Advocating a sociological explanation of scientific knowledge, David Bloor protests against the adherents of the autonomy of knowledge; i.e., those who asymmetrically explain the credibility of theories in the history of science. These philosophers and historians regard the credibility of true and rational theories due to their proper reasons, while accounting for the acceptance of false or irrational beliefs by citing social causes. Bloor assumes that the credibility of all beliefs is socially influenced, and therefore considers all in need of (...) sociological explanation. To substantiate this claim, he argues that all epistemic factors that are appealed to in explaining true or rational beliefs are really social. However, this argument aligns rational entities with social factors, and thus, undermines the ground of this division. Therefore, his prior complaint of the autonomy of knowledge would be invalidated. Hence, there is a conflict between Bloor’s objection to the asymmetrical explanation of scientific theories and his account of the social construction of epistemic reasons. In this paper, we reveal this concealed conflict and attempt to suggest ways to resolve it. (shrink)

Earlier semioses (implicating at least sometimes political forces to establish a sign) enabled by anonymous intentions permeate later semioses and shape the structure of language. The same way earlier neuroses shape the epistemically embattled structure of unconscious.---Contingent but primordial relations of power semiotically implicated, on both sides of inter-translation of distant languages, so effectively permeate language and literature that there is ever an ineradicable textual residue in the translation reminiscent of the political contexts.---Every belated text a corollary to the primordial (...) proof of establishment of precursor texts. (shrink)

__1__ If form is present content is bound to get eclipsed. The eclipse means there is an unfulfillable task of overcoming obstacles to decipher the ultimate content. By utilizing forms they depict vastly different strands of reality tailored to circumstances, neither lying nor imitating a single strand of reality, poets obscure content and dodge criticisms of the referential aspect of work. -/- __2__A text unavoidably reflects the context under which it is produced. The direct emissaries of the underlying object of (...) desire underlying the text are disseminated in content. That is what content is. Form is there only supplementarilyto make the content inherently communicative (evocative poetic function). The text is proximally recontextualized to its original context of production if the content is deciphered in the process of reading in a such a way to signify the same object of desire. If there is nothing outside the text, the original context is free from commitment to contextual proximity and paves the road to the signification of slightly or strikingly different object by re-assigning significance to the constituents of the textual whole. (shrink)

Tyranny, in western political philosophy, is the primary subject of inquiry. Western political philosophy developed remedies for the evil of tyranny because it is considered unnatural. By the time of John Locke, there was a consensus developed in Europe that living under tyranny is the same as living in the state of nature. The natural law theory lays the foundation for law, such as positive law, under the premise that no law can violate natural law. This dictum laid the foundation (...) for republicanism in the West to counterbalance tyranny. The mechanism for such endeavor is the separation of law from authority to the degree that law is above the authority. My research is to trace the similar thought, if any, in the Iranian context beginning with its ancient time. (shrink)

In the article “A Tension in the Strong Program: The Relation between the Rational and the Social,” I stated that David Bloor, citing the principle of symmetry, expresses that rational and irrational beliefs must be explained in the same way, that is, by causes of the same kind. On this wise, he rejects the methodology of traditional philosophers and historians of science as asymmetrical; since they explain evidence-based beliefs with epistemic reasons and unreasonable beliefs—e.g. beliefs based on indoctrination, propaganda, ideology, (...) and superstition—citing social factors. On the other hand, Bloor argues that the rational is made entirely of the social and, therefore, is itself a kind of social factor. But by admitting this maximum conception of social constructivism, Bloor can no longer consider the rational and the social as two separate identities and accuse the traditional view of asymmetry. However, Professor Finn Collin says that Bloor’s critique of the traditional model never commits him to the duality of the rational and the social. (shrink)

___MERGING of temporally distant events: One perceives a singular causal relation that c causes e whenever c instantiates a mental property C which anticipates a certain mental property E instantiated by e. Such a knowledge of future self is feasible by there being a common mental property D that is instantiated by both c and e. -/- ___SPLITTING to temporally distant events: In the action that is aimed to bring about E, the knowledge or perception or D (explained by the (...) anticipation of E by C) in turn causally explains an event cc instantiating C and then (via causing cc) event ee instantiating E. (shrink)

This qualitative research aims to explore and unravel the theory of natural law within its Greek context and its influence on political thought, particularly addressing the need to counteract the damages of tyranny and the cyclical succession of regimes, as articulated by Plato. This study reveals that the concept of natural law predates Stoics and it is rooted within the pre-Socratic natural philosophy. The study exposes that Aristotelian ethics and politics are rooted in the concept of natural law, ultimately giving (...) rise to the Aristotelian "mixed form of government" and laying the groundwork for republicanism. In extending this inquiry, I attempt to identify a parallel argument in ancient Iran, investigating the presence of natural law and its impact on the political landscape. The concept of natural law, emphasizing the alignment of social and political affairs with nature's rules, played a significant role in shaping the Indo-Iranian communities. The Sanskrit term rta and its Avestan equivalent, Aša, denote this foundational concept. However, the ascendancy of Zoroastrianism and its new theology led to the consolidation of all Indo-Iranian gods into the singular omnipotent deity, Ahura Mazdā. Ahura Mazdā, along with its prophet Zaraθuštra, possessed the authority to govern both earthly life and the afterlife. The exclusive attributes of Ahu and Ratu empowered God and its messenger to formulate and enact laws ensuring a place in heaven. Consequently, Divine Law and positive law became intricately intertwined within a unified legal framework. This divine law, sanctioned by God and enforced by the King, diverges from the Greek perspective, particularly that of Aristotle, where tyranny is seen as a deviation from the ideal political order. In the Iranian context, tyranny is synonymous with God's representation, sharing the holiness and regal attributes of a King, who, in the Iranian and Avestan sense, enjoys God's blessing as Xvarənah or Faer-e Izadi. The intertwining of law and authority of the King precludes the possibility of an independent legal sovereignty apart from the King’s authority. The monotheistic tenets of Zaraθuštra’s religion, officially established in the 4th century AD as the Religion of the State, solidify this integrated system. Consequently, the coexistence of republicanism or any mixed form of government within Iran becomes unattainable under the influence of this monotheistic doctrine. (shrink)

Propositional = Linguistic + Hermeneutically Efficacious. An interpretation of a text is guided by emerging functions of the interpretation. And future function of a text is less than fully known to the author at the time of its production. There is only one the most charitable interpretation of any text at any given time however because there are ever infinitely many propositional versions of any text.

This paper attempts to explore theoretical plausibility of a deterministic universe capable of accommodating freedom by postulating certain requisite features for the set of initial conditions (without probing into the nature of deterministic laws). In another sense this paper codifies a reaction to McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of time.

In a convoluted and a frail sense there might be external reasons. One cannot just precipitate an external reason on demand. Their emergence is feasible only via a posteriori rationalization---effectively the effects of future mental events. This paper attempts to specify pre-conditions for an (internal) reason for action in the past to transform into an external reason later. Most fundamentally one must not know something about one's reason at the time of action .

This article explores the philosophical underpinnings that guided the Framers of the US Constitution in establishing a government, following its War of Independence (1775-1783), as the first large republic in history. The Founding Fathers first began convening formally during the First Continental Congress in 1774, though the path to independence escalated with the Second Continental Congress in 1775. Central to their concerns was the protection of individual rights, a concept deeply rooted in Western political thought. These rights, including freedom of (...) speech, belief, and private property, were essential to safeguard against government overreach. The tyrannical rule of King George III constantly violated His Majesty’s American subjects’ fundamental rights, due to the high rising costs of the war with France. Although, it was the British government (the Parliament) which was in charge of running the Empire. Through the eyes of American subjects, it was the King who was responsible for many grievances such as “taxation without representation.” The Declaration of Independence (July 4, 1776), and the US Constitution (September 17, 1787) declare, enlist and protect those rights. The measures for protecting those rights for the people, and protecting the integrity of the government were among the two essential concerns for the Founding Fathers after gaining the independence. There is a delicate balance between these two concerns which has been engraved within the Constitution. American republic represents that balance to keep. The concern for saving the republic from foreign and domestic enemies remain as strong as before. After the Philadelphia Convention in 1787, when Benjamin Franklin was leaving Independence Hall, he was reportedly asked by a woman, “Well, Doctor, what have we got—a republic or a monarchy?” Franklin famously responded: “A republic, if you can keep it.” (McHenry, 85.). (shrink)

Existential reason belief is a tacit premise in reasoning in any instance of substantial decision making where sentential reason alone cannot indicate the rational choice. The outcome of the decisions that implicate such existential reasons are to essentially constitute either utility or knowledge of some sort or both. The binding underwrites some aspect of mental content that is by design charitably interpretable.---Knowledge or utility if reason consist of desire and belief.

Physical translation of a mental content must involve a set of causal antecedents A and a set of causal consequents B which instantiate properties that figure in strict laws as antecedent and consequent conditions respectively. Only if there are double-role events in common between A and B capable of migrating to purely A or to purely B in future depending on the role that the mental content play then, psychological anomalism can be established but without any need to give up (...) the type-identity of mental and physical events. This paper argues that belief and desire are explanatorily inextricable likewise. (shrink)

Zeno's paradox of Achilles and Tortoise is relevant only when Achilles and the tortoise move at different speeds but not if they ever move at the same speed but different directions. Or not relevant if there is in addition a kind of space in which they move at the same speed contrary to appearances. -/- According to a principle of special relativity the more an object moves in coordinate space the less it moves in coordinate time. If the relative speed (...) between Achilles and the tortoise is v, after T passage of time, from the point of view of the tortoise, Achilles moves vT in coordinate space and wT in coordinate time. The framework of special relativity wholly describes the motion of both if v^2 + w^2 = C^2 where C is the speed of light. -/- Achilles and the Tortoise phenomenally (ordinary 3-dimensional conception of space) move at different speeds, but noumenally (in 4-dimensional spacetime) move at the same speed C. (shrink)

The realm of non-sentential propositionality and purely functional rationality the constitutive force of which enables (otherwise non-sentential) incessant subconscious inter-translation of psychological and physical. Nietzsche: there are more wisdom in your body than in your deepest philosophy.

A truism: a name that is essentially associated with a description—so that its description contributes to the psychological explanations in which it figures—refers not to its referent simpliciter but to its referent relative to the information that is mirrored by the description.

x and y are at least weakly indiscernible if they are distinct with respect to two predicates F and G (FxGy or FyGx and not both) but for all z except x and y, Fz if and only if Gz.

An attempt to vindicate naive set theory by postulating a universal set V which is describable in two distinct description languages: predicative and extensional. The extensional description of a set consists of describing all its elements whereas its predicative description consists of describing what sets it is an element of. -/- Extensionally described V has an uncapturable description length, akin to its cardinality. But predicatively described, in virtue of being the set that is not contained in any set whatsoever, V (...) has a minimal description length, a counterbalance to its cardinality. -/- Descriptive efficiency can genuinely be attributed to V (achieved in a third description language) only if it contains predicatively indiscernible but extensionally discernible sets. (shrink)

Object x being a member of itself or not and x being a member of R or not constitute two vastly different concepts. This paper attempts to locate the reflection of such an utter difference within the formal structure of the axiom of extensionality. -/- .

Type-identity of mental and physical events is compatible with psychological anomalism. (1) Both in action and perceiving singular causal relations, two temporally distant physical events C and E (caused by C) instantiate a COMMON mental property securing "inter-event" continuity of mental content: the mental content when the room is illuminated shows a trace of familiarity with the mental content just before flipping the switch. (2) "Inter-event" continuity is possible if there is "intra-event" continuity in individual mental content: subsets of C (...) and E capable of functioning as both causal antecedent and consequent included. (3) Intra-event continuity means not just seamless adaptation to physical by role-depriving the double-role events but also enables physical shortcuts by being already equipped with pre-causal epistemic link to future (some causally efficacious knowledge of future mental property). --- Whatever causal effect mental may ever have in the physical domain can be reproduced by purely physical events (for example causally deviant chain set off by rare quantum or cosmological events) so it must be covered by strict laws. Mental brings the cause and the effect of such strict laws temporally closer. Illuminating the room takes remarkably shorter time if there is a relevant (temporally extended) mental content involved than if it is left to rare physical phenomena. -/- . (shrink)

(I) According to J.L Austin all speech and all utterance is the doing of something with words and signs, challenging a metaphysics of language that would posit denotative, propositional assertion as the essence of language and meaning. -/- (II) Since doing things with words implicates authorial intention and rationalization, writing a text implies a psychogenetical origin. -/- (III) The text in the process of charitable interpretation, as a sociolinguistic outcome and practice, acquires new meaning or significance by its claims being (...) rendered true or utilizable. The original psychogenesis is incriminated into sociogenesis through the merger of horizons between the author and the interpreter by effectively bridging a historical abyss (sociogenesis of claims to truth or agreed-upon utility). In writing primarily-psychogenetical context causes and precedes its text. In reading the text causes and precedes its primarily-sociogenetical context. (shrink)

There is external reason if every action is by necessity susceptible to charitable interpretation, and the supreme charity (only asymptotically achievable) is guaranteed to excavate an external element arisen from one's desire. The desire whose object perpetually evades disclosure is the target of supreme charity. This only requires one's reason for action face the tribunal of interpretation (evaluation) not individually but as a corporate body. Though Individualistically reasons are the slaves of passions, holistically they are rebellious.

Highlighting the preferential/comparative aspect of rationalization. Reasons that explain actions are putatively internal. But if one is compelled to decide between A and B and prefers to be exempt, that one pursues A is partially explained by the external factor causing the compulsory decision situation. The more pronounced the external factor, the less causal agency, and hence the less scrutiny and the more leniency in the process of charitable interpretation, the less hermeneutical sacrificial and the higher hidden utility. This paper (...) attempts to make explicit the nomological structure of possible worlds disclosing such hidden utility. (shrink)

There is a SURFACE unity of a text which may be described as that which is reflected by taking for granted that the object of desire to be fulfilled in the text contributes EQUALLY to the parts constituting the text as a whole. The DEEP unity of a text on the other hand is that which is reflected by specifying to which constituents the object of desire contributes the most content. The other parts while bearing some superficial content have ONLY (...) poetic (or evocative) function. They constitute FORMS serving aesthetic fortification and condensation not really condensation of content relevant to the object of desire. They are ultimately contingent in terms of the underpinning the text. The Freudian mythology is susceptible to conflating contingent forms as essential content. -/- . (shrink)

Perhaps beginning of time is the common end of many causal paths and that temporal phenomena compete for somehow finding their way towards one of the beginning of the casual paths. Each casual path starts from a distinct set of parts but they all converge to the same whole at the end of their path. Such a pre-temporal causation is constitution of a whole by the sets. The temporal is de-constitution, the reverse direction, but implicates a second mechanism of causation (...) which enables a pre-temporal effect to somehow cause its pre-temporal cause. Time moves towards its origin. (shrink)

In the context of Kripke's puzzle, Paderewski-the-pianist and Paderewski-the-politician are the same object but belong to two different semiotic systems. Their respective tokenings in thought or language are based on two informational contents which are caused by the same object but emitted through two distinct causal pathways. Relativization of the object to the two semiotic systems represent elements of a set of ___coreferential homonyms___. Every F is an F = Everything X that is conspicuously or demonstratively an F is something (...) XX which is systematically or descriptively an F. Although bearing distinct meanings, X is the same as XX. (shrink)

In “A Tension in the Strong Program: The Relation between the Rational and the Social”, Shahram Shahryari (2021) advances the following thesis: In his Strong Program in the sociology of science, David Bloor blames traditional philosophy of science for adopting a dualist strategy in explaining scientific developments, as it employs rational explanation for successful science and social explanation for flawed science. Instead, according to Bloor, all scientific developments should be explained monistically, i.e. in terms of social causes. This is (...) also referred to as the Symmetry Principle, and it is a key tenet in the Strong Program. The author detects a tension here, as Bloor apparently asserts that traditional philosophy of science deploys two kinds of explanation, and simultaneously insists that there is only one kind, i.e. social explanation. (shrink)

In his article, “The Strong Program and Asymmetrical Explanation of the History of Science: A Reply to Collin” (Shahryari 2022b), Shahram Shahryari responds to my comments (in Collin 2022) upon his original article, “A Tension in the Strong Program: The Relation between the Rational and the Social” (Shahryari 2022a). I believe that in this new contribution, Shahryari changes the subject as compared to our original discussion. Hence, before I comment upon his recent contribution, I want to recapitulate briefly the (...) content of that discussion. (shrink)