Results for 'Moral Intuitionism'

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  1. Moral Intuitionism and Disagreement.Brian Besong - 2014 - Synthese 191 (12):2767-2789.
    According to moral intuitionism, at least some moral seeming states are justification-conferring. The primary defense of this view currently comes from advocates of the standard account, who take the justification-conferring power of a moral seeming to be determined by its phenomenological credentials alone. However, the standard account is vulnerable to a problem. In brief, the standard account implies that moral knowledge is seriously undermined by those commonplace moral disagreements in which both agents have equally (...)
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  2. Moral Knowledge, Epistemic Externalism, and Intuitionism.Daniel Star - 2008 - Ratio 21 (3):329-343.
    This paper explores the generally overlooked relevance of an important contemporary debate in mainstream epistemology to philosophers working within ethics on questions concerning moral knowledge. It is argued that this debate, between internalists and externalists about the accessibility of epistemic justification, has the potential to be both significantly influenced by, and have a significant impact upon, the study of moral knowledge. The moral sphere provides a particular type of strong evidence in favour of externalism, and mainstream epistemologists (...)
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  3. Explaining historical moral convergence: the empirical case against realist intuitionism.Jeroen Hopster - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (5):1255-1273.
    Over the course of human history there appears to have been a global shift in moral values towards a broadly ‘liberal’ orientation. Huemer argues that this shift better accords with a realist than an antirealist metaethics: it is best explained by the discovery of mind-independent truths through intuition. In this article I argue, contra Huemer, that the historical data are better explained assuming the truth of moral antirealism. Realism does not fit the data as well as Huemer suggests, (...)
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  4. Ethical Intuitionism and the Linguistic Analogy.Philipp Schwind - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (2):292-311.
    It is a central tenet of ethical intuitionism as defended by W. D. Ross and others that moral theory should reflect the convictions of mature moral agents. Hence, intuitionism is plausible to the extent that it corresponds to our well-considered moral judgments. After arguing for this claim, I discuss whether intuitionists offer an empirically adequate account of our moral obligations. I do this by applying recent empirical research by John Mikhail that is based on (...)
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  5. Revisionary Intuitionism.Michael Huemer - 2008 - Social Philosophy and Policy 25 (1):368-392.
    I argue that, given evidence of the factors that tend to distort our intuitions, ethical intuitionists should disown a wide range of common moral intuitions, and that they should typically give preference to abstract, formal intuitions over more substantive ethical intuitions. In place of the common sense morality with which intuitionism has traditionally allied, the suggested approach may lead to a highly revisionary normative ethics.
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  6. Moral Knowledge Without Justification? A Critical Discussion of Intuitionist Moral Epistemology.Philipp Schwind - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Miami
    In this dissertation I discuss the epistemology of ethical intuitionism, in particular the claim that mature moral agents possess self-evident moral knowledge. Traditional intuitionists such as W.D. Ross have claimed that by reflection, we can acquire knowledge of our basic moral duties such as the duty of veracity or benevolence. Recent defenders of intuitionism such as Robert Audi have further developed this theory and argued that adequate understanding can be sufficient for moral knowledge. I (...)
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  7. An Intuitionist Response to Moral Scepticism: A Critique of Mackie's Scepticism, and an Alternative Proposal Combining Ross's Intuitionism with a Kantian Epistemology.Simon John Duffy - 2001 - Dissertation, University of Edinburgh
    This thesis sets out an argument in defence of moral objectivism. It takes Mackie as the critic of objectivism and it ends by proposing that the best defence of objectivism may be found in what I shall call Kantian intuitionism, which brings together elements of the intuitionism of Ross and a Kantian epistemology. The argument is fundamentally transcendental in form and it proceeds by first setting out what we intuitively believe, rejecting the sceptical attacks on those beliefs, (...)
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  8. Are Intuitions About Moral Relevance Susceptible to Framing Effects?James Andow - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (1):115-141.
    Various studies have reported that moral intuitions about the permissibility of acts are subject to framing effects. This paper reports the results of a series of experiments which further examine the susceptibility of moral intuitions to framing effects. The main aim was to test recent speculation that intuitions about the moral relevance of certain properties of cases might be relatively resistent to framing effects. If correct, this would provide a certain type of moral intuitionist with the (...)
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  9. Cooperative Intuitionism.Stephen Ingram - 2020 - The Philosophical Quarterly 70 (281):780-799.
    According to pluralistic intuitionist theories, some of our moral beliefs are non-inferentially justified, and these beliefs come in both an a priori and an a posteriori variety. In this paper I present new support for this pluralistic form of intuitionism by examining the deeply social nature of moral inquiry. This is something that intuitionists have tended to neglect. It does play an important role in an intuitionist theory offered by Bengson, Cuneo, and Shafer-Landau (forth), but whilst they (...)
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  10. As Boys Pursue the Rainbow. Whewell’s Independent Morality Vs. Sidgwick’s Dogmatic Intuitionism.Sergio Volodia Marcello Cremaschi - 2011 - In Placido Bucolo, Roger Crisp & Bart Schultz (eds.), Proceedings of the Second World Congress on Henry Sidgwick. Ethics, Psychics, Politics. Catania, Italy: CUECM. pp. 146-235.
    I discuss Whewell’s philosophy of morality, as opposed to systematic morality, not unlike Kant’s distinction between a pure and an empirical moral philosophy. Whewell worked out a systematization of traditional normative ethics as a first step before its rational justification; he believed that the point in the philosophy of morality is justifying a few rational truths about the structure of morality such as to rule hedonism, eudemonism, and consequentialism; yet a system of positive morality cannot be derived solely from (...)
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  11. Psihologia morala si natura judecarii morale. O examinare critica a modelului social intuitionist.Emilian Mihailov - 2015 - In Bogdan Olaru & Andrei Holman (eds.), Contributii la psihologia morala: evaluari ale rezultatelor si noi cercetari empirice. Pro Universitaria. pp. 61-74.
    În acest studiu, îmi propun să arăt că modelul social intuiţionist al judecăţii morale propus de Haidt este la rândul său prea restrictiv faţă de influenţa raţionării morale, poate tot aşa cum modelul raţionalist subestima influenţa emoţiilor morale. Mai întâi, voi prezenta modelul raţionalist despre natura judecăţii morale şi voi evidenţia rezultatele empirice care au contribuit la erodarea sa. Apoi, voi prezenta şi critica modelul social intuiţionist revigorat de revoluţia „afectivă” din psihologia morală, argumentând că rezultatele din psihologia experimentală, neuroştiinţă (...)
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  12.  77
    Review of Ethical Intuitionism: Re-Evaluations. [REVIEW]Pekka Väyrynen - 2006 - European Journal of Philosophy 14 (1):159-63.
    This piece is a short review of a volume of papers on ethical intuitionism (Ethical Intuitionism: Re-evaluations, ed. Philip Stratton-Lake, Oxford University Press, 2002).
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  13. Does Disgust Influence Moral Judgment?Joshua May - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (1):125-141.
    Recent empirical research seems to show that emotions play a substantial role in moral judgment. Perhaps the most important line of support for this claim focuses on disgust. A number of philosophers and scientists argue that there is adequate evidence showing that disgust significantly influences various moral judgments. And this has been used to support or undermine a range of philosophical theories, such as sentimentalism and deontology. I argue that the existing evidence does not support such arguments. At (...)
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  14. Do Framing Effects Make Moral Intuitions Unreliable?Joanna Demaree-Cotton - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (1):1-22.
    I address Sinnott-Armstrong's argument that evidence of framing effects in moral psychology shows that moral intuitions are unreliable and therefore not noninferentially justified. I begin by discussing what it is to be epistemically unreliable and clarify how framing effects render moral intuitions unreliable. This analysis calls for a modification of Sinnott-Armstrong's argument if it is to remain valid. In particular, he must claim that framing is sufficiently likely to determine the content of moral intuitions. I then (...)
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  15. The Mystery of Moral Perception.Daniel Crow - 2016 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (2):187-210.
    _ Source: _Page Count 24 Accounts of non-naturalist moral perception have been advertised as an empiricist-friendly epistemological alternative to moral rationalism. I argue that these accounts of moral perception conceal a core commitment of rationalism—to substantive a priori justification—and embody its most objectionable feature—namely, “mysteriousness.” Thus, accounts of non-naturalist moral perception do not amount to an interesting alternative to moral rationalism.
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  16. Moral Perception, Inference, and Intuition.Daniel Wodak - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (6):1495-1512.
    Sarah McGrath argues that moral perception has an advantage over its rivals in its ability to explain ordinary moral knowledge. I disagree. After clarifying what the moral perceptualist is and is not committed to, I argue that rival views are both more numerous and more plausible than McGrath suggests: specifically, I argue that inferentialism can be defended against McGrath’s objections; if her arguments against inferentialism succeed, we should accept a different rival that she neglects, intuitionism; and, (...)
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  17. C.D. Broad on Moral Sense Theories in Ethics.Robert Cowan - 2015 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Virtual Issue: Methods of Ethics (3):168-183.
    C.D. Broad’s Reflections stands out as one of the few serious examinations of Moral Sense Theory in twentieth century analytic philosophy. It also constitutes an excellent discussion of the interconnections that allegedly exist between questions concerning what Broad calls the ‘logical analysis’ of moral judgments and questions about their epistemology. In this paper I make three points concerning the interconnectedness of the analytical and epistemological elements of versions of Moral Sense Theory. First, I make a general point (...)
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  18. Difficult Cases and the Epistemic Justification of Moral Belief.Joshua Schechter - 2017 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 12.
    This paper concerns the epistemology of difficult moral cases where the difficulty is not traceable to ignorance about non-moral matters. The paper first argues for a principle concerning the epistemic status of moral beliefs about difficult moral cases. The basic idea behind the principle is that one’s belief about the moral status of a potential action in a difficult moral case is not justified unless one has some appreciation of what the relevant moral (...)
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  19. Henry Sidgwick's Moral Epistemology.Anthony Skelton - 2010 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 48 (4):491-519.
    In this essay I defend the view that Henry Sidgwick’s moral epistemology is a form of intuitionist foundationalism that grants common-sense morality no evidentiary role. In §1, I outline both the problematic of The Methods of Ethics and the main elements of its argument for utilitarianism. In §§2-4 I provide my interpretation of Sidgwick’s moral epistemology. In §§ 5-8 I refute rival interpretations, including the Rawlsian view that Sidgwick endorses some version of reflective equilibrium and the view that (...)
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  20. Comment on David Kaspar's Intuitionism.Moti Mizrahi - 2015 - Reason Papers 37 (2):26-35.
    In his book Intuitionism, David Kaspar is after the truth. That is to say, on his view, “philosophy is the search for the whole truth” (p. 7). Intuitionism, then, “reflects that standpoint” (p. 7). My comments are meant to reflect the same standpoint. More explicitly, my aim in these comments is to evaluate the arguments for intuitionism, as I understand them from reading Kaspar’s book. In what follows, I focus on three arguments in particular, which can be (...)
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  21. The Prudent Conscience View.Brian Besong - 2014 - International Philosophical Quarterly 54 (2):127-141.
    Moral intuitionism, which claims that some moral seemings are justification-conferring, has become an increasingly popular account in moral epistemology. Defenses of the position have largely focused on the standard account, according to which the justification-conferring power of a moral seeming is determined by its phenomenal credentials alone. Unfortunately, the standard account is a less plausible version of moral intuitionism because it does not take etiology seriously. In this paper, I provide an outline and (...)
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  22. From the Nature of Persons to the Structure of Morality.Robert Noggle - 2001 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (4):531-565.
    Intuitionism—in some form or another—is the most widely recognized and thoroughly discussed method of justification for moral theories. It rests on the claim that a moral theory must not deviate too much from our pre-theoretical moral convictions. In some form or another, this methodology goes back at least as far as Aristotle, and has been discussed, refined, and defended by such contemporary philosophers as John Rawls and Norman Daniels.There is, however, another methodology for constructing and defending (...)
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  23.  87
    On Some Moral Implications of Linguistic Narrativism Theory.Natan Elgabsi & Bennett Gilbert - 2020 - De Ethica 6 (1):75-91.
    In this essay we consider the moral claims of one branch of non-realist theory known as linguistic narrativism theory. By highlighting the moral implications of linguistic narrativism theory, we argue that the “moral vision” expressed by this theory can entail, at worst, undesirable moral agnosticism if not related to a transcendental and supra-personal normativity in our moral life. With its appeal to volitionism and intuitionism, the ethical sensitivity of this theory enters into difficulties brought (...)
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  24. A Normative Approach to Moral Realism.Gerald Hull - manuscript
    The realist belief in robustly attitude-independent evaluative truths – more specifically, moral truths – is challenged by Sharon Street’s essay “A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value”. We know the content of human normative beliefs and attitudes has been profoundly influenced by a Darwinian natural selection process that favors adaptivity. But if simple adaptivity can explain the content of our evaluative beliefs, any connection they might have with abstract moral truth would seem to be purely coincidental. She (...)
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  25.  88
    Sidgwick’s Coherentist Moral Epistemology.Sergio Volodia Marcello Cremaschi - 2012 - The Scientific Annals of Andquot;Alexandru Ioan Cuza" University of Iasi (New Series). Philosophy 59:36-50.
    I discuss the ideas of common sense and common-sense morality in Sidgwick. I argue that, far from aiming at overcoming common-sense morality, Sidgwick aimed purposely at grounding a consist code of morality by methods allegedly taken from the natural sciences, in order to reach also in the domain of morality the same kind of “mature” knowledge as in the natural sciences. His whole polemics with intuitionism was vitiated by the apriori assumption that the widespread ethos of the educated part (...)
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  26. The Cambridge History of Moral Philosophy.Sacha Golob & Jens Timmermann (eds.) - 2017 - Cambridge University Press.
    With fifty-four chapters charting the development of moral philosophy in the Western world, this volume examines the key thinkers and texts and their influence on the history of moral thought from the pre-Socratics to the present day. Topics including Epicureanism, humanism, Jewish and Arabic thought, perfectionism, pragmatism, idealism and intuitionism are all explored, as are figures including Aristotle, Boethius, Spinoza, Hobbes, Hume, Kant, Hegel, Mill, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Sartre and Rawls, as well as numerous key ideas and schools (...)
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  27.  42
    The Difficulty of Understanding: Complexity and Simplicity in Moral Psychological Description.Camilla Kronqvist & Natan Elgabsi - 2021 - Scientia Moralitas 6 (2):78-103.
    The social intuitionist approach to moral judgments advanced by social psychologist Jonathan Haidt presupposes that it is possible to provide an explanation of the human moral sense without normative implications. By contrast, Iris Murdoch’s philosophical work on moral psychology suggests that every description of morality necessarily involves evaluative features that reveal the thinker’s own moral attitudes and implicit philosophical pictures. In the light of this, we contend that Haidt’s treatment of the story about Julie and Mark, (...)
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  28. William James on Emotion and Morals.Guy Axtell - forthcoming - In Jacob Goodson (ed.), Cries of the Wounded: William James, Moral Philosophy, and the Moral Life. Rowman & Littlefield.
    The Emotions chapter (XXV) in James' Principles of Psychology traverses the entire range of experienced emotions from the “coarser” and more instinctual to the “subtler” emotions intimately involved in cognitive, moral, and aesthetic aspects of life. But Principles limits himself to an account of emotional consciousness and so there are few direct discussions in the text of Principles about what later came to be called moral psychology, and fewer about anything resembling philosophical ethics. Still, James’ short section on (...)
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  29.  68
    Qadi `Abdul-Jabbar al-Mu`tazili's Moral Theory.Hossein Atrak - 2007 - Journal of Philosophical-Theological Reseach 9 (33):53-96.
    Abstract Qadi `Abdul-Jabbar, although has come to be Known as a Mu`tazili theologian, can be certainly mentioned as a moral philosopher by attention to his ethical views in the theological books. The paper is going to present his ethical opinions concerning normative ethics and Meta-ethics. It shows that `Abdul-Jabbar is a rationalist moral philosopher, who considers reason as the origin of moral obligations, and as the means of evaluating the rightness and wrongfulness of actions. Moreover, he is (...)
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  30. An Ethics of Uncertainty.C. Thi Nguyen - 2011 - Dissertation, UCLA
    Moral reasoning is as fallible as reasoning in any other cognitive domain, but we often behave as if it were not. I argue for a form of epistemically-based moral humility, in which we downgrade our moral beliefs in the face of moral disagreement. My argument combines work in metaethics and moral intuitionism with recent developments in epistemology. I argue against any demands for deep self-sufficiency in moral reasoning. Instead, I argue that we need (...)
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  31. The Seeming Account of Self-Evidence: An Alternative to Audian Account.Hossein Dabbagh - 2018 - Logos and Episteme 9 (3):261-284.
    In this paper, I argue against the epistemology of some contemporary moral intuitionists who believe that the notion of self-evidence is more important than that of intuition. Quite the contrary, I think the notion of intuition is more basic if intuitions are construed as intellectual seemings. First, I will start with elaborating Robert Audi’s account of self-evidence. Next, I criticise his account on the basis of the idea of “adequate understanding”. I shall then present my alternative account of self-evidence (...)
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  32. Critical Notice of Robert Audi, The Good in the Right.Anthony Skelton - 2007 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (2):305-325.
    Critical notice of Robert Audi's The Good in the Right in which doubts are raised about the epistemological and ethical doctrines it defends. It doubts that an appeal to Kant is a profitable way to defend Rossian normative intuitionism.
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  33. L'etica moderna. Dalla Riforma a Nietzsche.Sergio Cremaschi - 2007 - Roma RM, Italia: Carocci.
    This book tells the story of modern ethics, namely the story of a discourse that, after the Renaissance, went through a methodological revolution giving birth to Grotius’s and Pufendorf’s new science of natural law, leaving room for two centuries of explorations of the possible developments and implications of this new paradigm, up to the crisis of the Eighties of the eighteenth century, a crisis that carried a kind of mitosis, the act of birth of both basic paradigms of the two (...)
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  34. Introduction to Ethics: An Open Educational Resource, Collected and Edited by Noah Levin.Noah Levin, Nathan Nobis, David Svolba, Brandon Wooldridge, Kristina Grob, Eduardo Salazar, Benjamin Davies, Jonathan Spelman, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Kristin Seemuth Whaley, Jan F. Jacko & Prabhpal Singh (eds.) - 2019 - Huntington Beach, California: N.G.E Far Press.
    Collected and edited by Noah Levin -/- Table of Contents: -/- UNIT ONE: INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY ETHICS: TECHNOLOGY, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, AND IMMIGRATION 1 The “Trolley Problem” and Self-Driving Cars: Your Car’s Moral Settings (Noah Levin) 2 What is Ethics and What Makes Something a Problem for Morality? (David Svolba) 3 Letter from the Birmingham City Jail (Martin Luther King, Jr) 4 A Defense of Affirmative Action (Noah Levin) 5 The Moral Issues of Immigration (B.M. Wooldridge) 6 The Ethics (...)
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  35. Is, Ought, and the Regress Argument.Jacob Sparks - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (3):528-543.
    Many take the claim that you cannot ‘get’ an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’ to imply that non- moral beliefs are by themselves incapable of justifying moral beliefs. I argue that this is a mistake and that the position that moral beliefs are justified exclusively by non-moral beliefs—a view that I call moral inferentialism—presents an attractive non-sceptical moral epistemology.
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  36. L'etica del Novecento. Dopo Nietzsche.Sergio Cremaschi - 2005 - Roma RM, Italia: Carocci.
    TWENTIETH-CENTURY ETHICS. AFTER NIETZSCHE -/- Preface This book tells the story of twentieth-century ethics or, in more detail, it reconstructs the history of a discussion on the foundations of ethics which had a start with Nietzsche and Sidgwick, the leading proponents of late-nineteenth-century moral scepticism. During the first half of the century, the prevailing trends tended to exclude the possibility of normative ethics. On the Continent, the trend was to transform ethics into a philosophy of existence whose self-appointed task (...)
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  37. Sidgwick E Il Progetto di Un’Etica Scientifica.Sergio Cremaschi - 2006 - Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics 8 (1):1-36.
    In this paper I discuss the role played by the ideas of ‘common sense’ and ‘common sense morality’ in Sidgwick’s system of ideas. I argue that, far from aiming at overcoming common sense morality, Sidgwick aimed purposely at grounding a consist code of morality by methods allegedly taken from the example provided by the natural sciences, in order to reach also in the moral field some body of ‘mature’ knowledge similar to that provided by the natural sciences. His whole (...)
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  38.  87
    Teaching Applied Ethics to the Righteous Mind.Peter Murphy - 2014 - Journal of Moral Education 43 (4):413-428.
    What does current empirically informed moral psychology imply about the goals that can be realistically achieved in college-level applied ethics courses? This paper takes up this question from the vantage point of Jonathan Haidt’s Social Intuitionist Model of human moral judgment. I summarize Haidt’s model, and then consider a variety of pedagogical goals. I begin with two of the loftiest goals of ethics education, and argue that neither is within realistic reach if Haidt’s model is correct. I then (...)
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  39. Elizabeth Anscombe e la svolta normativa del 1958.Sergio Volodia Marcello Cremaschi - 2010 - In Juan Andrés Mercado (ed.), Elisabeth Anscombe e la psicologia morale. Roma, Italy: Armando. pp. 43-80.
    I discuss the three theses defended by Anscombe in 'Modern Moral Philosophy'. I argue that: a) her answer to the question "why should I be moral?" requires a solution of the problem of theodicy and ignores any attempts to save the moral point of view without recourse to divine retribution; b) her notion of divine law is an odd one, more neo-Augustinian than Biblical or Scholastic; c) her image of Kantian ethics and intuitionism is the impoverished (...)
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  40. Elizabeth Anscombe on Consequentialism and Absolute Prohibitions.Sergio Cremaschi - 2012 - Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 47 (1):7-39.
    I discuss the third of Anscombe’s theses from “Modern Moral Philosophy”, namely that post-Sidgwickian consequentialism makes the worst action acceptable. I scrutinize her comprehension of “consequentialism”, her reconstruction of Sidgwick’s view of intention, her defence of casuistry, her reformulation of the double-effect doctrine, and her view of morality as based on Divine commands. I argue that her characterization of consequentialism suffers from lack of understanding of the history of utilitarianism and its self-transformation through the Intuitionism-Utilitarianism controversy; that she (...)
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  41.  38
    Oversight in the Canon: The Animals Issue Rekindled.Juliette Helene Christie - 1996 - Dissertation, University of California, Santa Barbara
    I take issue with an argument to the effect that because contractualism proves--both practically and theoretically--the philosophically superior moral theory, we have the result that nonhuman animals can have no, nor ought be extended any, moral standing. The combined argument belongs to Peter Carruthers, and appears in his The Animals Issue. My response involves demonstration that on careful analysis contractualism fares even less well than the two theories against which Carruthers compares it--rights and utilitarian. Furthermore, I offer a (...)
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  42. Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Mathematics.Eric Steinhart - 1999 - International Studies in Philosophy 31 (3):19-27.
    Nietzsche has a surprisingly significant and strikingly positive assessment of mathematics. I discuss Nietzsche's theory of the origin of mathematical practice in the division of the continuum of force, his theory of numbers, his conception of the finite and the infinite, and the relations between Nietzschean mathematics and formalism and intuitionism. I talk about the relations between math, illusion, life, and the will to truth. I distinguish life and world affirming mathematical practice from its ascetic perversion. For Nietzsche, math (...)
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  43.  91
    The Mill-Whewell Controversy on Ethics and its Bequest to Analytic Philosophy.Sergio Volodia Marcello Cremaschi - 2006 - In Elvio Baccarini & Snežana Prijic Samaržja (eds.), Rationality in Belief and Action. Rijeka, Croatia: University of Rijeka - Croatian Society for Analytic Philosophy. pp. 45-62.
    In this paper I intend to reconstruct the weight of rational and non rational factors in ethical controversies and to highlight the mixed bequest this controversy left to 20th century analytic ethics. I argue that the structure of the controversy includes ‘Kuhnian’ factors, rhetoric and pragmatic dimensions, and that a consistent self-criticism of his own previous views may be detected in Mill’s writings published after the controversy. I argue that the controversy’s bequest for analytic ethics includes: (i) anti-empiricist elements, which (...)
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  44.  67
    Sidgwick e il progetto di un’etica scientifica: risposte a Greco e Pellegrino.Sergio Volodia Marcello Cremaschi - 2006 - Etica and Politica \ Ethics & Politics 8 (1):1-4.
    I clarify that Sidgwick was not a moral relativist; on the contrary he was heavily conditioned by ethnocentric prejudice: I add that Sidgwick did not believe a reform of common-sense morality to be viable; on the contrary he concluded that it was impossible and, besides, that there were important utilitarian reasons against the viability of any reform strategy.
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  45. Naturalizzazione Senza Naturalismo: Una Prospettiva Per la Metaetica.Sergio Cremaschi - 2007 - Etica and Politica \ Ethics & Politics 9 (2):201-217.
    I discuss first the meaning of naturalism in philosophy and then the sense in which it has been introduced in ethics: that of American Naturalism, that of Dewey’s pragmatism, the sense of a negation of Moore’s negation of naturalism, the neo-Aristotelian, and the one of the external realists. I will argue a fundamental heterogeneity of these meanings and will add that the reasons for the apparent unity of a naturalist front in recent philosophical debates lies more in factors pertaining to (...)
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  46.  10
    Comments on Diana B. Heney: "Toward a Pragmatist Metaethics". [REVIEW]Cathy Legg - 2018 - Syndicate.
    This poised and articulate volume addresses an area of pragmatist philosophy as yet relatively unexplored in pragmatism's welcome revival. Neopragmatism's preoccupation with changing philosophers' view of the relation between language (or as Rorty puts it: "vocabularies") and reality, has largely focussed their discussions on the 'metaphysics & epistemology', rather than the 'value' side of philosophy, apart from Rorty's brief flirtations with edifying Western political discourse. Yet the nature of truth in ethics has been a topic of keen discussion in recent (...)
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  47. Meta-Ethics and Analysis of Language From Wittgenstein to Deontic Logic Systems.Maurilio Lovatti - 2007 - Analysis and Metaphysics 6:120-135.
    In this paper, partly historical and partly theoretical, after having shortly outlined the development of the meta-ethics in the 1900?s starting from the Tractatus of Wittgenstein, I argue it is possible to sustain that emotivism and intuitionism are unsatisfactory ethical conceptions, while on the contrary, reason (intended in a logical-deductive sense) plays an effective role both in ethical discussions and in choices. There are some characteristics of the ethical language (prescriptivity, universalizability and predominance) that cannot be eluded (pain the (...)
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  48. How Insensitive: Principles, Facts and Normative Grounds in Cohen’s Critique of Rawls.Daniel Kofman - 2012 - Socialist Studies 8 (1):246-268.
    Cohen’s hostility to Rawls’ justification of the Difference Principle by social facts spawned Cohen’s general thesis that ultimate principles of justice and morality are fact-insensitive, but explain how any fact-sensitive principle is grounded in facts. The problem with this thesis, however, is that when facts F ground principle P, reformulating this relation as the "fact-insensitive" conditional “If F, then P” is trivial and thus explanatorily impotent. Explanatory, hence justificatory, force derives either from subsumption under more general principles, or precisely exhibiting (...)
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  49. Reasons, Reflection, and Repugnance.Doug McConnell & Jeanette Kennett - 2016 - In Alberto Giubilini & Steve Clarke (eds.), The Ethics of Human Enhancement: Understanding the Debate. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
    In this chapter we draw comparisons between Kass’ views on the normative authority of repugnance and social intuitionist accounts of moral judgement which are similarly sceptical about the role of reasoned reflection in moral judgement. We survey the empirical claims made in support of giving moral primacy to intuitions generated by emotions such as repugnance, as well as some common objections. We then examine accounts which integrate intuition and reflection, and argue that plausible accounts of wisdom are (...)
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  50.  26
    Bene.Sergio Volodia Marcello Cremaschi - 1996 - In Virgilio Melchiorre (ed.), Enciclopedia della Filosofia e delle Scienze Umane. Novara, Italy: DeAGostini. pp. 96-98.
    The genealogical deconstruction of the notion of "good" by F.Nietzsche in Genealogy of Morals highlights the arbitrariness of the Platonic unification of various kinds of good, a unification that is still shared by both objectivists and subjectivists. For the same reasons, the attempt of G.E. Moore and other neo-intuitionists to define a single property that is common to all uses of the term "good" and the specular denial of the existence of this property by the emotionalism of A.J. Ayer and (...)
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