This is a protocol for a Cochrane Review (Intervention). The objectives are as follows: -/- The main aim of this review will be to assess the effects of changing practitioner empathy or patient expectations for all conditions. The main objective is to conduct a systematic review of randomised trials where the intervention involves manipulating either (a) practitioner empathy or (b) patient expectations, or (c) both.

The concept of organizational stigma has received significant attention in recent years. The theoretical literature suggests that for a stigma to emerge over a category of organizations, a “critical mass” of actors sharing the same beliefs should be reached. Scholars have yet to empirically examine the techniques used to diffuse this negative judgment. This study is aimed at bridging this gap by investigating Goffman’s notion of “stigma-theory”: how do stigmatizing actors rationalize and emotionalize their beliefs to convince their audience? We (...) answer this question by studying the stigma over the finance industry since 2007. After the subprime crisis, a succession of events put the industry under greater scrutiny, and the behaviors and values observed within this field began to be publicly questioned. As an empirical strategy, we collected opinion articles and editorials that specifically targeted the finance industry. Building on rhetorical analysis and other mixed methods of media content analysis, we explain how the stigmatizing rhetoric targets the origins of deviant organizational behaviors in the finance industry, that is, the shareholder value maximization logic. We bridge the gap between rhetorical strategies applied to discredit organizations and ones used to delegitimize institutional logics by drawing a parallel between these two literatures. Taking an abductive approach, we argue that institutional contradiction between field and societal-level logics is sufficient, but not necessary to generate organizational stigma. (shrink)

Luck egalitarianism is a family of egalitarian theories of distributive justice that give a special place to luck, choice, and responsibility. These theories can be understood as responding to perceived weaknesses in influential earlier theories of both the left – in particular Rawls’ liberal egalitarianism (1971) – and the right – Nozick’s libertarianism (1974) stands out here. Rawls put great emphasis on the continuity of his theory with the great social contract theories of modern political thought, particularly emphasising its Kantian (...) character, while Nozick overtly develops his theory as an elaboration of John Locke’s account of property. By contrast, how luck egalitarianism is related to the history of political thought or philosophy more generally has been left unexplored by its proponents. Perhaps this is because they see luck egalitarianism, with its focus on individual choice and association with such contemporary concerns as equality of opportunity, as without significant predecessors in the canon. My purpose in this chapter is to make the tentative first steps towards identifying some historical antecedents of luck egalitarianism among the main works of Western political thought, in particular Aristotle, Machiavelli, and Locke. (shrink)

A large proportion of humankind today lives in avoidable poverty. This article examines whether affluent individuals and governments have moral duties to change this situation. It is maintained that an alternative to the familiar accounts of transdomestic distributive justice and personal ethics put forward by writers such as Peter Singer, John Rawls, and Thomas Pogge is required, since each of these accounts fails to reflect the full range of relevant considerations. A better account would give some weight to overall (...) utility, the condition of the worst off, and individual responsibility. This approach provides robust support to global poverty alleviation. (shrink)

This excellent book focuses on a decisive moment in Schelling's philosophical development: his 1801 dispute with Eschenmayer shortly before publishing Presentation of My System, the inaugural text of his identity philosophy. Carl August Eschenmayer was a German physician whose Kant-inspired writings in the philosophy of nature greatly influenced Schelling, especially with respect to the doctrine of the potencies. As Berger and Whistler demonstrate, the 1801 controversy has significant implications for understanding the trajectory of German Idealism and its debates on (...) methodology, the meaning of identity, and the place of nature in philosophy. (shrink)

Several metaphysical/philosophical concepts are developed as tools by which we may further understand the essence, structure, and events/symbols of “Complex” Synchronicity, and how these differ from “Chain of Events” Synchronicity. The first tool is the concept of Astronomical vs Cultural time. This tool is to be the basis of distinguishing Simple from Complex Synchronicity as Complex Synchronicities are chunks of time that have several coincidences in common with each other. We will also look at the nature of the perspective of (...) the time being quantized. The next tool is a particular case study of two movies, The Matrix and Black Swan, that may be viewed as an example of a Complex Synchronicity in the collective conscious of popular culture (as opposed to Simple Synchronicity or a single coincidence). And the final tool is the concept of “Chain of Events” synchronicity as a separate concept from Simple or Complex synchronicities. This 3rd tool is developed using a mathematical metaphor of foreshadowing (an element of storytelling) in the seemingly random pattern of prime numbers. The purpose of this paper is to distinguish and develop these concepts and to lay a foundation for the further study of the concept of Synchronicity first illuminated by Carl Jung as an acausal connecting principle between coincidences. (shrink)

Dieser Band versammelt Beiträge zu den drei klassischen Disziplinen der Philosophie – dem Wahren, dem Guten, dem Schönen. Ihre Autoren zeichnet aus, dass sie aus dem akademischen Umfeld Michael Sukales zu seiner Zeit am Institut für Philosophie an der Carl-von-Ossietzky-Universität Oldenburg stammen. Ihm ist dieses Buch zum Abschied von seiner aktiven Lehrtätigkeit in Oldenburg gewidmet. Die thematische Vielfalt der enthaltenen Texte spiegelt die Bandbreite seines philosophischen Schaffens wider.

Bu kitap, Carl Schmitt'in demokrasi ve diktatörlük üzerine düşüncelerini politik felsefenin sorgu sahasında ele almayı amaçlayarak Schmitt'i kendi döneminin polemikleri arasında konumlandırmaktadır. Bu amaçla Weimar dönemi hukukçuları üzerinde önemli etkisi olan Carl Friedrich Wilhelm von Gerber ve Paul Laband'ın anayasa düşünceleri ekseninde Alman İmparatorluğu'nun hukuk mirası incelenmiştir. Weimar Cumhuriyeti'nin krizlerle şekillenen politik atmosferi, politik felsefe açısından verimli tartışmaların ortaya çıkmasını sağlamıştır. Bu tartışmaların izi; dönemin hukukçularından Gerhard Anschütz, Richard Thoma, Georg Jellinek, Hans Kelsen ve Hermann Heller'ın demokrasi ve (...) diktatörlük tartışmasına kaynaklık eden düşünceleri üzerinden sürülmüştür. Schmitt, çoğunluğu 1920'li yıllara denk gelen anayasa hukuku çalışmaları ile Weimar dönemi hukuk tartışmaları arasında belirleyici bir yerde durmaktadır. Schmitt ile anayasanın koruyuculuğu ve parlamentarizm hakkında polemiğe giren düşünürler, kitabın ayrı bir bölümünün konusunu oluşturmaktadır. Politik felsefenin güncel bir uğrağı olmayı sürdüren Schmitt'in demokrasi ve diktatörlük üzerine düşünceleri, çağdaş dünyanın karşı karşıya kaldığı demokrasi sorunlarının derinleştirilmesinde verimli bir kaynaktır. Bu kitabın amaçları arasında, kendi tarihsel bağlamı içerisinde Schmitt'in devlet düşüncesinin spesifik bir incelemesini yapmanın yanında, kendisini diktatörlüğün karşısında konumlandıran liberal demokrasi anlayışını tartışmaya açmak da bulunmaktadır. (shrink)

Resumen: El presente artículo busca presentar sumariamente las principales críticas elaboradas por Karl Löwith y Leo Strauss en su recepción del clásico trabajo de Carl Schmitt Der Begriff des Politischen [El concepto de lo político]. Se intentará explorar, en un primer apartado, la acusación löwithiana de “ocasionalismo ateológico”, formulada, aunque bajo pseudónimo, en un texto crítico de 1935 cuyo título original fue luego reemplazado por aquel con el que se lo conoce actualmente: Der okkasionelle Dezisionismus von Carl Schmitt (...) [El decisionismo ocasional de Carl Schmitt]. En la segunda sección, siguiendo principalmente la lectura propuesta de Heinrich Meier, se buscará dar cuenta de la interpretación que aparece en los Anmerkungen zu Carl Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen [Comentarios sobre El concepto de lo político de Carl Schmitt], las notas de Leo Strauss, publicadas en 1932, que sugieren entender la afirmación de lo político en la obra de Schmitt como constitutiva de la posterior crítica schmittiana de la filosofía política de Thomas Hobbes. Palabras clave: político, ocasionalismo, decisión, teología política, liberalismo. Abstract: This article seeks to briefly present the main criticisms elaborated by Karl Löwith and Leo Strauss in their reception of the classic work of Carl Schmitt Der Begriff des Politischen [The Concept of the Political]. It will be explored, in a f irst section, the Löwithian accusation of “atheological occasionalism”, offered, although under a pseudonym, in a text of 1935 whose original title was later replaced by that with which it is currently known: Der okkasionelle Dezisionismus von Carl Schmitt [The Occasional Decisionism of Carl Schmitt]. In the second section, following mainly the reading of Heinrich Meier, I will seek to give an account of the interpretation present in the Anmerkungen zu Carl Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen [Comments on Carl Schmitt’s Concept of the Political], the critical notes by Leo Strauss, published in 1932, which suggest understanding the assertion of politics in Schmitt’s work as constitutive for the later Schmittian critique of Thomas Hobbes’ political philosophy. Keywords: political, occasionalism, decision, politcal theoology, liberalism. (shrink)

In telling the story of Thomas Willis and the collective investigations of body and brain in 17th-century England with tremendous energy and enthusiasm, journalist Carl Zimmer has written one of the best recent books of popular history of science. The full range of readers will be rewarded by Zimmer’s synthetic scholarship and his evident pleasure in the language of the primary texts. While he owes much to the work of Robert Frank and Robert Martensen in particular, Zimmer has (...) negotiated a vast secondary literature on the major figures of early modern natural philosophy. His decision not to discuss scholarly controversy directly, but rather ‘to give accounts of these people that were consistent with the current consensus’ (p.304) is understandable given the mass market at which he has successfully aimed: yet such a voice would bring a welcome freshness to specialists’ debates. (shrink)

Thomas Polger and Laurence Shapiro argue that Carl Gillett's much publicized dimensioned theory of realization is incoherent, being subject to a reductio. Their argument turns on the fact that Gillett's definition of realization makes property instances the exclusive relata of the realization relation, while his belief in multiple realization implies its denial, namely, that properties are the relata of the realization relation on occasions of multiple realization. Others like Sydney Shoemaker have also expressed their view of realization in (...) terms of property instances, yet they too have accepted the multiple realizability of properties. Thus I am interested in the more general issue raised by Polger and Shapiro's argument. Specifically, I show how to supplement a theory of realization with a category-inclusive auxiliary assumption, which avoids the stated reductio. I then offer a few reasons to justify the proposed category-inclusive view of realization, making some comparisons to supervenience and causation along the way. (shrink)

A reading is offered of Carl Hempel’s and Thomas Kuhn’s positions on, and disagreements about, rationality in science that relates these issues to the debate between W.V. Quine and Rudolf Carnap on the analytic/synthetic distinction.

This article aims to research on Carl Schmitt’s foundations of the individual and his reserve of consciousness. Nowadays, the main researchers of Schmitt’s works asseverates that the German jurist was an antiliberal and, therefore, an antiindividualist. However, we argue that is possible to find not only a critique to liberal conception of the individual, but a purposeful conception through his reflections on criticism against authority and public authority. In order to demonstrate it, we propose an hermeneutical approach to his (...) work —mainly to The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes and “The Visibility of the Church. A Scholastic Consideration”. Particularly, we attend the human action as the founder of the political order and the individual’s ability to criticize the authority. This article claims that Schmitt formulates a notion of individuality of a different sign than the liberal one and that is closely linked to the idea of Law, the institutionalstate framework and the community substrate. (shrink)

In this paper, I address some puzzles about Frege’s conception of how we “grasp” thoughts. I focus on an enigmatic passage that appears near the end of Frege’s great essay “The Thought.” In this passage Frege refers to a “non-sensible something” without which “everyone would remain shut up in his inner world.” I consider and criticize Wolfgang Malzkorn’s interpretation of the passage. According to Malzkorn, Frege’s view is that ideas [Vorstellungen] are the means by which we grasp thoughts. My counter-proposal (...) is that language enables us to grasp thoughts (ideas are merely their baggage or “trappings,” as Frege puts it). One significant consequence of my interpretation is that it helps challenge the standard reading of Frege according to which he is a metaphysical platonist about thoughts. My interpretation thus provides support for the deflationary, anti-ontological reading spelled out by readers like Thomas Ricketts and Wolfgang Carl. As Ricketts puts it, Frege’s distinction between the objective and the subjective, rather than being an ontological doctrine, “lodges in the contrast between asserting something and giving vent to a feeling.”. (shrink)

Estamos cansados das utopias. Estamos cansados das utopias literárias e dos devaneios sobre a Cidade ideal: as utopias em ação que foram os totalitarismos do século XX nos nausearam. Os horrores reais de uns nos impedem de sonhar com os outros. Nossas antigas utopias De Platão a Thomas More, de Étienne Cabet a Fourier, as utopias falavam da rejeição do presente e do real: “Existe o mal na comunidade dos homens”. Mas não lhe contrapunham o futuro nem o possível; (...) elas descreviam um impossível desejável: “Seria bom viver lá!”. Não eram programas políticos planejando meios de atingir um objetivo racional. Contentavam-se em querer o melhor. E mais valia o Bem nunca obtido a um Mal menor amanhã. As utopias eram revolucionárias, mas em palavras: “Os homens vivem assim, sempre viveram assim, deveriam viver de outra forma”. Todas as utopias comunistas do século XIX foram assim. Quando se tratava de arregaçar as mangas, havia um esforço para criar à distância, e durante um certo período, uma pequena comunidade real mais ou menos em conformidade com o sonho. Os utopistas eram revolucionários quando não eram realistas, e quando eram realistas não eram revolucionários. Nunca visaram a eliminar o Mal para sempre e derrubar as comunidades políticas existentes para instaurar o Bem. Por exemplo, Étienne Cabet, com seu comunismo cristão, imaginou a cidade ideal de Icária e tentou fundar uma colônia icariana em New Orleans, em 1847. Charles Fourier, com seu falanstério, estava em busca de uma harmonia universal que se formaria livremente por afeição de seus membros. O mais realista de todos, Saint-Simon, descreveu uma sociedade fraterna, cujos membros mais competentes (industriais, cientistas, artistas, intelectuais, engenheiros) tinham a tarefa de administrar a França da forma mais econômica possível, a fim de torná-la um país próspero, onde reinariam o interesse geral e o bem comum, a liberdade, a igualdade e a paz; a sociedade seria uma grande fábrica. Mas o sonho de uma associação entre industriais e operários baseada na fraternidade, na estima e na confiança desfez-se na realidade das grandes empresas capitalistas dos saint-simonianos, no Canal de Suez e nos caminhos de ferro franceses. No fundo, aconteceu o mesmo com os teóricos do "comunismo científico" no século XIX, Karl Marx e Friedrich Engels. Eles, é claro, eram autenticamente revolucionários e profundamente realistas, pois fundamentaram seu projeto político em uma análise do funcionamento econômico e histórico do capitalismo, mas a ideia comunista e a abolição da propriedade privada permaneceram em estado de esboço nas obras dos autores do Manifesto, um ideal abstrato e, por assim dizer, vazio, ou, em todo caso, tão utópico quanto nos teóricos franceses. Nos Manuscritos de 1844, a ideia comunista é pura especulação conceitual em torno da "apropriação real da essência humana pelo homem e para o homem" ou "a verdadeira solução da luta entre existência e essência, entre objetivação e afirmação de si mesmo, entre liberdade e necessidade". Em A ideologia alemã, é uma expressão puramente verbal para designar "o movimento real que abole a ordem estabelecida". Em Engels, é "o ensinamento das condições da libertação do proletariado" (Princípios do comunismo). E uma ideia até mais vaga e abstrata nos marxistas do que nos utopistas, pois é dissociada de qualquer tentativa de fundamentação conceitual e qualquer análise concreta dos meios de sua realização. E ainda como um sonho de Cidade ideal, em que "cada um recebe conforme suas necessidades", como circulava entre os utopistas franceses do comunismo no século XIX. Ao contrário de suas predecessoras, as utopias em ação dos totalitarismos do século XX situam-se no cruzamento de um ideal revolucionário ("partir ao meio a História do mundo", segundo Nietzsche em Ecce homo, depois retomado pelos maoístas) e um programa realista de transformação política radical. Enquanto as utopias de Platão a Engels evitavam os meios de se atingir o ideal para preservar sua perfeição, as utopias em ação fazem o inverso: retardam indefinidamente a realização do ideal para empregar da melhor forma os meios capazes de realizá-lo. Não é mais uma questão de sonhar com o Bem, mas de lutar indefinidamente contra o Mal. E, desde a República de Platão,5 o Mal na comunidade política tem duas faces: ou é Impuro ou Desigual. Portanto, a Cidade deve ser: ou uma comunidade de iguais, cuja unidade perfeita é garantida pelo fato de que tudo é comum entre eles; ou uma comunidade pura, cuja unidade perfeita é garantida pelo fato de que todos têm a mesma origem. Define-se ou pelo comum das posses (nada deve pertencer a ninguém, mas a todos) ou pela identidade dos seres (ninguém deve ser estrangeiro): o comum que temos (ou deveríamos ter) ou aquilo que somos (ou deveríamos ser). Naturalmente, nessa união de idealismo revolucionário e realismo programático, o Bem absoluto, o Puro, o Comum, é uma idealidade fora de alcance: o combate mortal contra o Mal torna-se a obsessão dos regimes de terror. O Puro deve começar excluindo. Mas nunca chega a excluir por completo, porque o já purificado nunca é suficientemente puro. A ponto de a ideia se transformar em um delírio infinito de rechaçar e depois expulsar, a fim de exterminar. Os judeus e os ciganos, que encarnavam o micróbio maléfico que ameaça a pureza da raça e do sangue ariano, tinham de ser caçados até nos mais ínfimos recantos do território sob domínio nazista e eliminados como pulgas. O Comum e o comunismo também estão fora de alcance. Começa-se expropriando. Mas ainda há a propriedade e o privado. E, portanto, nunca se chega a expropriar, despossuir, comunizar por completo. As lutas contra as classes (supostamente) proprietárias ou avessas à coletivização, os pequenos proprietários de terra, geram deportações em massa (deskulakização) ou organização sistemática de grandes fomes (Holodomor). Por isso, apesar da formidável esperança de emancipação que o ideal comunista representou durante quase um século para as classes ou povos explorados do mundo inteiro, ele se despedaçou no século XX contra o muro do "socialismo real". Nos antípodas do comunismo imaginado, ao qual se supunha que conduziria infalivelmente, o ideal comunista se transformou em uma máquina tirânica, burocrática e totalitária. A sociedade sem Estado sugerida por Engels na obra Anti- Dühring6 tornou-se seu contrário, uma ditadura do Estado contra a sociedade. O terrível fracasso dessa utopia em ação destruiu os sonhos de libertação coletiva — enquanto "a exploração do homem pelo homem" continua indo muito bem. Infelizmente, não se pode dizer o mesmo das utopias revolucionárias em nome do Puro. Enquanto o ideal comunista quase desapareceu dos programas políticos, a ideologia purista do sangue e da raça, a ilusão da origem comum (seja biológica ou religiosa) e, portanto, o ódio destruidor do estrangeiro continuam a alimentar as utopias coletivas e seus massacres em série: genocídio ruandês contra os tutsis, depuração étnica dos muçulmanos na ex-lugoslávia (em particular na Bósnia), limpeza étnica de cristãos, turcomanos xiitas e no autoproclamado "Estado islâmico" etc. O fim das utopias? Felizmente, parece que somos poupados de tudo isso em nossas "democracias ocidentais", após setenta anos de paz sob as asas da Europa, algumas décadas de relativa prosperidade econômica e tranquilidade política sob a frágil proteção de nossos sistemas representativos. Não acreditamos mais na salvação comum. Nem na salvação nem no comum. Há três razões para isso, todas as três interligadas: o fim do político, a desconfiança em relação ao Bem, o reino dos direitos individuais. As utopias políticas conduziram ao desastre. Não conseguem mais nos fazer sonhar com o futuro como faziam no passado, porque estamos absorvidos por nosso hoje e por nós mesmos. A política parece ter derrotado o político. A política são estratégias coletivas ou táticas individuais, é o império dos "eles" ou o reino dos "eus". O político é a afirmação da existência de um "nós" ("nós, o povo"), além das comunidades de famílias ou amigos, das comunidades regionais ou religiosas, além das identidades de gênero ou origem, e aquém da comunidade humana em geral. As peripécias usuais dos governos representativos sufocaram o sentimento de pertencimento coletivo e a aspiração a um destino comum, que ressurgem apenas quando uma emoção violenta abala o corpo social, quando existe uma ameaça extremista ou ocorre um atentado terrorista. Em situações normais, porém, os acasos da conquista ou do exercício do poder escondem o político, isto é, as condições de unidade da comunidade. Não acreditamos mais no Bem. Não sonhamos mais com uma Cidade bondosa, finalmente livre do Mal. Aspiramos simplesmente a uma sociedade — ou um mundo — menos má. Prova dessas aspirações são as manifestações que mobilizam a juventude dos países ocidentais ou sublevam os povos do planeta de vez em quando. Movimentos altermundialistas contra o capitalismo financeiro, Fórum Social Mundial (Porto Alegre), Occupy Wall Street, Indignados, Nuit Debout etc. Movimentos a favor da democracia nos países da Europa do Sul nos anos 1970, na América Latina e, em outros continentes, lutas de emancipação na praça da Paz Celestial (Pequim), na praça Tahrir (no Cairo), na praça Taksim (Istambul), de Sidi Bouzid (Tunísia), revolução dos guarda-chuvas (Hong Kong) etc. Apesar da diversidade de contextos e objetivos, em todas essas revoltas há uma constante que as distingue das utopias revolucionárias passadas: as pessoas se revoltam contra alguma coisa, elas não se mobilizam por alguma coisa. Sabemos o que elas rejeitam (injustiça, miséria, corrupção, humilhação, arbitrariedade, segregação e repressão), mas desconhecemos a que aspiram. Ou melhor, é como se tudo que desejassem fosse justamente um "menos" — menos injustiça, menos miséria, menos arbitrariedade, menos corrupção, menos segregação, menos repressão etc. —, ou o menos possível, mas nunca o impossível de um horizonte coletivo. Os que almejam em todo o mundo derrubar um poder tirânico ainda sonham com essa nossa "democracia" que não nos encanta mais, porque acreditamos que as liberdades fundamentais em que ela consiste são para sempre e ela se resume a votarmos esporadicamente em políticas que não nos satisfarão. Pois quando não há mais nada contra o que se revoltar, restam apenas motivos para reivindicar. Contudo, ninguém mais sonha com uma Cidade perfeita: nem os que protestam contra sua miséria e servidão nem os que lutam por condições de vida decentes e pela satisfação de seus interesses. Não há mais utopia política. Foi assim que se instalou entre nós o reino dos direitos individuais. Pois não desejamos mais um Estado ideal que nos una e nos faça um nós, um nós inédito, um nós que seja um nós mesmos: esperamos somente que esse Estado nos deixe em paz, cada um por si, e nos permita realizar as aspirações individuais a que acreditamos ter direito. O sonho de emancipação coletiva se estilhaçou em uma multiplicidade dispersa de desejos. Podemos indicar a data recente em que esse "nós" considerado poderoso demais começou a se encolher em "eus" triunfantes. Quando esses "eus" ainda usavam a máscara do antigo "nós" para se legitimar. No último terço do século XX, as reivindicações individualistas ainda tinham uma coloração revolucionária; as pessoas não sonhavam mais com a libertação de uma classe ou de um povo, mas ainda sonhavam com uma libertação política: a dos desejos individuais. O ideal proletário adquiriu um matiz libertário: foram os movimentos de "Maio de 68". O conceito de revolução recuava na história social e progredia nos costumes. Nesses movimentos dos países capitalistas ocidentais, as pessoas acreditavam, apoiavam, afirmavam em textos e discursos que tudo na vida de cada um era político por natureza, para além da própria política. O amor era político: elas acreditavam que as relações entre homens e mulheres, os sentimentos, a sexualidade eram determinados pela existência social — logo eram políticos. A arte também era política: a arte falsa era a arte reacionária, a música tonal, a pintura figurativa, o romance ou o cinema narrativos etc. A "verdadeira arte" era a das vanguardas, revolucionária na forma e messiânica no conteúdo. A moral, por sua vez, era política de um extremo a outro. Ou então era oca, ridícula. (Isso foi antes de tudo virar ética.) Este era o programa: libertação coletiva das aspirações individuais, "viver sem tempo morto e gozar sem obstáculos". Desde o início do século XXI, não existe mais utopia política. Nem sonhos de libertação social; ela se despedaçou contra o muro da realidade totalitária: de suas esperanças restam apenas algumas conquistas, cada vez mais frágeis, do Estado providência. Nem sonhos de realização libertária; eles se chocaram contra o fim das ilusões e o retorno do conservadorismo. Dos primeiros e dos segundos sobrou apenas o império dos direitos. A era do indivíduo não precisa mais se abrigar sob a ideologia da libertação: o vocabulário liberal dos direitos subjetivos é suficiente. De fato, os direitos individuais, na esteira e conforme o modelo muitas vezes infiel dos "direitos humanos", tornaram-se nosso único ideal, depois que perdemos a fé no Ideal. Pois a ideia de "direitos humanos" é a dupla negação de toda utopia política: porque se trata de "direitos" e porque se trata de "humanos". Cópia de: FRANCIS WOLFF. Três Utopias Contemporâneas. São Paulo: Unesp, 2018. (shrink)

The goal of this short chapter, aimed at philosophers, is to provide an overview and brief explanation of some central concepts involved in predictive processing (PP). Even those who consider themselves experts on the topic may find it helpful to see how the central terms are used in this collection. To keep things simple, we will first informally define a set of features important to predictive processing, supplemented by some short explanations and an alphabetic glossary. -/- The features described here (...) are not shared in all PP accounts. Some may not be necessary for an individual model; others may be contested. Indeed, not even all authors of this collection will accept all of them. To make this transparent, we have encouraged contributors to indicate briefly which of the features are necessary to support the arguments they provide, and which (if any) are incompatible with their account. For the sake of clarity, we provide the complete list here, very roughly ordered by how central we take them to be for “Vanilla PP” (i.e., a formulation of predictive processing that will probably be accepted by most researchers working on this topic). More detailed explanations will be given below. Note that these features do not specify individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for the application of the concept of “predictive processing”. All we currently have is a semantic cluster, with perhaps some overlapping sets of jointly sufficient criteria. The framework is still developing, and it is difficult, maybe impossible, to provide theory-neutral explanations of all PP ideas without already introducing strong background assumptions. (shrink)

The goal of this article is to present a first list of ethical concerns that may arise from research and personal use of virtual reality (VR) and related technology, and to offer concrete recommendations for minimizing those risks. Many of the recommendations call for focused research initiatives. In the first part of the article, we discuss the relevant evidence from psychology that motivates our concerns. In Section “Plasticity in the Human Mind,” we cover some of the main results suggesting that (...) one’s environment can influence one’s psychological states, as well as recent work on inducing illusions of embodiment. Then, in Section “Illusions of Embodiment and Their Lasting Effect,” we go on to discuss recent evidence indicating that immersion in VR can have psychological effects that last after leaving the virtual environment. In the second part of the article, we turn to the risks and recommendations. We begin, in Section “The Research Ethics of VR,” with the research ethics of VR, covering six main topics: the limits of experimental environments, informed consent, clinical risks, dual-use, online research, and a general point about the limitations of a code of conduct for research. Then, in Section “Risks for Individuals and Society,” we turn to the risks of VR for the general public, covering four main topics: long-term immersion, neglect of the social and physical environment, risky content, and privacy. We offer concrete recommendations for each of these 10 topics, summarized in Table 1. (shrink)

Recognizing that truth is socially constructed or that knowledge and power are related is hardly a novelty in the social sciences. In the twenty-first century, however, there appears to be a renewed concern regarding people’s relationship with the truth and the propensity for certain actors to undermine it. Organizations are highly implicated in this, given their central roles in knowledge management and production and their attempts to learn, although the entanglement of these epistemological issues with business ethics has not been (...) engaged as explicitly as it might be. Drawing on work from a virtue epistemology perspective, this paper outlines the idea of a set of epistemic vices permeating organizations, along with examples of unethical epistemic conduct by organizational actors. While existing organizational research has examined various epistemic virtues that make people and organizations effective and responsible epistemic agents, much less is known about the epistemic vices that make them ineffective and irresponsible ones. Accordingly, this paper introduces vice epistemology, a nascent but growing subfield of virtue epistemology which, to the best of our knowledge, has yet to be explicitly developed in terms of business ethics. The paper concludes by outlining a business ethics research agenda on epistemic vice, with implications for responding to epistemic vices and their illegitimacy in practice. (shrink)

Many philosophers believe that luck egalitarianism captures “desert-like” intuitions about justice. Some even think that luck egalitariansm distributes goods in accordance with desert. In this paper, we argue that this is wrong. Desertism conflicts with luck egalitarianism in three important contexts, and, in these contexts, desertism renders the proper moral judgment. First, compared to desertism, luck egalitarianism is sometimes too stingy: it fails to justly compensate people for their socially valuable contributions—when those contributions arose from “option luck”. Second, luck egalitarianism (...) is sometimes too restrictive: it fails to justly compensate people who make a social contribution when that contribution arose from “brute luck”. Third, luck egalitarianism is too limited in scope: it cannot diagnose economic injustice arising independently of comparative levels of justice. The lesson of this paper is that luck egalitarians should consider supplementing their theory with desert considerations. Or, even better, consider desertism as a superior alternative to their theory. (shrink)

In this chapter, we introduce the notion of “moral neuroenhancement,” offering a novel definition as well as spelling out three conditions under which we expect that such neuroenhancement would be most likely to be permissible (or even desirable). Furthermore, we draw a distinction between first-order moral capacities, which we suggest are less promising targets for neurointervention, and second-order moral capacities, which we suggest are more promising. We conclude by discussing concerns that moral neuroenhancement might restrict freedom or otherwise “misfire,” and (...) argue that these concerns are not as damning as they may seem at first. (shrink)

A central tenet of medical ethics holds that it is permissible to perform a medical intervention on a competent individual only if that individual has given informed consent to the intervention. However, in some circumstances it is tempting to say that the moral reason to obtain informed consent prior to administering a medical intervention is outweighed. For example, if an individual’s refusal to undergo a medical intervention would lead to the transmission of a dangerous infectious disease to other members of (...) the community, one might claim that it would be morally permissible to administer the intervention even in the absence of consent. Indeed, as we shall discuss below, there are a number of examples of public health authorities implementing compulsory or coercive measures for the purposes of infectious disease control (IDC). The plausibility of the thought that non-consensual medical interventions might be justified when performed for the purpose of IDC raises the question of whether such interventions might permissibly be used to realize other public goods. In this article we focus on one possibility: whether it could be permissible to non-consensually impose certain interventions that alter brain states or processes through chemical or physical means on serious criminal offenders. We shall suggest that some such interventions might be permissible if they safely and effectively serve to facilitate the offender’s rehabilitation and thereby prevent criminal recidivism. (shrink)

This chapter sets the scene for the subsequent philosophical discussions by surveying a number of biological interventions that have been used, or might in the future be used, for the purposes of crime prevention. These interventions are pharmaceutical interventions intended to suppress libido, treat substance abuse or attention deficit-hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), or modulate serotonin activity; nutritional interventions; and electrical and magnetic brain stimulation. Where applicable, we briefly comment on the historical use of these interventions, and in each case we discuss (...) the evidence that they are effective, or might become so with further refinement. The chapter concludes with a comment on some potentially significant differences between the varieties of intervention that we canvass. (shrink)

According to a number of influential views in penal theory, 1 one of the primary goals of the criminal justice system is to rehabilitate offenders. Rehabilitativemeasures are commonly included as a part of a criminal sentence. For example, in some jurisdictions judges may order violent offenders to attend anger management classes or to undergo cognitive behavioural therapy as a part of their sentences. In a limited number of cases, neurointerventions — interventions that exert a direct biological effect on the brain (...) — have been used as aids to rehabilitation, typically being imposed as part of criminal sentences, separate treatment orders, or conditions of parole. Examples of such interventions include medications intended to attenuate addictive desires in substance-abusing offenders and agents intended to suppress libido in sex offenders.This chapter reviews some of the ethical issues raised by the use of neurointerventions as aids to rehabilitation. (shrink)

Political candidates often believe they must focus their campaign efforts on a small number of swing voters open for ideological change. Based on the wisdom of opinion polls, this might seem like a good idea. But do most voters really hold their political attitudes so firmly that they are unreceptive to persuasion? We tested this premise during the most recent general election in Sweden, in which a left- and a right-wing coalition were locked in a close race. We asked our (...) participants to state their voter intention, and presented them with a political survey of wedge issues between the two coalitions. Using a sleight-of-hand we then altered their replies to place them in the opposite political camp, and invited them to reason about their attitudes on the manipulated issues. Finally, we summarized their survey score, and asked for their voter intention again. The results showed that no more than 22% of the manipulated replies were detected, and that a full 92% of the participants accepted and endorsed our altered political survey score. Furthermore, the final voter intention question indicated that as many as 48% (69.2%) were willing to consider a left-right coalition shift. This can be contrasted with the established polls tracking the Swedish election, which registered maximally 10% voters open for a swing. Our results indicate that political attitudes and partisan divisions can be far more flexible than what is assumed by the polls, and that people can reason about the factual issues of the campaign with considerable openness to change. (shrink)

In a paper recently published in this journal, Navin and Largent argue in favour of a type of policy to regulate non-medical exemptions from childhood vaccination which they call ‘Inconvenience’. This policy makes it burdensome for parents to obtain an exemption to child vaccination, for example, by requiring parents to attend immunization education sessions and to complete an application form to receive a waiver. Navin and Largent argue that this policy is preferable to ‘Eliminationism’, i.e. to policies that do not (...) allow non-medical exemptions, because Inconvenience has been shown to maintain exemption rates low while not harming parents by forcing them to do something that goes against their beliefs. We argue that it is at least doubtful that Inconvenience is ethically preferable to Eliminationism: while the latter disregards the value of liberty, Inconvenience disregards the value of fairness in the distribution of the burdens entailed by the preservation of a public good like herd immunity. We propose a variant of Inconvenience, which we call ‘Contribution’, which we think is preferable to the versions of Inconvenience discussed by Navin and Largent in that it successfully strikes a balance between the values of parents’ liberty, fairness and expected utility. (shrink)

We provide conditions under which an incomplete strongly independent preorder on a convex set X can be represented by a set of mixture preserving real-valued functions. We allow X to be infi nite dimensional. The main continuity condition we focus on is mixture continuity. This is sufficient for such a representation provided X has countable dimension or satisfi es a condition that we call Polarization.

Human agents happen to judge that a conjunction of two terms is more probable than one of the terms, in contradiction with the rules of classical probabilities—this is the conjunction fallacy. One of the most discussed accounts of this fallacy is currently the quantum-like explanation, which relies on models exploiting the mathematics of quantum mechanics. The aim of this paper is to investigate the empirical adequacy of major quantum-like models which represent beliefs with quantum states. We first argue that they (...) can be tested in three different ways, in a question order effect configuration which is different from the traditional conjunction fallacy experiment. We then carry out our proposed experiment, with varied methodologies from experimental economics. The experimental results we get are at odds with the predictions of the quantum-like models. This strongly suggests that this quantum-like account of the conjunction fallacy fails. Future possible research paths are discussed. (shrink)

This article evaluates the effects of two types of rewards (performance-contingent versus engagement-contingent) on self-regulation, intrinsic motivation and creativity. Forty-two undergraduate students were randomly assigned to three conditions; i.e. a performance-contingent reward group, an engagement-contingent reward group and a control group. Results provide little support for the negative effects of performance rewards on motivational components. However, they do indicate that participants in the engagement-contingent reward group and the control group achieved higher rated creativity than participants in the performance-contingent reward group. (...) Alternative explanations for this finding are discussed. (shrink)

This paper looks at the critical reception of two central claims of Peter Auriol’s theory of cognition: the claim that the objects of cognition have an apparent or objective being that resists reduction to the real being of objects, and the claim that there may be natural intuitive cognitions of nonexistent objects. These claims earned Auriol the criticism of his fellow Franciscans, Walter Chatton and Adam Wodeham. According to them, the theory of apparent being was what had led Auriol to (...) allow for intuitive cognitions of nonexistents, but the intuitive cognition of nonexistents, at its turn, led to scepticism. Modern commentators have offered similar readings of Auriol, but this paper argues, first, that the apparent being provides no special reason to think there could be intuitions of nonexistent objects, and second, that despite his idiosyncratic account of intuition, Auriol was no more vulnerable to scepticism than his critics. (shrink)

Bioethicists sometimes defend compromise positions, particularly when they enter debates on applied topics that have traditionally been highly polarised, such as those regarding abortion, euthanasia and embryonic stem cell research. However, defending compromise positions is often regarded with a degree of disdain. Many are intuitively attracted to the view that it is almost always problematic to defend compromise positions, in the sense that we have a significant moral reason not to do so. In this paper, we consider whether this common (...) sense view can be given a principled basis. We first show how existing explanations for the problematic nature of compromise fall short of vindicating the common sense view, before offering our own explanation, which, we claim, comes closer to vindicating that view. We argue that defending a compromise will typically have two epistemic costs: it will corrupt attempts to use the claims of ethicists as testimonial evidence, and it will undermine standards that are important to making epistemic progress in ethics. We end by suggesting that the epistemic costs of compromise could be reduced by introducing a stronger separation between ethical debate aimed at fulfilling the epistemic role of ethics, and ethical debate that aims to directly produce good policy or practice. (shrink)

Much disease and disability is the result of lifestyle behaviours. For example, the contribution of imprudence in the form of smoking, poor diet, sedentary lifestyle, and drug and alcohol abuse to ill-health is now well established. More importantly, some of the greatest challenges facing humanity as a whole – climate change, terrorism, global poverty, depletion of resources, abuse of children, overpopulation – are the result of human behaviour. In this chapter, we will explore the possibility of using advances in the (...) cognitive sciences to develop strategies to intentionally manipulate human motivation and behaviour. While our arguments apply also to improving prudential motivation and behaviour in relation to health, we will focus on the more controversial instance: the deliberate targeted use of biomedicine to improve moral motivation and behaviour. We do this because the challenge of improving human morality is arguably the most important issue facing humankind (Persson and Savulescu, forthcoming). We will ask whether using the knowledge from the biological and cognitive sciences to influence motivation and behaviour erodes autonomy and, if so, whether this makes it wrong. (shrink)

We investigate whether standard counterfactual analyses of causation imply that the outcomes of space-like separated measurements on entangled particles are causally related. Although it has sometimes been claimed that standard CACs imply such a causal relation, we argue that a careful examination of David Lewis’s influential counterfactual semantics casts doubt on this. We discuss ways in which Lewis’s semantics and standard CACs might be extended to the case of space-like correlations.

We can introduce singular terms for ordered pairs by means of an abstraction principle. Doing so proves useful for a number of projects in the philosophy of mathematics. However there is a question whether we can appeal to the abstraction principle in good faith, since a version of the Caesar Problem can be generated, posing the worry that abstraction fails to introduce expressions which refer determinately to the requisite sort of object. In this note I will pose the difficulty, and (...) then propose a solution. Since my solution appeals to a plausible constraint on the introduction of new expressions to a language, it is of interest independently of the particular case of terms for pairs. Since these provide the occasion for discussion we should nonetheless review the use of abstraction for pairs before the argumentative business of the paper commences. (shrink)

The Schwarzschild solution (Schwarzschild, 1915/16) to Einstein’s General Theory of Relativity (GTR) is accepted in theoretical physics as the unique solution to GTR for a central-mass system. In this paper I propose an alternative solution to GTR, and argue it is both logically consistent and empirically realistic as a theory of gravity. This solution is here called K-gravity. The introduction explains the basic concept. The central sections go through the technical detail, defining the basic solution for the geometric tensor, the (...) Christoffel symbols, Ricci tensor, Ricci scalar, Einstein tensor, stress-energy tensor and density-pressure for the system. The density is integrated, and some consistency properties are demonstrated. A notable feature is the disappearance of the event horizon singularity, i.e. there are no black holes. So far this is for a single central mass. A generalization of the solution for multiple masses is then proposed. This is required to support K-gravity as a viable general interpretation of gravity. Then the question of empirical tests is discussed. It is argued that current observational data is almost but not quite sufficient to verify or falsify K-gravity. The Pioneer spacecraft trajectory data is of particular interest, as this is capable of providing a test; but the data (which originally showed anomalies that match K-gravity) is now uncertain. A new and very practical experiment is proposed to settle the matter. This would provide a novel test of GTR, and a novel test of the cause of the Pioneer anomalies. In conclusion, K-gravity has extensive ramifications for gravitational physics and for the philosophy of GTR and space-time. (shrink)

In the following article I intend to examine the problem of the unity of the proposition in Russell, Frege, and Wittgenstein. My chief aim will be to draw attention to the distinction between Russell’s conception of propositional constituents, on the one hand, with Frege and Wittgenstein’s on the other. My focus will be on Russell’s view of terms as independent, propositions being built up out of these building blocks, compared with Frege and Wittgenstein’s ‘top down’ approach. Furthermore, I will argue (...) that, contra certain other commentators, Frege’s metaphor of saturation and unsaturation does not serve as a solution to the problem of unity, and that the extension of this metaphorical language to Wittgenstein is, therefore, inappropriate. (shrink)

Consciousness and evolution are complex phenomena. It is sometimes thought that if adaptation explanations for some varieties of consciousness, say, conscious visual perception, can be had, then we may be reassured that at least those kinds of consciousness are not epiphenomena. But what if other varieties of consciousness, for example, dreams, are not adaptations? We sort out the connections among evolution, adaptation, and epiphenomenalism in order to show that the consequences for the nature and causal efficacy of consciousness are not (...) as dire as has sometimes been supposed. (shrink)

The authors respond to a wide range of objections defending our argument that some forms of behaviour modification utilising advances in the cognitive sciences are desirable and need not necessarily undermine autonomy or freedom.

We propose a multi-step evaluation schema designed to help procurement agencies and others to examine the ethical dimensions of autonomous systems to be applied in the security sector, including autonomous weapons systems.

Comment on "The ethical 'elephant' in the death penalty 'room'". Arguments in defense of the death penalty typically fall into one of two groups. Consequentialist arguments point out beneficial aspects of capital punishment, normally focusing on deterrence, while non-consequentialist arguments seek to justify execution independently of its effects, for example, by appealing to the concept of retribution. Michael Keane's target article "The ethical 'elephant' in the death penalty 'room'" should, we believe, be read as an interesting new consequentialist defense of (...) physician involvement in capital punishment. (shrink)

Resident microbiota do not just shape host immunity, they can also contribute to host protection against pathogens and infectious diseases. Previous reviews of the protective roles of the microbiota have focused exclusively on colonization resistance localized within a microenvironment. This review shows that the protection against pathogens also involves the mitigation of pathogenic impact without eliminating the pathogens (i.e., “disease tolerance”) and the containment of microorganisms to prevent pathogenic spread. Protective microorganisms can have an impact beyond their niche, interfering with (...) the entry, establishment, growth, and spread of pathogenic microorganisms. More fundamentally, we propose a series of conceptual clarifications in support of the idea of a “co-immunity,” where an organism is protected by both its own immune system and components of its microbiota. -/- . (shrink)

This paper reconsiders Ockham's critique of the species theory of cognition. As Ockham understands this theory, it says that the direct objects of cognition are mental representations, or species. According to many commentators, one of Ockham's main objections to this theory was that, if the direct objects of cognition are species rather than external objects, we will never be able to establish whether or not a given species is a veridical representation of the world. In this paper I argue that (...) this line of interpretation sits uneasily with Ockham's epistemology, and offer a new interpretation of Ockham's critique of species. (shrink)

Immunology researchers are beginning to explore the possibilities of reproducibility, reuse and secondary analyses of immunology data. Open-access datasets are being applied in the validation of the methods used in the original studies, leveraging studies for meta-analysis, or generating new hypotheses. To promote these goals, the ImmPort data repository was created for the broader research community to explore the wide spectrum of clinical and basic research data and associated findings. The ImmPort ecosystem consists of four components–Private Data, Shared Data, Data (...) Analysis, and Resources—for data archiving, dissemination, analyses, and reuse. To date, more than 300 studies have been made freely available through the ImmPort Shared Data portal , which allows research data to be repurposed to accelerate the translation of new insights into discoveries. (shrink)

In this paper we discuss three examples of the appropriation of Kuhn’s ideas in philosophy of science. First we deal with classical logical empiricism. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, the arch-logical empiricist Carnap considered Kuhn’s socio-historical account as a useful complementation, and not as a threat of the philosophy of science of logical empiricism. As a second example we consider the attempt of the so-called struc- turalist philosophy of science to provide a “rational reconstruction” of Kuhn’s approach. Finally, we will deal with (...) Friedman’s proposal to apply Kuhn’s ideas to the formulation of a modernized, historically enlightened Kantian approach that is based on the concept of a non-apodictic constitutive and historically moving a priori. (shrink)

A history of representations of readers and reading acts in images (paintings, prints, drawings, postcards) from the Middle Ages to the 20th century. It includes a bibliography and 42 illustrations.

Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems are here. Technological development will see them become widespread in the near future. This is in a matter of years rather than decades. When the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons meets on 10-14th November 2014, well-considered guidance for a decision on the general policy direction for LAWS is clearly needed. While there is widespread opposition to LAWS—or ‘killer robots’, as they are popularly called—and a growing campaign advocates banning them outright, we argue the opposite. LAWS (...) may very well reduce suffering and death in war. Rather than banning them, they should be regulated, to ensure both compliance with international humanitarian law, and that this positive outcome occurs. This policy memo sets out the basic structure and content of the regulation required. (shrink)

Nagarjuna and Quantum physics. Eastern and Western Modes of Thought. Summary. The key terms. 1. Key term: ‘Emptiness’. The Indian philosopher Nagarjuna is known in the history of Buddhism mainly by his keyword ‘sunyata’. This word is translated into English by the word ‘emptiness’. The translation and the traditional interpretations create the impression that Nagarjuna declares the objects as empty or illusionary or not real or not existing. What is the assertion and concrete statement made by this interpretation? That nothing (...) can be found, that there is nothing, that nothing exists? Was Nagarjuna denying the external world? Did he wish to refute that which evidently is? Did he want to call into question the world in which we live? Did he wish to deny the presence of things that somehow arise? My first point is the refutation of this traditional translation and interpretation. 2. Key terms: ‘Dependence’ or ‘relational view’. My second point consists in a transcription of the keyword of ‘sunyata’ by the word ‘dependence’. This is something that Nagarjuna himself has done. Now Nagarjuna’s central view can be named ‘dependence of things’. Nagarjuna is not looking for a material or immaterial object which can be declared as a fundamental reality of this world. His fundamental reality is not an object. It is a relation between objects. This is a relational view of reality. Reality is without foundation. Or: Reality has the wide open space as foundation. 3. Key terms: ‘Arm in arm’. But Nagarjuna did not stop there. He was not content to repeat this discovery of relational reality. He went on one step further indicating that what is happening between two things. He gave indications to the space between two things. He realised that not the behaviour of bodies, but the behaviour of something between them may be essential for understanding the reality. This open space is not at all empty. It is full of energy. The open space is the middle between things. Things are going arm in arm. The middle might be considered as a force that bounds men to the world and it might be seen as well as a force of liberation. It might be seen as a bondage to the infinite space. 4. Key term: Philosophy. Nagarjuna, we are told, was a Buddhist philosopher. This statement is not wrong when we take the notion ‘philosophy’ in a deep sense as a love to wisdom, not as wisdom itself. Philosophy is a way to wisdom. Where this way has an end wisdom begins and philosophy is no more necessary. A.N. Whitehead gives philosophy the commission of descriptive generalisation. We do not need necessarily a philosophical building of universal dimensions. Some steps of descriptive generalisation might be enough in order to see and understand reality. There is another criterion of Nagarjuna’s philosophy. Not his keywords ‘sunyata’ and ‘pratityasamutpada’ but his 25 philosophical examples are the heart of his philosophy. His examples are images. They do not speak to rational and conceptual understanding. They speak to our eyes. Images, metaphors, allegories or symbolic examples have a freshness which rational ideas do not possess. Buddhist dharma and philosophy is a philosophy of allegories. This kind of philosophy is not completely new and unknown to European philosophy. Since Plato’s allegory of the cave it is already a little known. The German philosopher Hans Blumenberg has underlined the importance of metaphors in European philosophy. -/-. (shrink)

According to Colerus, Spinoza replied affirmatively when his landlady asked if she "...could be saved in her faith." This paper asks what Spinoza could have meant -- and what his landlady would have thought he meant. She was asking about salvation of a certain kind -- a kind that Spinoza did not in fact believe to be possible. When he talks about salvation in his writings, he has in mind a different kind of salvation -- one that his landlady will (...) certainly not achieve "in her faith." So, when he assured her that she could be saved in her faith was he simply lying to her? This question is explored against the background of the controversies regarding Spinoza's sincerity in the Tractatus Theologico-politicus. (shrink)

"No, your honor. I didn't know who or what he was when I first came across the book -- they don't exactly love him in the synagogue, if you've read the story of his life. I found it in a junkyard in a nearby town, paid a kopek, and left cursing myself for wasting money hard to come by. Later I read through a few pages and kept on going as though there were a whirlwind at my back. As I (...) say, I didn't understand every word but when you're dealing with such ideas you feel as though you were taking a witch's ride. After that I wasn't the same man. That's in a manner of speaking, of course, because I've changed little since my youth.". The speaker is Yakov Bok, the unlikely hero of Bernard Malamud's The Fixer. At this point, early in the novel, Yakov speaks truthfully when he says that he has changed little since his youth. But over the next two and a half years (the time-period covered in the novel), he will undergo profound change and impressive moral growth. He suffers; he learns; he grows. Spinoza's name and ideas appear again and again at crucial moments in the course of the hero's moral development. Yakov Bok's verbal account of Spinoza's ideas is often comically primitive, but his understanding far outstrips his ability to articulate. By the end of the novel, his sufferings have led him to a deep grasp of certain of Spinoza's ethical and political doctrines. (shrink)