The temple from Jerusalem was never more defended by Jewish servants and believers, as when the Apostle Paul wrote the Epistle to the Hebrews. We are not referring to the armies of the revolutionaries. We should know that in Sanhedrin was judged every word that a Jew talked about the temple. But when St. Stephan was killed, and after too, St. James, because they have seen the True temple of Christ, the Levites and the Priests became killers not worshipers. With (...) diplomacy, the Apostle Paul wrote to the Jews this letter without even saying a word about the Temple, but asking them to remember the way they can fulfil the ideals of unity and freedom patented by Moses and the Tent: through Christ and through the Church. (shrink)

I suggest a way of extending Stalnaker’s account of assertion to allow for centered content. In formulating his account, Stalnaker takes the content of assertion to be uncentered propositions: entities that are evaluated for truth at a possible world. I argue that the content of assertion is sometimes centered: the content is evaluated for truth at something within a possible world. I consider Andy Egan’s proposal for extending Stalnaker’s account to allow for assertions with centered content. I argue that Egan’s (...) account does not succeed. Instead, I propose an account on which the contents of assertion are identified with sets of multi-centered worlds. I argue that such a view not only provides a plausible account of how assertions can have centered content, but also preserves Stalnaker’s original insight that successful assertion involves the reduction of shared possibilities. (shrink)

A commonly held idea regarding the nature of time is that the future is open and the past is fixed or closed. This article investigates the notion that there is an asymmetry in openness between the past and the future. The following questions are considered: How exactly is this asymmetry in openness to be understood? What is the relation between an open future and various ontological views about the future? Is an open future a branching future? What is the relation (...) between an open future and the question of whether contingent statements about the future are true or false? Is an open future compatible with a single determinate future? (shrink)

The Repugnant Conclusion served an important purpose in catalyzing and inspiring the pioneering stage of population ethics research. We believe, however, that the Repugnant Conclusion now receives too much focus. Avoiding the Repugnant Conclusion should no longer be the central goal driving population ethics research, despite its importance to the fundamental accomplishments of the existing literature.

Die Frage nach dem Verhältnis aufeinanderfolgender Theorien rückte spätestens mit der Publikation von T. S. Kuhns einflußreicher Schrift Die Struktur wissenschaftlicher Revolutionen im Jahre 1961 in den Brennpunkt wissenschaftsphilosophischer Untersuchungen. Dabei gibt es im wesentlichen zwei große Lager. Auf der einen Seite stehen Philosophen wie P. Feyerabend und T. S. Kuhn selbst, die den Aspekt der Diskontinuität...

Am 14. Juli 1995 berichteten die angesehene Wissenschaftszeitschrift Science sowie die berühmte amerikanische Tageszeitung New York Times – auf dem Titelblatt – gleichzeitig über die erstmalige experimentelle Erzeugung eines Bose-Einstein-Kondensates aus einem Gas schwach wechselwirkender Alkaliatome am Joint Institute for Laboratory Astrophy- sics (JILA) in Boulder/Colorado (USA). Was war an dieser Leistung so bedeutsam, dass man sich entschloss, sie auf jene Weise bekannt zu geben?

There is currently disagreement about whether the phenomenon of first-person, or de se, thought motivates a move towards special kinds of contents. Some take the conclusion that traditional propositions are unable to serve as the content of de se belief to be old news, successfully argued for in a number of influential works several decades ago.1 Recently, some philosophers have challenged the view that there exist uniquely de se contents, claiming that most of the philosophical community has been under the (...) grip of an attractive but unmotivated myth.2 At the very least, this latter group has brought into question the arguments in favor of positing special kinds of content for de se belief; I think they have successfully shown that these arguments are not as conclusive, or fully articulated, as many have taken them to be. In this paper I will address these challenges directly and I will present and defend an argument for the conclusion that the phenomenon of de se thought does indeed motivate the move to a special kind of content, content that is uniquely de se. First, I characterize a notion of de se belief that is neutral with respect to friends and foes of uniquely de se content. I then argue for a determination thesis relating de se belief to belief content: that there is no difference in de se belief without a difference in belief content. I argue that various proposals for rejecting this determination thesis are unsuccessful. In the last part of the paper, I employ this determination thesis to argue for the existence of a type of belief content that is uniquely de se. (shrink)

This entry sketches the theory of personal identity that has come to be known as animalism. Animalism’s hallmark claim is that each of us is identical with a human animal. Moreover, animalists typically claim that we could not exist except as animals, and that the (biological) conditions of our persistence derive from our status as animals. Prominent advocates of this view include Michael Ayers, Eric Olson, Paul Snowdon, Peter van Inwagen, and David Wiggins.

I consider whether the self-ascription theory can succeed in providing a tenseless (B-theoretic) account of tensed belief and timely action. I evaluate an argument given by William Lane Craig for the conclusion that the self-ascription account of tensed belief entails a tensed theory (A-theory) of time. I claim that how one formulates the selfascription account of tensed belief depends upon whether one takes the subject of selfascription to be a momentary person-stage or an enduring person. I provide two different formulations (...) of the self-ascription account of tensed belief, one that is compatible with a perdurantist account of persons and the other that is compatible with an endurantist account of persons. I argue that a self-ascription account of tensed beliefs for enduring subjects most plausibly involves the self-ascription of relations rather than properties. I argue that whether one takes the subject of self-ascription to be a momentary personstage or an enduring person, the self-ascription theory provides a plausible B-theoretic account of how tensed belief and timely action are possible. (shrink)

Alongside science and law, argumentation is also of central importance in everyday life. But what characterizes a good argument? This question has occupied philosophers and psychologists for centuries. The theory of Bayesian argumentation is particularly suitable for clarifying it, because it allows us to take into account in a natural way the role of uncertainty, which is central to much argumentation. Moreover, it offers the possibility of measuring the strength of an argument in probabilistic terms. One way to do this, (...) implicit in much work, is to identify the strength of an argument with the degree to which the premises of the argument confirm the conclusion. We criticize this prima facie plausible proposal and suggest instead that the strength of an argument has something to do with how much the premises and the conclusion of the argument cohere with each other. This leads to a new probabilistic measure whose properties we examine in more detail. (shrink)

Will it rain tomorrow? Will there be a sea battle tomorrow? Will my death be painful? Wondering about the future plays a central role in our cognitive lives. It is integral to our inquiries, our planning, our hopes, and our fears. The aim of this paper is to consider various accounts of future contingents and the implications that they have for wondering about the future. I argue that reflecting on the nature of wondering about the future supports an Ockhamist account (...) of future contingents according to which many of them are true. Alternative accounts which maintain that no future contingents are true, either by claiming that they are all false or by claiming that they are neither true nor false, face difficulties concerning why it is appropriate to wonder about them. Reflecting on wondering in general, and wondering about the future in particular, suggests that in wondering how the future will go, we implicitly assume that there is a determinate fact of the matter. After presenting an attractive account of interrogative attitudes that has been recently proposed by Jane Friedman and outlining some norms governing wondering, I argue that all accounts of future contingents except Ockhamism face difficulties concerning why it is appropriate to wonder about them. (shrink)

Coherence considerations play an important role in science and in everyday reasoning. However, it is unclear what exactly is meant by coherence of information and why we prefer more coherent information over less coherent information. To answer these questions, we first explore how to explicate the dazzling notion of ``coherence'' and how to measure the coherence of an information set. To do so, we critique prima facie plausible proposals that incorporate normative principles such as ``Agreement'' or ``Dependence'' and then argue (...) that the coherence of an information set is best understood as an indicator of the truth of the set under certain conditions. Using computer simulations, we then show that a new probabilistic measure of coherence that combines aspects of the two principles above, but without strictly satisfying either principle, performs particularly well in this regard. (shrink)

Since the 1860s, petroleum companies, through their influence on local governments, port authorities, international actors and the general public gradually became more dominant in shaping the urban form of ports and cities. Under their development and pressure, the relationships between industrial and urban areas in port cities hosting oil facilities evolved in time. The borders limiting industrial and housing territories have continuously changed with industrial places moving progressively away from urban areas. Such a changing dynamic influenced the permeability of these (...) borders. Port cities are nodes and logistic points where various flows of commodities, wealth, and knowledge gathered before further re‐distribution. These flows affected port cities by changing their spatial organization and the availabiity of space between borders. The main question here is: How did industrial and urban borders evolve through time in port cities? Through a historical analysis, the article explores the settlements of oil facilities and the influence of oil companies over local, regional, and national governments in creating borders and how it influenced the porosity of port cities. This article, through the petroleum narrative, illustrates the impacts of past borders on the contemporary urban form through the evolution of the French port city of Dunkirk, in the North of France. As a historical study, the article analyzes the changing relationships between petroleum industrial sites and housing areas in the city of Dunkirk, using aerial pictures, archival sources, and regulations of different periods. The importance of this analysis lies in knowing that former oil sites previously located on the periphery of Dunkirk, that were forgotten by the authorities are now located within the current urban tissue. This process demonstrates the importance of historical developments to understand current challenges in the urban planning of industrial port cities. (shrink)

De se attitudes seem to play a special role in action and cognition. This raises a challenge to the traditional way in which mental attitudes have been understood. In this chapter, we review the case for thinking that de se attitudes require special theoretical treatment and discuss various ways in which the traditional theory can be modified to accommodate de se attitudes.

Simulation (von lat. simulare, engl. simulation, franz. simulation, ital. simulazione), Bezeichnung für die Nachahmung eines Prozesses durch einen anderen Prozeß. Beide Prozesse laufen auf einem bestimmten System ab. Simuliertes u. simulierendes System (der Simulator in der Kybernetik) können dabei auf gleichen oder unterschiedlichen Substraten realisiert sein.

Fundamental aspects of modern life owe their existence to the achievements of scientific reason. In other words, science is an integral element of the modern world and simultaneously the epitome of the rational nature of a technical culture that makes up the essence of the modern world. Without science, the modern world would lose its very nature and modern society its future. Right from the start, physics forms the core of European scientific development. It is the original paradigm of science, (...) the foundation of technology and a constitutive part of a rational culture. It will remain a model methodological discipline in the future and its strengths will be used fruitfully in interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary collaboration. (shrink)

An Beispielen aus der Entwicklung der Elementarteilchenphysik wird aufgezeigt, welche Rolle Modelle im Entstehungsprozess einer physikalischen Theorie spielen.

Die Frage, was eine wissenschaftliche Erklärung ist, stellt seit mehr als einem halben Jahrhundert ein zentrales Thema der Wissenschaftsphilosophie dar. Die heutige Diskussion begann mit einer richtungsweisenden Arbeit von Carl Hempel im Jahre 1942 über den Erklärungsbegriff in der Geschichtswissenschaft. In dieser Arbeit gab Hempel, frühere Überlegungen von John Stuart Mill, Karl Popper und anderen präzisierend, eine formale Definition der Erklärung eines singulären Faktums.1 Mit seiner dem zugrunde liegenden Auffassung, dass die Wissenschaften sehr wohl in der Lage sind, Erklärungen zu (...) liefern, setzt sich Hempel ab von den zur damaligen Zeit vorherrschenden antimetaphysisch gestimmten Erklärungsskeptikern wie Pierre Duhem. Es ist jedoch wichtig zu betonen, dass Hempels Definition des Konzeptes der wissenschaftlichen Erklärung nicht wesentlich über das Deskriptive hinaus geht und damit auch und gerade von Empiristen akzeptiert werden kann. Bekanntlich versteht man unter einer Erklärung in Hempels Deduktiv-Nomologischen (D-N) Modell ein deduktiv gültiges Argument, zu dessen Prämisse (dem sog. Explanans) mindestens ein universelles Gesetz und eine Menge von singulären Sätzen gehört und dessen Konklusion das zu erklärende Faktum (das sog. Explanandum) ist. (shrink)

A large body of work has demonstrated the utility of the Bayesian framework for capturing inference in both specialist and everyday contexts. However, the central tool of the framework, conditionalization via Bayes’ rule, does not apply directly to a common type of learning: the acquisition of conditional information. How should an agent change her beliefs on learning that “If A, then C”? This issue, which is central to both reasoning and argumentation, has recently prompted considerable research interest. In this paper, (...) we critique a prominent proposal and provide a new, alternative, answer. -/- . (shrink)

Let me first state that I like Antti Revonsuo’s discussion of the various methodological and interpretational problems in neuroscience. It shows how careful and methodologically reflected scientists have to proceed in this fascinating field of research. I have nothing to add here. Furthermore, I am very sympathetic towards Revonsuo’s general proposal to call for a Philosophy of Neuroscience that stresses foundational issues, but also focuses on methodological and explanatory strategies.2 In a footnote of his paper, Revonsuo complains – as many (...) others do today – about what is sometimes called “physics imperialism”. This is the view that physics dominates the philosophy of science. I am not sure if this is still the case nowadays, but it is certainly historically correct that almost all work in the field of methodology centered around cases from physics. Although this has been changing, there are still plenty of special sciences philosophers did not worry about much. Admittedly, I am myself a trained physicist and not a neuroscientist and will therefore probably be biased negatively. As it is, I will discuss some examples from physics in order to illustrate my points. (shrink)

A theory is disjunctive insofar as it distinguishes genuine from non-genuine cases of some phenomenon P on the grounds that no salient feature of cases of one type is common to cases of the other type. Genuine and non-genuine cases of P are, in this sense, fundamentally different. Those who advocate disjunctivist theories have (for the most part) been concerned with perception and perceptual knowledge. This entry outlines two such theories: the disjunctivist theory of experience (cf. Brewer, Hinton, Martin, Snowdon, (...) Travis) and the disjunctivist theory of appearances (McDowell). (shrink)

Scientific theories are used for a variety of purposes. For example, physical theories such as classical mechanics and electrodynamics have important applications in engineering and technology, and we trust that this results in useful machines, stable bridges, and the like. Similarly, theories such as quantum mechanics and relativity theory have many applications as well. Beyond that, these theories provide us with an understanding of the world and address fundamental questions about space, time, and matter. Here we trust that the answers (...) scientific theories give are reliable and that we have good reason to believe that the features of the world are similar to what the theories say about them. But why do we trust scientific theories, and what counts as evidence in favor of them? (shrink)

This paper will delve into the problem of Good Governance in the light of Kong Zi. What makes up a Just State? What are the elements that constitute a prosperous Kingdom? What principles of Confucianism can we employ to achieve a just and humane society? These are the primary questions that we will try to investigate as we go along. The paper will be thus divided into three essential parts: The Notion of Li and the Sovereign, The ConfucianMoral Ideal, and (...) lastly, The Great Commonwealth. (shrink)

What is the relationship between Frege’s puzzle and the puzzle of the de se? An increasingly influential view claims that the de se puzzle is merely an instance of Frege’s puzzle and that the idea that de se attitudes pose a distinctive theoretical challenge rests on a myth. Here we argue that this view is misguided. There are important differences between the two puzzles. First, unlike Frege puzzle cases, de se puzzle cases involve unshareable Fregean senses. Second, unlike Frege puzzle (...) cases, de se puzzle cases cannot be resolved by objective information alone. Further, there seem to be pure cases of each puzzle: instances of the de se puzzle which do not have a Fregean structure, and instances of Frege’s puzzle, which do not involve de se attitudes. We conclude that the two puzzles are fundamentally different and that the traditional theory of attitudes needs to be amended. (shrink)

In Nothing to Come, Fabrice Correia and Sven Rosenkranz provide a sophisticated, compelling, and thoroughly defended account of the growing block theory. This note critically evaluates two aspects of this account. First, it evaluates Correia and Rosenkranz’s attempt at providing a grounding principle for future truths and argues that this principle fails to make progress in explaining why future truths are true. Second, it evaluates Correia and Rosenkranz’s construal of the open future arguing that the asymmetry in openness with respect (...) to the past and future is not plausibly understood in terms of determinism and indeterminism, and in the final section, it evaluates their claim that a growing block theorist is able to maintain that the future is open in a stronger sense than the block theorist. (shrink)

Why is there a specific problem with biological individuality? Because the living realm contains a wide range of exotic particular concrete entities that do not easily match our ordinary concept of an individual. Slime moulds, dandelions, siphonophores are among the Odd Entities that excite the ontological zeal of the philosophers of biology. Most of these philosophers, however, seem to believe that these Odd Cases oblige us to refine or revise our common concept of an individual. They think, explicitly or tacitly, (...) that to be a living, evolutionary entity is to be a living individual. In this paper, we explore an alternative proposal: the variety and oddity of the forms of the living realm might be ontologically regimented through an increase in the categorial complexity of the living realm, by admitting, beside living individuals, living non-individuals or by acknowledging, more generally, that the evolutionary development of the living forms is not necessarily a process of building individuals, that life is not necessarily individuals-oriented. We claim that, from an ontological point of view, the spectacle of the living realm obliges us to take aggregativity seriously. (shrink)

In this paper I consider two strategies for providing tenseless truth-conditions for tensed sentences: the token-reflexive theory and the date theory. Both theories have faced a number of objections by prominent A-theorists such as Quentin Smith and William Lane Craig. Traditionally, these two theories have been viewed as rival methods for providing truth-conditions for tensed sentences. I argue that the debate over whether the token-reflexive theory or the date theory is true has arisen from a failure to distinguish between conditions (...) for the truth of tensed tokens and conditions for the truth of propositions expressed by tensed tokens. I demonstrate that there is a true formulation of the token-reflexive theory that provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the truth of tensed tokens, and there is a true formulation of the date theory that provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the truth of propositions expressed by tensed tokens. I argue that once the views are properly formulated, the A-theorist’s objections fail to make their mark. However, I conclude by claiming that even though there is a true formulation of the token-reflexive theory and a true formulation of the date theory, the New B-theory nonetheless fails to provide a complete account of the truth and falsity of tensed sentences. (shrink)

There are different ways in which imaginings can involve the first-person. I can imagine skiing down a mountain, looking down the slope, the wind whipping me in the face. I can also imagine myself skiing down a mountain from the outside, adopting the point of view of a spectator watching myself fly down the mountain. I can also imagine that I am someone else entirely, say Angela Merkel, skiing down a mountain. In this paper I develop and defend a new (...) account of the content of first-person imaginings. I first look at two existing accounts, one proposed by Francois Recanati (2007a, 2007b) and the other proposed by Dilip Ninan (2008), and I argue that they lack the resources to model the rich and distinct types of first-person imaginings that we can have. I then present and defend a new account that reconstrues the imagining from the inside vs. imagining from the outside distinction and can accommodate the various ways in which imaginings involve the first-person. (shrink)

Many collective decision making problems have a combinatorial structure: the agents involved must decide on multiple issues and their preferences over one issue may depend on the choices adopted for some of the others. Voting is an attractive method for making collective decisions, but conducting a multi-issue election is challenging. On the one hand, requiring agents to vote by expressing their preferences over all combinations of issues is computationally infeasible; on the other, decomposing the problem into several elections on smaller (...) sets of issues can lead to paradoxical outcomes. Any pragmatic method for running a multi-issue election will have to balance these two concerns. We identify and analyse the problem of generating an agenda for a given election, specifying which issues to vote on together in local elections and in which order to schedule those local elections. (shrink)

In this paper, I defend the view that our knowledge of our desires is inferential and based on the consciousness we have of our emotions, and on our experiences of pain and pleasure.

Consciousness is the major, perhaps the only, issue that makes the perennial mind-body problem unsolvable. To solve the problem, it is necessary to identify what produces consciousness. Every attempt to explain what produces consciousness has failed, and this failure is venom in discoursing the mind-body problem. Without consciousness in the real sense: the materialists within their framework would have succeeded in explaining how the body responds to impulses from the brain, now, their explanation is redundant; the immaterialists would have had (...) nothing to say, but now, their explanations on the nature of mind, and its relationship with the body, is confusing. This paper critically evaluates the concept, of consciousness, it observes that materialism and immaterialism have created more problems than what they set out to solve. Their mutually exclusive positions on the source of humans' consciousness and explanations of the relationship between the mind and body have closed the door to removing the venom in the mind-body problem. Also, that has hampered human yarning to know the true nature of reality. Based on the foregoing, this paper argues that consciousness is the product of both the body and mind. The mind is seen as a quasi-material – an extension of the main-brain. The source is likened to the signal received by the digital television set. The decoder receives information from the satellite dish and presents it to human beings in understandable ways. Without the satellite dish, there would be no such information, and without the television set, such information would be meaningless. Keywords: Consciousness; Main-brain; Materialism and Immaterialism; Mind-body; Neurons. (shrink)

This review is a critical discussion of three main claims in Debs and Redhead’s thought-provoking book Objectivity, Invariance, and Convention. These claims are: (i) Social acts impinge upon formal aspects of scientific representation; (ii) symmetries introduce the need for conventional choice; (iii) perspectival symmetry is a necessary and sufficient condition for objectivity, while symmetry simpliciter fails to be necessary.

Der Begriff ‘Modell’ leitet sich vom Lateinischen ‘modulus’ (das Maß) ab, im Italienischen existiert seit dem 16. Jh. ‘modello’ und R. Descartes verwendet im 17. Jh. ‘modèlle’. Während der Begriff in Architektur und Kunst schon seit der Renaissance gängig ist, wird er in den Naturwissenschaften erst im 19. Jh. verwendet.1 Dort greifen wissenschaftliche Modelle die für eine gegebene Problemstellung als wesentlich erachteten Charakteristika (Eigenschaften, Beziehungen, etc.) eines Untersuchungsgegenstandes heraus und machen diesen so einem Verständnis bzw. einer weiterführenden Untersuchung zugänglich. Es (...) ist üblich, zwischen Skalenmodellen, Analogmodellen und theoretischen Modellen zu unterscheiden. (shrink)

Vacuum (leer, frei) bezeichnete bis zum 19. Jahrhundert allein den körperlosen Raum. Unter dem Einfluss physikalischer (Feld-) Theorien meint der Terminus inzwischen diejenige residuale physische Entiät, die einen vorgegebenen Raum ausfüllt bzw. im Prinzip ausfüllen würde, nachdem alles, was mit physikalischen Mitteln entfernt werden kann, aus dem Raum entfernt wurde. Theorien über das V. sind daher eng mit Theorien über die Struktur des Raumes, die Bewegung, die physikalischen Gegenstände und deren Wechselwirkungen verbunden. In der Quantentheorie bezeichnet V. den Zustand niedrigster (...) Energie (Grundzustand) eines Systems. (shrink)

Loss of self is widely regarded to be a consequence of dementia, and this perceived loss presents a variety of problems - not least because a clear understanding of the concept of self is elusive. This paper suggests a way to cut through problems that arise because we rely on conceptions of self in our understanding of the effects of dementia. It is proposed that we can avoid reliance on the concept of self through an approach based in in bio-phenomenology. (...) Such an approach would help us better understand the inner life of those with dementia and assist us to recognize that even in late stage dementia they are semiotic subjects with unique value. (shrink)

When do objects at different times compose a further object? This is the question of diachronic composition. The universalist answers, ‘under any conditions whatsoever’. Others argue for restrictions on diachronic composition: composition occurs only when certain conditions are met. Recently, some philosophers have argued that restrictions on diachronic compositions are motivated by our best physical theories. In Persistence and Spacetime and elsewhere, Yuri Balashov argues that diachronic compositions are restricted in terms of causal connections between object stages. In a recent (...) article, Nikk Effingham argues that the standard objections to views that endorse restrictions on composition do not apply to a view that restricts composition according to compliance with the laws of nature. On the face of it, such restrictions on diachronic composition preserve our common-sense ontology while eliminating from it scientifically revisionary objects that travel faster than the speed of light. I argue that these attempts to restrict diachronic composition by appealing to either causal or nomological constraints face insurmountable difficulties within the context of special relativity. I discuss how the universalist should best respond to Hudson’s argument for superluminal objects, and in doing so, I present and defend a new sufficient condition for motion that does not entail that such objects are in superluminal motion. 1 Introduction2 Diachronic Composition3 Diachronic Composition and Superluminal Objects4 Restricting Diachronic Composition5 Causal and Nomological Restrictions on Composition in a Relativistic Context6 Superluminal Objects and Motion7 Conclusion. (shrink)

In this paper I examine an argument that has been made by Patrick Grim for the claim that de se knowledge is incompatible with the existence of an omniscient being. I claim that the success of the argument depends upon whether it is possible for someone else to know what I know in knowing (F), where (F) is a claim involving de se knowledge. I discuss one reply to this argument, proposed by Edward Wierenga, that appeals to first-person propositions and (...) argue that this response is unsuccessful. I then consider David Lewis’s theory of de se attitudes involving the self-ascription of properties. I claim that, according to this theory, there are two senses in which someone else can know what I know in knowing (F). I then argue that the second sense allows for the compatibility of de se knowledge with the existence of an omniscient being. (shrink)

Two features are often assumed about emotions: they are intentional states and they are experiences. However, there are important reasons to consider some affective responses that are not experienced or only partly experienced as emotions. But the existence of these affective responses does not sit well with the intentionality of conscious emotions which are somehow geared towards their object. We therefore face a trilemma: either these latter affective responses do not have intentional objects and we should renounce intentionality as a (...) defining feature of emotions; or we have to explain how they actually have intentional, though unconscious, objects; or after all we must deny that they are really emotions. I suggest that the second option is the correct one: we can provide an account of the intentionality of unconscious emotions and its relation to the intentionality of conscious emotions. To do this, I rely on neuropsychological studies that distinguish two kinds of attention: salience as enriched treatment, and focus as a way of turning our attention. Then, given that only salience is always present in unconscious emotional phenomena, I suggest that emotions are intentional because they involve an object being made salient. I further argue that this feature of emotions explains why unconscious and conscious emotions can be taken as organized around their object. Finally, I defend this account against several objections, showing that the account can be applied whatever the cognitive base of the emotions may be and is not falsified by the fact that attentional aspects of emotions may vary in other dimensions. (shrink)

This paper examines a looming reproducibility crisis in the core of the hard sciences. Namely, it concentrates on molecular modeling and simulation (MMS), a family of methods that predict properties of substances through computing interactions on a molecular level and that is widely popular in physics, chemistry, materials science, and engineering. The paper argues that in order to make quantitative predictions, sophisticated models are needed which have to be evaluated with complex simulation procedures that amalgamate theoretical, technological, and social factors (...) – leading to problems with reproducibility. Thus, for methodological reasons, the predictive success causes a reproducibility problem. (shrink)

This paper reviews four leading strategies for addressing the problem of material constitution, along with some of the prominent objections faced by each approach. Sections include (1) "The Orthodox View: Coincident Objects," (2) "Dominant Kinds," (3) "Nihilism," (4) "Revising the Logic of Identity," and (5) "Future Research." Also included is an annotated bibliography.

In this article, we address a major outstanding question of probabilistic Bayesian epistemology: how should a rational Bayesian agent update their beliefs upon learning an indicative conditional? A number of authors have recently contended that this question is fundamentally underdetermined by Bayesian norms, and hence that there is no single update procedure that rational agents are obliged to follow upon learning an indicative conditional. Here we resist this trend and argue that a core set of widely accepted Bayesian norms is (...) sufficient to identify a normatively privileged updating procedure for this kind of learning. Along the way, we justify a privileged formalization of the notion of ‘epistemic conservativity’, offer a new analysis of the Judy Benjamin problem, and emphasize the distinction between interpreting the content of new evidence and updating one’s beliefs on the basis of that content. (shrink)

This paper concerns model-checking of fragments and extensions of CTL* on infinite-state Presburger counter systems, where the states are vectors of integers and the transitions are determined by means of relations definable within Presburger arithmetic. In general, reachability properties of counter systems are undecidable, but we have identified a natural class of admissible counter systems (ACS) for which we show that the quantification over paths in CTL* can be simulated by quantification over tuples of natural numbers, eventually allowing translation of (...) the whole Presburger-CTL* into Presburger arithmetic, thereby enabling effective model checking. We provide evidence that our results are close to optimal with respect to the class of counter systems described above. (shrink)

Patrick Todd's The Open Future defends the view that all future contingent statements, like ‘It will rain tomorrow’, are false.1 Not only is ‘It will rain tomor.

Beyond the past, present, future and possible conceptual varieties and variations as well as applications or uses, our purpose is to try to understand what can be concealed and revealed, in terms of residual elements, the various & multiple aspectual dimensions of the idea of " View from Nowhere". For these reasons, we propose to question the concept of "point of view/ View from" from the following interrogation: to what extent would it be necessary for thought to be able to (...) go beyond the limits inherent to any human and individual perspective, necessarily particular and subjective? Our proposal will question the origins of "perspectivism" in order to circumscribe a certain conceptual indeterminacy which seems to haunt also all or part of its possible contemporary uses. To reflect on the different systems where it can be operative and on the structuring function of the "perspectivity", to determine certain epistemic and historical contexts which bring this last one to the metaphysical agenda, to define the problems and limits of any logic of the "point of view" and the various related conceptual strategies, elaborated by the philosophers when they seize the idea of perspective and its aspectual dimensions, such will be the stake of our subject which will undoubtedly tend, according to the points of view, to claim or not to exceed any perspective.... (shrink)

A consistent finding in research on conditional reasoning is that individuals are more likely to endorse the valid modus ponens (MP) inference than the equally valid modus tollens (MT) inference. This pattern holds for both abstract task and probabilistic task. The existing explanation for this phenomenon within a Bayesian framework (e.g., Oaksford & Chater, 2008) accounts for this asymmetry by assuming separate probability distributions for both MP and MT. We propose a novel explanation within a computational-level Bayesian account of reasoning (...) according to which “argumentation is learning”. We show that the asymmetry must appear for certain prior probability distributions, under the assumption that the conditional inference provides the agent with new information that is integrated into the existing knowledge by minimizing the Kullback-Leibler divergence between the posterior and prior probability distribution. We also show under which conditions we would expect the opposite pattern, an MT-MP asymmetry. (shrink)

This article presents the results of research conducted with secondary school teachers in Quebec, specifically in the Mauricie region. The authors propose a reflection on the construction of professional identity in a context of institutional crisis. They argue that in this context, the teacher can not rely on stable and social frameworks to build up a strong professional identity and that work experience that becomes the primordial material from which that identity is developed. Therefore, the teacher has to build its (...) identity from a set of rational narrative experience of professional practice.contrastée des attentes et des représentations d'étudiants en formation initiale à l'enseignement secondaire en fonction de leur engagement ou non dans un établissement scolaire Cet article présente les résultats d’une recherche menée auprès d’enseignants du niveau secondaire au Québec, plus spécifiquement dans la région de la Mauricie. Les auteurs proposent une réflexion sur la construction de l’identité professionnelle dans un contexte de crise des institutions. Ils soutiennent que dans ce contexte l’enseignant ne peut compter sur des cadres sociaux stables et solides pour se constituer une identité professionnelle et que c’est l’expérience au travail qui devient le matériau primordial à partir duquel s’élabore cette identité. Par conséquent, l’enseignant a à construire son identité à partir d’une mise en récit rationnelle de son expérience de la pratique professionnelle. (shrink)

Since at least the mid-1980s claims have been made for rationality in rats. For example, that rats are capable of inferential reasoning (Blaisdell, Sawa, Leising, & Waldmann, 2006; Bunsey & Eichenbaum, 1996), or that they can make adaptive decisions about future behavior (Foote & Crystal, 2007), or that they are capable of knowledge in propositional-like form (Dickinson, 1985). The stakes are rather high, because these capacities imply concept possession and on some views (e.g., Rödl, 2007; Savanah, 2012) rationality indicates self-consciousness. (...) I evaluate the case for rat rationality by analyzing 5 key research paradigms: spatial navigation, metacognition, transitive inference, causal reasoning, and goal orientation. I conclude that the observed behaviors need not imply rationality by the subjects. Rather, the behavior can be accounted for by noncognitive processes such as hard-wired species typical predispositions or associative learning or (nonconceptual) affordance detection. These mechanisms do not necessarily require or implicate the capacity for rationality. As such there is as yet insufficient evidence that rats can reason. I end by proposing the ‘Staircase Test,’ an experiment designed to provide convincing evidence of rationality in rats. (shrink)

In this paper, I explain the processes undergone by the producer of an awoval. The conditions of its possibility and its effects on the subjet itself through the effects on those to whom the avowal is addressed. I finally wonder to what extent it may be considered a moral transformation.