über menschliche Mitarbeit gewonnen werden können. In einer Konvergenz von Methoden der Human-Computer-Interaction und der KI ist in den letzten zehn Jahren eine Fülle von Mensch-Maschine-Interfaces und medialen Infrastrukturen entstanden, durch die menschliche kognitive Ressourcen in hybride Mensch-Maschine-Apparate eingespannt werden. Diese Apparate vollbringen im Ganzen jene Leistung, die als (...) künstliche Intelligenz bezeichnet wird. KI in der damit vorliegenden Form ist somit ein distribuiertes, netzwerkförmiges Phänomen. (shrink)

Was hat der Staat mit sexueller Orientierung zu tun? Eine ganze Menge, meint Gundula Ludwig, denn durch staatliche Macht in Form von „heteronormativer Hegemonie“ würden wir zu Subjekten gemacht – und zwar ‚normalerweise‘ zu männlichen bzw. weiblichen und heterosexuellen. Dabei betont Ludwig die Gegenseitigkeit des Verhältnisses von Staat und Geschlecht: Nicht nur wirke staatliche Macht konstitutiv und vergeschlechtlichend auf Subjekte, sondern der Staat selbst werde im „Prozess der vergeschlechtlichen Subjektkonstitution erst hervorgebracht“. Deshalb seien weder der Staat noch Heterosexualität natürlich gegeben, (...) sondern ihre Konstruktion sei eine Regierungstechnologie, und nicht zu trennen vom ökonomischen (Neo-)Liberalismus. Mit ihrem Buch möchte die Autorin eine Leerstelle in der Forschung füllen: Einerseits sei die Staatstheorie geschlechtsblind, andererseits ließen queer-feministische Arbeiten zur Konstruktion von Geschlecht den Staat aus. Ludwig verspricht eine poststrukturalistisch antiessentialistische Theorie, die beides beobachten kann und so den Zusammenhang von Staat und Geschlecht erklärt. (shrink)