Results for 'Pseudoscience'

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  1. Prove It! The Burden of Proof Game in Science Vs. Pseudoscience Disputes.Massimo Pigliucci & Maarten Boudry - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (2):487-502.
    The concept of burden of proof is used in a wide range of discourses, from philosophy to law, science, skepticism, and even in everyday reasoning. This paper provides an analysis of the proper deployment of burden of proof, focusing in particular on skeptical discussions of pseudoscience and the paranormal, where burden of proof assignments are most poignant and relatively clear-cut. We argue that burden of proof is often misapplied or used as a mere rhetorical gambit, with little appreciation of (...)
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  2. Pseudoscience and Idiosyncratic Theories of Rational Belief.Nicholas Shackel - 2013 - In M. Pigliucci & M. Boudry (eds.), Philosophy of Pseudoscience: Reconsidering the Demarcation Problem. University of Chicago Press. pp. 417-438.
    I take pseudoscience to be a pretence at science. Pretences are innumerable, limited only by our imagination and credulity. As Stove points out, ‘numerology is actually quite as different from astrology as astrology is from astronomy’ (Stove 1991, 187). We are sure that ‘something has gone appallingly wrong’ (Stove 1991, 180) and yet ‘thoughts…can go wrong in a multiplicity of ways, none of which anyone yet understands’ (Stove 1991, 190). Often all we can do is give a careful description (...)
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  3. What Makes Weird Beliefs Thrive? The Epidemiology of Pseudoscience.Maarten Boudry, Stefaan Blancke & Massimo Pigliucci - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (8):1177-1198.
    What makes beliefs thrive? In this paper, we model the dissemination of bona fide science versus pseudoscience, making use of Dan Sperber's epidemiological model of representations. Drawing on cognitive research on the roots of irrational beliefs and the institutional arrangement of science, we explain the dissemination of beliefs in terms of their salience to human cognition and their ability to adapt to specific cultural ecologies. By contrasting the cultural development of science and pseudoscience along a number of dimensions, (...)
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  4. Pseudoscience.Massimo Pigliucci - 2013 - In Byron Kaldis (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Social Sciences. SAGE.
    The term pseudoscience refers to a highly heterogeneous set of practices, beliefs, and claims sharing the property of appearing to be scientific when in fact they contradict either scientific findings or the methods by which science proceeds. Classic examples of pseudoscience include astrology, parapsychology, and ufology; more recent entries are the denial of a causal link between the HIV virus and AIDS or the claim that vaccines cause autism. To distinguish between science and pseudoscience is part of (...)
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  5. The Hypothesis That Saves the Day: Ad Hoc Reasoning in Pseudoscience.Maarten Boudry - 2013 - Logique Et Analyse 223:245-258.
    What is wrong with ad hoc hypotheses? Ever since Popper’s falsificationist account of adhocness, there has been a lively philosophical discussion about what constitutes adhocness in scientific explanation, and what, if anything, distinguishes legitimate auxiliary hypotheses from illicit ad hoc ones. This paper draws upon distinct examples from pseudoscience to provide us with a clearer view as to what is troubling about ad hoc hypotheses. In contrast with other philosophical proposals, our approach retains the colloquial, derogative meaning of adhocness, (...)
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  6. Science and Pseudoscience - Falsifiability.Nicolae Sfetcu - manuscript
    The delimitation between science and pseudoscience is part of the more general task of determining which beliefs are epistemologically justified. Standards for demarcation may vary by domain, but several basic principles are universally accepted. Karl Popper proposed falsifiability as an important criterion in distinguishing between science and pseudoscience. He argues that verification and confirmation can play no role in formulating a satisfactory criterion of demarcation. Instead, it proposes that scientific theories be distinguished from non-scientific theories by testable claims (...)
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  7.  21
    Pseudoscience et falsifiabilité.Nicolae Sfetcu - manuscript
    La délimitation entre science et pseudoscience fait partie de la tâche plus générale qui consiste à déterminer quelles croyances sont épistémologiquement justifiées. Karl Popper a proposé la falsifiabilité comme critère important de distinction entre science et pseudoscience. Il soutient que la vérification et la confirmation ne peuvent jouer aucun rôle dans la formulation d'un critère de délimitation satisfaisant. Au lieu de cela, il propose que les théories scientifiques soient distinguées des théories non-scientifiques par des affirmations vérifiables que les (...)
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  8. Pseudoscience.Bradley Monton - 2013 - In Martin Curd & Stathis Psillos (eds.), Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science, Second Edition. Routledge. pp. 468-479.
    I insightfully discuss the question: what is pseudoscience?
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  9. Why the Demarcation Problem Matters.Massimo Pigliucci & Maarten Boudry - 2013 - In Massimo Pigliucci & Maarten Boudry (eds.), Philosophy of Pseudoscience: Reconsidering the Demarcation Problem.
    Ever since Socrates, philosophers have been in the business of asking ques- tions of the type “What is X?” The point has not always been to actually find out what X is, but rather to explore how we think about X, to bring up to the surface wrong ways of thinking about it, and hopefully in the process to achieve an increasingly better understanding of the matter at hand. In the early part of the twentieth century one of the most (...)
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  10. Do Extraordinary Claims Really Require Extraordinary Evidence?Massimo Pigliucci - 2009 - In K. Frazier (ed.), Science Under Siege: Defending Science, Exposing Pseudoscience. Prometheus.
    To what extend does David Hume's argument about miracles inform modern skepticism about pseudoscience?
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  11. The Fake, the Flimsy, and the Fallacious: Demarcating Arguments in Real Life.Maarten Boudry, Fabio Paglieri & Massimo Pigliucci - 2015 - Argumentation 29 (4):10.1007/s10503-015-9359-1.
    Philosophers of science have given up on the quest for a silver bullet to put an end to all pseudoscience, as such a neat formal criterion to separate good science from its contenders has proven elusive. In the literature on critical thinking and in some philosophical quarters, however, this search for silver bullets lives on in the taxonomies of fallacies. The attractive idea is to have a handy list of abstract definitions or argumentation schemes, on the basis of which (...)
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  12. The Demarcation Problem: A (Belated) Response to Laudan.Massimo Pigliucci - 2013 - In Massimo Pigliucci & Maarten Boudry (eds.), Philosophy of Pseudoscience: Reconsidering the Demarcation Problem. University of Chicago Press. pp. 9.
    The “demarcation problem,” the issue of how to separate science from pseu- doscience, has been around since fall 1919—at least according to Karl Pop- per’s (1957) recollection of when he first started thinking about it. In Popper’s mind, the demarcation problem was intimately linked with one of the most vexing issues in philosophy of science, David Hume’s problem of induction (Vickers 2010) and, in particular, Hume’s contention that induction cannot be logically justified by appealing to the fact that “it works,” (...)
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  13.  59
    An Analysis of the Demarcation Problem in Philosophy of Science and Its Application to Homeopathy.Alper Bilgehan Yardımcı - 2018 - Flsf 1 (25):91-107.
    This paper presents a preliminary analysis of homeopathy from the perspective of the demarcation problem in the philosophy of science. In this context, Popper, Kuhn and Feyerabend’s solution to the problem will be given respectively and their criteria will be applied to homeopathy, aiming to shed some light on the controversy over its scientific status. It then examines homeopathy under the lens of demarcation criteria to conclude that homeopathy is regarded as science by Feyerabend and is considered as pseudoscience (...)
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  14. Loki's Wager and Laudan's Error: On Genuine and Territorial Demarcation.Maarten Boudry - 2013 - In Massimo Pigliucci & Maarten Boudry (eds.), Philosophy of Pseudoscience: Reconsidering the Demarcation Problem. University of Chicago Press. pp. 79--98.
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  15. Is Intelligent Design Creationism?Massimo Pigliucci - 2009 - In Kendrick Frazier (ed.), Science Under Siege: Defending Science, Exposing Pseudoscience. Prometheus.
    Intelligent Design proponents want to distinguish themselves from creationists. But the distinction appears to be without a difference.
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  16. The Referee's Dilemma. The Ethics of Scientific Communities and Game Theory.Tomislav Bracanovic - 2002 - Prolegomena 1 (1):55-74.
    This article argues that various deviations from the basic principles of the scientific ethos – primarily the appearance of pseudoscience in scientific communities – can be formulated and explained using specific models of game theory, such as the prisoner’s dilemma and the iterated prisoner’s dilemma. The article indirectly tackles the deontology of scientific work as well, in which it is assumed that there is no room for moral skepticism, let alone moral anti-realism, in the ethics of scientific communities. Namely, (...)
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  17.  91
    A Secondary Tool for Demarcation Problem: Logical Fallacies.Tevfik Uyar - 2017 - Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi / Cilicia Journal of Philosophy 4 (3):85-104.
    According to Thagard, the behavior of practitioners of a field may also be used for demarcation between science and pseudoscience due to its social dimension in addition to the epistemic one. I defended the tendency of pseudoscientists to commit fallacies, and the number of fallacies they commit can be a secondary tool for demarcation problem and this tool is consistent with Thagardian approach. In this paper, I selected the astrology as the case and I revealed nine types of logical (...)
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  18. The Salem Region: Two Mindsets About Science.John S. Wilkins - 2013 - In Massimo Pigliucci & Maarten Boudry (eds.), Philosophy of Pseudoscience: Reconsidering the Demarcation Problem. University of Chicago Press. pp. 397.
    This chapter distinguishes between two mindsets about science—the deductivist mindset and inductivist mindset—and explores the cognitive styles relating to authority and tradition in both science and pseudoscience. The deductivist tends to see problems as questions to be resolved by deduction from known theory or principle. The inductivist sees problems as questions to be resolved by discovery. Those leaning towards a deductivist mindset may find results that conflict with prior theoretical commitments unacceptable. The deductivist tends to be a cognitive conservative, (...)
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  19.  55
    Bilim ve Sözde Bilim: Bilimsel Topluluğun Doğasının Belirlenmesi ve Sözde Bilimin Ayırt Edilmesine Yönelik Sosyal Bir Ölçüt.Alper Bilgehan Yardımcı - 2019 - Kaygı. Uludağ Üniversitesi Fen-Edebiyat Fakültesi Felsefe Dergisi 18 (2):567-588.
    Bilimin ne olduğunun tespit edilmesi ve bilimi sözde bilimlerden ya da bilimsel olmayan alanlardan ayırt edecek ölçütün ne olması gerektiğine yönelik tartışma, bilim felsefesinde sınır çizme sorunu olarak ele alınmaktadır. Bu makalede, öncelikle söz konusu soruna yönelik geleneksel yaklaşımlar incelenmiş ve ardından bu yaklaşımların bilimsel toplulukların doğasına ilişkin özellikleri göz ardı ettiği ortaya konmuştur. Daha önce yapılan çalışmalar bilimi daha çok önermeler, ifadeler ya da salt epistemik bir sistem olarak ele almakta ve bilimsel akıl yürütmenin biçimi ile bilimsel kuramların özelliklerine (...)
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  20. Existence Problems in Philosophy and Science.Peter W. Ross & Dale Turner - 2013 - Synthese 190 (18):4239-4259.
    We initially characterize what we’ll call existence problems as problems where there is evidence that a putative entity exists and this evidence is not easily dismissed; however, the evidence is not adequate to justify the claim that the entity exists, and in particular the entity hasn’t been detected. The putative entity is elusive. We then offer a strategy for determining whether an existence problem is philosophical or scientific. According to this strategy (1) existence problems are characterized in terms of causal (...)
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  21. Why Gaia? Pigliucci - 2014 - Ethics and the Environment 19 (2):117.
    “The Gaia Hypothesis: Science on a Pagan Planet tells a story that comes out of the 1960s, a story that reflects all of the beliefs and enthusiasms and tensions of that decade.” So begins Michael Ruse’s fascinating, if at times puzzling, exploration of James Lovelock’s famous idea that our planet is, in a serious scientific sense, a living organism with a tendency of taking care of self. But why tell this particular story, especially considering that Gaia hardly makes an appearance (...)
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  22. The Borderlands Between Science and Philosophy.Massimo Pigliucci - 2008 - Quarterly Review of Biology 83 (1):7-15.
    Science and philosophy have a very long history, dating back at least to the 16th and 17th centuries, when the first scientist-philosophers, such as Bacon, Galilei, and Newton, were beginning the process of turning natural philosophy into science. Contemporary relationships between the two fields are still to some extent marked by the distrust that maintains the divide between the so-called “two cultures.” An increasing number of philosophers, however, are making conceptual contributions to sciences ranging from quantum mechanics to evolutionary biology, (...)
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  23. Is Knowledge of Science Associated with Higher Skepticism of Pseudoscientific Claims?Matthew Johnson & Massimo Pigliucci - 2004 - American Biology Teacher 66 (8):536-548.
    We live in a world that is increasingly shaped by and bathed in science, with most scientific progress occurring in the past century, and much of it in the past few decades. Yet, several authors have puz- zled over the observation that modern societies are also characterized by a high degree of belief in a variety of pseudoscientific claims that have been thoroughly debunked or otherwise discarded by scientists (Anonymous, 2001; Ede, 2000).
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  24. American Science and its Anti-Evolutionist Critics: It's the Evidence Stupid.Reed Richter - manuscript
    This is an unpublished talk written for a meeting of French philosophers. The paper describes the evolution versus creationism/intelligent design controversy in the U.S. A number of philosophers and scientists try to resolve this issue by sharply distinguishing the realm of science versus any talk of the supernatural. These pro-evolutionists often appeal to science's essential commitment to "methodological naturalism," the view that scientific methodology is essentially committed to naturalism and cannot meaningfully entertain hypotheses concerning the supernatural. I criticize methodological naturalism, (...)
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  25. Supporting Abstract Relational Space-Time as Fundamental Without Doctrinism Against Emergence.Sascha Vongehr - manuscript
    The present paper aims to contribute to the substantivalism versus relationalism debate and to defend general relativity (GR) against pseudoscientific attacks in a novel, especially inclusive way. This work was initially motivated by the desire to establish the incompatibility of any ether theories with accelerated cosmic expansion and inflation (motto: where would a hypothetical medium supposedly come from so fast?). The failure of this program is of interest for emergent GR concepts in high energy particle physics. However, it becomes increasingly (...)
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  26. Creationism as a Cultural, Not Scientific, Issue.Massimo Pigliucci - 2007 - In T. Flynn (ed.), The New Encyclopedia of Unbelief. Prometheus.
    Why creationism is an important cultural, but scientifically negligible, phenomenon.
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  27.  44
    Krytyka nauki przez odniesienie do holizmu wiedzy w myśli Seyyeda Hosseina Nasra oraz Ismaila al-Faruqiego.Justyna Figas-Skrzypulec - 2016 - Argument: Biannual Philosophical Journal 6 (1):195-208.
    The paper presents a cognitive, educational and philosophical strategy, sometimes called reconstructionism (as it denotes e orts to reconstruct knowledge and science), proposed by a number of Muslim authors as a proper reaction to modern science. The pre‐modern background for this reaction is highlighted. Two examples are given: the Islamic science idea by Seyyed Hossein Nasr, and the Islamization of knowledge project by Ismail Raji al‐Faruqi. Their critique of Euro‐Atlantic science is based on its perceived e ects on society and (...)
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  28. First-Person Experiments: A Characterisation and Defence.Brentyn Ramm - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9:449–467.
    While first-person methods are essential for a science of consciousness, it is controversial what form these methods should take and whether any such methods are reliable. I propose that first-person experiments are a reliable method for investigating conscious experience. I outline the history of these methods and describe their characteristics. In particular, a first-person experiment is an intervention on a subject's experience in which independent variables are manipulated, extraneous variables are held fixed, and in which the subject makes a phenomenal (...)
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  29. Nonsense on Stilts About Science: Field Adventures of a Scientist- Philosopher.Massimo Pigliucci - 2012 - In J. Goodwin (ed.), Between Scientists and Citizens. CreateSpace.
    Public discussions of science are often marred by two pernicious phenomena: a widespread rejection of scientific findings (e.g., the reality of anthropogenic climate change, the conclusion that vaccines do not cause autism, or the validity of evolutionary theory), coupled with an equally common acceptance of pseudoscientific notions (e.g., homeopathy, psychic readings, telepathy, tall tales about alien abductions, and so forth). The typical reaction by scientists and science educators is to decry the sorry state of science literacy among the general public, (...)
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  30. The Evolution-Creation Wars: Why Teaching More Science Just is Not Enough.Massimo Pigliucci - 2007 - McGill Journal of Education 42 (2):285-306.
    The creation-evolution “controversy” has been with us for more than a century. Here I argue that merely teaching more science will probably not improve the situation; we need to understand the controversy as part of a broader problem with public acceptance of pseudoscience, and respond by teaching how science works as a method. Critical thinking is difficult to teach, but educators can rely on increasing evidence from neurobiology about how the brain learns, or fails to.
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  31.  11
    A review on a peer review.Andrej Poleev - 2016 - Enzymes 14.
    The peer review is an opportunity to perform an unlawful censorship which ensures that no apostate notion ever get published in mainstream journals. Or such peer review censorship is an opportunity to steal any content and to claim afterward the priority of the first publication. And last but not least, the peer review is an academic tool to promote the mainstream pseudoscience.
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  32. Welche Kompetenz hat Wissenschaftsphilosophie?.Kay Herrmann - 2012 - Universitätsverlag Chemnitz.
    Many prominent scientists have pointed out that philosophy is of no benefit to science. Stephen Hawking asserts: Philosophy is dead! Sciences use conceptions like natural laws, matter, nature, theories, etc. But science is also confronted with questions such as: “What is a natural law?” “What is nature?” “What is matter?” and “What is a scientific theory?” These (metatheoretical) questions exceed the sphere of competence of science – they are items of the philosophy of science. Philosophy of science is a metatheory (...)
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  33.  11
    Falsification et réfutation - Extension de la falsifiabilité de Popper.Nicolae Sfetcu - manuscript
    Selon Popper, une théorie scientifique peut être légitimement sauvée de la falsification en introduisant une hypothèse auxiliaire permettant de générer de nouvelles prédictions falsifiables. De plus, s’il existe des soupçons de biais ou d’erreur, les chercheurs pourraient introduire une hypothèse auxiliaire falsifiable, qui permettrait de procéder à des tests. De nombreux autres auteurs ont proposé des critères pour démarquer la science de la pseudoscience. Celles-ci incluent généralement la croyance en l'autorité, des expériences irremplaçables, des exemples choisis, le manque de (...)
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  34.  45
    The Distinction Between Falsification and Refutation in the Demarcation Problem of Karl Popper.Nicolae Sfetcu - manuscript
    Despite the criticism of Karl Popper's falsifiability theory for the demarcation between science and non-science, mainly pseudo-science, this criterion is still very useful, and perfectly valid after it was perfected by Popper and his followers. Moreover, even in his original version, considered by Lakatos as "dogmatic", Popper did not assert that this methodology is an absolute demarcation criterion: a single counter-example is not enough to falsify a theory; a theory can legitimately be saved from falsification by introducing an auxiliary hypothesis. (...)
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  35.  28
    Filosofie Vědy a Problém Demarkace. [REVIEW]Pavel Kasík - 2014 - Teorie Vědy / Theory of Science 36 (4):457-468.
    Recenze: Massimo PIGLIUCCI - Maarten BOUDRY, Philosophy of Pseudoscience: Reconsidering the Demarcation Problem. Chicago: Chicago University Press 2013, 480 s.
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  36.  45
    La Distinction Entre Falsification Et Rejet Dans le Problème de la Démarcation de Karl Popper.Nicolae Sfetcu - 2020 - Drobeta Turnu Severin: MultiMedia Publishing.
    Malgré les critiques de la théorie de Karl Popper sur la falsifiabilité pour la démarcation entre la science et la non-science, principalement la pseudo-science, ce critère est toujours très utile et parfaitement valide après avoir été perfectionné par Popper et ses disciples. De plus, même dans sa version originale, qualifiée de « dogmatique » par Lakatos, Popper n’a pas affirmé que cette méthode constituait un critère absolu de démarcation : un seul contre-exemple ne suffit pas à falsifier une théorie ; (...)
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