Are feelings an essential part or aspect of emotion? Cases of unconscious emotion suggest that this is not the case. However, it has been claimed that unconscious emotions are better understood as either (a) emotions that are phenomenally conscious but not reflectively conscious, or (b) dispositions to have emotions rather than emotions proper. Here, I argue that these ways of accounting for unconscious emotions are inadequate, and propose a view of emotions as non-phenomenal attitudes that regard their contents as relevant (...) to one's motivations. (shrink)

The metaphysics of gender and race is a growing area of concern in contemporary analytic metaphysics, with many different views about the nature of gender and race being submitted and discussed. But what are these debates about? What questions are these accounts trying to answer? And is there real disagreement between advocates of differ- ent views about race or gender? If so, what are they really disagreeing about? In this paper I want to develop a view about what the debates (...) in the metaphysics of gender and race are about, namely, a version of metaphysical deflationism, according to which these debates are about how we actually use or should use the terms ‘gender’ and ‘race’ (and other related terms), where moral and political considerations play a central role. I will also argue that my version of the view can overcome some recent and powerful objections to metaphysical deflationism of- fered by Elizabeth Barnes (2014, 2017). (shrink)

Most theories of slurs fall into one of two families: those which understand slurring terms to involve special descriptive/informational content (however conveyed), and those which understand them to encode special emotive/expressive content. Our view is that both offer essential insights, but that part of what sets slurs apart is use-theoretic content. In particular, we urge that slurring words belong at the intersection of a number of categories in a sociolinguistic register taxonomy, one that usually includes [+slang] and [+vulgar] and always (...) includes [-polite] and [+derogatory]. Thus, e.g., what distinguishes ‘Chinese’ from ‘chink’ is neither a peculiar sort of descriptive nor emotional content, but rather the fact that ‘chink’ is lexically marked as belonging to different registers than ‘Chinese’. It is, moreover, partly such facts which makes slurring ethically unacceptable. (shrink)

Testimonial injustices occur when individuals from particular social groups are systematically and persistently given less credibility in their claims merely because of their group identity. Recent “pluralistic” approaches to folk psychology, by taking into account the role of stereotypes in how we understand others, have the power to explain how and why cases of testimonial injustice occur. If how we make sense of others’ behavior depends on assumptions about how individuals from certain groups think and act, this can explain why (...) speakers are given different degrees of credibility depending on their group identity. For example, if people assume that women are more emotional than men, they will systematically give less credibility to women’s claims. This explanation involves three empirical claims: people assume that women are more emotional than men, people assume that emotionality hinders credibility, and people give less credibility to women’s claims. While extant studies provide some support for and, no study to date has directly tested. In two different studies, we tested all these three claims. The results from both studies provide support for, as we found significant negative correlations between emotionality and credibility attributions. However, in contrast to what some accounts of folk psychology posit, we did not find any significant difference in people’s attributions of emotionality and credibility towards women versus men speakers. We hope that our studies here pave the way for further empirical studies testing the phenomenon of testimonial injustice in a context-sensitive way, in order to have a better understanding of the conditions in which testimonial injustices are likely to happen. (shrink)

In his genetic phenomenology, Husserl introduces types, pre-predicative frames of experience that guide the perception and cognition of objects. In this essay, I argue that there are two types that are functionally almost identical to Kant’s schemata. To support this conclusion, I first present an interpretation of Kant’s discussion of schemata. I argue that we must see schemata as pure, a priori cognitions that involve only pure intuition, pure concepts of the understanding, and the imagination. I offer two analogies to (...) explain how schemata function to subsume objects under concepts and to anticipate possible objects of experience before moving on to discuss the schema of substance. Next, I present a brief explanation of Husserl’s genetic phenomenology, organizing my presentation around the idea of apperception. This paves the way for a demonstration of how the fundamental type is best understood as standing at the center of a cluster of concepts, including apperception, passive belief, natural bodies, and the one spatio-temporal horizon of experience. I argue that the fundamental type is central to Husserl’s attempt to ground logic in pre-predicative experience. Finally, I compare two specific types with schemata on the grounds cultivated in the previous sections. The first of these types, the fundamental type, functions to pre-predicatively anticipate objects of possible experience, just as schemata do. The second of these types, which is implied by but never discussed in Husserl’s work, serves to mediate between a formal system of rules and an intuitive grasp of the world, just as schemata do. (shrink)

In a recent paper in this journal, David Chalmers introduced the meta-problem of consciousness as “the problem of explaining why we think consciousness poses a hard problem” (Chalmers, 2018, p. 6). A solution to the meta-problem could shed light on the hard problem of consciousness. In particular, it would be relevant to elucidate whether people’s problem intuitions (i.e. intuitions holding that conscious experience cannot be reduced to physical processes) are driven by factors related to the nature of consciousness, or rather (...) by factors that are independent of consciousness. Whether people hold problem intuitions, and what factors drive those intuitions, are largely empirical questions. However, there is a lack of empirical research on these issues to date. The results of four studies will show that (1) problem intuitions are not widespread, and (2) when they arise, they do so because of factors that are unrelated to the nature of consciousness. This suggests that consciousness is, after all, not so problematic. (shrink)

What does it mean to say that some features, such as gender, race and sexual orientation, are socially constructed? Many scholars claim that social constructionism about a kind is a version of realism about that kind, according to which the corresponding kind is a social construction, that it, it is constituted by social factors and practices. Social constructionism, then, is a version of realism about a kind that asserts that the kind is real, and puts forward a particular view about (...) the nature of the kind, namely, that it is constituted by social factors and practices. Social constructivists about human kinds such as gender, race and sexual orientation often make an additional claim, namely, that these kinds are social constructions but they are typically believed to be biological kinds (that is, people are typically wrong about the nature of these kinds). Ron Mallon (2017) calls social constructions that are (falsely) taken to be biological kinds covert social constructions. This paper is about how we could have terms in our natural language that come to refer to covert social constructions. (shrink)

It is generally assumed that emotion concepts are purely descriptive. However, recent investigations suggest that the concept of happiness includes information about the morality of the agent's life. In this study, we argue that normative influences on emotion concepts are not restricted to happiness and are not about moral norms. In a series of studies, we show that emotion attribution is influenced by whether the agent's psychological and bodily states fit the situation in which they are experienced. People consider that (...) emotions are not just about feeling in certain ways, but also about feeling the right way. (shrink)

Can we experience emotion without the feeling of accelerated heartbeats, perspiration, or other changes in the body? In his paper “What is an emotion”, William James famously claimed that “if we fancy some strong emotion and then try to abstract from our consciousness of it all the feelings of its bodily symptoms, we find we have nothing left behind” (1884, p. 193). Thus, bodily changes are essential to emotion. This is known as the Subtraction Argument. The Subtraction Argument is still (...) used to support Embodied theories of emotion. Proponents of Disembodied theories, however, have different intuitions regarding the role of bodily changes in the experience of emotion. In order to advance this debate, I conducted a series of studies testing people’s intuitions regarding the Subtraction Argument. Results show that, against James’ claims, most people consider that their hypothetical (Study 1) and actual (Study 2) emotions persist in the absence of bodily feelings. Furthermore, Study 1 found that participants’ responses were not related to individual differences in reflection or interoceptive awareness. These results pose a problem for Embodied theories of emotion and challenge extant explanations for the persistence of emotional experience in cases of impaired interoception. (shrink)

It is often claimed that fear has an important epistemological function in making us aware of danger. Reactive theories challenge this view. According to them, fear is a response to real or apparent danger. In other words, real or apparent danger is the reason for which we experience fear. Thus, fear depends on awareness of danger instead of making us aware of danger. Proponents of the reactive theory have appealed to phenomenological and, most prominently, linguistic observations to support their views. (...) In particular, they argue that how we talk about the objects of fear supports the view that fear is a response (rather than a perception), and that how we talk about reasons for fear supports the view that reasons for fear are necessarily evaluative (about danger). Building on systematic linguistic observations in the form of corpus analyses and survey data, we argue that how we talk about the objects of fear and how we talk about reasons for fear do not support the reactive theory. Indeed, these linguistic considerations undermine the reactive theory. Most importantly, they suggest that there are non-evaluative reasons for fear. This is good news for rival theories, like perceptual theories, which hold that emotions have epistemic value in contributing to knowledge of evaluative properties such as danger. (shrink)

In emotion research, both conceptual analyses and empirical studies commonly rely on emotion reports. But what do people mean when they say that they are angry, afraid, joyful, etc.? Building on extant theories of emotion, this paper presents four new studies (including a pre-registered replication) measuring the weight of cognitive evaluations, bodily changes, and action tendencies in people’s use of emotion concepts. The results of these studies suggest that the presence or absence of cognitive evaluations has the largest impact on (...) people’s emotion attributions, and that bodily changes and action tendencies are considered to depend on cognitive evaluations. Implications for theories of emotion (concepts) and the interpretation of emotion reports are discussed. (shrink)

Emergency situations require individuals to make important changes in their behavior. In the case of the COVID-19 pandemic, official recommendations to avoid the spread of the virus include costly behaviors such as self-quarantining or drastically diminishing social contacts. Compliance (or lack thereof) with these recommendations is a controversial and divisive topic, and lay hypotheses abound regarding what underlies this divide. This paper investigates which cognitive, moral, and emotional traits separate people who comply with official recommendations from those who don't. In (...) four studies (three pre-registered) on both U.S. and French samples, we found that individuals' self-reported compliance with official recommendations during the COVID-19 pandemic was partly driven by individual differences in moral values, disgust sensitivity, and psychological reactance. We discuss the limitations of our studies and suggest possible applications in the context of health communication. (shrink)

Husserl’s theory of types is most often associated with his account of perception. Here, types operate as pre-predicative frames of experience that guide the perception of objects. In this paper, I will argue that Husserl’s theory of types is also central to his account of intersubjectivity. More specifically, I will show that a foundational kind of typical subjectivity is entailed by his discussion of the sphere of ownness. It is by way of this type that even a solitary subject can (...) tacitly anticipate the possibility of other subjects. It is also this type that is enriched through interactions between actual subjects. (shrink)

Although Husserlian phenomenology appears to require that practitioners bracket all metaphysical questions and claims, this requirement runs against the evidence of experience in which objects themselves are presented as constituents of experience. Moreover, to completely bracket metaphysical considerations would suggest that phenomenology is compatible with metaphysical views it should in principle deny. Nonetheless, permitting metaphysical claims threatens to contravene the critical limits of phenomenology, to invite claims that would require a perspective different in kind than our own to verify. These (...) tensions raise an important question, namely, what are the metaphysical implications of the phenomenologically intuitive claim that objects themselves are constituents of experience? To answer this question, I draw on a broad swath of thought on transcendental idealism and phenomenology. I argue that a modest metaphysics of appearance is warranted within the critical limits of Husserlian phenomenology. Through discussing and addressing the problems that typically plague transcendental arguments, I show that Husserlian phenomenology permits stronger claims about objects of experience than deflationary accounts allow but does not permit claims about intrinsic properties allowed by some forms of transcendental idealism. (shrink)

El presente artículo tiene como objeto llevar a cabo un estudio pragmático y analítico sobre la acción de valoración, el valor y los valores a la luz de la ciencia semiótica y de la ciencia cibernética. Por ello, se desarrollará un proceso axiológico que ilustre cómo sucede el ingreso, la transición y la salida de códigos morales en función de un esquema cognitivo. Así pues, el proceso axiológico se postula, primero, en fundamento de tres sistemas: de mentalidad, de valores y (...) de biomoralidad y, segundo, conforme a la teoría de la información y de la teoría general de sistemas. (shrink)

El presente artículo tiene como propósito criticar y reformular la teoría de valores del autor y filósofo argentino Risieri Frondizi. Para ello, se someterán a falsacionismo las tesis según las cuales la cualidad estructural es, primero, estructuralista y no analítica y, segundo, empírica, de acuerdo con la metodología holista de la ciencia. La crítica, así, se desarrollará a partir de los siguientes interrogantes. Inicialmente, ¿el autor acude al holismo o al reduccionismo como enfoques metodológicos de desarrollo? Finalmente, ¿cuál es la (...) distinción lógica entre el valor como cualidad sui géneris y el valor como cualidad estructural? (shrink)

One of the best-known aspects of José Carlos Mariátegui’s philosophy is his concept of a revolutionary myth. What does this revolutionary myth entail, how and why did Mariátegui develop this idea? The following article situates Mariátegui’s thought in both the historical and intellectual context of the 1920’s in order to answer these questions. This is relevant because Mariátegui’s philosophy and his revolutionary myth have influenced several Latin American revolutionaries such as Ernesto Che Guevara and Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path). Mariátegui’s ideas (...) have thus changed the lives and history of Latin Americans and it is important that we neither demonize nor idolize Mariátegui’s intellectual work without first attempting to understand it. (shrink)

Human emotional expressions can communicate the emotional state of the expresser, but they can also communicate appeals to perceivers. For example, sadness expressions such as crying request perceivers to aid and support, and anger expressions such as shouting urge perceivers to back off. Some contemporary artificial intelligence (AI) systems can mimic human emotional expressions in a (more or less) realistic way, and they are progressively being integrated into our daily lives. How should we respond to them? Do we have reasons (...) to reply to the appeals made by AI emotional expressions? In this paper, we examine the conditions under which AI emotional expressions could give us prudential or even moral reasons to change our behavior. We argue that these conditions do not depend on whether the emotional expression is genuine or not, but rather on the presence of features some of which can be implemented in emotive AI given our current level of technological development. We extract recommendations and warnings for the development of emotive AI. (shrink)

Are emotions bodily feelings or evaluative cognitions? What is happiness, pain, or “being moved”? Are there basic emotions? In this chapter, I review extant empirical work concerning these and related questions in the philosophy of emotion. This will include both (1) studies investigating people’s emotional experiences and (2) studies investigating people’s use of emotion concepts in hypothetical cases. Overall, this review will show the potential of using empirical research methods to inform philosophical questions regarding emotion.

This chapter analyses the prospects of using neuroimaging methods, in particular functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), for philosophical purposes. To do so, it will use two case studies from the field of emotion research: Greene et al. (2001) used fMRI to uncover the mental processes underlying moral intuitions, while Lindquist et al. (2012) used fMRI to inform the debate around the nature of a specific mental process, namely, emotion. These studies illustrate two main approaches in cognitive neuroscience: Reverse inference and (...) ontology testing, respectively. With regards to Greene et al.’s study, the use of Neurosynth (Yarkoni 2011) will show that the available formulations of reverse inference, although viable a priori, seem to be of limited use in practice. On the other hand, the discussion of Lindquist et al.’s study will present the so far neglected potential of ontology-testing approaches to inform philosophical questions. (shrink)

The general aim of this article is to carry out a reconstruction of the theory of Population Dynamics (DP) in Ecology, according to Castle’s (2001) general stance with regard to the semantic view of theories, but doing it within the framework of metatheoretical structuralism. Thus, we will first identify Population Dynamics’ basic theory-element: its core K(DP) – with the class of potential models, the class of models (through the identification of its fundamental law) and the class of partial potential models (...) (though leaving aside the identification of its constraints and its intertheoretical links) –, and its domain of intended applications I(DP). Then, we will establish the general guiding lines of its theory-net, developing in some detail one of its main lines of specialization – namely, that related to the so-called “continuous growing” of the considered populations –, with DP’s principal “models”, and leave developing of the other of its main lines of specialization – namely, that related to the so-called “discrete growing” of the considered populations – for a further publication. (shrink)

Do moral beliefs motivate action? To answer this question, extant arguments have considered hypothetical cases of association (dissociation) between agents’ moral beliefs and actions. In this paper, I argue that this approach can be improved by studying people’s actual moral beliefs and actions using empirical research methods. I present three new studies showing that, when the stakes are high, associations between participants’ moral beliefs and actions are actually explained by co-occurring but independent moral emotions. These findings suggest that moral beliefs (...) themselves have little or no motivational force, supporting the Humean picture of moral motivation. (shrink)

El objetivo principal del artículo es hacer notar la dimensión jurídico-normativa del problema del aborto, considerando que acentuar excesivamente su dimensión ético-moral conduce a una estéril contraposición que impide una discusión serena del abortoy de su dimensión irremediablemente pública. En este sentido, aún reconociéndole su perspectiva moral, en el artículo se plantea la posibilidad de pensar el aborto como una conducta que pueda reconducirse a un modelo de regulación jurídica “blando”, dondela perspectiva moral del legislador no adquiera las características de (...) una moral común, igual para todos ,y que,por el contrario,mediante la modalidad jurídica del permiso, cada individuo ponga en acto su propia convicción moral. De ahí puede surgir una legislación en la que el aborto no sea objeto ni de un deber jurídico ni de una prohibición: abortaro no abortar, en este modelo de regulación jurídica, son decisiones que los individuos toman con base en sus propias convicciones. (shrink)

A recent quarrel over faultless disagreements assumes that disputes over evaluative sentences should be understood as regular, factual disagreements. Instead, I propose that evaluative disagreements should be understood in Lewisian terms. Language use works like a rule-governed game. In it, the assertion of an evaluative sentence is an attempt to establish one value as default in the conversation; its rejection, in turn, is in most cases the refusal to accept this move.

Evaluative judgments imply positive or negative regard. But there are different ways in which something can be positive or negative. How do we tell them apart? According to Evaluative Sentimentalism, different evaluations (e.g., dangerousness vs. offensiveness) are grounded on different emotions (e.g., fear vs. anger). If this is the case, evaluation differentiation requires emotional awareness. Here, we test this hypothesis by looking at alexithymia, a deficit in emotional awareness consisting of problems identifying, describing, and thinking about emotions. The results of (...) Study 1 suggest that high alexithymia is not only related to problems distinguishing emotions, but also to problems distinguishing evaluations. Study 2 replicated this latter effect after controlling for individual differences in attentional impulsiveness and reflective reasoning, and found that reasoning makes an independent contribution to evaluation differentiation. These results suggest that emotional sensibilities play an irreducible role in evaluative judgment while affording a role for reasoning. (shrink)

ESPAÑOL: Traducción de segmentos de los capítulos 1 y 6 del libro de Evan Wolson’s Why Marriage Matters: America, Equality, and Gay People’s Right to Marry. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004). ENGLISH: Translation (English to Spanish) of segments from chapters 1 and 6 of Evan Wolfson’s Why Marriage Matters: America, Equality, and Gay People’s Right to Marry. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004).

You and I are going to die. We are aware that it is going to happen, but not exactly when—in which there is relief, but also anxiety. What happens to us when we know with some precision what our last day will be? In this text, we discern the process of our own death, once we have reliable information about the approximate moment of the cessation of our life. Tú y yo vamos a morir. Estamos al tanto de que va (...) a ocurrir, pero no exactamente cuándo —en lo cual hay alivio, pero también angustia—. ¿Qué nos ocurre al saber con cierta precisión cuál será nuestro último día? En este texto, discernimos el proceso de nuestra propia muerte, una vez que tenemos información confiable sobre el momento aproximado del cese de nuestra vida. (shrink)

En su trabajo acerca del debate Putnam-Rorty, Luis Robledo supone una concepción reduccionista de la justificación en Rorty, y defiende contra ella la indepen-dencia entre justificación y consenso, a través del argumento de la posibilidad de un consenso sin justificación. A su juicio, el no sostener una independencia tal conduciría a problemas desfavorables para el pragmatismo. En este trabajo buscaré presentar una interpretación alternativa y no reduccionista de la justificación rortiana, que aún sin reconocer una total independencia entre ambas instancias, (...) no sólo evita estos proble-mas, sino que además muestra que es poco pragmático el ejemplo proporcionado por Robledo en su argumentación. (shrink)

El propósito central del presente artículo, es formular un enfoque sistémico-jurídico para el análisis de los sistemas sociales. Para esto, se proponen tres tipologías de consensos denominados límites del sistema social: consenso normal, consenso normativo y consenso legítimo. La función de estas tipologías es, primero elaborar una explicación sobre la constitucionalización y democratización del poder político, con base en la regla de reconocimiento y la norma fundamental de un Estado; segundo postular dos metodologías normativas, un registro positivo y una demarcación (...) positiva, que desplieguen, tanto sobre las conductas sociales como sobre la estructura del sistema social, un proceso de legalidad emergente, cuya función sea, tercero regular, realimentar y optimizar el funcionamiento de la constitución política. Finalmente, se analizan los conceptos de completitud y de legitimidad del sistema normativo, con el fin de definir el alcance institucional que debe poseer un sistema jurídico sobre los subsistemas culturales del sistema social. (shrink)

Subtractive schooling is a type of pedagogy that subtracts from the student aspects of her identity in order to assimilate and reshape her identity to fit the American mainstream. Here, I question the value of assimilation as it takes place in our public school systems. Currently, immigrant children are often made to feel inadequate for being culturally different. This is detrimental to their development as students given that at their young age they do not yet have the emotional maturity to (...) know that their experience, language and culture are legitimate and valuable. My goal is to shift the focus of subtractive schooling to one that fosters the growth of students through recognition. I suggest that John Dewey’s and Paulo Freire’s pedagogy of recognition is a helpful approach to this problem. Both Dewey and Freire’s pedagogy emphasize recognition as central to their pedagogy. (shrink)

La teoría de los hacedores de verdad, como la vieja teoría correspondentista, intenta comprender la relación que, ligando proposiciones y hechos, resulta en la verdad (o falsedad) de las primeras. Esta teoría presenta una versión débil, que da cuenta de dicha relación en términos de la noción de implicación, y una fuerte, fundada en la relación de "ser verdadero en virtud de". La diferencia fundamental entre ambas es la adhesión y el rechazo, respectivamente, del Principio de Implicación, según el cual (...) dos proposiciones ligadas por implicación serán hechas verdaderas por el mismo hecho. El presente trabajo muestra cómo esta adhesión conduce a las versiones débiles al colapso, por lo cual sólo las versiones fuertes tienen oportunidades de prosperar. (shrink)

Nuestro lenguaje no solo describe el mundo que nos rodea: muchas expresiones que usamos habitualmente (desde predicados de gusto a expresiones como “interesante” o “divertido”) tienen por función valorar los objetos que constituyen nuestro entorno. Las oraciones que las contienen son sensibles a la evaluación: su valor de verdad depende del estándar evaluativo saliente en contexto y su emisión puede dar lugar a desacuerdos duros. El presente trabajo examina la ex- tensión de esta categoría a oraciones con predicados y verbos (...) normativos (éticos, epistémicos, procedimen- tales y deontológicos). Se presta especial atención a la posibilidad de estas oraciones de generar desacuerdos duros, en el marco de una teoría que comprende a las aserciones como adquisición de compromisos discur- sivos y prácticos. (shrink)

La teorı́a literaria contemporánea plantea desafı́os complejos para el estudio del lenguaje en su generalidad, sobre todo al tener en cuenta su función referencial, significado y la formulación del conocimiento en un paradigma de mediación. Las premisas de un lenguaje retórico parecen llevar a la teorı́a al más profundo de los pesimismos, poniendo en duda su finalidad y orientación crı́tica. El presente trabajo se propone investigar el carácter del significado y la función referencial a partir de la teorı́a tropológica de (...) Paul de Man, cometido que tiene tras de sı́ la necesidad de fundamentar una teorı́a literaria optimista en el encuentro entre figuración y conocimiento. Por medio de una atenta lectura de la retórica de Paul de Man, el trabajo presenta una solución tentativa al problema del conocimiento en el lenguaje retórico mediante una visión que entraña la inseparabilidad entre contenido y forma. De esa manera, la teorı́a literaria quedarı́a a salvo de ser una corriente contraria a la posibilidad de conocimiento sin traicionar sus propios postulados, como también la  forma  pasarı́a a ser parte del campo de estudio de la epistemologı́a. (shrink)

Las descripciones definidas pueden ser interpretadas de acuerdo con las dos lecturas propuestas por Donnellan. El presente trabajo presenta una interpretación contextualista de la lectura referencial de estas expresiones.

Las oraciones con predicados evaluativos son sensibles a la valoración realizada según un parámetro evaluativo contextual. Dos teorías han proporcionado explicaciones para este tipo de sensibilidad: el contextualismo y el relativismo de apreciación. En este trabajo presentaré una tercera opción que logra lo mismo que estas de una manera más sencilla. La teoría se centrará en dos pilares: una reconsideración del contenido expresado por las oraciones con predicados de gusto que parte de la articulación del parámetro evaluativo como una función (...) diádica, y los compromisos que la aserción de este tipo de oraciones impone sobre los hablantes y sobre el auditorio. Con ambas herramientas se logrará una teoría que podrá dar cuenta de acuerdos, desacuerdos y usos ecóicos de las oraciones evaluativas sin apelar a contextos de apreciación suplementarios a la teoría semántica estándar o a presupuestos de comunidad de los parámetros evaluativos. Sentences with evaluative predicates are sensitive to the valuation carried on under an evaluative parameter in the context. Two theories have provided an account for this kind of context-sensitivity: contextualism and assessment relativism. In this paper I will present a third alternative that achieves the same results in a simpler way. This theory is based on two main ideas: understanding the content expressed on the basis of an articulation of the evaluative parameter as a dyadic function, and the practical and linguistic commitments that the assertion of these sentences imposes over speakers and hearers. Both tools will result in a theory that can manage agreements, disagreements and echoic uses of evaluative sentences without the need to supplement the standard semantic theory with contexts of assessment or with presuppositions of commonality of the evaluative standard. (shrink)

Se aplicó el asistente de prueba Tree Proof Generator (TPG) para determinar la corrección lógica de la primera vía tomista sobre la existencia de Dios, así como la corrección de algunas relaciones conceptuales en metafísica modal (necesidad y posibilidad), en epistemología (conocimiento) y en la formulación estructural del árbol de Porfirio. La investigación procura no solo abordar las tesis en cuestión desde el punto de vista computacional, sino que ofrece un marco reflexivo sobre tres condiciones necesarias para una filosofía asistida (...) por computadora; en tal sentido, la investigación se compromete con la idea de que la filosofía es análisis conceptual y argumentación, que pensar filosóficamente no supone un privilegio epistémico o cognitivo y que se requiere de un lenguaje formalmente especificable para ‘hacer’ filosofía. (shrink)

El conflicto armado colombiano, uno de los más largos del mundo, requiere un enfoque especial para estrategias de justicia transicional. Las prácticas institucionalizan costumbres. Enfocarlo desde una perspectiva que, junto a las acciones legislativas y judiciales, dé el lugar a acciones político-educativas y ético-culturales, es clave. Reconocimiento y Legitimidad son complementarias. Con Carlos S. Nino, vemos el Derecho como acción colectiva en el tiempo. Palabras clave: Legitimidad – Ciudadanía – Compromiso – Reconocimiento –Postconflicto - Justicia transicional. Abstract: Colombia's armed conflict, (...) one of the longest in the world, requires a special approach to transitional justice strategies. Institutionalized practices customs. Approach it from a perspective that, with the legislative and judicial actions, give rise to political-educational and ethical-cultural actions is key. Recognition and legitimacy are complementary. With Carlos S. Nino, we see the law as a collective action in time. (shrink)

El pensamiento kantiano y en su interior, el concepto de crítica; comprenden un capítulo de la Historia de la Filosofía considerado asidero y objeto constante de recapitulaciones. Kant advierte que el conocimiento filosófico ha llegado a un estado de crisis, y más allá aún, despoja la metafísica de las ataduras arcaicas que la esgrimían al comienzo de la época moderna. Pone al descubierto la necesidad indiscutible de una revolución teórica, que aunque no cumplió su cometido cabalmente, al permanecer en una (...) perspectiva abstracta, contiene méritos de valor en el camino a la subversión de la filosofía. Sería oportuno traer a colación, una serie de argumentos que definen este pensamiento y exponen en su sencillez la esencia de su discurso. (shrink)

Pensamiento Crítico y las Ciencias Sociales: Una mirada desde la arqueología foucaultiana, es una indagación, que propone un acercamiento historiográfico a la revista, diferente del que tradicionalmente se ha practicado. Dicha investigación, al tiempo que repasa el estado de las Ciencias Sociales en la década del 60 (sus altos y bajos), introduce la arqueología (como un método de la investigación histórica) desde el cual es posible analizar la producción científico-social de la revista Pensamiento Crítico, y que describe nuevas aristas y (...) enfoques no referidos antes por sus biógrafos. (shrink)

The relation between slurs and their neutral counterparts has been put into question recently by the fact that some slurs can be used to refer to subsets of the referential classes determined by their associated counterparts. This paper aims to reinforce this relation by offering a way of explaining referential restriction that distinguishes between two kinds of slurs: those performing a normalizing role upon (some) individuals inside a class (mostly, a gender) and those used to derogate a marginalized out- group.

Kim Diaz's translation of Guillermo Hurtado's "Retratos de Luis Villoro".

Una de las críticas dirigidas a la teoría contrafáctica de la causación es el problema de la necesidad, según el cual la relación de dependencia contrafáctica entre causa y efecto no es necesaria para la existencia de relaciones causales. Este problema es, empero, fácilmente resoluble por la estrategia de fijación desarrollada por Yablo. En uno de sus escritos sobre el tema, Carolina Sartorio menciona un segundo problema, el problema de la suficiencia de dicha relación, que se instancia en casos de (...) causación que involucran eventos negativos. En el trabajo pretendo mostrar que, dado el modo en que Sartorio plantea estos casos, la teoría contrafáctica puede evadirse del problema apelando a la estrategia de fijación siempre que adopte, para ello, un reduccionismo moderado que no contradiga las intuiciones principales de la autora y un criterio mixto para la individuación de eventos, que combine tanto un criterio causal como un criterio regional. (shrink)

This work seeks to answer the question of whether the Internet is epistemically secure. The problem is approached from a double path (i) analytical (a priori, logical-philosophical) and (ii) empirical. For the first, the treatment is based on the logic of justification; while the second, in a survey in which respondents answer on the use and assessment of the information offered by the internet. The argument presented is as follows: If epistemic security requires the exercise or implementation of epistemic virtues (...) and those practices by the user are weak, then the Internet is not epistemically secure. Based on the established results, it is concluded that the internet is not epistemic safe and some risks that this entails are discussed. (shrink)

Altruism and solidarity are concepts that are closely related to organ donation for transplantation. On the one hand, they are typically used for encouraging people to donate. On the other hand, they also underpin the regulations in force in each country to different extents. They are often used indistinctly and equivocally, despite the different ethical implications of each concept. This paper aims to clarify to what extent we can speak of altruism and solidarity in the predominant models of organ donation. (...) It also raises the ethical question of whether these categories are adequate as a basis for such models, bearing in mind that organs are a scarce resource and that a shortage of them may mean that fewer lives are saved or improved. (shrink)

Evaluative sentences (moral judgments, expressions of taste, epistemic modals) are relative to the speaker's standards. Lately, a phenomenon has challenged the traditional explanation of this relativity: whenever two speakers disagree over them they contradict each other without being at fault. Hence, it is thought that the correction of the assertions involved must be relative to an unprivileged standard not necessarily the speaker's. I will claim instead that so far, neither this nor any other proposal has provided an explanation of the (...) phenomenon. I will point out several problems presented by them and I will hint to how this phenomenon could be explained by making minor adjustments to our semantic theory. Sentenças avaliativas (julgamentos morais, expressões de gosto, modos epistêmicos) são relativas aos padrões do falante. Recentemente, um fenômeno desafiou a explicação tradicional dessa relatividade: sempre que dois falantes discordam entre si, eles contradizem um ao outro sem estarem errados. Por isso, pensa-se que a correção das asserções envolvidas deve ser relacionada a um padrão desprovido de privilégio e não necessariamente ao padrão do falante. Eu sustentarei, ao contrário, que até agora nem esta nem alguma outra proposta forneceu uma explicação do fenômeno. Eu assinalarei diversos problemas apresentados por essas propostas e sugerirei o modo como este fenômeno poderia ser explicado ao fazer pequenos ajustes em nossa teoria semântica. (shrink)

Why would we argue about taste, norms or morality when we know that these topics are relative to taste preferences, systems of norms or values to which we are committed? Yet, disagreements over these topics are common in our evaluative discourses. I will claim that the motives to discuss rely on our attitudes towards the standard held by the speakers in each domain of discourse, relating different attitudes to different motives –mainly, conviction and correction. These notions of attitudes and motives (...) will allow me to claim that different domains of evaluative discourse have a different distribution of disagreements driven by them. (shrink)

In order for students to succeed, especially in times of crisis like the Covid 19 Pandemic, they must be trained to be self-sufficient in their language studies. This research investigates using a self-access language learning strategy in an emergency virtual reading class during the covid 19 pandemics to improve language learners' Autonomy. It employed a descriptive correlational research design. The study involved 89 randomly selected language students in one University of Peru. Results of the study showed that the students can (...) utilize internet as their learning resource using devices they have. This shows that all of the students have devices to be used for their online and blended language learning. It is interesting to note the all the sampled students have access to internet for their online language learning. Hence the students have a motivated level of learning Autonomy in reading classes. As to the assessment of internet self-access reading skills of the students. This shows that the students have a favorable attitude towards using the internet in their reading lessons. It shows that the students have a fair level of technology acceptance and utilization for their language learning. Self-Access Skills in Reading was shown to be closely linked to Students' Learning Autonomy. This suggests that the relevant factors in the research have a positive correlation. This means that the students are more likely to adopt online self-access reading skills if they have a good attitude about learning Autonomy. This result shed light on the gap in addressing students' online language learning engagement in the COVID 19 era, particularly in the context of Peru. (shrink)

In this study, we examine the philosophical bases of one of the leading clinical psychological methods of therapy for anxiety, anger, and depression, Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT). We trace this method back to its philosophical roots in the Stoic, Buddhist, Taoist, and Existentialist philosophical traditions. We start by discussing the tenets of CBT, and then we expand on the philosophical traditions that ground this approach. Given that CBT has had a clinically measured positive effect on the psychological well-being of individuals, (...) it becomes important to study the philosophical foundations on which this therapy is based. (shrink)

La conmoción causada por el término hermenéutica como disciplina, ha abierto una nueva escala de problemáticas en el análisis lingüístico. Sin embargo, la posibilidad de su comprensión se encuentra orientada a las claves de la fenomenología. Este es el pretexto sobre el que Heidegger, Gadamer y Ricoeur asumen un conjunto de disposiciones que orientan a la posibilidad de una hermenéutica fenomenológica. La tarea que subyace conlleva a analizar cuáles son las condiciones de posibilidad de esta hermenéutica fenomenológica de responsabilidad lingüística (...) y epistemológica que deriva en una ontología de la facticidad. (shrink)