For millennia, knowledge has eluded a precise definition. The industrialization of knowledge (IoK) and the associated proliferation of the so-called knowledge communities in the last few decades caused this state of affairs to deteriorate, namely by creating a trio composed of data, knowledge, and information (DIK) that is not unlike the aporia of the trinity in philosophy. This calls for a general theory of knowledge (ToK) that can work as a foundation for a science (...) of knowledge (SoK) and additionally distinguishes knowledge from both data and information. In this paper, I attempt to sketch this generality via the establishing of both knowledge structures and knowledge systems that can then be adopted/adapted by the diverse communities for the respective knowledge technologies and practices. This is achieved by means of a formal–indeed, mathematical–approach to epistemological matters a.k.a. formal epistemology. The corresponding application focus is on knowledge systems implementable as computer programs. (shrink)

Sophocles’ Oedipus the King is an extended meditation on the limits of human intelligence, or more precisely, on how a man renowned for the power of his intellect could fail to know the most important truths. One could argue, however, that Sophocles intended for his audiences to take away a second, narrower lesson: namely that divinely inspired seers such as Tiresias have a surer claim on truth than do those who, like Oedipus, seek to gain knowledge through their own (...) efforts. Thus, the Oedipus can be seen as a defense of prophecy and a reaction against the complex of scientific and philosophical ideas known as “the 5th-century Enlightenment.” I offer some support for this reading of the Oedipus. I also argue that part of the cultural background of the Oedipus consisted of ideas about knowledge introduced into Greek thought by the outspoken critic of Greek popular religion, Xenophanes of Colophon. (shrink)

The central question of this article is how to combine counterfactual theories of knowledge with the notion of actuality. It is argued that the straightforward combination of these two elements leads to problems, viz. the problem of easy knowledge and the problem of missing knowledge. In other words, there is overgeneration of knowledge and there is undergeneration of knowledge. The combination of these problems cannot be solved by appealing to methods by which beliefs are formed. (...) An alternative solution is put forward. The key is to rethink the closeness relation that is at the heart of counterfactual theories of knowledge. (shrink)

A recursive definition of knowledge is proposed, to deal with Gettier style difficulties, and provide a framework for a variety of recursionist theories of knowledge.

Here is a definition of knowledge: for you to know a proposition p is for you to have an outright belief in p that is correct precisely because it manifests the virtue of rationality. This definition resembles Ernest Sosa’s “virtue theory”, except that on this definition, the only virtue that must be manifested in all instances of knowledge is rationality, and no reductive account of rationality is attempted—rationality is assumed to be an irreducibly normative notion. This definition (...) is compatible with “internalism” about rationality, and with a form of “pragmatic encroachment” on the conditions of rational outright belief. An interpretation is given of this definition, and especially of the sense of ’because’ that it involves. On this interpretation, this definition entails that both safety and adherence are necessary conditions on knowledge; it supports a kind of contextualism about terms like ‘knowledge’; and it provides resources to defend safety, adherence, and contextualism, against some recent objections. (shrink)

A short dissertation on a definition for knowledge. Although similar to binary opposition, this treatise follows the logic to conclude that knowledge is finite.

The Gettier Problem is the problem of revising the view that knowledge is justified true belief in a way that is immune to Gettier counter-examples. The “Gettier Problem problem”, according to Lycan, is the problem of saying what is misguided about trying to solve the Gettier Problem. In this paper I take up the Gettier Problem problem. I distinguish giving conditions that are necessary and sufficient for knowledge from giving conditions that explain why one knows when one does (...) know. I argue that the problem with the Gettier Problem is that it requires us to articulate conditions that suffice for knowledge even if those conditions are non-explanatory. After defending this view, I take up two related methodological issues, one about the evidence that can be given in favor of an account of knowledge, and one about the role that investigating justification might play in investigating knowledge. (shrink)

Is knowledge consistent with literally any credence in the relevant proposition, including credence 0? Of course not. But is credence 0 the only credence in p that entails that you don’t know that p? Knowledge entails belief (most epistemologists think), and it’s impossible to believe that p while having credence 0 in p. Is it true that, for every value of ‘x,’ if it’s impossible to know that p while having credence x in p, this is simply because (...) it’s impossible to believe that p while having credence x in p? If so, is it possible to believe that p while having (say) credence 0.4 in p? These questions aren’t standard epistemological fare, at least in part because many epistemologists think their answers are obvious, but they have unanticipated consequences for epistemology. Let ‘improbabilism’ name the thesis that it’s possible to know that p while having a credence in p below 0.5. Improbabilism will strike many epistemologists as absurd, but careful reflection on these questions reveals that, if improbabilism is false, then all of the most plausible theories of knowledge are also false. Or so I argue in this paper. Since improbabilism is widely rejected by epistemologists (at least implicitly), this paper reveals a tension between all of the most plausible theories of knowledge and a widespread assumption in epistemology. (shrink)

A theory of knowledge is the explanation of things in terms of the possibilities and capabilities of the human way of knowing. The human knowledge is the representation of the things apprehended sensitively either through the senses or intuition. A theory of knowledge concludes about the reality of the things studied. As such it is a priori speculation, based on synthetic a priori statements. Its conclusions constitute interpretation, that is, hermeneutics. Linguistics as the science studying (...) real language, that is, the language spoken, reverts to human subjects in as much as they speak, say and know. Language thus must be studied as a theory of knowledge. (shrink)

An account of Plato’s theory of knowledge is offered. Plato is in a sense a contextualist: at least, he recognizes that his own use of the word for “knowledge” varies – in some contexts, it stands for the fullest possible level of understanding of a truth, while in other contexts, it is broader and includes less complete levels of understanding as well. But for Plato, all knowledge, properly speaking, is a priori knowledge of necessary truths (...) – based on recollection of aspects of the Forms – and so in contemporary terms, it meets the conditions of “safety” and “adherence” (or “indefeasibility”) to the highest degree. This account is defended on the basis of the text of Meno, Phaedo, and the Republic, against some objections – especially objections that are due to Gail Fine. (shrink)

Skepticism about the external world may very well be correct, so the question is in order: what theory of knowledge flows from skepticism itself? The skeptic can give a relatively simple and intuitive account of knowledge by identifying it with indubitable certainty. Our everyday ‘I know that p’ claims, which typically are part of practical projects, deploy the ideal of knowledge to make assertions closely related to, but weaker than, knowledge claims. The truth of such (...) claims is consistent with skepticism; various other vexing problems don’t arise. In addition, even if no claim about the world outside my mind can be more probable than its negation, the project of pure scientific research remains well motivated. (shrink)

We will argue here, that one of the salient messages of standard quantum formalism implies a failure of Classical Theory of Knowledge (hereafter CTK) which is primarily based on the presumption that, our knowledge is predetermined by Nature. This failure provides pointers against the classically held ontological definiteness of future. Quantum formalism admits interpretation , that suggests, that there is no such thing as ‘universal global present’ in the sense of being able to confirm a complete set (...) of facts of matter about it, unless this is coupled with a specific observation recipe. (shrink)

Theory of "conceptual pragmatism" takes into account both modern philosophical thought and modern mathematics. Stimulating discussions of metaphysics, a priori, philosophic method, much more.

It is demonstrated here that despite apparent differences and their adherence to two different schools of thought, Suhrawardī's epistemology is essentially Ibn Sīnian, and even his theory of "knowledge by Presence" ('ilm al-hudurī), which is considered to be uniquely his, is at least inspired by Ibn Sīnā. I argue that Ibn Sīnā's peripatetic orientation and Suhrawardī's ishrāqī perspective have both maintained and adhered to the same epistemological framework while the philosophical languages in which their respective epistemologies are discussed (...) are different. (shrink)

In this dissertation I present a new solution to the renowned Gettier problem. My solution, which in a sense represents a defense of a rather traditional epistemological approach, is based upon a distinction between primary and secondary beliefs. I argue that primary beliefs are known if justified and true, whereas secondary beliefs are known if they are believed on the basis of a known primary belief. Much emphasis is put upon defending this approach against potential objections, but I also draw (...) some epistemological and semantical consequences pertaining to such issues as the nature of epistemological justification, the Lottery Paradox, philosophical skepticism and the semantics of belief contexts. (shrink)

A philosophical study of the nature, types and conditions of knowledge, namely belief, truth, and justification. It discusses the most prominent theories presented by contemporary philosophers in the analysis of these conditions. It answers questions related to understanding, interpretation and scientific knowledge. The most important branches of contemporary epistemology are deepened, such as naturalistic epistemology and social epistemology. Moreover, the author addresses the concepts of knowledge through linguistic and logical analysis. He defends a vision of philosophy as (...) a conceptual clarification as well as a natural tendency. It offers an epistemological doctrine called moderate naturalism, which comes in the form of a moderate form of scientism. دراسة فلسفية لطبيعة المعرفة، وأنواعها، وشروطها وهي الاعتقاد، والصدق، والتسويغ. ويناقش أبرز النظريات التي قدمها الفلاسفة المعاصرون في تحليل هذه الشروط. ويجيب عن الأسئلة المتعلقة بالفهم والتفسير والمعرفة العلمية. ويتعمق أهم فروع الإبستمولوجيا المعاصرة مثل الإبستمولوجيا الطبيعية والإبستمولوجيا الاجتماعية زد على ذلك أن المؤلف يعالج مفاهيم المعرفة من خلال التحليل اللغوي والمنطقي. ويدافع عن رؤية للفلسفة بوصفها توضيحا مفهوميًّا بالإضافة إلى نزعة طبيعية. ويقدم مذهبًا إبستمولوجيًّا سماه المذهب الطبيعي المعتدل، يأتي فى إطار صورة معتدلة من النزعة العلمية RELATED PRODUCTS . (shrink)

In this paper we argue that knowledge is characteristically safe true belief. We argue that an adequate approach to epistemic luck must not be indexed to methods of belief formation, but rather to explanations for belief. This shift is problematic for several prominent approaches to the theory of knowledge, including virtue reliabilism and proper functionalism (as normally conceived). The view that knowledge is characteristically safe true belief is better able to accommodate the shift in question.

Abstract In this paper I present a short outline of an Indicativity Theory of Knowledge, for the cases of Perceptual Knowledge and Knowledge by Memory. I explain the main rationale for a token-indicativity approach, and how it is fleshed out precisely in terms of chances. I elaborate on the account of the value of knowledge it provides, and what that value is. I explain why, given the rationale of conceiving Knowledge as token indicativity, separate (...) sub-accounts in terms of chances should be extracted for the different modes of Knowledge, elaborating on the common core of high token-indicativity. In the main section that outlines the account of Perceptual Knowledge, the main Indicativity condition is presented, as are the main condition of in what sense high token indicativity should yields high chance, the important Discriminability condition, and its associated Contrast Class. (shrink)

Anyone familiar with Russell’s work on the multiple-relation theory of judgment will at some point have puzzled over the map of the five-term understanding complex at the end of Chapter 1, Part II of his Theory of Knowledge (1913). Russell presents the map with the intention of clarifying what goes on when a subject S understands the “proposition” that A and B are similar. But the map raises more questions than it answers. In this paper I present (...) and develop some of the central issues that arise from Russell’s map, and I offer an interpretation of it that reflects his evolving views in the manuscript. I argue that multiple lines in the map are not meant to represent many relations, but rather one comprehensive multiple relation of understanding. And I argue that such a relation relates in a complex way due to the distinctive nature of its relata. (shrink)

The present essay took as its hypothesis the premise that the Metaphysical Neutrality proposed by Husserl since his initial studies needs to be recognized with methodological and analytical limits. In order to overcome this limit, a recovery of the Metaphysics and Theory of Knowledge of St. Thomas Aquinas was carried out, interpreting this theory through a Moderate and Direct Realism. As a conclusion, it was possible to identify that there is a very important similarity between both theories, (...) as well as that for phenomenological investigations to achieve their primary cognitive intent, care must be taken not to annihilate moderate realist metaphysics. (shrink)

A brief dissertation on what knowledge is.

The article analyses the meta- epistemological problem of the justification of a theory of knowledge. The first section is dedicated to the morphological reconstruction of the problem, the second presents a diagnosis of the problem in terms of a metatheoretical and logically non- contradictory "petitio principii" and the third delineates the limits within which strategies for the treatment of the problem could be elaborated.

Knowledge-first theories of justification are theories of justification that give knowledge priority when it comes to explaining when and why someone has justification for an attitude or an action. The emphasis of this article is on knowledge-first theories of justification for belief. As it turns out, there are a number of ways of giving knowledge priority when theorizing about justification, and what follows is a survey of more than a dozen existing options that have emerged in (...) the early 21st century since the publication of Timothy Williamson’s *Knowledge and Its Limits*. This article traces several of the general theoretical motivations that have been offered for putting knowledge first in the theory of justification. This is followed by an examination of existing knowledge-first theories of justification and their standing objections. These objections are largely, but not exclusively, concerned with the extensional adequacy of knowledge-first theories of justification. There are doubtless more ways to give knowledge priority in the theory of justified belief than are covered here, but the survey is instructive because it highlights potential shortcomings that would-be knowledge-first theorists of justification may wish either to avoid or else to be prepared with a suitable error theory. This entry concludes with a reflection about the extent to which the short history of, arguably, failed attempts to secure an unproblematic knowledge-first account of justified belief has begun to resemble the older Gettier dialectic. (shrink)

This article discusses a kind of knowledge classifiable as knowledge-wh but which seems to defy analysis in terms of the standard reductive theory of knowledge-wh ascriptions, according to which they are true if and only if one knows that p, where this proposition is an acceptable answer to the wh-question ‘embedded’ in the ascription. Specifically, it is argued that certain cases of knowing what an experience is like resist such treatment. I argue that in some of (...) these cases, one can know that p, where an acceptable answer to the question ‘What’s the experience like?’ is that p, but where one does not know what the experience is like. This could point to the distinctiveness of this sort of knowledge. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Tristan Haze offers two examples that, he claims, are counterexamples to Nozick's Theory of Knowledge. Haze claims his examples work against Nozick's theory understood as relativized to belief forming methods M. We believe that they fail to be counterexamples to Nozick's theory. Since he aims the examples at tracking theories generally, we will also explain why they are not counterexamples to Dretske's Conclusive Reasons Theory of Knowledge.

This dissertation engages in a critical analysis of the work of Adolf Reinach in the theory of knowledge and legal philosophy. Reinach had trained as a lawyer and brought that perspective and experience to bear in his phenomenological work on problems in evidence and legal philosophy. His contributions to phenomenology in the early 20th century provide a window into the earliest phases of the development of the phenomenological movement, prior to World War I. This dissertation locates this work (...) in the European intellectual context of the era and finds analogies with key philosophical dilemmas and developments in England during the same period, arguably ones with shared intellectual roots. Valued for his talent as an inspiring university lecturer, Reinach was a central figure in the circle of young scholars who practiced phenomenology in the spirit of the "early" "pre-Ideen" phase of phenomenology. The dissertation Appendices include translations of selected excerpts from the Nachlass. My translation of the obituary Edmund Husserl wrote and published following Adolf Reinach's death in WWI is published separately. Professor Raymond Klibansky was my supervisor and mentor throughout. (shrink)

Rachael Briggs and Daniel Nolan attempt to improve on Nozick’s tracking theory of knowledge by providing a modified, dispositional tracking theory. The dispositional theory, however, faces more problems than those previously noted by John Turri. First, it is not simply that satisfaction of the theory’s conditions is unnecessary for knowledge – it is insufficient as well. Second, in one important respect, the dispositional theory is a step backwards relative to the original tracking (...) class='Hi'>theory: the original but not the dispositional theory can avoid Gettier-style counterexamples. Future attempts to improve the tracking theory would be wise to bear these problems in mind. (shrink)

Kant mentions two faculties of the mind that are involved in the knowing process, namely, sensibility and understanding. Through the former, the objects are “given” while through the latter, objects are “thought of.” The receiving faculty, that of sensibility, deals with space and time as pure intuitions. On the other, the thinking faculty - that of understanding, treats concepts or categories. Thus, these faculties of the human reason presuppose the two elements of knowledge: contents or intuitions and thoughts or (...) concepts for sensibility and understanding, respectively. This paper aims at presenting the coming-to-be of knowledge through the operations of the mind in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and critically exposes the correlation of sensibility and of understanding in the knowing process. (shrink)

The present article is an attempt to give - in the frame of the theory of the organism - environment system - a new interpretation to the role of efferent influences on receptor activity and to the functions of senses in the formation of knowledge. It is argued, on the basis of experimental evidence and theoretical considerations, that the senses are not transmitters of environmental information, but they create a direct connection between the organism and the environment, which (...) makes the development of a dynamic living system, the organism - environment system, possible. In this connection process the efferent influences on receptor activity are of particular significance, because with their help the receptors may be adjusted in relation to the parts of the environment which are most important in the achievement of behavioral results. Perception is the process of joining of new parts of the environment to the organism - environment system ; thus, the formation of knowledge by perception is based on reorganization of the organism - environment system, and not on transmission of information from the environment. With the help of the efferent influences on receptors each organism creates its own peculiar world which is simultaneously subjective and objective. The present considerations have far reaching influences as well on experimental work in neurophysiology and psychology of perception as on philosophical considerations of knowledge formation. (shrink)

I present two counterexamples to the recently back-in-favour truth-tracking account of knowledge: one involving a true belief resting on a counterfactually robust delusion, one involving a true belief acquired alongside a bunch of false beliefs. These counterexamples carry over to a recent modification of the theory due to Briggs and Nolan (2012), and seem invulnerable to a recent defence of the theory against known counterexamples, by Adams and Clarke (2005).

Consider the claims that representations of physical laws are intersubjective, and that they ultimately provide the foundation for all other intersubjective knowledge. Those claims, as well as the deeper philosophical commitments that justify them, constitute rare points of agreement between the Marburg School neo-Kantians Paul Natorp and Ernst Cassirer and their positivist rival, Ernst Mach. This is surprising, since Natorp and Cassirer are both often at pains to distinguish their theories of natural scientific knowledge from positivist views like (...) Mach’s, and often from Mach’s views in particular. Thus the very fact of this agreement between the Marburg School neo-Kantians and their positivist stalking horse points to a deep current of ideas that runs beneath the whole of the post-Kantian intellectual context they shared. (shrink)

Argument that Marx has a realist ontology and a correspondence theory of truth. His views are compared to both Hegel's and Kant's. This interpretation departs from more Hegelian, 'idealist' interpretations that often rely on misunderstanding some of the work of the early Marx. There is also a discussion and partial defence of Lenin's Materialism and Empirio-Criticism.

Alvin Plantinga’s theory of knowledge, as developed in his Warrant trilogy, has shaped the debates surrounding many areas in epistemology in profound ways. Plantinga has received his share of criticism, however, particularly in his treatment of belief in God as being “properly basic”. There has also been much confusion surrounding his notions of warrant and proper function, to which Plantinga has responded numerous times. Many critics remain unsatisfied, while others have developed alternative understandings of warrant in order to (...) rescue Plantinga’s theory from certain objections. The most promising of such attempts fall under the broad category of “virtue epistemology” or a “virtue-theoretic” approach. The work being done in virtue epistemology is still in its early stages and a consensus on what actually constitutes virtue epistemology has yet to be reached. While some have attempted to structure an entire theory of knowledge based on the virtues possessed by the knower, others have focused more on the role of epistemic virtues as an attempt to supplement existing theories, including Plantinga’s. In this paper, I will offer an analysis of what such an attempt might look like and evaluate the potential success of broadening Plantinga’s original model. -/- My proposal is that certain features of a virtue-theoretic approach (also referred to as “agent-reliabilism”) could improve Plantinga’s model in significant ways. Not only would such a broadened approach be better equipped to handle common objections, but it would also be better suited to contribute an enhanced understanding of the task of epistemology, one that seeks to discover multiple epistemic goods other than what has been traditionally confined to the realm of knowledge. I conclude by applying this approach to Plantinga’s treatment of theistic belief in Warranted Christian Belief and by articulating a few of the ways in which epistemic virtues can increase the degree of warrant enjoyed by such belief. (shrink)

Bernard Lonergan has argued for a theory of cognition that is transcendentally secure, that is, one such that any plausible attempt to refute it must presuppose its correctness, and one that also grounds a correct metaphysics and ontology. His proposal combines an identity theory of knowledge with an intentional relation between knower and known. It depends in a crucial way upon an appropriation of one’s own cognitional motives and acts, that is, upon “knowing one’s own knowing.” I (...) argue that because of conflicts between the identity and intentionality components of the theory, rational self-appropriation cannot, as Lonergan claims, be an iteration of just the same acts by which we acquire other sorts of knowledge. I propose an amended theory in which the relation between intending-subject and intended-object of first-level cognition becomes, in RSA, a numerical identity of knower and known and of the epistemic and the ontological. (shrink)

Most epistemologists agree that epistemic justification is required for knowledge. This requirement is usually formulated in one of two ways: S knows that p only if S is justified in believing that p. S knows that p only if S's belief that p is justified. Surprisingly and are generally regarded as synonymous formulations of the justification condition. In Chapter 1, I argue that such a synonymy thesis is mistaken and that, in fact, and specify substantively different requirements. requires that (...) the person be justified, whereas requires that the belief in question be justified, and intuitively, these constitute different requirements. Thus, it is concluded that and employ inherently different kinds of epistemic justification in their respective analysantia. I dub them "personal justification" and "doxastic justification", respectively. The remainder of the dissertation is devoted to demonstrating both the legitimacy and the importance of the personal/doxastic justification distinction. For example, the distinction helps account for the divergent intuitions that regularly arise regarding justificatory evaluations in demon-world contexts. ;In Chapters 2 and 3 I provide analyses for doxastic and personal justification. Chapter 2 spells out an externalist reliabilist account of doxastic justification which safely avoids demon-world counterexamples. Chapter 3 advances an internalist coherence account of personal justification. In defending this coherence theory, I argue that all foundation theories are false and that the regress argument on which they are predicated is unsound. ;In Chapter 4, I propose an analysis of ordinary knowledge which only requires doxastic justification. Nevertheless personal justification plays a negative, undermining role in the analysis. I then demonstrate that this analysis of knowledge is immune to typical Gettier examples. It also remains unscathed by Harman's beefed-up Gettier cases. Finally, I consider a stronger analysis of knowledge requiring both doxastic and personal justification. Though the latter analysis proves too strong for ordinary knowledge, it remains interesting as an analysis of a more intellectualistic kind of knowledge. ;The final chapter examines the internalist/externalist controversy and demonstrates that this controversy is yet another manifestation of the personal/doxastic justification conflation. (shrink)

The value of knowledge can vary in that knowledge of important facts is more valuable than knowledge of trivialities. This variation in the value of knowledge is mirrored by a variation in evidential standards. Matters of greater importance require greater evidential support. But all knowledge, however trivial, needs to be evidentially certain. So on one hand we have a variable evidential standard that depends on the value of the knowledge, and on the other, we (...) have the invariant standard of evidential certainty. This paradox in the concept of knowledge runs deep in the history of philosophy. We approach this paradox by proposing a bet settlement theory of knowledge. Degrees of belief can be measured by the expected value of a bet divided by stake size, with the highest degree of belief being probability 1, or certainty. Evidence sufficient to settle the bet makes the expectation equal to the stake size and therefore has evidential probability 1. This gives us the invariant evidential certainty standard for knowledge. The value of knowledge relative to a bet is given by the stake size. We propose that evidential probability can vary with stake size, so that evidential certainty at low stakes does not entail evidential certainty at high stakes. This solves the paradox by allowing that certainty is necessary for knowledge at any stakes, but that the evidential standards for knowledge vary according to what is at stake. We give a Stake Size Variation Principle that calculates evidential probability from the value of evidence and the stakes. Stake size variant degrees of belief are probabilistically coherent and explain a greater range of preferences than orthodox expected utility theory, namely the Ellsberg and Allais preferences. The resulting theory of knowledge gives an empirically adequate, rationally grounded, unified account of evidence, value and probability. (shrink)

The interpretive-sensory access theory of self-knowledge claims that we come to know our own minds by turning our capacities for knowing other minds onto ourselves. Peter Carruthers argues that two of the theory’s advantages are empirical adequacy and scientific fruitfulness: it leaves few of the old discoveries unexplained and makes new predictions that provide a framework for new discoveries. A decade has now passed since the theory’s introduction. I review the most important developments during this time (...) period regarding the two criteria: whether the theory’s six main predictions were supported, and whether the theory’s predictions contributed to new empirical studies. I argue that the interpretive-sensory access theory of self-knowledge remains empirically adequate and scientifically fruitful. (shrink)

Great religions to pragmatic capacities sporadically abound in the stories of supernatural phenomena which subsumes telepathy, clairvoyance and precognition. However, unfortunately treated as the topics of spiritualism, witchcraft and edification, not the materials of Scientific Enquiry. Whatsoever, have been deciphered about these queer speculations, the most prevalent sole concept is : namely, that there can be senseexperiences from the realm which is not accessible to human brain and sense organs. Possessor of these senses which are not currently accessible to average (...) humans can be a omniscient being tapping to his full potential. Presently, we have no language or any communication system to describe them intelligibly. When inquiring about these affairs we cannot avoid absurdity as presently we lack any linguistic convention on it. Our linguistic convention is derived from the physical world in which the supernatural is not considered as "Normal". It is considerably strained with "Abnormality" in the first place. My aim in this paper is to reconcile this Orthodox Psychology with Science and Philosophy which certainly appears conflicting. This inquiry leads me to enable the 10 percent brain myth. (shrink)

A review of Georges Dicker's primer on Kant's theoretical philosophy. -/- .

This is a very selective survey of developments in epistemology, concentrating on work from the past twenty years that is of interest to philosophers of science. The selection is organized around interesting connections between distinct themes. I first connect issues about skepticism to issues about the reliability of belief-acquiring processes. Next I connect discussions of the defeasibility of reasons for belief to accounts of the theory-independence of evidence. Then I connect doubts about Bayesian epistemology to issues about the content (...) of perception. The last detailed connection is between considerations of the finiteness of cognition and epistemic virtues. To connect the connections I end by briefly discussing the pressure that consideration of social roles in the transmission of belief puts on the purposes of epistemology. (shrink)

The text “The Ontology of Knowledge, Logic, Arithmetic, Set Theory, and Geometry” by Jean-Louis Boucon explores a deeply philosophical interpretation of knowledge, its logical structure, and the foundational elements of mathematical and scientific reasoning. -/- Here’s an overview condensed by an AI of the key themes and ideas, summarized into a quite general conceptual structure. These two pages are instructive on their own, but their main purpose is to facilitate the reading of the entire article, allowing the (...) reader to situate in the coherence of the whole both the meaning and the usefulness of each proposed idea. (shrink)

In Processes of Knowledge, George Towner analyzes the actual ways that human knowledge is accumulated and organized, both in science and in everyday life. He places the processes of knowledge within their social context, examining the basic ways that communication lets people share ideas. Towner traces the development of language, writing, and data processing, demonstrating their different effects on theorizing. He also develops an evolutionary view of group thinking, examining the ways that human groups use specific types (...) of theories to achieve social cohesion and showing how these theories change over time. The result is a dynamic view of intellectual history, based on the inherent processes by which knowledge grows. (shrink)

I argue that recent rationalists' accounts of a priori knowledge suffer from two substantial weaknesses: an inadequate phenomenology of a priori insight , and the error of psychologism. I show that Husserl's theory of a priori knowledge presents a defensible and viable alternative for the contemporary rationalist, an alternative that addresses both the ontology and phenomenology of rational intuition, as well as such contemporary concerns as the possibility and character of a priori error, the empirical defeasibility of (...) a priori claims, the relation of mind to necessity, and the role of conception and imagination in a priori knowledge. Consequently, I conclude that Husserl's theory provides the needed response to the 20 th century critique of rationalism, and its attendant a priorism, as mysterious and obscure. (shrink)

Intentional action is, in some sense, non-accidental, and one common way action theorists have attempted to explain this is with reference to control. The idea, in short, is that intentional action implicates control, and control precludes accidentality. But in virtue of what, exactly, would exercising control over an action suffice to make it non-accidental in whatever sense is required for the action to be intentional? One interesting and prima facie plausible idea that we wish to explore in this paper is (...) that control is non-accidental in virtue of requiring knowledge – either knowledge-that or knowledge-how (e.g., Beddor and Pavese 2021; cf., Setiya 2008; 2012 and Habgood-Coote 2018). We review in detail some key recent work defending such knowledge-centric theories of control, and we show that none of these accounts holds water. We conclude with some discussion about how control opposes the sort of luck intentional action excludes without doing so by requiring knowledge (that- or how). (shrink)

Helmholtz's public reflection about the nature of the experiment and its role in the sciences is a historically important description, which also helps to analyze his own works. It is a part of his conception of science and nature, which can be seen as an ideal type of science and its goals. But its historical reach seems to be limited in an important respect. Helmholtz's understanding of experiments is based on the idea that their planning, realization and evaluation lies in (...) the hands of a person or group acting according to decisions of free will. In my opinion this idea is characteristic for the foundation of the experimental method in early modern times, not however for several forms of its present structures. Above all, the increasing technization of producing knowledge reduces the roIe of the subject in conducting experiments. My lecture consists of three parts. In its first part I would like to present a summary of Helmholtz's own theory of experiment and the change of his conception of science and nature. In the second part I would like to discuss three examples of his experimental practice, which were taken in chronological order from three different periods of his work; in the third part I would like to compare the examples with the change of his conception of science and nature. (shrink)

Time has puzzled scientists. Some see it as just a tool and a unit of measurement, while others consider time to be a real thing and needs to be measured. There are also those who believe that time is an ancient thing that arose with the creation of the universe and the Earth, running parallel to life in them, and counting every movement, event, or speed in them. While some see it as an essential part and a major component of (...) the virtual relationship that includes life and place, there are also those who see time as a metaphysical thing that only appeared and developed in human consciousness and then mixed with the physics of life. Is duration measured by movement, or is movement measured by duration or time? Here began the dilemma of this research: How did time transform from a concept that reads and measures the flow of time forward, that is, the flow of time, according to Isaac Newton, into a physical measuring tool that calculates the movement, speed, and state of things? Then the concept turned into a tool that calculates the speed of light and tells the story of the origin and development of the universe. Scientists will not agree on a clear, direct, and frank interpretation of the concept of time, but people generally agree that time can be divided into past, present, and future. This division, according to this research, has gradually developed in human consciousness since the manifestations of knowledge appeared in the human mind and began to take its first steps. In the wondrous land where the sun rises repeatedly, the moon also rises, planets and stars appear, trees grow, rivers and seas overflow, storms and rain intensify, light appears and then darkness, and creatures wake up and sleep, mysteriously and repeatedly, until all these phenomena have become Appearances are measurable, with the development of human consciousness. In this brief research paper, we will discuss what is called “the present,” and the validity of its existence in the real time in which we live, and where its place is in human consciousness, and why scientists let it tamper with mathematical, physical, and social matter, and transformed it from a mere thing that does not exist, to a rest stop, which sometimes takes a long time., between the past and the future. (shrink)